ARH yet another substandard Bell performance?

[tottigol]

Or should we call this the new Bell standard?
"ARH: Bolton issues Show Cause letter; other options being studied
The US Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) for the ARH was held Tuesday and chaired by Claude Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology/Army Acquisition Executive. As a result, Bolton issued a Show Cause letter to Bell stating that the Army had no confidence in Bell's ability to execute the ARH program.
Expect a T4C (termination for convenience) soon. This leaves the future of the program in doubt and gives weight to previous reports in rotorhub.com that a OH-58D modernisation program using a different sensor system is being considered or that the Army may extend the EC145 LUH program to include an armed scout version."

[SASless]

Go to war in a EC-145? Is that not one of the objections posed by some of us when this program was being floated as being for domestic National Guard use only?

[arismount]

Everyone said the UH72 would be "domestic only." Fat chance, says I. Now the first one hasn't been on the block but about a month and already they are talking about using it in combat. If I was a betting man, I would lay odds you will see UH72's "in theater" within two years from now, doing something, I don't know what, but something.

[widgeon]

Not sure what the objection of going to war in a non US Vehicle. Army have been flying Sherpas ( built in Belfast ) for years , Air force will probably buy an Italian medium lift aicraft ( Spartan ) . Can the UH145 not be sufficiently armoured for a combat role ?. Or is it a matter of pride ?.

[H347]

Remember that the OH-58 is just an extended Jet Ranger. It was not made just for the Army initialy. The first OH type helicopter Bell proposed did not make the cut. The ARH is another attempt to reengineer the same platform (OH-58) the Army replacing. The UH145 would have to be modified for the mission, however for an off the shelf helicopter it has promise.

[tottigol]

"The UH145 would have to be modified for the mission, however for an off the shelf helicopter it has promise."

Apparently so much more than Bell's little ARH given the news above.

However that was not the point of the thread, it was Bell producing yet another abysmal product in a long string of commercial/pseudo-military slapstick performers.

If I remember correctly the ARH was to be pretty much based on an off-the-shelf airframe, then the "417" idea was born and we have all seen where that one is headed during last HAI show.

What's left for Bell?

[Lama Bear]

They have taken the 206A and the UH-1 airframes about as far as they can go but I think the 47-J just scratched the surface of stretching the 47 airframe. I expect a "NEW" Bell 47-K any day now.

[PANews]

It is almost as if 30+ years ago the US helicopter industry came out of Vietnam and gave up advancing technology.

Standing back and looking at what has happened the only real advances by what were then the major players [regardless of whether they worked out] were the development of twin-engine airframes which are arguably most suitable for the European market. The 427/429 from Bell and the 900 from McDonnell [and perhaps the S-76].

Looking at the 'USA preferred' singles they are generally little more than a range of recycles of the Vietnam era hardware. The 206, Huey and the MD500 in a number of variations. Culminating in the debacle of the 210 then the recent loss of the 417.

Overall it is the home market not exports that have been ignored and potentially let down by the US big players. It has probably only been superb customer support that kept Bell up there in the commercial market. With the pressure of a war to spring a few gaps in the infrastructure now even the military illusion is looking shaky in the shape of the ARH.

Meanwhile the Europeans have wandered in and become accepted in a small way so that when, decades down the road, they played for the big game there was little real opposition to their presence in principle. After all 'American Eurocopter' was a name beginning in the A word. Only recently was the 30 years old AStar actually made locally in its primary market. Not quite sure how Agusta got away with it though... unless everyone got to thinking it was made in Augusta GA!

The 'all new' Messerscmitt BO105, 117 and 'Augusta' 109s paved the way ... followed by their decendants to make their mark in a commercial market, there followed local production and employment that was clearly promising to outstrip [Canadian] Bell and [Dutch] MD even before East European Sikorsky reared its head.

Probably accidentally, someone in Europe has played what turns out to have been a superb end game.

