C-5 accident at Dover AFB

[assymetric]

Just on BBC.

C5 crashed. Think it was Delaware.
Anyone with more details.

[GOLF-INDIA BRAVO]

BBC report a C-5 has crashed at Dover AFB, pictures show it has broken in half just behind the cockpit, 17 pax
Hope all OK

G-I-B

[Foreign Worker]

More here C5 crash (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261)

[neil armstrong]

cnn link with photo

http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/03/c5.crash.ap.ap/index.html


Neil

[flynverted]

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v243/flynverted/newt1.jpg

[Oshkosh George]

Here's a link with some pictures----

http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=local&id=4048441

[Charles Darwin]

The C-5 can carry 270,000 tons of cargo almost 2,500 miles on one load of fuel. The C-5's wingspan is 28 feet wider than a 747 and the military jet is 16 feet longer than the civilian airliner.
From CNN web.

What a payload!

[fernytickles]

Those are amazing pictures. It seems to have broken very cleanly and great that there was no fire.

[Epsilon minus]

270,000 tonne payload. Want one.
Not this one of course. What's happened to the tail?
http://a.abclocal.go.com/images/wpvi/cms_exf_2005/news/local/wpvi04032006c5crash200.jpg

[ORAC]

Slideshow (http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/slideShow?section=news&id=4048420&slide=1) of crash site. Tail? Over yonder....

From the shots it looks like they put it down where the tail separated and slid until the port outer was ripped off, whilst the aircraft spun and the cockpit section detached. hell of a landing at that weight and load. I have to be puzzled as to the lack of fire. Incredibly lucky if fully fuelled.
http://a.abclocal.go.com/images/wpvi/cms_exf_2005/features/wpvi04032006-c5-plane-tail.jpg

[BossEyed]

What's happened to the tail?
Tail is in the white circle.
http://a.abclocal.go.com/images/wpvi/cms_exf_2005/features/wpvi04032006-c5-plane-tail.jpg

http://a.abclocal.go.com/images/wpvi/cms_exf_2005/features/wpvi04032006_c5_tailcu.jpg

[AGPwallah]

Sorry Mr Darwin - got your payload slightly wrong.

The Galaxy has 12 internal wing tanks with a total capacity of 51,150 gallons (194,370 liters) of fuel -- enough to fill 6 1/2 regular size railroad tank cars. A full fuel load weighs 332,500 pounds (150,820 kilograms). A C-5 with a cargo load of 270,000 pounds (122,472 kilograms) can fly 2,150 nautical miles, offload, and fly to a second base 500 nautical miles away from the original destination -- all without aerial refueling. With aerial refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew endurance.

[ORAC]

Pilot, co-pilot pinned during C-5 crashUpdate 10:47 am - The News Journal - Delaware Online

DOVER -- The pilot and co-pilot of a C-5 cargo plane were pinned in their seats when the plane crashed today, just south of Dover Air Force Base, according to an Air Force officer who had friends on the plane.

Seventeen people were aboard, and three were flown by helicopter to Christiana Hospital in Stanton, two with possible spinal injuries, the officer said. A Christiana Hospital spokesperson referred all questions to the Air Force. Fourteen people from the C-5 were taken to Kent General Hospital with minor injuries, one with a broken leg.

At 9:30 a.m., at least four Air Force personnel wearing patients’ smocks at Kent General could be seen in a conference room filling out forms and being questioned by Air Force officers in camouflage fatigues. The personnel in the smocks appeared to be uninjured and were sipping coffee and munching donuts. Hospital spokesperson Pam Marecki was not immediately available for comment. According to Ellen Shockley of Bayhealth, which operates Kent General, all 14 “patients are being evaluated and treated now. Many patients will soon be discharged and a few will likely be admitted to the hospital.”

CNN: WASHINGTON (CNN) -- An Air Force C-5 cargo jet carrying 17 people crashed and broke into pieces Monday while trying to make an emergency landing near Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, Air Force and FAA officials said. No one was killed, but several aboard were injured, Air Force Tech. Sgt. Melissa Phillips, a spokeswoman for the base, told The Associated Press.

Pentagon sources told CNN the aircraft "declared an in-flight emergency for a No. 2 engine flameout."

[RatherBeFlying]

Hopefully all aboard survived without serious injury -- pending hospital reports. The fuselage seems to have broken in the upper deck kitchen/lav area where hopefully nobody was present. As I recall from a tour many moons ago the pax seating is around the wings.

Two of four slides seem to have been correctly deployed:ok:

I'm sure the cockpit crew was happy it remained erect as it's a long way down the ladder and made it much easier to extricate the front seat crew who were reported pinned in their seats.

[M609]

It allmost made the runway: http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=39.115382&lon=-75.443777&z=15.4&r=0&src=0

[archae86]

I have to be puzzled as to the lack of fire. Incredibly lucky if fully fuelled.
The photo posted on the BBC site has an arc of foam suggesting either a small actual fire or a precautionary measure centered about the pylon from which an engine departed.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/06/americas_enl_1144085581/img/1.jpg

[flynverted]

More pics, originally posted at AirDisaster dot com

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v243/flynverted/C5-Dover-01.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v243/flynverted/C5-Dover-02.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v243/flynverted/C5-Dover-03.jpg

[Golf Charlie Charlie]

Picture no. 5 above. Did the tail take some of the top of the fuselage with it as well ? It doesn't seem to have detached at the attachment lugs....?

[GrazingIncidence]

Couple of things look a bit strange:
1. The ground around the aircraft seems intact - would've expected recognisable skid/gouge marks, perhaps? Suggests they arrived at near zero groundspeed.
2. Foam round the port wing seems to be a pretty late arrival - or a very early one. Most of the pics that first made it on to CNN etc. show very little of it, compared with archae86's view.
Be interesting to know what the sequence of events was...
GI

[DingerX]

Not that I'd recommend speculating from photos, but to point out the obvious:

There are recognizable skid marks -- at the end of the slide, the aircraft turned 90 degrees to the direction of travel. In the process, the nose section broke off, and the left wing (pointing in the direction of travel), dipped down, sending the #1 pod on its way and causing a small fuel leak. There was no fire, and the passengers evacuated from the slightly lower side (towards the fuel leak). When the equipment arrived, they secured the site, evacuated the aircraft, then, when the TV crews showed up around, say, 12:01 pm, they applied flame retardant onto the spilled fuel.

[critical winge]

Listen folks I am not trying to apportion blame here, but I would like to continue with a discussion on possible causes. Having looked at the pictures, my best guess would be a structual failure of the tail on the approach. If the aircraft was stalled on the approach ( little ground skid marks) then how come the tail is so far away. No matter what, thank God they are all alive and I hope they all get over this as soon as is possible. Don't shoot me, there will be an investigation with results months down the line. As a pilot I am just curious of other peoples observations. Thanks

[Roadtrip]

Speculation at this point, is pointless. I hope no one was seriously injured. Given the mostly intact aircraft, it looks like the aircraft commander did an outstanding job of controlling the crash.

CNN said the crew was an RTB after an engine failure. Given the appalling record of CNN reporting, I wouldn't believe that until someone competent and in authority said it.

On CNN this morning, I saw the dimwit reporter pointing to the #1 engine that departed from the pylon and tell the audience that it was the "tail" of the airplane. It was embarassing to watch.

[vapilot2004]

DOVER -- All 17 people aboard survived the initial impact when a C-5 -- the U.S. military’s largest aircraft -- crashed at Dover Air Force Base early this morning after an undetermined in-flight emergency.

The massive plane, en route to Kuwait, was broken into three huge chunks, with the nose of the plane severed from the rest of the fuselage.

Fourteen people were taken to Kent General Hospital with minor injuries, one with a broken leg, and 11 were expected to be released shortly.

Three victims were taken by helicopter to Christiana Hospital in Stanton, some with possible spinal injuries.

No further information was immediately available on the other victims.

The pilot and co-pilot were pinned in their seats when the plane crashed just south of the base, according to an Air Force officer who had friends on the plane.

The engine failure may have been the result of birds being sucked into the engines, a known cause of engine failure, a spokeswoman a spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon said.

Officials at the Dover base have warned for years of the danger posed by birds feeding at the Eastern Shore Environmental garbage transfer station on 26 acres off Postles Corner Road just east of the main runway at Dover Air Force Base. That transfer operation is in the process of being relocated to a 20-acre site south of Farmington.

“I can confirm that they [DAFB] are reporting engine failure,” the pentagon spokeswoman said. “The initial suspicion in cases like that is birds. It’s something investigators always look at. It’s a known cause of engine failure.”

An air base ambulance was first on the scene at about 6:45 a.m., a worker on the scene said.

The ambulance crew went outside after being advised a C-5 was coming in with engine trouble and saw it crash.

When they reached the scene, some aboard the jet had already slid down the emergency chutes and were out of the plane. Ambulance crews took them to a triage site set up near the scene.

The most serious injuries were near the flight deck, where the pilots and flight engineers work.

Dover firefighters used ladder trucks to reach those in the flight deck, which is more than 35 feet off the ground. It was the only way to get to them.

Firefighters foamed down the fuel spilled on the site. Debris was scattered around the site. The state Dept. of Natural Resources and Environmental Control was cleaning up jet fuel.

A former reserve safety officer at Dover said the pilot and co-pilot of today’s C-5 crash likely prevented more serious injuries by steering the plane to the ground with the wings level.

But, said Lt. Col. Jay Lacklen, most worrisome is where the forward break in the plane occurred.

“It seems to have been through the middle of the aft crew compartment, where there were probably several crew members seated,” said Lacklen, who retired in 2004 and now teaches C-5 crews on a flight simulator in Mississippi. “You can see this because the aft crew compartment slide is deployed behind the break. That means it tore open at the aft compartment table where the non-duty crew members usually sit. The good news is someone put the aft slide out.”

Lacklen, who has 23 years and 10,000 hours in C-5s, said the plane hit hard.

“Fully loaded the maximum rate of descent is supposed to be no more than 6 feet-per-second,” he said. “They hit much harder than that.”

The strength of the impact would have injured the crew, he said.

“This is worrisome because the cockpit probably sustained pretty heavy G-forces which would suggest possible back injuries,” he said.

The most recent similar incident occurred at Dover Air Force Base in 1983, Lacklen said, when a fully loaded C-5 hit a flock of birds on take off.

“They lost one-and-a-half engines and barely made it around,” he said. “It was really dicey.”

Lacklen credits the pilots for minimizing the damage from the crash.

“The most crucial aspect of the crash is they hit wings level. Had they hit a wing tip first, they’d all be dead. That is the rule, if you are going down, at least go down wings level,” he said. “As always, though, the first reason you suspect for a crash is almost always wrong, so I won’t speculate on why it happened, I can only judge what happened when they hit.”

Jason Adkins, a former enlisted C-5 crew member, said the enlisted crew members knew they were going to hit hard Monday morning.

“They were fully aware,” Adkins said. “When you take off, everyone is situated for a crash landing. They were ready, belted in.


The above from a Delaware news source. Glad everyone made it out alive. Some injuries are sounding moderate. Kerosene, I got some spewed on me from an overpressurized 727 connector - it took days to get out of my system and I was still smelling it for longer than that. Not fun.

One engine out - no big deal on this aircraft - but what about two on the same side ? - would be difficult to control right after V2 I would think on a C-5.

I would say, job well done by the aircraft commander !

[Danza]

"I won’t speculate on why it happened, I can only judge what happened when they hit.”

Someone talking sense for once ........

[Zeffy]

Airport diagram here

http://www.naco.faa.gov/d-tpp/0604/00562AD.PDF (https://mail.granitelp.com/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.naco.faa.gov/d-tpp/0604/00562AD.PDF)

If the accident occurred at 0630 local, that would be 1030Z

METAR KDOV 030855Z 18005KT 7SM BKN250 07/05 A2998 RMK SLP153 56017
METAR KDOV 030955Z 15005KT 7SM SCT250 07/06 A2997 RMK SLP150
METAR KDOV 031055Z 17005KT 5SM BR SCT050 SCT120 BKN250 07/06 A2996 RMK SLP147

[jondc9]

roadtrip:

I watched CNN this morning too. I know about the mistakes made on TV. But let us NOT call one of the better Aviation reporters a dimwith shall we?


I watched closely and at first I thought there was little or no fuel spill...but a different angle showed me a huge wet spot on the grass and foam protecting fuel spill.

To speak off the cuff as an aviation accident is happening is tough...I've done it and I have 12k hours. You can be right or wrong, but you have to keep talking till you get more data.


hey guys, that WET grass was low in friction, probably helped avoid post crash fire...
also the C5 has a fuel inerting system which would protect the fuel tanks from explosion, though once the fuel was out on the ground, its just fuel...the inerting system puts nitrogen in the ulliage ( where air would be) in the tank....wonder if this helped.

jon

[broadreach]

The sequence of photos is difficult for this armchair analyst to resist so, a suggestion to GrazingIncidence and on the back of Dinger's comments:

The skid mark is there alright, just some sixty feet wide. Port gear seems to have collapsed way back while the starboard gear would seem to have pivoted round to near 90° to follow the sideways slide.

It must have been one awful ride, aircraft presumably full of cargo and fuel. What a plus for all to get out intact and have those pics to show to the grandchildren. Thank heaven for open land beyond the threshold.

[misd-agin]

Wet grass? Driest March in years, if not ever. If anything I'd give credit to the soil on the Delmarva Penninsula. Great for farming, lots of sand in it.

Crew did a great job? What did they do? At this point no one knows anything so even congratulating them is premature. What was the start of the incident and why didn't the a/c make it back in one piece?

Did the tail fail prior to impact? There doesn't seem to be a big impact mark visible in the picture indicating that the a/c made initial ground contact there.

And after the tail came off I'll bet money the investigation reveals that for the most part the crew was along for the ride. No rudder, no elevator/stab. They could probably keep the wings level until airspeed dropped off. Then the a/c, like gliders, would tend to tip/turn resulting in the side slip that cracked the spine. Investigators will have to figure out if the gear was down and if, or when, it failed in the sequence of events.

Leading edge slats between #1 and #2 engine are missing. When did that occur? Pre or post ground contact?

Local news said eyewitnesses saw flames coming from #2 engine. Not completely unexpected *if* severe bird damage.

Jon, any chance you're an Agusta MV4 1000 fan? ;)

[innuendo]

AGPWallah, please understand that I am not trying to be a smart alec:

"With aerial refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew endurance."

I'm presuming that they either have an ability to top up engine oil or have a pretty big capacity. I bring it up only because the A-340-300 has oil quantity minimums dictated by the planned length of the flight.

[Ignition Override]

One of our pilots flew the C-5 years ago on active duty and is now a part-time instructor on the C-5.

Will ask him very soon if he has any actual facts on the accident, but some could remain classified until the investigation is complete.

As most in PpruneLand realize, it is a quite complex aircraft and requires two Flight Engineers. The C-5s were upgraded, so to speak, years ago and equipped with FMCs, LNAV and VNAV.

[Foreign Worker]

An experienced professional trolling the naive and the lazy.

The more embarrassing follow ups to this post should have been deleted but hey, let's enjoy them in a new light.

