Campaign Medal for Bomber Command?

[Lon More]

Currently in Jet Blast, but of interest here, An attempt to belatedly get a campaign medal for those of Bomber Command during WWII Petition (http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/BomberCommand/)

[Chugalug2]

Nice one LM, and done! Interestingly the petition cites the "men" of Bomber Command, and I understand that Harris insisted that such an award should go to the Ground Staff as well as the Aircrew, and hence would have surely included women. It isn't really clear if this is also the intention of this campaign, if it is it might hit the same buffers that derailed the original, as it was felt that many others supported the war effort in the UK without such an award. As to the Aircrew though, definitely a long overdue acknowledgement of their courage and sacrifice, and a PC scandal that it has not been done before. :=

[Brian Abraham]

Looked at the petition and seems those from Canada, Oz etc who flew in RAF, RAAF, RCAF Squadons would not be eligible. Am I correct? They all received Imperial awards and decorations at the time.

[Lon More]

Petition states "men of Bomber Command"so I believe it is not linked to nationality.

BTW I didn't bring this to light originally, thanks should go to Mr. Draper on JB

[Robert Cooper]

This one is worth supporting, and I hope it will include groundcrew.

[Jackonicko]

Why?

The groundcrew are entitled to and received EXACTLY the same gongs as any other serviceman serving within the UK in a frontline capacity. Why should they receive any more than (say) Fighter Command, Coastal Command or Army Co-operation Command groundcrew?

And indeed, why should there be any need for a separate medal for Bomber Command aircrew, who received the same medals as other UK-based frontline aircrew - whether that was 'Air Crew Europe', 'France and Germany' or whatever.

The idea of a separate Bomber Command campaign medal is divisive nonsense, in my view.

[Chugalug2]

Why? Because The Bomber Campaign, from the very beginning of the war to the very end was unique, in that it was the only major campaign that was not so acknowledged. And we all know why, because having tasked them throughout the war and called for ever greater effort (and sacrifice!) the "establishment", including Churchill, disowned them. The latter did so for purely political reasons, both those of realpolitik and electoral, the former because they wished to distance themselves from the ever apparent devastation now clear to everyone that had been wrought on Germany. The soundbite for this attitude was of course "Dresden", as though the people who died in that hell hole were any more undeserving to die than anyone else. Whatever the rights and wrongs of that one operation, the brave young men who went out night after night, until of course the night that they didn't return, deserve our respect and recognition. Those who are still with us should receive the physical demonstration of that recognition. If the Battle of Britain, that kept us in the War, was so acknowledged, the Bomber Campaign, which was essential to Victory, should be as well!

[vecvechookattack]

Ah, the controvesy surrounding Butcher Harris continues....

"Flying in a British bomber during World War Two was one of the most dangerous jobs imaginable. Some 55,000 aircrew died in raids over Europe between 1939 and 1945, the highest loss rate of any major branch of the British armed forces"......

Those guys should be recognised for the sacrifcice they gave.

[Jackonicko]

I disagree.

To elevate Bomber Command's sacrifices above those of Fighter Command, Coastal Command (look at the Blenheim losses, for example), Army Co-operation Command et al, is offensive and divisive.

[Chugalug2]

I disagree.

To elevate Bomber Command's sacrifices above those of Fighter Command, Coastal Command (look at the Blenheim losses, for example), Army Co-operation Command et al, is offensive and divisive.

Well you could say the same about any Campaign Medal! The point is this was a campaign, and of a duration only matched by the Battle of the Atlantic. This wouldn't be a Command Medal, which of course was never issued, but a Campaign Medal, which crews of other Commands did receive if involved in an acknowledged campaign.
Those Blenheims by the way Jacko, whoever flew them were fated, including those operated by Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain, the crews of which were thus acknowledged, or those of Bomber Command that were lost in the Bomber campaign, who weren't.

[Yellow Sun]

Jacko,

and anyone else who doubts the correctness of this cause. You should stand in the North transcept of Lincoln Cathedral and then decide.

YS

[cribble]

Does not the campaign medal described below fit the bill?
"British Commonwealth War and Campaign Medals
- The Air Crew Europe Star
This medal was awarded for flying operations from UK bases over Europe between September 1939 and June 1944.
About the ribbon
The ribbon is light blue with black edges, with a narrow vertical yellow stripe on each side between the light blue and the black. The colours and layout symbolise the continuous service of the Air Force by night and day.
Clasps and Bars
Two clasps, ‘Atlantic' and ‘France and Germany' were awarded with this medal. When ribbons only were worn on military uniform, a silver rose emblem on the ribbon denoted the award of a clasp."

[Jackonicko]

Cribble,

Spot on!

[PPRuNe Pop]

Not so!

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1948647.stm

Some of the veterans were wearing medals - although there is still no official campaign medal commemorating Bomber Command.

[228 OCU]

Done.
In memory of the 55,573

[philrigger]

Does not the campaign medal described below fit the bill?
"British Commonwealth War and Campaign Medals
- The Air Crew Europe Star
This medal was awarded for flying operations from UK bases over Europe between September 1939 and June 1944.
About the ribbon
The ribbon is light blue with black edges, with a narrow vertical yellow stripe on each side between the light blue and the black. The colours and layout symbolise the continuous service of the Air Force by night and day.
Clasps and Bars
Two clasps, ‘Atlantic' and ‘France and Germany' were awarded with this medal. When ribbons only were worn on military uniform, a silver rose emblem on the ribbon denoted the award of a clasp."
;)
Conditions did apply:
There are 3 medals in question;

France & Germany Star (Jun 44 to May 45)
Atlantic Star (Sep 39 to May 45)
Aircrew Europe Star (Sep 39 to June 44)

Only one of these medals and one further clasp could be awarded.
(The first medal for which you qualified and a clasp for the second that you qualified for).
Eg: You could have the Atlantic Star with the France and Germany clasp (Or vie versa). And still not be able to wear the Aircrew Europe Star/Clasp.
Or you could have the Air Crew Europe with the Atlantic Clasp and not be awarded the France and Germany Clasp.



'We knew how to whinge but we kept it in the NAAFI bar.'

[StuartP]

More than happy to sign in memory of my wife's grandfather, who did come back but would never talk about it.

Incidentally, you/we are currently about 33400 signatures behind the anti-road pricing petition, and a few signatures behind the one requesting Our Tone to stand on his head and juggle ice cream.

(I know my posting adds nothing to the debate but it will at least get rid of that annoying "Hey - you've gone all quiet" reminder I get every time I log on.)

[GelBoyCT]

The Battle of Britain Boys were issued with their own bar to the 39-45 star, for what was a relatively short period during the war. Bomber Crews lost over 55000 Aicrew and their sacrifice was, undoubtedly, the single biggest effort from any one organisation. Though it goes without saying that, the war was won because of the joint effort of all those involved. Why couldn't there be more bars for other Commands?

[Chugalug2]

Bomber Crews lost over 55000 Aicrew and their sacrifice was, undoubtedly, the single biggest effort from any one organisation. Though it goes without saying that, the war was won because of the joint effort of all those involved. Why couldn't there be more bars for other Commands?
Hear hear GB! I think I read somewhere that the Bomber Command losses were unmatched by any other unified command of any country, save for the Kriegsmarine U-boat arm. A very special sacrifice that was an essential prelude to victory. For other thoughts on this there was a similar thread "Canadians question morality of Bomber Command" at:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=254162
Perhaps it is easier for us to view these events from a distance than it was at the time. There is a debt to be paid. We should pay it.

[Flash2001]

This would no doubt delight my uncle W/C W.M. Stephen RCAF, DSO, Croix de Guerre etc. Unfortunately he passed away 59 years after the campaign ended and so will never get to see it. It is with some bitterness that I see that the petition is restricted by residence to the British Isles. There were a few colonials in Bomber Command.

He was one.

[doubledolphins]

The old boys who I have known always called Harris "Butch". Yes I know what it was short for but I see no reason to legnthen it now.

Jack I am with you, these guys have a medal any way. All you can hope for is a little badge like the Arctic Convoy people have just been awarded. Frankly a total waste of time and effort. A new labour piece of band wagon jumping.

Where will it all end? A "Submarine Service Medal"? How about a "Trenches Medal" for any one who was in one for more than a week in the Great War. Or a "Stakes Medal" for any one at Agincourt.

I will always feel a tremendous respect and debt of gratitude for any one who has seen active service in any theatre of conflict but let's leave the awarding of honours to those who were around at the time.

[HectorusRex]

Having been privileged to have been a member of the Guard of Honour at the dedication of the Royal Air Force War Memorial at Runnymeade on 17th October 1953, I would like to challenge Jackonicko and other naysayers to stand in front of the 360 granite wall panels therein inscribed with the names of 20,547 aircrew members who lost their lives during the Second World War while serving with the Air Forces of the Commonwealth, at bases in the United Kingdom or in North-West Europe and who have no known grave, and repeat that these deaths were not worthy of being accorded the dignity of a Campaign Medal, and neither are those that survived.
Another travesty.:mad:

[Jackonicko]

I don't need pompous lectures, thanks, Hec.

Perhaps you'd care to stand up in front of a smaller group of ex-Aircrew and tell them why every Bomber Command aviator and erk deserves a campaign medal when they don't.

The group I have in mind are the surviving members of just one Coastal Command Liberator crew.

One of whom saw his Anson squadron shot to pieces around him twice, leaving him as the most senior pilot within weeks of being posted in, before converting to the Lib, in which he (with the others) destroyed one enemy submarine, was shot down by Bf110s, and then captured another U-Boat at the end of the war.

Another of whom flew with Army Co-operation Command (Mustangs), flying long range low level Tac R sorties over occupied Europe, before being commissioned and posted to Libs.

And another of whom flew Beaufighters on dangerous anti-shipping strikes after leaving the Lib.

One member of the crew was previously groundcrew on a Bomber Command Hamden unit, and would thus qualify for this divisive medal you're proposing.....

The Coastal blokes faced just as many perils as their Bomber Command colleagues, and had just as many nasty ways to die. They got used to empty places in their messes, and saw their friends fail to reach the end of a tour.

And they actually achieved more than the Bomber Command blokes - it's been demonstrated that a four engined bomber serving with Coastal did 20 times as much damage to the German economy as a Bomber Command Lancaster. But they don't deserve a campaign medal, nor do the supply droppers, the fighter and fighter bomber boys, the agent droppers....

Just the Bomber Command blokes.

Sick making.

[Chugalug2]

Jacko, would not your Coastal Command veterans have been awarded the Atlantic Star? If so surely that was the appropriate recognition of the campaign in which they fought so heroically, ie The Battle of the Atlantic? All that is called for here is similar recognition of the Bomber Campaign, which like the Atlantic one ran from the beginning to the end of WW2. I know that there are complications about only receiving one even if you saw service in more than one campaign, but the BoB guys had a bar to the 39/45 Star, I believe, and something along those lines would perhaps meet the bill.