[Matthew Parsons]

PANews,

Interesting fiction. Think of the following:

Chinook
Blackhawk
S76
Apache
Cobra
H53

[SASless]

The issue about the "civilian" aircraft flying in combat is a serious one. The success of the Blackhawk and AH-64 and to some extent the CH-47 and CH-53 has to do with the design criteria set forth for crash worthiness and ballistic tolerance of the aircraft. Something that is not a part of the civvie requirements.

Given the choice of flying into a hot LZ in either a Huey or a Blackhawk....the Blackhawk wins hands down.

The Huey is 50's technology and the Blackhawk is '70's technology which was based upon wartime experience in Vietnam.

[Verbatim03]

Why not the 500 damn it! It's crashworthy and the perfect scout helicopter, small, fast, nimble, somewhat quiet, great visibility, decent payload for its size. The EC-145 and maybe even the 407 are too much helicopter to be down low working with the troops 50 feet off the roof tops, it would be a suicide mission. You would think with modern technology the weight of all the computer **** from the 58D could be minimized to that of a desktop PC, plenty of room to spare for a minigun and rocket pods. What do I know though, I think I need more beer, thats what.

[PANews]

MP
Your list is nearly all military, I thought I had said home market and commercial enough times! More needed it seems. I mentioned the S76. The others are mainly beyond economic commercial use and most are the twins I was mentioning.

I am not saying I am right of course - and clearly you disagree - but its a perspective.

[TwinHueyMan]

Anyone that thinks the 206 series isn't suited for combat, wait until you see a 58 come back with more holes in it than a cabbage sifter. Those little things are dourable as hell, and have made it home with damage that would have brought down a "combat designed" blackhawk. The Kiowa guys I work with said if they could get bring the avionics and computer crap down to 21st century size like Verbatim said, and throw the sensor on the nose, it'd be pretty much be what they want. Oh, and a bigger cockpit.

I doubt the EC145 would take the job. I believe the contract stated a single? Its also a bit larger than a 58/ARH/MH-6. If they decide to dump the ARH, the only other real option I see would be an MH-6 derivative, which is also an extension of a 1950s design. Nothing wrong with it either, though.

-Mike

[rotorrookie]

They have taken the 206A and the UH-1 airframes about as far as they can go but I think the 47-J just scratched the surface of stretching the 47 airframe. I expect a "NEW" Bell 47-K any day now

bla bla bla If it works(as it does and probably will) why change it ???

[Matthew Parsons]

PANews,

Your first paragraph: "It is almost as if 30+ years ago the US helicopter industry came out of Vietnam and gave up advancing technology."

Now read my list again and determine whether your above statement is correct.
If you think it is...oh well, we disagree.

[Verbatim03]

The H-6/MD500 are such a great helicopters, their design although old seems like such incredible insight was put into maintenance, reconfigurability, survivability, and simplicity. I don't know the status of MD Helicopters right now but I wouldn't be surprised if they did not get the contract only because of their recent struggles.

[Lama Bear]

Rotorrookie..

Why change it? Because Bell is losing it's customer base. Eurocopter outsells Bell world wide. Several recent competitions haven't even allowed Bell to be considered, Bell 210 for example. Now the ARH is going to be taken back. The 417 program has just been cancelled. The Indian military recently dis-allowed Bell products from competition for lack of altitude performance. The EC-120 has totally taken the 206B market away from Bell. Two years ago Bell only delivered 7 new 206B-III's. Are you starting to see a trend here?

[PANews]

MP

I think our 'argument' is a fine line. Almost everything we write on a forum can be pulled to pieces because we have not had enough time to consider the nuances of every word. Perhaps it was an over simplification of the situation on my part, but even some of those in your list have been sniped at in the past for being old and tired. But this is really a Bell item even if the others are being mentioned. The MD500 is fine but only really if it were selling well alongside the newer products from the same company, the trouble is that no newer products were ever developed. And Bell is similar [pending the 429].

If only I was the only one here blasting Bell for sleeping on duty!!

[SASless]

If you make a better mousetrap.....and all that!:uhoh:

The EC folks are doing something right whereas Bell seems to have dropped the ball.

