Beechjet dual flameout

[ctrautve]

Hi,

I'm looking for more information about a Beechjet dual flameout on June 14, 2006. The only details I know is that the aircraft took off from KBWI and was headed to Florida but declared an emergency and diverted to KORF. There's no mention of the incident in the FAA or NTSB accident/incident databases.

Thanks

[Mike Echo]

Hi
Sent a PM with some basic details and the probable registration to help with a search.
M.E.

[mgTF]

hi, I fly on the beechjet, someone knows something more?
this winter I heard about a flameout in the nothern sea I think somewhere between england and ireland!

[Mike Echo]

PM'd the details.
For those interested the following can be looked up on the NTSB incident database
M.E.

NTSB Identification: DCA06IA007
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Monday, November 28, 2005 in Jacksonville, FL
Aircraft: Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400, registration: N691TA

NTSB Identification: ENG04IA021
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Monday, July 12, 2004 in Sarasota, FL
Aircraft: Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400N, registration: N455CW

[OVERTALK]

the story (http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/beechjet-1.html)
.
the data (http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/beechjet.html)

[Mike Echo]

NTSB Identification: ENG06IA020
A Third Beechjet Flameout Under Investigation
On June 14, Beechjet 400A N440DS lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines while the airplane was in cruise flight at FL380 near Norfolk, Va. Unsure if they could remain clear of clouds, the pilots decided to turn on the engine anti-ice. They told the NTSB that they turned on the engines’ igniters and then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1, but before they could reach up to turn on the anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The left engine restarted on its own at about FL300 and the right engine restarted on its own at about FL240. Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed that icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that the fuel was jet-A. The NTSB is also investigating two previous Beechjet dual engine flameouts—on July 12, 2004, over the Gulf of Mexico and another on Nov. 28, 2005, near Jacksonville, Fla. Both of these aircraft were being operated by Flight Options. Investigations of all three incidents are ongoing.

[ctrautve]

Latest story (http://www.ainonline.com/Issues/08_06/flamout_1.htm)

[OptionsCLE]

Wow it's strange to actually read about N455CW's flameout over the gulf.

I was working for an FBO at CGF (Cuyahoga County Airport, near CLE) which was opened by the former CEO of Flight Options at the time of this incident. The FBO performed all of the fueling, cleaning and stocking for FO at their base. I remember hearing a lot of whispers and rumors regarding a dual engine flameout of one of the BeechJets, but never anything solid. Then again, the pilots never did talk to us line guys much. I can't believe that it was actually true!

It's funny, I can vividly remember fueling each one of those BeechJets listed on the "Data" link above. There sure are a lot of CW and TA tail numbers in those reports! At least no LX tails in there yet!

[ctrautve]

Safety Communiqué No. 272
August, 2006
TO: ALL OWNERS AND OPERATORS, CHIEF PILOTS, DIRECTORS OF
OPERATIONS, CHIEF INSPECTORS, DIRECTORS OF MAINTENANCE, ALL
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED SERVICE CENTERS, AND
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS AND DEALERS.
MODELS: ALL RAYTHEON MITSUBISHI MODEL MU-300; BEECHJET MODEL 400,
400A (INCLUDING HAWKER 400XP); MODEL 400T (T-1A AND TX) AIRCRAFT
SUBJECT: DUAL ENGINE POWER LOSS
In April 2006, Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) issued Safety Communiqué 269 to inform operators of
an incident in which a Model 400A experienced complete loss of power from both engines during descent.
The Safety Communiqué also reminded operators of FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
procedures pertaining to operation in possible icing conditions, proper use of fuel system icing inhibitors,
and preflight inspections.
RAC is issuing this Safety Communiqué to provide updated information related to that event and other
occurrences of dual engine power loss. This Safety Communiqué also announces revisions to the various
model-specific AFMs. Due to design similarities, this information is applicable to all listed models.
From April, 2000 to June, 2006 RAC has received four reports of airplanes which experienced dual engine
power loss, including the incident referred to in Safety Communiqué 269. Following are brief summaries
of those reports (The referenced National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports may be viewed on
the internet at
www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp): (http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp%29:)

No NTSB Report
- On April 23, 2000, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-122, departed Curacao and was
two hours 15 minutes into flight in clear air at an altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410) when the crew noticed
complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by a complete loss of power from the left engine
two seconds later. The crew reported they had experienced some thunderstorm activity, but were above
the tops of the clouds at the time of the incident. The left engine was successfully restarted and the
airplane landed without further incident at Macapa, Amapa (Northern Brazil).

NTSB Report ENG04IA021
- On July 12, 2004, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-365, departed Duncan,
OK and was en route to Fort Myers, FL. Approximately 100 miles west of Sarasota, FL while descending
from FL410 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) the aircraft experienced a complete loss of
power from both engines. After several attempts, the right engine was restarted and the airplane landed
at Sarasota, FL without further incident.

