F-18 Radar Warning Receiver

[Going Boeing]

It looks like the Department of Defence have finally made the decision to dump the BAE Systems ALR2002 RWR.

Ensuring Australia's Air Combat Capability Edge

(13 November 2006) -- The Government has taken an additional step to ensure that the F/A-18 delivers Australia's air combat capability edge during the transition to the Joint Strike Fighter.

As part of our plan to maintain air superiority in our region, the F/A-18 fleet is undergoing substantial combat enhancement under the Hornet Upgrade Program. The upgrades delivered under this program will give the F/A-18 enhanced air to air combat capability and strike capabilities.

A highly capable Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) is a critical component of these upgrades. It will allow the F/A-18 to prosecute (deter or engage) targets in complex high threat environments.

BAE Systems Australia has been developing a RWR - the ALR 2002B. This is an Australian developed technology that shows great promise. The Government is not and will not be risk averse in encouraging innovation and in obtaining the best capability.

However, we have concluded that this technology cannot be delivered within the necessary timeframe. Ensuring the success of the extensive Hornet upgrade and Australia's regional superiority is the most important priority and requires us to progress with another, proven option.

Accordingly, the Government has now decided to fit the Raytheon ALR-67(v)3 RWR to the entire F/A-18 fleet. The ALR-67(V)3 is already proven and operational in the United States' F/A-18 fleet, so there is low integration risk. The ALR-67(V)3 will be progressively fitted to the F/A-18 from 2008 with Full Operational Capability achieved in 2011.

Working variants of the ALR-2002 RWR, developed by BAE, will be fitted to our helicopter, and possibly, transport fleets. This decision does not reflect on the efforts of BAE Systems Australia and the CEO of BAE Systems Australia, Mr Jim McDowell, has assured me that no jobs will be lost as a result of this action.

source: MOD Australia

[GolfTangoVictor]

It appears the ADF often look at specs on paper before compatibility trials are even contemplated....

AGM-142 + F-111 (Just entered service and being phased out soon), ASRAAM + FA-18 (I still see Hornets flying around with AIM9m dummy rounds- where's the AIM132?), the whole SH-2G program- I mean, they still aren't certified for anything but DAY VFR Circuits....

It's as though we continually push for the most modern, fresh, ingenuitive, albeit, problematic solution...

A Navy friend said crew intake when he joined in 98, for the SH-2G still wish they had something to fly.... poor buggers!

I hope they learn from it, and ditch the JSF for a more mature system- for example, the F-15K variant of the F-15E, still in production for the Koreans.

Two Big Engines, more range/payload than two FA-18s with external tanks, cumulatively (not that hard) , and more than an F-35, and enough to near an F-111, HI-Lo-HI at least, and systems that talk to each other, and do so well- vs Frontal Stealth and an aircraft that attempts to be a jack of all trades from the outset, which we all know ends up in tears, and a fat aircraft

- ahh see the light please guys! :ugh:

[Death made simple]

I agree DreamerJules, why waste millions on an unproven system [unflown]. Go an F-15, or spend heaps on building something that will atleast come close to the F-111.
Booya :ok:

[Chronic Snoozer]

Jules,

I guess you need to have sat in the cockpit demonstrator to understand the JSF capabilities more fully. Its apples and oranges.

[GolfTangoVictor]

No doubt ChronicSnoozer-
you probably know more than I and Im sure the systems interoperability will be great when its sorted, because the real focus is on its processing ability. And yeah, a single monster Fan helps the cause a little, even if its a little porky, but when something starts out as a jack of all trades, it really does end up master of none- I think the Hornet is a great example of that. There are many which are better fighters, and many which are better strikers- about the only thing it does better than most is get around the corner at extremely slow speeds. And speed is life, so surely that airshow trick is death? At least the Flankers have enough grunt to accelerate away from their airshow tricks- a Hornet with tanks on it (always) is not in the same company.

Im sure it will be to a Hornet what the F-16 was to an F-4, around the lates 70s- but at the same time, the F-16 wasnt anything to an F-4 at first, because it was a simple as shyte, make mincemeat of em dayfighter. It only became more with time. And weight. And then more thrust. Then more weight. But more capability each time, so it was small steps which were achieveable.

