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PK-KAR
22nd Aug 2006, 07:39
After the spectacular incident where PK-KKE went off course a few months ago, where it landed at some isolated small airport 400NM off away from its destination, many of us down here suspected bad maintenance as a cause. Despite all the press statements by Adam Air citing pilot error, the Directorate General of Air Communication (DGAC) placed an order for Adam Air to fix the IRS of PK-KKE (B733) and it would require 13 proving flights with the DGAC on board inspectors over a few months for PK-KKE to be released for unrestricted commercial flying.

Now, a quick look into Adam Air in the few months revealed some (not so) shocking discoveries, mainly around the commercial vs safety issues. All this culminated in the strike by the Flight Ops Officers at CGK station around 2 weeks ago, where they wanted better pay (they're amongst the lowest paid in the industry), and better safety, and the reemployment of 10 of their colleagues who were fired for "differences with management."

I have decided to write some of these up based on publicly available information, witnesses and also conversations with current and former Adam Air personnell, and many of whom wished this information to be known public but without fear of reprisals to their livelihoods, their lives, and also mine.

Does management understand the real meaning of the word "safety" ?
There are serious doubts as to the safety conscience of the senior management within the airline, in particular, the owners. The effects of the PK-KKE incident (Tambolaka Incident) did not dent Adam Air's image thanks to a quick hash up of the incident despite all the discoveries by the press regarding the handling. However, the management was quick to put the blame on the pilot and the first officer (who was a DGAC pilot attached to the airline). This resulted in Adam announcing that it was to place criminal charges on the two pilots for endangering people's lives (some sort of attempted manslaughter) through professional negligence. This yielded public protest from the pilot community and in particular Adam Air's pilots, who already had 17 colleagues being sued by Adam Air for not paying their bonds (20,000 USD).

Strangely enough, those 17 pilots that were being sued had in the past refused to fly aircraft that were not in a safe condition to carry passengers. The pilots were taken off the rosters and did not fly for some months, depriving them of income through per diem pay, flight hour pay and meal allowances which can form 25 - 40% of their income. When they decided to resign because the company wouldn't put them on flying duties, the company decided to sue them for their working bonds and other damages such as losses from training costs etc. Bear in mind that some of these pilots may already have had their type ratings before they joined Adam Air.

Further concerns of Adam Air's safety comes to the flight attendants. Adam Air's flight attendants often fly with maximum daily duty time and minimum rests at outstations, as well as being worked to the maximum legal limit of 6 days flying in a week. Fatigue have resulted in at least one known case of an Adam Air flight attendant being hospitalised for fatigue or illnesses where fatigue is a major contributory factor. The other side of the concern is the relative experience of the cabin crew on a particular flight. Adam Air is known to have put many junior flight attendants on a gruelling roster and place them as Pursers/CA1 within 6 months of flying duty.

Incidents, accidents, maintenance defects and deferrals

1. Tambolaka
The most well known of all Adam Air incidents is the Tambolaka Incident. The details of this incident have been discussed before in this forum. A few months down the road, it can be said that the company's handling of the Tambolaka incident was also hilarious and shocking.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) ordered was appalled when their go-team was left stranded in Denpasar when they were due to fly to Tambolaka with the Adam Air engineers, after the flight they were supposed to take flew with the engineers but without them. The NTSC was then appalled that the item of focus for the investigation, PK-KKE's IRS, was "repaired" before they arrived. NTSC cited that this was an obstruction to the investigation and a deliberate attempt to hide evidence. The NTSC was further hindered in that the aircraft flew to Makassar after being repaired without the NTSC's prior approval. The DGAC also protested against such a move, but Adam Air insisted that the aircraft had permission to fly to Makassar immediately after it was repaired but would not state which DGAC officer gave the approval.

2. Weather Radars
During last monsoon season, one Adam Air pilot has once called me asking for weather satellite pictures of Indonesia. I had asked him why and his answer was shocking. "At one stage, all of our 732s had no weather radar." Despite this, they were forced to fly into the night in areas with dense cumulus and Cumulonimbus clouds that is prevalent during monsoon season.

