Chinook HC3s - Why has it all gone so quiet?

[Jackonicko]

At one stage, it seemed as though the Chinook Fix-to-Field programme at last had some impetus behind it. That an unnamed Southampton-based company had unsuccessfully competed with DARA Fleetlands to win the contract to embody Thales Top Deck avionics on the eight HC3s. That we might expect Main Gate in the early part of 2007.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=109805

But it's all gone terribly quiet again, and the eight HC3s (or perhaps just seven of them, with the eighth in Wilmington, Delaware) remain mouldering in the sheds at Boscombe, unflown since 2005.

So what's going on?

Has someone grown big enough gonads to take the decision that the risk involved in simply putting these aircraft into service (taking Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation on the chin) is a risk worth taking?

Or has someone decided that validating the aircraft to a previous standard is good enough?

Or has someone found some way of validating the Software to today's standards?

Or is the fix-to-field programme going ahead - just very quietly?

Or is someone sitting back and procrastinating?

[DoctorStrangecab]

Having had Reds and Greens on chinooks and then moving to the DPA ...where I was sighted on QuinetiQs concerns...the technical reservations were only marginally credible.

The revised Def Stan 56, that I saw in draft at that time-2004, would have allowed for the receiving IPT Ldr to sign off these aircraft so that they could enter service at 'prudent' risk.

Dont know what's happened since then...but as a CEng I would have been happy to accept them and there is a de-facto body of evidence (from other Boeing customers) to support the required safety case.

Bottom line..no idea for the delay

[VuctoredThrest]

There is frantic activity taking place behind the scenes to get an 'affordable' solution to the Fix-To Field proposal. So they will be ready any decade now.

[Safeware]

Dr Strangecab,

Without deep insight into what was going on in the minds of those involved, things aren't so easy to brush off.

Although on a different aircraft, I too have held reds and greens. I too am a CEng. I have also been involved in the RTS process. Having reds and greens on type does not give you all the knowledge that you need to assess whether or not a fleet of aircraft is safe to bring into service. Nor does being a CEng. Having reds and greens only gives you some experience, being a CEng only the opportunity to exercise your duties with responsibility.

Yes, it is the responsibility of the Duty Holder as to whether they accept the risk. Obviously they felt that the case was not made. What 'other Boeing customers' think may be of little relevance if Boeing themselves cannot demonstrate that their product is safe.

sw

[DoctorStrangecab]

Dear Safeware, all you say is indeed true...but I was there as the scrutineer, and although I can't read minds I can read documents.

In my present post I am about to accept/sign off a new Mk of aircraft...so I know what is involved. ....no brush-off intended to anyone...but prudent and informed risk taking is the order of the day. Regds

[Navaleye]

Last I heard they were going to Fleetlands to have a new cockpit installed. What a waste of money.

[Safeware]

Dr Stangecab,
prudent and informed risk taking is the order of the day Indeed! Those that are particularly risk averse are just as bad as those who are gung-ho.
Best wishes with the new aircraft.
sw

[Safety_Helmut]

Having had Reds and Greens on chinooks
so what ?
the technical reservations were only marginally credible.

interesting choice of words
The revised Def Stan 56, that I saw in draft at that time-2004, would have allowed for the receiving IPT Ldr to sign off these aircraft so that they could enter service at 'prudent' risk.
and prey tell why you believe this to be the case ?
but as a CEng I would have been happy to accept them
As a CEng you are displaying quite a flippant/ill-informed attitude to the subject. Have a read of some of the other pprune threads about peoples attitudes to the current risks the MoD is running within its aircraft fleets.

By the way the revised Def Stan that you refer to was published quite some time ago, look it up ! There are a few changes to what you probably saw, but it's essentially the same.

Safety_Helmut

[BossEyed]

... and there is a de-facto body of evidence (from other Boeing customers) to support the required safety case.

In fact, and unfortunately, this suggests to the reader that the system design is a Boeing standard and in service with other users around the world.

This is not correct - the HC3 architecture is unique and hence no such body of evidence can and does exist.

Dr Strangecab, this should have been immediately obvious to an intimately involved scrutineer. It is fundamental to the situation that now prevails.

[DoctorStrangecab]

Helmut, flippant? ....as you call it...

BossEyes...there was nothing unique (to the MOD) about the source code running the HC3's system.


Shall we stop wibbling now and perhaps do you know what has happened since '04?