My belief, and I may well be wrong, is that such a Star would have been struck, were it not for the way that the whole Bomber Offensive was disowned by those in power after the war. The Bomber guys were told that the Aircrew Europe or France and Germany Stars would be issued to them. Of course those who earned these Stars flying over Europe before and after D-Day were just as brave, that is not in question. But these Stars covered all Air Ops in their periods. What the Bomber Campaign Star or Clasp would represent would be that specific campaign, as does the Atlantic Star, and recognition of it at last!

[PPRuNe Pop]

Jacko,

Individuals, hundreds of them, have rightfully received gallantry medals for their acts of bravery. To single them out now is not what this is about.

It is about a whole command which flew night after night and day after day in harms way, in which over 55,000 aircrew sacrificed their lives, and have never received just recognition for it.

Arguments such as those above do nothing to redress this. For the families of those who gave their lives, and for those who still live today it is right and just that a medal for Bomber Command is struck.

[HectorusRex]

Thank you PPRuNe Pop.
I shan't dignify Jacko's comments by slanging off at him.
He's entitled to his opinion, just as I am, and I consider that he is wrong.
Merry Xmas All.

[Jackonicko]

PPRuNe,

That may be your opinion, but however didactic you are in expressing it, that's all it is. It is not "right and just" to single out Bomber Command to receive greater recognition than those in other Commands and other theatres - they have already received adequate recognition (and indeed by comparison with Coastal, Army Co-operation Command, Malta, etc, Bomber Command have had far more exposure and public recognition). The idea that Bomber Command are today 'forgotten' or 'unrecognised' is nonsensical - only the Battle of Britain Fighter Command men have greater recognition - in my view quite rightly.

A new campaign medal for Bomber Command would be disproportionate and divisive, and would be extremely offensive to the veterans of other Commands who fought just as hard and just as bravely - especially were it also doled out to erks who did nothing more dangerous than sit out the war at (say) Ludford Magna. You'd also have the situation in which Bomber Command Blenheim aircrew (for example) would get a medal when Coastal Command Blenheim aircrew (flying much the same missions, against much the same targets, and suffering much the same losses during 1941) would not.

Those responsible for deciding on the allocation of campaign medals post war quite deliberately omitted a special Bomber Command medal (not for reasons of malice or 'politics') but because medals were allocated for service within a particular theatre - and not on the basis of an individual's service affiliation, and Bomber Command had no unique campaign medal in just the same way that the Submarine Service didn't, and nor did Fighter Command.

Nor was the so-called Bomber campaign a separate war in its own right - however much Harris tried to make it so, it was part of the overall air campaign against the Reich (which is why Air Crew Europe is the appropriate medal).

This smacks of uninformed populism - and reflects the dominance of the Lancaster and Lancaster crews in media coverage, autobiographies, films, etc. Perhaps a medal just for the brave boys who flew (and serviced) the Daily Mirror Bomber, omitting the non-achievers who flew Halifaxes, Stirlings, Hamdens and the like would be more to your liking?


Chug,

Atlantic Star or Air Crew Europe, depending.

Just as Bomber Command blokes already qualify for Air Crew Europe or France and Germany, depending.

I would see some merit in a rosette or bar for Bomber Command, along the lines of the Arctic addition to the Atlantic Star.

[Chugalug2]

Chug,
Atlantic Star or Air Crew Europe, depending.
Just as Bomber Command blokes already qualify for Air Crew Europe or France and Germany, depending.
I would see some merit in a rosette or bar for Bomber Command, along the lines of the Arctic addition to the Atlantic Star.

Ok Jacko, a bit of common ground perhaps? When you say Atlantic or Air Crew Europe Star for the Coastal guys depending, the difference is where they operated. The Atlantic Star, like the campaign it represents, covered the entire period of the war. When you say Air Crew Europe or France and Germany Star for the bomber guys, the difference is when they served, ie before/after June '44. Hence the Coastal guys who fought the Battle of the Atlantic at any time of the war have a campaign medal that represents that, in the Atlantic Star. The Bomber Guys, who are just as proud of their campaign that ran also for the entire war do not. It is as simple as that.
If they were indeed made eligible for a Bomber Campaign Star, it would of course be at the expense of the existing campaign star (Europe or France Germany) which they were issued. If they are already wearing a star with a clasp, they could change that clasp for a bomber one (and rosette for a ribbon). It may all sound fussy, but it is a canker that has eaten away at them since '45. Oh and you go and tell them their campaign was just part of an overall one against the Reich! You could say the same to the Atlantic Guys and take away their medal, I wouldn't wish to be around on either occasion!

[doubledolphins]

This is all opening up old wounds. The Atlantic Star was awarded to land based aircrew for two months service. Sailors needed six months west of 20 west.

The new "Arctic star" is not worn on the ribbon as a rosette but just as a seperate lapel badge. As I said previously, just a cheap and nasty piece of New Labour band wagon jumping. The Old Boy behind the bar at a watering hole of mine who qualifies for it does not bother.

[Sven Sixtoo]

Agree it is old wounds.
My father (who navigated Halifaxes early in 1945) is incensed not so much that he does not wear a "bomber campaign medal" but that unlike Dowding, Tedder and others, his boss Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was left as just that, and not as (for instance and following Monty's example) Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Harris of Dresden.
The campaign became an embarrassment to the victors, possibly the first example of political correctness, and the honours were as limited as they could be rather than as generous as they could be.
It is too late to recognise Harris as every other commander at his level was recognised (and thereby acknowledging everyone under his command), so the only way to right an undoubted wrong is to award the honour to his troops.
Sven
Still serving

[Basil]

I recollect someone likening a bomber raid to walking across a hangar floor in the dark with a fuzed weapon in one hand and a bucket of petrol in the other with someone firing tracers at you.
Although, like many, an admirer of Churchill, I feel that he let himself down by his indecent haste to distance himself from the city bombing which he himself had, so recently, supported.
Should there have been a campaign medal and a peerage for Harris? Too darn right there should have!
Basil - who has never been shot at in anger (or if I was they missed) nor ever had to stand the test of nightly flights into nightfighters, searchlights and AA.

Edited to say subsequent posting by tornadoken suggests that my comment re Churchill is, in respect of Sir Arthur Harris, less than wholly accurate.

[Chugalug2]

For those interested may I commend http://www.rafbombercommand.com by the Bomber Command Association. An excellent though very restrained site. The raw statistics alone make for sober reading, total strength 125,00 men and women, over 55,000 dead, 10,000 captured. Average age only 22, from 18 years upwards. 23, yes 23, VCs awarded. Apropos this thread, it is interesting to note that no mention (AFAIK) is made of this controversy, for it is a memorial site and this campaign is for the survivors. It is because of their modesty and diffidence that we should right the very much intended slight of the decision after the war not to issue a Bomber Campaign Star. As I have said previously, I feel that the Bomber Campaign ranks with the Battle of the Atlantic in importance in the British WWII effort. The latter ensured that we survived, the former that we prevailed. We recognise the latter as a Campaign that spanned the entire war, we should do likewise with the former.

[tornadoken]

Re Churchill and Harris. The diaries of KGVI's P/Sec, Sir Alan Lascelles have only now been published (due stuff about Duke of Windsor) - King's Counsellor, Weidenfeld. P.381: Jan.1946, New Year Honours: WSC irate with A.L, why Harris has no peerage. AL says he got MRAF - of more use to him than any peerage, and in (June,45 Birthday Honours) he had GCB at WSC's recommendation.

[pulse1]

I feel that the Bomber Campaign ranks with the Battle of the Atlantic in importance in the British WWII effort

I have recently been reading a comparison of the faults in leadership of Harris and Doenitz. Both resisted new technology. Both stuck to the old way of doing things inspite of obvious failures of their tactics due to improvements in technology by the other side.

These failings eventually led to very high losses by very brave bomber and U-boat crews for very little return.

For this reason, perhaps, there is some argument that bomber crews should receive some extra recognition for their undoubted bravery against great odds, the enemy and their own leadership.

[Chugalug2]

[quote=pulse1;3074886]I have recently been reading a comparison of the faults in leadership of Harris and Doenitz. Both resisted new technology. Both stuck to the old way of doing things inspite of obvious failures of their tactics due to improvements in technology by the other side.[quote]

Thanks for the support Pulse. I would be interested to know how Harris resisted new technology? Bomber Command was at the forefront of electronic navigational aids AFAIK, though their use had always to be tempered with the security considerations of them falling into enemy hands. The Americans, bombing by day, made great play of so called "precision bombing", but their results were little better than Bomber Command's night bombing campaign and in effect merely meant that the whole campaign was of round the clock area bombing. That such a campaign meant high losses to the crews and German population alike was a reflection of the state of the art at the time. The only way open to ameliorate these losses would have been to slacken the effort. That would have given the enemy the chance to increase war production and redeploy the men and equipment used in the defence of the Reich, possibly turning the fortunes of war on either or both fronts. It was a close run thing as it was, and I wouldn't have laid money on victory if we had relented in any way!

[pulse1]

chugalug2,

Harris played a leading role in the development of RAF bombing strategy from 1934. Until the publication of the Butt Report in 1941 he ignored scientific developments (e.g. he turned down Gee in 1938). The Butt report destroyed the illusion, created by Harris, that modern, fast bombers could accurately bomb targets deep in Germany. Butt showed that, at best, only one third of bombs were falling within 5 miles of their target. In 1941, after the discovery that the Luftwaffe were using radio beams to locate targets, Harris was quoted as proudly saying “We use no beams but we bomb just as successfully as the Germans deep into Germany”.

Even after Butt, all scientific developments were driven by the scientific community and they were usually reluctantly accepted by the RAF.

However, after Butt in 1942, Harris did start to encourage the acceptance of technology and we saw the development of H2S. However, at the peak period of bombing of Berlin, another Harris obsession for which the cost in losses was arguably not balanced by the benefits, the Germans’ use of technology had caught up and this led to unacceptable losses in late 1944. The Luftwaffe was using Gee, IFF and, to a lesser extent H2S, to home in on the bomber streams. Again, the scientists (e.g. R. V. Jones) had warned Harris that this would happen but were ignored once again, with many crews leaving them switched on even when they were not being used. This disastrous attitude of the Bomber Command leadership, and Harris in particular, was finally exposed by the terrible raid on Nuremburg on March 30/31, with the loss of 12% of the bombers, mostly to nightfighters using Schrage Musik.

Whether a reduction in the bombing of German cities would have prolonged the war I am not really qualified to judge. However, if some of that effort had been put into more dedicated raids on the German transport system and industry I believe that would have shortened the war. The Peenemunde raids are good examples of the proper use of a bomber force.

Harris's strategy of demoralising the German population certainly didn't work but that is a more complex issue. For example, how much did Roosevelt's policy of 'unconditional surrender' help the German propoganda machine to discourage any thoughts of giving in?

