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Oilhead
25th Jul 2006, 00:31
:ugh: Near-collision on O'Hare runway

By Jon Hilkevitch
Tribune transportation reporter
Published July 24, 2006, 3:08 PM CDT


A United Airlines passenger jet departing O'Hare International Airport on Sunday night lifted off over the top of a Boeing 747 cargo plane that moments earlier landed on a crossing runway, and the two aircraft missed colliding by about 300 feet, the Federal Aviation Administration said today.

The FAA blamed controller error for the runway incursion — the fifth incident this year at O'Hare involving planes occupying the same runway or in violation of separation standards.

Sunday's incident occurred about 10 p.m. when United flight 1015, a Boeing 737 bound for Denver, was cleared by the O'Hare air-traffic control tower for takeoff from runway 27 Left, said FAA spokesman Tony Molinaro.

A 747 freighter operated by Atlas Air was rolling out after landing on runway 14 Right and it crossed the intersection with runway 27 Left where the United plane was taking off, Molinaro said.

It was not clear whether the United pilot lifted off early to avoid hitting the Atlas Air cargo plane, but the FAA said the two planes came within 300 feet of each other.

The National Transportation Safety Board will send investigators to O'Hare on Tuesday to interview the pilots and examine the flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders aboard both aircraft, said safety board spokesman Keith Holloway.

rhovsquared
25th Jul 2006, 00:45
Time for the FAA to clean up and modernise :\

777300ER
25th Jul 2006, 01:09
How long can this continue without much worse consequences? The FAA controllers in major centers are pushing the limit in terms of movements and mistakes will continue to happen. Either the system needs an upgrade or traffic needs to be capped.

Halfnut
25th Jul 2006, 04:37
http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DN-runways_16bus.ART.State.Edition1.17acda0.html

Lighting the way

A program tested at D/FW could help prevent deadly runway accidents - if it receives funding

11:20 AM CDT on Sunday, July 16, 2006

By SUDEEP REDDY / The Dallas Morning News

WASHINGTON – Many aviation officials consider it the most dangerous part of a plane trip: moving across a runway just as another aircraft is taking off.

The U.S. averages almost one runway incursion a day, creating the potential for serious accidents. Ground collisions between commercial airliners have been among the deadliest plane disasters. Pilots and safety officials are watching a program at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, the primary test bed for preventing such runway incidents.

The system uses a series of computerized lights embedded along a runway to signal pilots. It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.

A year into tests at D/FW, the Runway Status Lights program has won broad support from pilots and airport officials. But with funding constraints at the Federal Aviation Administration, the program may not expand fast enough to prevent another serious accident.

Incursions represent "a highly dangerous situation," said Capt. William Mino of the Allied Pilots Association, the union for American Airlines Inc. "The chance of loss of life is so great that any of them is too many."

Since 1990, the National Transportation Safety Board has included stopping runway incursions as one of its five "most wanted" aviation safety improvements. The independent agency, which makes safety recommendations to the FAA, wants pilots to get immediate warnings of possible ground collisions instead of waiting on air traffic controllers.

Airports in Boston, New York and Las Vegas have experienced high-profile near-collisions since last summer, prompting heightened attention from safety officials.

In the incident at Las Vegas' McCarran International Airport, a controller confused two departure aircraft and cleared an Air Canada jet just as an America West plane was taking off.

The America West pilot later said he was 100 feet above the Air Canada plane as he passed over it, according to the NTSB. (America West is now part of US Airways Group Inc.)

The worst runway incursion occurred in March 1977, when a KLM Boeing 747 attempting to take off from Tenerife in the Canary Islands collided with a Pan Am 747 coming from the other end of the runway. The crash, the deadliest in commercial aviation, killed 574 people.

How it works

At D/FW, Runway 18L/36R features the series of red lights embedded in the runway, flush with the pavement.

If another plane is crossing a runway, "takeoff hold" lights illuminate to warn pilots to stop their departure. If a runway is unsafe for entry or crossing because a plane is taking off, runway entrance lights illuminate to warn pilots to stay away.

The system operates for every plane moving across the runway, not just when someone has made an error, said Jonathan Bernays, assistant group leader for surveillance systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory.

That means the system must be able to process as many as 3,000 light activation commands a day for a busy runway – one that operates up to 20 hours a day, with 50 takeoffs or landings an hour, at several intersections.

"If all we had to do was turn on one light every few minutes, it would be trivial," Mr. Bernays said. "What's hard about the status lights is doing it right every time."

The takeoff hold lights have been in place for four months. They're the second phase of the safety lights program that launched in March 2005 after two years of engineering and software testing.

The runway entrance lights were initially intended for a three-month evaluation.

But after an "overwhelmingly positive" reaction during initial testing, the program has remained in place, said Jaime Figueroa, the FAA's surface systems manager in Washington.

"The response has been very positive, from pilots, air traffic controllers and airport operators alike," Mr. Figueroa said.

But the system hasn't been flawless. Some pilots have been reported to taxi over illuminated lights. Other concerns remain about pilots seeing the lights go off and moving ahead without clearance from a controller, though officials say that properly trained pilots have handled the system well.

'Layered defense'

The system's designers are quick to note that the lights were never meant to be a first-line defense but a tool that helps in case of human error.

"We have a very low tolerance for accidents," said Mr. Bernays. "You need a layered defense. The expectation of this program is it provides an independent backup to all of the procedures and training that currently give us a very safe system."

The program's cost for one runway at D/FW was $2 million, though other sites could be less. The San Diego airport is launching its own lights test program using a different surface radar.

When the program might expand beyond there is unclear. The FAA is revamping its funding structure to implement key technology upgrades and has fallen short on plans to expand other surveillance infrastructure.

Meanwhile, airport officials and pilots in Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles are interested. The FAA even hosted a Japanese delegation interested in the safety lights technology, Mr. Figueroa said.

Pilots and safety officials say they're hopeful that the program will attract the funding needed.

The U.S. had 324 incursions in the fiscal year that ended last fall, including three close calls between commercial jets that were deemed the most serious, according to FAA data. That figure has dropped from 424 incursions in 2000.

"We are working hard and making progress, but we are not there yet," FAA administrator Marion Blakey told a Senate panel last fall.

The D/FW test grew out of more than a decade of efforts to build an effective warning system for pilots.

MIT researchers, working with the FAA, sought to use marine radar technology for a pilot warning system in the early 1990s. The project, tested at Boston Logan International Airport, had too many false alarms and was discontinued until new surface surveillance systems could be deployed.

D/FW Airport has been the test bed for other aviation systems, including one to help pilots and controllers predict the weather planes would fly through. As the nation's third-busiest airport, D/FW is a top candidate for such projects.

The airport invested in the advanced technology at the beginning of this decade as part of a broader construction effort. The system, which gives controllers a comprehensive view of planes on the ground, also provides the foundation for the runway lights program.

E-mail [email protected]

Ground Safety

To help reduce near-collisions on the ground, the Federal Aviation Administration is:

•Providing more educational information to pilots, airlines, mechanics and others who work with aircraft.

•Standardizing rules on airport surface operations.

•Reworking runway markings and signs so they can be more easily seen.

•Testing automated lighting systems.

SOURCES: Air Line Pilots Association; Federal Aviation Administration

Online at: http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DN-runways_16bus.ART.State.Edition1.17acda0.html

Halfnut
25th Jul 2006, 04:39
More info at:

http://www.faa.gov/and/and500/private/rwsl/index.htm

SLATS_EXTEND
25th Jul 2006, 06:31
I used 36R for T/O at DFW the other day with the new embedded lights operational. As we were holding in position, they crossed a 757 upfield and the lights immedialty turned red and it would have been impossible for us not to note that takeoff would have been unsafe.