3. A 737-3/4/5 flat battery incident.
A few weeks ago I received a message asking about the 737-3/4/5 electrics. Apparently, during cruise, the GEN2 have failed. Normally, the flight would continue with the APU GEN enganged to replace the failed GEN. Unfortunately, the plane had somehow been dispatched with a flat battery which wouldn't recharge. The aircraft continued to the destination on a single GEN and its unclear whether there was a nearer suitable airport to divert to as no further information was given.

Various incidents over the last 10 days:

4. PK-KKE (B733)
PK-KKE has been flying under DGAC surveillance since then until last week when it finally completed 13 flights without any IRS problems, although PK-KKE's story doesn't finish there, two days ago, PK-KKE's IRS#2 went unserviceable again and this time the crew decided to RTB and the crew refused to fly the aircraft. Passengers were left wondering why they returned and complained that they were already late. Adam Air's answer was "we left some of your last minute bag this time, and you should be on your way shortly," while they go and look for another crew to fly. It seems that this aircraft's IRS is a never ending saga.

5. PK-KKF (B732)
A year back, Adam's 732 pilots have protested to the management regarding its decision to delay the maintenance of PK-KKF due to a missing rear section of the leading edge slats on the right wing. Three pilots who have raised this issue with me personally have now left the company due to the management's handling of various safety matters.

Within the last 7 days, PK-KKF's left engine would not start in Semarang and the aircraft had to remain overnight there after spares had to be flown in and maintenance done overnight. Given that this is a long holiday weekend, it resulted in a huge mess throughout the Adam Air network.

8. PK-KKN
This 737-200 had two incidents/defects over the past 10 days.

Last week, the aircraft was heard radio-ing Fatmawati Tower (Bengkulu airport) asking if a pushback truck was available at the airport. The airport had no pushback trucks, so the crew asked "which runway direction would give (him) the longest distance to the taxiway intersection (next to the apron). A witness then photographed why the aircraft asked for the information, it lost its HYD A pressure resulting in no nosewheel steering.

Instead of RTB-ing, the aircraft landed and stopped in the runway, blocking it, to drop its passengers and bags. Then, it was pushed back to apron using raw muscle power.

The problem was traced to a hydraulic rubber line that had hardened and the hose had split near a pipe joint. Adam's solution? Don't replace the line, save cost by cutting the split section and connect the shortened hose to the pipe and the aircraft is then dispatched.

This weekend, the aircraft again reported problem, the left fuel flow gauge was inoperative. After a short groundstop where the engineers "opened it up and cleaned it up", if flew again with the gauge now working. However, before the flight ended, the right fuel flow gauge became inoperative. The pilot suspected that they had just "swapped the gauges". That suspicion was blown away when today it flew and then both fuel flow gauges broke down.

9. PK-KKT (B733/4/5)
Four days ago, this aircraft had a single IRS unserviceable and one of the operations officer refused to sign off the aircraft for dispatch. The management forced the aircraft to fly because it was carrying "valuable cargo." Normally, the aircraft shouldn't fly, and even if it did, it is restricted as follows:
-a Remaining IRS operates normally and is used for both attidude indications and both HSI's AND
-b flight is restricted to DAY VMC
-c all standby instruments operate normally...
-d NO autopilot
-e Must not operate in RVSM airspace

It ended up flying to Medan in IFR with autopilot and in RVSM airspace.

Again on a on a flight to Medan, this aircraft's first officer panel went dead mid-flight. Calling maintenance, they were asked to see if the CB had popped up. To the crew's surprise, the CB did not pop out, it was split in two. The aircraft was stranded in Medan awaiting spare parts. A joke has quickly surfaced in Adam about KKT's panel, "when the right panel is dead, you can still use the left one!"

It is not clear if both of KKT's incident occured within the same flight, however, by the information received, it appears that occured on the same day.

10. PK-KKW (B734) and -KKC
On the 19th, PK-KKC went in for a C-Check, despite having an abnormally high-EGT problem resulting in the crew flying under reduced N1, the engine didn't go in for repairs at this opportunity. Instead, it was moved into PK-KKW, and continued to fly under N1 reduction until yesterday or two days ago when the engine gave up completely. The engine was repaired quickly at a cost of US$300,000. The humourous thing was, the aircraft today was put intensively to cater for Adam Air's 14 extra flights to Bali today, and one of the owners was quoted complaining today that "all those extra flights still can't cover that engine repair costs!"