[Safeware]

Dr Strangecab,

Nothing unique maybe, but if you pick bits from here, bits from there because you are doing COTS you make it very difficult to pull together a safety case that says 'this design standard, composed of these items, when integrated together, has a safety case that demonstrates an acceptable level of safety in this operating environment'.

When the MOD sets its own rules, it has to be prepared to live by them.

And as the saying goes, an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

sw

[DoctorStrangecab]

Its midnight here and the details escape me now but.....you said..

"you pick bits from here, bits from there"

Errrrrrr we do actually, by principle of modular qualification and there is a agreed standard for it........

....need sleep zzz

[Safeware]

Don't have the info to hand, but think that the Mk3 contract pre-dates (or excludes?) modular avionics standards as we now know them.

sw

[pulse1]

When the MOD sets its own rules, it has to be prepared to live by them.


And our servicemen have to be prepared to die by them, apparently.

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

But it's OK pulse cos that damn clever techie chap has told us so:ugh:

all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced

[DoctorStrangecab]

SAFEWARE- exactly, the problem was with the contracting and not the resulting technical solution that was supplied.

HELMUT- why prey do I believe that the new Def Stan 56 would have allowed us to accept the ac despite QuinetiQs reservations....because I specifically asked the drafter of the document; albeit no criticism whatsoever of the IPT should be inferred.:O

[phil gollin]

Very simplistically, the HC.3s are/were meant to be SF orientated (?) so if the requirement was for ordinary supply helicopters (which everyone seems to be crying out for) would it be easier to qualify them, and then buy a "proper" SF Chinook version and transfer any special equipment over ?

[tucumseh]

As the Def Stan (Part 2) states, most emphatically, “THIS GUIDANCE IS NOT MANDATORY”. How safety management is implemented on a given project is left up to the IPT.

It follows that, as usual, the MoD describes very well WHAT safety is, but doesn’t offer any practical advice on HOW to do it. Even if the IPT were afforded the resources to appoint a Safety Manager (or Risk Manager for that matter), it is unlikely he’d actually get anywhere just by reading this Def Stan. For example, what to do when a senior officer gleefully points out it is not mandatory and uses this as his excuse for knowingly leaving the aircraft unsafe. (For those who haven’t experienced this, you ignore him, make the aircraft safe and take your punishment. Or you do what you’re told, get your promotion and brick it for the rest of your career waiting for a call).

It concentrates on delivering safety but, notably, does not cross refer to the Def Stan which outlines the procedures for maintaining safety through life. It has long been practice to ignore the latter but I wonder if this indicates it is now policy?

Getting back to the main topic, Mk3. Oh, just read the above.


(Edit) Perhaps worth pointing out the analogy to the Boscombe advice issue, where accepting this is not mandatory. However, only a complete idiot would ignore it. We have already heard that Boscombe advice was ignored on Mk3. This then only leaves the question, what idiots were responsible and did they routinely condone safety advice being ignored? (Yes).

[Jackonicko]

While there is clearly some body of opinion that seems to endorse the current position

"that the HC.Mk 3 should not be released to service because the software cannot be adequately verified"

at the same time, many of those closely involved with the programme (engineers, TPs, etc) believe that Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation should be noted, but that this aircraft should still enter service, because the degree of risk is such that it can be prudently accepted.

Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?

Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?

Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?

[tucumseh]

J

“Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?”

The Def Stans aren’t mandatory, so with all due respect J, the question is academic. You have to ask what standards the Directorate (not IPT) applied to the contract, were they adhered to, was QA/QC robust, were the risks identified, mitigation plans put in place etc etc. (If you’re of a mind, ask who the Risk, Quality, Safety, Standardisation and Configuration Control Managers were. What??!!). And, in the context of your question, did the risks that were identified and ignored, materialise.

However, you also have to realise there are two distinct “acceptance” phases – off contract and into Service. Clearly, if the two are not considered as part of an integrated process, you get a situation where a contract is paid off, but the Service (and often other PMs) refuses to accept it because of outstanding airworthiness issues. This is quite common and was deemed acceptable by the MoD(PE) hierarchy at the time. Still is, depending on who the PM is. It is NOT deemed acceptable by PMs or Users who understand the question, or Boscombe. You may find that the real issues on Mk3 are (a) nervousness caused by Mull, where Boscombe’s warnings and recommendations were ignored, and (b) the answer to the question why far more complex programmes were delivered concurrently and with effortless competence by the same Directorate.


“Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?”

