Military rotary wing assets: Army or RAAF

[Super 64]

I’ve started this thread due to a comment made by Wiley in another thread. I’m assuming that Wiley is a former Ronnie who is very stuck in his ways regarding things that fly should remain in the RAAF, and possibly out of touch with modern day goings on (apologises if I’m way off the mark).

My big question here is when was the last time that RW assets did anything except provide support to the Army? Given the difference in culture between Army and RAAF I believe it is was a very smart, quite possibly essential, move to transfer the RAAF RW assets to the Army.

I would also go as far as to suggest that this should also occur with the Caribou and its replacement (if any such thing was ever to occur). When was the last time the Bou’s did anything other than work with and support Army personnel and units?

S64

[Wombat35]

Been waiting for this one to come up.

Now listen here sonny, you leave the mighty Bou alone.. don't need no Mangos up the front, bad enough that they let them in the back. ;)

[Arm out the window]

This discussion is likely to quickly become a "Is so, is not, is so...." type head-butting match, but before all that starts, a few comments if I may:

Of course RW assets and the Bous do a lot of Army tasking - it's what they're for.
However, they also work really well in disaster relief ops (eg. cyclone, flood, tsunami) and things like support to UN-type peacekeeping forces, for example.

I don't agree at all that it was a particularly smart move to transfer the RW assets to the Army, because before that happened, there were 4 competent and effective RAAF helicopter squadrons providing good support to user units, slotting nicely into the Army command system when allocated to various tasks or exercises and generally doing a well-respected and good job.

There followed a period of great disruption as the capability was handed over to Army Aviation, who had a massive job on their hands to ramp up and take over new types and capabilities. Not many RAAFies came over, so they basically had to crank it all up from semi-scratch - a big ask.
To their credit, they made a good fist of it in my view, and have gone on to introduce newer technology and ways of operating into the picture too.

However, I contend that the transfer was an unnecessary, expensive and ultimately pointless exercise that could be summarised as follows:
a) Not broken, but a certain honcho thinks it needs to be fixed and rides roughshod over much good advice to the contrary.
b) Capability suffers as systems are dismantled and laboriously built up again.
c) Over time, capability returns to normal and is probably much the same as it would have been anyway, but there's been a lot of stuffing around in the meantime.

[Captain Sand Dune]

To piggy back on AOTWs' post, the decision to transfer RAAF rotary wing assets to Army was purely political. Unfortunately for the RAAF the CDF was Army, and the RAAF lost.
As a rebuttal to Super 64 (and using the same logic): given the size of the ADF (i.e. small!) wouldn't it make more sense (financially, operationally etc) to have all maritime assests owned and operated by the Navy, all land assts owned and operated by the Army, and all air assets owned and operated by the Air Force?

[Super 64]

The logic I was using that given the Army and RAAF have very different cultures, and operate quite differently that those that directly support them should be under their command. I would also argue (using the same logic) that perhaps the P3's might be better suited being under RAN command.

Well given the 'we're very small' logic CAPT SD, I would actually argue that given our size do we even need an air force, or an army for that matter? If we really wanted to go about streamlining things I suggest we just have the RAN with an extended FAA and marines to do the ground stomping!

Given that marines were the first troops here, and that we are an island nation, I could never understand why we never had them from the beginning.

Don’t forget way back when (even before you Wombat35!) that the RAAF was born out of the Army.


S64

[GreenKnight121]

The problem that the US Army always had in requesting something from the Air Force, was because the "Green Machine" could never really depend on the "Blue-boys" to get one where it was needed, when it was needed, and for as long (and to where) as it was needed.

The "Flyboys" frequently had something else they thought the helo should be doing... like ferrying Generals and the like (or their "special supplies") around for a "look-see".

A Priority 1 request from the Army was always at least a full notch lower than an Air Force Priority 1. And there was a difference of opinion as to what qualified for top priority.


This is also why the US Army wants its own C-27J/CN-235 fleet, so it can move its own light cargo without having to first argue with the USAF about whether they really need it now, then wait for the Zoomies to get done with their card game/nap.

[griffinblack]

It’s pretty simple. The RAAF are in the game of providing air power. They don’t understand, and probably never will, land manoeuvre.

Army and navy aviation is integral to the land and naval battle. In the army, they are part of the combined arms team. Indeed with the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) aviation has the opportunity to form a Battle Group HQ. The RAAF are simply unable to have this ability. They can ‘support’ the army from an airpower point of view (the provision of CAS/fires and transport) but they do not want to understand land manoeuvre.

Many will ask why it is it important to understand land manoeuvre, is it not just about providing ordinance at the desired time and place? The same questions can be asked about operating in a combined arms team. The answer is simple – no. I can quack on about forming habitual relationships, understanding commanders intent, knowing and understanding ground manoeuvre and understanding command and control. I can also discuss command relationships and how critical command and control is – those who have done task org matrixes will understand. This is a language that is foreign to the RAAF and is not RAAF core business.

I would point out the extraordinary success of the US army Cav. They have fully integrated the combined arms team principles. I suspect both the UK and aus hold this model as something to aspire too.

With the exception of the FJ boys, I have always felt the RAAF have been in the business of flying, not warfighting. I have no idea why a graduate from 2FTS would wish to fly BBJs, except to position him/herself a Qantas career. They are more interested in the myriad aspects of how various pressure instruments work, or how thunderstorms form or what are the twenty three reasons for conducting a missed approach rather than the how do you select a BP, FP/OP, LZ/PZ, bounding considerations, EA development etc etc.

The other thing is to deploy a RAAF detachment is like staging extravaganza – it involves a cast of thousands – there is nothing lean or mean about a RAAF deployment.

There are advantages of the RAAF system – I invite a counter argument for those who wish to point them out. I have intentionally taken a very one eyed view in order to allow someone to balance my views.

Handing over.

[mini]

Can't help wondering if you were to sit down today with a clean sheet of paper and create an armed force for a country would it entail three distinct branches? methinks not.

Its very hard to dispense with tradition though...:sad:

[Arm out the window]

Griffin Black, you have a point that the average RAAF pilot probably doesn't understand the intricacies of ground warfare.
However, as I alluded to above, when the RAAF operated helicopters in support of the Army prior to the handover, the squadron execs and line drivers involved in day-to-day work with battlefield units had a good understanding of the ground commander's intentions not only with respect to the individual task at hand, but also in how the battle was expected to unfold and the anticipated work required of the helicopter assets.
Everyone had intel briefs on how the battle was progressing, the air mission commander for a task would have face-to-face planning meetings with infantry, arty and cav commanders to work out integration, the BALO or DALO would be there at the appropriate commander's side for advice and liaison, and it all worked well.

After the handover, we still had a similar number of air assets (less capable for a while as transitional issues were overcome) to go round a lot of would-be user units, so in reply to GreenKnight121's point, "A Priority 1 request from the Army was always at least a full notch lower than an Air Force Priority 1", this was far from the case for our Defence Forces when I was involved. Our number one priority as RAAF helicopter units was to provide support to our main customers, the Army battlefield units, and I don't believe there was a significant increase in the quality or quantity of support given after the transfer.
If X aircraft + Y crews gave you Z amount of support available each year, changing ownership of the machines was never going to give you more than Z sustainably, particularly as the operators of said machines already integrated nicely into the command structure of the units they supported.
These days, the hands-on knowledge of this stuff is gone from the RAAF and belongs to the Army, so trying to go back would be as stupid as I think the original transfer was, but I will strongly defend the RAAF's ability to do the job well when we were doing it.

Re the comments about RAAF bigger-than-Ben Hur deployment requirements, again, 'when I were a lad' we had squadrons deployed in the bush for numerous exercises, in hutchies, doing stand-to, digging holes and generally doing our best to fit in with the grunts, all quite 'lean' and not a luxury item in sight - in fact, I dug more gun pits as a RAAFie than I ever did when I actually joined the Army to do a similar job.
All the junior pilots used to do Joint Warfare course and be assigned to the Brigade TACP to learn about what those crazy pack-toting members of the Green Machine got up to and how we could all operate together, so there you go.

[GreenKnight121]

Then, A-O-T-W, the RAAF was doing a far better job than the USAF ever did in the "understand the customer" department... or does now, even.

[Captain Sand Dune]

The RAAF are in the game of providing air power. They don’t understand, and probably never will, land manoeuvre.
And the converse of that argument is that Army and Navy understand nothing of air power – a patently false assumption.
….they do not want to understand land manoeuvre.
Just as some Army users do not want to understand that overloading an aircraft is potentially dangerous, or that changing a LZ at the last moment during a night insert is lethal.
With the exception of the FJ boys, I have always felt the RAAF have been in the business of flying, not war fighting.