A most reassuring system for those occasional 300/300/300 RVR takeoffs.:ok:

Shitsu_Tonka
25th Jul 2006, 08:01
One has to wonder what the FAA Management are prepared to accept before decisively acting. I fear I know the answer already.

The staffing levels at most of the FAA Centres, TRACONS are WAY under establishment levels. The FAA response is to conduct witch hunts and refuse to negotiate a contract for its controllers. You can well imagine what this morale booster is doing for the understaffed and overworked that remain - and all rapdily approach retirement age.

A sorry state of affairs thanks to the politicking of Marion Blakey and her conservative stooges.

MrBernoulli
25th Jul 2006, 08:25
Stuff like this is why my company, and my previous, refuse to be involved in any LAHSO or SIRO.:eek:

Land And Hold Short Operations/Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations

HEATHROW DIRECTOR
25th Jul 2006, 08:43
<<It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.>>
That saddens me. I worked for 21 years in Heathrow Tower and never experienced a runway incursion. The only "near" ones I had were one or two caused by pilots but, luckily, I was able to stop them in time. If runway incursions caused by ATC are increasing then something is drastically wrong with controller training.

I've mentioned this elsewhere.... but I don't know how the tower controllers work at ORD but is their system foolproof? One US facility I saw on TV appeared to have no regimented system of representing the runways movements to the controllers - the controller working the runway just held a strip for each aircraft in his hand. At Heathrow, and other UK airports, each runway is represented by a flight-progress strip bay in front of the controllers. Each aircraft is represented by a FPS which can be moved in that bay; as an aircraft is cleared to land or take off the strip is emphatically moved to the bottom of the bay. If the runway is blocked in any way either a red blocker strip is placed in the bottom slot in the bay or, if the obstruction is caused by another aircraft the strip for that aircraft is placed in the bay such that other movements cannot take place while it is there. I've used that system successfully in a variety of "crossing runway" configurations and single-runway operations. Its isn't rocket science but it damned well works.

The light system appears to be similar to the reds and greens which have been in use for many years at Heathrow, albeit only during fog and at night. Under those conditions, if an aircraft is crossing a runway red stop bars are illuminated across the runway as protection. It's not precisely like the system mentioned above, but it wouldn't take much to change it. But how much better it would be for the ATC systems to work every time so that pilot confidence could be restored and workload reduced...

Groundloop
25th Jul 2006, 08:56
The system uses a series of computerized lights embedded along a runway to signal pilots. It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.


Just one question to the author of this article - How do you see these lights by NOT looking out the cockpit windows?

Doors to Automatic
25th Jul 2006, 08:57
Sounds like a botched LAHSO - 747 must have landed well past the TDZ given the length of the runway (14R). Can't wait to see the report!

Konkordski
25th Jul 2006, 09:29
A program tested at D/FW could help prevent deadly runway accidents



This isn't news!! I was writing about Runway Status Lights seven years ago - how many goddamn tests do you need to do?!

the_hawk
25th Jul 2006, 09:42
source: http://www.aero-news.net/EmailArticle.cfm?ContentBlockID=700bec09-42ba-48cd-a7a1-a7c5a19e4a7d
...The FAA says the 737 was cleared for take-off from Runway 27 Left at about 10:00 pm Sunday night as the jumbo freighter was cleared to cross the active.
The result? They missed each other... but only by about 300-feet. In fact, the United 737 took off over the top of the 747.
At this point, the FAA isn't sure whether the crew aboard United Flight 1015 rotated early to avoid the Atlas freighter.
In any case... the FAA blames controller error, the direction the agency is also leaning towards in two other incidents that occurred in March, including an incident in which two planes came as close as 100 feet.

says the FAA...says aero-news.net...

BOAC
25th Jul 2006, 10:28
I haven't read the whole of 'Halfnut's' quote, but if the system relies on manual selection of 'runway active' rather than 100% reliable automatic movement sensors that work in all wx conditions along every runway we are no further along since it appears to be human error in ATC that caused this.

I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?

Doors to Automatic
25th Jul 2006, 11:36
I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?

It should be possible on ORD's 14R as there is almost 11000ft available before the intersection - hence my speculation that the 747 must have landed very deep!

the_hawk
25th Jul 2006, 13:07
More like 9700-9900ft, though I didn't find the exact figure yet (e.g. look at the end of the parallel 14L with 10005ft length). Anyway, I don't think LAHSO played a role in that one (see my last post).

Whaledog
25th Jul 2006, 14:12
Door's:
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.

PAXboy
25th Jul 2006, 14:17
The Dallas Morning News, via HalfnutBut with funding constraints at the Federal Aviation Administration, the program may not expand fast enough to prevent another serious accident.The technical translation of that is: Not enough people have died yet. Unfortunately, nothing else will change the situation. The 'capping' of traffic is certainly not going to happen.

Turning to the origins of this situation ... (bearing in mind that I am simply a UK based Pax) when did training start to slip? Is this linked to the 1981 strike and the reaction of the US govt/FAA to PATCO? My reason for raising this is that, the decline of a skilled trade does not happen over night and the fault line will run long and deep. If we do not understand where the 'earthquake' started, then we cannot hope to plot the way it will develop and thus, how we can minimise damage. Politicians (which includes the FAA as it is a govt agency) will want to say, "We have moved on" and all that other stuff but, I suspect, that we have not.

bubbers44
25th Jul 2006, 14:47
Door's:
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.


27L has 6600 feet from take off position to edge of 14R so dought if the captain ever saw the 747 since they were at least 300 feet high at that point for that short of a flight to Denver. Maybe the FO saw it.

Oilhead
25th Jul 2006, 15:00
Atlas cleared to land about 9 miles out - full length 14R. United held in position on 27L - then cleared for take off - two separate frequencies, a point that has driven me mad about ORD ops for years :ugh: . When you are on 27L first third or so, you cannot see traffic landing/rolling out 14R. My understanding is that this was closest one yet of the five or so this year. Kudos to UAL Cap.

cwatters
25th Jul 2006, 15:57
Good job the United flight didn't have to abort his take off.

Spitoon
25th Jul 2006, 17:11
I I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?Regardless of whether LAHSO was a factor in this incident, the answer to BOAC's question is 'You can't'. And no debates about how long the runway is before the intersection will change that. I'm just a simple controller but I really cannot see how this procedure can realistically be considered 'safe' or why/how it has found its way into the ICAO books.

forget
25th Jul 2006, 18:07
Did someone mention FAA inertia? Take a look at ---
http://www.groundmarker.com/testimonials.asp

and then 'FAA History'.:confused: :confused:

zerozero
25th Jul 2006, 21:18
It should be possible on ORD's 14R as there is almost 11000ft available before the intersection - hence my speculation that the 747 must have landed very deep!

At least you admitted you were offering unabashed speculation....but to what end?

The fact is, Atlas is not approved for LAHSO operations.

bubbers44
26th Jul 2006, 01:49
I think any Atlas pilot would land long given the whole length to expedite taxi to their facility. I would. This wasn't even close since the United flight was over 300 feet above them where they crossed 27L. Yes, the controller screwed up but it wasn't a big deal.

