EasyJet A319 Complete Loss of Electric Power?

[Barbara's Pole]

Apparently an EasyJet Airbus had a major electrical failure a couple of days ago and diverted to Bristol after the Captain contacted ATC via his mobile phone.

This incident seems to have been kept quiet, but apparently the AAIB attended the aircraft as soon as it landed. I would have thought that a complete loss of electrics was almost impossible and one would assume that they had at least emergency electrical config - does anybody have further details?

(edit to downgrade to "major" electrical failure because I can't imagine they lost battery power as well).

[hetfield]

God save Vodafone.

[IB4138]

Good job the old draconian security regs weren't in force, otherwise he wouldn't have had a phone to use !

[BOBBLEHAT]

I read about a BA 319 or 320 that had a complete electrical failure just out of LHR, they managed to sort it (or most of it)and pushed on to Budapest, but it couldn't be replicated again. I read about in flywise, the BA publication. Please noboody shoot me if i've missed some info - i'm only an ATCO.

[the dean]

Good job the old draconian security regs weren't in force, otherwise he wouldn't have had a phone to use !


dead right...if info correct..

would'nt it be weird if someday the people that make security regs were in a bind like that as passenger..!!!!...not for a moment wishing that ill on anyone...:oh:

[tilewood]

Surely it couldn't be a 'complete' electrical failure? May be the
radios, screens and other avionics were down, but (forgive my ignorance)
there must have been power via fly by wire to operate the flying surfaces,
and command the engines.

I now wait to be jumped upon!! :hmm:

[DaveO'Leary]

I thought one was not allowed to use a mobile on a/c? That skipper is sure in trouble now.

[stator vane]

i've tried several times to check and see if my mobile would work in flight and i never get a signal?

how low and slow must you be to get it to connect?

or is it a function of certain services work better than others? or do i need to arrange an in-flight subscription add on?

i have seen numbers to contact ATC in the loss of comm section, but have never been able to imagine it to work-especially if one were at the higher FL's.

please let me know how it works.

cheers;

[Impress to inflate]

When you say a complete power loss surely you don't mean the fecking lot. Are you left with the essentials like fag lighter and vanity light on the visor. Surely the battery would power the essential bus

[hetfield]

i've tried several times to check and see if my mobile would work in flight and i never get a signal?

how low and slow must you be to get it to connect?

or is it a function of certain services work better than others? or do i need to arrange an in-flight subscription add on?

i have seen numbers to contact ATC in the loss of comm section, but have never been able to imagine it to work-especially if one were at the higher FL's.

please let me know how it works.

cheers;

If slats/flaps extended it should work (low and slow).

[oliversarmy]

Ive tried at 2000ft at 100kts in a 152 and it doesnt work, mind you my phone doesnt work in the kitchen.

[jondc9]

airbus 320 series has a RAT (ram air turbine) which can spin a hydraulically powered generator.

perhaps it wasn't a complete loss of electrics, but perhaps shutdown many vital functions.

more info would be nice.


A friend (who shall remain nameless) reported a good signal on his cell phone at 30,000feet near Las Vegas, Nevada USA...also strangely near Area 51...

[AndyPandy]

I heard from a friend of a friend so take the information how you will but allegedly the aircraft was operating with one IDG u/s which calls for the APU to be running and it also caps the maximum flight level. Towards the end of the cruise the amber caution lit and the ECAM commenced to display multiple failures which ran into several pages.

They were left with only the FO's PFD, ND and the lower ECAM display.

There were no fault lights on the overhead panel.

ALL three radios were dead as well as the transponder. Switching the transponder to number two system made it work again and they were able to transmitt 7700.

When working through the ECAM they were presented with a hydraulics and flight control page with amber xx's through everything and an indication that the RAT had deployed (on the ground it was confirmed that the RAT had NOT deployed).

FO was flying raw data with Alternate Law. INOP sys page listed just about everything from Seat Belts to Thrust Reversers. Both suffered from hypoxia symptoms but thankfully were already in descent.

Gear lever would not lower the gear and so manual deployment was actioned early which was not ideal as it meant a direct law approach. They landed safely in BRS and thrust reversers deployed and brakes worked normally despite being listed as inop.

They came to a stop but could not shut down the engines with the master switches and had to use the fire push buttons. In the cabin the CIDs was dead as well as the seatbelt signs, PA worked but intercomm did not.

Allegedly Airbus is perplexed and have said that these failured together should not be possible especially the triple radio failure.

The AAIB are allegedly involved and have the the FDR and CVR data, unfortunately the CVR appeared to stop recording at the time of the initial fault (not supposed to happen) and there is no record of any out of the ordinary event on the FDR or CDS.

Apparently when the aircraft was next powered up everything appeared normal!

I know no more and what I have written is third hand.

Regarding cell phones I have occasionally, accidentally left mine switched on and have received text messages during the flight, discovered upon landing.

[jondc9]

andy pandy

thanks for that great information, that at least stirs the imagination even if not official.

as wonderful as electronic things are, sometimes they quit working right. call it a short, call it what you like, but...

first off, good job to crew for getting down in one piece...nice too that flight controls worked even if only in direct law or another law...still easier than using trim and rudder//assymetric thrust etc.

I am a fan of fly by CABLE and not by wire...


Every once in awhile you hear or see for youself an odd electrical situation...it does happen even if the manufacturer says its impossible. I hope that this plane remains grounded until problem can be duplicated!!!


regards

jon
"daisy, daisy, give me your answer dooooooooooooooooooooo"

[Megaton]

Even if only half true, Andy, Excellent post so thank you. Gives plenty of food for thought on Le 'Bus systems.

[Skylion]

Airbourne mobiles Mobiles will pick up messages from ground stations, welcoming them to their networks most of the way from Hong Kong to London.
Good thing the security industry has stopped binning them.