[Wader2]

chugalug2,

The Luftwaffe was using Gee, IFF and, to a lesser extent H2S, to home in on the bomber streams. Again, the scientists (e.g. R. V. Jones) had warned Harris that this would happen but were ignored once again, with many crews leaving them switched on even when they were not being used.

Sorry for a bit of thread drift but possibly of interest.

Bomber Command war doctrine during the cold war was for a rigourous emcon silent policy. Even in peacetime crews were not permitted to radiate H2S into Soviet or Warsaw Pact territory unless transitting over Lake Van to Tehran.

It was routine, if not SOP, for the Nav Plotter to switch the Gee off at Top of Climb on all sorties. When Tacan replaced Gee it was again left off although increasingly the pilots asked for particular beacons to be set up. This led to one exchange when the Tacan had unlocked.

"Capt-Nav is that Tacan needle bothering you?"

"no."

"OK I'll switch it off then."

The H2S OTOH was left burning and turning from power on to power off. Only in the 70s did crews start to think about ground radiation safety.

[Chugalug2]

chugalug2,
Harris played a leading role in the development of RAF bombing strategy from 1934. Until the publication of the Butt Report in 1941 he ignored scientific developments (e.g. he turned down Gee in 1938).
Even after Butt, all scientific developments were driven by the scientific community and they were usually reluctantly accepted by the RAF.
However, at the peak period of bombing of Berlin, another Harris obsession for which the cost in losses was arguably not balanced by the benefits, the Germans’ use of technology had caught up and this led to unacceptable losses in late 1944. The Luftwaffe was using Gee, IFF and, to a lesser extent H2S, to home in on the bomber streams. Again, the scientists (e.g. R. V. Jones) had warned Harris that this would happen but were ignored once again, with many crews leaving them switched on even when they were not being used. This disastrous attitude of the Bomber Command leadership, and Harris in particular, was finally exposed by the terrible raid on Nuremburg on March 30/31, with the loss of 12% of the bombers, mostly to nightfighters using Schrage Musik.
Whether a reduction in the bombing of German cities would have prolonged the war I am not really qualified to judge. However, if some of that effort had been put into more dedicated raids on the German transport system and industry I believe that would have shortened the war. The Peenemunde raids are good examples of the proper use of a bomber force.
Hmm...is your book the "Boy's Bumper Book of how British Scientists Won WW2", by any chance, Pulse? In 1938, Harris was an Air Cdre at 4 Group, and sent to the States to purchase Hudsons and Harvards. I'm not sure how that would put him in a position to "turn down Gee", which AFAIK was developed in 1940 by Robert Dippy, after a suggestion by Watson-Watt. How not switching off a Gee set, which was a receiver, could compromise an aircraft is a mystery, unless the TV detector vans utilise captured German technology? :)
All this would be shown as excessive drift on Green Satin, so I'll cut it short. Basically Harris was in a similar position to that which Haig had been in WW1. His campaign was always going to be a bloody and costly one given the state of military technology available. Like Haig he had little choice other than to keep going. Bomber Command was a blunt instrument, but the very persistence of his crews' efforts defeated German war production and the Luftwaffe. Strategic Bombing alone did not win the war, in that Harris had been mistaken, but it was a vital component of the offensive effort (and for some time the sole one!) that ensured final victory.

[pulse1]

chugalug2,

I expect that R. V. Jones, who loved practical jokes, would be amused to hear his book 'Most Secret War' described as "Boy's Bumper Book of how British Scientists Won WW2".

I did not really intend to extend the decades of controversy about Harris.

Let's just agree that the bravery of RAF bomber crews should be honoured by a campaign medal. To go out night after night over Germany knowing that, at best, 3% were not coming back, takes an extraordinary amount of courage which needs to be formally recognised, particularly in today's PC society.

Incidentally, I thought that Harris went to the US in 1940, when he was deputy Chief of the Air Staff. In 1934 he was Deputy Director Plans at the Air Ministry where his work was noted by his successor, Group Captain Bennett, as "neglecting practical research and experiments".

[Chugalug2]

I agree, Pulse, not the time to argue about Harris. As you say he was indeed Dep CAS Nov 1940, having been AOC 5 Group, and returned to the States in 1941 to arrange deliveries of US aircraft under Lease Lend, and future possible co-operation with the USAAF.
Our concern in this thread is with his crews, and what they faced on our behalf. One of the instructors on Hastings told me that he had just soloed on the Wellington prior to the first of Harris's thousand bomber raids. On that basis alone he qualified for the raid! Somehow he and his crew made it to the target and back. Quietly enjoying in the mess the "flying fry up" that as an Operational pilot he was entitled to, he was suddenly accosted by one of the Flying Instructors. "Glad you made it back old chap, any problems?". "Well, Sir, I'm afraid we lost an engine due to flak, and I did find it a bit of a struggle". "Ah yes, the Wimpey is a pig with one feathered". Not wishing to say more, he sought out his own instructor. "What do they mean when they say feathered?", he asked. He had flown back with a windmilling engine, not knowing any better!

[Pontius Navigator]

chugalug2,
I expect that R. V. Jones, who loved practical jokes, would be amused to hear his book 'Most Secret War' described as "Boy's Bumper Book of how British Scientists Won WW2".

Indeed he would having died 10 years ago.

[cyclicmick]

Sadly I think that despite petitions or whatever appeal may be made to the high and good the award of another medal for WW2 will never happen, it is simple too long ago. Perhaps those campaigning for the institution of a new medal for the Bomber Command crews might console themselves of the fact that the Air Crew Europe Star is seen by many as the bomber crew's medal. This, I think, is reflected in the fact that in the medal collecting world, of the eight WW2 Stars, the Defence Medal and the War Medal only three are valued as individual pieces in excess of £20. The Atlantic Star and the Pacific Star are quoted at between £30 and £35 whereas a genuine Air Crew Europe Star (and sadly there are forgeries around) would be valued at between £160 and £180. A reflection on the respect that people have for the recipients. Only an acredited 1939-45 Star with the Battle of Britiain clasp tops that at £450-£550.

[Basil]

tornadoken,
Very interesting - thanks for that info.
Would appear that I've misjudged WSC and very happy to admit so.

[Chugalug2]

Sadly I think that despite petitions or whatever appeal may be made to the high and good the award of another medal for WW2 will never happen, it is simple too long ago. Perhaps those campaigning for the institution of a new medal for the Bomber Command crews might console themselves of the fact that the Air Crew Europe Star is seen by many as the bomber crew's medal. This, I think, is reflected in the fact that in the medal collecting world, of the eight WW2 Stars, the Defence Medal and the War Medal only three are valued as individual pieces in excess of £20. The Atlantic Star and the Pacific Star are quoted at between £30 and £35 whereas a genuine Air Crew Europe Star (and sadly there are forgeries around) would be valued at between £160 and £180. A reflection on the respect that people have for the recipients. Only an acredited 1939-45 Star with the Battle of Britiain clasp tops that at £450-£550.
CM, very interesting figures, but with due respect to collectors, their interest is in the cost of these artifacts. The value is inestimable, especially of a medal that was planned for, deliberately not struck, then perhaps eventually issued over 60 years later! If it were due to a consistent policy that Harris's "Battle of Germany" did not warrant a medal, well fair enough I suppose, but this slight to these brave men was a lash up of opposition from Cannon Collins, rival services, the liberal intelligentsia, and the political reality that the enemy was now our ally, and the ally now our enemy. The first is now history (though one of his CND adherents is now our beloved leader!), the second may perhaps now view the sacrifice of these men in a more informed way, the third deserve the same contempt that their successors do (now, in sheltering those who oppose this country, while urging prosecution of those who defend it), the last is superseded again by RealPolitik, following the end of the Cold War. If the Shot At Dawn campaign can overturn British Military Policy some 90 years later, or the Suez Veterans can (quite rightly!) get their GSM having been denied it until recently, then Harris's "Old Lags" who fall between the two, and who really are getting on now, should get their gong as well. It is too late to right the calculated insult to Harris, but if a Bombing Campaign Medal is struck at last, there might be an approving grunt at least from beyond the grave!

[cyclicmick]

Chugalug2
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.

[Chugalug2]

Chugalug2
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.

No slur intended CM, but the value of these awards to those who earned them must surely be unique? Point taken and agreed re groundcrew. It is said that Harris wanted everyone involved, ie groundcrew and aircrew alike, to be thus acknowledged, but if we are discussing a new Campaign Star, then as in all other cases it must be defined by the area it refers to, presumably in this case bomber ops in German airspace.

[Hugh Spencer]

Sixty two years ago today our crew arrived at RAF Syerston to train on Lancasters at No 5 Lancaster Finishing School. A fortnight later we would be flying our first operation with 61 Sqdn.
One military historian wrote that every time a bomber crew flew over enemy territory they were engaging in another battle. It was equivalent to soldiers in WW1 going over the top with bayonets fixed. LMF - Lack of Moral Fibre - have you heard of it? This was hanging over our heads continually, if we showed any sign of deviating from the routine of being sent on an operation. You could be removed from your crew, spirited away secretly, maybe placed in the hands of the Medical Officer, could be stripped of your rank and doing a ground job. I had to put up with air sickness on almost every flight, training or operational. If I had reported that, would they accuse me of LMF?
Professor Richard Holmes, a military historian, wrote:
"People whose courage I admire most greatly are people who carry on, even though they know what they are doing is likely to get them killed, and even though they often know that there is very little they can do about it. In other words thereis danger, there is sustained danger."

[Chugalug2]

Thank you Hugh for your post. There have been very few, if any, from those, like yourself, who are the object of this campaign. May I therefore cut to the quick and ask you for your opinion? Do you think that a Bomber Campaign Medal should be struck, or do you consider that the existing Campaign Star with which you presumably were awarded, be it Air Crew Europe or France/Germany suffices? If receiving the new medal meant surrendering the old one would that alter your outlook? You may have read some of the preceding posts in which it is suggested that the CinC wanted Groundcrew as well as Aircrew to receive the medal. Is that how you remember it? As has been said, it would have made it nigh-on impossible to have done so bearing in mind the many other service personnel base in the UK not eligible for any campaign medal, and for that very reason.
Lastly thank you for reminding us all of the cold courage required to go out night after night on those long and dangerous missions. I think that is far more remarkable than the courage that shows itself in the face of sudden danger, although heaven knows enough of that was called upon as well!
I hope that your post encourages more of your contemporaries to follow your example. Thank you once again.

With much respect, Chugalug

[Hugh Spencer]

Hi Chugalug,

Thanks for your remarks. I wonder, but doubt, whether many ex aircrew of WW2 are able to contribute to these discussions but I wish they could, or would. Coping with computers at my age requires determination, that is if nature has been kind enough to leave you with sufficient mental facilities to cope with it.