PAXboy
26th Jul 2006, 01:57
In order for the mere pax to understand if this was, or was not, a big deal, (bubbers44): What are the separation limits for ORD for their intersecting runways? Do they allow some measure of separation - or is it a complete ban on crossing when using opposing runways?

Intruder
26th Jul 2006, 03:35
I think any Atlas pilot would land long given the whole length to expedite taxi to their facility. I would.
In that case, I'm glad you don't work for Atlas, and hope you don't fly 747s!

Intentionally and needlessly giving up a couple thousand feet of runway just to expedite taxi a few minutes is NOT a reasonable trade in the 747 -- especially when landing at near max allowable landing weight. There are other options available on a long runway, including management of braking once on the ground.

FWIW, Atlas airplanes are more often found up north by the Signature ramp these days, rather than the SW ramp...

Danny
26th Jul 2006, 07:56
Unfortunately, comments such as "...it wasn't a big deal." and "I think any Atlas pilot would land long given the whole length to expedite taxi to their facility." are the kind of give-aways that we are not dealing with professional pilots. They may like to post on this website and they may have a desire that you perceive them as professional pilots.

As has been pointed out above, no airline pilot, especially one flying a B747, would "try to land long" just to save two minutes of taxi time. In fact, I would challenge any airline pilot flying a jet to give an excuse for not flying a safe profile and aiming to touch down at the touch down point. It's not called that for nothing.

As for a near miss, even if it was 300 feet, is a near miss and the next time it may not be one. The whole reason it is being debated here is because there are more and more instances of these near misses at airports with intersecting runways being used simultaneously. The rules in place are obviously not good enough if these incidents are happening repeatedly. Whether it is a human or a technology failing has to be studied. If as mentioned above, even controllers have their doubts about issues such as LAHSO operations and we all know that at the end of the day it is down to money, then perhaps a bit more money should be spent on studying the problems. Have the beancounters weighed up how much it is going to cost if and when two airliners meet at an intersection when compared to the extra revenue they are generating from the increased traffic flow? A bit like knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.

Brian Abraham
26th Jul 2006, 09:00
Remember standing on the ramp at West Palm Beach with a Shorts 360 lined up on one runway and a Gulfstream Jet on an intersecting runway. At flag drop both went for it but then a penny dropped in both cockpits and both aborted, but not before hefty groundspeed had been attained by both. Very entertaining, read heart stopping. Tis only a matter of time.

Intruder
26th Jul 2006, 12:29
Unfortunately, the simultaneous rejects can be more dangerous, given the wrong circumstances, than one going flying. Just picture both airplanes coming to a stop at the intersection with all brakes a-smokin'... What was the "right decision" on the part of both pilots could have been disastrous despite best efforts!

Last time I stated "unable LAHSO" on tower contact at ORD, that controller told me 'We don't plan for it for heavies, anyhow.' (despite local procedures requiring the call when LAHSO is in effect). I suspect this incident was simply a mistake that ANY controller could make, MANY have made, but most of which didn't result in anything reportable, much less disastrous.

There will certainly be a lot of press regarding the incident, but they will continue in the future as long as humans continue flying and controlling. We just gotta be ready for them, like these involved pilots were!

bubbers44
26th Jul 2006, 13:33
I didn't suggest the ORD incident was no big deal. Thankfully the 737 was light and flew well over the 747. It could have been a disaster if it was a departing heavy 747. The controller screwed up, end of story.

I think most pilots that are familiar with the airport they are flying into know which high speed they want to exit on to be efficient. Landings on 9 at Miami which is 13,000 feet and making the first available turn off pretty much guarantees that you will be following the plane landing behind you when you finally get up to the high speed he exited on. It isn't that hard to be both efficient and safe. Getting the landing clearance for the full length of 14R is probably standard procedure for Atlas to minimize their taxi time especially when the airport isn't that busy.

the_hawk
26th Jul 2006, 14:03
staff shortages, bad weather, shift change and a runway-safety system "not fully operational" b/c of upgrade / training (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/custom/newsroom/chi-060725ohare,1,6993017.story?coll=chi-news-hed) cited

misd-agin
26th Jul 2006, 20:25
Folks, reread the statement. The news article states that they missed by 300', not that the UAL flight was 300' in the air 6-7000' feet down the runway.

Missing by 300' can be a completely different scenario than an overflight of 300'.

bubbers44
26th Jul 2006, 22:41
The major airline I flew for considered the 1000-1500 foot touch down the target and anything up to about 3000 feet or one third of the runway which ever was shorter a normal touchdown zone in dry conditions before considering a go around. Danny seems to think that is unprofessional. All my copilots and I from different backgrounds, military and civilian, don't have any problem with that on that 13,000 foot runway I was talking about earlier. A lot of my FO's would only use idle reverse to the optimum high speed with 4'000 feet remaining to not waste taxi time. I'm retired now but after 23,000 hrs with no incidents or violations don't consider myself the amateur that Danny portrays.

Danny does have over 2000 more post than me however. Does anybody know how much flying time he has?

PAXboy
26th Jul 2006, 23:25
misd-aginMissing by 300' can be a completely different scenario than an overflight of 300'.As I understand the limited information in this thread: the departing machine was 300' up, when it passed over the cross runway? Therefore, if it had had to reject the T/O, it would have been on the ground at that point. Whether or not the landing 747 was at the intersection at the time, is not the point I would have thought. If the departing machine had not departed, then it would have been considerably closer to the arriving one and thus separation compromised. Looks like it's time to wait for the report.

bubbers44
26th Jul 2006, 23:34
According to one report the controllers advised both of them of their converging and United decided to continue the take off because they were able to climb above them. Good decision on United's part.

mocoman
26th Jul 2006, 23:59
Good decision on United's part

That's as maybe; but I'll stand by the fact that it's not good practice but is usual procedure in the US.....:ooh:

We've discussed this before; it has yet to be addressed,-:sad:

Some time soon it'll bite you guys in the arse; sorry but it's true.

M.Mouse
27th Jul 2006, 00:51
I fly into ORD most months at least twice. I think the controllers do an amazing job given the ridiculous amount of traffic they are compelled to handle. However, I find it one of the most chaotic and disorganised places I ever fly to (I have flown worldwide 747s and 777s for the past 16 years).

Before departure at ORD there are normally 3 runways given for departure. I routinely get perfomance figures for all because until the moment of being given taxy instructions it is a mystery which runway will be assigned. I have also been given one of the runways NOT given in the ATIS!

On the 777 changing the performance figures means reloading at least two pages of the FMC and often having to select another flap setting. I personally find that a recipe for a serious error as one person has to be heads in while taxiing in that busy environment.

I have gained the distinct impression (probably mistaken) at most major US airports that aircraft on approach are fitted into gaps that appear rather than having an overall co-ordinated master plan. I have experienced speed up then slow down then speed up again, been slotted into a gap behind slower traffic which resulted in a controller instigated go-around. That was at ORD funny enough and almost before we had raised the wheels we were given a height, heading and runway change for the next approach!

I don't blame the guys and gals but believe they are struggling with what appear inadequate procedures, inadequate managerial direction and too much traffic.

mocoman
27th Jul 2006, 01:29
I don't blame the guys and gals but believe they are struggling with what appear inadequate procedures, inadequate managerial direction and too much traffic.

retorts from parties west of here would be most valued...:8

misd-agin
27th Jul 2006, 02:08
retorts from parties west of here would be most valued...:8

Can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen? :oh:

Intruder
27th Jul 2006, 18:22
Getting the landing clearance for the full length of 14R is probably standard procedure for Atlas to minimize their taxi time especially when the airport isn't that busy.