The JSF appears to be heading down the F-111B track already- too complex too soon, and the problems are already there, and the unit price and the bidding of 150m before we even get a chance at Aussie involvement... damn.... it's nearly as much as an F-22 now! AARRGH:}
And the orders keep being reduced- so its more development every year, amortised over fewer airframes!

Time will tell, but I feel like I would prefer something like an F-15 or SU30 to be flying around with a roo on it. And I may be more persuaded to have a crack at the RAAF if there was- perhaps the kiddies out there are more enamoured with the Computer side of it all, and they might love the JSF idea.

But like I said that's just me (and you too DMS!), and Im probably the minority:ok:

[Death made simple]

The sheer size of the Pacific and south Asia area that Australia may have to cover is the concern. Range, speed and strike capability will win the day.
Spending millions on platforms that connot cover this vast region is surprising.

Guiding Yankee tankers around the desert is one thing but having to fly far, hit hard and get out quick is another.

As has been proven our very capable flight crew in the RAAF have performed better than other Allied groups in older beasts time and again. Why not give them a capable platform to use. :ugh:

New F-15's or upgraded F-111's who knows, but these two types would look alot better defending our border than a couple of "escort fighters" with a whole bunch of tankers supporting them.

Booya :ok:

[Wiley]

Some clever journo needs to take a look at what Liberal senior politician has his electorate in the area where BAE are based in Adeliade.

That's the ONLY reason the untested BAE system was chosen over the proven Rayethon system.

If my missus ran the weekly housekeeping at our place the way these ****'s from the Public 'Service' and BOTH Parties have mishandled Defence procrurement over the last fifty+ years, my family would be very thin and we'd have been relying on the bloody dole years ago.

We need a pair of Aussie Woodwards and Bernsteins to do some proper investigative journalism on this and earlier Defence debacles, the most recent of which that comes to mind is the RAN's extraordinarily costly Seasprite disaster.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Defence capability white papers are window dressing for the main aim of government and industry - votes and profit. Noone gives a flying ____ what the operators think because a polly can come in over the top and decide whats best for his electorate (or future employment possibilities). Somewhere in the future Defence will be whinging about the lack of or unsuitability of equipment and you'll then be able to trace an interesting chain of events back to a 5 minute politician saving his arse. And so shall it ever remain.....

Having said that, one must remember that if Australian jobs are up for grabs much reason disappears and paranoia and a delusion of competence overwhelms the community as it claims it can build 'it' as good or better or quicker. So blame the Aussie voter too.

I'm certain the selection of BAE for the RWR had practically nothing to do with its fitness for purpose at the time of the decision.

[Wiley]

I understand the Steyer purchase was another financial disaster, costing almost four times as much as it would have if we'd bought the rifles from Austria and set up a maintenance facility here to service them rather than do as we did - make 'em from scratch in Lithgow, admittedly with Oz jobs created/saved, but hopeless from an economy of scale perspective.

The Mirage was another - the Air Force wasn't remotly interested in it, but there was a question of a balance of payments that needed to be addressed with France, so that's what we got. It was typicsl of most if not all European aircraft - great in temperate conditions, but a real headache in high temperatures. Speak to any ex Mirage ground crew about the back pack Victa motor mower motors they would carry so the engine could be started in the tropics.

[Sunfish]

Those that talk don't know and those that know don't talk.

All this stuff is not as simple as it sounds and aircraft that look the same as those used by another country are not necessarily the same under the skin.

[GolfTangoVictor]

Very true mate- if youre referring to the hornet- I understand that ours are now pretty close to a C in terms of fitout and weights but without the extra thrust. I dont really think we're gonna have that much say with the JSF-everyone knows there's been a cat fight to get hold of source codes for the OS and Fire/FlightCS, its hardly likely we're gonna receive anything but a factory fresh stocker. Or perhaps they will specify some obscure RWR or IRST set that will not end up being able to communicate with the FireCS and then we have a partially capable aircraft again (SH2 Hawk et al). Obviously a lot of it is classified, but Im feeling disillusioned at the fact that they wont even consider the EF2000, Rafale, Gripen, F-16/50/60, or even the FA-18E/F. The sale brochure is just too glossy this time, methinks, and economics rules the fray.