[Loose rivets]

Mmmm, shades of the British Eagle Viscount that had a history of total electrical failures. The last time it happened, the aircraft tumbled out of a layer of stratus followed by the outer wings being torn off trying to level out. Electrical quirks have to be taken very seriously.

[jondc9]

surprised no one has said it but this is obviously a :

BUS FAULT ;-)

[The AvgasDinosaur]

Mmmm, shades of the British Eagle Viscount that had a history of total electrical failures. The last time it happened, the aircraft tumbled out of a layer of stratus followed by the outer wings being torn off trying to level out. Electrical quirks have to be taken very seriously.
This one I think,
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19680809-0&lang=en
Hope it helps
Be lucky
David

[Self Loading Freight]

Why don't flight decks have a handheld VHF transceiver stashed away in a niche somewhere? You might not be able to get to ATC directly with the integral antenna inside the cockpit, but you should be able to get someone on 121.5 if you're anywhere remotely busy. Cost negligable, reliability good (keep it on trickle charge and change the battery every year), and I can think of other scenarios where it might just make the difference. Certainly beats having to rely on a GSM mobile - getting text messages in flight is very different from maintaining a voice-grade connection.

R

[hingey]

Last year an instructor and pupil out of Exeter had a complete radio failure, a fair distance and height from the field. Instructor called tower on his phone, getting priority clearance in what has become affectionately known as the Nokia approach. Seems to have caught on! Good work by the crew.

Fly by cable, fly by wire... do away with the lot. Go wireless and fly by broadband!

h

[exeng]

Although I am an anti-airbus guy I am absolutely sure there was finger trouble at some point and this is not third hand.


Sarah,

Surely you cannot be certain of finger trouble until the investigation is complete. Lets wait shall we?

BTW I'm not nuts on the 'bus', but I only flew it for about 3years and then went back to Boeings. I would imagine that I would still have a lot to learn about the intricacies of Airbus products.

The ECAM was not as straight-forward as the system on theB777 for sure.

Nothing like a straight-forward QRH which is easily amended - unlike the ECAM on buses.


Kind regards
Exeng

[Ignition Override]

Dave O'Leary: A Captain can break any regulation or procedure in an emergency situation, if he has a good reason for it.

Andy Pandy: The turbofan aircraft flown by many of us are old and they can only fly in a condition which Airbus pilots call 'Direct Law'.

Loose Rivets: Years ago a Zantop "Logair" mission Electra crashed near Provo, Utah in IMC. The Flight Engineer made a mistake during an electrical fault and the pilots lost both ADIs/horizons.
Under the'grandfather' rule, Zantop's Electras were never required to have standby horizons powered by the batteries etc. Neither were the US Air Force/AFRES/ANG C-130s for decades.

My father twice lost all C-130 (A and E model) electrics and both horizons+ everything else in night IMC. Outstanding professional Flight Engineers saved everyone's lives twice. The second time was about 500' agl in solid IMC above Scott AFB, east of St. Louis. The FE immediately switched on his flashlight (torch) and put it on the Aircraft Commander's horizon as the 'gyro' flag came on. This flying was a frequent part-time job over many years for my Dad and thousands of others.

Complex aircraft are no longer designed with Flight Engineers. The AF KC-135 and B-52 never had them.

[reverserunlocked]

Airbus don't have much luck with CVR's. Didn't the Air France tree-cutter's CVR stop working at an inopportune moment, as did the CVR on the China Airlines A300 that went down at Shanghai?

[MrBernoulli]

Airbus! I just don't TRUST them. These aircraft are still trying to fox crews with their bollocks but the manufacturers STILL claim "its not possible". Jaysus!

[Loose rivets]

One of my old captains once said, "All God's pilots got torches." Hopefully, all God's pilots can get at them when the aircraft is in an extreme unusual attitude....and also find that they work.

The following is something I feel very strongly about...since the 747 crash at Stansted really.

When I was a new ppruner, I made some comment about turn and slip indicators and the fact that they are such a simple piece of kit...and even while on batteries, could output to a warning system if on full scale deflection. Why did they get taken out of the standard panel I asked. I got flamed.

Much of the flaming was about posting my meanderings on R&N, and one soul piped up and said that there was little chance of controlling an aircraft on such an instrument. It wasn't put so politely.

Having done dozens of approaches and occasionally full blind landings on limited panel–monitored by a test pilot in the RHS I hasten to add–I know that this modest instrument would have saved the Viscount. That particular captain loved such challenges and with power on just one tied gyro he would, I am sure, have pulled off a cloud-break.

This little instrument can take any amount of chaotic input, and still be as good as before any upset. Some of the standby horizons, while on back-up power are not as solid as they may appear.

I have had two major losses of instruments in my career, plus two across-the-board black screen scenarios. Yep, the standby horizon worked in these latter cases, but the power came from the heart of a rather badly designed electrical system.

As any glider pilot will know, there is an horizon that is so small that you could put it in your shirt pocket. It's strange to think that such an item plus a mobile phone, could save hundreds of lives.

[BYLAW]

Looks like a DC ESS BUS FAULT.
Have to do some Ecam/Air Data switching to get captns PFD and the status page back.
Cab press 2 available, no need for em. gear ext. as LGCIU 2 is still there. Both gen`s are working, no RAT.
Also you loose a lot of non essentials.
Anyway, it`s not an easy one as for instance RMP 3 (radio) is the only one working, together with CAptn`s PTT!
Fire pushbuttons have to be used to shut engines down as FCMC 1 and 2 (part) are not working.
NOT an easy failure, requires some Airbus thinking. Cheers.