Even the US Army is shying away from Bell....must be the VP Jobs and Board seats are better paid at Sikorsky, Boeing-Vertol, and Eurocopter. The Gen Gen's know how to make a buck after retiring.

[hotzenplotz]

Bell's friends rescue ARH

By BOB COX

Posted on Fri, Mar. 23, 2007

Bell Helicopter, faced with losing a $4 billion Army helicopter contract, called friends in high places and gained an 11th-hour stay of execution.
A trade publication reported Thursday that Army officials decided to cancel Bell's contract to develop the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter outright but were overruled after the company received help from political supporters.
Inside Defense reported that acting Army Secretary Pete Geren, a former Democratic congressman from Fort Worth, interceded with his subordinates and gave Bell 30 days to submit a plan to fix the troubled program.
After a high-level meeting of Army officials Tuesday, Assistant Army Secretary Claude Bolton called Bell Chief Executive Richard Millman and told him that the contract was being terminated, according to several sources who declined to be identified because of their relationships with Bell and the Army. Bell officials, believing that they had not gotten a fair hearing, called area politicians. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, called Geren, the sources said.
A spokesman in Hutchison's office declined to comment on the matter. Army officials did not respond to questions.
After Geren weighed in, the Army's aviation program office transmitted a notice to Bell late Wednesday ordering the company to stop work on the program and submit a plan within 30 days "which describes a strategy that maximizes contract performance while minimizing negative cost and schedule impact to the government."
Bell spokesman Mike Cox said company officials are confident that they can address the Army's concerns and retain the contract.
"We are preparing a package that we, Bell, think represents the best path forward on the continued development of the ARH," Cox said. "Bell's commitment to the ARH remains strong."
During the next 30 days, if the Army approves, Cox said that "Bell and several of our key suppliers plan to continue development work at our own [expense]."
Bell won the $210 million contract to develop the ARH in mid-2005 with a proposal to turn its civilian model 407 helicopter into an armed aircraft capable of performing missions now handled by the Army's aging fleet of Bell OH-58D Kiowa Warrior aircraft. Four prototypes have been flown, including one that crashed in Mansfield last month, but development work is more than a year behind schedule and Bell is $100 million or more over budget.
Instead of getting enough aircraft to outfit an operational squadron by fall 2008, the Army now says it would be December 2009. And Bell has said it would lose between $2 million and $4 million per aircraft on the initial 48 helicopters at the contract price.
Brig. Gen. Steven Mundt, the Army's chief of aviation programs, said the service is ready and willing to listen to Bell's suggestions on how it will speed delivery and cut the cost. He said the cost could reach $10 million per aircraft, up from the contract price of $5.5 million for the initial 12 helicopters.
"The operative word is that the Army is 'concerned,'" Mundt said in an interview with Bloomberg News. "We fully support getting this airplane, but we want them to come to us and tell us, no kidding, what we are going to do. If it's not within the limits, we can't continue on that course. We've got to find someplace else to go."
Mundt said Bell Helicopter's contract "absolutely can be" terminated if the company can't make a compelling case.
"Our hope is that Bell is absolutely going to come with Textron and say: 'Hey, guys, sorry for any confusion. We got it. The program is good, and we're moving forward,'" Mundt said, "but we are not going to allow cost escalation like this, schedule escalation like this."
Bell spokesman Cox said the test aircraft "have accumulated over 500 flight hours in less than two years" and have "met several important milestones and won accolades from Army test pilots."
The Army contract is just one of several Bell programs of concern to military and civilian Pentagon leaders.
Inside Defense also reported Thursday that, according to internal Navy documents, Pentagon officials are planning to shift work that Bell was slated to perform on the next-generation presidential helicopter to England.
Bell is a partner in the Lockheed Martin-led team that won the contract two years ago to build a much-modified version of the AgustaWestland US101 helicopter to serve as the primary presidential transport.
AgustaWestland and Bell formed a partnership to build the helicopters, which were to be assembled by Bell in Amarillo.
Cox said he had no information about the status of the presidential helicopter program and could not comment.
Inside Defense said that given Bell's other problems Navy officials are worried about the likelihood of cost increases and schedule delays on the high-priority and highly visible program. Navy officials, the report said, now want Italian helicopter manufacturer AgustaWestland to build the helicopters itself.
The helicopters will then be turned over to Lockheed, which will install communications and defensive systems.
Navy spokesman John Milliman said he could not confirm or deny the report.
Navy officials have been openly critical of Bell for more than a year over continuing problems with costs and delivery delays on the Marine Corps H-1 helicopter program.
Three test versions of the presidential helicopter and five initial production helicopters are to be built at AgustaWestland's facilities in Yeovil, England.
The test aircraft are all scheduled to be flying this year, and the Navy's contract calls for the first five production helicopters to be ready for service by late 2009. http://www.star-telegram.com/100/v-print/story/45513.html