Can’t speak for Typhoon, but “yes” on Mk2. Also, of course, the SEM system almost guarantees that many in-service aircraft would not pass the Boscombe test and, like Mk2, do not have a seamless airworthiness audit trail back to the TI and PI a/c.


“Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?”

This IS considered and understood in DPA, but in my experience the issue is deemed a political one and outside the boundary of responsibility of those in DPA/DPO who deliver and maintain airworthiness. The issue also arises in other domains (infantry, ships etc). It is the “How much value do you place on a man’s life” question – and that is quite definitely political. It is for DPA/DLO/Users to present the evidence to the decision making machine. Where the issue is obvious you would expect it to have already been addressed by DEC in their original risk register, which they pass on to DPA. Trouble is, I’ve never known a DEC to satisfy this basic mandatory requirement, so DPA are playing catch up on risk from Day 1, and if the mitigation costs money (which of course they haven’t been given because DEC haven’t identified and hence costed the risk in the first place) then something else has to give.

Hope this helps. It’s a short answer. You raise some good points.

[VuctoredThrest]

Reminds me of a story known as 'Nero fiddling while Rome burns'.

[tucumseh]

And Nero played his fiddle like a bowman in the heat of battle
Faster than a fever
And he paid no heed to Standards, he moved against the flow
Like a salmon in a river
And those who were carried along by his flowing notes
Followed him all over
For Nero had the lust and the passion for promotion
Coursing through his fingers


Sorry VT, my sense of humour. With apologies to the late Davy Steele.

[Jackonicko]

So is it over-simplistic to suggest that we're about to spend £130 m or so to fit new avionics to eight cabs that don't actually need them, except to solve the problem that no-one has costed a theoretical and unquantifiable (but not indicated or suspected) risk with the current avionics?

That we are about to do so in the face of opinion from the TPs that the aircraft should enter service 'as is', and in the face of the opinion of blokes like Dr Strangecab that these risks could be 'prudently' accepted?

That this is, in part, due to a culture of risk aversion in the IPT which may be, in part, an inevitable function of the Mull incident?

Would we be refusing to give the HC2s an MAR on similar grounds if doing so did not entail grounding the entire fleet?

[Autorev]

Yes Jackonicko, you're quite correct... the risk is indeed "unquantifiable".
How then do you suggest that the individual who underwrites that risk, ie ACAS, decides whether that risk is acceptable (or not) and that the ac merits a RTS?
Do you not accept that an accident where the cause is not positively determined, would have every man and his dog wanting somebody's head on a plate as "the ac were unsafe....BD said so years ago."
The ac can indeed be flown, however it was decided that introducing the 8 ac for an expected 40yrs required the problems to be addressed, hence 'Fix to Field'.
Hopefully, there should be more news in the New Year , and then everyone can start having a go at the programme schedule- You've got to think there are too many wannabe DPA employees on this forum judging from the comments above!

[hobie]

An answer straight from the top .....

http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2006-12-11a.107236.h

[Jackonicko]

Autorev

That would be all well and good if an 'unacceptable' recommendation from Boscomber always meant no RTS from ACAS.

But it doesn't. ACAS can, does, and has signed MAR's for aircraft deemed unacceptable by Boscombe Down.

If an aircraft can get an RTS/MAR without Boscombe's formal recommendation, then there is no automatic blanket answer, and it has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

So why not the Chinook HC3?

[Chugalug2]

That this is, in part, due to a culture of risk aversion in the IPT which may be, in part, an inevitable function of the Mull incident?

Would we be refusing to give the HC2s an MAR on similar grounds if doing so did not entail grounding the entire fleet?

I'm not clear what might be exercising the minds of the IPT as regards the Mull incident. Surely this was exhaustively investigated by an RAF BOI, and then by two very senior RAF officers in the direct Chain of Command. Was it not their finding that the pilots had operated with Gross Negligence, and that this was the sole reason for the accident? Is it not the case that there was found no probable technical cause for this accident, and that the IPT, Group, Strike Command, MOD, Boeing and all other interested parties can therefore rest easy and sleep soundly knowing that blame has been laid fairly and squarely at the feet of the deceased guilty parties? Or is there now the most cynical double think going down here, whereby the innocent are deemed guilty and the guilty get off scot-free?

[Autorev]

An unacceptable MAR recommendation from an Independent Safety Advisor needs some pretty good mitigation in order to receive a RTS. In this case such mitigation was not forthcoming. If anybody feels that they could provide such evidence that would satisfy the process by which the IPT is required to adhere, well they should submit the GEMS and be several pounds richer!;)
Service Deviation/ TCs or CLEs can and have been provided in the case of UORs where there have been unacceptable MAR comment, however that is not what is required for the Mk3 Chinook.
Remember also that it is not just one single Unacceptable comment but a host of them that is being addressed by Fix to Field.