[WindSheer]

Yeah I heard similar details to Andy Pandy although I did hear that the RAT was out upon landing.

AAIB did a good job of keeping it hush. I walked into work the next day to pass a guy in a huge bright red coat, with AAIB INCIDENT CO-ORDINATOR written all over it. No-one suspected a thing!

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

I have absolutely no idea if this story is correct or not - it certainly seems to have an air of truth about it. What I can say is that this is the first I have heard about the alleged incident and there has been absolutely nothing from the company on the subject. If it is true I would hope that that a very full and thorough description of what happened will be forthcoming very soon.

Reading some of the posts here, you could be forgiven for thinking that electrical failures on Airbuses are regular events. All I can tell you is that I have flown them for years and have never had a single electrical failure of any kind (except in the simulator!).

[cheer up]

NSF - the event did happen - ask any engineer at Bristol. Originally the aircraft departed with one gen. u/s with the apu on to substitute. As for the RAT, it did not deploy - I know that because I watched the aircraft land.

[saffron]

this event did happen,the rat did not deploy,which is very concerning.

[Miles Magister]

SLF,

You asked a question earlier about hand held radios. It is my understanding that to be effective it would need to have an output of aroung 20W and the best on the market is only 5W with most less than 2W. You could route it through an existing aircraft arial but that would be a major modification and still probably not enough power to send a useful signal.There are only one or two very old or obselete models which are approved by the UK CAA for use in an aircraft. Of course a company could do some trials and certification but it would be very expensive especially if the pre-study suggested it would not work sufficiently well.

In summary I think it is a good idea which would not be effective in practice. But I am not an engineer and would welcome informed comment by an engineer.

Perhaps this is something which could be discussed in the Tech Log forum.

MM

[CaptainProp]

i've tried several times to check and see if my mobile would work in flight and i never get a signal?
how low and slow must you be to get it to connect?
or is it a function of certain services work better than others? or do i need to arrange an in-flight subscription add on?
i have seen numbers to contact ATC in the loss of comm section, but have never been able to imagine it to work-especially if one were at the higher FL's.
please let me know how it works.
cheers;

22000 ft over southern Denmark with full signal.
/CP

[GotTheTshirt]

Mobile phones!

Having used mobiles on ferry flights reception has nothing to do with height speed or atttitude.
It is like buying a house - Location location location.;)

Like walking down the street on the phone - one minute you have it then nothing.

It the location of the relay station.

I must say height is a factor I have had reception up to 20,000 feet but not after that as it then is a pure distance thing.

You can see from the various comment how scientific it is !!:)

[hetfield]

Mobile phones!

Having used mobiles on ferry flights reception has nothing to do with height speed or atttitude.
It is like buying a house - Location location location.;)

Like walking down the street on the phone - one minute you have it then nothing.

It the location of the relay station.

I must say height is a factor I have had reception up to 20,000 feet but not after that as it then is a pure distance thing.

You can see from the various comment how scientific it is !!:)

It has to do with height and speed. Too high means too far. And too fast means the mobil loses contact or simply can't log in. BTW even if it shows FULL SIGNAL it may not work.

[crewboi83]

For anyone Manchester based in the UK, My mobile normally picks up signal just before you fly over Tesco and Asda in Stockport!! not sure how high you are there roughly? maybe a member of flight deck can tell us? ;)

[AndyPandy]

I have since learned that what I posted is broadly correct. The AAIB are investigating and I shall await the report with great interest.

One correction is that a mobile telephone was NOT used by the crew to contact ATC.

[AlphaWhiskyRomeo]

For anyone Manchester based in the UK, My mobile normally picks up signal just before you fly over Tesco and Asda in Stockport!! not sure how high you are there roughly? maybe a member of flight deck can tell us? ;)


Usually 1500 to 2000 ft I think. Around the times that the u/c drops down.

[Dani]

Looks like a DC ESS BUS FAULT.
...
NOT an easy failure, requires some Airbus thinking. Cheers.

Excellent hint, Bylaw, that's what it was, DC ESS BUS FAULT.
Btw, you recognize it when gray background of speed tapes on PFD disappear - if you still have a PFD :}

I agree it's difficult to recognize this failure and needs quite some switching (especially for radio). Airbus syllabus doesn't cover that failure, you don't speak about it at all during your whole course. We played it through in Swiss Training where you do a bit more than just basics.

Dani

[Rampi]

ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT

-VHF 2 OR 3..............USE
-AUDIO SWTG..............SELECT
(ACP 1 and 2 are lost. Therefore, set the AUDIO SWTG selector to CAPT 3 or F/O 3 to recover communications.
- BARO REF..............CHECK

NAV GPWS FAULT
-GPWS..............OFF

FUEL L TANK PUMP 1 LO PR
FUEL R TANK PUMP 1 LO PR
VENT BLOWER FAULT
NOTE: To shut down the engines on ground, use ENG FIRE pushbutton

AFFECTED SYSTEMS
* CAB PRESS
* HYD
* F/CTL

STATUS
LDG DIST PROC..............APLLY
ENG 1 APPR IDLE ONLY
ENG 2 APPR IDLE ONLY
BOTH PFD ON SAME FAC
SLATS/FLAPS SLOW
CAT2 ONLY

INOP SYS DISPLAYED ON ECAM
B HYD
SPLR 3
VHF1
ACP1+2
WING A. ICE
AP 1
A/THR
FCU1
FAC1
L TK PUMP 1
R TK PUMP 1
REV 2
ENG 2 START
CAB PR 1
VENT EXTRACT
B ELEC PUMP
GPWS
ENG 1 LOOP A
ENG 2 LOOP B
FCDC 1
CAT 3

OTHER INOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
BRK PRESS INDICATOR
FLIGHT INTERPHONE
EIU 2
CPT REIN REPELLENT
AVIONICS AIR COND VALVE
STBY HORIZON
STBY COMPASS LIGHT
HP FUEL SHUT-OFF VALVES
SFCC 1
RMP 1
HYD FIRE VALVES ENG 1 AND 2
RAM AIR INLET
ECAM CONTROL PANEL
LEFT LOUDSPEAKER
DC SHED ESS BUS

---
From Airbus FCOM training manual.