Hmmmm, let’s see now…….
A P3 pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about sea warfare.
A FAC pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about ground warfare – after all it’s the same (RAAF!) FAC pilots that teach ground FAC to the Army!
A Caribou pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a reasonable amount about ground ops as well – after all, they spend most of their life carting grunts around.
I have no idea why a graduate from 2FTS would wish to fly BBJs, except to position him/herself a Qantas career.
If you’re talking about why an individual would want to fly a BBJ, well why not?! It's a nice aircraft! If you’re alluding to why 34SQN exist, it’s to cart pollies around and therefore would be the last ADF flying unit the pollies would mess with. IMHO, 34SQN is a waste of ADF resources and should be disbanded ASAP.
They are more interested in the myriad aspects of how various pressure instruments work, or how thunderstorms form or what are the twenty three reasons for conducting a missed approach…..
Ummmm……..this would be called “professionalism”, I believe.
rather than the how do you select a BP, FP/OP, LZ/PZ, bounding considerations, EA development etc etc.
Well as I’ve eluded to above, not only do “they” need to know their basic trade (flying aircraft) inside out, “they” also know quite a bit about why they’re doing it.
The other thing is to deploy a RAAF detachment is like staging extravaganza – it involves a cast of thousands – there is nothing lean or mean about a RAAF deployment.
Well have a look at the aircraft being deployed. Somewhat more complex than the average Army aircraft. Oh and BTW, I don’t recall RAAF UH-1H deployments being “extravaganzas”! In fact, many of the Army detachments had more "home comforts".

Ask how many Army aviators have transferred to the RAAF, and then ask how many have gone the other way.

[griffinblack]

Captain Sand Dune,

Good to see someone take up the challenge!



I will however address A-O-T-W’s points first. Yes, the RAAF did provide adequate support but it was as a support arm not as part of the combined arms team. I can only surmise the RAAFs commitment to tactical transport based on their decision to discontinue Medium lift support in the late 80s (the withdrawal of the CH47) and there refusal to upgrade/replace the venerable (to put politely) Carabou.


C-S-D

And the converse of that argument is that Army and Navy understand nothing of air power – a patently false assumption.

This is irrelevant to my original point about the RAAF not understanding land manoeuvre. You have provided no evidence to prove me wrong. I will however say that in my experience most Bde Comds don’t really give a toss about air power they just want to know if the RAAF can move their sh1t and if the will provide the bombs when needed – the intricacies is lost on them (indeed we find it hard enough to educate the general army on how to use army aviation). In case you missed it first time, I will restate – the RAAF do not understand land manoeuvre

Just as some Army users do not want to understand that overloading an aircraft is potentially dangerous, or that changing a LZ at the last moment during a night insert is lethal.

I assure you no one is more aware of this than army aviators. And why should a Battle Group Commander worry about the intricacies of C130 weight and balance – they are trying to keep 600 blokes alive – that is our job to let him know and be part of his staff to advise and plan with him. And by the way commanders don’t change LZ at the last moment on a whim.

Hmmmm, let’s see now…….
A P3 pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about sea warfare.
A FAC pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a bunch about ground warfare – after all it’s the same (RAAF!) FAC pilots that teach ground FAC to the Army!
A Caribou pilot not only flies the aircraft but knows a reasonable amount about ground ops as well – after all, they spend most of their life carting grunts around.

P3 drivers – I can’t really comment, but I always understood that the TACCO directed and planed the engagements – the drivers placed the weapon system (just flew the acft!!)
FAC – Sorry, having had some experience with FACDU, they know very little about ground warfare. They teach the provision of CAS – a tactic, not a mission, and certainly only a small part of ‘ground warfare’. And I reiterate, they have little understanding of land manoeuvre and no understanding of how to operate as a combined arms team.
A caribou pilot – pleeeaase. They are, in army parlance, a support arm (taxi drivers).

IMHO, 34SQN is a waste of ADF resources and should be disbanded ASAP.

So you agree with me?

Ummmm……..this would be called “professionalism”, I believe.

You mix professionalism (the ability to conduct warfighting (safely, efficiently and as violently as possible/needed)) with knowing sh1t you can’t effect while airborne, but because some QFIs don’t know how to warfight, they have got to have ‘an angle’. I won’t continue with this line, if you guys feel you need to know this stuff- fill your boots.

Well as I’ve eluded to above, not only do “they” need to know their basic trade (flying aircraft) inside out, “they” also know quite a bit about why they’re doing it.

We only ‘fly’ the aircraft IOT ‘fight’ the aircraft. Yes, this needs to be done safely, indeed with a great deal of precision – its rather hard to get decent terminal effects with rockets when you are flying like a bag of sh1t. Therefore, you do need to understand your weapon system – but only IOT to ‘fight’.

In fact, many of the Army detachments had more "home comforts".

You must be talking about the ‘other’ regiment.

Well have a look at the aircraft being deployed. Somewhat more complex than the average Army aircraft.

Have you seen the ARH?

Ask how many Army aviators have transferred to the RAAF, and then ask how many have gone the other way

Irrelevant

Finally, tell me how the RAAF could contribute to land manoeuvre (within the CT/BG context) and more importantly how could operate seamlessly with the combined arms team?

[Envoy604]

I tend to aggree with Arm out of the window. Having been on both sides of the fence, lived the dream and now grown up a bit I have a slightly more mature perspective than I once had. A number of observations above are short sighted and fail to take the broader view. My view is that each organisation is trying to achieve the aim within the limitations and resources they are faced with. I clearly remember figures being touted by Army on the reduced numbers of people required to support the helicopters when compared to RAAF. Unfortunately, the same figures failed to acknowledge all the RAAF people that continued to provide support to Army. Add them and surprise surprise the numbers were the same.

I note the comment that CDF was Army when the decision was made. I suspect that his decision was made based upon some bitter experiences in Vietnam, and more importantly from some of the terrible comd and control construct from the late 70's early 80's. What was missed was the frustration at the coal face by both Army and RAAF operators during this period. You just have to look at Exercise K83 when the current CDF as SQN XO was able to provide support but was prevented by the slow decision making in the chain of command. By the time the decision to transfer battle field helo was made these problems had been fixed. Having said that its too late to change the decision and I don't think we should. In my view the next step is a purple aircrew and a purple training system with movement between all three organisations. It can only help. In some respect this has started to happen as future Tiger pilots are training as Hawk pilots. It all leads to a better ADF. Unfortunately turf wars and vested interests will prevent this.

Just one other point close to my heart. While some of you think 34SQN is a waste of resources, don't forget they are the face of the ADF and represent you to the pollies. Just like other units they work just as hard, respond to every ADF callout. The 1st ADF asset into East Timor, 34SQN. 1st ADF asset to arrive after the Bali bomb (8hrs), 34SQN. I guess what I'm saying is we tend to bag without understanding. Obviously, they are thinking about the instrument approach on arrival while disregarding the int brief. Yes, I'm sure that pilots at 34SQN want airline jobs, but so do pilots at Armys 173 SQN and 5AVN REGT as well as 32, 33,36,37, 1,3,6,9,10 SQNs etc etc. Funny thing is some want to come back once they go to Qantas etc.

Back to you lot

[sagy34]

If X aircraft + Y crews gave you Z amount of support available each year, changing ownership of the machines was never going to give you more than Z sustainably, particularly as the operators of said machines already integrated nicely into the command structure of the units they supported.QUOTE]



Not sure if what you are stating here is correct, my understanding is the Army now gets about 70% of the flying hours on task, as opposed to about 30% when the RAAF "owned" the aircraft.
Me thinks Army has a much better utilisation rate now?????:=

[Chronic Snoozer]

griffinblackThis is irrelevant to my original point about the RAAF not understanding land manoeuvre. You have provided no evidence to prove me wrong.
I don't think anyone is going to give you such evidence....why would they? So you are saying that if you don't understand land manoeuvre you can be of no benefit to the army? A lot of people get hung up on the colour of the uniform.
A caribou pilot – pleeeaase. They are, in army parlance, a support arm (taxi drivers).

Nice. I guess if Army gets the new tactical transport as you suggest, then army aviators can look forward to being regarded by the hierarchy in such terms.
I have no idea why a graduate from 2FTS would wish to fly BBJs, except to position him/herself a Qantas career. They are more interested in the myriad aspects of how various pressure instruments work, or how thunderstorms form or what are the twenty three reasons for conducting a missed approach rather than the how do you select a BP, FP/OP, LZ/PZ, bounding considerations, EA development etc etc.
Professional knowledge is a bloody good thing to have in your back pocket. Any army aviator will tell you that and will no doubt possess the same knowledge. Pretty narrow view of pilots there Griffin. When I graduated from 2FTS 'Huey gunships' were not an option, had they been, I'd have been there in a shot, and anecdotally I believe there was never a problem filling those slots. So your example of someone wanting to fly BBJs is a bit misleading, it is about whats on offer at the time.
I've can count plenty of mates who left the Army to join Qantas, albeit, with a quick transfer to the RAAF beforehand.
Finally, tell me how the RAAF could contribute to land manoeuvre (within the CT/BG context) and more importantly how could operate seamlessly with the combined arms team?
I think AOTW has already said this was working pretty well before the assets were transferred.
With the exception of the FJ boys, I have always felt the RAAF have been in the business of flying, not warfighting.
Grab yourself a copy of the Air Power Manual and have a read.

[Arm out the window]

GriffinBlack, you seem to be continuing your self-described policy of taking the 'one-eyed view' for the sake of escalating the argument, which I'm finding pretty tiresome. Just saying what you really mean in non-emotive terms would be the way to go, in my view.
There are many points you make which beg replies to the contrary, but to take one:
"and there refusal to upgrade/replace the venerable (to put politely) Carabou."
The RAAF have wanted and argued for a Caribou replacement for 20 years, but even when it gets to project status it keeps falling off the back of the budget - hardly a refusal on the part of the RAAF to go and buy one, as you imply.