Rob

[Eff Oh]

Interesting incident indeed. Glad everyone alive and looks like a good job by the crew! Correct me if I'm wrong though, but are the USAF saying that a single engine failure caused this crash? I find that a little hard to believe, even if it lost two engines it was still flying ok, as they had time to transmit a distress call, almost return to base, and for a helicopter to be scrambled before the crash. Performance calculations should allow for an EFATO. The reason for the engine failure(s) isn't really the issue here, but the reason for the crash is.
Did the tail seperate for some reason?
Was the aircraft overweight? (Hence lack of single engine performance, if this was the cause.)
Was the situation mishandled?
Did another factor contribute to the cause?
I am not seeking to blame with the above, far from it, having been in aviation for a while now I know that things are never that cut and dried! It just all seems a bit strange to me.
Also, is it wise for a Pentagon official to say “The initial suspicion in cases like that is birds. It’s something investigators always look at. It’s a known cause of engine failure." Seems a bit quick to come out with something like that does it not? I mean do they ACTUALLY know what happened? I would suggest that as he used the word "seems" then the answer is no they don't. So why bother giving a possible cause? Strange.

[76CAUSA]

Local PHL news said the 17 were soaked in jet fuel, lucky there was no combustion!!

[lomapaseo]

First reports (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) indicated that the crew reported a problem shortly after take-off.
Unless the aircraft was refuelled with the incorrect grade of kero, how does one explain the exceptionally heavy, gear-up landing that caused the aircraft to break up into 3 pieces.
Why has No1 engine separated from the wing?
The early photo (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) in this article indicates a trail of extinguishant (presumably the aircraft's own supply, fired by the crew) prior to being doused by the fire trucks that attended.
Why?
Crew error -either not checking that the correct fuel was used - or using the incorrect procedure(s) and hurrying back - is still a STRONG possibility in this one, imo.


That has got to be one of the most uninformed postulations that I have seen in a long time on this forum.

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

Foreign Worker - you are simply not in any position to make the assertions you do. You have no knowlege of the aircraft involved and as far as I can see no specific knowledge of this particular event. You are, like the rest of us, completely unqualified to make the assumption of crew error. The difference is everyone else knows they are not qualified - you alas have some doubt.

[AGPwallah]

Innuendo - no offence taken!! My post was taken from an NBC article, the assumption was theirs. I was just trying to point out that the payload was 260,000 pounds, NOT tons as posted by Charles Darwin.

[Danny]

Sigh

I think I really am going to have to figure out a way to make sure that only people who have at least some basic knowledge of flying heavy metal are allowed to postulate on here. I reserve the right from now on to remove any post that is obviously from someone with no real knowledge of what is involved. It's fairly obvious that anonimity gives some posters imaginary knowledge that is so out of tune with reality that I must make more of an effort to keep their witterings off these forums. :rolleyes:

[filejw]

They flew trough a flock of birds that reside in a sanctuary at the end of the runway.

[Roadtrip]

roadtrip:
I watched CNN this morning too. I know about the mistakes made on TV. But let us NOT call one of the better Aviation reporters a dimwith shall we?
I watched closely and at first I thought there was little or no fuel spill...but a different angle showed me a huge wet spot on the grass and foam protecting fuel spill.
To speak off the cuff as an aviation accident is happening is tough...I've done it and I have 12k hours. You can be right or wrong, but you have to keep talking till you get more data.


If that's one of the "better" aviation reporters they've got (one that mis-identifies an engine as a tail), then I rest my case.

As far as basic ethical journalism goes, the emphasis should be on "correct" before "first." In the US press that has been completely turned around to where "firstest, with the most blood" is way ahead of "correct."

Maybe as an aviation accident is happening, you SHOULDN'T speak "off-the-cuff." The wives and families of the airman on that aircraft might have been watching and time-filler BS spewed out by so-called "experts" can be gravely hurtful and probably WRONG.

It's astonishing and appalling that you think it's ok to "keep talking" regardless of the accuracy or veracity of what you're reporting.

[canyonblue737]

First reports (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) indicated that the crew reported a problem shortly after take-off.
Unless the aircraft was refuelled with the incorrect grade of kero, how does one explain the exceptionally heavy, gear-up landing that caused the aircraft to break up into 3 pieces.
Why has No1 engine separated from the wing?
The early photo (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) in this article indicates a trail of extinguishant (presumably the aircraft's own supply, fired by the crew) prior to being doused by the fire trucks that attended.
Why?
Crew error -either not checking that the correct fuel was used - or using the incorrect procedure(s) and hurrying back - is still a STRONG possibility in this one, imo.

One of the most ill informed and uneducated opinions I have ever seen on PPRune, imo of course.

[Arctaurus]

I won't add to the responses to FW's grossly uninformed comments.:mad:

Regarding the bird strike possibility, this from the USAF on Dover AFB and bird migration.

""In the DelMarVa region, the bird hazard increases each fall and remains high until birds migrate north in the spring. Blackbirds and Canadian geese are the main threat. The blackbird population peaks at 150,000 from mid-October through mid-November and resurfaces in February. Snow geese begin arriving in mid-October and peak at 150,000 in January and February. Additionally, seagulls are a year-round problem, peaking in number from March through May.""

So, it appears (from the above anyway), that it's the right time of year for higher risk of bird strikes.

[John Farley]

Surely if an aircraft of this configuration lands short and hard (perhaps because of the results of multiple bird ingestion after takeoff) it is hardly surpising that the tail would break off downwards. (That even happens in flight test sometimes - check your videos) Since the tail has little mass it will slow down quickly after it departs the fuse while the rest of the aircraft has more than a little mv so can be expected to proceed some way further (to put it mildly)

[ExSimGuy]

Even having been out of "the business" since shortly after the "Toulouse aircraft" came in, I could see that FW's post made about as much sense as a chocolate fireguard.


However, we have seen before incidences of "News Reporters" quoting from this board and including "a web bulletin board subscribed to by professional pilots"


Yes, I agree that the drivel's "fun" - as long as some fool does not grab at it as the truth (and the crew's already-distraught family get even more grief to worry about)

[misd-agin]

They flew trough a flock of birds that reside in a sanctuary at the end of the runway.
**********************************************************

8 yrs of flying fighters in the area. We had specific bans on low altitude flights during 'bird' season.

It's that time of year.

[hobie]

Danny posted ....

I think I really am going to have to figure out a way to make sure that only people who have at least some basic knowledge of flying heavy metal are allowed to postulate on here. I reserve the right from now on to remove any post that is obviously from someone with no real knowledge of what is involved. It's fairly obvious that anonimity gives some posters imaginary knowledge that is so out of tune with reality that I must make more of an effort to keep their witterings off these forums

...... and in particular when crews are being 'Castigated' for a procedure/maneuver that the writer has no authority/qualification to comment on, let alone condemn the crew ......

e.g. by all means ask why a crew might do a 180 on a Taxiway, if you must, but to expand the question by asking if the crew will face disciplinary action for 'being lost!' ..... :mad:

[jondc9]

To Mis-D again!

Regarding the WET grass...my belief is based on the following: temp/dewpoint spread within 1degree C. Comments by a Lt. Col, that the:landing was almost like a water landing on the grass as the plane slid along".

Mv4-1000, you mean the motorcycle? no, not a fan, and NO, not fallen off a motorcycle.

To: RoadTrip>

As I recorded the CNN comments and reviewed them, yes the newsman indicated the number one engine, circled it and spoke of the tail, but this was more of a mis-speak as he was concerned for some time that the tail was hundreds of yards from the nose/fuselage-wings.

I have never said to speak without some concept of what is going on...what I want to make clear is that one can say something, within possibility/probability, and in a moment or two be proven wrong by subsequent reports.

I still recall that all major news organizations were reporting that Southwest airlines went off the end of 13C at Midway (KMDW) and this was reported by either an FAA or airport officer.

It was quite clear that it was runway 31 C, and as all real pilots know, this is the same piece of pavement as 13C. just in the opposite direction.

yes the cnn person circled the engine (number one on the ground) and spoke of the tail, but this was a mistake of words and not understanding of what it was.

we could get into a huge argument about public speaking...just look at Pres. Bush and how many things he says have to be explained later on by the White House staff.

Roadtrip, have YOU ever had to cover a crash on national TV? Have you ever mis-spoke?


fly safe

jon

[barit1]

Good news: Media report (http://www.wmdt.com/topstory/topstory.asp?id=2087) 11 of 17 aboard have been released from the hospital.

One eyewitness remarked hearing a very unusual noise during approach, which could well be consistent with birdstrike on an enqine (or multiple engines).

[Roadtrip]

Roadtrip, have YOU ever had to cover a crash on national TV? Have you ever mis-spoke?

I've been close to a few accident investigations, and I know enough to keep my mouth shut until the facts are known. So, NO, I haven't mis-spoke. What's wrong with reporting the FACTS, then STFU? . . . "A xxx aircraft crashed in xxxx at xxxx hours today. The cause of the accident is unknown. The aircraft broke up into several pieces, but did not burn. As the accident is only minutes old, there are no reports of casualties."

When the so called experts like you start speculating, usually about an aircraft that you're not qualified in, then you're just selling soap. Speculating about birds, weather, the fuel on-board the aircraft, and then coming up with 37 different scenarios of what might have happened is just plain exploiting the situation. The purpose is to titalate the average viewers (an imbecile when it comes to aircraft operations) imagination, and scare them. The other major problem is so many of these hired-gun "experts" with inflated titles and credits aren't experts at all, as evidenced from what I've heard come out of their mouths. The reporting with the anchors and "experts" sounds a lot more like a bunch of women sitting around gossiping than responsible journalism. My favorite scam by "experts" is when they sit around and make the 37 speculations about what probably happened, then make a quick caveat about "But, you know Bob, it's really too early to tell exactly what happened and we shouldn't speculate about the cause of the accident" 3 seconds out of a 10 minute report almost all of which was spent SPECULATING about the cause. The news media and "experts" depend upon the lack of critical thinking skills of the average viewer.

When that CNN guy pulled out the 'ol high tech, wiz-bang telewriter and started circling engines as "tails," that's when I couldn't take anymore BS, and the remote went "click" before he might try to find some casualties to circle.

I just wish all you hired-gun "experts" would report the facts, then shut-up instead of trying to embellish everything. CNN's initial reporting on the C-5 was up to it's usual low standards in aviation reporting.

[Roadtrip]

First reports (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) indicated that the crew reported a problem shortly after take-off.
Unless the aircraft was refuelled with the incorrect grade of kero, how does one explain the exceptionally heavy, gear-up landing that caused the aircraft to break up into 3 pieces.
Why has No1 engine separated from the wing?
The early photo (http://70.86.224.210/~aqwquuwt/forum/viewtopic.php?t=261) in this article indicates a trail of extinguishant (presumably the aircraft's own supply, fired by the crew) prior to being doused by the fire trucks that attended.
Why?
Crew error -either not checking that the correct fuel was used - or using the incorrect procedure(s) and hurrying back - is still a STRONG possibility in this one, imo.


Wow, that's so imbecilic it's hard to keep from laughing. Do you work for CNN?

[Ignition Override]

CanyonBlue 737:

Yep. Some nit-wit amateur is fishing for some comments to print elsewhere.

One link above said that in the hospital were the "pilot, the copilot, and the aviator" (??).

Roadtrip: Yep, and some "experts" teach at aviation schools such as Embry Riddle and have little actual aviation background in a high-performance cockp1t-but they know the academics very well. Their impressive titles fool the public and their hours of reading about the ' known' facts, before preparing to supply smooth sound-bytes to the media take nothing into account regarding the many procedures being put together on a very short flight by real crewmembers. One classic abnormal procedure was probably practiced as a fairly simple engine-failure, six months ago in a simulator. Our armchair experts, fawned over by the media who assume that they have lots of real experience, might spill hot coffee on their shirts, simulating turbulence, or even fall out of their chair-that is their aviation proficiency. Or fly their computer, as I just did, against Bf-110s and Migs (...Forgotten Battles...").

One of the best aviation consultants in the US is Mr. John Nance. He has spent a career flying various jet transport aircraft and is an aviation attorney, but he is often avoided, or unknown by certain media groups.

The planes whuch many of us fly can take off at weights over 100,000 pounds when we deicide which runway/wind /flap settings (15* or 5*?) are suitable and safe, yet there are so many systems and procedural differences between these and the large widebodies with much more complexity. Most of us who fly airplanes for a living realize that there could have been some additional compound problems, i.e. an engine failure could lead to a partial electrical failure which could cause reduced hydraulic power, pneumatic and fuel glitches etc. Or just pop various circuit breakers, thereby creating indictations which are NOT described in abnormal/emergency procedure manuals. Or a weird combination. For example, "Eh...Captain/Major", we also have a battery charger caution light, fuel low pressure on number 2, and at least 1 hydraulic/flight control problem, but I'll get to those after I read you guys the (2-3 pages of) 'engine failure procedures' i.e...ok, ignition? identify the failed engine..check throttle to idle..verify fuel control xxx, maintain 2-engine Vmc plus at least 20 knots...". :( "Hey-what was that last bang sound!"

A B-747 suffered a near-disaster years ago departing SFO. One problem which many people were unaware of, was that the engine surge created enough vibration to make some of their instruments almost unreadable. The requirement to only complete six simulated takeoffs and landings each 6 months was little help to the flying pilot. A recent tv show on History International described the competition between young people to fly and crew a Lancaster. The airline pilot who flew highly-automated A-320s had some trouble at first flying the T-6 Harvard/Texan. Our aviator skills must be practiced often.

Back to the C-5. The amateurs are not only are blissly ignorant of how to fly a complex airplane with serious problems, but have no idea as to how crewmembers must communicate between all four (not to mention with the loadmasters/FAs) and perform emergency checklists while telling the Tower or Departure controller exactly what they need. Is it possible that an electrical problem affected fuel boost pumps supplying pressure to the C-5's good engine on the same side, next to the one which failed or surged? This might be just one of a huge list of possibilities. The flap/slat indications might have been erratic, not just split.

A hundred things are happening at the same time for the intensely busy crew.:ooh:

[ORAC]

Air Force Times (http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1664881.php) report. Which seems pretty comprehensive and includes a crew name/condition list at the end.

[ExSimGuy]

One of the best aviation consultants in the US is Mr. John Nance. He has spent a career flying various jet transport aircraft and is an aviation attorney
If I recall correctly, "John J. Nance" writes aviation fiction - I believe a book that I very much enjoyed "The Last Hostage" was written by this author.

Yes! A quick search indicates this is the same guy - I did think that the author of the book was pretty knowledgable on the 737 (last "sim" that I worked on, so I still rememebr quite a bit!)

(Maybe CNN can't afford him :E )

[ExSimGuy]

Thanks for the link, Orac.

It's not too clear from the fisherman's report if the tail came off "in mid-air", or if it hit the ground while still on the aircraft, separated, and bounced.

His description sounds like it separated first, but the likelihood of this, on a flight that was already in trouble with an engine out seems low (can't think of any possible connection unless maybe the engine problem put on some sort of horrible rudder config?)

Whichever, the crew sure did a good job of keeping the thing somewhat under control - level:ok:

(from the link) "designed to break apart like this on impact" Anyone explain why?:confused:

[jondc9]

RoadTrip and others on the topic of aviation reporting on LIVE tv:

I have heard many people like yourself who won't speculate. If you are going to go on tv and just say, "a plane crashed at 5:30 pm near Miami, Florida...the NTSB says it will be a YEAR before the investigation is complete"...would you stay tuned?

Informed speculation is just that. From the right person, it might spark a debate about safety that will actually wake some people up on subject (including pilots).

By the way, John Nance doesn't do CNN often because he is on ABC. An aviation editor there I think. (as an aside, I don't care for John Nance's reporting style or his books)

I've been on CNN a number of times. Most recently on the southwest crash/incident/over-run at Midway, and the seaplane crash (amphibian if you want to get technical) near Miami.

Regarding the Miami deal, a former NTSB official was on. He wouldn't even confirm (while tape showing the same was rolling) that the WING had come off .