11. Unknown, B732... oil pressure light illuminate inflight. No further details.

7 out of 11 of these incidents occured within the last 10 days. Staff in Adam Air have lost count on how many technical delays and incidents that had occured within that period of time. This number comes out of a fleet of around 18 - 20 aircraft.


Operational Policy and Safety Policy
It is apparent that some in the senior management has a serious lack of understanding of an aircraft's operating dynamics (that aircraft work in weights not volume), and the safety measures that prevails in the industry.

Cargo
We all know that cargo is valuable, but it is not prudent to sacrifice safety for the sake of cargo revenue when you have paying passengers on board. If we look back at PK-KKT's incident, let's see how much they were getting.

On this 2 hr flight, the Take off weight was restricted due to the Maximum Landing Weight at the destination. It was carrying 2.8 tons of cargo. 2.8 tons of cargo would yield about US$9000, now if it wasn't full and was carrying only 150 pax, that would mean that the lives of each passenger is valued at US$60 thanks to Adam Air's policy. That's not worth much is it?

Cargo, Safety and Flight Ops - The daily conflicts.

One of the most dillematic part of Adam Air operations is the flight operations department. Due to various conflicts and poorer than industrial standard working conditions, the Adam Air Flight Operations Officers in Jakarta decided to strike on 11th of August, causing chaos on Adam Air's operations. By the end of the day, of all 46 FOOs, 33 were fired, and there was a huge gap in the FOO coverage.

Adam Air covered the deficit by "importing" FOOs from its outstations as well as newly recruited FOOs were put to run the show immediately. However, unlicensed FOOs also filled the gap. One case is a former company debt collector who was sent there to "help". The person has absolutely no clue on Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, weight limits, fuel requirements etc, let alone being licensed.

On the friday, Adam conducted interviews for FOO applicants and put them into use. All those previously rejected were immediately taken in. Even the former district manager of Bouraq and station manager of Jatayu was taken in.
Adam is still seeking ways to take legal actions against 33 FOOs they fired.

In Adam, the FOO is under Ramp and is supervised by the ramp manager. The ramp manager (which is not a licensed FOO) would not know what to decide when confronted with flight planning issues/problems especially when a conflict occurs between the FOO and the Cargo department. The FOOs measure the payload to conform to the performance limits. Explaining this to the cargo department or the ramp manager is a futile exercise because he does not understand why there is the Single Engine climb limit weight or why there is a V1 and a runway performance chart. What he does understand is the language of the cargo manager, which is "if there's space, why not fill it". The concept of weight limitations (instead of space limitations) seems like an alien concept to them, including the management.

This safety problem is further boosted by the management's emphasis on prioritising cargo. The Chief Pilot has no say, it is maximise cargo revenue to the limit, and cutting cost to the absolute minimum.

"It happens often..."
One sad example that is a result of this is on the 15th when over the radio it was heard that a 732 destined for PNK diverted due to low visibility. The Terminal Area Forecast was different from the actual, which was only 500m. The Flight Ops department could not get the actual weather of the destination. There is no telex, the photocopier had to be shared with other department (including sales and ticketing, who needs a LOT of photocopying). Where could the actual weather information be obtained from? No one is in the Adam Air office in PNK yet as it was too early in the morning. Upon hearing of the diversion, the Flight Ops in CGK was heard calling the aircraft to apologise and was replied, "It's OK, it happens often."

Bad habits are fuel for displeasure
The negative side effect of the Flight Ops being under Ramp is happening in the critical aspect of flying: FUEL. With the senior management wielding absolute power, it is normal for a displeased colleague to report any incident directly to the senior management to seek retribution in the form of punishment to the so-called offending party. With FlightOps being under Ramp, fuel uplift becomes a conflict of management hierarchy. An incident was reported by a witness where the ramp agent threatened to report the flight ops officer to the management because the agent had filled the tanks to 9,500kgs of fuel when the captain ordered 10,000. The fuel truck was unhappy to return only to pump 500kgs of fuel.

