Cirrus SR22
14th Aug 2006, 20:47
Here is the unanimous verdict of the Cape High Court (The Honourable Mr Justice Siraj Desai and his assessors, Nationwide Airlines Captain Bruce Hyde and Magistrate Johan Venter) today:
In deciding whether the death of the deceased was brought about by any act or omission prima facie involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person, the Court was entirely reliant upon the evidence of Dr A L de Kock and the documentation handed up in evidence.
Dr de Kock also compiled an accident report in terms of the relevant Civil Aviation Regulations for the South African Civil Aviation Authority. In the said report, and also in evidence, Dr de Kock cited several probable causes for the aircraft crashing.
Essentially it appears that the pilots lost situational awareness pursuant to an attempted instrument landing. Dr de Kock maintains that they deviated from the prescribed missed approach procedure during this attempt. Their plight was aggravated by adverse weather conditions and the aircraft drifted off course eventually colliding with mountainous terrain 6.7 nautical miles north-east of the George Airport.
Some concern was raised about the intermittent unreliability of the Instrument Landing System on runway 29 at George Airport where the aircraft commenced its approach. It is apparent from the evidence that without the Instrument Landing System functioning properly a pilot could still land an aircraft safely and lawfully using alternative navigational aids which were available. This was accordingly not a significant contributing factor, if at all, to the accident.
It was also suggested that the directional gyro was not serviceable and this may have resulted in faulty directional information. There is also the suggestion that uncleared defects reflected in the aircraft’s Flight Folio could also have contributed to the accident. Although possible contributing factors they do not detract from the principle cause of the crash.
According to Dr de Kock “good data” was obtained from the Flight Data Recorder. It appears from both the Flight Data Recorder and the Cockpit Voice Recorder that the aircraft, on the initial approach for landing at the airport, was too high and too fast. The pilots decided to follow the missed approach procedure. The procedure to be followed on a missed approach is clearly set out in the prescribed approach procedure and in the Flight Operations Manual. The manual prescribes the duties of pilots as well as the navigation procedures in such circumstances. It also includes the procedure in the event of a Ground Proximity Warning System (“GPWS”) warning at any stage during the approach.
This was what is termed a “monitored approach” with the pilot in command doing the monitoring and the co-pilot the flying. Dr de Kock stated that there was no indication from the Cockpit Voice Recorder or the Flight Data Recorder that the pilots complied with the Flight Operations’ Manual in trying to get themselves out of the situation. It seems clear that despite several GPWS warnings – 13 in all – there was no pull up, either immediate or at all, of the aircraft. This much is clear. Dr de Kock agrees that the complacency of the pilot in command was surprising and concedes that the co-pilot failed under the circumstances to do what a reasonable pilot would have done.
Having considered this evidence and the available documentation it is the Court’s view that the death of the deceased WESSEL JOHANNES CRONJE was brought about by an act or omission prima facie amounting to an offence on the part of the pilots WILLEM LODEWYK MEYER and IAN HUGHES NOAKES.
[Ends]
In deciding whether the death of the deceased was brought about by any act or omission prima facie involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person, the Court was entirely reliant upon the evidence of Dr A L de Kock and the documentation handed up in evidence.
Dr de Kock also compiled an accident report in terms of the relevant Civil Aviation Regulations for the South African Civil Aviation Authority. In the said report, and also in evidence, Dr de Kock cited several probable causes for the aircraft crashing.
Essentially it appears that the pilots lost situational awareness pursuant to an attempted instrument landing. Dr de Kock maintains that they deviated from the prescribed missed approach procedure during this attempt. Their plight was aggravated by adverse weather conditions and the aircraft drifted off course eventually colliding with mountainous terrain 6.7 nautical miles north-east of the George Airport.
Some concern was raised about the intermittent unreliability of the Instrument Landing System on runway 29 at George Airport where the aircraft commenced its approach. It is apparent from the evidence that without the Instrument Landing System functioning properly a pilot could still land an aircraft safely and lawfully using alternative navigational aids which were available. This was accordingly not a significant contributing factor, if at all, to the accident.
It was also suggested that the directional gyro was not serviceable and this may have resulted in faulty directional information. There is also the suggestion that uncleared defects reflected in the aircraft’s Flight Folio could also have contributed to the accident. Although possible contributing factors they do not detract from the principle cause of the crash.
According to Dr de Kock “good data” was obtained from the Flight Data Recorder. It appears from both the Flight Data Recorder and the Cockpit Voice Recorder that the aircraft, on the initial approach for landing at the airport, was too high and too fast. The pilots decided to follow the missed approach procedure. The procedure to be followed on a missed approach is clearly set out in the prescribed approach procedure and in the Flight Operations Manual. The manual prescribes the duties of pilots as well as the navigation procedures in such circumstances. It also includes the procedure in the event of a Ground Proximity Warning System (“GPWS”) warning at any stage during the approach.
This was what is termed a “monitored approach” with the pilot in command doing the monitoring and the co-pilot the flying. Dr de Kock stated that there was no indication from the Cockpit Voice Recorder or the Flight Data Recorder that the pilots complied with the Flight Operations’ Manual in trying to get themselves out of the situation. It seems clear that despite several GPWS warnings – 13 in all – there was no pull up, either immediate or at all, of the aircraft. This much is clear. Dr de Kock agrees that the complacency of the pilot in command was surprising and concedes that the co-pilot failed under the circumstances to do what a reasonable pilot would have done.
Having considered this evidence and the available documentation it is the Court’s view that the death of the deceased WESSEL JOHANNES CRONJE was brought about by an act or omission prima facie amounting to an offence on the part of the pilots WILLEM LODEWYK MEYER and IAN HUGHES NOAKES.
[Ends]