I have expressed my feelings about the treatment of Sir Arthur Harris and his wish for a campaign medal for his 'lads' in several other websites and I am totally behind the idea. What some of the aircrew had to tolerate in WW2 must be recognised and appreciated. I cannot see any point in asking for the return of the Aircrew Europe or France and Germany Star. Just make it a new award to aircrew.

I appreciated and still admire the tenacity with which ground staff devoted their long hours to maintain our aircraft even through the night. I recall that we returned from Farge with all four tanks holed - fortunately they were selfsealing - the port inner engine feathered and the rudders peppered with shrapnel holes. The groundstaff had to work on our Lancaster throughout the night to have it ready for the next day. Please try to persuade as many friends as possible to sign the petition which a few days ago stood at 1152.

Cheers.

[Chugalug2]

Hugh, whether others of your ex-colleagues post or not, and I truly hope they do, you make a most worthy spokesman, Sir! I am really pleased that you are for this idea, for some say that after so much time there is no real interest now, well there most obviously is! How the mish-mash that was done in 1945/6 can be resolved now, if it is to be, is for those in the corridors of power to decide. I feel strongly, as you do, that as far as possible, Sir Arthur Harris's wish for a Bombing Campaign Award be honoured, particularly as he was not at a time when others were! The stumbling block appears to be that only one such medal can be awarded, with a clasp for another. As I understand it you would all have been awarded the 1939/45 star, along with the Aircrew Europe or France Germany star. Those pilots who fought the Battle of Britain received the Battle of Britain Clasp to their 1939/45 star. It would seem appropriate if a Battle of Germany Clasp be awarded to those who fought that battle, as Harris named it. Whether that would accord with your wishes, medal protocols and all the other stumbling blocks, I know not. Perhaps those more qualified than I might give us their views, and I hope offer a solution.
Meanwhile thank you again for your contributions Hugh. Your mention that your aircraft could be flying the next night after so much battle damage is a reminder of the can-do attitudes of those days and the skill and dedication of the ground crews. We must never forget the debt we owe a remarkable generation!

[poorwanderingwun]

Is it permissable for someone never part of UK forces to offer an opinion here ?

My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.

They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.

I’ve often thought that the attention focused on the pilots of fighter command to be somewhat disproportionate... natural, as this was the modern day version of Knights in combat.... and there’s no doubting that there were some very special people doing the job. Courage is a quality that we each have to a varying degree but I think can be divided into at least two types... the courage of instant combat...high adrenaline rush and short lived action... and cold courage... the sort of courage that I think of as 4 o’clock in the morning courage. Going out knowing that for many hours ahead you will be in constant peril doing what you’re doing... The crews of bomber command faced this night after night... interceptors, flak, going in and coming out...and every day a few empty seats at the table... not surprising that they avoided getting to know the replacements... No glamour just losses and darkness before the next 5, 6 or 7 hour trip and more empty seats... a grinding down of ones courage over weeks and months. These men were not for the most part self elected warriors... they were draftsmen, insurance actuators, mechanics and plumbers and those that survived went back to those mundane occupations... Very special people...

As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.

[Brian Abraham]

true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.

Under orders maybe, and although conscription applied to the RAF, all aircrew were volunteers.

The RAF reached a total strength of 1,208,000 men and women, of whom 185,000 were aircrew. About 70,000 RAF personnel were killed. Bomber Command had the highest loss rate of any major branch of the British armed forces, with 55,000 aircrew dying in bombing raids over Germany.

Hugh Spencer, you are one of a unique band and hats off to you, your kind, and especially those that paid the price. God knows how you did it.:D :D :D

[Chugalug2]

Poorwunderingwun wrote:
Is it permissable for someone never part of UK forces to offer an opinion here ?
My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.
They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.
As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
Thank you for your contribution PWW, as welcome as any that has been posted! Indeed your theme that these were men simply carrying out orders, and thus not responsible for any "wrongs" of the campaign is instructive as it encapsulates the present day perception (especially among the civilian population) of the bombing campaign against Germany. Now my opinion carries no more weight than yours, and it needs contemporary evidence from war time interviews, letters, personal diaries etc as to how people felt, but it is my impression that the civilian population, as well as the crews themselves, were overwhelmingly behind its execution. Of course there were those who dissented. Only the British would appoint an objector as Chaplain to the CinC's HQ. Only that CinC would allow him to continue in post, effectively preaching sedition!
The dilemma facing Churchill, the War Cabinet, the Air Ministry and Harris was that the only way to win the war was to seriously damage German war production. The only way to do that was to take the war to them. The only way to do that was to bomb them, and to bomb them with such an effort that, despite the very severe navigational limitations resulting from the combination of technology and counter measures during the war, they would lose the arms race to their opponents. The result as we all know, was devastation that shocked us when it was revealed, and the campaign came to represent the evil of war on which we turned our backs. Hugh and his fellow survivors paid the cost that we are now discussing. I truly believe if that campaign had not been fought (for instance if we had not produced a Strategic Bomber Force), that German war production would have grown unhindered to match that of its enemies. Russia would have been defeated, and Hitler's butchers, Himmler, Heydrich (yes I know), Eichmann etc would have made their 20 million dead a mere overture to the resulting ethnic cleansing. We could not have invaded and would have had to sue for peace confronted with the Nazi WMD's, or drop the first atom bombs on Germany (for which they were intended). Thus, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Bombing Campaign saved far more lives than it cost, such is the grim book keeping of war. So let us salute these brave men now, not for carrying out orders, but for making victory possible!

[Jackonicko]

There are two related but separate issues here. One concerns the issue of a specific campaign medal to the men of Bomber Command, the other concerns the conduct, efficacy and morality of the Bomber War as directed by Harris.

They need to be considered separately, as one might reach the judgement that it was right to recognise those who participated in the Bomber Campaign even if one disapproved of its conduct and its architect.

However, I would argue that however much Harris boasted that he could win the war through strategic bombing alone (and that was his claim), and however much he claimed a disproportionate share of resources, Bomber Command was always part of an integrated air campaign against the enemy, and as such, its members received the appropriate campaign medals (eg the Air Crew Europe or France and Germany Stars).

It is not that their efforts went unrecognised and unrewarded, it’s just that they were (rightly in my view) recognised in the same way that we recognised and rewarded the Coastal Command crews (who suffered heavy losses, were often equally unlikely to survive a tour, but who did rather more damage to the German war economy) and to those who flew intruder missions, agent-dropping, or resupply missions to the partisans and resistance movements. All of them required just as much 4 am courage, and received rather less attention from the newspapers and newsreel, and rather less attention post war from Gaumont British and Pinewood. To single out Bomber Command’s contribution above and beyond these contributions would be unjustified, offensive and unjust.

Let me make it clear. The issue of a Bomber Command medal (especially if extended to groundcrew) is a slap in the face to all of the other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations, further relegating the importance of their efforts (Bomber Command has already been glorified again and again in print and on the big and small screens), even though many of them flew longer, more uncomfortable and more dangerous missions.

We would all condemn the “Hollywoodisation” of history, and yet many of those here are doing something very similar, allowing ingrained prejudice and ignorance (fed on a diet of ‘Target for Tonight’ and the ‘Dambusters’, and by hordes of books by Bomber Command vets) to give a very distorted version of history.

The claim that “the only way to win the war was to seriously damage German war production. The only way to do that was to take the war to them. The only way to do that was to bomb them” is risible.

If you go first to the Bomber Command war diaries, and examine the losses for a given night, and then at the (typically efficient) German records of damage sustained, and then do so again, for night after night after night, the truth about Bomber Command’s war becomes shockingly clear.

Night after night, we lost tens of aircraft (and their crews) and achieved nothing – killing a cow here, and damaging five houses there. Everything achieved by Bomber Command’s heavies up to the end of 1943 could have been achieved better, and at lower cost, by smaller tactical bombers, which were more likely to ‘live to fight another day’ and which put more bombs more accurately on target.

Bomber Command’s greatest successes were achieved in spite of Harris, not because of him, since they were often viewed by him as being ‘diversions’ from the Main Force effort. (Peenemunde, the tactical ops in the wake of D-Day, Tirpitz ops, bridge dropping with the big bombs, even Augsburg and the Dams Raid.)

It has been calculated that a single four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy as the same aircraft allocated to Bomber Command’s main force, yet Harris resolutely and forcefully argued against any allocation of resources to other Commands.

One can only imagine the potential effect had the resources devoted to the four engined heavies instead been used to build up a much larger force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos.

One can only admire the spirit of Bomber Command veterans, and their loyalty to their former Commander, but one cannot help but think that if it was ever reciprocated, Harris had a blo.ody strange way of showing it. He always preferred the Lancaster to the Halifax, because an average Lanc dropped 154 tonnes of bombs during its brief life, while a Halifax crew dropped only 100. The fact that the Halifax was easier to escape from, and that a higher proportion of Halifax crews survived was of no interest to Harris, to whom live aircrew in a Stalag or Offlag were of no interest whatever. The fact that Lancaster crews, bombing from greater height, in greater discomfort, further from base, over more of the heavily defended heartland targets were less accurate than the late mark Halifaxes was of similarly little concern.

In Harris’ mind, a heavier tonnage of bombs dropped inaccurately on area targets in the vicinity of Berlin were of more value than smaller tonnages dropped more accurately on vital industrial targets closer to home.

Harris claimed, on 7 December 1943, that his planned campaign against Berlin would destroy the German capital and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. History records his lack of success, except in increasing absenteeism in the German workforce to 23.5 days per year….. and that at a cost of an average 5.4% loss rate (that had reached an unsustainable 9% by the time the campaign was abandoned).

By contrast, the success of Bomber Command against tactical targets in France in 1944 was huge, yet Harris itched to return to the sterile and marginal operations which he believed were “The real business of winning the war.”

The claim that: “if that campaign had not been fought (for instance if we had not produced a Strategic Bomber Force), that German war production would have grown unhindered to match that of its enemies.” Is simply unsustainable.

Had the four engined heavies been used in larger numbers against the U-Boats and in protecting convoys, and in tactical operations like those which led up to, accompanied and followed D-Day, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses would have been lower, and victory would have been quicker.

Had the industrial capacity and service man power expended on the Bomber Command Main Force been used instead to build up a huge force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos, the damage to German industrial and military targets would have been greater, and losses would have been slashed.

Small wonder that the Luftwaffe CoS, Jeschonnek remarked that:

“Every four-engined bomber the Western Allies build makes me happy, for we will bring these down just as easily as we brought down the two-engined ones, and each four engined aircraft constitutes a much greater loss to the enemy.” It’s hard to imagine him being quite so sanguine had he been facing a larger Main Force consisting entirely of Mosquitos!