Sagy, I think it's likely the change in percentage of tasks being Army as opposed to RAAF these days would be because of how training is reported, ie Army aircrew training is an Army task, so it goes into that bucket.
As I recall, our tasking consisted mainly of Army support like exercises and brigade air famils, aircrew training, comsurv, SAR and relief ops when they came up, RAAF support such as positioning safety officers for knuck exercises, and the other ring-ins like carting pollies to see cyclone-affected areas etc - maybe the Army has dumped the RAAF support, I don't know, but the main ones were Army support and our own training, so I wouldn't expect too much has changed there.

[Agony]

I started reading this thread and began to enjoy the logic and parry that I would come to expect from Officers underpinning a sound arguement. Sadly it has narrowed in logic.

I suppose if a Bou driver in Army parlance is a taxi driver, what is a Blackhawk driver or a Chinook driver.

We all "drive", the speed, altitude and conditions vary. Having flown for all three, rotary and fixed and now on the outside, I can tell all of you that think they they are bigger than the rest, that the job of "driving" has each of it's own significances. The knowledge to fly at high level is different to low. Aided versus unaided, slow versus fast, embarked versus ashore, paddock versus flight deck. They are all there and they require specific knowledge. I am sure that a Kiowa driver would need do do some work to take a BBJ into JFK. And I am sure that a Seahawk driver would need to do some work to take an F18 on a mud run.

In short we chose to fly what we did because of our own circumstances, don't bag the other guy.

Miltary guys generally need to "fight" their aircraft. Flying needs to be second nature. In my experience the comment re the Tacco on the P3 is far from the truth, as it is re the NAv in a Pig or the Tacco in a Seahawk. Those that drop weapons, (as in missiles, bombs and torpedoes) have a particular knowledge required also. Correct me if I am wrong, when I say that the only guys who drop something, (other than firing door guns), is:

F18
F111
(Hawk and FAC included)
P3
Seahawk
SeaSprite (Steady, we don't know the outcome yet!)
Tiger

But that doesn't make a BBJ driver or a Seaking driver or a Blackhawk driver any less skillfull, IMHO

So far as who owns what, AOTW hit the nail, anyone can probobly do it, the disruption to the capability is the bit that is ovelooked by the headshed when making the decision, my opinion only of course.

Dons flak jacket :D

[StbdD]

Ah, the so often debated issue of whether Rotary Wing Aviation is a maneuver or support element

Seems we once again miss the point due to ego and 'tradition'. There is a bigger picture.

As the helo hasn’t the range to do strategic shaping but is very capable in the shorter range ground commander battle who should it belong to?

Does helicopter aviation have a unique role in hauling troops and supplies and providing close-in fire support or it is a maneuver element in and of itself? It’s both.

When gunships range out in front of the force to destroy armour/hardpoint threats or carry out a screening mission do they do it as an arm of the ground commander ‘shaping of the battlefield’? Or are they executing the intent of the AC/JFAC and under his orders? (I’ll leave discussing of the ATO to another time).

IMHO, and from rather extensive experience, the JFAC could give a rats about the immediate battlespace the ground forces commander is concerned with. JFAC fills ASRs from the ground commander but they are frankly not his main interest. Are ASRS filled there? Yes, but after the rest of the JFAC originated targets are serviced.

The sorts of targets JFAC is after are generally deep ‘strategic shaping’ ones. Not generally suitable for helos. The ground commander is no less interested in strategic shaping but his means of influencing that are nil. Instead, he focuses on relatively close-in targets his assets can reach. His assets should therefore be helos and shorter range attack aircraft.

The helicopter is both an assault/logistic support asset and a battlefield shaper via gunships. It doesn’t have the range to do strategic shaping. Therefore, the majority of rotary wing assets should belong to the ground commander. The exceptions being Spec Ops and Rescue.

[GreenKnight121]

In regards to this particular statement: "And by the way commanders don’t change LZ at the last moment on a whim."

No, they don't... such last-minute changes are the result of the fluid way ground-warfare operates... what was a secure LZ when the flight was requested, and still was when it took off may no longer be so when it gets there.

Does that mean that the landing should be cancelled, and the aircraft (helo or rough-field transport) should return to base so a new LZ can be properly prepared, and the new flight and operation plan properly written out and approved by the Sqdn CO and the other planning/control elements before it can go again? That seems to be the preference of most Air-Force types.

Or does that mean that it orbits at a decent (safe) altitude and distance for a very few minutes while a new LZ is improvised, then carry out the mission? That is much more in line with the NEEDS (not the wants) of the Army elements involved.

Usually, an Army-operated helo or rough-field transport unit will be much more familiar with, prepared for, and ready to do, that kind of improvised, last-minute change in plans than an Air Force unit.

It has nothing to do with willingness to fight, or reluctance to support the ground element, it is inherent in the way of thinking embodied in the organization.

[Captain Sand Dune]

Just one other point close to my heart. While some of you think 34SQN is a waste of resources, don't forget they are the face of the ADF and represent you to the pollies.

I have no doubt that the guys & gals of 34SQN do an excellent job, and it was never my intention to question that.

My point is that perhaps those resources (experienced aircrew, money etc) could be better used in the wider defence community.

IMHO the carraige of pollies should have been the first target of the inexorable march of civilianisation. An ideal job for a corporate charter type operation. I fail to see anything military about carting pollies around.

[ClockwinderWO]

Very interesting debate, even if, at times, the "message" is lost in deeply held personal bias.
Having been in the RAAF at the time of the "switch", and knowing a lot of blues who became green on the groundie side, it takes me back. Anecdotally, nearly all those guys thought the change was positive and liked NOT being deployed as much as when in their blue suits.
I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.
Grounding and storing perfectly capable RAAF 12SQN Chinooks for years didn't help either!!!
Another can-of-worms, I suspect.
I'll leave my own deeply held bias regarding Bou work in the Blue bucket.

[SASless]

Is this argument much the same as the American Military went through in the past....the Air Force wanted to be the Air Arm and fought to deny the Army the capability it now has?

http://www.aircav.com/histavn.html

[baffler15]

[quote=ClockwinderWO;3009042]I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.[quote]

Clockwinder,

Having read several books about the Battle of Long Tan, I can't recall there being any bad sentiment about the performance of 9 Sqn at that time. In fact, given that rain was bucketing down, the delivery of much-needed ammunition at tree top height, on a dark night (without NVGs!) would suggest that the RAAF crews probably wouldn't have paid for a drink for quite some time in any boozer over in Vietnam!

The Baffler

[Arm out the window]

Yes, I believe it wasn't Long Tan, but other experiences the future Gen. Bennett had when he was fighting in Vietnam that led to him to so vehemently pursue the transfer of helicopters from RAAF to Army.
Someone may be able to cast more light on this, but that was certainly the word going round at the time, so I figure it's fair enough to put it on a rumour network.:ok:

[Doors Off]

Pass The Bozo
Many don't know but in East Timor, the army choppers were tasked out of the Air Component. That's right, under the control of an Air Force Air Commodore. So who wants to throw rocks at the Army Blackhawk’s in Timor? They were doing what Air Force told them to do.
Your comment really depends on your interpretation of WHO was doing as they were told. Some enlightened research in to the system of tasking requests etc may well enhance your understanding of the fact that the Air Force and AAAvn were doing what the army had requested, by providing Aviation Support to the Land Force. A very noble task, whether you are a frustrated fixed wing pilot in the RAAF wishing you were flying helicopters but too scared to dig a hole, or a frustrated army pilot looking up at some big aircraft with creature comforts and a chain of command focussed primarily on aviation but too scared to be alone in a motel room.:ok:

[ClockwinderWO]

Baffler,

I agree your sentiments. Note my use of the word "perception". You're right re the performance of 9 Sqn. Remember too, they were "in country" only a short time too. However, did the books you read also mention the sad fact that the ammunition delivered at tree top height in pouring rain at night, was still banded? The Diggers sure did get their critical combat deliveries, but in steel banded boxes! When you're up to the eyes in the sh1t, you don't want to be looking for a band cutter!! This was the the single biggest criticism to come out of the whole operation, by some.
Of course, we all know it wasn't the aircrew to "blame". Some REMF Supply wonk made a very stupid decision (or rather never thought about it all).

[quote=ClockwinderWO;3009042]I offer only one comment - The Army never forgave the RAAF's performance at Long Tan, and no matter what argument you make plus or minus, the entire "switch" is directly attributable to the perception that 9 SQN didn't conform to Army doctrine when engaged in close quarters combat.[quote]

Clockwinder,

Having read several books about the Battle of Long Tan, I can't recall there being any bad sentiment about the performance of 9 Sqn at that time. In fact, given that rain was bucketing down, the delivery of much-needed ammunition at tree top height, on a dark night (without NVGs!) would suggest that the RAAF crews probably wouldn't have paid for a drink for quite some time in any boozer over in Vietnam!

The Baffler

[SASless]

Per Harry Smith, OC of the troops at Long Tan....

At about this time we started running short of ammunition, and I requested helicopter re-supply. This arrived some time after, no mean feat by the pilots in monsoon rain conditions, and was dropped through the trees right into our position during a lull in the VC onslaught, and the ammunition was quickly distributed. Without this re-supply, there is little doubt we would not have survived.