[SASless]

Hmmmmmmm....wonder what happened to the Commanche jigs and airframes? At least that program was going to be state of the art.:rolleyes:

At Ten Million Bucks per copy for the ARH (aka 407) the thing is beginning to sound a lot like the Osprey and its unique Jeep.:{

Bell must pay politicians well.:=

[B Sousa]

"Bell must pay politicians well."

Does that surprise anyone, why do you think they spend millions to get elected to a low paying job.

[diethelm]

Boeing has the the intellecual property rights to build the enhanced mission little bird and as such, would be the provider to the Army.

[turboshaft]

U.S. Department of Defense
IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 874-08
October 16, 2008
Dod Announces Non-Certification Of Armed Reconaissance Helicopter Program

Today, the Department of Defense notified the Congress and the contractor, Bell Helicopter, that it will not certify the U.S. Army Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program for continuation.

John Young, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, in consultation with senior Defense and Army officials, has determined that the fundamental cost and schedule basis underlying award of the ARH contract is no longer valid.

The ARH contract was awarded for an expected development cost of $359 million and a procurement average unit cost of $8.56 million. Currently, DoD estimates that development will cost $942 million and the procurement average unit cost will be $14.48 million. Delivery of ARH to the Army was originally scheduled to take place by 2009, but the current projection is for 2013.

“Rather than continue this program”, Young said, “I have decided that the best course of action is to provide the Army with an opportunity to define a coherent, disciplined Kiowa Warrior helicopter replacement program, and to obtain more rigorous contract terms for its development.”

Secretary of the Army Pete Geren stated, “The cost and schedule that were the focus of the decision to award the contract to Bell Helicopter are no longer valid. We have a duty to the Army and the taxpayer to move ahead with an alternative course of action to meet this critical capability for our Soldiers at the best price and as soon as possible.”

[Hilife]

Ouch!!!

I suspect that when John Young draws open his bedroom curtains first thing this morning, there’ll likely be an AH/MH-6 Little Bird parked on the lawn with a whole host of Boeing reps smiling and offering hot coffee and bagels.

Without the ARH and V-22 orders, you have to wonder whether Bell were about to weld the hangar doors shut for good.

[Freewheel]

There is but one ray of hope - we know him well.

[Dan Reno]

Huh!?

Bell trying to get away with another Osprey-like, do nothing, go nowhere program. I guess Army leadership really does trump Marine 'leadership'.

Even Nick couldn't pull-off this hat trick!

Mark this one down for the tax-payers (at last)!

[Lt.Fubar]

The whole ARH thing looks like a death trap, first Sikorsky, now Bell... who's next ? Boeing?

[Shawn Coyle]

I'm not so sure it's entirely Bell's fault. I'll bet when the investigating gets done that the Army is going to look not so good. These are the same folks that couldn't get the Commanche to production - kept moving the goal posts.
Nearly all the other US military services have a specialist 'procurement' classification (waiting for the obvious jokes), but the Army is still in the 'soldier first, aviator second' mode.
This is serious, expensive business and it needs to have the right sort of people in the military. Long story, and I'm not sure it could ever get properly told.

[Aser]

Here comes Boeing to the contract... :E

lovely little bird...

http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2008/photorelease/q4/MSF08-2231-1_sm.jpg

-- The Boeing Company [NYSE: BA] today announced a new rotorcraft program, the AH-6 light attack/reconnaissance helicopter.