Read again what zerozero posted up above: Atlas CANNOT do LAHSO!

Freighters land near max gross landing weight much more often than do pax airplanes, so using a lot of runway is "ops normal". If it's a 747 Classic, there are also considerations of brake temperatures.

bubbers44
28th Jul 2006, 00:40
Atlas can not do LAHSO. Good, now we don't need an Atlas ops manual to know that thanks to you. Did you ever study diplomacy? You must be a very wonderful pilot to have such a high opinion of yourself.

Intruder,
I am very sorry, I thought you were calling me zero zero because I was stupid. Looking back through the posts I see what you were saying. I see a lot of pilot slamming on this post and I think it keeps a lot of us on the defensive. Pilots like to be on the conservative side and sometimes aren't willing to express their real feelings because they will be criticisized for it.

An abort would have been interesting. Say the abort took the 737 through the 14R intersection, which it probably would have, would have they collided or not? We won't see the tapes for a while but thank goodness they continued the take off and nothing happened. This is not our procedure like someone insinuated in the US, this is what you do when an emergency happens and you do what you have to do to stay alive. These guys did the right thing and if that guy from Europe who said they should have aborted because that is the procedure in Europe would have been in the airplane, then God help him. We don't have a procedure for something like this, you just do whatever it takes to survive.

Ignition Override
28th Jul 2006, 05:04
Did the United pilots by chance notice the other plane during rotation and firewall the throttles with "max power"?

zerozero
28th Jul 2006, 05:13
Intruder,
I am very sorry, I thought you were calling me zero zero because I was stupid.

HAH! Now *that* is funny! Buy me a beer sometime and I'll tell you why they call me "zerozero"....and it ain't my IQ!

:}

TopBunk
28th Jul 2006, 06:29
An abort would have been interesting. Say the abort took the 737 through the 14R intersection, which it probably would have, would have they collided or not? We won't see the tapes for a while but thank goodness they continued the take off and nothing happened. This is not our procedure like someone insinuated in the US, this is what you do when an emergency happens and you do what you have to do to stay alive. These guys did the right thing and if that guy from Europe who said they should have aborted because that is the procedure in Europe would have been in the airplane, then God help him. We don't have a procedure for something like this, you just do whatever it takes to survive.

So what you're saying Bubbers, is that ATC in the US relies on statistical analysis/luck rather than good practise as in the rest of the world? Commercial greed and a cowboy attitude win out over common sense and safety. Nuff said.

[My next 3 flights are to Boston, Chicago and LAX - luverly!]

West Coast
28th Jul 2006, 06:46
With that level of smuggness, I'll avoid flying to those three US cities for the next few.

nuff said.

TopBunk
29th Jul 2006, 10:43
West Coast

Smugness? I think not and that if that is how you interpret it then I fear it is you that is being smug, not me.

By pointing out the places I fly to in the future (oh, and btw add to that list JFK, SEA and PHX in the next weeks), I merely emphasise my deep joy [sic] and heightened sense of alertness that I will endeavour to deploy whilst battling the hostile environment that is US airports.... and no, it is not incompetence of my part, it is a systemic problem with US ATC. The controllers do their utmost, the system lets them, us and our passengers run the 'risks' detailled above.

I choose to operate longhaul, flying to the US comes with the territory, I accept that and try to mitigate potential problems, but don't tell me I'm being smug when I point out defficiencies. The ability to accept criticism/observations is a basic requirement to improve performance, the US ATC system does not appear to react appropriately, imho.

West Coast
29th Jul 2006, 15:50
Simply don't bid the US please.

3Greens
29th Jul 2006, 16:35
I too am dismayed by the way our special friends operate. OK i suppose if you doing it that way day-in-day-out you eventually get used to it. I find that US ATC have absolutely NO idea of heavy jet performance or the way we fly these machines. Do you guys over there really enjoy all this. As an aside how do you find English ATC/airport ops?
Please don't take this as a US bashing post as it certainly isn't meant to be, i just want to add to the posts above that operating to the US is largely 8hrs of boredom followed by 20mins of sheer terror when given numerous runway changes at late notice...oh, and don't forget that luuurvly visual after a long tiring 2-crew flight to somewhere you have never flown to!!

TopBunk
29th Jul 2006, 17:38
West Coast

A really well considered response. You are obviously happy to bury your head in the sand (or somewhere else suitably dark) to the defficiencies in the system you operate in (you are a pilot, aren't you?).

Your intellect in your response speaks volumes, thankfully not all of your colleagues are quite so arrogant as to your invincibilty.

Spitoon
29th Jul 2006, 18:34
From a slightly different perspective. I can't help finding it strange that in one breath ICAO is asking for ATS procedures to be subject to safety management processes and, in another, introducing Standards for LAHSO which has so many hazards that it's hard to see how any ATS agency can permit such procedures to be used! Oh well, that's aviation I guess.

120.4
29th Jul 2006, 19:44
USA and ICAO in the same sentence?
I visited Dallas last year with a view to understanding their methods for operating more than 2 parallel runways. I asked the boss about the apparent lack of ICAO standards and his response was, verbatim, "ICAO? We don't do ICAO here."

Here in lies the difficulty. In my view, ICAO hasn't moved on but continues to 'regulate' to the lowest common denominator. This has held back ATC procedures development and left those at the sharper end having to go it alone. Consequently there is no longer a universal standard and America stands out as high risk.

To efficiently operate Heathrow with triple parallels, flexibly but without huge numbers of runway crossings (themselves a safety concern) requires that new ATC prcedures be developed that are both safe and less restrictive than some of the current ones. A set of simple but very effective new procedure concepts were put before the UK regulator last year for comment and constructive review. At the regulator's request these concepts had been mathematically tested and then photographed on a high-tech simulator for comparison prior to submission. The testing/photographs demonstrated that even with significant technical failures, strong winds and human error, existing separation standards would not be breached. I now hear that the UK regulator has dismissed them because they are not ICAO, thereby throwing a very large spanner in the works of UK government policy.

In America where traffic pressures are so high, such a refusal would have left a gaping hole in their ATC system's capacity. They have felt it necessary to go it alone and, humbly I say it, I believe they have made mistakes in the process, exposing many to significantly higher risk than is prudent.

It seems to me that ICAO has to get with the programme and pioneer a new set of ATC standards that enhance capacity through the use of modern technologies. In doing so it would be more likely to encourage a universal standard and discourage those under most pressure from introducing procedures that are not fully thought through.

In the meantime an alert and 'in the picture' flightdeck is even more essential.

Point 4

zerozero
29th Jul 2006, 21:07
I think 120.4 makes some solid and sobering points.

But if we're talking about ORD specifically the problem is more complex.

In fact, it's the "complex" of runways that's the problem--not to mention the high level of traffic.

And all of the standardization and regulation in the world won't fix that.

Botton line: The design of the ORD runway complex is dangerous. It's not an efficient design and *everyone*, ATC and cockpit crew, are required to operate at the top of thier game.

Modern well designed airports with parallel runways and minimal crossings are a luxury.

We can either accept the challenges presented as professionals or we can stoop and resort to more name calling.

Willit Run
30th Jul 2006, 02:28
Zero Zero,

You beat me to it!
ORD has such a mix of crossing runways and an absolutely obscene amount of traffic, that a well orchestrated plan is , i think, impossible to implement.

You must be on your game in ORD.