IS THIS what you want roadtrip?

I did say, based on one eyewitness report, that I suspected structural failure.
After the tape showing the wing coming off, I was pretty darn sure. But even Wolf Blitzer was good about explaining that this was Speculation.

On the Southwest deal, I came up with numbers like 5216 feet required...I didn't mention that as we didn't have the exact loading of the aircraft...but within days the NTSB said it was about 5300 feet.

On live TV we decided that pieces of the wing (737) sticking up were NOT the spoilers, but wing damage.

Aviation reporting, if left to some ideas, would be just as you said: a plane crashed here at this time. And now a commercial message.
If that is what you want, all YOU have to do is turn off the TV after the first few seconds.

Yes, to the person speaking about the multiple failures that an engine problem might bring on and how this complicates the real reason for a crash. I had an engine problem that started with high EGT, followed up by a CSD running hot (JT8d-15) all caused by a crack in the engine casing.

I will say this right now, SPECULATION, as long as it is marked as such, is OK on live tv. Roadtrip, if you don't like the SPECULATION, turn the TV off.

I think LIVE coverage also brings to the forefront important safety improvements. How many of you had heard of the special over-runs (emas) to stop airplanes prior to Southwest/Midway. I have spoken to Congressmen (tom lantos of san mateo,ca for one) about the EMAS system in the early 90's! This helps to set the SAFETY agenda AND MAY ACTUALLY DO SOME GOOD.

Aviation reporting is still in its infancy, the finest example was probably, the "oh the humanity" report on the Hindenburg as it happened live.

I do thank people like Roadtrip for speaking up...but don't stop others from speaking out...especially on live TV as it is happening.

jon regas

[email protected]

PS:
anyone who ever has good info on an aviation incident/accident etc feel free to write to me EVEN AS IT IS being covered LIVE!


my experience is CFIIMEIATPMEL... last job as a 737 captain for a major airline....dc9/bae146 among many,many other lighter planes flown. about 12k hours. now medically grounded due to injury (pinched nerve sort of thing)

no one pilot can know all the systems of every plane out there, but someone like me OR MANY OF YOU on the forum can certainly speak with some good authority on what is going on.

[galaxy flyer]

I can pretty much guarantee the tail did NOT come off while airborne--it would not have been controllable for long sans tail. Nose first, big, BIG splat.

Several times over the years C-5s have nearly come to grief after severe birdstrikes--once at Dover and once at Westover, both times more than 10 years ago. Dover has extensive restrictions on ops during migratory seasons and a HUGE bird problem. The two events resulted in very heavy weight returns on less than three engines, one of the remaining engines vibrating so hard it was difficult to concentrate on flying.

Speculation on ANY cause is way, way premature. The C-5 has very complex and redundant systems, but compound emergencies after an engine failure surely are a possibility. In any case, the guys did a spectacular job bringing it around the bay and to a survivable crash landing.

GF

[lomapaseo]

I agree with JonDc9 handling of the critical retorts about speculative reporting in the media.

The final report with its considered recommendations for preventive measures may take years to sooth the publics confidence. Leaving the public in any kind of vacuum even for minutes, experience has shown, will only serve to fill their minds with their latest nightmare dream as reality.

It is the job of the professionals in this business to at the minimum place some bounds on the necessary speculation that must occur in order to focus an investigation on the right issues.

I'm am a professional investigator of major accidents and I come here to this forum because the first letter in Pprune suggests that I may get an informed hint from some of you as to what issues might be the most critical to look into.

So please don't cut off your noses to spite your face and do continue to provide point and counterpoint, even with a degree of speculation or what if's. Some of us, even some in the media, do have the ability to separate imaginative from experienced comments.

[con-pilot]

I almost hate to do this, but, the article in the "Air Force Times" report has a serious error in the story.


It was the first crash on U.S. soil of the American military’s largest plane

Back in the mid 1970s, sorry I can't remember the exact year, a C-5 crashed after attempting an emergency landing at Clinton,Oklahoma (KCLK). I know this for a fact because I was there the next day.

The C-5 was making practice approaches at a near by Air Force Base, Clinton Sherman AFB (KCSM). On downwind after an touch and go the C-5 suffered a massive hydraulic failure that resulted in a fire in the left wing. A trailing KC-135 observed the fire on the C-5 and notified the crew. The fire spread so rapidly that the Aircraft Commander decided that they could not make it back to Clinton Sherman and attempted to land at the civilian airport.

The aircraft touched down about 200 past the end of the runway (he flat nailed the landing) on the center line, the runway back then was less than 5,000ft and 50ft wide. However, with no hydraulics the aircraft was unable to be stopped and it ran off the end of the runway, through a fence, over a road and then hit a ditch before coming to rest in a open field.

If memory severs me correctly the wreckage was in four major pieces, tail section, aft fusulage, wing section and then the cockpit section. The wing center section burned up, however, the rest of the airframe was not fire damaged.

Oh yes the crew. When the first emergency vehicles arrived the enitre crew was standing on a road about a quarter mile from the crash site smoking cigarettes, pointing at the wreckage saying "Wow, look at that!"

No injuries at all.

[jondc9]

Dear Ppruners:

What follows is probably the best information about the C5 crash to date. Including eyewitness accounts indicating pitch attitude of up to 50 degrees on short final. While some may say it is too early to speculate, I think a possible (repeat POSSIBLE) aerodynamic stall may be part of the equation.

While there may be many things leading up to a stall, please read this article!

jon regas

[email protected]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

C-5 crew recovering as investigation starts
Cause likely more than engine failure, veteran pilots say

The News Journal/GARY EMEIGH
Investigators examine debris Tuesday in the area where a U.S. Air Force Reserve C-5B Galaxy airplane crashed Monday near Dover.

> Special report
C-5 crashes near Dover


The News Journal/GARY EMEIGH
Lt. Col. Darren James is safety officer of the 436th Airlift Wing at Dover Air Force Base.

The 17 PEOPLE ABOARD MONDAY'S C-5 FLIGHT:

(Name, unit, condition, hospital)

Lt. Col. Robert Moorman, 326th Airlift Squadron, Fair, Christiana

According to his squadron’s Web site, Moorman, of Dover, is the commander of the 326th Airlift Squadron, has more than 5,000 hours in C-5s and is a captain with a commercial airline.

Lt. Col. Harland Nelson, 326th AS, Fair, Kent General

Nelson, of Milford, is a pilot and member of the command staff of the 326th Airlift Squadron.

Capt. Brian Lafreda, 326th AS, Fair, Christiana

Lafreda, a pilot, has commanded several combat missions into Iraq and has flown relief supplies into New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and into Pakistan for earthquake relief.

Master Sgt. Timothy Feiring, 709th Airlift Squadron, Released

Master Sgt. Michael Benford, 709th AS, Released

Tech. Sgt. Vincent Dvorak, 709th AS, Fair, Christiana

Master Sgt. Brenda Kremer, 709th AS, Released

Chief Master Sgt. David Burke, 326th AS, Released

Burke, 53, of Dover is “doing fine,” according to a woman who answered the phone at his home. “Unfortunately, he’s not going to be able to make a comment at any time.” She wouldn’t give her name.

Chief Master Sgt. George Mosley, 709th AS, Released

Mosley, 43, lives in the Camden-Wyoming area.

Tech. Sgt. Henry Fortney, 326th AS, Released

Fortney is 29 and lives in Dover.

Senior Airman Scott Schaffner, 89th Airlift Squadron, Released

Tammy Lucas, Lockheed Martin employee, Fair, Kent General

Lucas is a Lockheed Martin avionics engineer who has worked for the company for approximately 12 years. Based at the company’s headquarters in Marietta, Ga., she was on board the C-5 as an observer.

Staff Sgt. David Abrams, 436th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Released

Senior Airman Nicholas Vather, 436th AMXS, Fair, Kent General

Chief Petty Officer (USN, retired) Paul Kath, Released

Hannelore Kath, Released

Tech. Sgt. (USAF, retired) Raul Salamanca, Released


Related news from the Web



By JEFF MONTGOMERY
The News Journal
04/05/2006

Pilots likely were fighting far more than a choked engine just before they skidded a C-5 cargo jet across farmland just short of a Dover Air Force Base runway Monday morning, according to two veteran pilots and military standards for the workhorse aircraft.

Aircrews regularly practice for engine-failure emergencies by flying and landing C-5s with only three engines at full power and one all but shut down. Loads are calculated so that even at maximum weight, the big planes can climb and return to base if one engine conks out shortly after takeoff, according to a C-5 training manual.

All 17 people aboard Monday's flight survived the crash and breakup of the fuel-laden cargo jet. Most have returned home, but the Air Force said four people were recuperating in stable condition at Christiana and Kent General hospitals, including Lt. Col. Harland Nelson and Lt. Col. Robert Moorman.
Advertisement

Pest Control & Termite Tech - Willing to train
Pest Control & Termite Tech - Willin...
Restaurant - Looking for exp'd
Restaurant - Looking for exp'd P/T Serv...


Click to learn more...

"I'm OK," Nelson said from his hospital bed at Kent General.

Ann Moorman said her son, who was hospitalized at Christiana, was recovering, with his wife at his bedside. "He's doing very well," she said in a brief telephone interview from her home in Lake Forest, Ill. "I really don't know anything other than he is coming along fine."

Chief Master Sgt. George Mosley, 43, who was treated at Kent General and released, said he was under orders not to talk to news media pending completion of an investigation.

"Until they know more about it we're not allowed to say anything about it, and I've put my family under the same gag order," he said after answering the door at his home in Camden.

The C-5, which was put in service 21 years ago, crashed in a field just short of Dover's longest runway after reporting an engine problem about 10 minutes into a flight to Kuwait by way of Rota, Spain.

"It doesn't seem likely it was just because of one engine," said retired Maj. Ramona Hechtl of Davis, Calif., a veteran C-5 pilot who flew missions during the first Gulf war. Hechtl said she was a pilot on a C-5 flight that safely returned to base after an engine failed over the Pacific Ocean halfway between Hawaii and California.

Other factors, including problems with other systems or a miscalculated approach, might have compounded the emergency and put the heavily laden craft into a stall or a too-rapid descent.

"They could have gotten into a sink [descent] rate and couldn't pull out of it, I don't know," Hechtl said. "C-5 engines are not the greatest; it's pretty underpowered."

Base officials have yet to release details about the engine problem that forced the plane back to base, or the plane's altitude or location at the time the emergency began. But they praised both the crew and rescue teams for averting a potential tragedy.

The C-5 that crashed is a C-5B Galaxy and recently had its onboard flight controls and electronic systems modernized by Lockheed Martin under a program that will be used to determine whether to spend $10 billion to overhaul all the Air Force's 112 C-5s. A Lockheed Martin avionics engineer, Tammy Lucas of Marietta, Ga., was aboard the plane when it crashed. She is in fair condition at Kent General.

On Monday, Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del., said a military briefer told him that until the cause of the accident has been determined, the modernized C-5s are being grounded. But a day later, Capt. Jeff Bishop, a spokesman for the Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, said none of the nation's C-5 fleet are grounded nor were they grounded at any point after the accident in Dover.

"We are not grounding or standing down the C-5 fleet ... none, including those with the avionics modernization program," Bishop said. Biden's office did not immediately return calls for clarification.

Short of the runway

One eyewitness account suggests the aircraft may have been fighting a stall just before its tail hit the ground just south of the runway. The tail broke off while the rest of the plane continued on, its forward section splitting off from the fuselage and wings.

Mike Cowan of Hartly reported that the plane's nose was pitched up about 45 or 50 degrees before its tail smacked the ground.

"The way he was coming in, he was way short," said Cowan, who spotted the plane's final seconds in the air while driving along U.S. 113. "I was saying 'You know what? If you don't bring that nose down soon, the tail is going to hit the ground.' "

The nose-high profile suggests crew members were "a little slow and trying to compensate by bringing the nose up," according to a retired colonel who recently served as an operations commander at Dover.

Retired Col. David G. Estep of Virginia said air crews must land planes with one engine idling as part of their qualification requirements.

"I've heard they were pretty heavy on gas. I'm assuming a heavy airplane, right after you take off, depending on what happens, you can be very busy very quickly," said Estep, who cautioned he had no direct information about the Dover crash.

"You can't get behind the power curve in that situation. If you start getting too slow and you're very heavy, it's difficult to accelerate and get back into a positive flight control regime."

Base officials said late Tuesday that all "black boxes" and other data recorders have been recovered from the C-5, still under heavy armed security where it came to rest on Monday.

"They've collected all that data. All we're doing is preserving it," Lt. Col. Darren V. James, safety office chief for the 436th Airlift Wing at Dover, said late Tuesday.

Safety board to convene

The Air Mobility Command expects to convene an outside safety board at Dover Air Force Base within a day or two to investigate Monday's crash, local officials said late Tuesday.

Interim safety teams from Dover already are probing the accident, but only to collect and preserve evidence and interviews, James said. Actual analysis and reporting of findings will be handled by a military board from other units to assure objectivity in the probe.

News Journal reporters James Merriweather, Mike Billington, Kristin Harty and Lee Williams and the Associated Press contributed to this article.

[pigboat]

ExSimGuy, re 'designed to break apart like this on impact.'

G and impact forces will break some aircraft into pieces at the construction breaks, ie behind the cockpit, say, and at the rear pressure bulkhead. That's one possibility here.

[cwatters]

Listen folks I am not trying to apportion blame here, but I would like to continue with a discussion on possible causes. Having looked at the pictures, my best guess would be a structual failure of the tail on the approach.

Planes don't usually go far without a tail. There is usually quite a rapid pitch nose down when the tail falls off (sometimes to inverted). Since it didn't go in nose down that kinda rules out the tail breaking off at any significant altitude. I guess we'll have to wait for the reports.

[barit1]

Planes don't usually go far without a tail. There is usually quite a rapid pitch nose down when the tail falls off (sometimes to inverted). Since it didn't go in nose down that kinda rules out the tail breaking off at any significant altitude. I guess we'll have to wait for the reports.

The classic example (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19770514-0) of the loss of only 50% of the horizontal tail. Nothing at all like this C-5 accident.

[212man]

If you watch this clip it may give you an idea of how readily tail planes can detach during a heavy landing:

http://www.airdisaster.com/download/md80.shtml

[broadreach]

More speculation, nothing to do with why it happened nor with how the emergency was handled, rather what happened after the aircraft hit the ground. This accident has been one of the most densely covered photographically so there's plenty to look and wonder at.

If Mr Mike Cowan's (he is mentioned as a crash witness in jondc9's last post) estimate of an aoa of 45-50° is even approximately correct, the nose would have come down like a hammer from what, the equivalent of five-seven stories? Would that in itself not have been sufficient to shear most of the structure just ahead of the heavy cargo, i.e. just aft of the nose section? And, if that's the case, not surprising flight deck crew were "pinned" down and had to be extracted by the rescue team. I hope they recover quickly and fully.

Nitpicking perhaps but what's had me puzzled is, was the gear down or not? Several posts and the ABC report suggest a "belly landing", and sliding on wet (or dry) grass over sandy, frangible soil. But, that close to touchdown, would the gear not have been extended? Surely better, despite the speed penalty, than a gear-up landing?

Pics from starboard show what what appear to be those bogies swivelled completely around in line with the direction of slide. And the port gear doors are shown still slightly ajar. Look closely and one can pretty much see where the port wing tipped over and dug in just before the aircraft came to a halt; had the aircraft been bouncing along on its belly surely that wing would have hit the ground much sooner and at a much higher speed, with hotter consequences than just some fuel sprayed out to port.

So, was the gear down or not? If so, what difference did it make?