Best Regards

Rampi

[Airbubba]

I am a fan of fly by CABLE and not by wire..

Yep, the old DC-8 had almost everything, including pressurization, run by cables. As a result, electrical and hydraulic failures were not a big deal.

We've come a long way since then.:)

[ironbutt57]

I like fly-by wire as well...take the wires and braid ém into a cable :}

[nonemmet]

I can confirm what AndyPandy says although I believe the crew only spoke to the tower by phone once they were on the ground, having made unsuccessful attempts whilst airborne.

I can also add, G-EZAC departed Alicante for Bristol with a u/s No1 generator, using the APU iaw the MEL. When the failure occurred (APU went off line amongst other things!), just North of Brest, the crew elected to continue to Bristol, even though the runway was not ideal, because with no radios and a diversion off their flight planned route…………:eek: The incident occurred on Sep 15th and is recorded in WINBASIS as an Essential AC bus failure, although the only electrical power available was from AC2, DC2 and the battery. AC essential could not be recovered, and as Dani says airbus training does not cover actions in the event of no power from the DC essential bus – because it can’t happen! A/C was grounded until Sep 21st ( AAIB and Airbus involved) by which time a huge amount of electrical components had been replaced. No reason for the failure has yet been found, or at least reported, but the aircraft is back in service.

As reported by 2Dmoon, the effect of the failure was similar in some ways to the BA A319 incident in Oct 05 where all screens except the lower ECAM display (SDU) were lost. In the EZY case the F/Os PFD and ND were also powered, although may have been in a degraded mode.

Post the BA A319 incident the AAIB recommended that the MMEL should be changed so that despatch is no longer permitted with the lower ECAM u/s.
The MMEL has yet to be changed to reflect the AAIB recommendation, and still permits despatch with either SDU, ND2 or PFD2 u/s.


However, how many Captains will now accept an aircraft with a display unit u/s?

[Rosta Change!]

Heard pretty much the same as nonemmet. It appears it was an AC essential and DC essential bus failure with ADR 1+2+3 to top it off. Those of you flying airbus add up the number of inop systems that gives you and you'll soon run out of fingers and toes! Also heard that AC ess ALTN didn't work or any of the Reversionary switching. Makes for a busy day in the office!

[TopBunk]

For anyone Manchester based in the UK, My mobile normally picks up signal just before you fly over Tesco and Asda in Stockport!! not sure how high you are there roughly? maybe a member of flight deck can tell us? ;)

You list yourself as a member of cabin crew. May I ask you wtf you are doing with your mobile switched on, contrary to all legal requirements and presumably company rules? The fact that you would appear to do this normally makes me think that you are totally irresponsible and are not fit to hold your position.

[brain fade]

We were at the hold as this easy landed. I wondered why he never spoke to the tower, who cleared him to land about 3 times. The main gear doors were hanging down so we thought maybe a hyd problem. Wonder how he declared an emergency if radios all inop? Squawk maybe. Glad it ended well anyway.:ok:

Ah, I see they got a xpdr going. youda thought they be able to get box 2 up then?

[Just Browsing]

The Airbus is still new to alot of the crews in BRS - cabin and flight deck. If this is a failure that 'can't happen', and as such is not trained for or even described by Airbus, then I think the whole crew should be praised for recovering into their original destination safely. I wonder if they were on time!

JB

[zeronine]

there is a section on use of mobiles inflight in the middle of the loose change video regards 11/09/01...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zUht6cLkMc
http://www.loosechange911.com/
This video is interesting for other reasons too but mainly just refering to the section on mobile phones not working in the air
Craig

[hedgehog-in-fog]

BYLAW looks to be right.
BTW heard of 330 comm loss smwhere around UK due DC ESS FAIL some timeago.
Tried this failure at the sim ride-it's puzzling and you need time and full attention to go through it. And QRH in this case gives more clear picture of your actions.

Concerning mobils-ones sent SMS when I was a pax.
Just saw some big sity down and put the mobil closer to the window:) .
Suppose it's impossible from the 320cockpit because of the screen of the heated windows around you.

Cheers.

[biddedout]

Nonemmet,

I think you raised another important point when you mentioned the decision to go to Bristol from over Brest rather than diert off flight planned route. Just to add to the problems for this crew with a very high workload, if they had chosen to divert off route and turn in a London direction say with only an emergency SQ and no radios, this action alone would have potentially created even more unwanted distraction. The radio failure procedures were written years ago and need updating. I suspect that it has been considered, but rejected on the grounds that total radio failure will never happen these days:rolleyes: .

I say this because on the 145 which has a huge amount of electrical redundancy, a total generator failure (all 5) and a transfer to essentials results in the loss of both transponders. Not ideal in todays envronment. I just hope Com 1 keeps working.

Well done that crew. Even if there was some finger trouble, it's hardly surprising in the circumstances. :D

[easyprison]

As some one has already said the crews are new to the Airbus at BRS. Judging by the above they did a good job in getting the job done. It doesn't really matter if the crew where in touch with atc or not. When they are presented with multiple failures i'm sure ATC will soon get the hint to clear the skies!

The report will make interesting reading. Good job it didn't happen at the end of a long 4 sector day!

[barit1]

BTW, I wonder how the all-electric 787 is coming along?