The airport ain't changin any time soon, and there is no where for the traffic to go. This is one of the biggest challenges we have in our industry. We have other very busy airports, but they are mostly parallel ops, except for maybe BOS.

Ignition Override
30th Jul 2006, 04:04
All of you have made very valid points, influenced by your various aviation backgrounds and expectations.

Zero Zero reminded us of the ORD runway layout. As bad as it is, at least there are many fewer runways to be crossed, compared to Midway, Milwaukee, Atlanta and DFW. Never mind Boston! Oh, and let's not forget that an unsafe situation happened at DFW after ATC made the decision to park an MD-80 on runway 17R, in IMC! another plane mistakenly landed on 17R in low vis/darkness. Yes, those pilots made a serious mistake-but how could ATC decide to park an aircraft where both runways are so very close together, if at all? Ppruners-check the 10-9 airport diagram.

I've found over the years that ATC at O'Hare is excellent, especially with the huge challenges presented to all controllers. Many of our departures are after a fairly simple taxi route out to the intersection takeoff at runway 32L/T-10. One must never forget that at certain ATC facilities, especially on approach, a quick clearance from ATC is given with no time available for a 'read back': "turn to hdg 090. descend and maintain 5,000' " etc.

The overall system in the US seems to be designed for aircraft movement much more than providing the required time, all the while with so many blocked transmissions, for accurate "readbacks' and "hearbacks". The FAA's (former, they say) dual mandate was to promote aviation while ensuring safety. The managers push traffic flow to the limit and a bit beyond, knowing that the burden for safety rests on the shoulders of the individual controllers and pilots. Many ATC controllers are now beginning to retire, and they are the most experienced.

At LAX about nine years ago, SOCAL Approach controllers sometimes either had limited grasp of, or were not allowed to factor in, the problems with slowing a B-757 (or A-320?) while on the constant descent required to "fly" the CIVET Arrival. We once were given three runway changes and given an extra altitude/DME fix, which was NOT published on the arrival! On this very fast-paced constant descent, the Captain called for the landing gear at about 11,000' in an attempt to slow the beast down (somehow slow from about 194 down to 162 knots for landing flaps 30?). Having already grabbed the speedbrake handle many miles ago, we then feverishly pushed FMC/MCP/Execute buttons with our heads down as the only solution-except for breaking off the arrival, and appearing not to be able to hack it. Safe?

Much of the blame for problems might rest with the upper ranks of the FAA's traffic mgmt or flow control, or whatever they call themselves.
Complaints from foreign pilots about the US system have plenty of merit, and they use some version of aviation English with ATC at all of the foreign airports.

Unfortunately, US-based pilots have been stuck with this (in many places) over-saturated system since we began to fly and maybe many of us feel that there is no other way to operate-maybe subconsciously because we know that we have no choice. Some US pilots may feel defensive-I've often simply felt cynical and dismayed, even a bit despondent about any improvements at many larger airports :( (I will avoid BOS and maybe LAX if I make it thru Bus training in the near future...even LGA/JFK for a while).

I will not jump on the patriotic bandwagon, however fashionable, on Pprune or anywhere else, and defend US ATC's (the FAA is the ultimate boss) overall system and style (mostly needed at the big airports, and enroute, anywhere between MKE and MIA, Beckley VOR [VA] and BOS), because we need many improvements. It is not necessarily the fault of the individual controllers-they are allowed to become full performance controllers based upon their training and observed compliance with operating procedures, are they not? Maybe either Congressional funding or the FAA's priorities, or both, have been to blame.

Whatever the excuses, this has gone on for decades, and it is a bit of an embarassment to me when foreign pilots fly through our skies. I am 100% sincere, no matter what my various areas of ignorance consist of.

Could it be that too many people go through the revolving door as FAA Administrator, and as a top-level political appointee, seeking another career ticket to be punched, that nobody is willing to criticize the system, or wants to allow other personnel to come to grips with it? It is complex, but if so, this type of career thinking allegedly also resulted in a large fraction of the tens of thousands of lives lost in Southeast Asia. Some FAA Administrators were neither commercial nor military pilots. One was a former Thunderbird pilot :cool: who seemed to have achieved little, at best.

M.Mouse
30th Jul 2006, 09:09
One must never forget that at certain ATC facilities, especially on approach, a quick clearance from ATC is given with no time available for a 'read back': "turn to hdg 090. descend and maintain 5,000' " etc.


That quote is really quite chilling. Those of us who regularly fly to the USA have experienced times where the workload means that it happens.

How can that ever be considered a safe and satisfactory way to control air traffic?

120.4
30th Jul 2006, 10:01
M.Mouse

I think you are absolutely right but workloads at that level are now common place in the LTMA too and we need to put our own house in order.

A TMA north bank friend of mine once had a Ryanair call him to say:

"Just to let you know London that about 5 minutes ago we had a TCAS RA but couldn't get in on the r/t; we've been up and are now back down and under your control."

A concern to all of us should surely be that ATC development isn't staying ahead of traffic growth. For example, the ESSEX sector in TC is now operating at traffic levels significantly outside the current airspace design. In 2004 a report indicated that a number of urgent changes were needed "...on the grounds of passenger safety." (direct quote) Nothing significant has been done because the Airspace Change Process here takes years to complete and the traffic has out grown it. A major airspace change to resolve the issues is planned for 2009, which means that by the time it is introduced the airspace will have been acknowledged to have been operating with a question mark over passenger safety for 5 years. We in the UK are in no position to be taking the moral high ground.

Point 4

groundbum
30th Jul 2006, 13:03
time to eliminate those bitty 737s and A32x's and put some A380's on twice a day between hubs, never mind these hourly departures LHR/MAN etc etc 8-)

or how about making A380 landing fee's less than bitty planes for the next decade??! And still only 2 crew at the front..

S

Flying Lawyer
8th Jan 2007, 20:43
There’s a 3D animated reconstruction of the July incident on the NTSB website: LINK (http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2006/MostWantedFed/AnimationDescription.htm)

At the time, it was estimated that the distance between the aircraft was about 300 feet. The distance between the 737’s gear and the top of the 747’s tailfin appears to be much less than that.


NTSB press release:
Citing a serious near collision of two aircraft in Chicago last July, the NTSB, at a public meeting (in November) called again for effective action by the FAA to counter the danger posed by potentially catastrophic runway collisions. This issue has been on the Board's list (of 'Most Wanted' changes) since it's inception in 1990.

The FAA completed action on a number of objectives to make ground operation of aircraft safer. However, these incidents continue to occur with alarming frequency. The FAA indicates that during fiscal year 2005 there were 327 incursions, and during 2006 there were 330.

A system introduced by the FAA provides warning to air traffic controllers, but not to the flight crews, a fact that severely reduces the amount of time that pilots have to react to an impending incursion.

Recommendation: Implement a safety system for ground movement that will ensure the safe movement of airplanes on the ground and provide direct warning capability to the flight crews.
Timeliness Classification: Unacceptable.






Apologies if this seems like a ‘spotter’ question, but I’m genuinely interested:
Some years ago (pre 9/11) I was fortunate to be allowed in the jumpseat for a landing at ORD. ATC offered a LAHSO but the Captain (BA) declined. Is that SOP for BA or Captain’s discretion?
I didn’t think of asking at the time.

(Edit) In case it's relevant, the aircraft was a 747 Classic.

M.Mouse
8th Jan 2007, 21:14
BA SOP, we are not authorised (by our company I think) to participate in LAHSO operations. We are supposed to mention this on first contact with ATC.