Taken from www.diggerhistory.info/pages-battles/long_tan.htm

[Charlie Luncher]

Griffin
Think we are stuck in a time warp daddy'o, put away the flared white jumpsuit man:hmm: .
Even if you read AAP1000 instead of the latest flight sim manual, it would only give you a broad brush view of the RAAF today. Suggest you look in to ISTAR and where the aviation units of the ADF are deployed on operations instead.:rolleyes:
Giving the RAN control of P3s is fine as long as they don't get their filty mitts on the AP3Cs, it just wouldn't be right:= .
Charlie sends

[griffinblack]

Some good points. I was hoping to continue to pursue the ‘cultural issues’ but will leave that one alone for the time being. There was also some mention of how ‘support’ was used – a related issue to culture. Now that army aviation is a combat arm (this has only formally occurred in the last three or four years) rather than a support arm, the meaning of ‘support arm’ versus ‘combat arm’ and how it is applied is most relevant. Irrespective of how unpalatable it is, the support provided by RAAF tactical lift is one of a ‘support arm’.

The main focus in this thread has been one of command and control. And despite some strident assertions otherwise, this issue continues to be significant for the ground commander. By the way, my view of the support provided during Long Tan was that the Hueys did a magnificent job.

Commanders wish to task organise their forces. This allows them to change structure and design combined arms teams for specific missions. It will often involve re-grouping. A commander relies on the forces ‘allocated’ to him to achieve the mission. Army aviation units will generally (this also depends on what types/unit you are allocating) be allocated OPCOMD or TACOMD for phases or missions (noting that there can be several phases for a mission, with a phase changing either when ME changes or a re-group occurs). Control implies either OPCON or TACON – the maximum level of C2 expected from a RAAF unit.

Very briefly, being assigned OPCOMD or TACOMD (under command) allows a commander to specify missions and tasks and allocate those forces to his CT’s ( invariably his Main Effort – ME). This is not possible under TACON/OPCON. That means if the RAAF allocate a unit to 3 bde, the 3 Bde commander is unable to further assign that unit to his ME. He may not task the unit assigned to him.

I won’t join the dots, I will let the collective brains here determine why Commanders need ‘command’ of assigned forces to successfully operate as a combined arms team. That is not to say TACON/OPCON does not work – it does, but only for very proscriptive operations that is unlikely to change and is rather simple in nature and complexity.

Unless the RAAF would be prepared to allocate forces ‘under command’, C2 would always be a war stopper.

[Arm out the window]

griffinblack, a couple of points:
combat arm vs. support arm - unpalatable? Why? Everyone's hopefully doing their bit to make the battle go as well as possible, so I don't think a classification either way is a biggie as long as that happens.
On that note, and harking back to the pre-helicopter transfer days (obviously not relevant to today's situation, but part of the original premise for the debate), what would the RAAF gunships and slicks carrying out an airmobile insert as part of a coordinated battle plan (eg artillery stops, gunships soften up the area around the LZ, slicks land and deplane troops who then go directly into battle) be classified as?

Command & control:
How does this sound? Exercise of, say, three weeks main 'fighting' with periods of preparation and wash-up before and after. Helicopter squadrons tasked out of a nearby base for the 'admin' periods via normal RAAF tasking system, but when the 'real war' starts, deploy in bush near supported battalion / brigade - RAAF TACP is in the commander's HQ, assets are there for him to use as needed, tasking comes from the TACP to squadron CP, squadron GLO and Intello provide timely liaison and intel, air assets move around the battlefield coordinated with arty, naval gunfire, CAS and other air movements. Also provide a SAR capability.
Helicopters are positioned there to work for that infantry commander and do the jobs he wants done, do that for the assigned period, then go back to base - impossible you say? Those RAAFies wouldn't be able to do it!
Next you'll be telling me that these days, each ground commander has an eager squadron of helicopters with pilots cammed up and sitting in the cockpit waiting for him to shout 'Scramble!':)

[baffler15]

However, did the books you read also mention the sad fact that the ammunition delivered at tree top height in pouring rain at night, was still banded? The Diggers sure did get their critical combat deliveries, but in steel banded boxes! When you're up to the eyes in the sh1t, you don't want to be looking for a band cutter!! This was the the single biggest criticism to come out of the whole operation, by some.
Of course, we all know it wasn't the aircrew to "blame". Some REMF Supply wonk made a very stupid decision (or rather never thought about it all).

F:mad: 'n Q-ees!:ok:

Baffler

[trapezoid]

For GriffinBlack,

You have certainly rolled out the cliches. Lets see if I have them all:

Land Manoeuvre
Combined Arms Team
Hardened and Networked Army WTF?
Commander's Intent
Task Org Matrixes (sic)

Do you really believe it or have you just done staff college?

Did Douglas McCarthur or Chester Nimitz worry themselves with Task Org Matrices?

Can a force that is bogged down in doctrine react quickly?

Interested

[Brian Abraham]

Re Long Tan - Army Major Peter Young worked in intelligence (yes I’ve heard the oxymoron jokes) in Vietnam and became “The Australian” newspaper defence correspondent following his service. Many years ago during the course of a book review about the conflict he related that when the request for resupply came in the RAAF declined (maybe due to the god awful weather, but who knows) where upon the US Army rep said they would do the job. The RAAF then accepted the task.

I have some sympathy for the Army if the one and only time I worked (1972) with the RAAF was an indication of how business was done. The SAS approached the RAAF for Huey support to make a dawn helo insertion from the aircraft carrier to Beecroft range. The RAAF declined on the basis the Huey was not cleared to operate from ships. The SAS then approached the Navy thinking they might be able to use the Wessex. It was explained that stripping the anti sub gear was one hell of a job and so why not use the Hueys (Navy had 5). But the RAAF told us ………. they said. The deal was done and then the RAAF found that Hueys could operate from ships and so would participate. The idea was for crews to stay over night on the ship, brief and fly the dawn mission. The RAAF decided the ships accommodation was sub standard and they would be unable to get adequate rest because of the unfamiliar noises. It was suggested they stay in the Nowra mess but that too was considered sub standard and because it was an airfield aircraft operations would disturb their rest. That meant staying in a motel in town. All this then raised other issues. They would be unable to position to the ship in time because they were not permitted to fly over water at night (ship was to be one mile off shore) because they didn’t have RADALTS. And they couldn’t fly before having breakfast so everything swung around the time of breakfast being served in the motel. The SAS got to the beach in time for lunch (just). I make no judgement, just relating what happened.

[Little Fish]

Surely it doesnt make any real difference who flies the aircraft. Whether a guy (or gal these days) ticks the blue or green box is irrelevent. It all comes down to training. Why not send someone who is going to operate an aircraft in support of the land battle to do courses like COAC. Surely it is an individuals personality and the culture of their sqn that makes the difference. I can assure you all, there is just as big a diference in culture between a recce and an airmobile sqn as there is is between a lift and fighter sqn.

We have this argument at work all the time. There are currently Raafies in AAAvn (and there have been more in the past both recce and airmobile) and all of them are doing a sterling job. It's not the uniform but the individual and their training that makes the difference. Why not give all the air assets from army and navy (including UAV's to the air force) but then make different FEGs do either maritime or land courses. As far as C2 goes why not rally to have assets assigned OPCOMD or TACOMD so that the job can get done.

After all, egos aside, we are all on the same team.

LF :ok:

[griffinblack]

PAF-

Army.. throwing a spanner in the works of an efficient aviation operation.
Perhaps that was the attitude that lead to army needing to control battlefield aviation.

A-O-T-W

Before I address some of your points. I don’t buy your response about the Caribou replacement. Replacing a weapon system requires significant staff work and impetus from senior commanders (chiefly the CAF). Since the Caribou was supposed to be replaced we have upgraded almost all other platforms, and the venerable old girl is well past its used by date and not viably operational (Certainly hasn’t been deployed in more challenging theatres). But I would be interested in how you see the RAAF withdrawal of the CH47 – what message did that give about the seriousness of battlefield/tactical transport from our blue brethren. I clearly remember the FAA withdrawing A4 in the knowledge that the RAAF would provide fleet support. We know were that lead, leasing our own A4’s back from the Kiwi’s. So, I can demonstrate that on two occasions in recent history the RAAF have failed to provide necessary aviation support to the navy and army.

Your point about your three week ‘exercise’. Let us go one step further and say the RAAF, under your paradigm, is supporting a land operation in a theatre of war. I, as brigade staff develop a plan for the Bde COMD that involves risk – a JAAT that will destroy the en’s reserve (an en BG) and thus undermine his ability to conduct offensive operations (this will almost certainly reduce casualties amongst our ground guys). I go to the TACP and provide the plans and say that there is a chance of loosing an aircraft (or two) but it will significantly reduce the likelihood of the brigade becoming decisively engaged – we may save 50-100 lives. Who accepts the risk – the RAAF comd (I am guessing it will be approved by the air comd) or the land component commander? A vital point- can the RAAF refuse to do the task?

The point being, the pretty picture you drew above makes no difference. The land comd needs autonomy of ‘his’ assets. He needs to command them and needs to accept the risk of loss. He cannot afford to have assets withdrawn or have tasks knocked back – much as Brian described with the initial refusal of RAAF to support the resupply at Long Tan.

Trapizoid,

I was going to be harsh and say that if you don’t understand the terms stated then this is not the thread for you, but I shan’t. I am guessing you are a pilot – how then do civilians view ‘pilot’ jargon? (they probably think it is a whole lot of meaningless terms). Have you heard FJ guys talk? - they have a common language, hard to understand (but necessary). I assure you the terms I have used are commonly used in planning, briefings and orders of land operations - including army aviation (and a hell of a lot more terms). Dare I say, that if those providing ‘support’ had a better understanding of the language (and doctrine) of the ‘customer’, this topic would never need to be raised.