[rpbrown]

I heard from one of our pilots who knows the AC that they had inadvertent thrust reverser deployment at takeoff power and were trying to return - probably not enough power to make the approach heavy weight.

[757manipulator]

I heard from one of our pilots who knows the AC that they had inadvertent thrust reverser deployment at takeoff power and were trying to return - probably not enough power to make the approach heavy weight.

Inadvertent? does this mean or imply they deployed reverse by mistake?...or to clarify the news in the reverser activated without command?

(of course this is asking for clarification on pure speculation)

[RatherBeFlying]

A B-732 in Cranbrook suffered an uncommanded reverser deployment on go-around and lost control in 1978; so did a Lauda Air B-763 in 1991.

We should also note that post-Cranbrook modifications to the reverser interlock system may have played a role in last winter's overrun at MDW.

Against that grim background, it's a brilliant achievement to get an a/c back on the ground without loss of life after an uncommanded reverser deployment:ok:

[KC135777]

I heard from one of our pilots who knows the AC that they had inadvertent thrust reverser deployment at takeoff power and were trying to return - probably not enough power to make the approach heavy weight.
I don't believe it was full t/r deployment...I was told it was a t/r 'unlocked' light...which requires a precautionary shutdown of the engine. A full blown t/r deployment would be emergency shutdown required (T-handle).

can't get slow, back side of the power curve---right?! hmmmm.....

[patrickal]

If you watch this clip it may give you an idea of how readily tail planes can detach during a heavy landing:
http://www.airdisaster.com/download/md80.shtml


If you watch the clip that 212man linked to, you can also see the fuselage buckle just in front of the wing as the nose smacks down. A little faster rate of descent and this MD-80 may have suffered the same fate as the C-5 and broken into 3 pieces.

[212man]

Thanks Patrick,
sadly, small post = small observation but actually there is a lot of useful info in that video. High vertical rates of descent tend to split aircraft in fairly specific areas, and the empenage attachment is one of them. The cockpit bulkhead another.

[archae86]

A colleague forwarded me a Powerpoint file containing nothing save a couple of dozen photos apparently taken at ground level in early morning light, thus fairly soon after the event. From that set, here is a view of the tail section which may help those familiar with the structure see the failure points:
C-5 tail (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/Tail.jpg)
This photo of hand-held spraying appears earlier than the truck foaming shown elsewhere in video. To my eye, the spray appears directed more toward the pylon from which an engine departed than toward the fuel spill, but no hint of fire is apparent.
Hand Spray (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/spray.jpg)
This view of the main portion may clarify the separation point, appears to be just aft the last row of a set of passenger seating.
side_aft (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/side_aft.jpg)
This view of an early portion of the gear tracks may suggest that the C-5 landing gear's oft-discussed but little-used low California Bearing Ratio capability may have been helpful this day.
gear tracks (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/geartracks1.jpg)
This view shows the large caster angle of the main gear at rest, with a deployed slide that must not have been used.
main gear and slide (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/maingear.jpg)

[Earl]

Back in the early 90's a C-5 crashed at Ramstein AB if I remember correctly.
Wasnt the final report due to T/R deployment?

[galaxy flyer]

Earl:

Yes, it was. Many mods to improve reliability and better fault indications since.

GF

[jondc9]

Ah, thrust reversers and deployment (uncommanded) inflight.


I recall that Douglas actually took their planes up, at a critical moment deployed reversers and showed that the plane could be controlled.

I understand (correct me if I am wrong , please) that boeing makes a mathematical calculation on the effect of a reverser and the ability of the plane to be controlled.

Does anyone know what Lockheed does/did for the C5?

It sure does sound like the plane got a little bit behind the power curve. Does anyone know what the flap settings should be at super heavy weight and loss of one or two engines on approach?

Does anyone know (for a fact please) if the C5 can "dump" fuel?


On some of the planes that I have flown if you "lose an engine" during the approach, you reduce your flap setting...how about the C5?


jon

[ironbutt57]

You can make it in a 767 as well if the t/r deploys after liftoff, but it takes full rudder and lots of aileron applied in a "timely" fashion..

[lomapaseo]

Ah, thrust reversers and deployment (uncommanded) inflight.
I recall that Douglas actually took their planes up, at a critical moment deployed reversers and showed that the plane could be controlled.
I understand (correct me if I am wrong , please) that boeing makes a mathematical calculation on the effect of a reverser and the ability of the plane to be controlled.
Does anyone know what Lockheed does/did for the C5?
It sure does sound like the plane got a little bit behind the power curve. Does anyone know what the flap settings should be at super heavy weight and loss of one or two engines on approach?
Does anyone know (for a fact please) if the C5 can "dump" fuel?
On some of the planes that I have flown if you "lose an engine" during the approach, you reduce your flap setting...how about the C5?
jon

A few comments

No where Have I seen anything but unsubstantiated third and 4th hand rumor about uncommanded inflight reverse. I have read 2nd hand rumor about a reverser unlock light, which is still protected from deployment by backup systems.

The present tense use of what Boeing does or does not do relative to protecting against uncommanded deployment is not correct. Lessons have been learned by all manufacturers and regulatory agenciesd and are reflected in today's (present tense ) designs

What Lockheed did (past tense) may have been of interest for the C5 but only if the facts relate it to this accident. Right now, as far as I understand, the report from the crew is that an engine flamed out/was shutdown.

I still have no idea why this was not routinely handled by the crew and if there might have been another system failure.

[galaxy flyer]

Yes, the C-5 can dump fuel. At his fuel load, about 9000# per minute.

Normally, a heavy weight OEI return would be flown at 40% (apx 16 degrees) of flap vice 100% or 40 degrees at normal weights. Vref would be around 168 or a bit more. The plane, at heavy weights can be "underpowered" on a OEI return, but is quite controllable, if the speed is closely monitored and power is applied correctly. Getting slow is likely to be very scary or non-survivable. Could that have happened--maybe, but the crew was highly experienced and knew what the stakes were. Sims are done quarterly, emphasize OEI work. NOT to imply any faults on the crew, we simply do NOT know what happened.

The thrust reverser, as opposed to FAA-certified planes of like vintage, does NOT mechanically pull the throttle to idle in the event of an uncommanded T/R deployment. With a T/R deployed, they would have shutdown the engine and landed on three. IF a T/R deployed, it would have a either a crash OR a routine return on three. GE and Lockheed have done major work on the T/R installation since the RMS accident and it has been pretty reliable since. While a T/R was the cause of that accident, no other plane has been found with an identical fault, seems to be a one-time event.

A two-engine inoperative landing, assuming they got to a safe altitude (DOV about 1000 feet) would have required careful handling, a willingness to apply near T/O power on the operating engines and good planning. It is possible to return heavy on two, but worthy of a DFC on the part of the crew and the handling pilot. Losing two during liftoff would have been a certain disaster, IMHO. Two engine returns, in the sim, are managable at around 730K weight, but in real life, demand skill and a bit of luck. A perfect sim performance is just like a perfect operation on a cadaver. You will be flying with a bootful of rudder AND full scale rudder trim AND T/O power. There is absolutely no room for error.

From many sim sessions and several three-engine landings, these guys did pretty well with what they had. They got real, real close to the runway with an obviously very sick plane and landed it without fatalities. It had to be very, very damaged, beyond a simple engine-out to result in a crash landing. I await the investigation for the real answer, not idle speculation.

There is something missing in the open news as on now. NO news there.

GF

[411A]

From a knowledgeable guy on the scene...

"The C-5 flew into a huge flock of seagulls right after lift off and they lost #2 engine immediately, and were losing power on #1 and #3 engines. Evidently the other engines failed as they were turning final - and at the high gross weight it became a brick. The pilots did a hell of a job just getting it down wings level. Note that in the pictures there are no sliding tracks or marks of any kind in the dirt. The C-5 evidently hit hard, the tail broke off and the rest of the plane bounced high and landed several hundred yards from the tail and stopped right where you see it without sliding."


Seems consistant with other folks on the scene.
Time will tell.

[archae86]

Note that in the pictures there are no sliding tracks or marks of any kind in the dirt. The C-5 evidently hit hard, the tail broke off and the rest of the plane bounced high and landed several hundred yards from the tail and stopped right where you see it without sliding.This picture is one of a set taken at ground level very shortly after the event. In the sequence, it appears to have been taken in the direction away from the main section, from a position a bit beyond the tail section's resting point.
gear tracks (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/geartracks1.jpg)
an AP overhead picture published in the New York Times a couple of days ago appears to show clear tracks documenting a gradual transition to sideways movement over the distance from the tail resting point to the main section as the marks left by the forward section get farther and farther to the right of the main track. I don't have that picture, though this relative close up shows the last portion of the gear marks:
final slide (http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/PeterAStoll/Aircraft/Dover%20C-5/maingear.jpg)
I not trying to pick nits over how much sliding is "no sliding", just to fill in the available information.

[galaxy flyer]

Thanks 411A

That scenario, without any inside knowledge, sounds much more believable than the news and uninformed speculation. Indeed, a very scary situation.

GF

[lomapaseo]

From a knowledgeable guy on the scene...
"The C-5 flew into a huge flock of seagulls right after lift off and they lost #2 engine immediately, and were losing power on #1 and #3 engines. Evidently the other engines failed as they were turning final - and at the high gross weight it became a brick. The pilots did a hell of a job just getting it down wings level. Note that in the pictures there are no sliding tracks or marks of any kind in the dirt. The C-5 evidently hit hard, the tail broke off and the rest of the plane bounced high and landed several hundred yards from the tail and stopped right where you see it without sliding."
Seems consistant with other folks on the scene.
Time will tell.

The pictures I have, show extensive slide out of the fuselage after the initial touchdown where the tail broke off. It is only as the aircraft came to a stop that the nose section appears to have broken and skewed away from the fuselage. Also in the pictures I do not see any evidence of bird strikes to the wing leading edge, nose cowls or fan blades of Pos 1 engine.

Quite surprising though that dead bird carcases are not being reported found on the runway ala Elmendorf. Do you suppose the investigators are being that secretive to withhold such overt common cause evidence from all other aviators, or do you suppose that this is just a rumor?

[ExSimGuy]

dead bird carcases are not being reported found on the runway Surely any birds that managed to find their way into the engines would have been quite well "liquidised"? not much to be found on the runway?

[411A]

>>...or do you suppose that this is just a rumor?<<

Dunno, Lomapaseo, but my info comes straight from the horse's (keyboard) via a first-hand observer of the takeoff, and the very many birds present.
Having only operated into Dover a very few times (L10) it seems that this time of year is prevelent for large flocks of birds.
It would appear that this accident is very similar to the Eastern Air Lines Lockheed Electra accident many years ago at Boston Logan....multiple engine failures disabled by bird injestion.
Really bad news...and 'luck'.:(

[lomapaseo]

Surely any birds that managed to find their way into the engines would have been quite well "liquidised"? not much to be found on the runway?

The engines only represent a small percentage of the frontal area of the aircraft. Any birds striking the gear, leading edge frontal areas including being caught in vortices will be strewn along the runway ala the Elmendorf event.

Sure only one or two birds could be actually involved, but that is something different.

[barit1]

The bird flock may not have been over the runway - "right after liftoff" may have been further along the r/w centerline extended, given the heavy TOGW.

The key factor in bird control is to remove the favored components of the habitat - food, water etc. Evidently Dover isn't too successful here?

[patrickal]

In a conversation with a former C-5 pilot yesterday, he stated that flaps at 40% would normally be wrong for a 1 engine out scenario. But that the accepted procedure for any failure on takeoff which required an immediate return was to maintain takeoff configuration, which has flaps at 40% and gear down. Would love for someone in the know to confirm. That would explain the flap configuration, even for one engine out, and take the "crew error"speculation off the table....at least until the facts come out. Not that we would ever let that get in our way guessing to wrong conclusions. :)

[galaxy flyer]

Well, the engines appear to have all the thrust reverser cowls closed, so I would discount an in-flight T/R. And the wreckage shows clearly flaps symetrical at about 40%

A heavy weight return after a "simple" engine failure in decent weather (existing that day) could be flown at 100% (40 degrees for the civvies), but if in doubt about the health of the other engines, most guys would opt for 40% which happens to be the two-engine approach configuration. They were well above the normal landing weight of 635,850 based on the mission and destination.

Dover has a huge bird problem, but no amount of mitigation is going to entirely solve it. They are right smack dab in the middle of the largest migratory flyway AND right on a large saltwater bay with oodles of wildlife (read: BIRDS) sanctuaries. Flying during migratory season is subject to a number of rules, esp, around dawn and dusk. But, can be waived for mission departures and frequently is, if all the factors are considered.

GF, who wasn't stationed at DOV, but is familiar with the place. Not happily.

[aviator]

Gentlemen,

Consider this information highly unofficial, but I believe it to be reliable. It was obtained from sources close to the situation.

It was not a bird ingestion but a "reverser unlock" on the #2 engine that started this. They lost a C-5 with all aboard a few years back in Germany for the same cause. This crew however shut down the engine before an actual unstow took place. The airplane was well over 700K gross weight with FOB of over 300K. The airplane had the newest version of the C-5 flight deck with big panel glass. Unfortunately, only one of the three pilots was really comfortable with the new equipment and FMS.

The crew decided because of their weight to fly their approach to the longest runway, which unfortunately was only being served that day by a Tacan (fancy VOR for you civilian types) approach. They also decided to fly a full flap approach to keep the approach speed down. This isn't prohibited--just highly discouraged. The recommended flap setting for a three engine approach is Flaps 40. During the approach the crew became worried about not having enough power to fly a full flap approach and selected flaps 40--which they were now too slow for. Here's the point all you glass cockpit guys should sit up and take notice about. The one guy who was familiar with the new glass and FMS was also the one flying the aircraft. He became distracted inputting the new approach speed in the FMS. There was also some confusion about just who was flying the A/C while he had his head down updating the speed. Long story short--the got way slow and into the shaker, and actually stuck the tail into the trees and it departed the aircraft first. The nose pitched down hard and the nose and left wing impacted next snapping off the nose. Several cockpit occupants suffered spinal compression injuries. The guys sitting at the crew table behind the cockpit actually came to a stop with their legs dangling out over the ground.

The miracle of this was the left outboard fuel tank was broken open and none of that fuel managed to find something hot enough to ignite it and the other 300k. Again, a bunch of very lucky people.

So I guess there really is a reason we bitch at guys for hand flying and making their own MCP and FMS inputs.

As for no fire you can thank the onboard nitrogen system that pumps nitrogen into the fuel tanks and removes the O2 (similar to a C-17 only we generate our own).

[galaxy flyer]

I have received an email with the same story, word for word. If true, it will be a bleak day for AF aviation. A real miracle they survived a real crash, as opposed to controlled descent into the ground which had been my working assumption. Only ONE guy familar with the new equipment! Yikes! All possibly "heads down" in the screens.

"If the speed goes away, the Earth will rise up and smite thee" is rule ONE in flight. Stall, Spin, Crash and Burn are four fundamentals.

Still awaiting facts, though

GF

[misd-agin]

A B-747 suffered a near-disaster years ago departing SFO. One problem which many people were unaware of, was that the engine surge created enough vibration to make some of their instruments almost unreadable. The requirement to only complete six simulated takeoffs and landings each 6 months was little help to the flying pilot.
**********************************************************

Raw flying skills, or the lack thereof, was a large factor in this incident.

[misd-agin]

[quote=jondc9]Ah, thrust reversers and deployment (uncommanded) inflight.


It sure does sound like the plane got a little bit behind the power curve. Does anyone know what the flap settings should be at super heavy weight and loss of one or two engines on approach?