Designed on a combat-proven platform with a heritage of successful service with Special Operations, the AH-6 is designed to meet the current requirements of international military customers while maintaining flexibility for future growth.

"Boeing has been approached by several potential customers seeking light attack and reconnaissance capabilities in a flexible rotorcraft platform," Dave Palm, director of Boeing Rotorcraft Business Development, said today at the Association of the United States Army's annual convention in Washington, D.C. "We believe this system is a perfect fit for those customers seeking long endurance, proven performance and 2,000-pound payload within an affordable helicopter."

The AH-6 features an Electro-Optical/Infrared forward-looking sight system as well as a mount for weapons that have been qualified on the aircraft, including Hellfire missiles, the M260 seven-shot rocket pod, a machine gun and a mini-gun integrated with a sensor system. A communications package allows the AH-6 to connect to other aircraft and to ground stations.

Boeing will produce the AH-6 at its Rotorcraft Systems facility in Mesa, Ariz., and will draw on that organization's existing secure supply base to ensure on-time, on-cost delivery


Regards
Aser

[Dan Reno]

U.S. Army vows to do better with next helicopter

Wed Nov 19, 2008 11:07am EST


WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Army Secretary Pete Geren said the service had learned important lessons from a canceled $6.2 billion armed reconnaissance helicopter led by Textron Inc Bell Helicopter unit.
"It's a case study in how things can go wrong," Geren said on Tuesday after a speech to the Center for National Policy, a Washington-based think tank.
"There were lessons learned for industry and government," Geren told Reuters after the event. "And we will do better this time." He did not elaborate on how the new program would differ.
The Pentagon canceled the Textron program last month after the cost of each helicopter soared nearly 70 percent to $14.5 million. Chief arms buyer John Young said it would be better to start from scratch than continue the existing program.
The Army is currently seeking industry input for a new Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program that will likely include offers from Boeing Co, Sikorsky Aircraft, a unit of United Technologies Corp, AgustaWestland, a unit of Italy's Finmeccanica and EADS.
Army officials have said Bell was welcome to bid as well, but they noted that past performance would be a key factor in assessing bids in the new program.
On Tuesday, Geren said the Army still urgently needed a replacement for its OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet.
The Kiowas, now numbering 342, are the most heavily used Army helicopter in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the oldest.
The Army now plans to spend nearly $800 million make the existing Kiowa fleet "safe, suitable and reliable" and keep it operating until 2020 as a bridge to the next helicopter.
A senior Army official last month said the prime factor driving up Bell's costs had been the cost of labor and materials after the company dropped plans to manufacture the air frame in Canada and fly it to Texas for military outfitting.
(Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Maureen Bavdek)

[heli1]

" A case study in how things can go wrong "

1) take an underpowered off the shelf commercial helicopter
2) add new unproven engine
3) add new rotors and uopgrade transmission
4)add new unproven avionics and sensors
5) pretend it is still off the shelf
6) christen it Arapaho
7) keep developing and spending money,even when it is obvious it won't work
8) EUREKA !

...or a case study in how things can go right...

1) take an off the shelf commercial helicopter
2) carry out minimum modifications
3) christen it Lakota
4) put in production ahead of schedule and within budget !

[usmc helo]

InsideDefense.com NewsStand (http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/cs_newsletters.asp?NLN=ARMY)

Report Catalogs Many Problems with Armed Recon Helicopter ProgramSource: Inside the Army
Publication date: 2009-04-27
Arrival time: 2009-05-01
By Kate Brannen