[hedfan]

Not convinced yet on ALL electronic flight displays, total failure cant happen so they say but it can either through tech problems or finger trouble, Beech200 with Proline 21 EFD lost all electrics and flight/engine displays this year, lots of damage and brown stains.:eek:

[Dessert Aviator]

We lost the DC essential bus on one of our GF 340 after getting airbourne out of SIN for SYD about six years ago. We also had an A330 lose TR 1+2 going into Dublin in June this year. Not nice but manageable.

[55yrsSLC_10yearsPPL]

Would an aircraft losing all means of communication and entering controlled airspace acquire a fighter escort ? What if for technical reasons it deviates from the planned route ? There is a case here for the old hand-held in the flight bag. And please do use your cell phone if you are within range !

[FlapsOne]

Janspeed
What do you mean by 'too many'?
A couple have been given high publicity here but when put into perspective as a proportion of how many uneventful flights happen in Airbus (or similar technology) world wide I can't see it as being a huge issue.
As a general comment on this whole thread, presented with a really lousy situation, this crew did a very good job and, no matter how many of us from our armchairs believe we could have done better, I doubt it really.:D :D :D :D :D

[birdofprey]

I think this whole thing sounds like there was a great flight crew who, despite having little idea what on earth was going on behind them, got it down in one piece:ok:

Prospect of interception must have been something very high on the agenda and with such a high workload, not something to look forward to!

[Sal-e]

LMAO!!!!!:} you've confirmed my thoughts on Scare Buses. If it's not Boeing, I ain't going.
I don't care what anyone says, least of all Airbus themselves. When electrical failures cannot be explained by the manufacturer, a really, really big disaster is just waiting to happen, just a matter of time.

Last year an instructor and pupil out of Exeter had a complete radio failure, a fair distance and height from the field. Instructor called tower on his phone, getting priority clearance in what has become affectionately known as the Nokia approach. Seems to have caught on! Good work by the crew.
Fly by cable, fly by wire... do away with the lot. Go wireless and fly by broadband!
h

[nnc0]

Any thoughts on the AD to keep the dome light on?

[outofsynch]

What difference would that make? Especially during the day...

[SLATS_EXTEND]

Fifi with no electric :eek:

[nnc0]

What difference would that make? Especially during the day...

That's what I'm asking myself yet that is the requirement I believe although you can select DIM for T/O and APP.

The idea is that integrated standy lighting (batt bus) needs to be selected on to read the standby instruments clearly but in the dark the overhead switch is hard to find so the AD directs that the Dome lights (also batt bus) remain on to facilitate finding the switch.

In practice though we're finding that the glare on the displays from the dome lights is distracting, not to mention a little disturbing on approach. (if the illness doesn't cure you the medicine just might?)

There is an airbus fix coming next year to automate the switching of the standby inst. lights but in the meantime we're stuck with the glare.

[outofsynch]

I just can't fly at night with the dome light on... even dim. But then we have the ISIS which is lit anyway, so an immediate loss of power shouldnt leave us entirely in the dark!

And if you practice finding the switch in the dark, then it shouldnt be too much of a problem..?:rolleyes:

[nnc0]

And if you practice finding the switch in the dark, then it shouldnt be too much of a problem..?:rolleyes:

I know that, you know that. Our problem is the folks who wrote the AD as well as our inspectors don't seem to agree.

The problem is causing enough concern on the line I'm thinking of applying for an AMOC using a glow in the dark placard above the switch.

[Odlix]

Is easyJet saving money on batteries?? Just use the flashlight to find it. You should be able to find that in the dark.

[kriskross]

Yes, Odlix, it should be in our bag shouldn't it?

[stator vane]

i've left my mobile on many times-and not always intentional.

what ever messages i received was whilst on ground and taxiing in.

has anyone else out there actually succeeded in making a call on your personal mobile whilst flying a transport category aircraft?

low and slow with gear and flaps out as one suggested-

okay but that is a long way from losing the radio in flight! you have to get very low and very slow from a cruise situation.

next flight, i will leave it on and take note of when the signal comes and goes.

perhaps i will call the chief pilot just before takeoff and have a chat with him during the takeoff and see how long we stay connected.

then i will start calling the agencies for a new job whilst descending to land.

all in the name of safety research!!!!

[exvicar]

Why bother rooting around in a bag when airbus give you a nicely charged emergency torch at the side of your seat.

[Odlix]

Why bother rooting around in a bag when airbus give you a nicely charged emergency torch at the side of your seat. Touché!!!!!!!

[Craggenmore]

The switch is easy to find in the dark. Its just 2 up and 2 across :)

[jshg]

I've been using the dome light on 'dim' for many years for T/O & land, and I prefer it. It was originally recommended on earlier Airbus types when an emergency landing was anticipated, so that check-lists etc could easily be found and read. I did have a 'non normal' approach on that type where I used the dome light, found it a great help, and have used it ever since.
(Also on earlier types before the dome light was commonly used in flight, we had an incident where the c/c brought in teas to a completely dark flight deck, bumped into an invisible headrest and soaked the F/O. He then inadvertently kicked the rudder, disconnected the autopilot, spiral dive etc etc ...)
In the Old Days of R/W approach lights switched to 'dim' there was some point to dark F/Ds. Now with Cat 3 T/D lights, HIALs and so on a dim dome light is not intrusive in my opinion.

[dragon501]

Call me ignorant but I had a right big laugh on that Fo story with the trolley dolly spilling the tea etc... mwaaahahaha... Was she from essex by any chance?? hahahaha

Only messin'.

On topic: I like the night, turn off that bl@@dy light!!!!