Cheers all :ok:

[Swingwing]

Regrettably there are the usual number of uninformed opinions on this issue - as there are on most that involve Defence procurements. As taxpayers, everyone is entitled to an opinion of course, but the issues are not as simplistic as many posters imply. A few facts:

- It is true that the ALR 2002 presented a greater technical risk than the more mature Raytheon ALR 67 V6.
- As part of a strategy set out in the Electronics Systems Sector Plan, it is the Government's desire to encourage the development of national capabilities in specific and important niche areas. Radar Warning Receivers are such an area.

- The reason this is so (as anyone who has ever used one knows) is because the core of the capability is not the "black box" of the receiver hardware itself, but the ability to have full programming capability for the system software. That is, if threats change at short notice, you need to have a system support facility that can rewrite the code in the EID (Emitter Identification Database). Access to the full hardware and firmware coding is a distinct advantage too.

- There is no argument that a fully Australian designed, built and maintained receiver would give us this capability to a much greater extent than one bought from a foreign Defence company - even given the technology transfer agreements that will be signed to support the ALR 67. Paradoxically, this is one of the biggest advantages of the F-111 - having our own software support facility at Amberley to produce purpose-built mission system loads is far superior to the system used on the F/A-18, where we are at the mercy of the US Navy's software development schedule and priorities.

- The ALR 2002 receiver is also being bought for the BlackHawk and Chinook helicopters (this is not affected by the Hornet decision), and the order of receivers for the F/A-18 would have substantially increased the economies of scale for this production process, and lowered the cost across the board, including in the key software library support area described above.

- Whatever some might say, Australian jobs and industry are important, including for some of the reasons I have discussed. If these decisions were left only to the users, we'd probably get everything we needed from overseas. This might be OK short term (and yes, maybe even cheaper in most cases), but would wipe out the domestic defence industry - wait and see where the priorities of allies lie in times of conflict if you think this an acceptable outcome.

- In the end though, domestic procurement can only be justified if it does not furnish our war fighters with inferior equipment. In this case, the performance and schedule of the preferred domestic solution were not acceptable, so the procurement strategy was changed. Note that a prudent hedge was left in place in the form of the Raytheon receiver. This is not the disaster that some would want to suggest, it is defence procurement actually working well - start with the optimum outcome, but go back to off the shelf if Plan A doesn't work.
I hope that clarifies it a bit.

SW

PS: Re the JSF - even allowing for cost escalation in the nearly a decade before we buy it, it will still be considerably cheaper than the F-15 variants. We simply cannot afford the F-15 (or the F-22, Carlo) in the numbers required to support concurrency in more than one operating theatre.

[GolfTangoVictor]

Thanks for putting it into perspective swingwing, I take it youre a vark driver, Im happy to shut up as Ive already admitted Im out of depth here, and everything you've added sort of hits the nail square on the head!

I do, however, believe that the recent deal for Korea's F-15k came in at a much cheaper unit cost and even with the spares, as cheaper than the F-35... but like you said, its unlikely we'd have much to do with their assembly- at least this way some Aussie involvement is guarranteed.

I still dont think Carlo agrees with you, though LOL

[Chronic Snoozer]

You're right SW, not a disaster, just a lazy 94 mill down the gurgler. No doubt dwarfed by ten other projects.

[Magoodotcom]

You're right SW, not a disaster, just a lazy 94 mill down the gurgler. No doubt dwarfed by ten other projects.

The $94m spent to date is for the whole ALR-2002 project, not just on the Hornet's -2002B which is the only element being scrapped. It's probably less than half that amount that has been lost, and there will likely be savings to be had with the ALR-67(v)3 as it will likely be cheaper per unit due to no major integration work being required and because it has been produced in its 100s, not 10s.

My only concern was that it will take until 2011 to get the -67 on the jet and fully operational - seems an extraordinarily long time!

Great post above Swingwing - finally some common sense emerging from the fog of disinformation.