I’m all for saluting the men who participated in the Bomber War, but lets keep away from inaccurate mythologizing about its effectiveness, and let’s view Harris for what he was – a narrow-minded and inflexible commander who showed little concern for casualties among his own people, who resisted what he saw as diversions (even when they were clearly war-winning efforts!), and who blindly followed the aim of defeating the enemy by destroying civilian morale through bombing, even after it became clear that it did not work. (Did the reaction of Londoners to the Blitz not give anyone pause for thought as to how difficult that might prove?)

A fair judgement would be that Harris was as much an obstacle to Allied victory as he was one of its architects.

[Chugalug2]

The claims made by Harris, his personality, his attitudes to his crews, his aircraft, his resentment at being diverted from the Strategic Bombing Campaign were not part of my argument, nor thus of my reply, Jacko. Rather it is what his bombing campaign did or did not achieve. A campaign medal acknowledges just that, participation in a major campaign. Coastal Command's major campaign was the Battle of the Atlantic, and like the bombing campaign, lasted from the start to the finish of the European War. It was essential that we prevailed, or we would have lost the war. I acknowledge the effort and sacrifice by all those who fought that battle. The equivalent campaign fought by the bomber crews was what Harris called the Battle of Germany. Same duration but suffering a much greater loss, both in rate and actual numbers. The campaign did not have a medal struck, not because to issue it would have been "a slap in the face to other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations", but because the Bombing Campaign had been disowned for political reasons.
The importance of that campaign is not down to "Hollywoodisation", really Jacko we must elevate the argument a little don't you think? Rather I would point to the lack of Luftwaffe response to D-day, where it was conspicuous by its absence, because of the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Of course it could have been conducted better in hindsight. What campaign couldn't? The essential thing was that it was conducted, in order to win the war. You may find that risible, well let us agree to disagree!
Coastal Command could count success in numbers of u-boats sunk, versus allied shipping not sunk. Tactical bombing could likewise be judged in its ability to clear the way for advancing armies. Bomber Command had a more difficult equation to resolve, much of which was in the negative, i.e. shortages of equipment on the Eastern Front, lack of missions flown by the Luftwaffe, etc. However, Robin Neillands' The Bomber War gives some interesting numbers to conjure with. In 1944, 30% of artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of optical and 50% of electronic output together with 900,000 men all allocated to Reich Air Defence.
Speer said that up to 1943 German industry worked a 10 hour day, after that they changed to 3 shifts, 24 hour operation and the expanding use of slave labour. Despite all that production only rose by a small part of what was expected. The reason was the bombing. He made the point that it had opened an enormous second front long before D-day.
You quote Jeshonnek as favouring twin rather than four engined bombers. Well he would wouldn't he? It was that very decision by the Luftwaffe that prevented them from bombing the T-34 factories that had been evacuated to the east. Combined with their own tank production difficulties it led to the long German withdrawal via Kursk to the Reich.
You say that my statement that German war production could have matched Allied production without the bombing is unsustainable. Perhaps, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey found that Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse.
Finally your two contentions:
1. A single 4 engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy compared to main force.
2. Had the 4 engined bombers been used in larger numbers against u-boats, convoy protection and tactical ops, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses lower and victory quicker.
I do not understand these statements. Surely the losses to the Germans would be in u-boats and their crews, i.e. at the margins of total industrial output? Obviously sinking u-boats and surface units was essential to prevail in the maritime war, but I cannot see how that ensured victory, rather it was essential to avoiding defeat.
Regards, Chug

[Hugh Spencer]

:ugh: I am getting a little tired of repeating myself on the subject of the benefit of hindsight. I was around in WW2 and experienced all the things which were said, discussed and the general feeling of the public. Where were you, Jacko? You are like so many of the writers since WW2 who are only to willing to neg atively criticise what went on. If we knew in 1942 what we found out in 1943 or in 1944 what we knew in 1945 all of our actions would have been modified. Do a little more studying, especially what was known about things at that time. Of course with a little bit more intelligence at the time our leaders would have directed efforts towards greater successes. Give credit where credit is due.:ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

Chug, I side with your argument over Jacko's although it would be fascinating to listen you you both in a civilised debating chamber (not the BBC where you can both talk at once :)).

Chug mentions the switch from a 10 hour day to a 24 hour production day. Historians acknowledge that that we the first time Germany actually mobilised. Up until then they had produced and fought to order so to speak. Only in 1943 did they have to ramp up their efforts.

That operations such as Hamburg did not bring the German's to the peace table had nothing to do with the strategic bomber campaign but to a failure to understand the philosophies attached to modern warfare. Shock and Awe become Acceptance and Fatalism once the shock has worn off.


I don't know the true extent of Coastal Command losses but given that the top scoring squadron achieved just 10 confirmed kills and that many sorties were flown without contacts, the stress levels had to be different.

To my mind, a most poignant example of the confidence of the bomber crews may be found in a side room of the USAAF museum hall at Duxford. In a display case is a bomb aimer's collection of arming pins. Each pin represents ne mission and a small label on each bears the date and the target. The collection is complete. Did he believe that he would collect all 30 pins necessary to complete the collection? That is courage.

[Chugalug2]

Pontious, thank you for your support, it is appreciated. As for a debate, this is it, so if people have a view let's have it here! You illustrate dramatically the truth that, for all the numbers involved, this was a campaign based on quiet individual courage.
Hugh, you take Jacko to task far more effectively than I or any other contributor on this thread can. You put your finger on the nub of the matter when you say; "Do a little more studying, especially what was known about things at that time". It is what is known now about things at that time, or rather not known, by military aviators let alone the general public that concerns me. At least Jacko cares enough to post here. I think his passion clouds his judgement, but better that than nothing. And nothing is what we have from the overwhelming majority!
This thread may be primarily about issuing a campaign medal or bar for the RAF WWII Bombing Offensive against Germany, but it is ultimately about the rehabilitation of that campaign and the brave men who fought it. The limbo in which they have existed since 1945 is an indictment of this nation and their service. Explanations abound as to why this has happened but are really only excuses from the war time and post war generations. It is now for the present practitioners of the art of military aviation to set the record straight.
We now have information that was not available previously, but essentially the facts are straight forward enough. The German tank commander who saw countless numbers of T34s in his visor far outnumbering his own tanks, the American GI fighting for his life on Omaha who at least had the comfort of knowing that any aircraft he heard were ours, were both directly affected by the bombing campaign. If you were unaware of all this, then take Hugh's advice, study! If you are aware then share your thoughts with the rest of us. If you disagree with the point of the thread, then post. Now is the time for this debate, and if those concerned with military aviation have no view, who should?
It is time that this wrong was righted. This campaign was the biggest effort, at the biggest cost, in the history of military aviation. If that isn't reason enough to post on this forum, I can't think what is. So post!

[Jackonicko]

At the age of 65, Chugs, you may have 'been there', but only technically.

Hugh, you may have been there, at the frontline, and therefore have the benefit of direct experience of the Bomber War, as it was fought by your squadron, at your station. I've merely gained an overview by talking to scores of veterans, and by exhaustively going through the Bomber Command war diaries (and I'll bet they kept the extent of losses from you chaps) and the reports from Germany as to what damage was done. And my Dad was operational aircrew during the War, and his crew included second tourists from both Bomber Command (Hampdens - who knew all about heavy losses) and Coastal, so I have some idea as to what was what at the time. And even in 1944, very many people questioned the conduct of the Bomber war - I'm not some kind of revisionist chump approaching this with 20:20 hindsight.

As long as people want and try to equate "rehabilitation of those who fought the bomber war" with apologism for, and rehabilitation of the reputation of its AOC, and with wild and inaccurate claims of its effectiveness and success, then they are doomed to losing the argument.

No-one questions the bravery of Bomber Command, though I would strongly oppose the notion that their courage, sacrifice, skill or mettle was any greater than that displayed by Army Co-operation Command, Coastal Command, Fighter Command, the Desert Air Force, etc.

They qualify for Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany. No other aircrew got a specific campaign medal, and nor should they.

With the precedent set by the Arctic emblem and the 'Battle of Britain' and other clasps, I'd be marginally less hostile to a 'Bomber Command' bar or badge on Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany.

Harris: A narrow minded, inflexible commander who threw away his crews carelessly, who resisted what he thought of as diversions (when many of them were far more effective than the routine ops), who boasted of what he could achieve and who signally failed to achieve it. A man who presided over a costly, and inefficient use of precious resources, and who became an obstacle to victory.

Effectiveness of the bombing campaign: Even after 1943, the ratio of losses to actual damage against German military and industrial infrastructure was pitifully low, and we could have done much more by using air power more intelligently.

With regard to Coastal Command, I can help, I hope, to provide some appreciation of what was achieved, and at what cost.

My Dad's first Captain had been posted to a Coastal Anson squadron, which was cut to pieces soon after his arrival - losing more than three quarters of its strenth during a single mission. The squadron reformed, and the same thing happened again.

Even in Liberator days, crews simply failed to return at regular intervals, claimed by the weather, flying into high ground, flying into the sea, knocked down by enemy fighters, or blown to pieces by the fuel-burning heater systems. Crews who did the calculations realised that the odds were stacked against their completing a tour of operations. Just like Bomber Command. 1,777 aircraft were lost, and the official History "Royal Air Force 1939-1945" Vol III, gave a total of 5,866 personnel killed in action. The Coastal Command & Maritime Air Association gives a higher total of 10,875 lives lost. The lower figure may not have included the many missing personnel, later assumed killed, nor those killed who were allied and dominion personnel serving with the RAF.

Heavy losses, in other words, for a Command that was very much smaller than Bomber Command. And I see no merit in throwing away highly trained aircrew - the flower of the nation's youth - without wreaking commensurate damage on the enemy. If pointless suicidal loss rates were to be the measure, then we'd celebrate the Battle and Blenheim crews as war-winners!

But a Command which clocked up an impressive record. During the war Coastal Command flew over 240,000 operations, sinking 212 U-boats and destroying 478,000 tons of shipping in the process. (And that doesn't include many of the U-boats found by Coastal and later destroyed by Naval forces). And even the 'no contact' patrols kept enemy aircraft tied down countering them, kept the U-Boats transiting to their operational areas via circuitous routes shortening their patrols, often rendering them unable to hunt by day and later even by night, and helping to reinforce the blockade that strangled German industry (by cutting off the raw materials on which it depended) far more effectively than bomber efforts that knocked down a row of workers' houses or killed a cow or two.

The official calculation was that a four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command had 20 times greater impact on German industrial production than it would have done if allocated to Bomber Command.