[MrBernoulli]

The AAIB has issued 'Special Bulletin S9/2006 Airbus A319-111, G-EZAC' for those who are interested. It is a 7 page pdf file available here:

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/special_bulletins/s9_2006_airbus_a319_111__g_ezac.cfm

[nnc0]

Re the Dome Lights - Airbus have convinced EASA the cure was worse than the disease. Dome light can go off on approach at Capt's discretion.

Re the AAIB report - the problem is particular only to the 320 srs with "enhanced" electrical distribution systems per the referenced OIT that wasn't originally distributed to Flt Ops.

(Should probably know what the term enhanced refers to but I don't - anybody?)

[Lemper]

Maybe they were low..then it can work. You won't reach anybody halfway across the Atlantic in FL390 with a Cell Phone though...


Oh yes you will......if there is no turbulence and that pax stands still, you could reach him on the scalp. :hmm:

[old-timer]

:sad: Automatics are fantastic but at the end of the day (or worse god forbid)
it is so important to give control back to the guys & gals in the flight deck because humans think - act - respond -calculate - use experience & overcome to keep the a/c flying & get back safely.
Automatics simply respond to data & shut down or do whatever that fit's their programmed electronic brain at that particular moment - which is VERY VERY SCARY !!!

Keep safe folks, Mr B from the red barn is pretty smart & knows these things

[PantLoad]

Why is ACP #2 off of DC ESS?

They had no commications because:

ACP #1 .......... DC ESS
ACP #2 .......... DC ESS
ACP #3 .......... DC 1

VHF #1 .......... DC ESS
VHF #2 .......... DC 2 (This bus was still powered.)
VHF #3 .......... DC 1

HF #1 .......... AC ESS SHED or AC #1 (depending on
model and S/N)
HF #2 .......... AC 2 (This bus was still powered.)

All the above busses were cold, except as noted.

What do you guys think? If Airbus were to add a
DC ESS BUS FEED button to their system...so, you could 'force' (if necessary) the DC ESS to be fed off Battery 2.
This would give assured (if there is such a thing on the Airbus) sources of DC ESS. There are a lot of problems if this bus is lost.

PantLoad

[Nil further]

AFAIK there is no OEB or TR to the FCOM for the A319 as operated by EZY that states anything about leaving the dome light on.

The AD that is referred to has not been circulated withing EZY either that i can see.

Could someone post a link to the AD ?

Ta

ps could night vision be affected by having the dome light on at night ? say for a TCAS RA .

[CAT III DUAL]

PantLoad
The AAIB report states:
"G-EZAC was fitted with an upgraded digital
Audio Management Unit (AMU) for all the RTF
communications. Unlike earlier versions, its operation
depended on a power supply from a single busbar
(DC ESS). Airbus advised that this meets present
certification standards."

Furthermore:
"It had been found that the contents
of a Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM) component
could alter and that this would result in a GCU
‘Failsafe’ fault and isolation of the associated IDG
from the electrical system."

Conclusion:
Due to the failed SRAM, any IDG available was rejected finally
and associated buses were lost.

Now what about this to discuss:
Could they have used the RAT ?

The RAT powers AC ESS directly (via no BTC´s or so) and
additionally the DC ESS via the ESS TR.
It works as a bypass of the normal electrical system to guarantee
some essential electrical supply.

Of course:
There was no ECAM drill to ask for this, I know, and I dont know
what I would have done in this situation. :rolleyes:
(Remark: I absolutely dont want to blame the crew for not trying it!!)
But here is the "green table" and I think, they could (??) have recovered
the AC ESS bus via this and as a result the DC ESS with all the radios.

Any electrical guru here ? :bored:

[Rod Eddington]

Why is ACP #2 off of DC ESS?

They had no commications because:

ACP #1 .......... DC ESS
ACP #2 .......... DC ESS
ACP #3 .......... DC 1

VHF #1 .......... DC ESS
VHF #2 .......... DC 2 (This bus was still powered.)
VHF #3 .......... DC 1

HF #1 .......... AC ESS SHED or AC #1 (depending on
model and S/N)
HF #2 .......... AC 2 (This bus was still powered.)

All the above busses were cold, except as noted.

What do you guys think? If Airbus were to add a
DC ESS BUS FEED button to their system...so, you could 'force' (if necessary) the DC ESS to be fed off Battery 2.
This would give assured (if there is such a thing on the Airbus) sources of DC ESS. There are a lot of problems if this bus is lost.

PantLoad

Hi PantLoad,

I believe the rationale behind powering the ACP2 through the DC ESS BUS is so the FO can still operate the radio in the emergency elec config (don't quote me on that tho!), however not much use in this case.

As for a DC ESS FEED button, well there is an AC ESS FEED button and this didn't work in this case. Would a DC ESS FEED button be just as useless?! In fact, it seems one of the recommendations is that the AC ESS FEED become automatic.

Cat III Dual,

I believe they tried to extend the RAT with no luck.

Cheers

[shortfinals]

...here's the account in Flight of what happened.

http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/12/19/Navigation/195/211163/Airbus+urged+to+fix+A320's+electrics.html.

The AAIB says events like this have occurred seven times now. Good crew action meant no-one came to grief.

The total, unrecoverable loss of comms in this event is the most unnerving bit. The copilot never lost his displays although the skipper was down to standby instruments. But the decision they had to make was: what do we do since we can't say who we are and the transponder is out as well?

They decided to stick to flight plan route and destination, and fortunately they were able to get the standby squawk to work, but chose 77 (rather than 76).

It does look as if Airbus could usefully do some tweaking to its electrical system. The AAIB certainly thinks so.

[Dan Winterland]

.
Now what about this to discuss:
Could they have used the RAT ?
The RAT powers AC ESS directly (via no BTC´s or so) and
additionally the DC ESS via the ESS TR.
It works as a bypass of the normal electrical system to guarantee
some essential electrical supply.
:

I think they could looking at the diagram in the AAIB report. The emerg gen should power the ess T/R and thus the DC ESS bus and the AC Ess bus once on line. Something to try in the sim.