**********************************************************

Jon,

You're against speculating. But folks are taking an Air Force Times article, with quotes by a retired C-5 pilot in California, and another retired Colonel, and viola, these guys are 'experts' :confused: so they must know what happened.

If the case is this simple why have an investigation? Have the retired Colonel and the ex C-5 pilot from California write the report.

Shot, send it to me and I'll have my kids type it up. I'll prime them, "nose up too high, slow, then crashed. Remember to use spell check."

45-50 degrees nose up? I wonder if the actual report will have anything near that pitch up attitude?

Give it time, the facts will come out.

[Ignition Override]

On the SFO incident, it appeared to me that the need to only fly six simulated takeoffs and landing each six months is not enough. Often, airline Captains fly most departures and arrivals, which does not allow the FO more than limited experience, except during cruise. It seems ironic to fly across the Pacific numerous times ('split shift' with double crews), yet not be allowed enough 'practice' to get a good feel for manually-flown climbs and descents-and this is with four, normally operating engines, requiring no rudder input, and no vibrations which could create an unreadable EICAS.

How often do 744 (A-330/340) FOs fly a SID departure (mostly by hand-or V1engine failures in the sim.?), and how often do C-5 copilots ("FOs") hand-fly? If this is their first exposure to automation, would it not take quite a number of legs to get fairly familiar with their versions of LNAV and VNAV, or do they ever fly short proficiency legs from their bases, i.e. Dover, Kelly, Memphis or Travis?
Heck, B-757 Captains train in the simulator once a year, specifically for Eagle (EGE) Colorado, in additon to other events, and often practice three V1 engine cuts in a row-the departure, even on one engine, is hand-flown. The engine 5-minute limit on takeoff power is almost reached when the plane clears the mountains. I was there, in the right seat, but only 'flew' into EGE once, at night. It is interesting that, unless procedures have changed, automation is trusted on departure there only if both engines are operating normally. Many foreign pilots on Pprune, around the world, seem to feel that full automation is always superior, no matter what. But does the automation work for the pilots, or are the pilots often trained to be subservient to the "automatics"? Sometimes, I truly wonder.

Does AMC require that any C-5 crew have pilots together, only after one has flown over 100 hours in the same type? This might be, for example, only ten long legs/flights, unless local proficiency is part of the flying budget?:hmm:

[jondc9]

I am not against speculation. sorry for any confusion.

I do prefer that airplane pilots speculate on airplane crashes...train engineers just don't seem to know that much about planes...and vice versa

:-)

j

[misd-agin]

Ignition override, are you an airline pilot for a major carrier? Only Captains fly arrivals an departures? Who are you flying with? The huge majority of pilots in the U.S. get every other leg. Sometimes I'll give a new guy 3 out of the 4 legs. With under 100 hrs in the a/c they can remember every flight in the jet. My 'losing' a leg is peanuts in comparison.

Occasionally for other reasons, sometimes operational, the legs will get dictated. If there are tough operational issues on one particular leg I'm more inclined to break the trip up so that I take that leg, unless I know the FO well. Otherwise it's often a coin flip as to who starts off flying the first leg.

Jumpseated Sat AM. CA asked FO, "what legs you want?" FO - "can I grab the LAS leg? I havn't landed there in years." CA flew the first leg so that the FO could get the leg he wanted.

EGE is not always the standard sim training at my carrier. Sometimes it's part of the standard training package but then they cycle to other scenarios.

I've flown EGE many times. FO's got every other leg into, and out of, a difficult airport.

Went to training with an FO that I'd been flying with all month. Come the sim ride I deliberately didn't brief him prior to our first EGE departure(training scenario that cycle). I ask "Fred, any questions?" "No." "Good, then standard ops." Instructor wasn't too pleased.... "Just kidding, we've been doing this for real all month. This little simulator doesn't scare us after we've been doing it for real all month."

EGE departure? S/E the automation becomes even more critical. With two engines turning and burning above 10,000'(?) it's a hard right turn to the north. With one engine inop you fly the FMC flight path towards the mountain range to the SW. Regardless of altitude, at the 'M' (?)(13 miles) fix you *must* turn, regardless of altitude. You should be above the terrain and have turned earlier, but if it's so bad that you havn't reached a safe altitude the terrain SW of the 13 (?) mile fix is worse than the terrain to the north so turn you must.

The automation is so critical a position update is required not more than 3 or 4 minutes prior to departure. (sorry about the vagueness of my details. Been awhile since I've been there).

Military guys drag C-141's, C-17, and C-5's around their local base doing 'local' training flights all the time. I think it's once a quarter. I can occasionally see them from my yard or at some of the local golf courses. I can't think of anything more boring than taking an large a/c into the sky to practice landings.

The investigation will tell if the crews recent experience, or lack thereof, with the FMC's was an issue.

[barit1]

...

Military guys drag C-141's, C-17, and C-5's around their local base doing 'local' training flights all the time. I think it's once a quarter...

Wasn't that a big contributor in the T-43 (Secy. Brown) Dubrovnic accident?

[212man]

"Wasn't that a big contributor in the T-43 (Secy. Brown) Dubrovnic accident?
Today 19:02"

Wasn't it more to do with having a single ADF for an approach that mandated having two ADFs (for two NDBs) ??

[Golf Charlie Charlie]

"Wasn't that a big contributor in the T-43 (Secy. Brown) Dubrovnic accident?
Today 19:02"
Wasn't it more to do with having a single ADF for an approach that mandated having two ADFs (for two NDBs) ??

I think there was always supposed to be just one NDB but it was improperly set or calibrated or located, or something like that. But as demanding as an NDB approach is in terms of available navaids, the crew were also thought to have exhibited poor planning on the day - before the flight and on letdown/approach. I knew one of the passengers on that flight, sadly.

[Ignition Override]

Misd: My comments might not be accurate, and probably don't apply to many types of widebody trips. Many of our 744 FOs, those who go mostly to Narita and back with the double crew, years ago said that they got very few landings or takeoffs, hence their return to the simulator each six months. FEDEX MD-11 trips might circle the planet-in one direction until they are finished. :ugh:

A buddy who is brand-new on a widebody Airbus (transoceanic only) just told me that he gets few legs after IOE, but after enough back-to-back Atlantic trips, maybe he will get to learn the MCDU after a while (would he get one leg every two weeks?). Talked to him three days ago passing through LIT. During training, recently, one of his ground instructors gave him his MCDU lesson plan for the day, signed him off, and the 'Instructor' disappeared....for the entire 4-hour period. FAA-approved syllabus.
My flying, by choice the last seven years (the Euro. layover are rarely more than 24-27 hours), has been on narrow-bodies except for vacations and jumpseats on Fedex years ago.

Trying not to be exactly like many Captains years ago, I give the FO the spoke legs most of the time, sometimes a guy suggests do 2 and 2, i.e. each pilot averages a spoke landing then a hub.
I don't understand how the widebody trips to NRT and back equate to narrow-body flying, where on bad days we can do 6-7 legs per duty period, but on many, just 4-5 for us senior guys.

[KC135777]

I went a FULL year on the 777 without "a leg". Zero actual flying. Cruise int'l relief a/p flying only. In the sim every 90 days. Good, full sim profiles....made recurrent sim flying a breeze.

[Shore Guy]

Some of these pics linked individually before.....here is a 38 picture slide show

Just amazing no one was killed/seriously injured


http://www.atalink.org/misc/C-5_84059_c_files/frame.htm

[misd-agin]

Landing currency is an issue for long haul crews. Especially augmented crews. But the pilot that flies, CA, FO, or relief pilot, gets to fly SID/cruise/STAR/landing typically.

********************************************************
Re:C-5 crash. Unsigned email floating around from a guy who knows a guy who knows a guy, etc, etc.

Unsigned...

*********************************************************
Eyewitness report that morning (I live in local news area and heard report first hand) said #2 engine on fire. Pictures don't support that however. Pictures do so discoloration on top of left wing behind #2 engine. But it is angled from the pylon/wing interface of the #1 engine. Makes me wonder if it's mud from the #1 engine digging into the dirt.

Other eyewitness report stated 45-50 degrees nose high.

My point is that eyewitnesses, and especially non-professional eyewitnesses, can be very wrong at times.

Give it time, we'll hear the truth eventually.

[misd-agin]

Oops, forgot. We're up to two versions from folks that know a guy, who knows a guy, that knows someone -

Version 1 - hit birds. Multiple engine problems.

Version 2 - T/R unlocked light. Shut engine down.

I vote for version 3. That would be the official version *after* the investigation.

[Stu_Pidazzo]

Iranian sleeper agents.

[Dengue_Dude]

Actually Osama bin Laden was seen earier at Dover clutching what appeared to be a copy of Salman Rushie's Satanic Verses, do you think there was a connection . . . . ?

Cmon guys, some of the theories that people appear completely unable to refrain from should be signed by the Brothers Grimm.

Looks like a really bad day for a few people, but at least they'll be alive to attend the Board of Enquiry.

Perhaps we should appreciate that mums and kids don't care why Dad's alive, they're just glad he is - irrespective of what comes out of this - human or technical.

[misd-agin]

But if you look at the early reports and pictures on the first page, how do you explain the seperation of the wing and the heavy landing with the gear up?

Picture taken from the right side seems to indicate the gear was down. The wing didn't seperate. The tail and forward fuselage section suffered structural failure. The MD-80 landing certification also broke the spine of the a/c. It will be interesting to see what the investigation reveals about the impact load, sink rate, angle, etc of the crash.

Spoke with USAF heavy jet pilot today. 2 sims/qtr, 8 per year. That's much higher than the airline equivalent of 2.7 sims per year(2 sims every 9 months).

[broadreach]

Horst Schmitt,

All the landing gear was down as attested by the photos posted by Shore Guy. Look at the furrows. "Separation of the wing" seems to have gone unnoticed, perhaps you meant separation of the nose section?

[ORAC]

Survivors describe crash of C-5

..."About two or three minutes into the flight, both of us kind of looked at each other saying it didn't sound right -- as far as the engines were concerned -- and there just wasn't enough power," said Paul W. Kath, 59, a retired Navy senior chief petty officer who caught a ride on the plane with his wife, Hannelore...."We just felt that there's something wrong, and shortly after that they made an announcement that they did have mechanical difficulties and they were returning to base," Kath said by telephone Monday from his Honolulu home...

After takeoff, Kath recalled, he felt the engines being throttled back and forth, "going from low to high and back down, but I could never really feel the thrust of the engines." The plane took a gentle turn as the pilot headed back to Dover. "It seemed level to me all the way along the line, that's what amazes me," Kath said. "People on the ground, eyewitnesses, said it came at a very nose-high angle. I didn't notice that."

A short time later, he said, "I heard a really shrill sound, and about the best I can describe it, the closest I've heard before is a high-speed bandsaw cutting through metal." Kath said he believed the sound was the C-5's tail separating from the rest of the aircraft. "And then a few seconds after that it was a very violent hitting of the ground, and then the plane started going side to side, we were being rocked back and forth."

When the plane came to rest, a loadmaster in the troop compartment attempted to open one door without success. A second door opened but an escape chute failed to inflate. "So we went back to the other side, got that door open and the chute did inflate," Kath said. Hannelore Kath was sent down the chute first. Inside the compartment, a loadmaster and another retiree passenger were scrambling out from beneath an emergency life raft that had inflated on its own.

"When we landed at the bottom of the slide, there was a two-inch accumulation of jet fuel, it was spewing out of the wing, as well as gas [vapor]," Kath recalled. "I was told that the gas was nitrogen that's supposed to be deployed when there's a rupture. It was just flowing very heavily, in like a fog."

Other crew members were already at the bottom of the chute, helping passengers escape, Kath said. "They instructed us to run as fast as we could away from the plane," Kath recalled. "I was very fearful that it was going to blow up." Both were splashed with aviation fuel up to their knees.

Outside the plane, Hannelore Kath recalled, she was stunned at the damage. "It really struck home for her that it was much more serious," Kath said. "She just thought it was a hard landing, maybe we had some flat tires, some damage to the landing gear."....

Kath said that he and his wife ran about 1,000 yards to escape the fire threat, and then were taken in by fire and rescue crews.....

[J.O.]

6/13/2006 - SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill (AFPN) -- The results of an investigation into the C-5 Galaxy crash at Dover Air Force Base, Del., on April 3 found that human error was the cause, Air Mobility Command officials released today.

The accident investigation board determined the pilots and flight engineers did not properly configure, maneuver and power the aircraft during approach and landing.

Following a normal takeoff and initial climb, the C-5 aircrew observed a No. 2 engine “Thrust Reverser Not Locked” indication light. They shut down the No. 2 engine as a precaution and returned to Dover AFB. The board determined that during the return to the base:

-- The pilots and flight engineers continued to use the shut-down No. 2 engine’s throttle while leaving the fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle.

-- Both instructor and primary flight engineers failed to brief, and pilots failed to consider and use, a proper flap setting.

-- The pilots’ attempt at a visual approach to runway 32 resulted in the aircraft descending well below a normal glidepath for an instrument-aided approach or the normal visual flight rules pattern altitude.

-- The aircraft commander failed to give a complete approach briefing that would have included non-standard factors, configuration, landing distance and missed approach intentions.

All 17 people on board the C-5 survived the crash, but three crewmembers were seriously injured when the aircraft stalled, hit a utility pole and crashed into a field about a mile short of the runway. The other passengers and crewmembers sustained minor injures and were treated and released from local hospitals.

The aircraft was assigned to the 436th Airlift Wing and was flown by members of the 512th Airlift Wing, a Reserve associate unit at Dover. It was bound for Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and was carrying 105,000 pounds of replenishment supplies for the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

[westhawk]

6/13/2006 - SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill (AFPN) -- The results of an investigation into the C-5 Galaxy crash at Dover Air Force Base, Del., on April 3 found that human error was the cause, Air Mobility Command officials released today.

Wow.

The AF certainly wastes little time in reaching a conclusion as compared to the NTSB! But then, I suppose they don't have to deal with investigatory groups comprised of "interested parties" to quite the same degree. Military justice is known for it's swiftness when compared to the civilian variety, and it seems as though the same might be said of their accident investigations too.

This situation will no doubt trigger a review of cockpit procedures and crew training within the C-5 community. A much more detailed report will be necessary in order to form any valid opinions regarding the root causes of the apparrent procedural lapses implied in this report summary. I hope a full version of the report will become available to the public in the future. Thankfully, nobody was killed and there may be useful lessons to be learned.

Best regards,

Westhawk

[Ignition Override]

Just out of curiosity, was the C-5 the first operational transport aircraft for both pilots? Had either one also trained on the T-44 (C-90 'King Air') or the T-1 Jayhawk ('Beechjet') during UPT (initial training)?

Years ago, all Air Force UPT graduates went from the T-37 and T-38, both centerline-thrust jets, directly into almost any operational Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, whether trainer, tactical, tanker, transport or heavy bomber.
The Navy/Marines/Coast Guard had always split up pilots early into about three different training 'pipelines' (tracks), with other differences in tng. philosophies. I met the sole survivor of the USAF Learjet crash in Alabama, while leaving Base Ops at Andrews back around '89, and although that accident was quite different, both the 2-engine Learjet (with one of the highest thrust/weight ratios of any transport aircraft) and especially a 4-engine C-5 present so many more combinations of possible malfunctions and mis-interpretations, compared to a twin-engine plane with centerline thrust.

Many now train in a somewhat combined Air Force/Navy syllabus, depending upon the pipeline/assignment.
I hope that all of those crewmembers in such an accident are recovering, and not just physically.