NTSB Report DCA06IA007
- On November 28, 2005, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-317, departed
Indianapolis, IN and was en route to Marco Island, FL. The flight cruised at FL350 for 45 minutes, then
requested an ascent to FL400 due to clouds. The flight was at FL400 for 30 minutes. The flight descended
to FL380 for five to 10 minutes and was in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in and out of the tops
of clouds. Shortly after decreasing power and initiating a descent from FL380, the crew reported a complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by the left engine ten seconds later. The crew was
unsuccessful in their attempts to restart the engines and landed successfully without engine power at
Jacksonville, FL.

NTSB Report ENG06IA020
- On June 14, 2006, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-8 departed Quonset
Point, RI and was en route to Charleston, SC. The flight crew reported being about 70 miles south of
Norfolk, VA in VMC at FL380 with a solid cloud deck at FL350. The clouds were known to be the remnants
of tropical storm Alberto. After being directed to make a turn by ATC, the flight crew activated the engine
igniters and reduced engine power in preparation for activating engine anti-ice. After reducing engine
power but before activating engine anti-ice, the crew reported simultaneous and complete loss of engine
power. The crew was successful in restarting both engines and landed without further incident at Norfolk,
VA.

The last three incidents are still under investigation by the NTSB and no probable cause has been
determined at this time. However, it has been noted that certain circumstances are common to all of the
events:

•
The airplane was being operated near visible moisture and/or near convective activity.

•
The airplane was being operated at or above FL380.

•
Engine anti-ice was not in use at the time of power loss.

•
Except for the right engine from RK-317, which was removed as part of the investigation, all of the
involved engines remained in situ on the airplane and were returned to service. Subsequently,
there has been no reported loss of power associated with any of those engines.
FAA, RAC, and Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) are cooperatively assisting the NTSB in its investigation
of these incidents. As a result of this information sharing, RAC has elected to revise the respective AFM
procedures in order to clarify them and to incorporate industry practice with regard to operation in or near
icing conditions.
With reference to the current Model 400A AFM, there are two CAUTION statements in Section 4,

NORMAL PROCEDURES.
The first CAUTION located under ANTI/DEICE SYSTEMS (IN FLIGHT
OPERATIONS) reads as follows:

CAUTION
Do not operate anti/deice systems at Ram Air Temperatures greater than 10°C unless in actual
icing conditions, as indicated by illumination of the ICING annunciator (If installed) or airframe ice
accumulation. Ice protection systems should be on prior to encountering actual icing. Turn
systems off when clear of icing conditions.
The second
CAUTION, located under DESCENT, states the following:

CAUTION
If icing conditions are anticipated during descent and approach, turn ice protection systems ON as
early as possible prior to penetrating clouds. Maintain wing/deice operation light ON
(approximately 70% N
2) during descent to assure proper wing anti-ice operation.

Safety Communiqué No. 272 3 of 3
The export of these commodities, technology or software are subject to the US Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited. For guidance on
export control requirements, contact the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export Administration at 202-482-4811 or at
www.bxa.doc.gov (http://www.bxa.doc.gov/).

While observance of these
CAUTIONS remains paramount, RAC intends to expand the definition of

engine icing conditions
to include:

•
Illumination of the icing annunciator (If installed)

•
Airframe ice accumulation.

•
At all altitudes and Ram Air Temperatures (RAT) of 10°C or less in visible moisture (Any
obstruction to visibility should be considered visible moisture unless it can be determined to be
smoke, dust or ash).

•
Above 20,000 feet MSL, and RAT of 10°C or less and any of the following conditions:

o
Within approximately 5,000 feet above visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
Within approximately 10 nm horizontally of visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
In visible moisture

o
At any time that the conditions listed above cannot be verified
As was noted in Safety Communiqué No. 269, no lower temperature limit exists for the operation of antiice
systems. Operators should be aware that air moving through the engine experiences a significant
temperature increase as it passes through the compressor section. This increase could bring the air
temperature to a range where internal engine ice formation might occur if Engine Anti-Ice were not
operating. Operators should not assume ice formation to be impossible at very low ambient temperatures
(i.e., -30 degrees C or colder).
In addition, Safety Communiqué No. 269 states that activation of engine anti-ice is not recommended
above 90% N1 to prevent transient exceedance of engine ITT limits. This procedure has been reviewed by
RAC and P&WC and it has been determined that reduction of power below 90% N1 is not required. .Engine
gauges should be monitored and thrust levers adjusted (if required) to maintain engine ITT limits following
activation of engine anti-ice.
RAC will be releasing a Temporary Change (TC) to all applicable Model AFMs, with subsequent AFM
revision, to incorporate this information. Additionally, RAC intends to request an Airworthiness Directive
from the FAA to introduce and distribute this change both domestically and internationally.
As noted previously, the NTSB is still investigating these incidents. RAC continues to assist the NTSB in
this investigation and will provide additional information as required.
For additional information on operating in or near icing conditions, refer to the applicable Pilot’s Operating
Manual (POM), Section V, General Information on Specific Topics, Flight Operations, Flight in Icing
Conditions.