Grunf
6th Nov 2006, 20:08
Following is the excerpt from an Aviation Week's article on famous Teterboro (2004) Challenger accident.
Basically, and besides everything, pilots didn't do the W&B check before the flight.
Please read the whole article so to be in line what else they have missed.
Permit me to say that it boggles my mind the possiblity of these specific pilots' (are they?) level of ignorance and lack of respect for procedures.
Not to talk about the one who employees them :mad:
Also, what will happen to them next? Will they go flying in some less controlled airspace (hint Africa)? Maybe after a year or so, when things settle down (and in a different country) they will start working for an airline?
If they could have skipped so many controls (not to talk about the "right seat" guy who doesn't have a work permit in the US!) who else can do it?
Challenger can fly all the way over the Atlantic so do you calc. These type of amateurs (as an antonym for a word professional) are possible anywhere!
Here is the article:
********************************************************
NTSB CRITICAL OF FAILURES IN CHALLENGER OVERRUN AT TEB
11/06/2006
Dave Collogan
The Feb. 2, 2005 accident in which a chartered Challenger business jet ran off the end of a runway at the Teterboro, N.J. Airport (TEB) "was as sloppy an operation as we've seen" in quite some time, National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark Rosenker said last week. Rosenker's assessment of the accident - in which the fully loaded airplane departed the airport property, crashed into a warehouse and caught fire - came after investigators described a litany of mistakes and poor judgment by the crew members.
Investigators said there was nothing mechanically wrong with the Challenger, but it was far outside the forward center-of-gravity (CG) limit when the crew began the takeoff roll down Runway 6. The airplane carried two pilots, a cabin aide and eight passengers. The flight was supposed to go from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport and had plenty of fuel on board to make that trip, investigators said. But the flight crew asked ground service personnel to top off the tanks before takeoff. The additional fuel pushed the airplane's CG "well forward" of the 16 percent MAC forward limit, investigators said, making it impossible for the crew to rotate the aircraft when it reached takeoff speed.
The crew "made no attempt" to determine the Challenger's CG even though the necessary information to perform that calculation was available in the cockpit, investigators said. The airplane also was 100 pounds overweight.
NTSB investigator Steve Demko said determining an aircraft's weight and balance before takeoff is "basic airmanship," a "Flying 101 type of thing" that even low-time general aviation pilots are taught.
While that failure was the key element in the accident, investigators documented numerous other failures or violations by the crew, operator Platinum Jet Management, and Darby Aviation/Alphajet, which was the holder of the certificate under which the Part 135 flight was operating. It had been more than three years since the Challenger had been weighed to determine its basic operating weight, a violation of FAA regulations. The crew did not have a passenger manifest. The captain's employment history was sketchy.
Investigators said he could not produce a flight log, although he claimed to have type ratings on six different aircraft types. The captain last held a full-time flying job about eight months before the accident, but he was terminated from that job after about two months. Records show he was discharged from another flying job in 2003 for poor judgment and decision-making.
Seat Belts Difficult To Access
Investigators said the first officer, a citizen of Venezuela, is believed to have been in the U.S. on a tourist visa, which board members said would have made him ineligible to serve as a commercial pilot. The first officer also had not completed all of his required training to serve as a first officer. A flight attendant was not required on the flight, but PJM did have a cabin aide in the cabin who had received "some informal safety training," investigators said.
Passengers said all of the seat belts on the airplane were stowed behind or under cushions and were difficult to access. Two passengers who could not find and engage their seat belts before the aircraft started its takeoff roll were tossed into the aisle when the airplane hit the warehouse. Glass and china service items given to passengers by the cabin aide were not collected before the takeoff roll began, leading to at least one injury.
PJM did not hold a Part 135 operating certificate, investigators said, but the company paid a monthly fee to get on Darby's certificate and represented itself as a charter operator. Such arrangements "were quite common" in the charter industry at the time of the accident, officials said, noting that FAA has subsequently clarified the regulations and has developed a new Operations Specification document A008, which will be implemented soon (BA, Oct. 30/195).
In the wake of the TEB accident, NTSB investigators said FAA surveyed about 130 operators of large aircraft to gauge the number of such relationships between Part 135 certificate holders and other operators. The paperwork outlining those arrangements ranged from "single sheets of paper" in some instances to documents the size of small phone books, investigators said. As a result of its operator survey, FAA found there are "thousands" of leased aircraft and "many hundreds of agreements" like the one between PJM and Darby.
Contributing to the accident, according to NTSB, were: "PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper FAA certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; the failure of the Birmingham, Ala. FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and, the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM."
NTSB recommended that FAA inspectors and Part 135 certificate holders get specific guidance, such as that contained in A-008, to learn how certificate holders can demonstrate they are maintaining adequate operational control over all on-demand flights conducted under the authority of their certificates.
It said FAA should "review all charter management, lease and other agreements between...certificate holders and other entities to identify those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements."
The safety board said all Part 135 certificate holders should be required to ensure that seatbelts are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight. It also recommended that any cabin personnel on Part 135 flights "who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas: preflight briefing and safety checks; emergency exit operation; and, emergency equipment usage." That training should be documented and recorded by the certificate holder, NTSB said.