ATC Watcher
8th Jan 2007, 21:46
Most, il not all , non-US Airlines do not accept LAHSO ( or SIRO in Canada) .
The procedure is against both IFALPA and IFATCA policy ( but accepted by US ALPA and NATCA )

Normally US controllers should not " offer" it to non-US airlines.

Flying Lawyer
11th Jan 2007, 11:22
Thanks for the answers.


Tudor

Stoic
11th Jan 2007, 17:26
"Some years ago (pre 9/11) I was fortunate to be allowed in the jumpseat for a landing at ORD. ATC offered a LAHSO but the Captain (BA) declined. Is that SOP for BA or Captain’s discretion?
I didn’t think of asking at the time."


I retired from the BA Classic in 99. You could well have been my guest during those, what now seem like, halcyon days.


It is my recollection that the BA ban on LAHSO came in as a SOP in the mid 90s. Before the ban came in, many of us declined LAHSO as a matter of prudence, but it was at our discretion. Unfortunately, both before and after it became a SOP, the US ATC system found it hard to handle. You would advise them on first contact with Approach: "Unable to accept LAHSO". As often as not Tower would not get the message and would advise you to LAHSO despite your initial message. If this happened early enough, you could advise "unable" and the system usually seemed to cope.

On one memorable, for me, occasion - I went into print - having initially advised we could not accept LAHSO, we were given the instruction to LAHSO just before the flare. This was at ORD and after it had become a BA SOP not to accept LAHSO. In the event, I decided that it was safer to land and hammer the brakes rather than to go around back into the manic ORD sky.


Once at BOS, as I recall, we declined 27 on first contact as too short for comfort, and were given 22L instead. But immediately after touching down, we were instructed to hold short of 27 resulting, if my memory is correct, in a slightly shorter stopping distance than landing on 27 itself.


Happy days!


Regards


Stoic

oliver2002
12th Jan 2007, 21:35
Strange that documents on LAHSO at the FAA never mention that some may decline to accept the procedure...
http://www.faa.gov/ats/atp/atx/lahso118.pdf

Sick Squid
12th Jan 2007, 22:19
That animation seriously gave me the creeps... just watching the constant relative bearing hold true...... nasty.

As I recall from my time in BA longhaul, the requirement to not accept LAHSO is on the filed flight plan as a remark... however, as I now know, controllers don't see the flight plan without specifically searching for it in a seperate system.

LAHSO is probably the biggest accident waiting to happen in global aviation. When it happens, who will be held to blame? That is the question that should be asked now, and the procedure stopped. Unfortunately, time on runway equals money, and money talks. But that's now...

The single best thing that could happen here would be unilateral action by the Commanders of aircraft into fields operating LAHSO to refuse to accept the procedure. Well within the rights of a Captain, though it would be interesting to see what, if any behind the scenes pressure came from the operators.

This is one area where we can see the tombstone technology before it happens. Do not let the complacency of "Well, it's worked for me till now, why shouldn't it continue to work" affect judgement; this is an unacceptable risk for the innocent people who pay our wages. It must stop.

quietfrog
13th Jan 2007, 05:12
Post after post on this thread have crucified either ORD's runway layout or ORD's controllers as being crap. I've been in and out of ORD, LGA, BOS, ATL, JFK, EWR, IAD for the last 5 years now and nowhere have I been more impressed by ATC's skills than at ORD. I've never flown into Heathrow or DXB, but lets everyone realise here that ORD has at least double the number runways in use at any one time as any of these other airports. Agreed, ORD is controlled chaos, but given what the controllers there have to work with I believe they do an exceptional job. What does Heathrow have? 2 or 3 parallel (sp?) runways. Not to throw spears here, but the attidude that some of the UK pilots have taken on this thread is a bit pompous. Understood that many of them may not come into these airports here in the US as often as some of the natives, and are therefore going to be a bit more cautious, but it seems to me that European operators are so 'by the book.' There are times when safety is a factor and in those circumstances the rules should be followed. But for example, you never see a European operated aircraft turn off its taxi to light to avoid absolutely blinding a facing aircraft. Its not a safety factor. Not as though anyone is going to miss a fully lighted 777 on the ramp if they turn out there taxi light for 30 seconds to avoid blinding a fellow pilot. And no, im not some George Bush loving cowboy yank, I tend to side with the euros on most issues, but insuating that the FAA and US are running a less safe operation in ORD is outrageous. In the UK there you folks have to deal with LHR. Here in the states we have MSP, EWR, IAD, PHL, JFK, LGA, ORD, ATL, MIA, MCO, SEA, LAX, SFO, IAH, DFW, DEN.

And to finish, it is worth adding that im a 30 year old yank who would rather live in the UK because I enjoy the culture and weather over there. This is not an anti-UK post, I'm simply arguing against this notion of ORD being an uncivilised mess.

Now take aim and......FIRE!

SweetChilly
13th Jan 2007, 08:25
""That saddens me. I worked for 21 years in Heathrow Tower and never experienced a runway incursion. The only "near" ones I had were one or two caused by pilots but, luckily, I was able to stop them in time. If runway incursions caused by ATC are increasing then something is drastically wrong with controller training."""

Heatrhow Director,
Although I am new to this field, even I can notice that LHR has no corss runways but many apts across UA have many cross runways........ and thats what is a major issue here. LHR has only 2 runways parellel to each other and is relatively easy to manage ...

Tree
14th Jan 2007, 17:36
For comparison purposes:

LHR
Two long widely separated parallel runways and simple taxiway routings. Mostly benign weather. Mostly jet transport aircraft with experienced pilots; rarely general aviation/private or turboprop aircraft. Rare use of visual approaches. Few go-arounds due weather/traffic.
Medium density simple operation.

ORD
Multiple closely spaced crossing runways, some are short. Complex and unusual taxiways. Thunderstorms/windshear/snow/lightning. A mix of jet transport/
turboprop/general aviation/freighter/private operators; some not experienced. Many simultaneous visual approaches.
Frequent go-arounds due windshear/traffic separation etc.
Very high density complex operation.

I admire and respect the controllers at both airports for their skills but they are not similar operations.

Geffen
15th Jan 2007, 08:29
Tree

On the surface Heathrow may appear to be a simple operation to you. However Heathrow is probably the busiest airport with only two runways. LHR shifts about half the traffic of somewhere like O'hare or Atlanta. The runways are approximately 1400 yds apart (stand to be corrected on that one) not quite far enough for mixed mode ops to come in easily. Therefore I think you will find heathrow is a high density operation. Have you ever seen the controlers at heathrow moving traffic around this small airport? I have and it is pretty complex at times. As to the rest of your post about heathrow, sounds about right.

As to missed approaches, it sounds like something is not working well in ORD if they have frequent missed approaches due traffic, or am I missing something here?

I agree with your sentiments about the comparison, they are wildly different airports and the ORD guys are working flat out at a complex airport. Roll on their runway realignmet program to cut down on the cross runway ops I say!

Del Prado
15th Jan 2007, 11:01
Is mine bigger than yours?

Heathrow. 2 runways (parallel but not separated). Peak movements 98 per hour?
Gatwick. Single runway. Record hourly movement 60.

How does that compare?

Geffen
15th Jan 2007, 11:12
Hats off to Gatwick. What do you think the underlying reason for the push to mixed mode at heathrow is for?