[Arm out the window]

Griffinblack,
Re the Caribou: buy my response or not as you see fit, but projects have been under way for donkey's years to get a replacement, and each time it's come close the money has not been forthcoming due to other requirements seen as more pressing. The last time this happened, they were down to the short short list when it fell off the budget - much time and money had been spent getting to that stage which the RAAF would hardly have wasted if they'd never wanted to replace it at all.

Chinooks: I don't know the full story as to why the 12 SQN machines were mothballed, but I think at least in part it was a reaction to the loss of the rest of the helicopter assets - ie. after all our best efforts and advice, the transfer has gone ahead, so OK, we're not wasting any more time and assets on this.
This happened after the utility helo transfer, so in no way is it an indication of the seriousness with which the RAAF previously approached its battlefield/tac transport duties, as you imply. Previous to that, and as I've discussed above, the Army were getting good service.

Re your point about who accepts the risk in a task: in the scenario I mentioned in the last post (which is not my pretty picture but rather how we were working prior to the helicopter transfer, albeit on exercises rather than real operations), helicopters were used in the ways I mentioned and therefore being placed in risky positions as much as anyone else on the battlefield.
The BALO or DALO as the case may be wasn't going up the chain to ask his boss whether a task was acceptable or not, he was working with the ground commander/s to advise on the sensible use of air assets and come up with a reasonable plan, something that I'm sure would still happen with Army-owned assets, ie infantry boss wants to do something with his helicopters and his air advisors tell him what they think about it.
As the air assets are expensive and hard to replace no matter who owns them, the answer as to what would be an acceptable risk would likely be similar whether it was RAAF or AAAvn helicopter guys doing the talking.

[trapezoid]

Griffinblack,

20 years as a military aviator, QFI (real one from CFS), served in real conflict, happily retired (still flying) long time interested in real conflicts from the great wars: land, naval, and air.

Don't be thinking that RMC is the only place that one can be a student of warfare. Your arrogance belies your military origin.

Having drawn such a long bow at the RAAF (my military origin) you need to answer some of my questions or pull your head in.

Which brings me to the still unanswered first question. Do you really believe it? Can you react?

The badhats are coming over the hill, this calls for an immediate task org matrix.

BTW, I never said that I didn't understand those terms, an incorrect assumption on your part. Happy to listen to your argument, just spare us the aide memoire fervour.

Hardened and networked? Come on.

[Arm out the window]

I must add a bit of fuel to the fire here:
A couple of years after the helo transfer, I actually jumped the fence and put on the green uniform with the blue cordy thing that goes in your pocket for a few years, before going back the other way.
I went back to the same base doing a very similar job to what I'd been doing previously in the blue uniform. So what were the changes in capability?

1. From the Army's point of view, there was a big expansion going on and lots of learning to do.

2. Some of the Army guys running the troops and squadrons had worked with the RAAF as a transition measure, so the procedures and tactics didn't change a great deal. Lifting people and objects round the battlefield and brassing things up with gunships was done much as it had been previously.

3. Aircraft availability went down somewhat because every bastard was off doing PT, or away on subject 3 for Corporal or whatever all the time. Additionally, the maintainers were on the same big learning curve as the aircrew.

4. The deeper knowledge of the ground commander's intentions supposedly posessed by the newly-appointed aviation commanders made bugger-all difference to what we did, how we did it or how well it worked.

5. The depth of aviation experience posessed by those guys running the outfit at most levels was relatively less than before, and there was a different attitude from some pilots (certainly not all, there were some really good operators too) about how much they should know about their craft.

Example: As troop QFI I did an emergencies check on my troop commander.
For practice, I gave him a notional boost pump failure. 'If we were up in the hills, what height would we have to descend to now?'
No idea. A very straightforward emergency that he should have known like his two times table. The worst bit was that he didn't seem to think it was a big deal.
These guys were basically bograts thrust into a position of responsibility so they were snowed under with paperwork and regimental bull**** when they should have been getting really good at their primary job - flying well themselves and making sure our aviation tasks were done as well as possible.
I don't expect people to know how many rivets in the tail boom, but they should know their stuff properly before being let loose with a crew and pax.

Finally, Griffinblack, these blokes who I assume are the ones you refer to as having the knowledge required to be the aces of the battlefield for the infantry commander, had no advantage over a RAAFie with similar time in a working squadron, and in some cases were at a distinct disadvantage because of their relatively junior status for the jobs they were thrown into.

[Captain Sand Dune]

AOTW,

Give up mate. Experience, facts and logic are no match for Army staff college dogma!:E

[Arm out the window]

Maybe so, but those acronyms and such certainly sounded convincing for a bit!:)

[sagy34]

Pass-A-Frozo,

mate aren't the RAF regiment the same as ADGeeeeeees, just glorified grunts wearing blue:confused: :confused: :confused:

aren't they the next best thing to the SAS:confused: :confused: :confused:

Don't think your comment has much cred:ok:

[Point0Five]

mate aren't the RAF regiment the same as ADGeeeeeees, just glorified grunts wearing blue

No, they control Ground Based Air Defence, I believe that PAF supports the RAAF filling this role, rather than the Army.

aren't they the next best thing to the SAS

Kinda true, they both create media interest regarding their misbehaviour of their unit members...

[griffinblack]

AOTW

The BALO or DALO as the case may be wasn't going up the chain to ask his boss whether a task was acceptable or not

the answer as to what would be an acceptable risk would likely be similar whether it was RAAF or AAAvn helicopter guys doing the talking.

AOTW – please state for me clearly and unambiguously, who accepts the risk? And if the risk is considered too high by the RAAF comd, can he refuse it?

By the way, I disagree with both points above. The last BALO I worked with (quite recently) was an ATCO. I don’t think he would make any decisions. I am sure he would go to the CO, who would then give a quick call to the FEG comd who may then call the Air Comd.

I must add a bit of fuel to the fire here:
A couple of years after the helo transfer, I actually jumped the fence and put on the green uniform with the blue cordy thing that goes in your pocket for a few years, before going back the other way.

You forget I know you and have flown with you a number of times.

I don't expect people to know how many rivets in the tail boom, but they should know their stuff properly before being let loose with a crew and pax.

I totally agree. But this includes technical and tactical aspects in equal amounts.


Trapezoid –

I have no idea why you feel a CFS trained QFI is worth mentioning.

Do you really believe it? Can you react?

Yes

Hardened and networked? Come on.

HNA. Yeah well. Hardening in coming along well. Networked – not so good. However, networking is a problem for all services of all defence forces. I would call it an asperational statement.



Experience, facts and logic are no match for Army staff college dogma!

No staff college for me!!!

PAF

So your JTAC did exactly what the JOST or platoon commander told him to do. He did his job well and got rewarded. Well done.

No, they control Ground Based Air Defence, I believe that PAF supports the RAAF filling this role, rather than the Army.

And give away one of our BOSes? What is the purpose of GBAD?

[trapezoid]

Griffinblack,

To let you know that I have mil credentials.

Confirm or deny this to the forum please.

There are morons in our service who spout doctrine and just gum up the works and there are quiet achievers, highly competent people who go about their business quietly and make everything happen.

One of the most tub thumping doctrinites I ever met was an Army Aviation Officer who was so blitheringly incompetent (and everyone knew it), yet still he climbed the greasy pole.

Which are you?

[Arm out the window]

Griffinblack, I think you're just trying to point score for some reason, cherry-picking parts of people's comments and ignoring the rest, but are you suggesting that an Army helicopter unit would accept more risk than a RAAF one? Unless the infantry commander has his own helicopters, ie part of his unit that he can task as he wants, there's going to be possible conflict between him wanting to do something on the one hand, and the aviators possibly thinking it's too risky on the other, be they green or blue uniformed.

'You forget I know you and have flown with you a number of times.' - my discussion of my background was aimed at cutting through some of this hypothetical to and fro-ing. It's just what I saw, and unless things have changed drastically since I left, a background or otherwise in ground warfare makes little difference to how you shape up as a helicopter operator in the battlefield environment. If that's your contention, then I reckon it's a crock.

[griffinblack]

Trapezoid –

From my point of view, I cannot deny your statement.

Which are you?

Why don’t you PM me, and I will let you know exactly my credentials and background and you can decide.

PAF –

Nice try.

AOTW –

but are you suggesting that an Army helicopter unit would accept more risk than a RAAF one?

The answer is yes (in context). Using our example above, with the need to conduct JAAT IOT save lives, I have no doubt army aviation would do the task, the question is would RAAF do the task? and are they able to refuse it? Clearly the task is ‘extreme’ risk. I am still waiting for this answer from you. In day to day training and exercises the answer is no.

You say

my discussion of my background was aimed at cutting through some of this hypothetical to and fro-ing

However, you initially stated you wanted to add fuel to the fire.

Unless the infantry commander has his own helicopters, ie part of his unit that he can task as he wants, there's going to be possible conflict between him wanting to do something on the one hand, and the aviators possibly thinking it's too risky on the other, be they green or blue uniformed.