The Army unwisely bypassed more feasible and less costly alternatives in choosing the "better of two risky proposals" for its Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program, according to a new report that catalogs numerous problems with the terminated effort and offers lessons for future helicopter acquisitions.
The ARH program, canceled in October due to cost and schedule overruns, experienced a wide range of problems that began even before the prime contractor came on board, according to a new report from the Army Audit Agency.
The report places most of the blame on the service and its management of the program from start to finish, contending the Army "extended a program with little or no chance of success."
However, in a memo that accompanies the report, Brig. Gen. William Crosby, program executive officer for aviation, contends that the report contains some inaccuracies and highlights problems that originated with ARH's contractor, Bell Helicopter Textron.
The Army Audit Agency invited the company to participate in the review, it states, but company officials declined. Bell Helicopter also declined to comment for this story.
The Army Audit Agency performed the after-action review to determine what went wrong with ARH for the benefit of other acquisition programs and "for the Army's use in developing an acquisition strategy to meet its manned ARH requirement," states the report. It is dated January but was not approved for public release until April.
The review found that the program's cost and schedule overruns were due to mistakes made early on in the acquisition process, the pressure to field a capability quickly and the fact that when risks were discovered they were not well reported and the proper officials were not made aware.
The wrong turns made at the beginning of the program were numerous, AAA contends. While the operational requirements for ARH were officially approved, the essential capabilities identified were not "fully supported by rigorous analysis," states the report.
The most problematic requirement was the key performance parameter that required a weight light enough so that two ARHs could be carried by a C-130 aircraft. The KPP also stated the helicopters had to be debarked, reassembled and flown within 15 minutes.
A 2007 Center for Naval Analysis report, used by the Army Audit Agency to carry out its review, questioned the necessity behind the C-130 requirement, stating it would likely only apply to special operations forces and that it would limit competition to single-engine aircraft.
After C-130s were armored and made heavier, it became clear that the larger C-17 aircraft would likely be used instead. However, Army leaders were reluctant to go through the lengthy process of revising ARH requirements and delay the schedule for fielding the helicopter, according to the report.
"Also, we found some indications that the KPP was developed, at least in part, to limit competition, shorten the contracting process, and increase the likelihood of meeting aggressive program schedule goals," states the AAA report.
Additionally, the report said the low-rate initial production cost of $5.2 million per aircraft was not valid for the selected acquisition strategy.
The Army derived the figure from the cost of its preferred platform for ARH, the Mission-Enhanced Little Bird. However, in the estimate, the service left out costs for assembly facilities and program management activities that with ARH would need to be performed by the contractor.
"Contractors were expected to incur these costs and still produce the initial 38 ARHs at $5.2 million each," states the report.
According to the 2007 CNA report, the required LRIP cost had the effect of eliminating all but two of the eight companies that expressed interest during the initial market survey.
The audit agency blames the LRIP cost goal, the restrictive KPP and the perception that the Army preferred the MELB helicopter as the reasons behind the limited competition.
The report also faults the Army for making the wrong choice for a platform that would meet the ARH operational requirements and schedule.
While a non-developmental, commercial off-the-shelf airframe was deemed a feasible option, an analysis of alternatives found that a product improvement program for the existing OH-58D Kiowa Warrior aircraft was "the most economical alternative, met all KPPs and had the least technical and program risk."
However, the Army went ahead with a "modified off-the-shelf airframe integrated with non-developmental mission equipment packages," according to the report.
"Army personnel stated they didn't select the OH-58D KW PIP option because it was based on using a 20-plus-year-old airframe with fatigue issues and the need for replacing future OH 58D KW combat losses," states the report.
However, modifying an off-the-shelf airframe proved to be far more complex and work-intensive than originally envisioned, according to the report, which lists the many changes that were required for the existing aircraft.
The goal at the outset was to use non-developmental mission equipment packages for the helicopter. However, according to the report, "developmental efforts were inevitable."
In addition to the flawed decisions made early in the program, the pressure to field a capability quickly led to cutting corners during the contracting process, according to the report.
Urgent requirements for aircraft to replace OH-58D Kiowa Warriors lost in combat "caused the acquisition community to focus more on meeting the fielding schedule than effectively managing the business aspects of the program," states the report.