[Mr-AEO]

Permit me to be naïve for just a moment - in counter to the accusations.

Would not the many clever people who work within our organisation have thought of all that before committing themselves to a circa £150M upgrade?

Or, as some appear to be suggesting, are we that crap at doing this sort of thing, that the only answer is to modify ourselves out of the frying pan? Note: F2F not only meets the airworthiness need, it also addresses a whole host of obsolescence and future issues. E.g – by setting the standard for a Thales Top Deck now, we could be shaping the future cockpit of the Mk2. (Notwithstanding CAAS).

Further, set against the backdrop of real funding pressure over the next few years, I’m sure that a good many senior people have already ‘been there’ and questioned the need for this expenditure especially given the lift shortfall.

Anyway, if Santa gave the MOD 20 Chinooks on 25 Dec, I would be guessing that we wouldn’t have the aircrew to fly them…..

[Two_Squirrels]

With respect to Jackanicko (and to test pilots!), test pilots are not the be all and end all in the world of flight test. Just beccause one or two tps MAY have said that the Chinook Mk 3 is safe, doesn't make it so; they are not necessarily the experts in system design or safety engineering for example. Most of the safety guys, engineers, FTEs, and indeed the IPT agree that the Mk 3 were potentially unsafe. Perhspas the risks are small, but equally, they could be huge. Many different tactics and philosophies were investigated to try and get the aircraft into service. The fact of the matter is that there were a number of areas where the risk was unquantifiable. In some areas the risk WAS quantifiable, and they were STILL assessed as unacceptable. I can only imagine the furore if a Mk 3 had crashed due to a software failure that resulted in misleading (or non existent) attitude information in instrument flight, or if the AFCS had suffered a dual lane runaway at low level, or if the transmission system had sufffered a catastrophic failure due to an unknown number of torque exceedances. And yes, perhaps some aircraft have entered service with unacceptable deficiciencies, but either mitigation was applied, or at least the MAR was signed off by someone who was aware of the risks. Neither of these options were possible on the Mk 3 (and yes, they were investigated).

P.S. I was NOT involved in ANY way with the Mk 3 procurement or evaluation!

[Safeware]

I think that part of the rationale behind someone not just saying 'oh bu99er this, get on and fly them' is one of the central aspects of holding an airworthiness responsibility. If you get to the point of having the evidence to say 'stop doing x', either by limitation (and for the sake of politics I've seen some strict limitations) or by grounding aircraft, you actually have to have an idea of how you are going to get yourself out of that hole. This occurs for at least 2 reasons: 1. You're going to have to justify why you took such extreme action to someone with long trousers. 2. You have to know when you have got yourself to the point where you know (ie have the evidence) that the problem is resolved. So, for Mk 3, this resolution is F2F. It's pointless getting hung up on the history (whatever your viewpoint, it's happened), the focus needs to be on the resolution.

oh, t_s, "the MAR was signed off by someone who was aware of the risks" - you'd like to think so, but I know of at least one situation where this wasn't the case because of dilution of opinion, rather than acceptance of the truth, as things went up the chain. A bit like that story about a crock of **** becoming policy (wish I could remember it all).


sw

[ORAC]

The Times January 10, 2007
£100m to make Chinooks safe
Michael Evans

WHITEHALL The Ministry of Defence is to spend more than £100 million updating eight Chinook helicopters that have been grounded since they were bought from the United States for £252 million 12 years ago.

The helicopters, which are needed urgently in Iraq and Afghanistan, failed to meet strict airworthiness and safety specifications, which include a basic requirement that they should be able to fly in cloud. The MoD has decided that with such a shortage of helicopters, there is no alternative but to spend the money on making the Chinooks airworthy............

[nigegilb]

Fair play to Lord Drayson, he got there in the end. Any news on the timescale? Can't imagine they will be ready in time for the next fighting season in May. I am sure Thales didn't work the MoD over the proverbial barrel on this one. Still, it will make a hell of a difference when they come on line.
Well done too, to BBC R4 and C4 News for highlighting the issue.:E

[Mr-AEO]

Ready for next fighting season in May?:D You are a very good comedian. Do you do children's parties?

Try May 201X

[VuctoredThrest]

Good news. This will keep me off the streets for the next 'few' years.