The commander is the commander. He may be infantry, armoured, artillery or even aviation (its an arms corps thing). The task force/formation commander is nevertheless the commander and tasks ‘his’ assets.

unless things have changed drastically since I left

When was the last time you served in an Air or Land Comd unit?

a background or otherwise in ground warfare makes little difference to how you shape up as a helicopter operator in the battlefield environment. If that's your contention, then I reckon it's a crock.

Sure, if you are a new pilot or number 3 in a formation of 8. But if you are S3, LO, OC or Tp comd, you must know and understand ground manoeuvre to be most effective. How do we shape those young guys to think and understand?

Perhaps that leads nicely into culture…. Do you wish to start?

[Mark Six]

Just to throw a bit of petrol on the fire...
I asked my father his opinion about the reasoning behind the decision to hand over rotary wing assets from RAAF to Army. He was a career Army officer (33 years), with 2 tours of Vietnam, was wounded a couple of times and awarded an MC, etc, so he was involved at the sharp end and frequently made use of helicopters in the battlefield. He reckons the decision has its origin in Vietnam and the experiences of his contemporaries who went on to lead the Army and the ADF. In his experience the US forces and Oz Army (Sioux) used there helicopters as "just another piece of battlefield equipment", whereas the RAAF were a bit more "conservative." As an example, he says it was a waste of time doing a recce with the RAAF because they would not fly below a certain height (1500 feet?) due to the risk from small arms fire. He remembers asking a US pilot to fly a HUEY at 100 feet and 90 knots, and the pilot replied "Sir, I'll give you 90 feet and 100 knots."

[Doors Off]

Pass-the-Bozo,
Try to avoid being overly emotive with your points. The RAAF has done a great job in its role, as has the army. Like any organisation be it Woolworths, RAAF or Army, mistakes have been made and improvements are needed.
You probably need to get over the fact that the organisation you belong to no longer has rotary assets and will not get them back. If you would like to fly helicopters, it really is good fun, pop on down to the recruiting office and put in your transfer paperwork. I am sure the army would love to have you on board, then you can start influencing the organisation and implement some of the improvements you have in mind.
You will probably have to get over your apparent dislike of SSO's, nothing a couple of beers with some of 'Them' couldn't fix.
I get the impression from your hatred of the army that you are an ADFA Artist, struggle with your fitness and your slightly chubby ex-girlfriend was given a lovely seeing to by a dashingly handsome army aviator who happened to be an SSO.
Do some more reading in to events in Afghanistan (and Iraq) and view the performances by US Army, Marines, UK AAC and AAAvn and seriously ask yourself would the level of performance be enhanced if it was all being done by the world's Air Forces. Also do some more research in to the aviation tasking system in the ADF. Useful education is a wonderful thing, we can all learn.;)

[Arm out the window]

MarkSix, g'day, hope you're getting along well, and full credit to your Dad's experiences - fair points he makes, by the sounds of it.

Griffinblack;
The 'ownership' aspect of the helicopters and who accepts the risk has to be a contentious issue, even though it's ultimately the taxpayer who does own them. I don't agree that Army helicopter operators would be more willing to take on risky jobs than RAAFies in a similar role - I can't see the CO of 5Avn being any more keen to waste a couple of his helicopters and crews than a RAAF CO would have been. I agree that the more complicated system of command and control necessitated by joint operations could make it harder to get a go-ahead on a risky task than a single-service environment, so there would probably be more opportunities for a task to be knocked back in the former case.
However, as I mentioned before, the exercise scenario (for what it's worth) used to be RAAF helicopters tasked by the TACP, so the BALO would be advising the ground commander and issuing tasks direct to the units. Whether that would have changed in real operations, I don't know.

"When was the last time you served in an Air or Land Comd unit?"
My last Army support task was my last RAAF flight, (Caribou, Sep 01), so I'm not that far out of touch yet (although some may say I wasn't ever really in touch). That posting included a bunch of Army tasking, as well as 6 months in Timor over 3 trips, so it was related to the kind of thing we're talking about.
My last operational Army helicopter job was in 1995, so a while back, but as I've said a few times, the land warfare background of the guys taking over the reins didn't, in my experience, give them any particular advantage over anyone else. What can I say? It's counter to your suggestion, but that's how I see it.

Quotes:
(Me) I don't expect people to know how many rivets in the tail boom, but they should know their stuff properly before being let loose with a crew and pax.

(You) I totally agree. But this includes technical and tactical aspects in equal amounts.

Not sure what you're getting at with this - it's air tactics in support of the ground battle that were important in the kind of flying we're talking about, and the RAAF had that going pretty well. Helicopter crews needed an appreciation of the current, expected and desired progress of the land battle, but you don't need to have gone to Duntroon to get that.

Well, that's about it from me - can't see the helicopters going back the other way any time soon so it's all a bit academic.

[Mark Six]

G'Day AOTW,
You'd have a laugh if you knew where I was now.
I didn't remember you as being such an argumentative little bugger.
I'm still in awe of you after watching you argue with Sikorsky's chief test pilot over helicopter aerody!

[griffinblack]

PAF –

Take a mothers little helper and have a nice lie down. You’re a little emotional and illogical, perhaps you can form a coherent argument and re-engage.

Doors off -

Hahahahahaha. Stop baiting the crabs!!!! It’s fun does not advance the argument.

AOTW –

Good post.

[Super 64]

PAF,

First of all this:

Air Defence guards should be army, not air force."

Then:


Yeah, sounds like the RAF have it wrong and Australian Army Aviation are correct. People in blue suits definitely don't understand ground maneuver :
I guess if he were Army he would have performed better due to his enhanced understanding of "ground maneuver" and been awarded a VC. :rolleyes:


So which is it, should ADG's be RAAF or Army? Looks like all you really want to do is beat whichever drum supports your argument at the time. I guess you're another prime example of over a decade of being told 'you're the cream of the crop', you start to believe that it's true, that you can only ever be right. Unfortunately for your brethren in blue, you're the type of guy that gives them a bad reputation and everyone else the $hit$.

S64.

[GreenKnight121]

"I can't see the CO of 5Avn being any more keen to waste a couple of his helicopters and crews than a RAAF CO would have been."


From one who has been on the greasy side of those things (81-89 repairing avionics for USMC), it all depends on what the definition of "waste" is... and on one's definition of "acceptable risk" and "possibility of success", now doesn't it?

The commander whose men are the ones in dire need of the "air support/medevac/lift out" is probably going to rate their risk a little heavier than someone else's aircrew's risk, while a "different service" commander loaning his aircrew and helo out to aid someone else's men is likely to reverse the weightings.

The Army commander is not disregarding the safety of the aircrew even a smidgeon (in his mind), he just has a greater sense of urgency about his own men's needs.

This is NOT usually a deliberate, conscious decision... this weighting mostly happens on the subconscious, emotional level.

This is simply a fact of human nature... you care more about those you know personally, or who you have been given specific responsibility for.

Does this mean the ground commander is more correct... or correct more times?

Not necessarily, but as the one "on the ground", you feel more comfortable relying on the commander "in our own service" than that "different service" commander.

Once again, a subconscious, emotional level thing more than a rational opinion based on experience.

You may have great support from "those other guys" 95% of the time, but one bad experience (or one mis-percieved as bad) can outweigh dozens of good experiences.

I do know that both the US Army and the USMC ground elements feel & claim that Army rotary-wing and USMC fast jet & rotary-wing air support is pressed more closely and persistently than USN & USAF air support is... correct or not, that is what they feel.


Thus an Army in command of the ADF wants the helos on the "Army's team", right or wrong.

Of course, the aircrew are now "his men" as well, now aren't they... so the same dynamic will keep him from "wasting" them, won't it?

[GreenKnight121]

One comment to add to my previous statements on attitudes and "pressing attacks more closely".

The A-6E Intruder (all-weather heavy attack jet, for those not familiar with US equipment) has something I have not seen on any other aircraft: externally mounted "bolt-on" armor plates for the engines... which are issued to each squadron, and with which they periodically fly in order to get used to how they affect performance.

At least... each USMC squadron has them... I saw them in VMA(AW)-242's hangar, have helped load & unload VMA(AW)-121's armor during our 1985-1987 deployments (to Korea & the Arabian Gulf) aboard CV-61 Ranger, and have seen both squadron's aircraft flying with them.

I never saw any armor at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington (the USN's West coast A-6E/EA-6B base), nor did the USN A-6E squadron on Ranger (VA(AW)-145) bring any with them!


Just some food for thought...

[MaroonMan4]

Guys,

I have been lurking in the wings on this thread for a while - and it is like de ja vue from some threads that appeared (and from time to time still do) here on Prune having a good slagging match between Services.

Most is banter, some is harsh and the rest is just ill informed, arrogant, jealous ranting.

However, recently rounds going both way in an Operational theatre that has not only 'pressed to test' the whole Joint thing but also the air/land integration (at the tactical/shop floor level).

I do not see any posts from the 'Patriot' callsigns or the 'cabbage and potato dressed group' - who are doing a superb job and really supporting the customer on the ground. This is where it counts.

I am not for one moment saying that the UK template of the Joint Helicopter Command is a role model - it has some significant work to do, but I really hope that you put all this bitching behind you as when it counts the indications from this thread are that you all need to pull together you will have so much superflous rubbish to wade through before you recognise that you are all in it together. I thought that it was us Pommies that whinged!