[nnc0]

AFAIK there is no OEB or TR to the FCOM for the A319 as operated by EZY that states anything about leaving the dome light on.
The AD that is referred to has not been circulated withing EZY either that i can see.
Could someone post a link to the AD ?
Ta
ps could night vision be affected by having the dome light on at night ? say for a TCAS RA .

NF,
It didn't affect all MSNs. Only those in which auto switching of the standby lighting to one of the remaining busses wasn't incorporated. I'll dig out the details later today and PM you.

[Squawk7777]

just a little sidenote to a previous reply...

"Citroën" is written with a tréma, not with an accent circonflexe.

Going back to electric failures, and as previously mentioned, this has happened to non-computerized aircraft as well. Trans States Airlines based in STL, back in the days operating for TWE, had an incident in a J-32. With the engines running on the ground the crew hit the master test light switch. What followed was a flameout on both engines. If I recall correctly, it was due to a faulty diode in the test circuitry of the start/stop selector. Now that's scary ... :uhoh:

(This aircraft got hit 7 times by lightning during its life under TWE, subsequently it was nicknamed "sparky") ;)

7 7 7 7

[ElectroVlasic]

Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM) component could alterHopefully a read-only component could not easily be altered, but a random access memory can be altered due to natural radiation sources, and of course, a software bug. So I wonder what is being suspected here? I would hope the SRAM would have error-correction circuitry. I am hoping they get to the real root cause of this worrysome incident. Isolating it down to the compenent is a good first step, but only a first step.

[Val d'Isere]

....mind you my phone doesnt work in the kitchen.
Appalling, if you can't get a feed in the kitchen. :rolleyes:

[D'vay]

I get an excellent signal whan the thrust reversers are deployed. Anybody else notice this compared to FL390?
Regards
D'vay

[threegreenlights]

Thank you Squawk for the language point - I always thought a ´trema´was what one received in oneś bowels when departing LHR at V2 and experiencing total engine shutdown.....I stand corrected.
On the subject of mobile signals, I was rudely awakened from my slumbers recently at FL370 with an irascible pip from my Nokia as T-mobile CZ advised me that I had entered their territory......:D
:mad: ing mobiles!

[aardvark2zz]

......Furthermore:
"It had been found that the contents
of a Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM) component
could alter and that this would result in a GCU
‘Failsafe’ fault and isolation of the associated IDG
from the electrical system."
Conclusion:
Due to the failed SRAM, any IDG available was rejected finally
and associated buses were lost.....
The report wrongly writes Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM).
It should read ROM Read-Only-Memory or
Static Random-Access-Memory (SRAM)

Can someone clear this up !?
.
.

[akerosid]

The AAIB has just issued its formal report on the serious incident involving Easyjet A319, G-EZAC, in September 2006:

Air Accidents Investigation: 4/2009 G-EZAC Report Sections (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/4_2009_g_ezac/4_2009_g_ezac_report_sections.cfm)

Causal factors were identified as:

The investigation identified the following causal factors in this incident:

1. An intermittent fault in the No 1 Generator Control Unit, which caused the loss of the left electrical network

2. An aircraft electrical system design which required manual reconfiguration of the electrical feed to the AC Essential busbar in the event of de-energisation of the No 1 AC busbar, leading to the loss or degradation of multiple aircraft systems, until the electrical system is reconfigured

3. The inability of the flight crew to reconfigure the electrical system, for reasons which could not be established

4. Master Minimum Equipment List provisions which allowed dispatch with a main generator inoperative without consideration of any previous history of electrical system faults on the aircraft

5. Inadequate measures for identifying Generator Control Units repeatedly rejected from service due to repetition of the same intermittent fault.

[MikeAlphaTangoTango]

I can't decide what scares me most, the loss of systems or the resultant AIRPROX :eek:

[Harry Burns]

At least it proved to all its critics that an Airbus still can be flown manually without most of its automatics.

HB

[Smilin_Ed]

Some passengers on the 11 Sept 2001 flight which crashed near Pittsburg, PA had cell phone contact with friends and family who advised them on what was going on. Otherwise they wouldn't have fully understood. Because they had an idea of what was going on, the passengers attempted to regain control of the aircraft. Unfortunately, they didn't succeed.

[racedo]

Unfortunately, they didn't succeed.


I look on it as they did suceed as they were dead men walking on the plane, in their actions they prevented a greater loss of life in forcing Hijackers to crash it.

[Smilin_Ed]

I look on it as they did suceed as they were dead men walking on the plane, in their actions they prevented a greater loss of life in forcing Hijackers to crash it.

I fully agree. :ok:

Ed

[Bobbsy]

SLF here...but one with some background in RF and antenna theory.

The antenna arrays used for cellular phones are designed for maximum efficiency in a horizontal plane with as little energy as possible "wasted" in a vertical direction. However, no antenna system is perfect and there will be some signal outside the optimum area--how much depends on many factors including the height above ground of the tower and the topography the site is designed to cover.

There is one other design "feature" that may account for some of the effects people have noticed: a by product of the antenna design is that there is frequently a fairly strong vertical lobe directly above the tower. This would have the effect of showing a fairly strong signal on a phone briefly as a plane passes directly over a tower site--but with this disappearing again rapidly when the aircraft is not directly above the transmitter. At modern aircraft speeds, there is not usually enough time for the phone to sync to the system before the signal is lost--though there can be service briefly in a few locations.

As somebody has already said, location makes a big difference and there will be places, particularly in the early part of a climb or late part of a descent, where you will get an adequate signal...but the higher you fly, the less likely you are to be able to use your phones.