[Shore Guy]

Is the full report available? Not having any luck with a Google.

[411A]

Hmmm, it seems all that could have gone wrong...did!

After listening for years to USAF transport flights in the Med, generally on the way to Cairo West, appear to not know where the heck they were, from time to time, and even on a few occasions (more that a few) go steaming down the wrong airway....is it any wonder just why a few are not surprised?

[ORAC]

What might be termed UNFIT, Uncontrolled Flight Into Terrain... :hmm:

[ORAC]

Was this a new glass cockpit C5 or the odd layout with "strip" engine indications Glass cockpit, also had, IIRC, a company rep in the cockpit. The following is post 88, by aviator, a couple of pages back, which would seem to have been a pretty accurate description of the incident....

The airplane had the newest version of the C-5 flight deck with big panel glass. Unfortunately, only one of the three pilots was really comfortable with the new equipment and FMS.

The crew decided because of their weight to fly their approach to the longest runway, which unfortunately was only being served that day by a Tacan (fancy VOR for you civilian types) approach. They also decided to fly a full flap approach to keep the approach speed down. This isn't prohibited--just highly discouraged. The recommended flap setting for a three engine approach is Flaps 40. During the approach the crew became worried about not having enough power to fly a full flap approach and selected flaps 40--which they were now too slow for. Here's the point all you glass cockpit guys should sit up and take notice about. The one guy who was familiar with the new glass and FMS was also the one flying the aircraft. He became distracted inputting the new approach speed in the FMS. There was also some confusion about just who was flying the A/C while he had his head down updating the speed.

[RatherBeFlying]

The usual shutdown drill is to pull the throttle first to verify that you are shutting down the problem engine, but in this case the problem engine is producing thrust; so, you anticipate losing thrust.

Yep, there would be quite the clue when the next engine is shutdown, but it got missed -- perhaps both actions were done together.

There could be an ergonomics issue if the fuel shutoffs are not lined up with the throttle levers -- perhaps a C5 driver could comment.

There is another thread titled FAA to conclude 2 engines are as safe as 3 or 4 -- they may use this accident to add support for that thesis.

[spitfire]

"fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle" - why was the No 3 at idle in the first place? It will be really interesting to read the full report when anyone finds it. Sounds like there's an awful lot to be learnt from this event.

[patrickal]

"fully-operational No. 3 engine in idle" - why was the No 3 at idle in the first place? It will be really interesting to read the full report when anyone finds it. Sounds like there's an awful lot to be learnt from this event.

Spitfire,
I think you have landed on the crux of the problem. I have some close friends who are former C5 jockeys and have had some discussions about this incident with them. At the time of the incident, they both said that flap settings can be confusing during non-standard "times" in a C5. If the crew involved were confused by this, while at the same time pulling the wrong throttle back to idle, they were compounding the situation. And we all know that this is when accidents happen. In this case, it appears that they were flying on the power of two engines but thought they had three. This, combined with selecting proper settings for the flaps made a bad situation much worse. Situational awareness was going away as the incident progressed. I do not want to second guess or criticize those who were flying at the time. As a non-pilot I have no basis for that.

But as a student of team management and crisis management, I do know that strict adherence to proper procedure and good checklist is a must in a situation as this, whether it involves flying or any other critical discipline. The Air Force seems pretty quick to serve up crew error. I hope they will pay as much attention to the quality of the procedures that were used as they are currently written, and to the amount of time and cockpit resource required to implement them. If it takes a minute to figure out what you're reading when you have 45 seconds to act, the results can be predicted.

I'm off my pulpit.

Patrick

[rodthesod]

In this case, it appears that they were flying on the power of two engines but thought they had three.
Patrick

Not wishing to pre-empt the full and final report, which should be interesting and informative, but I seem to be missing something. Does the C-5 have auto-rudder when asymmetric? If not shouldn't the lack of footload with oei have given a clue?

rts

[jondc9]

unless there was some sort of interlock with the reverser, I would think that after an engine was shut down all throttles would be moved as one (assymetric issues aside).

given a choice it is probably better to be too fast than too slow on an approach ( chicago midway aside!).

I would like to hear about fatigue issues, the last time this crew flew together as a crew, the previous aircraft that the crew had flown ( most AF reserve/ANG are airline pilots)

I recall a crash in which the pilot, flying a 737-400, said he confused the rudder "feel" with the C130 he had just flown in the guard.


Back in the old days, airline pilots got lots of time off...they rested and hopefully came to work read to fly...but with hard times at USAIrlines, topped off with miliatry duty, fatigue may have been part of this equation.

[barit1]

I'm inclined to draw a parallel with the Helios 737 accident a few months ago, in that the problem originated well before takeoff.

The indicated fault (t/r unlock light) should be a sim exercise, and OEI approaches (with complications like wx, etc.) should be well covered in the box. If they weren't, why is the MAC commander dispatching his valuable vehicles with half-trained crew? :ugh:

(And speaking as a taxpayer, try this in a Google window:
"Milton Friedman" "Four ways to spend money" ) :sad:

[Halfnut]

http://www.newszap.com/articles/2006/06/13/dm/central_delaware/dsn01.txt

Errors C-5 crash cause; Three gaffes cited

By Drew Volturo, Delaware State News

DOVER - A series of human errors by three pilots and two flight engineers led to the April 3 crash of a C-5B Galaxy cargo aircraft into a field about 1,000 feet south of a Dover Air Force Base runway, Air Force officials announced Tuesday.

The plane, bound for Kuwait by way of Germany, was returning to the base shortly after taking off that morning because the number two engine's "thruster reverser not locked" indication light came on.

"Clearly, there was complacency and clearly a lack of situational awareness," said Col. Raymond G. Torres, president of the 10-member Air Force accident investigation board that reviewed and simulated the crash.

"Our crews are highly trained. This is not normal behavior for our crew members.

"If there was a good part to it, it's that (all) 17 people who were aboard the aircraft survived the crash, survived the accident."

Col. Torres said he "wouldn't quite go that far" in crediting the flight crew with saving the lives of the 13 active and reserve military crew members and four civilians.

The 19-page report identified three primary causes of the crash, the first involving a C-5 in 15 years:

* The pilots and flight engineers failed to use the fully operational number three engine, confusing it with the shut down number two engine;

* Bringing the flaps down 100 percent when C-5 directives prescribe opening them 62.5 or 40 percent;

* Landing on a visual approach at half the normal altitude for the circumstances.

Corrections could have been made to any one of the errors to safely land the aircraft, Col. Torres said.

The board also singled out the aircraft commander and lead pilot, Capt. Brian J. LaFreda, for not fully briefing the other crew members about the planned return to the Dover base.

"Had a full briefing occurred, it is possible the other pilots or flight engineers would have further discussed these factors, leading to a safe return to Dover Air Force Base," Col. Torres said.

All 13 airmen declined to comment on the crash. None of the airmen have flown since the accident.

Col. David H. Wuest, vice wing commander for the Air Force Reserve's 512th Airlift Wing, said the pilots and flight engineers were members of the wing.

He said it is too early to say what, if any, disciplinary action would be taken against the men.

"We will take as long as needed to make the proper decision," Col. Wuest said.

Series of errors

The C-5 took off from the base at 6:21 a.m. April 3 with what Col. Torres characterized as "an experienced crew."

The pilots had a combined 10,000 flight hours in a C-5, while the flight engineers had logged 12,000 hours.

After the "thrust reverser not locked" indication light came on, the crew followed protocol and shut down the number two engine, then decided to return to the base.

Col. Torres noted that flight crews routinely practice flying with three engines, calling it "not unique."

While preparing to land, Capt. LaFreda reduced all engines to idle for descent, Col. Torres said.

"(The pilot) mistakenly moved the (shutdown) number two throttle in concert with engines one and four, but left the (fully operational) number three throttle in idle for the remainder of the flight," said Col. Torres, adding that none of the other pilots or flight engineers recognized the error.

Had three engines been used, even as late as 300 feet above the ground, the plane could have been landed safely, he said.

C-5 directives instruct flight crews to deploy the flaps of heavy aircraft at 40 percent during landing.

The regulation applies to aircraft weighing more than 635,850 pounds. The C-5 weighed about 730,000 pounds when it crashed.

Deploying the flaps fully, Col. Torres said, would create more drag, slowing the aircraft by about 23 mph to 168 mph.

If the flaps had been opened to the prescribed 62.5 or 40 percent settings, the plane still could have landed safely with only two engines, Col. Torres said.

While on approach to land, the C-5 was coming in at about half the altitude necessary for a heavy plane with fully deployed flaps and only two engines, Col. Torres said.

"A normal glidepath would have been approximately 900 feet at three miles, 500 feet at 1.8 miles and 300 feet at one mile," he said.

"The mishap aircraft was 500 feet at three miles, 300 feet at 1.8 miles and 150 feet at one mile."

Before crashing, the flight crew attempted to make an adjustment.

"Just prior to stalling, they took the flaps from full to 40 percent at 147 feet and one mile out," Col. Torres said.

The aircraft entered a stall, he said, and the tail of the plane struck a telephone pole about 3/4-mile short of the runway, then slammed into the ground with 10 times the force of gravity, Col. Torres said.

"That was significant enough to snap off the tail of the airplane," he said.

The nose landing gear then smashed into a field the federal government owns with 30 times the force of gravity, and the plane skidded for several hundred feet, coming to rest about 1,000 feet short of the runway at 6:42 a.m.

The cockpit, which cracked on impact, broke off completely from the plane.

Firefighters and emergency personnel throughout Kent County responded to the scene.

All 17 crew members and passengers were taken to Delaware hospitals, with 11 discharged later that day.

Salvaging the C-5

Dover base maintenance personnel estimate they will be able to reuse about 1,100 parts from the downed 248-foot C-5.

The 13,000-pound crew compartment, already removed from the plane, will be transported to Warner Robins Air Force Base in Georgia to be used as a mock-up and training cockpit.

Other salvageable parts include flight control surfaces.

Base spokeswoman Lt. Col. Cheryl Law said the base plans to decide on a contractor by July to remove the remaining parts of the plane from the field.

She did not know how long it would take to disassemble the plane and remove it.

AMP not involved

The crashed C-5 was among those planes with an upgraded cockpit.

Last year, the Air Force began its Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) to extend the service lives of C-5s, partially at the insistence of some members of Congress, including Delaware's delegation.

The 12 modernized planes are split between the Dover base and Travis Air Force Base in northern California.

The accident investigation board has concluded that the AMP did not play a role in the crash, Col. Torres said.

"I think it is very important that the new avionics package was not involved," said Sen. Thomas R. Carper, D-Del., a retired Naval flight officer.

"We need to provide cost-effective airlift capabilities to support our troops stationed throughout the world. We can move forward with plans to upgrade the cockpits of all 100-plus C-5s."

Rep. Michael N. Castle, R-Del., said Dover Air Force Base could have suffered severely had the crash been caused by a problem with the plane.

"If it had something to do with problems with the new cockpit or with the planes' structure because of age that would have forced the grounding of the fleet, it would have been a serious blow to the base," Rep. Castle said.

Residents unfazed

Several people who live near Dover Air Force Base said April's crash didn't make them feel unsafe.

Kitts Hummock Road resident Sam Wilson heard the crash and was one of the first to reach the scene.

Mr. Wilson, a Vietnam veteran, does the same thing today when he hears the C-5s roar that he always has.

"I stand up and I salute. That plane, the C-5, that's a wonderful plane," Mr. Wilson said, citing its safety record.

Four C-5s have crashed since the cargo fleet went airborne in 1968.

Two of the four accidents - a 1990 crash at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a 1975 crash of a plane loaded with Vietnamese orphans near Saigon - were fatal.

Danny Wilson, a resident of Horsepond Road whose backyard borders the base, also saw the crash as an anomaly.

"It's the first time it's happened in like, ever," he said. "It's got to be the safest thing in the world.

"It doesn't bother me one bit. If it doesn't happen again for another 100 years, I feel pretty safe.

"I don't have any problems with still living here or being around these planes whatsoever."

Staff writers Elizabeth Redden and Joe Rogalsky contributed to this article.

Post comments on this issue at newszapforums.com/forum4

Staff writer Drew Volturo can be reached at 741-8296 or [email protected]

[Halfnut]

http://www.newszap.com/articles/2006/06/14/dm/central_delaware/dsn02.txt

Published: Jun 13, 2006 - 11:02:18 pm EDT

'Cavalier' crew draws blame; Retired generals say familiarity led to complacency

By Jenny Maher, Delaware State News

DOVER - When retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Richard Bundy learned Tuesday about the human errors that caused the April 3 C-5 crash at Dover Air Force Base, all he could do was shake his head in disbelief.

During an afternoon press conference at the base, Col. Raymond Torres, president of the Accident Investigation Board, announced that the crash resulted from several mistakes made by the pilots and flight engineers.

Those mistakes included using an incorrect flap setting, failing to use a fully operational engine and attempting to land at an incorrect altitude.

Mr. Bundy, who flew C-5s for three years and served as commander of Dover Air Force Base's 436th Airlift Wing, found the findings unsettling.

"I'm kind of shocked," he said after reviewing the report. "I don't know how this highly experienced crew could do that."

Col. Torres blamed the errors on complacency and a lack of situational awareness.

He compared it to the way drivers get careless when they're in familiar territory.

"We're all used to driving to our home, condo or apartment, and accidents often occur because we get close to (home)," he said.

"We're used to rounding that corner and not quite stopping at that stop sign. We're used to whatever the neighborhood traffic pattern is."

Retired Brig. Gen. Michael J. Quarnaccio agreed that the aircrew could have been overly confident and complacent because they were flying close to home.

"I hate to say this, but maybe they had a cavalier attitude," he said. "When you're in your own backyard, you're familiar with what you're doing and that could lead to that attitude."

Mr. Quarnaccio is a retired commander of Dover Air Force Base's 512th Airlift Wing with eight years of C-5 piloting experience.

He said it's not only hard to understand how experienced pilots and flight engineers could make such glaring mistakes, but how the other crew members could miss the errors.

"I was shocked that there were so many people in the airplane and nobody caught it," he said.

"How do you fly an airplane with two engines? The whole crew should've been looking at all that stuff."

There were 13 crew members and four passengers aboard the C-5 when it crashed.

The three pilots had more than 10,000 hours of C-5 flight experience, Col. Torres said, and the two flight engineers had more than 12,000 hours of C-5 flight experience.

George Talley, of Felton, a retired C-5 pilot with Dover Air Force Base's 512th Operations Unit, said he wonders if the air crew's mistakes could have been caused by inexperience with new C-5 cockpit instrumentation.

The aircraft was one of a dozen C-5s to recently receive a cockpit instrument modernization.

However, the Accident Investigation Board concluded that the types of errors that led to the crash would not have been impacted by the cockpit changes.

Despite their findings, Mr. Talley remains skeptical.

"That's easy for them to say," he quipped.

Mr. Talley said he knows some of the crew members and is confident in their expertise.

He was disappointed to learn about their mistakes, although he feared that human error had been a factor.

"When I first heard the eyewitness accounts, I thought, 'Uh-oh, it sounds like (the pilots) stalled the airplanes,' and it turned out that is what happened," he said.

"I was hoping I was wrong."

Retired Navy Chief Petty Officer Paul W. Kath, a passenger aboard the ill-fated C-5, was also upset by the Accident Investigation Board's findings.

Until this week, he assumed the crash had been caused by mechanical problems.

However, after learning about the mistakes, he said he felt no resentment toward the crew members.

In fact, he praised them for helping the passengers to safety after the crash, even though there were puddles of fuel surrounding the plane, creating a major fire hazard.