One thing is for sure that if you do not unite together and keep the historical mud slinging to friendly banter then in a climate of tight budgets, NAO reports and high operational tempos you will be swallowed up by those that are united and know exactly what they want out of a budget/procurement (I am sure that the RAN or the Gunners would just love to exploit any cracks appearing in the 'winged community').

You have so much going for you - ABCCC,C17, JSF, ARH Tiger, UAVs, MRH 90, new ships - a real spend fest as you come back into the sphere of a credible world wide defence capability (and dont just push your SF and medics on Ops).

So pull together - train together (hard I know when you are geographically based so far apart!), that way - when it happens (i.e. Contact Wait Out) - you will be able to fight together.

If I get this this thread right it is all about ownership of of a light fixed wing capability - an air taxi/limted movement of men/material?I would suggest that you want to start looking at your ARH/CH 47 integration and your rotary wing/infantry integration and your Air Component (CAS)/Land Component (ARH/Infantry) integration and prioritise the King Air debate to lower in the stack. The King Air debate could be done be done by readers of Flight International or Aviation Week as a Christmas competition, the Joint integrated battle takes all - the Staff College graduates, the old and bold specialist aviators and most importantly the bloke/girl on the ground in harms way calling you in and more than likely danger close.

Just a thought and observation?

[eagle 86]

Mark Six,
I was probably there with the RAAF when your father was in country and could well have known him.
I also flew briefly with the US Army. The US Army lost more helos in accidents in the RSVN than they did to enemy fire. I am at a loss to see what sort of a recce you could conduct at 100feet/90knots.
I was not Air Force and was critical of some of the dictatorial attitudes RAAF Senior Officers had to Army requirements. However at an operator level the Army, particularly the SAS, had nothing but praise for RAAF support.
In a book written about 1RAR's experience in RSVN a sentence in essence reads "when the face in the cockpit was sporting a beard we knew the job would be done right".
In a later part of my mil career I was instrumental in developing Naval Aviation tactics in support of SAS Bass Straight oil rig protection.
Comments passed to me at the time were that Army received more co-operative support from Naval Air than they did from Air Force. The Brits had the same experience earlier in places such as Borneo.
GAGS
E86

[Mark Six]

Eagle 86,
No argument with any of your points. I think my father was just making the point that the Americans were happy to do pretty much whatever was asked of them when it came to utilising their helicopters and supporting the Army.
I also remember the line about the bearded face - must have read the same book. You won't get any argument from me regarding Naval support for the SAS either- I had the pleasure of flying the Wessex in Bass Strait in formation at night on cyalume sticks. Was that your idea?!

[eagle 86]

M6
Yes.
GAGS E86

[jessie13]

Is it about time that I add that the RAAF were good at operating rotary assests along as it wasn't on the week end, public holiday's, at night or in the wet!
Seriously, I've spent 22 years looking after these rotary wing beasties for both pussers and the army and am more than happy with the way both of these services operate. I know that I dont have the "operational experience" of the aircraft that some of you have, but I definately have the deployed experience to say that from my experiences everyone did their jobs professionally and displayed all the attributes that all of you want in a professional military helicopter pilot. I have worked in tri-service enviroments on operations and can happily say that everyone did want was asked, no matter who was in charge, and every task was achieved. With all the cooperation and "networking" we all do, we have been and always will be a big happy family in the rotary wing world. Don't deny it, our world is very small and everyone knows everyone, and the cooperation between the three services with helicopters has been a very successful and friendly.
As for the tactics, warfighting, landwarfare etc, its my hubble opinion that because alot of this is experience gained from various overseas countries and at home, being UK, US or other, each service has been trained for a purpose by others and knows their jobs well without needing to know what everyone else has to do or is doing.
If you want to what a sh#t fight is like, have a read of the book by the retired USAF Colonel who was in charge of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the tradegy at Desert 1, now thats a book that will open your eyes to your original question about who should operate helicopter! Try having an operation with marines, army, navy and airforce trying to operate together in this example!

[Ascend Charlie]

I had the pleasure of being on Kangaroo 1, whereby the RAAF provided support to the Army and others. At the end of each day, the RAAF returned to Rocky and headed off to the motel for a good night's sleep, aided by a few bottles of anaesthetic.

Come time for K2, the grunts had moaned long and hard about the RAAF being in a motel, so this time, we were in tents on the airfield, with Thunderboxes dug just next to the perimeter road, which elicited a few catcalls from passing motorists. Not as good as a motel, but we still slept. But still the grunts moaned.

Eventually, the RAAF choppers were encamped with the army lads. Which was a seriously bad idea. This was the dawning of lots of night ops and NVGs, but sadly, the aircrews could not get sleep in a tent in an active army camp during the day. Result, tired aircrew flogging around in the dark. Result, one Huey smeared over a hillside and lots of dead people.

Lots of finger pointing, but the Streakers Defence was used :

"It seemed like a good idea at the time."

The ADF has pulled the Streakers Defence plenty of times since then, and one person's good idea is another's definition of stupidity.

It has been that way forever, and will probably continue to be. :(

[eagle 86]

In '68 whilst preparing for the SE Asia War Games I lived in a tent in the bush right beside our Army colleagues at Shoalwater Bay as part of RAAF support for 4RAR's pre-deployment workup - and I was Navy!
GAGS
E86

[Captain Sand Dune]

Gee! How did a grizzled old sea dog like you do without your morning shake and someone to straighten your cabin every morning?:}
aaaaarrrrrrrrrrrrrr..........:E

[eagle 86]

CSD,
I've often suspected that I may know you!!
GAGS
E86

[Wiley]

I had the pleasure of being on Kangaroo 1, whereby the RAAF provided support to the Army and others. At the end of each day, the RAAF returned to Rocky and headed off to the motel for a good night's sleep, aided by a few bottles of anaesthetic.Sorry, 'Ascend Charlie', but I was on K1 and I can assure you the RAAF chopper crews did NOT live in a motel, but in tents in the main support camp on Rocky airfield, which I grant were probably a lot more comfortable than a shell scrape out at Sam Hill. In fact I know it was, because I spent a few nights in a pup tent out in the exercise area when we did the emergency standby duty at the field hospital, (where the matron would call a practice triage every night just before lights out to get 'her' nurses well out of the clutches of any visiting blue suited male).

I know that even the 'looxury' of a tent at the main base camp seriously pissed off some of the grunts. I can recall baiting an arty major out at Sam Hill one day telling him how we had to make do with cold showers when we got back to Rocky after dark every evening. Not having showered for a week, he 'bit' wonderfully well. God help me, with that little stir, I was probably partly responsible for the helos' transfer to the Army.

You're not totally wrong about some RAAF crews using motels during the exercise though. I can remember being told that the Herc crews would be put up in tents during the exercise and we all lined up grinning from ear to ear to watch their reaction to that piece of news on arrival at Rocky. However, they insisted on 'proper' accommodation and were put up in a motel in town, so we were denied that one piece of entertainment.

[Captain Sand Dune]

CSD,
I've often suspected that I may know you!!
GAGS
E86
aaaaaarrrrrrr........'tis not true..aaaaarrrrr:}

[GreenKnight121]

"Try having an operation with marines, army, navy and airforce trying to operate together in this example!"


Marines flying Navy minesweeper MH-53s (without intake dust-filters), refueling from Air Force C-130s (whose encrypted radios wouldn't link with the USN helos' differently encrypted radios), with Army troops aboard!

Just because it was decided that all 4 services had to get their share of "glory", so no one would feel left out.

Of course, it would have been unthinkable to use Marines to fly USMC CH-53s, refuel from USMC KC-130s, with Force Recon on board, absolutely impossible!

[jessie13]

GreenKnight121, have you read the book?

[GreenKnight121]

Not that particular one, no, but there has been enough written about it for a lot of years to get a good picture of how it was "planned" (I use the term loosely) and how it went bad.

As this was not old history for me (I enlisted in the USMC July 1980), I have indeed paid attention to the facts as they became available, and have also seen how various authors have tried to "interpret" those facts to fit their particular agenda.

That is why I will accept no single author's view, no matter how "well respected" he is, or "definitive" his book is hailed to be.

More often than not, time does not bring clarity, but allows for well-meaning distortion of the event to go unchallenged as those with first-hand knowledge are ignored as "being too close to the situation to be objective", or simply aren't around to confirm or dispute the "new view" of the event.



Since the book you cite was written by a USAF officer involved in the operation, he has a decent view of what went wrong... and I do believe it would have gone much better if the USAF had provided the helos (if they had any suitable ones) and special ops types to lead the normal troops as well as the refueler/long range transport aircraft.

My statement about an all-Marine force was simply to illustrate one possible alternative to the politically-driven cluster-f$ck that actually went down.

Regardless of who ran the show, a single-service force would have avoided most of the problems with the mission.


Either that, or a coherant process & plan that equipped all services with compatable equipment, trained them all with the same standards and operating procedures, and conducted regular all-service planning & training exercises to allow them to become a unified team, rather than a bunch of separate "my way is the only way" teams working against each other whenever there is no one to "unite" against.

If you have spent the years of the peace fighting against one another, you will find it hard to put those differences aside when you have to "unite" against a common enemy... look at what went on in the US military headquarters in WW2 for a classic example. Inter-service rivalries & reluctance to cooperate added at least 6 months to the Pacific war, IMO.


In the 1980s & 1990s, the US Armed Forces have tried to fix those problems in incompatable equipment & training, and to work together more closely & more often, but they still have a long way to go to actually get it right.