Tree
15th Jan 2007, 16:54
2005 stats ORD 972,248 LHR 477,884

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World%27s_busiest_airports_by_traffic_movements

Geffen;
Many pilots operating to ORD (and other NA airports) complete a visual to improve efficiency. It does not always work out in a very high density operation. We may have difficulty descending quickly enough (especially with Airbus products), the preceeding traffic (plural) also on a visual may slow more than expected or not clear the runway quickly enough, we may have that unexpected midwest tailwind etc. I do not see it as something not working well at ORD. It is just a very "tight" operation and go-arounds come with the territory (been there done that). The controllers are very skilled at getting you quickly back in the approach sequence.

I agree that LHR ground movements are high density but it is still a very civilized and professional operation thanks to the controllers there.

Del Prado
15th Jan 2007, 18:48
2005 stats ORD 972,248 LHR 477,884


What's that per runway?

I don't see how switching to a visual approach can be a more efficient use of the runway. If ATC have no control of speed of the inbounds (or length of base leg/final?) how can the spacing be more efficient?

Not points scoring I'm genuinely interested.

West Coast
15th Jan 2007, 21:58
The London equiv until a recent third runway was KPHX. Busy enough with two runways, however in no way could it compare to ORD as far as volume, complexity or most any other comparison using any type of weighted or sliding scale because of the differing number of runways.
Have LHR's arrival runway cross its departure runway and the notional third runway I've heard about (in litigation?) cross both and then you might have an appreciation for what ORD controllers have to work with. Its a screwed up airport, I bet the controllers there would agree. They however didn't ask for many of the runways to cross one another once or twice over thier length. To their credit however they make it work, running numbers of aircraft that are stunning.
Geffen
KVNY north of LAX is busier than LHR, to correct your claim. There may be busier ones, that is however the one that comes to mind. Yes I know different types of traffic, however your claim is all encompassing.

Geffen
16th Jan 2007, 10:03
West Coast,
I think you will find I said "probably" and anyhow according to ACI Van Nuys is about 65,000 flights behing LHR. I agree that EGLL and KORD cannot be compared in terms of traffic flow around and through the airport, they are radically different. EGLL when it was first built maybe, with its multiple crossing runways, but not today.

I have nothing but the utmost respect for the controllers at KORD. As I have said previously roll on the O'hare modernisation programme.

One more thing, thread drift!

Tree
16th Jan 2007, 16:19
Del Prado;

For example: You are on left base leg vector for 09R and the controller is using IFR separation standards. He has a short window of opportunity just opening up for 09L and points out the traffic for 09R and offers the visual 09L. You report sighting the traffic and "field in sight" (meaning you are able the visual). You are cleared the visual 09L-revert to visual separation standards (pilot controlled and much less than IFR standards)-turn in and land 09L saving several minutes flight time=efficiency. You may also use this procedure on the same runway. By changing to the visual you would turn to final sooner and reduce your in-trail distance from the preceding traffic and increase the efficiency.

Many NA airports would be much less less efficient without this practice. For comparison purposes you may note the incidence and length of inbound holds when the weather is not suitable for visual approaches at ORD,LGA,LAX,BOS,YYZ,YVR etc.

Also for your information: http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2007/01/16/Navigation/177/211537/Industry+calls+for+closer+separation+to+aid+ADS-B.html

Say Again, Over!
17th Jan 2007, 16:55
So what you're saying Bubbers, is that ATC in the US relies on statistical analysis/luck rather than good practise as in the rest of the world? Commercial greed and a cowboy attitude win out over common sense and safety. Nuff said.

I think Bubbers was referring to the fact that UAL, after realizing that an error had been made and that something nasty was going to happen opted to go flying rather than plowing into the 747 on a reject.

He is not saying that we, in north america, routinely clear aircraft for take-off based on some sort of formula and hope luck will carry us through the day. :ugh:... I mean PLEASE!!

If that is really how you understand that situation then you need to re-read the last few posts. This pilot had to think outside the box. Safety ALREADY HAD been jeopardized.

:{

LX
CYOW Approach

Gonzo
18th Jan 2007, 01:20
I'm struggling to understand quite how it can be inefficient to constantly have the situation where the next to land is over the numbers when the one ahead is just vacating. That's using tightly controlled radar vectoring and speed control. Just how would making more use of visual approaches improve that?

And how much capacity is wasted by all those frequent go-arounds?

Tree: In your example of the switch to 09L, what becomes of the 'gap' that now appears on the approach to 09R? Isn't that a waste? Also, we need to provide the a/c following the one now on a visual with standard IFR separation. If he doesn't go visual too and maintain his own separation, if it were me I'd be very conservative because I wouldn't know how tight/wide this guy on a visual is going to turn.

bubbers44
18th Jan 2007, 04:48
SAO,

Wow, I thought I had one too many glasses of wine last night and couldn't remember posting anything until I saw my post was over six months old. I always try to read what I said before hitting that dreaded enter key. You can never get it back. Have a great new year and be careful at KORD.

Say Again, Over!
18th Jan 2007, 10:53
Gonzo,

At airports with parallel runways, there usually isn't enough space between them to let you vector to each without applying some sort of IFR separation. Usually, that means that you'll have to keep vertical separation until both are established on the LOC.

That can be circumvented however by pointing out trafic on final for the other runway and issuing a visual approach.

In your example of the switch to 09L, what becomes of the 'gap' that now appears on the approach to 09R? Isn't that a waste?

In this case, the traffic Tree is refering to is on a left downwind for 09R, maybe number 4 or 5, and then is "slam-dunked" to 09L which is probably a departure runway but with a few "arrival options".

Also, we need to provide the a/c following the one now on a visual with standard IFR separation. If he doesn't go visual too and maintain his own separation, if it were me I'd be very conservative because I wouldn't know how tight/wide this guy on a visual is going to turn.

You'll find that at airports that use visual approaches effectively, vectoring to final is always given to ensure efficient spacing.

Cheers,

LX

Say Again, Over!
18th Jan 2007, 11:00
Bubbers,

I hadn't even noticed the date on your original post. Sorry to wake you!! :} :ok:

Gonzo
18th Jan 2007, 14:22
SAO, I understand how that might work, but Tree's a/c was on base, not downwind. Of course, with your scenario you then have the issue of the separation between the one joining 09L from left downwind, and the one that is already established behind it on 09R.

You'll find that at airports that use visual approaches effectively, vectoring to final is always given to ensure efficient spacing.

Now I'm confused, if you're going to vector to final, even when using visuals, what's the benefit?:confused:

Tree
19th Jan 2007, 03:38
Ok, one more attempt. I originally entered this discussion with a plan to explain some of the differences between European and North American procedures/practices/real world operations and to counter the unfair criticism of ORD. That is the benefit of the forum that I value.

For those of you who wish to take posts literally.
Gonzo: 1. I meant and should have said "more frequent go-arounds than LHR"
2. Visualize it as a slinky toy, if there is a gap the coils behind it will fill it via increasing speed or shortening turn to final etc, I have not heard a European approach controller request/allow an increase in speed but in NA it is routine to fill the "gap". Please understand that this is not a single/dual parallel landing runway operation with strict runway limited volumes. There are multiple choices and flexibility at ORD.

Say Again, Over!
Thank you for your professional input, I am not doing very well at explaining this from a pilot's perspective.
May I say it is one of those "you had to be there" discussions.

Midland63
19th Jan 2007, 16:36
Will you permit a couple of questions from a mere SLF to help me understand this better?