This was a result of "following habits" and not consulting with the flight-ops department as the necessary extra 500kgs of fuel due to heavier than normal headwinds to the destination. When the error was discovered, because the Flight-Ops is below Ramp, the ramp agent would throw his fits at the Flight Ops.

MZFW
With the company's emphasis on cargo, and that the ramp agent is the one supervising the cargo loading, the risk of a ramp agent to under-report the cargo weight to the flight-ops is there.

Junior Flight Operations Officers tend to accomodate these conflicts, however, not so in the right way. One aircraft was 700kg over MZFW, the FOO told the pilot that he "overloaded the aircraft" by 700kgs. Not wanting to enter a delay to offload everything, the Captain asked, "So I'll just burn off the 700kgs before take off."So after pushback it sat there burning off the 700kgs (about 15 minutes worth to lower weight. When another flight ops officer not supervising the flight saw this, he asked the ramp agent why was it doing engine run ups after pushback. The reply was "he's over MZFW by 700kgs so he's there burning the 700kgs so he'll be legal for take off."

Where does this end?
This lack of understanding on MZFW also extends to the management who recently asked for all flights inbound to Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta Intl (CGK/WIII) to have file with Jakarta Halim Intl (HLP/WIHH) as an alternate, instead of the other alternates about 50 minutes away. Their reason for this is so that the airplanes can carry less fuel and carry more cargo instead. However, with all Adam Air flights having restricted take off weights due to Max Landing Weight limits or MZFW limits, this seriously cast a cloud of concern and fear that perhaps, until one of Adam Air's jets become a smoking hole in the ground, there will be no change.

What do you think?
:yuk:

PK-KAR

Alvin
22nd Aug 2006, 10:18
I believe one of Adam Air's B733 was under the previous registration G-IGOW, affectionately known at EZY and GO as 'scrapheap challenge'. Had many a long day out with various technical snags on that beast - glad to see the back of it! Think it had done over 60,000hrs and had spent a few years 'resting' in the desert somewhere.

mr Q
22nd Aug 2006, 13:56
Same Theme,different perspective.......
http://bialoglowy.********.com/2006/02/fear-factor-flying-in-indonesia.html?

CaptainSandL
22nd Aug 2006, 14:54
Alvin,

G-IGOW became PK-KKU (http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=5636229), which was not one of the aircraft mentioned in the original post. I did the post maintenance / customer demo airtest on that aircraft when it transferred to Adam Air and it passed first time without any significant defects. It should be a good aircraft for them.

S&L

LLuke
22nd Aug 2006, 15:37
Regarding incident 8:
Last week, the aircraft was heard radio-ing Fatmawati Tower (Bengkulu airport) asking if a pushback truck was available at the airport. The airport had no pushback trucks, so the crew asked "which runway direction would give (him) the longest distance to the taxiway intersection (next to the apron). A witness then photographed why the aircraft asked for the information, it lost its HYD A pressure resulting in no nosewheel steering.

These pictures were shown in same topic on airliners.net: http://www.airliners.net/discussions/general_aviation/read.main/2948643/

http://i83.photobucket.com/albums/j290/lhakokbisa/Adam%20Bengkulu/evakuasi.jpg

http://i83.photobucket.com/albums/j290/lhakokbisa/Adam%20Bengkulu/pushback_man.jpg

Disembarking and pushback as mentioned by the OP -- but not as we know it.

PK-KAR
22nd Aug 2006, 15:56
while the people in the management are probably relatives of the owner and probably never did work within the industry before

Well, it's in the spirit of PK-KKN...
Korupsi... Corruption
Kolusi... Collution
Nepotisme... Nepotism

PK-KAR

+200 No Flags
22nd Aug 2006, 16:44
Junior Flight Operations Officers tend to accomodate these conflicts, however, not so in the right way. One aircraft was 700kg over MZFW, the FOO told the pilot that he "overloaded the aircraft" by 700kgs. Not wanting to enter a delay to offload everything, the Captain asked, "So I'll just burn off the 700kgs before take off."So after pushback it sat there burning off the 700kgs (about 15 minutes worth to lower weight. When another flight ops officer not supervising the flight saw this, he asked the ramp agent why was it doing engine run ups after pushback. The reply was "he's over MZFW by 700kgs so he's there burning the 700kgs so he'll be legal for take off."