That urgency also led the Army to limit the involvement of defense acquisition personnel, according to the review.
The source-selection process was abbreviated to less than six months and the evaluation of proposals was done on paper because there was no time to inspect facilities or prototypes, reports the audit agency.
During this time, source-selection personnel realized that a non-developmental, commercial off-the-shelf aircraft that would meet ARH requirements did not exist and that both proposals under evaluation would require "extensive development of components and integration risks," states the report.
However, to meet the fielding schedule, the source-selection authority decided to go with "the better of the two risky proposals."
The report also faults the ARH contractor, Bell Helicopter, for not ramping up its staff and facilities after receiving the contract award. For these reasons, miscalculations were made on cost and schedule, the report states.
"If the source-selection process had been more thorough, it may have determined that the contractor couldn't perform within the proposed costs and required schedule," states the report.
Exacerbating these problems, neither the company nor the program manager clearly understood the contract specifications, according to the report. This led to increased program risks and an increase in contract cost from $210 million in July 2005 to a revised cost of $589 million in April 2008.
Finally, the report states that while risks were identified, they were not properly assessed, mitigated or reported.
"Specifically, significant risks identified before and during the first year after contract award weren't adequately reported to Army acquisition leaders in a timely manner," states the report. "This may have extended a program with little or no chance of success."
According to the report, Bell Helicopter reported airworthiness specification and weight as elements at risk as early as November 2005, but the program office did not include these risks in its assessments during that period.
The report partly blames an Army acquisition culture that encourages program managers to move forward despite clear warning signs.
"The Army needs to provide incentives for PEOs and PMs to recommend terminating acquisition programs early in development when termination is in the best interest to the Army," states the report.
It also recommends greater involvement from the Army's acquisition office, which, the report states, is in a better position to oppose the overly optimistic reporting from the program office.
The report makes a number of other recommendations, including the advice that the Army should avoid the perception of a preferred alternative.
Also, "the Army should thoroughly evaluate any strategies to acquire weapon platforms for warfighting operations using a commercial off-the-shelf approach," states the report. And the service "must fully understand the extent of system modifications needed to make the commercial system able to perform in wartime operations."
The Army said it agreed with most of the report's findings.
"The U.S. Army concurs with the results of the review and will endeavor to incorporate the recommendations and lessons learned into current and future programs," wrote Dean Popps, the Army acquisition executive, in a Jan. 16 letter attached to the report.
Crosby, on the other hand, raised some objections to the report and places more blame with the contractor.
"The report covers [system development and demonstration] related management and decisions in depth but does not thoroughly address the primary cause for termination which was significant increases in both Army and OSD cost estimates, which used the contractor's figures as the basis of the estimate," he writes.
The initial cost and schedule growth was a direct result of the contractor underestimating how much it would cost to design and built the prototype aircraft, he writes.
When it comes to assessing risk, Crosby writes that discrepancies between program baselines might lead to the conclusion that risk was not adequately reported, but he maintains that "the PM was diligent, forthright and timely in reporting as problems emerged with both SDD and production estimates." In conclusion, Crosby writes that the AAA report is a valuable tool as the Army moves forward to meet its manned reconnaissance capability gap.

[JohnDixson]

"WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Army Secretary Pete Geren said the service had learned important lessons from a canceled $6.2 billion armed reconnaissance helicopter led by Textron Inc Bell Helicopter unit.
"It's a case study in how things can go wrong," Geren said on Tuesday after a speech to the Center for National Policy, a Washington-based think tank.
"There were lessons learned for industry and government," Geren told Reuters after the event. "And we will do better this time." He did not elaborate on how the new program would differ."

Secretary Geren may well have addressed those same remarks to the Comanche Program.

It surprises me that after the Army's experience with the UTTAS competition, wherein a full fly-off, with two operational/tactical and one engineering aircraft per manufacturer competed utilizing Army pilots and maintainers ( with manufacturers assistance ), they have not resorted to that practice as standard.

Thanks,
John Dixson

[500e]

I bet Lynn is having a smile

[Shawn Coyle]

I agree with John Dixson's comments - why doesn't the Army have fly-offs. The Air Force had fly-offs for both the F-22 and F-35 programs at significantly higher costs than it would have cost the Army for this program.
And we wonder why helicopter programs in the US are in such a state.