"I'm saddened there was human error," he said during a phone interview from his Hawaii home.

"But I still hold the crew in high esteem. They did a lot of things in a very short and scary time period to get us off the plane."

Post comments on this issue at newszapforums.com/forum4

Staff writer Jenny Maher can be reached at 741-8233 or [email protected]

[atakacs]

He said it's not only hard to understand how experienced pilots and flight engineers could make such glaring mistakes, but how the other crew members could miss the errors
Indeed. This was certainly poor aimanship but there is a whole lot to learn and improve in terms of training, procedures, check lists, etc...

[Airbubba]

Funny how eager the accident board was to discount the glass cockpit transition issue.

Earlier in the year the aircraft commander was named Company Grade Officer of the Year for the 512th Airlift Wing:

http://www.512aw.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123018150

[Earl]

Thank God no one was killed.
Good area to point out in the sim.
First job, fly the aircraft, airspeed, alltitude, configaration etc.
We all learn from the mistakes of others.
Just seems like its constantly reminded to us, not sure what it will take for people to learn from this bad tradegy.
I am really suprised as the F/E third man in the cockpit is the one that usually catches these mistakes/errors before its too late.
Maybe something in the final report will contribute to these errors.

[411A]

I personally believe, Earl, that the 'I know it all, therefore don't confuse me with the facts' US AirForce attitude led, part and parcel to this very unfortunate accident.

One wonders, with the training civil crews receive in just these same sort of scenarios every 6 months, if the outcome would have been FAR different, had civil procedures been used.

USAF, too darn many 'Colonels' in charge.
Why are we not surprised...?:ugh:

[galaxy flyer]

411A:

I usually find your posts interesting and informative (many would disagree), but the problem here wasn't "too damn many Colonels in charge". There were two colonels on the crew, IN THE SEATS! One colonel is an airline pilot, experience and training wasn't the issue. Willingness to correct improper actions by the aircraft commander (a captain who seems to have excercised poor CRM--poor or non-existent briefings, failure to follow procedures for a well-practiced emergency situation in the sim, failure of the crew to question him was an issue). One "colonel", the Operations Group Commander has been relieved of command, by my sources.

The C-5 program includes 8 sims per year, plus quarterly local proficiency rides in the plane. Training requires 2 T/Os, 2 Approaches and 2 Landing per month. Each sim WILL include OEI and two-engine out work, we sweated the sim just like any airline guy does. Annual checks in the box.

[411A]

OK, Galaxy Flier, fair enough, eight sims a year...

BUT, my God, this sort of scenario is more or less standard heavy jet transport procedures, yet these guys screwed it up big time.
Quite frankly, to my way of thinking, the training standards surely could not have been up to snuff, otherwise the outcome would have been far more favorable.

Would you disagree?

OK, I can accept the fact that there are always one or two bad apples that slip through the system, but these folks all 'seemed' to be the best that there was, and yet, the end result was certainly not to be as expected.
I really do believe that the AirForce NEEDS to clamp down really hard, to keep this nonsense from happening again.

Then, we come to the new glass installed.
Could this have been distracting, to the point that there were too many heads down, wondering, "what the hell is it doing now?" all the while no one was keeping an eye out for the number of engines operating, and the altitude/sink rate/flap setting etc, to the point that it all went south?
If so, large changes in training need to be carried out, pronto.

[galaxy flyer]

411A

No disagreement on a standard emergency poorly executed. It was repeatedly covered in the 400+ hours I had the box. Can't speak for Dover's standards.

I would agree that the new FMS may have played a distracting role, but come on--two pilots and two FEs cannot recognize that they are not utilizing one of three engines.

Does set a bad example of airmanship

GF

[Shore Guy]

http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060618/NEWS/60618001/-1/NEWS01

[herkman]

I have a simulation, produced for the USAF on what really happened, but to put it in a nutshell, they did the Manchester thing, and shut down the wrong engine.

They were low on speed and altitude, and decided to reduce the flaps, but was too late. Nose pitched up, and the tail hit the ground and broke off.

I can email you the simulation, just yell out on

[email protected]

If you did not believe in CRM before, you will after seeing this. Three qualified pilots and two engineers, who allsat there and watched the whole sorry mess.

Regards

Col Tigwell

[forget]

'........they did the Manchester thing, and shut down the wrong engine'.

I think you may be referring to the Kegworth accident - British Midland 737. Not Manchester.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster

[JW411]

They did NOT shut the wrong engine down. No.2 had the thrust reverser problem and that is the engine that they shut down.

Look at your simulation again and you will see that Nos. 1, 3 and 4 throttles are forward and all three are producing N1.

Then watch the throttles come back to flight idle.

When the power comes on again it is Nos. 1, 2 and 4 throttles that go forward and that is when the disaster started. You will note that No.3 remains at flight idle.

Therefore the only engines that were responding were Nos. 1 and 4. The No.2 throttle was connected to a dead engine!

Amazingly not one of them noticed that a perfectly good engine (No. 3) had been left at flight idle!

[rodthesod]

When the power comes on again it is Nos. 1, 2 and 4 throttles that go forward and that is when the disaster started. You will note that No.3 remains at flight idle.

Therefore the only engines that were responding were Nos. 1 and 4. The No.2 throttle was connected to a dead engine!

Amazingly not one of them noticed that a perfectly good engine (No. 3) had been left at flight idle!

As I said a month (16 posts) ago, 'Does the C-5 have auto-rudder when asymmetric? If not shouldn't the lack of footload with oei have given a clue?' (i.e. when using the symmetrical thrust of 1 & 4)

[clicker]

Just seen the animation from the MAAF (Mishap Analysis & Animation Faciliity) which as already pointed out shows 1,3,4 throttles advanced then after coming back to flight idle then 1,2,4 are pushed forward.

The tape starts 6 miles from the rwy so a lot of the CVR is missing and you don't hear any briefing but what was noticeable is the number of crew talking againsnt one another. A mention is made of a checkerboard, which I assume is an airspeed warning, which is not picked up until too late. One member of the crew states "I'm concerned" twice but again appears to be far to late to be oof value.

It's no wonder that the last real comment heard was "Oh sh1t"

I can't host it myself but if someone can I'm happy to e-mail that person. Its 6Megs in size.

clicker

[jondc9]

clicker and all

I listened to the CVR, for some reason my player doesn't show any animation.

Every plane with more than one engine that I have ever flown, after a shutdown, you move all the throttles no matter what (exceptions: when needed to use asymetric thrust, or while flying in a situation in which you are only simulating, one is shut down).

I read another article that says the crew only had 4.5 hours of sleep...that is part of the equation.

While I understand a previous brake fire on a heavy landing plane caused one million dollars in damage, worrying about it this time was a false economy.

Training, sleep, a lack of something caused this.

of course, there for the grace of God go I.


I am glad no one was killed.Perhaps "tunnel" vision lead to this.

Any C5 drivers out there? I read an article that says some C5 pilots would have moved all throttles? thoughts?

[clicker]

One thing I'm uncertain about. I noticed that it was showing 90 per cent flaps down then as the crew saw the speed dropping off they brought the flaps up.

Bearing in mind I was ground based in my aviation days, would I be right in guessing that due to the heavy weight of the aircraft this would increase the airspeed quicker and thereby increase any climbout chances?

Thanks for helping a numbskull.

Clicker

[jondc9]

clicker

there are some times when retracting the flaps would help you climb...indeed on the older 737 if you lose an engine while making an approach, going to a reduced flap setting is one of the things you do...

HOWEVER

if you retract flaps and there is no or little margin between your current airspeed (really angle of attack) and STALL, BAM you stall.



in this case, with the information presented, unless the crew could have gotten additional thrust from number 3 engine, it might have been better to land short of the runway NOTstalled, than to try to "stretch" the approach to the runway and STALL.

[Red 69]

I have the data recorder animation replay of this event but can't seem to attach it or paste it in here. Can someone give me a clue and I'll post it if no one has before me?

[411A]

>>...in this case, with the information presented, unless the crew could have gotten additional thrust from number 3 engine, it might have been better to land short of the runway NOTstalled, than to try to "stretch" the approach to the runway and STALL.<<

Hmmm, perhaps a better idea, jondc9, would be for the crew to actually pay attention to what the hell they were doing.

Ok, as I understand it, one engine had been shut down.
So far, so good.
Normally, on a four engine type, the one engine inop landing procedure is the same as all engines operating...at least this was true on the 4-engine (and three engine as well) types that I have flown.
Now, if the crew truly believed that another engine was either failed or not producing adequate thrust, then the two engine procedure should absolutely be used, which requires a reduced flap selection for approach/landing.

This is pretty basic stuff, it seems to me.

I truly believe the USAF had better have a really close look at their training procedures, as apparently the ones they have now (if we consider this accident) simply don't cut the mustard.

[JW411]

411A:

"Now, if the crew truly believed that another engine was either failed or not producing adequate thrust, then the two engine procedure should absolutely be used, which requires a reduced plap selection for approach/landing".

Have you watched and listened to the animation? You don't seem to have grasped what they actually did. I agree that it is difficult to believe that something so basic went wrong.

They (correctly) shut down No. 2 engine.

They flew the pattern using the throttles (correctly) for Nos. 1, 3 and 4 engines and set up for a three-engine approach and landing.

When they got to slowing down all throttles came back to flight idle. When power was required again the GOOD No. 3 engine was left at flight idle and whoever was applying the power pushed forward the Nos. 1, 2 and 4 throttles.

The No. 2 throttle was, of course, connected to a shut-down engine and putting that throttle forward was as much use as putting t*ts on a bull.

It is obvious to me having listened to the CVR that it never at any point occured to any of them that they were now conducting a self-inflicted 2-engined approach so therefore never considered the 2-engine out procedure.

If they had used the perfectly good No. 3 engine they would have been in the bar by now and would have probably picked up at least five medals each!

[GlueBall]

Completely idiotic of the crew to have raised the flaps below Vref speed.

Completely idiotic of the crew not to have instinctively shoved all throttles to their forward stops during the airspeed decay below Vref and during the stick shaker warning and subsequent voice generated "stall" warning.

These crewmembers should be given a dishonorable discharge from the Service for needlessly trashing an airframe and wasting hard earned taxpayers' money. A 3-engine approach is a non-event.

[JW411]

Were they not a Reserve crew and were not some of them at least airline pilots?

[BEagle]

The only possible explanation for such obvious lake of CRM, airmanship, knowing what you were doing, call it what you will is that the crew must all have been half asleep. Were they? If so, why??

I must have flown and assessed hundreds of 2-e inop approaches in aircraft and simulators in my old job. On not one occasion did anyone crash. Why? Good teaching, adequate practice, disciplined professionalism and consummate CRM. I'm not saying that any of this was missing at Dover, but unless the crew were completely fatigued so that they were incapable of performing to even a basic, adequate standard then it's difficult to draw any other conclusion.

"FULL POWER" - did any of the crew say that at any stage of the approach? If not, why not??

[JW411]

You need to listen to it. About the most urgent statement on the tape is one of them saying "I'm starting to get a bit concerned"!

[411A]

Seems to me, JW411, that BEagle has it right, FULL POWER was indeed required.

That it apparently was not applied in a timely manner, would seem to indicate inadequate training...or even worse, NOT PAYING ATTENTION!

Reserve status has positively no bearing on the matter.

EITHER, do it right, or suffer the grief later.
It really is that basic.

[cargo boy]

I have no idea how the thrust levers and systems work on the C5A but on the B744 that I fly, after the problem engine has been positively identified and the shut down drills and QRH have been completed, we then go back to using all four thrust levers. The reason for this is precisely to avoid the kind of mishap we have seen in this incident.

As I mentioned, I have no knowledge of the C5A systems but does it preclude them using ALL thrust levers after shutting an engine down because of say a microswitch setup in the thrust lever quadrant or some other obscure reason? If not, then surely it is a failure of the training system that prevents the crew from using all four thrust levers even if one or two engines have been rendered inoperative. The fact that the crew didn't notice their mistake may be more than just a lack of attention as I'm sure they had no intention of crashing at the time and contributory factors may be ergonomics as well as poor training in technique.

Anybody know where the data recorder animation is available?

[411A]

Lets see, from left to right, 1,2,3,4.
Seems pretty simple to me.
You simply don't NEED to move any throttle that is connected to an engine that has been shutdown.
IF you DO, then I would suspect a difficiency in training.
Considering that this was the USAF in action, it doesn't surprise me in the slightest.
Get a grip guys.
Move the throttle that is connected to an engine that is actually producing thrust.
Good grief...if this can't be properly understood, these folks had NO business WHATSOEVER being in the airplane concerned.
IE, don't send boys to do a mans work.
And, lets face it, these folks in the concerned C-5 were totally out to lunch on this particular day.

[Ignition Override]

How about in a twin-turbofan plane?

After an engine fails or needs to be shutdown, the follow up procedures require use of BOTH throttle levers. This allows a certain lever to help retract ground spoilers when pushed to the go-around position, along with having the go-around (TOGA in some planes) button within reach of your thumb for the flight director, along with the throttles both being forward and they prevent unnecessary gear warnings from distracting you even more, during a go-around etc. And both reverser buckets open, allowing more drag after landing. About four extra reasons to use both throttles.
And the operative engine's lever is always in your hand, when needed, preventing a gigantic mistake, as happened on the C-5.

The C-5 has been around far too many years for their Initial Training syllabus not to have one standard way to operate the throttles and prevent a catstrophe.
Some 4-engine jets must not need these extra features? Would operation of the throttle which had a faulty reverser seriously affect controllability on the ground after the engine is shutdown?

My sympathy goes out to everybody who was on that plane.

Serious fatigue can be very insidious and I can't imagine how any pilot or FE can always be immune to it.

[8driver]

Cargo Boy was entirely correct. I flew for two DC-8 operators prior to flying the B744, which I fly now. In all cases, once a failed engine is secured, you use all the throttles. 411A, there is simply no good reason not to use all four. It would have prevented this accident, and its a lot easier on the hand then trying to fool around with three throttles out of four. I've seen the animation, and its sad to watch. They've even marked the event when the throttles come back up as "throttle swap". Thank God there was no post crash fire and everybody survived.

411A you're painting the US Air Force with a bit of a broad brush. I'm not ex-military, but I've flown with guys from all the branches of the US military as well as guys from all over the world. I've seen good and bad from all backgrounds, and the Air Force guys I've flown with have been just as good as the civilians and those from other nations' Air Forces. So give it a rest, eh?:cool:

[JW411]

411A: FULL POWER

"That it apparently was not applied in a timely manner...."

Full power was never selected even when they were about to hit the ground.

[cargo boy]

Oh for heavens sake! 411A, we all know you were gods gift to aviation and never did any wrong but please, spare us your sanctimonious thoughts on how you could never make any mistakes because you were so perfect. Thankfully you are not in a position to bore some poor beginner in real life with your know-it-all, Pythonesque style of "in my day we did it like..."

We try to learn from errors in this business and we do it without a blame culture that you so obviously need in order to satisfy your pathetic, boring life that you are now, thankfully, not inhabiting the cockpit of a 'modern' airliner. Yes, we all know you can count to four but that doesn't mean that you have to make life more difficult for yourself or your colleague just because you feel the macho-like need to express how clever you are. If it can be simplified by using all thrust levers after the appropriate engine has been shut down then you should train pilots to do it that way, subject to systems differences.

:rolleyes:

[RatherBeFlying]

So they left the throttle for a good engine down.

So how is it that none of the bodies in the cockpit noticed the engine gauges showing power out of only two?

Possible factors include fatigue, display design and group dynamics.