PK-KAR

Can someone explain how one goes about burning off 700kgs from the ZFW without putting either the A/C, the pax or the cargo on fire? Surely you mean the MTOW?

Row 12F
22nd Aug 2006, 16:51
From Adam Air web site, a quote from their President:

"Adam Air establishment is departing from our mission to create an air carriage with safety, high standard quality and refreshingly different flying experiences at affordable prices."

That sounds honest enough, bearing in mind the comments above.

SIDSTAR
22nd Aug 2006, 16:51
How can the DGAC allow this cowboy outfit to continue to operate? Or is it a fact that it is not the worst outfit in Indonesia. Remind me to keep away from them if I'm ever over that way.

PK-KAR
22nd Aug 2006, 17:36
Well, just received calls today about more problems...
7 incidents/maintenance problem in 14 days with 5 aircraft...
Sounds like they'll grab the Indonesian Airline Golden Boot Award away from Lion for sure this year!

Let's see today... In true reflection of the ruthless pursuit to cut costs etc... PK-KKA (735) is remaining overnight in Singapore tonight because of Zero pax booked on the SIN-CGK portion... which will cause some interesting aircraft rotations tomorrow... But, definitely they are pursuing the "if ain't full we don't fly it" culture.

PK-KKZ autothrottle has been "misbehavin'" for the past 2 weeks, the so called "shake" or the "A/T yoyo" became so bad today that the pilots threw a fit and wouldn't fly it the next time they have the aircraft unless the problems are fixed. Adam's solution... "Cleaning and Bypassing" didn't solve the problem, but why the heck do they keep doing it? Send it to GA Maintenance for God's sake and pay another sum of money for a proper fix! The info-sender is worried that the problem may not be with the A/T system but the engine... worried about which plane is going to become the next smoking hole in the ground.

Regarding the burning off the 700kg... well, the Capt. probably only checked the TOW which was below the MTOW and signed it off without realizing that he already had the correct fuel and he ended up burning off 700kgs of his reserves and still took off illegally... The JFOO didn't specify where the extra 700kg was and these things get signed off just before doors closed in a probably already delayed situation.

Sounds stupid, well, in a stressful and conflicting environment like this, unintentional lapses of safety occurs... compounding the problem of inter-department conflict, thus a vicious circle. Who's to blame? *my finger's pointing at management*

PK-KAR

Alvin
22nd Aug 2006, 20:27
S&L

We may have had this conversation before - if so then you may have told me that when you were testing this fine peice of machinery it was the closest you came to having the APU catch fire at a high altitude start!

I'm glad OW will be a good earner for someone! I enjoyed her nostalgia - but that was about it. Had my fingers crossed when we did a full CAT3 on that bird - but she pulled it off!!!

Lets hope that her '88 vintage will be a fine one!

Alvin

PK-KAR
23rd Aug 2006, 17:41
Oh dear... KKC brakes failed after landing today...

Hmm... PK-KKU ex G-IGOW has missed the spotlight in the last 2 weeks... however, it has engine "problems"... starter problems fixed...

PK-KAR

EDDNHopper
23rd Aug 2006, 19:14
Thanks for speaking up, PK-KAR! Even if it has been discussed before, outfits like these should certainly be listed in a PPRuNe Hall of Shame (provided, of course, that what you are saying is based on facts).

fdr
24th Aug 2006, 11:15
PK; if you want to try and get this further up the system, PM me.:bored:

yeeha
9th Sep 2006, 04:47
Anyone knows who's the stakeholders of this Red Baron Airline? Its been rumored that it is owned by an ex - University Student, even an ex - Bus Company Owner.

fiddlair
9th Sep 2006, 08:07
Just for record: Adamair started operations on 19th Dec 2003. Mr Adam got the airline as a present from his mother for his 20th or 21st birthday. At the beginning he was wery proud to have only modern 737 500 and 400 aircraft.
When I joined them the 737 chief-pilot did not have type-rating. We had different problems then, they usually filled the aircraft with fuel, the remaining fuel was always about 5 tons irrelevant of weather or the alternate.Apart from small incidents I remember the day, when we got a Fuel-filter light on. The QRH says something like land as soon as possible. We've been flying with it for about 2 weeks, the maintenance told us that they interchanged the two filters, but the light was still there, so this was a problem in the system somewhere, the filter itself was clean... but that was all lies, finally they got the new filter and the light was gone... Don't be upset, this is Indonesia, a wonderful country anyway, with great people and for your money you can get everything...