[Chugalug2]

Jacko, posting effectively the same message over and over hardly advances the debate. A swipe at Harris, a reminder of the sacrifice and achievements of Coastal Command, an attempt to rope in all the other Operational Commands with Bomber as part of an integrated European Air Campaign, for which a medal was struck, a swipe at the ineffectiveness of the Bomber Campaign once again culminating in your killer phrase that a Coastal 4 engine aircraft had twenty times greater impact on German industrial production than a Bomber one (which other than labelling it "official" you never substantiate), seem to constitute your manifesto, always the same words, though not necessarily in the same order, sunshine!
Well let's address them yet again. We are not discussing Harris, we are discussing his campaign and his men. He may have been a right "B", in which case he was in very good company, for RAF wartime career ladders seemed to favour the Leigh-Mallorys and Baders rather than the Dowdings and Parks, so what? Once again no-one is trying to detract from Coastal's record, it is you who keep raising it. They fought a long and arduous campaign and helped save us from defeat. They should, and do, wear their Atlantic Star with pride. As I have said before you could have had just one Aircrew Star, but it was more appropriate that those who fought the vitally important Battle of the Atlantic, be it on or above the waves be so acknowledged. Equally (I say no more than that!) it is fitting that those who fought the vitally important Battle of Germany, without which there might have been peace but no victory, should be so acknowledged. It wasn't in 1945, for political reasons, but should be now. As Hugh has said, there was a gradual improvement throughout the war of the effectiveness of the Bomber Offensive, despite a similar increase to the enemy's counter measures. As it prevailed towards the end, its destructive power was awesome. That is surely the measure of military success? Why did the Luftwaffe virtually cease flying at the end, why wasn't it thrown against the beaches on D-day, why did German industrial production scarcely rise, despite the total mobilisation mentioned earlier, by sinking u-boats?
You seem to be approaching this from a personal angle. You say that your father served in Coastal Command. It is a recorded fact that the 4 engined bombers went first to Harris, and the delay and scarcity of them had its detrimental effect in the u-boat war. Naturally he was aware of that, naturally he resented it. It doesn't follow that they were wrongly allocated. The Atlantic was for us a defensive war, the Bombing of Germany was an offensive one (and for some years the only one). To paraphrase Churchill, wars are not won by defensive measures, rather they are thus not lost. Who is to say that if those 4 engined aircraft had not gone to Harris, Speer could have pushed out the Tigers to stop the T34s, and refined and transported the fuel to keep the Luftwaffe flying. We sink every single one of Donitz's u-boats but get turned back on D-day! Either Hitler or Stalin would have ruled continental Europe from Siberia to Brest. A bit OTT? No more than the repeating a mantra about a Liberator having twenty times the impact on German industry with Coastal rather than Bomber Command.
BTW, my background is transport, so everyone alike can have a sneer, and my father was in LAA, so had it in for all of us!

[Hugh Spencer]

:= Hi Jackonicko,
Please don't this develop into a comparison between Bomber and Coastal Command. It is a shame that it appears to be going that way. If there is a just cause to champion the efforts and achievements of C.C. by all means do it in another forum.
Naturally the morale of crews of B.C. was very important to enable them to go out the next night or whenever so it was just as well we didn't know the fine detail of losses of crews and their aircraft. News coverage then was at an entirely different coverage than today. At no time did I hear any adverse criticism of the efforts of B.C. but whether it was because I came from the Thames Estuary area where the Luftwaffe did so much damage to housing, oil refineries and London itself. One or two may have adopted an attitude like Canon Collins in his attempts to persuade aircrew to disobey orders but we took no notice of him anyway.
If Bomber Command had been given better aircraft, better compasses, etc., earlier in the war the war may not have lasted so long as five and a half years. Sir Arthur Harris had to be tough in his handling of his job as C in C but where there was justification that he should listen to other advice, I think he did. At one time he offered his resignation to those above him because friction did develop between them but they agreed to back him in his attempts to go out and attack the German mainland. For many months no other branch of the armed services, except for the Submarine service, was taking part in any attacking activity, just defensive.

[Jackonicko]

"Please don't this develop into a comparison between Bomber and Coastal Command. It is a shame that it appears to be going that way. If there is a just cause to champion the efforts and achievements of C.C. by all means do it in another forum."

I'm not the one proposing that we single out Bomber Command aircrew for special recognition, above and beyond that accorded to their comrades in arms. The whole point is that the kind of Bomber Command medal being proposed would be divisive and profoundly unjust to the men of all other commands. Even the Battle of Britain fighter boys only got a bar, and not a dedicated medal, and they won an undisputed victory that was not tarnished by its conduct, nor by the callous disregard for his men shown by Bomber Command's egotistical and arrogant AOC in C.

How would you feel if the Desert Air Force got a dedicated campaign medal, above and beyond the Italy and Africa Stars? Or if Coastal had a dedicated campaign medal.

If Bomber Command (whose achievements have at least been recognised and trumpeted since the War) deserve a campaign medal, then so do the others. But to accord such an honour to Bomber Command alone is to diminish and nullify their achievements.

And I'm just using Coastal Command as an example. You could make just the same points about the Army Co-operation Command Mustang and Tomahawk Tac R pilots, the pilots of the Whirlwinds, Hurribombers, Bostons et al who were on the offensive (and rather more effectively than Bomber Command were during 42 and 43) throughout. And the Desert Air Force boys, and ......

You get the picture, I'm sure.

And the idea that there is any merit in "attacking activity", if it fails to do more damage to the enemy than it does to your own side seems to me to be a pretty dubious way of winning a war. Attacking the enemy ineffectively, at vast cost, just to appease public opinion and a public appetite for revenge is all too reminiscent of what today's Labour Party might do.

There's a time to be on the defensive, and there's a time to mount attacks that hit the enemy hard, where it hurts, and which does so at minimal cost to yourself. And that's what the Bostons and Mitchells did, quietly, and did so without the coverage from the Daily Mirror and Daily Express, and the newsreels, that was lavished on Harris' populist but wrong-headed and ineffective strategic offensive.

Anyone spouting the blinkered nonsense that you do, Chugs, should be made to go and read the Bomber Command War diaries, back to back with the reports from the German civil authorities.

Reading of the attacks on Duisberg in July 1942, for example (and it's a random, that's-where-the-page-fell-open, example), you'd read of the ten aircraft that failed to return on 13/14 July, having killed 17 civilians or the 31 bombers that failed to return from raids against the town on 21, 23 and 25 July. You might balance that against the 120 German civilians killed, and against the Burgomeister's matter of fact listing of the few houses destroyed and damaged. Or the 131 aircraft attack against Dusseldorf on 17 August which saw just four bombers fail to return, but which saw hardly any damage on the ground and just a single German fatality. And the shocking thing is that these weren't isolated and unrepresentative raids - the general run was of raids that cost us far more in lost aircraft and aircrew than they cost the enemy.

We were rarely as successful in 1942 and 1943 as we were against Wilhelmshaven on 8/9 July, when the damage caused (for the loss of five heavies) included the town's bus garage and 30 buses, and when we managed to kill 25 enemy civilians.

Accuracy was risible, and was typified by the 10/11 April attack against Essen, when 254 aircraft set out, 172 claimed to have bombed the target, but just six aircraft actually hit the city.

For YEARS, Bomber Command scattered bombs ineffectively about the German countryside, causing negligible damage, while haemorraging the cream of its men, and losing aircraft in droves. Before Harris took over, the average Bomber Command crew had a 28% chance of completing a tour. It plummeted to 11% when he started to attack targets deeper inside Germany, while the effectiveness and accuracy of the bombing declined dramatically.

What if all of those men and wasted aircraft production had instead been devoted to the kind of attacks that the Bostons and Mossies carried out? The German presence in the Low Countries and France could have been made untenable.

On 16 April 1942, as another random example, 12 Bostons attacked the power station at Le Havre (not just the town as an area target). Every bomb hit the target, and all 12 aircraft returned to base. Exactly the same had happened on 14 April, when 12 Bostons attacked the power station at Mondeville. No.2 Group showed quite clearly that REAL damage could be done to the enemy with a low loss rate, but its star waned under Harris, who ignored all evidence and pressed ahead with a heavy bomber night offensive against area targets whose effectiveness was negligible.

Instead, Bomber Command managed to stimulate German war production, and to increase the German will to resist in just the same way that their bombing inculcated a 'Blitz Spirit'

[Chugalug2]

Jacko, Hugh and I are not trying to be divisive or seek anything other than to correct the wrong that was done to those who took part in the bombing offensive in 1945, when the plan to issue a campaign star for the Battle of Germany was shelved and the offensive characterised as something of which we should be ashamed. It may suit your purposes to perpetuate this myth but I see it as betraying the 55,000 who gave their lives, and those like Hugh who survived. This was war for God's sake, you don't give points for presentation and interpretation. The important thing is to win, which was not a given from beginning to end. If the campaign was so ineffective, how do you account for the frustrating of Speer's attempts to massively crank up production, the withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from the west and its virtual grounding by 1945? Perhaps you think it was all done by day by the 8th USAAF? It was a joint effort and round the clock. Yes we certainly did for a lot of cows, and every other type of livestock. Main Force was a blunt instrument, but in sheer quantity it achieved what was needed, stopping Speer (who should have hung) giving the Fuhrer what he needed to prevail. Comparing this with twin engined attacks in France (by day?) is pointless. The industrial base was in the Reich, and that is what they sensibly defended. As to Coastal, presumably they expended a lot of munitions simply blowing up the Atlantic. That isn't a criticism, merely pointing out that a lot of expenditure is required to take out a target.

You seem obsessed with attacking Harris. Well of course that is your prerogative. His own crews it is true called him "Butcher", not for the effects he had on the enemy, but rather on them. It is surely up to them to decide if he was an inspiring commander, or a tyrant. As I understand it most plump for the former, but either way it is their call in my book.

As regards the medal itself, I don't call for a medal above and beyond that accorded to their comrades in arms. As I understand it the limits would prevent that anyway. I have always said that is for the authorities to resolve. All I call for is for that studied slight in 1945 to be put right. It may be that a "Battle of Germany" bar as per the Battle of Britain one might fit the bill. This would not be a dedicated Command medal (or bar), but a Campaign one. The fact that it would be issued mainly to Bomber Command crews simply confirms their overwhelming presence in the bombing campaign. As I say the experts can work it out, I simply call for the need to finally and properly recognise this important campaign.

As to suggesting that the offensive could be just as well conducted by New Labour, well I find that just...offensive! You seem to regard yourself as the oracle on this subject, Jacko, and not prepared to entertain any contrary views, even from someone who served in it. Let me guess, you've written, or are writing, the definitive work on Harris's campaign and I have been thoughtlessly spoiling it. I can only apologise!

[WHBM]

Well I wasn't there but my father was (Halifaxes from Topcliffe).

If they had been given medals in 1945, all to the good. But in 2007 I am afraid that the majority of the grand old chaps are no longer with us. And as it is for them, it does seem we have missed the opportunity long ago.

I have a few of his items from that time, like his RAF hammer he used on sundry recalcitrant parts when airborne and which assisted in repairing my garden fence only today, and these can go on down through the generations to my own descendents. If he had been given a medal at the time I or my brothers would have that as well. But a new medal he never saw is not the same thing at all. If he didn't have it then I don't want it.