[EffohX]

A friend passed me the link to this now dead thread. I think many of not most of the comments made (from both camps) come from people so deeply rooted in that they ‘know’ that no argument from the other side will have any impact at all. However, one comment from ‘jessie13’ is so patently ridiculous I had to comment.Is it about time that I add that the RAAF were good at operating rotary assets along as it wasn't on the week end, public holiday's, at night or in the wet!The first part of what he says is true; the “week end, public holiday's (sic), at night” proviso, utter bollocks.

Much of the flying I did on Hueys was at weekends supporting Army Reserve units, and almost every detachment to support a Regular unit involved starting first thing Monday morning and finished at 1500 on Friday afternoon - for the Army unit at least.

The chopper crew had to deploy on the Sunday to be on station at 0800 Monday morning and sometimes had to wait until Saturday to fly back to Amberley or Canberra - all to fit in with most regular Army units' "Monday to Friday" roster.

And when an individual Army unit went into the field maybe twice a year, the same helicopter (and Caribou) crews would be out in the bush digging yet another shell scrape a week or two later supporting another Army unit.

The comment above is a furphy up there with the crap you continually hear from Army people about RAAF chopper crews demanding always to be put up in five star hotels. All the five star hotels I stayed in in my time on choppers with the RAAF had green canvas walls - if I was lucky.

[AC3854]

Why are helicopters called 'rotary wing assets'?

AC3854

[Arm out the window]

To distinguish them from 'fixed wing liabilities'!

[Arm out the window]

Well, good point, but their wings don't rotate that much these days by all accounts!
Mustn't be that confidence-boosting to be having to press 'CTRL-ALT-DELETE' to make the computers talk to eachother again whilst tooling around over the dark cold sea at night.:eek:

[Captain Sand Dune]

EffohX,

Sounds identical to my short-lived RAAF rotary wing career.:{ But never let the facts stand in the way of a good story! :hmm:

Another example of how the politics of inter-service rivalry can fcuk up something that's working quite well to start with.:mad:

[EffohX]

I was always surprised at the antipathy towards the RAAF that was so often displayed by the men (there were few women in my day) of the Green Machine.

(I know I’m treading on really thin ice here and am standing by for the inevitable ‘incoming’ my next comments will generate), but it reminded me a lot of what we used to call the ‘inverse snobbery’ that my wife would sometimes encounter from some (I stress only some) of her staff where she worked in the town near our RAAF base. They (her staff) were married to (RAAF) enlisted men, while she, their boss, was married to an officer, and so it was just assumed by these ladies that she would come over all superior – (I hasten to say that my wife acted anything but) – and she found herself working with women with a serious attitude problem before she’d opened her mouth.

I quite frequently found this same attitude among some (again, I stress some) Army personnel when we’d turn up on detachment to support an Army unit. Muggins would walk in ready to be as co-operative as he could be and get slapped in the chops with the proverbial wet fish by some gentleman – usually a Captain or a Major – in green who’d quite obviously had some serious issues – real or just in his imagination – in the past with the boys in blue.

Reading some of the comments in this thread, I can only assume the stories some have recounted here were first heard late one Friday afternoon in some Army O’s mess – and were being told by someone who’d heard them second or third hand himself, because they had so obviously grown outrageously in the telling.

I have to agree that the handing over of the helicopters to the Army back in 1988 stemmed directly from the experience in their junior officer days in Vietnam of the then CGS (and a few others) who wanted the RAAF to operate their Hueys the way the US Army did, and the fact that the RAAF refused to is really the nub of the whole multi-page argument here. If they had, the loss rate would have been considerably higher than it was – and the fact that that would have been unacceptable, both operationally and politically back in Australia is something the then CDF and others who shared his views conveniently overlook.

It had little or nothing to do with the courage of the RAAF crews – God knows, quite a few of them exhibited enough of that when push came to shove and the situation demanded it – and everything to do with the fact that the Australians didn’t possess the huge logistics and replacement train the Americans had.

The Americans lost 100 choppers in a few days when they first ‘officially’ invaded Cambodia in ’71, and although I know that hurt them, they had the resources to cope with such losses and more importantly, continue operating. If 9 Squadron had lost 4 Hueys over a similar period of time, it would have involved a major undertaking trying to replace them (both the airframes and the crews) – and in the meantime, the Army would have been without meaningful (or sufficient) rotary wing support.

I think there’s little doubt – none, in fact – that the rules of engagement the RAAF INITIALLY operated under when the Hueys were first deployed to Vung Tau were unrealistic and were undoubtedly drawn up by someone very deeply buried in some back office in Russell Hill. Long Tan changed all that – the men on the spot decided despite the rules to go in to what was an extraordinarily dangerous situation and, perhaps just as important, one that demanded a high degree of flying skill. While it may be true the Americans offered to go in if the RAAF wouldn’t, has anyone considered that very few of the US Army helicopter pilots were instrument rated? The question has to be asked if a non-instruments pilot would have been capable of flying in that storm.

I had a very close Grunt mate who was regaling me one night in the bar about how piss poor the RAAF helicopter crews were but how fantastic the US Army guys were. To illustrate his point, he told me how one day a US Army Huey answered the call his unit in Viet Nam made for a dustoff, but couldn’t land to get the casualty out because the clearing his soldiers were in was too small. It didn’t have a winch, so the pilot used his main rotor to cut himself a pad through quite heavy foliage. He got away with it (but needed two new main rotor blades before the aircraft could fly again).

I think that story illustrates the differences between the two camps in this argument. To the soldier, what the American did was admirable. Before doing the same thing, an airman would ask himself what would happen to the wounded soldier and his colleagues on the ground under him if his reckless actions were to cause the aircraft to crash onto them (and despite what you see in the Hollywood movies, there was a very real chance of that in this case).

[Tibbsy]

Here's an academic study which examines some of the topics being 'discussed' here....
[/URL]
:ouch:
[url]www.defence.gov.au/raaf/airpower/html/publications/fellowship_visiting/sharp_battlefield_helicopters.pdf (www.defence.gov.au/raaf/airpower/html/publications/fellowship_visiting/sharp_battlefield_helicopters.pdf)

[Brian Abraham]

Long Tan changed all that – the men on the spot decided despite the rules to go in to what was an extraordinarily dangerous situation and, perhaps just as important, one that demanded a high degree of flying skill. While it may be true the Americans offered to go in if the RAAF wouldn’t, has anyone considered that very few of the US Army helicopter pilots were instrument rated? The question has to be asked if a non-instruments pilot would have been capable of flying in that storm.
EffohX, Good post but see my previous re Long Tan. Re US Army and instruments - yes they were up to the job. Re resources available to the US guys - you wouldn't believe how little we had, to the extent at times of having to reuse O rings when pulling filters. Read the excellent reference in Tibbsy's post to see why the RAAF was held in a sometimes less than flattering light by the Army - and of course those attitudes rub off onto the spouses.

[Captain Sand Dune]

Re US Army and instruments - yes they were up to the job.

Was told a story by a RAAF pilot who had flown Hueys in Vietnam which relates to this point. He was crewed with a US Army pilot as co-pilot, and for what ever reason they managed to go inadvertent IMC at low-ish level. The aircraft they were flying at the tine did not have an A.I., just the good old "bat and ball". The RAAF pilot had to take over control of the aircraft because the US Army pilot could not fly limited panel IF. Whether or not this was because he was not instrument rated, or was but not trained in limited panel techniques (don't know the US Army standards at the time!) was unclear.

Read the excellent reference in Tibbsy's post to see why the RAAF was held in a sometimes less than flattering light by the Army

A very impartially written and interesting read! Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but it would have been good if the CDF at the time could have slapped the Army and Air Force chiefs over their heads and told them to stop acting like kids and sort it! Would have prevented a lot of angst and wasted time, money and effort.

[MaroonMan4]

Aaah Capt Sand Dune,
How right you are - but couldn't we all learn a lesson on Jointery (or lack of it) from the past? How much Operational Effect/Effort has been nullified by those championing misguided individual Service 'party politicks'.
Lets hope that the here and now of the Aussie investment in technology and equipment will not see all of that potential wasted by individual 'pi$$ing on each other's fires' contests.

[Gundog01]

With the exception of the FJ boys, I have always felt the RAAF have been in the business of flying, not warfighting.

Griffinblack

This qoute goes back a long way so i hope you have had time to realise that it is complete bullsh1t. By your reasoning, Army loggies, truck drivers, vehicle maintainers etc etc are not warfighters. Does a war fighter have to have a gun at the ready.

Try "fighting a war" without the air supplies dropped to grunts in the field and air-to-air refuelling to keep CAS and CAP on station. And lets not forget about actually tansporting the armys new abrahams tanks, great kit, but hard to fight with them when they are stuck in Aus.

Pull your head in Griffinblack, anyone wearing an ADF uniform is a war fighter.

Rant over........pot stirred

[MIL OR CIVIL]

Griffinblack, you are the exact reason people leave the military, don't comment about other units and assume you know how they operate. A little bit of knowledge about what others do doesn't make you an expert, stick to what you know and comment on the Army.
In regards to flying, being professional is knowing everything about your aircraft and everything about the role your aircraft does. As others have said, everyones role contributes to the ADF being a force that is looked on in favourable terms by others.
The b...**** and bitching I've read in this thread makes me wonder why
I bother staying in the military sometimes.