Bob

[fc101]

The report wrongly writes Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM).
It should read ROM Read-Only-Memory or
Static Random-Access-Memory (SRAM)

Can someone clear this up !?

Guess it should be Static Random-Access-Memory. Static ROM doesn't make much sense.

In a nut shell, RAM can be modified at wish, ROM can't, but depending on type it is either hard coded at manufacturing time or can be field reprogrammed but this isn't the same as what would happen under normal running conditions.

Wikipedia reference on memory types: Read-only memory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Read-only_memory)

fc101

[Capetonian]

Pilots feared UK-bound easyJet flight would be shot down after losing radio contact

Guess which newspaper (this morning).

Wait for it ....

"Terrified passengers watch on in horror as doomed aircraft is buzzed by Tupolev F-1 Mirage fighters with guns blazing over Irish Sea"

[Cape Fear]

It's an Air Bus say no more :ugh:

[Harry Burns]

I'll be moving on shaky grounds when I say this, but in this case I might have tried to reset one bus or two by means of a circuit breaker. It might helped or it might have not. It depends on the time available of course. But if you fear to get shot down... (btw you wouldn't, they try to establish visual contact, if you rock your wings you are safe, just follow them to the next runway).

We were in a holding somewhere over Bologna at 3000ft and couldn't make sense out of the synoptic page. Contactor and relays didn't want to behave like they should have. We were able to get a bus back only after a CB reset and could continue our flight. (That was another type though).

HB

[slf99]

As SLF, I am deeply troubled by the statement on page 27, paragraph 1.6.6.8, of the AAIB report.

"Loss of the AC BUS 1 and AC ESS busbars causes loss of both DC ESS and ACESS SHED busbars and thus prohibits the release of the passenger oxygen masks, either automatically or manually."

Perhaps some industry people can explain why Airbus and the certification authorities allow life-critical systems, in this case affecting 138 passengers, not to be fed by the same electrical network that was capable of feeding the co-pilot's displays and other key equipment? The AAIB report adds that the flight deck oxygen system is unaffected.

Cynically, the network redundancy appears to have been designed to get the hull and flight deck crew home.

[iakobos]

Almost right...max energy (and capture) is targeted at the clients, antennas being even, often, tilted towards the ground.
However, if one looks at a cell base station from a "certain" distance, it will reach a point where the observer will see the antenna at a 0° angle, making the link perfectly possible.
In other words, whatever the altitude of the observer (assuming he does not go stratospheric) he might be line-of-sight at an adequate (low) angle to get his cellphone working, especially if flying towards the cell base station.
(high relative speed > doppler effect when flying laterally to a base station)


VHF
Power output is largely irrelevant. Again, this is a LOS link, if it works with 25W it should work with 5 (even much less). The difference being the signal/noise ratio...obviously more power gives more "comfort".

[voltage]

@slf99: First, please consider the tone of your question. It implies a strong accusation while it appears to me you don't fully understand the design and the nature of the malfunction that happened in the discussed incident.

The passenger oxygen system is powered by the AC ESS SHED and DC ESS buses. By design, the essential buses (ESS) are meant for essential loads. So the passenger oxygen system is connected to the correct buses as per design.

Obviously the essential buses were unpowered in this incident. This should not have happened (and persisted).

[Flyingstig]

Excuse me for coming into this at such a late stage, but I am going back on the Bus soon after a bit of a break so getting my head round some stuff again.

I`ve looked at the schematic and my moneys with Cat3 & Dan. Manually extending the RAT should restore AC Ess & DC Ess. However, when you decide to go away from the books / ECAM etc (on any aeroplane) the trick is really knowing what you want to achieve.

Sitting here at home it looks like an obvious option, but can someone elaborate on what help the ECAM and environment would have given them to conclude they had lost AC1 Ac Ess & DC Ess?

What I get so far is:
Loss of AC #1 = ECAM AC ESS BUS FAULT & DC ESS BUS FAULT procedure will lead to pushing AC ESS FEED P/B which should restore AC ESS Bus.It also says "ATC System 2"
DC ESS BUS FAULT says to use audio switching to #3.

So they still had neither ESS Bus ?

There is obviously loads of other stuff to deal with on this complex problem and it is always easy with hindsight. I never used to carry a copy of the ELEC Schematic but I will from now on. Sometimes it helps to get back to basics.

[Starbear]

I am guessing from your queries you have not had the opportunity to read the AAIB report in full ? If not I would strongly recommend it as it will almost certainly answer all of your questions and give lots more detail as well, with several good diagrams to boot. See Aeroskid's post of 24th Aug.

I offer this suggestion in good faith as I am sure it will inform far bettr than many of the replies which you may get here. I found it very worthwhile.

SB

[Mr Optimistic]

(as SLF) Thanks for that link: rather instructive - and concerning. Interesting to see how the recommendation to show switch position is received as this would seem to mean banning non-latching push buttons. Also the implied criticism of the certification diligence wrt this fault chain. All seems to have been handled very calmly considering, and a good steady report.

[Gary Lager]

Accident reports over history have made tons of 'recommendations' that never get implemented - smoke hoods for pax, rearward facing seats etc. Don't hold your breath for any major changes beyond those already underway.

[Flyingstig]

Starbear,
Thanks! Very interesting reading.
It alos gives a really good insight into the workings of the Elec system.

The guys did a good job, but its intersting to note that they thought about the RAT but did not persue the idea.
Also a salutory point made about being distracted from completing the ECAM!
Always a great help to learn from other`s experiences.

Yeah! Lets see how many `recommendations` are taken up , and how long the `requirements` actually take? Auto changeover of ESS Feed must be a priority, the fact that Airbus have seen fit to include it in later models rather gives the game away a bit!