[Hugh Spencer]

Jackonicko,
I suggest you take up some balanced thinking and not make spurious remarks, even comparing anything to the present Labour government. Yes, I have the War Diaries and what you picked confirms what I said about having the best equipment. Should B.C. have waited for the later gear before striking at the enemy? Chugalug, I may be opting out of this discussion as we appear to be going round in circles. But I do appreciate what our latest contributor says about this 'too late' application. Right from the start I was adding my name to the petition, that is all. :rolleyes:

[Chugalug2]

Fair point WHBM, but some of Harris's lags are very much alive and kicking, including Hugh Spencer who posts here, and he does want his bombing medal! That is why I feel that it should be done, for the survivors. I find it insufferable that after surviving against such terrible odds they should have been sidelined. Sidelined because; their boss was unpopular, people felt uncomfortable about the suffering of German civilians, Churchill wanted to be re-elected, the bombing in the last days of the war was aimed at facilitating the advance of the Red Army (ie Dresden), the Red Army was now morphing from gallant ally to threatening opponent, Germany was morphing in the opposite direction, Canon Collins, et al, felt the whole campaign was morally wrong.

The bombing campaign that your father and his comrades had fought so hard and so long, with so many of them dying in the process was disowned by the nation and the RAF, together with the CinC and the planned campaign medal that would have acknowledged it. It was expedient to perpetuate this position throughout the cold war, and later when policy was to be "at the heart of Europe". Only now, with the end of the former and the distrust of the latter is there a window of opportunity to right this wrong. Bliar has gone back further to pardon those shot at dawn in WWI, and issued GSMs to Suez survivors only 11 years following our period, so it could be done. Once again may I emphasise that I feel it should be done within the existing rules. How and what is up to "them". Just acknowledge Harris's Battle of Germany as a major campaign in its own right!

Hugh, just caught your last post, so adding this P.S. Please don't be put off by Jacko's hectoring and haranguing, that is his problem not ours. I take your point about this going round in circles, it was mainly caused by trying to address his posts, which were not so much in answer to ours but repeating the same agenda over and over, which is indeed going round and round. Like you I've had my fill, unless others like WHBM post. Like you I am only a supporter. The words horses and water come to mind I guess. If indeed this is goodbye Hugh, thank you for posting here and giving us a first hand account of what those dangerous nights involved. Live long and prosper Sir, I salute you and your kind, we can never repay our debt to you!
Regards Chug

[Hugh Spencer]

:D P.S. Just thought I would offer some comments about Sir Arthur from the book Tail-End Charlies by Nichol and Rennell.
Page 189 - 'He knew there was an awful job to do and the airmen of B.C. would be the ones to die doing it.' 'He was always balancing the demand for success against the risk to lives.'
Page 190 - 'the wife of the padre at B.C. 'His distress at casualties went very deep'
Page 191 - 'He rarely visited bomber bases....not for him the morale-boosting sessions so loved by other commanders......it has been suggested that he could not face the thought of meeting men he would have to order into battle.'
Page 192 - 'The very few visits he did make were emotional occasions.....gave the crews a salute.
Page 194 - 'His old lags really got to know him at squadron reunions....I felt in the presence of a great man, a man of affection and a humanitarian'
Page 203 - 'His real quarrel was with the politicians who refused to be honest about the consequences of modern warfare and were two-faced about the killing he and his men were carrying out in their name.'
And there are a lot more examples in a very readable book, not about rear gunners, as the title might suggest, but about the last battles of 1944-45. Cheers! :D

[exMudmover]

I think this poem sums it all up for the 55000 WW2 dead of Bomber Command:

Let them in Peter, they are very tired;
Give them the couches where the Angels sleep.
Let them wake whole again to new dawns fired
With sun, not war. And may their peace be deep
Remember where the broken bodies lie.........
And give them things they like. Let them make noise.
God knows how young they were to have to die!
Give swing bands, not harps, to those our boys.
Let them love, Peter - they have had no time -
Girls sweet as meadow wind, with flowering hair.
They should have trees and bird song, hills to climb -
The taste of summer in a ripened pear.
Tell them how they are all missed. Say not to fear;
It's going to be all right with us down here.

Anonymous

(written in POW camp Marlag 1, Germany
1944)

[HectorusRex]

A book review just released which may help answer some questions.

A tribute to bomber command bravery

Last Updated: 12:01am BST 18/04/2007
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/global/main.jhtml?xml=/global/2007/04/15/bobis15.xml

James Holland reviews Bomber Boys: Fighting Back 1940-1945 by Patrick Bishop
After the enormous success of Fighter Boys, Patrick Bishop's homage to the fliers of the Battle of Britain, a companion piece to the airmen of Bomber Command was an obvious follow-up. It was one, however, that was always going to be much harder to pull off successfully. As Bishop points out, the men of the Battle of Britain were The Few and the battle they fought was short; the men of Bomber Command were The Many and their struggle went on and on.
Spitfires were beautiful and fast, like racing cars; bombers were bulky and heavy, like trucks. The Battle of Britain will always be synonymous with a long English summer and pilots sitting in deck chairs waiting to take to the skies. 'In the letters and diaries of the Bomber Boys,' Bishop notes, 'it seems to be always cold and dark, no matter what the season.'
A potentially greater sticking point is that Bishop's book focuses on an aspect of the Second World War that now sits uncomfortably with many people. Where the Fighter Boys were shooting down black leather-jacketed German fighter pilots, the Bomber Boys were dropping bombs on centuries-old cities and their civilian residents.
The fact that Bishop has produced one of the most profoundly moving books about the war to have emerged in recent memory is testimony to his skills not only as a writer, but as an historian wholly able to understand his subject. During the Second World War a new breed of war correspondents emerged - men such as Ernie Pyle and Alan Moorehead - who were able to convey not only the sounds and smells of battle, but more importantly empathised greatly with the men who were doing the fighting. It is this empathy that Bishop, also a war correspondent, brings so successfully to his writing.
It is empathy born of deep respect. Night after night these men were forced to play Russian roulette as they sat in their cramped and freezing aircraft, risking death at any moment. Chances of successfully baling out of a doomed bomber were less than one in four. Even if they made it to the ground, there was a high possibility of being lynched or shot there.
Being in Bomber Command was not the most dangerous wing of the RAF - torpedo bombers, with a smaller than one in five chance of surviving one tour, took that honour - but the statistics are none the less astounding. Of the 125,000 men who passed through Bomber Command, about 55,000 were killed - a tenth of all British and Commonwealth war dead. Of course, most men had to believe that they would be spared but the odds were stacked against survival, and witnessing the plane in front dissolve into a ball of fire and debris did little to ease the nerves.
As Bishop says, 'The swing of the scythe was impressively arbitrary.' One crew member might be hit and leak blood all over their Lancaster while the others were unscathed. A pilot might have an eye and nose shot away; in this case he flew on, valiantly trying to fly the plane and his crew back to safety.
Back at base, those who failed to return were quickly wiped from the slate. Every man kept his wash-bag in a satchel on a peg above his bed so that if he was killed, all evidence of his existence could quickly be removed and the next man moved in. 'The spirit of death was everywhere,' says Bishop. 'The crews accorded it an awed, medieval respect.'
Rather than methodically tell the story of the bomber campaign in strict chronological order, Bishop sensibly opts for a looser approach. The birth of the campaign, the development of aircraft, bomber tactics, and the move towards 'area bombing' are all given plenty of space, but in between are chapters dealing with specific themes.
There is a typical day in the life of a bomber crew, full of tension, drama, excitement and the terror of taking part in the raid. There is a section on life at the base: bad food, miserable conditions and few creature comforts were typical of the airman's lot. Romance is also touchingly dealt with. Nor does he shirk from telling the story from the point of view of the civilians crouching underneath one of Bomber Command's raids. Indeed, the description of the destruction of Cologne is one of the most affecting passages in the book.
Of course, no book about Bomber Command can ignore the thorny question of its rights and wrongs. While Bishop avoids openly lauding the merits of mass destruction, he does clearly believe that the extraordinary bravery and resilience of the men who carried out this campaign deserve our lasting recognition and respect.
Redressing this 'wrong' is a mission statement declared at the outset. The men of Bomber Command were never properly thanked for their significant part in the Allied victory - neither by Churchill in his victory address, nor with a specific campaign medal. Nor is there a national memorial. Bishop hopes that Bomber Boys will mark the first step in rectifying this. If this fine book is half as successful as it deserves to be, his mission will undoubtedly be successful.

[kevmusic]

Amen to that. :D

[Chugalug2]

Thank you HR for that moving piece. James Holland's review of Patrick Bishop's book "Bomber Boys" tells of this bloody but essential struggle far more eloquently than I have read before. For all the impersonal nature of the bombing war, for all the relentless toll of life, be it allied or axis, military or civilian, this is still an essentially human story and here it seems at last is told, and told well. Hopefully it is a sign that now there is sufficient distance between us and those deadly nights to see past the natural revulsion at the waste of war and recognise that, if this one was going to be won, then this had to be done. All the more reason that the survivors be awarded their campaign medal now, while they are still with us. Time as well to consider a fitting memorial as is mentioned by Holland. I must read this book!

[timex]

Just signed the petition, bit late.

My own thoughts, we are looking at a Medal for the crews who flew through the campaign. Nothing to do with anyones likes or dislikes for Bomber Harris.

Jackinoko, yes CC do deserve a medal...........so start a petition for them.

Hugh Spencer, thank you.




shaun

[Hugh Spencer]

Hi,
So the 'powers that be' have decided that there will be no further consideration of awarding a Bomber Command medal or clasp. All I will say is what I have said before. A clerk in the office was awarded a France and Germany Star like me but he was not exposed to the terror and fear that many crews felt during eight and a half hours on one operation, exposed to fighter attack and shrapnel from AA guns. Nuff said!

[kevmusic]

I got the email. Makes me very sad. Ignorant :mad:ers!

[Chugalug2]

For those who may not have received a reply from the great leader, it reads as follows:
15 June 2007
We received a petition asking:
"We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to Recognise the courage and sacrifice of the men of RAF Bomber Command by instituting a Campaign Medal."
Details of Petition:
"Crewing an RAF heavy bomber was the second most dangerous role performed by servicemen on any side during the Second World War. At the end of the war the contraversial 'area bombing' policy (which was adopted in 1942 and heavily supported by the Prime Minister and the Government of the day) became something of an embarrassment to the powers that be once its full effectiveness had become known, and the authorities turned their backs on those who had implemented it. To this date, the bomber offensive against Germany is the only recognised campaign never to have been marked by the issue of a medal to those who fought it - men (and women) who were left to feel as though their country was ashamed of them. Many of the surviving veterans are now approaching the ends of their lives, and this petition is to request that their courage and sacrifice be belatedly recognised by the institution of a Bomber Command Campaign medal."