PK-KAR
9th Sep 2006, 08:34
Well, their idea of maintaining the IRS is rumoured to be: Take it out. Clean the ports, and plug it back in, if the thing runs, it's maintained... LOL forget calibration.

PK-KKC had a "spectacular" fright the other week, reported "panels went dead" and rtb-ed. In less than ideal visibility, it made a slip & dive to the runway resulting in a fast landing and one of the tyres shed a piece of rubber that was reported by a later flight, prompting runway closure for a little while. A little inquiring a little further, it appears that there was more than just "panels going blank".

Anyways, PK-KKM just came in within the last 10 days from South America, let's see how long this one lasts before something goes wrong.

Yeeha, Owned by a Mr. Adam and his "Adam's Family" + the family of the speaker of parliament. Finances are run by a Mrs. Ang who has been quoted "Forget the pax complaints, fill the hold with cargo at all cost"...

fdr, Well, it has been tried by others to no avail, they ended up with a lawsuit on their hands. Knowing Indo politics, thanks for the offer anyways...

PK-KAR

ABX
1st Feb 2007, 14:46
PK-KAR,

Your concerns are now proven so well founded.

How tragic. (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=258144&highlight=adam+air)

Myriad
2nd Feb 2007, 08:21
I just hope their is not a cover up of a magnitude similiar to the 1997 SilkAir crash.

FlyByHeart
2nd Feb 2007, 13:57
Adam Air jet subject of pilot complaints before crash
By Don Phillips
Published: January 30, 2007
Pilots complained repeatedly about problems with an Adam Air Boeing 737- 400 in the weeks before it crashed into the sea off Sulawesi Island, Indonesia, on Jan. 1, according to several investigators involved in the crash probe.
Two of the dozens of complaints were about the plane's weather radar, an item of particular concern since investigators have determined that the plane flew straight into a violent storm before it went down with 102 passengers and crew. Normally pilots would make almost any possible maneuver to avoid flying into the heart of a thunderstorm.In the latest news from the sarch, signals from plane's emergency locator beacon were detected from a location about 1,700 meters — roughly one mile — below the surface of the ocean. Indonesia has said that it had no equipment capable of reaching such a depth and asked for international help.Several officials and investigators connected with the crash investigation, who asked not to be identified because they are not designated as official spokesmen, said they were troubled by the large number of pilot complaints about malfunctioning instruments in the cockpit of the 17-year-old plane.By far the largest number of complaints concerned instruments that would tell one of the two crew members whether the plane was going up or down, and whether the plane was maintaining its course. So many complaints, called write-ups, were received from so many pilots that investigators have begun to ask whether any effort was made to repair the problems.
The vertical-speed indicator on the left side of the cockpit, the captain's side, collected by far the greatest number of complaints — 48 — in the three months before the crash, the investigators said. The vertical-speed indicator tells how fast the plane is climbing or descending.
Pilots complained 30 times about anomalies in the plane's left-right inertial reference system, which helps tell which direction the plane is turning. Problems with a fuel differential light drew 15 complaints. There were numerous complaints about inoperative cockpit instrument lights.There were several pilot write-ups about wing flaps that stayed stuck at an angle of 25 degrees. Flaps, located along the trailing edge of each wing, extend downward at various angles to help a plane slow for approach and landing. A plane would be in no danger, assuming the flaps stuck on landing. A 25-degree angle would almost never be used on takeoff, but stuck flaps at any angle on takeoff would likely force a plane to return to the airport.Investigators are intrigued by two complaints that the plane's weather radar was unreliable. However, until the plane is recovered from the ocean floor, there is little they can do to determine whether the weather radar had any role in the crash.On Tuesday, a spokesman for the airline could not be reached to respond to these specific complaints. The company said earlier it maintained and operated its planes according to the guidelines of Indonesian regulators and the manufacturer.