Cheers

Magoo

[Chronic Snoozer]

Fair enough, I'm being a cynic for sake of it, but $47m is still a fair bit of taxpayer dough, not to mention the intangible cost of the delay in fitting the aircraft. The question is who is accountable for this loss? (time and money)

SW - you must be working in the office of the Minister. "Prudent hedge?" - The only prudent hedge I know of is the one planted between the cadets barracks and the WAAFery at Pearce.

[Gnadenburg]

PS: Re the JSF - even allowing for cost escalation in the nearly a decade before we buy it, it will still be considerably cheaper than the F-15 variants. We simply cannot afford the F-15 (or the F-22, Carlo) in the numbers required to support concurrency in more than one operating theatre.

For balance, I have cut and pasted another bomber pilot's thoughts on JSF.




From Defence Industry Daily:



Guest Author Air Vice-Marshal Peter Criss, ret.

The acquisition of Australia's new strike/fighter, both as a strategic element of military hardware, and as a process of decision making, bears all the hallmarks of the same collusive and self-referential decision-making environment evident with military justice.

A recent article by AAP defence correspondent, Max Blenkin, is cause for alarm. He quotes the Deputy Chief of the Air Force stating that the ADF will buy the JSF and that there is unlikely to be a need for an interim solution. The latter statement I take no issue with. An interim purchase or lease of strike aircraft, when we already own and have spares to support our existing strike aircraft, the F-111, for another decade would make even less sense than the current decision to withdraw that aircraft by 2010.

In his evidence to a Parliamentary committee recently, the Chief of Air Force stated that he was concerned about 'not knowing what it is that he does not know'. Now I am concerned. Apparently, because CAF says they 'don't know what they don't know about the F-111', this is sufficient justification to get rid of it prematurely. Yet the Aerospace Adviser to the Minister recently acknowledged that a fully combat-capable JSF will not be available until around 2018.

Even before the recent North Korean action, the F-111 decision was questionable. It makes even less sense now.

Good risk management is all about knowing what you know and finding out about those things you don't know, then putting in place risk-mitigation strategies that ensure the risks do not materialise. The F-111 operates under this strategy in the only true Ageing-Aircraft Program in the ADF.

The germane question is 'can we support the system at acceptable cost and risk?' DSTO and Industry can definitively answer that question provided those who know are allowed to provide frank and honest advice without fear of recrimination or retribution.

Why did we spend hundreds of millions of dollars procuring life-of-type spares, only to now discard them? Why did we spend millions of dollars recently installing a specialised test facility that guarantees airframe integrity, only to now scrap it? Why did we go to all the cost and effort of moving the aircraft's deeper level maintenance to civilian contractors to now walk away when they are delivering levels of aircraft availability not seen for many years?

For those who claim the F/A-18 can temporarily fulfil both roles into this uncertain future, I simply say, think again! The F/A-18 fleet cannot currently meet its peacetime fighter availability requirements and further costly structural and enhancement programs will diminish this availability even further.

How is it that we can apparently commit to a JSF purchase when the acquisition risk management procedures for guaranteeing the integrity of the decision were arbitrarily deleted by departmental senior management in 2002?

Moreover, the Minister's aerospace advisor recently confirmed that no request for price or availability of the F-22 Raptor has been solicited from the United States. Yet the F-22, in open literature, is credited with superior performance to the JSF in all respects at near to, or even at, price parity. The F-22 is even openly acknowledged by the JSF manufacturer to be superior and it is already in operational service delivering unsurpassed levels of fighter and strike capability.

Our acquisition bureaucracy is ignoring its own procedures and appears to be supporting an arbitrary decision to pursue the JSF regardless of cost, schedule and performance. One is forced to ask what is driving this agenda? Why spend billions upgrading the worn out F/A-18 as a stop-gap measure when a replacement exists now that appears superior.

Whether the JSF is actually cheaper than the F-22 is irrelevant, since the JSF is not capable of doing the job in near and wider regions awash with advanced Russian fighters.

The fundamental point must be that no matter how many JSFs are procured, if the aircraft cannot guarantee control of the regional battlespace, then what utility does it have for the ADF?