In LAHSO ops, am I to understand that the tower will clear an a/c to take off before an a/c landing on a conflicting runway has stopped short but in anticipation that it will? If that's correct, then I can see the risks. But if the tower will not clear take off until the landing a/c has actually actually stopped short, then I can't see what the problem is - can someone clarify?

Also, if you're approaching an airport where they conduct LAHSO ops but your company doesn't permit it and you say "I can't accept LAHSO" what happens next? Are you effectively saying "You have cleared me to land but do NOT clear anyone to t/o on a conflicting runway"? If so, is that not also horrendously risky in case the tower forgets that you're not going to LAHSO?

Sorry if I've completely misunderstood all this and am wasting your time. :rolleyes:

Thanks in advance, M63

Tree
19th Jan 2007, 17:30
Midland63:

Try this link and go to 4.4.9; 4.3 and below to LAHSO.
http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/publications/tp14371/RAC/4-1.htm#4-4-9

This is the Canuck version. The FAA version is similar. It requires training/knowledge/certification in the Airline's OPS Manuals. I don't know of any Canadian operators who are certified to use it in the USA. Canadian operators use it in Canada.

Say Again, Over!
19th Jan 2007, 23:02
Gonzo,

I know it sounds weird to vector an aircraft to final on a visual approach but allow me an explanation.

In Canada, an aircraft on an ILS approach has to intercept the LOC 2 miles from the GP intercept so it often means a turn at 9 to 10 miles final.

Now picture a situation with two aircraft that will be at the 10 mile final point at the same time, one straight-in, the other from a downwind leg to a base etc. If the one on downwind leg sees the airport, notwithstanding noise abbatement, he can be turned on a nice tight base leg (4 or 5 miles) and with a few artfull speed adjustments ;) on the second aircraft, you just gained a slot since the number 2 essentially disappeared.

Then, let me go back to the 09R/09L example. On parallel runways that are too close together to permit independant ops, I would have to keep vertical separation until both aircraft are established. Now let's consider IMC operations with a 10 mile altitude of 3000. Let's consider further that the LOC to 09L is packed with arrivals 3 miles apart. To use 09L, I have to keep vertical sep with all traffic on 09R, therefore intercept final at 4000 (provided parallel traffic on 09R is at 3000 or 5000) which means I can't turn in until 12 or 13 miles final.

Now: All of a sudden, the weather clears and the aircraft on the downwind to 09L sees the airport and all appropriate trafic on 09R LOC. I can then tell him to "turn base now, cleared visual approach 09L". Or: "Turn left heading 120 to intercept final, maintain visual separation from xxxxx on 09R, cleared visual approach 09L".

Hope that makes sense.



Midland63,

SIRO / LAHSO is a bit of a controversial issue, I'll have to confess. I completely agree with the concerns pilots have in its use and in less than ideal conditions, it can and will pose a safety hazard.

Let me just state the way I use it. I work CYYZ tower for 5 years and we were trained to "not set up a weld" :confused:. Here's what I mean: As an example, let's use runways 05 and 33R, which intersect about 3/4 of the way down each runway. To better describe it, if an aircraft was to roll out on 05 and find itself unable to stop short of 33R, 3/4 of the way down, it could have a very close look at an aircraft about to rotate on 33R, 3/4 of the way down.

Now, about the weld. I was trained to never issue a take-off clearance to an aircraft on 33R when the lander on 05 was overflying the threshold since they would, should something go wrong, meet and weld. This obviously has to be tempered with type of aircraft landing and taking off. A DH8 on 05, vs another DH8 on 33R. We'd do it all day. Heavy to heavy, NO WAY!

I now work approach control for two airport that use SIRO / LAHSO and my personnal philosphy is that I never set anything that would see two aircraft at the intersection at the same time. I'll go tighter than what normal runway sep standards would allow (we can discuss this later if you want) but leave myself 1/2 a mile one way or the other.

Hope that helps,


LX

CYOW & CYQB Approach

Say Again, Over!
20th Jan 2007, 13:40
Midland63,

I forgot to answer the second part of your question. Oops... :zzz:


If you say "I can't accept LAHSO" what happens next? Are you effectively saying "You have cleared me to land but do NOT clear anyone to t/o on a conflicting runway"? If so, is that not also horrendously risky in case the tower forgets that you're not going to LAHSO?


Yes, that is indeed what you are saying and we'll be happy to oblige. We expect to hear you say it on initial contact with approach though and not on short final as we're about to issue t/o clearance.

In a situation where 2 aircraft are coming in to land and LAHSO is needed for both to land, if one was to neglect to tell us on first contact and only mention it when 2 or 3 miles final, BACK UP HE GOES! He should have said so on farther out so the approach controller could set it up differently.

As far as the danger of us forgeting is concerned, don't worry. Part of the landing/take-off clearance includes either the hold short instruction and traffic information or traffic information about the other aircraft holding short. Therefore, the pilot would be "forced" to remind us he can't/won't do LAHSO and we would go to plan "B".

Cheers,

LX

Gonzo
21st Jan 2007, 14:40
SAO,

Sorry, when you said 'vectoring to final' I thought you meant you'd give radar vectors to the final approach: I can certainly understand vectoring to a position where the a/c can accept a visual from base/late downwind.

I understand all the rest too, but my point was this: You have a line of inbounds on the 09R ILS, 3 miles apart. Aircraft A is now on a visual left base to 09L. You give traffic and tell it to maintain own sep against aircraft B in 09R ILS. Aircraft C is 2.5 miles behind B also on the 09R ILS, which still needs standard separation, and since he's been on an ILS approach, with heads down.

I appreciate the increase in landing rate that manoeuvre would provide, and at airports where noise abatement, outbound delay, ground configuration and other such considerations allow, it would obviously be beneficial.

Tree,

Same as you, although I've recently encountered a great deal of criticism of our (Heathrow's) 'lack of flexibility' from some US pilots. We all work to different regulations/noise procedures/layout constraints etc. I was attempting to show that we all do our best according to what we get given to work with.

LHR approach regularly keep a/c at a high(er) speed down the approach to facilitate closing a gap. However, we don't have many occasions (other than the very rare lack of traffic), to cause such gaps on approach. Indeed, on westerly ops we are dictated to by noise procedures that we are only permitted to use one of our runways for landing, except in an emergency or urgent situation.

Giles Wembley-Hogg
22nd Jan 2007, 10:18
Just being nosey, but in what area did they want you to be more flexible Gonzo?

Dan Winterland
22nd Jan 2007, 12:50
BA SOP, we are not authorised (by our company I think) to participate in LAHSO operations. We are supposed to mention this on first contact with ATC.

That is correct. BA, Virgin and the RAF do not allow LAHSO and SIRO. The CAA has advised all UK operators to refuse LAHSO/SIRO clearances. In the RAF, we used to put 'Unable LAHSO' in the remarks section of the ATC flight plan as well as informing the controller on first contact.

ALPA has advised it's members not to accept LAHSO. A lot of US carriers have followed this advice and have told their crews not to accept.

Gonzo
22nd Jan 2007, 13:43
GWH,

Nothing specific, just remarks that if LHR was in the US, it would move a lot more traffic.

I asked for more details, and things like allowing a lot more more visual approaches, using both runways in mixed mode and simultaneous parallel approaches were mentioned.

Say Again, Over!
24th Jan 2007, 11:27
Don't worry Gonzo,
It seems as if you can never move enough traffic sometimes. Both LOCs could be full for 30 miles with an aircraft taking-off in every 2.5NM gap and still, "somebody somewhere" could do it so much better. :rolleyes: :}

Cheers,

LX