Read the petition (http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/BomberCommand)
Petitions home page (http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/)Read the Government's response

Thank you for taking the time to sign this e-petition requesting that a campaign medal be instituted for those who served in Bomber Command during World War Two.
There is widespread admiration for the major contribution that the crews of Bomber Command made to the Allied victory in World War Two and their commitment in the face of significant losses. The Government acknowledges that a large number of people share your wish to mark this with a medal.
It may be helpful, however, if I explain that there were no medals awarded purely for service in a particular Command during World War Two. Those who completed the minimum qualifying period of service in operational areas were eligible for the 1939-45 Star; those with long service in non-operational areas received the Defence Medal. In addition to the 1939-45 Star and Defence Medal, a series of Campaign stars were created for participants in particularly hazardous campaigns, and many Bomber Command personnel qualified for the much prized Aircrew Europe Star, or, for example, the France and Germany Star.
The creation of medals is the prerogative of the Sovereign. In this, the Sovereign takes advice from the Government of the day, who, in turn, are advised by the inter-departmental, non-political committee on the grant of honours, decorations and medals (known as the HD Committee), on which the Armed Forces are represented. In the case of campaign medals for service during the Second World War, the issue was discussed exhaustively by those in command at the time and by the HD Committee. If they had considered that a Bomber Command Medal, or indeed one for Coastal Command, South East Asia Command etc was appropriate, they had the opportunity to recommend the institution of such medals.
Since the end of World War Two, the HD Committee has maintained a policy that it will not consider the belated institution of awards and medals for service given many years earlier. The reason for this policy is that the present HD Committee cannot put itself in the place of the committee which made the original decision and which would have been able to take account of the views of those in the chain of command, the Government and of other interested parties at the time of that decision.
The HD Committee has made it clear on a number of occasions in response to requests for the institution of belated awards that it will not change this policy. Successive governments have found no reason to overturn this ruling, which is periodically reviewed and has been followed for over fifty years.
Further Information


Ministry of Defence (new window (http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/home)Once again the deliberate confusion between a medal for Bomber Command (not asked for by this petition) and a Campaign Medal for the Bombing Campaign (which is a different and worthy recognition of that deadly and arduous battle). The reason given for rejecting the award, that second guessing the decisions taken at the time is inappropriate and not policy for the last 50 years, is immediately rubbished by the GSM awarded (quite rightly) to those who took part in the Suez Campaign, and done so by this very government! But double standards mean you get twice as many I suppose! :confused:

PS I don't want to be "contraversial", but it used to be "controversial". Perhaps new spelling comes after new thinking!

[VFE]

And she gives Salmon Rushdie a knighthood!

Well that's the muslims upset 'n all then.

Sad to hear that they cannot do something about the medal innit.

VFE.

[rmac]

Following on from HR's summary of "Bomber Boys", I would like to add that the author indicates that although the throughput of men of Bomber Command was 125000 over the period, up to 15000 of that could be discounted as being in training at the end of the war. This is indicative of a 65% death rate on operations. The closest we have ever been to near suicidal dedication since the first world war.

For those of you mentioning the involvement of "colonials" the author points out that at least 8,000 of the 55,000 killed were Canadian.

As a teenager I worked in the bar of the Scottish and Newcastle brewery club in Edinburgh. One of the managers was an old man with blazer and RAF aircrew tie. Turns out that he had completed two tours on bombers. I naively asked him if he had kept up the flying. He told me that after his last trip he walked away from the aeroplane and had never set foot in any aircraft again.

[Blacksheep]

I received my e-mail from Great Leader, but I reckon we asked for the wrong thing. A campaign medal for Bomber Command wasn't what was needed, because such had already been considered and rejected all those years ago. We ought to have asked for something specific that had not been considered previously: a Campaign Medal for Fortress Europe - The Bombing Campaign 1942-45 for example. These are after all, the people who decided that the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean are one and the same place. Flying into almost certain death night after night bears no comparison with qualifying for the France and Germany Star. My Uncle Lewis cooked his way from Normandy to Germany with the Catering Corps attachment to the Durham Light Infantry to earn that one. :rolleyes:

[rmac]

Now that they are almost all gone, perhaps a medal is a moot point.

How about a great big everlasting monument in a principal public place.

[Hugh Spencer]

Ho, ho, ho ! So our prime minister can change things after all. I am pleased that the Bevin Boys are getting a miners' badge after all these years but what about all the fuss in his reply that those decisions were made at the time and nobody can alter them now? He is as deceitful as ' a bag of monkeys'. How could we, during the past ten years, trust such a man!

[Tedthelad]

As one of the many who served with Bomber Command I too was dismayed by the negative response to the petition.

Our 'leader' lost the plot (so what's new) in saying that no Command had individual recognition - did he not know that Fighter Command were awarded a bar that was worn on the ribbon of the 1939/45 Star?

Granted, it was only awarded to certain squadrons who flew at least one sortie between certain dates "Battle of Britain" but nevertheless it was an Individual Command Recognition.

Would not a Battle of Europe clasp have been an acceptable compromise for all CVommands operating in Europe, Battle of Japan for the far eastern Boys.

As for the France & Germany Star. Thousands of Bomber boys lost their lives after the invasion but the only recognition was this Star, which, as has been mentioned elsewhere, could also be earned by a cook serving in France in (say) March 1945 for a matter of a few weeks.

A final comment, Aircrew who qualified for the Air crew Europe and subsequently became Prisoners Of War were told on their return at the end of the war to wear the Air Crew Europe Star with a Rosette (or was it an acorn?) to represent the France and Germany Star (you cannot wear both). (I wore this until 1949)

This was later rescinded on the basis that as a POW you were no longer on active service and confronting the enemy. So, who guarded us? Who shot at us if we got out of line? Who almost starved us?

Enough said.

Ted

[Chugalug2]

Ted welcome to the thread (and to Pprune come to that). It really is good to see the likes of yourself and Hugh Spencer posting here. I am sure you have reflected over the years on why the campaign medal that you feel was your due was never awarded. Given that your generation was very much in the wrong place at the wrong time, it seems fate had a special ration of the proverbial for you guys who beat the odds and survived the Bombing Offensive against Nazi Germany. That country (less the gang who had been running it) changed from mortal foe to front line ally. The destruction you had wrought was now an embarrassment to that new relationship. Russia moved in the opposite direction, so that the cities that had been razed in 1945 to aid the Soviet advance (especially Dresden) became a special symbol of that embarrassment. Those who saw the disowning of the offensive as a way to question the need for an independent Air Force (ie principally the Army and the Navy) made hay while the sun shone, expecting a re-run of the savage cuts that followed WW1, not realising that the conflict would continue albeit as a "cold war" for some 50 years, and get very hot at times as well. The Hampstead Thinkers, who were a joke in the war, now got their revenge, influencing the petty vendettas against the likes of Harris, and more unforgivably yourselves, as you so well recount. So no change until after the Berlin Wall came down, and then more time to placate the sensibilities of the Germans as we did the "good European" thing. With the Great Leader having an eye on the European Presidency, we were perhaps hoping for too much this time, so we'll have to try again with his successor, and his if need be. To those who say it won't happen I simply say, why not? A campaign of that severity, duration and losses should have earned a campaign medal. The fact that it was conducted, in the main, by one Command is immaterial. It is the campaign and those who fought in it, not their Command, which would be commemorated. It is unacceptable that it has not yet happened, the decision needs to be reversed and soon, very soon!

[kevmusic]

Well said, Chug, as always; and I echo the sentiment as regards Ted and Hugh. Though a lifelong civvy but with an abiding interest in the history of the RAF, I have been privileged to be accepted as an associate member of my local branch of the ACA. One or two of these gents are quite computer-literate, so we may get a couple more on side! :ok:

[Hugh Spencer]

Hi Tedthelad,
It is good to hear from other airmen from that era. I don't think there are so many of us who wish to or can cope with this new technology so we must make full use of our experience to put a point of view across as necessary. We have been through trying times these last 10 years but, I suppose, we must hope for the future. Take care.

[Hugh Spencer]

Just to revive this topic, Max Hastings has written a very good article on this in today's Daily Mail. He is a good man to have on our side. Can this topic be revived on the website? It isn't a lost cause so let's revive it. Contrary to what the PM's website stated, if the Land Army girls and the Bevin Boys can get their well- deserved recognition many years later so can Bomber Command. We have not been told the truth by the Government so let's not give them any peace until they have to admit it to us!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[Chugalug2]

Hugh, good to see that you, at least, do not suffer from the apathy and disinterest that seems to abound these days. Quite why those who post on an an aviation related site, and in particular the military aviation forum of that site do not see the fundamental injustice of not recognising the very heavy cost that was paid (almost one in two did not survive if you strip out those still in the training machine at the end) I fail to understand. 55,753 lost out of a total strength of 125,000 in order to enable Victory in Europe. Of course they didn't win the war by bombing alone. Harris's hyperbole was that of a leader inspiring his aircrew and fighting for the enormous resources that fed this weapon of mass destruction. Let us not get bogged down in the endless bickering of the effectiveness of the Allied Strategic Bombing Offensive in bringing the Nazi tyranny to its knees. Especially let us not produce that threadbare canard of Dresden. It's rather like questioning the Royal Navy's contribution to victory in the Falklands War by raising the issue of the Belgrano's course when she was sunk. The only real issue is that the Bombing Campaign was a separate and costly major effort defined by time, day one to VEday, and place, the airspace extending from the bases to deep into the territory of the Third Reich. That surely met the requirements of such Campaign Medals, vis that awarded for the Battle of the Atlantic. That it wasn't awarded would seem to have been a political decision, and though laid at the door of Churchill, following his questioning of Dresden, would now appear to have been down to a committee chaired by Attlee. Sharing the same medal that the rear echelons got after D-Day was a calculated snub by those who arbitrarily condemned the Offensive as pointless destruction for its own sake. They were and are entitled to their opinions, which they could express and enforce freely thanks to the freedoms enabled by these brave young men. Over 60 years on Let Right Be Done and give them their gong.

[Chugalug2]

No apologies for reviving this thread from the depths of the PPRuNe Towers Cellars! Once again a petition has been placed on the Downing Street site, once again we can apply pressure to get the Campaign Medal never awarded for the most dangerous campaign of all, the Bomber Offensive from the very start of WW2 to VE-day. 55573 Bomber Command crew died in this bloody conflict that paved the way to victory. We are privileged on PPRuNe to welcome the sponsor of the petition to PPRuNe. She is pilot's daughter and has posted on the Bomber Command Memorial thread on the Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum where it now resides (to little effect I would add, but that's another story):

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=296590&page=11

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/ForgottenRAF/

Post your response here if you wish, I'll make a similar cross link there so that she might find this one. By the same token post there any points you wish to make pro or con a national BC Memorial. Might be nice to have the two going side by side on the military aircrew forum PPRuNe Pop? I'm afraid it hasn't prompted either history or nostalgia there!