Basically, and besides everything, pilots didn't do the W&B check before the flight.
Please read the whole article so to be in line what else they have missed.
Permit me to say that it boggles my mind the possiblity of these specific pilots' (are they?) level of ignorance and lack of respect for procedures.
Not to talk about the one who employees them :mad:
Also, what will happen to them next? Will they go flying in some less controlled airspace (hint Africa)? Maybe after a year or so, when things settle down (and in a different country) they will start working for an airline?
If they could have skipped so many controls (not to talk about the "right seat" guy who doesn't have a work permit in the US!) who else can do it?
Challenger can fly all the way over the Atlantic so do you calc. These type of amateurs (as an antonym for a word professional) are possible anywhere!
Here is the article:
********************************************************
NTSB CRITICAL OF FAILURES IN CHALLENGER OVERRUN AT TEB
11/06/2006
Dave Collogan
The Feb. 2, 2005 accident in which a chartered Challenger business jet ran off the end of a runway at the Teterboro, N.J. Airport (TEB) "was as sloppy an operation as we've seen" in quite some time, National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark Rosenker said last week. Rosenker's assessment of the accident - in which the fully loaded airplane departed the airport property, crashed into a warehouse and caught fire - came after investigators described a litany of mistakes and poor judgment by the crew members.
Investigators said there was nothing mechanically wrong with the Challenger, but it was far outside the forward center-of-gravity (CG) limit when the crew began the takeoff roll down Runway 6. The airplane carried two pilots, a cabin aide and eight passengers. The flight was supposed to go from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport and had plenty of fuel on board to make that trip, investigators said. But the flight crew asked ground service personnel to top off the tanks before takeoff. The additional fuel pushed the airplane's CG "well forward" of the 16 percent MAC forward limit, investigators said, making it impossible for the crew to rotate the aircraft when it reached takeoff speed.
The crew "made no attempt" to determine the Challenger's CG even though the necessary information to perform that calculation was available in the cockpit, investigators said. The airplane also was 100 pounds overweight.
NTSB investigator Steve Demko said determining an aircraft's weight and balance before takeoff is "basic airmanship," a "Flying 101 type of thing" that even low-time general aviation pilots are taught.
While that failure was the key element in the accident, investigators documented numerous other failures or violations by the crew, operator Platinum Jet Management, and Darby Aviation/Alphajet, which was the holder of the certificate under which the Part 135 flight was operating. It had been more than three years since the Challenger had been weighed to determine its basic operating weight, a violation of FAA regulations. The crew did not have a passenger manifest. The captain's employment history was sketchy.
Investigators said he could not produce a flight log, although he claimed to have type ratings on six different aircraft types. The captain last held a full-time flying job about eight months before the accident, but he was terminated from that job after about two months. Records show he was discharged from another flying job in 2003 for poor judgment and decision-making.
Seat Belts Difficult To Access
Investigators said the first officer, a citizen of Venezuela, is believed to have been in the U.S. on a tourist visa, which board members said would have made him ineligible to serve as a commercial pilot. The first officer also had not completed all of his required training to serve as a first officer. A flight attendant was not required on the flight, but PJM did have a cabin aide in the cabin who had received "some informal safety training," investigators said.
Passengers said all of the seat belts on the airplane were stowed behind or under cushions and were difficult to access. Two passengers who could not find and engage their seat belts before the aircraft started its takeoff roll were tossed into the aisle when the airplane hit the warehouse. Glass and china service items given to passengers by the cabin aide were not collected before the takeoff roll began, leading to at least one injury.
PJM did not hold a Part 135 operating certificate, investigators said, but the company paid a monthly fee to get on Darby's certificate and represented itself as a charter operator. Such arrangements "were quite common" in the charter industry at the time of the accident, officials said, noting that FAA has subsequently clarified the regulations and has developed a new Operations Specification document A008, which will be implemented soon (BA, Oct. 30/195).
In the wake of the TEB accident, NTSB investigators said FAA surveyed about 130 operators of large aircraft to gauge the number of such relationships between Part 135 certificate holders and other operators. The paperwork outlining those arrangements ranged from "single sheets of paper" in some instances to documents the size of small phone books, investigators said. As a result of its operator survey, FAA found there are "thousands" of leased aircraft and "many hundreds of agreements" like the one between PJM and Darby.
Contributing to the accident, according to NTSB, were: "PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper FAA certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; the failure of the Birmingham, Ala. FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and, the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM."
NTSB recommended that FAA inspectors and Part 135 certificate holders get specific guidance, such as that contained in A-008, to learn how certificate holders can demonstrate they are maintaining adequate operational control over all on-demand flights conducted under the authority of their certificates.
It said FAA should "review all charter management, lease and other agreements between...certificate holders and other entities to identify those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements."
The safety board said all Part 135 certificate holders should be required to ensure that seatbelts are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight. It also recommended that any cabin personnel on Part 135 flights "who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas: preflight briefing and safety checks; emergency exit operation; and, emergency equipment usage." That training should be documented and recorded by the certificate holder, NTSB said.