[411A]

>>If it can be simplified by using all thrust levers after the appropriate engine has been shut down then you should train pilots to do it that way, subject to systems differences.<<



Sorry to disagree with you, 8driver, but where I was first trained on four engine types, inop engine throttles were left at the idle position.
This was not just in jets either, 4 engine turboprops and pistons as well.

IF a pilot cannot understand and use the remaining operative engines in a suitable manner, they have no business whatsoever on the FD.
Period.

[GlueBall]

True, true, true...411A. But if the guys are suffering from sensory overload as these sorry Billy Goats apparently were, then if there's the slightest doubt about which engine was or wasn't on vacation, then it wouldn't hurt to shove all the throttles to their forward stops.

[Brain Potter]

I am involved with training on a 4-engined aircraft. We retard the throttle of an engine that has been shut-down and then do not move it. The only reason I can offer is that the approach procedure is very benign and this practice reminds crew that they are on 3 engines. Our procedures have been in use since the 1960s and I don't believe that there has ever been a problem of "throttle swap". However, I can see the validity in moving all 4 levers and will raise the subject with my colleagues.
Returning to this specific case - in my experience the great majority of 3-engine approaches for training take place with an outboard engine "failed" - as it is a more demanding handling exercise. It strikes me that it would be more likely that a tired crew could mix-up the inboard throttles than an outboard/inboard, particularly if their training usually takes place with an outboard retarded. I agree that it seems incredible that the crew did not see their error on the engine instruments - but perhaps this is where the adequacy of their training on a new flight deck should be examined. I remember exactly the same problem being a raised as a factor in the Kegworth 737 crash, where a crew that were used to the analogue -200 layout confused some instrumentation in the glass -300.
Even in the worst cases of crew error there is usually some form of deficiency in training or supervision.

[Techman]

The design of the C-5 cockpit, especially the throttle position, does not strike me as one that invites the FE to get involved too much in what goes on in the front. I don't know what the glass version looks like, but inless the engine instruments are displayed more prominently than in the analogue version, I can see how this could happen.

I agree with 411. Leave the dead engine's throttle in idle. If the remaining engines have to come back to idle, the FE should have a finger on the dead throttle when they are advanced again. Basic stuff really.

[JW411]

The theory of using all four throttles when an engine has been shut down is all well and good if you happen to fly an aircraft where the fuel is switched off using a separate lever (does anyone else remember HP and LP cocks?). However some aircraft have a single lever system where fuel off is achieved by pulling the throttle right back through the FI/GI detents.

On such aircraft using all four throttles would allow fuel to flow again to the engine which has already been shut down and this might not be a smart thing to do. For the last 20 years I have been flying such an aircraft and I have never seen the wrong throttle being left behind.

Why should this crew have been fatigued? It is my understanding that they were setting off from Dover AFB to Frankfurt and at the beginning of a duty?

Mind you, if it was a Reserve crew they might well have been flying their ars*s off doing something else in their day jobs.

[DownIn3Green]

411a is correct...period...

[8driver]

JW411 I don't believe the C-5 has throttles of the type to which you refer, although I may be wrong.

Lets give an example from the B744. The autothrottle disconnect switches are outboard of numbers one and four. How would I easily access those switches with my thumb (as it is designed) if number one was left retarded and I am flying from the left seat, or number four is retarded and I am flying from the right seat? Assholes and elbows.

So far a number of good reasons have been given for using all the throttles when an inoperative engine is secured, not the least of which is that it would have avoided this accident. All I've heard in reply is "you should be good enough to remember which engine is shut down!", and that's not a good enough reason for me! (JW411s example as an exception). I wonder how they do it on the B-52, where they have 8 to deal with? Any BUFF drivers out there?

So anyway 411A, since you've got this down pat, on a B744 why would you leave an inop throttle closed, especially with perfectly good TOGA switches on 2 and 3, and autothrottle disconnect switches on 1 and 4? Any sensible reason will do.:rolleyes:

[411A]

Quite simple, 8driver, you don't use the autothrottle in these situations.
I have seen it time and again in the sim, guys using the autothrottle with engines shut down, in many cases the result is poor performance.

Now, as I don't fly the 744, I wouldn't know about that type, however my experience indicates (in other types) that the handling pilot had damn well better know which engines are operating, and which are not.
Otherwise, he belongs in a ground job.

Automation is fine, up to a point.
However, at some point in time, you have to realise that the handling pilot has to be in the loop, otherwise accidents occur.
Just like this very unfortunate one.
It seems everyone in the C-5 was asleep at the switch.

How very sad.:{

[gtale77]

Just got the Animation from a Reserve C-5 Driver buddy. This aircraft had just recieved a cockpit Mod bringing it up to a Glass Cockpit from previously being a steam guage airplane. Only one guy on the flight deck had ever actually flown the glass cockpit in this aircraft and he was using the EP as an opportunity to impart a little knowledge. Unfortunately, he got bogged down in the systems and forgot the part about flying the airplane. Notice also on the animation, the right inboard engine is not at full power like the outboards.

An unfortunate example of getting your priorities out of order. Just luckly no one was killed.

[brain fade]

On the fleet I'm on (twinjet) it used to be SOP to pick up all (ie 2) thrust levers on S/E missed app. Now SOP is just pick up 'live' TL.
Don't know why tho.:} :rolleyes:

[electricjetjock]

411A :ugh:

In the type of aircraft you flew that might have been the case. However, in modern aircraft the use of autothrottle is possible and safe, you can even do an autoland engine out!! Dang cant you pilots fly your aircraft you will no doubt reply, however if it is approved and available at the airport you are going to land at, you can do an autoland if you want. Hey that might mean I can actually monitor and manage the emergency better.

As for the moving of the dead thrust lever, if your type allows it then fine. When I fly the twin in the sim I don't as it is easy to manage the one thrust lever. When I fly the quad then if it is an outboard then again no real drama. However, when it is 2 or 3 it can be tricky when you are using manual thrust on approach and the dead lever is getting in the way of you moving the other three on approach in gusty conditions. In case you don't understand the thrust levers are close to idle, then it is easier to pick up all four. (Just did it a few weeks ago on my regulatory check - no comment from the checker as it is approved) You might have to do it anyway once you have landed to select reverse, cocking the interlocks. If your short sharp comments are how you used to brief / debrief your "lambs" in the simulator NO wonder they screwed up. You sometimes have to teach!!!:ok:

Perhaps if this poor USAF Colonel, that you seem to hate so much, the USAF not him personally,had collected all four from idle then he would have had the three remaining engines for the approach. Perhaps it is the dinosaur teaching of only using the working engines that helped cause the crash. Remember the swiss cheese model, it is a normally a COMBINATION of factors that cause an accident.:ouch:

Now tell me do you zero the rudder trim on approach engine out or not?:rolleyes:

[misd-agin]

[quote=gtale77]Just got the Animation from a Reserve C-5 Driver buddy.]

Uncle Sam's looking for you. :oh:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------


Somebody has noticed that their video is missing.

Dover Crash Video

There have been multiple emails going around containing the video animation of the C-5 crash at Dover. The animation is being sent as an attachment with the filename(s) of “animationfrom1323.wmv”, “animationfrom1323.wm”, “Dovercrash.wmv”, and possible other names or variants. This file is classified as Privileged. It is not for the general public nor is it intended to be openly available to all members of the DoD. Although the “official use only” identification label was edited from the beginning of this video, it is still a protected source and needs to be treated as such.

The sole purpose of this video is for mishap prevention purposes. It contains an interpretation gathered from Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data. Unauthorized possession of this video is a violation of military and federal laws. One must heed the last few frames of this video which contains the following statement:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THIS CONTAINS PRIVILEGED, LIMITED-USE SAFETY INFORMATION. UNAUTHORIZED USE OR DISCLOSURE CAN SUBJECT YOU TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, CIVIL LIABILITY, OR OTHER ADVERSE ACTIONS. SEE AFI 91-204 FOR RESTRICTIONS.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Unauthorized recipients will delete it and advise the sender to do the same as well as notify all those who were sent the file.Although DFDR and CVR data is releasable, animation created from the derived data is not. Federal ruling has upheld that CVR transcripts may be released; however, actual voice transmissions are not.

Safety Privilege is a critical tool for mishap prevention. It gives a flight safety investigation board (SIB) the ability to expeditiously conclude the findings, causes, and make recommendations for a mishap by granting limited immunity to those involved, thereby avoiding lengthy bureaucracy. This immunity only applies to the SIB’s investigation and their report because their sole purpose is mishap prevention. Without the ability of safety privilege, SIBs may never find the root causes to certain mishaps.

When safety privilege items are compromised, the entire investigation system breaks down and the ability to continue to grant such a right in future flight mishap investigations is jeopardized. It is incumbent for all, aviators or not, to protect this and all privileged material. If safety privilege is not properly and diligently protected, it may not be available in the future.

[safetypee]

I can understand the need for the USAF to publish such a notice in a litigious or blaming society – if only to cover their embarrassment, but this is the technological age and perhaps such leaks should have been expected.
The wording of the final paragraph is unfortunate; how can the disclosure of this information cause the collapse of an investigation. Perhaps this is more an issue of not wishing to embarrass some senior commanders or senators who, based on information in previous posts, appear to lack even the basic understanding of human factors and the nature of human error.
Sensible and well considered discussion in this and other forums, even with speculation, can provide valuable insight to human behaviour and thus identify potential safety improvements from which we may all learn.
I hope that the SIB/MAAF have sufficient integrity to investigate all of the contributing factors to this accident, particularly any organisational or systematic issues, including those which could embarrass the commanders / senators, so that they or those who follow might learn from any mistakes, and for the benefit of civil and military flight safety.

[Reach]

Privilege is there to promote safety. The crew may be less open with their answers if they know everything they say to the SIB is going to end up on the internet. Remember that unlike the airline guys, they don't have a union to protect their interests.

[safetypee]

Reach, true statements - I agree, but no post-accident information is in the animation.

[Ignition Override]

Reach: I'm sure that you realize this, but for the unfamiliar (non-airline types), a union can not save your job if you really screw up or if you to distort or try to hide any facts from the company investigation etc. If you really blunder, a union will not try to stand very close to you.

For the neophytes out there, nothing in this business remains hidden for very long. This world is much smaller than people believe, and faces (along with back-stabbers) are very hard to forget.

[Reach]

Ignition Override

Thanks. I should have added that once the mishap prevention stuff is done, the lawyers get involved and the blame game starts. Its then that the crew pays if they really screwed up.

[Ignition Override]

True, and despite the many problems inside a union, there is no better organization which attempts to preserve the dignity of the profession, nor the prerogative of a Captain to refuse an aircraft. Also for the neophytes and non-airline people: when this happens and no spare aircraft is available, the better airlines allow safety to come before revenue. So far, there is no other group which can replace a union. Many Ppruners imply the need for no union, but they are evading the question, without a better solution. They choose to remain oblivious to the real problems.

Still off of the main topic, but the thousands of laymen who read Pprune might have no idea, and would never imagine how often many companies often attempt to place revenue ahead of safety; very few US (aviation) corporate leaders have any operational aviation background. This alone says quite a bit about their true interests and motivation$. :cool:
Excuse me for the wandering.

[411A]

You are excused, thanks.

Sadly, this does NOT excuse the crew of the respective C-5 in question, as they REALLY did f**k up.
What to do?

Well, one thing is for sure, the USAF had better darn well get their collective house in order...or else.
And the 'or else' is NOT likely to be pleasant.

[alf5071h]

I have reviewed the animation and audio;– not admitting to retaining a copy!
It would be unwise to form conclusions on the cause of this accident from this data as it is only a very small subset of that which would be required to gain a full understanding of the situation both before and at the time of the accident. However, IMHO there are questions which can be raised based on what is present / not present in the animation. The answers to these questions, or just the questions alone could be a catalyst for thought or even initiate valuable safety activities.
The animation starts on base leg, thus what the crew had deduced after the failure, their reactions/actions, and subsequent abnormal/pre-approach briefing is not known. Similarly, there is no data on any associated human factors or organizational issues (fatigue, tiredness, training, safety culture) which could have significant input to understanding the accident.
It is not possible to identify the speakers from the audio except where it might be assumed that the pilot flying (PF) calls for checklist and actions; up to five voices can be identified. Verbatim CVR quotes are avoided as these are normally regarded as personal and private.

Before turning final, ATC gives landing clearance and the PF calls for the landing checklist. Aircraft configuration: 175kts, 38 flap, eng 1/3/4 at 65% (# 2 eng throttle at ‘Idle’, N1 at 15%, assumed to be shut down).
There is additional (extraneous) discussion on anticipating hot brakes and no necessity to aim for a gentle landing – ‘think about clearing the runway/taxi’. An interpretation of the tone of this reminder was of an ‘instructor’ or mentor briefing a student or a senior pilot to a junior – alternatively it could have been a ‘self briefing’.
Who gave this briefing?
Was this an indicator of the crew’s interaction or culture (power/distance, cockpit gradient) or alternatively a positive reminder of issues to consider – good CRM?
Was there any history of the aircraft brake performance at heavy weight that could have influenced the crew – a previous incident?
What specific advice is there for an overweight landing – use restricted flap?
Should the crew have considered / could the aircraft dump fuel?
Was the discussion distracting at this stage of the flight?

The landing checklist items were run smoothly, but quite quickly; there was an item for EGPWS.
Does this suggest that the briefing was for a non normal flap selection requiring EGPWS to be switched off, or is this a C5 specific item (QFE ops, DME/FMS input only)?

Gear was selected down and checked, ‘flaps’ were called from the checklist, the flaps move to 90 deg. Electronic audio call of ‘1000ft to go’
What flap setting is required for an approach with an engine inoperative, when is it set – full flap vice restricted flap for heavy wt – was this a conflicting combination in this situation – engine out and heavy?
What, if any, differences are there between an engine out approach and a normal approach? If different, is there a specific checklist for the differences?
How often do crews practice with an inboard engine failed?

At 900 RA (4.5nm), the throttle positions retard to idle (N1 50%), 165kts for 146 kts (Vapp). As the throttles are advanced, #2 and #3 are interchanged, thus only Eng 1&4 provide thrust, 70% N1 becoming 90% or greater for the remainder of the flight. The animation shows eng 2 at 15% N1 (shutdown) and eng 3 at 30% N1 (idle), landing checklist complete - Rad Alt 700 – thus a relatively short time for all of the above to have occurred.
Who normally manages the throttles during an approach?
What rudder trim is set with an engine inoperative or is there any rudder bias system which will / will not provide any force cue from the rudder as to which engines were in use.
Was the engineer head up? What should he be monitoring his or the crew's instruments?

Discussion:- note the significant differences between aircraft variants in the display format of engine parameters. See US Cockpits (http://uscockpits.com/), search for ‘C5’; review the range of photos pre/post flight deck update including the engineers station; also see the C141 for comparison – a common ‘Lockheed’ flight deck?.
Of particular interest are C5 Old flt deck (http://uscockpits.com/Cargo/C-5A%20Galaxy2.JPG) and New flight deck (http://uscockpits.com/Cargo/C-5B%20Galaxy%20AMP.JPG).
After the lessons learnt by civil regulators / operators from the FAA report ‘The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems’ (www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Institution/FAA/COPY/interfac.pdf), it is surprising that so many potential error paths (design weaknesses) can be identified with in the C5 flight deck upgrade.
The engine displays change from strip indications to dials (N.B. previous transport aircraft, C141 also has strip instruments).
The secondary engine are displays positioned alongside the main dials without vertical correlation (recall the 737 Kegworth accident). Was the C5 engineer’s engine display changed to ‘glass/LCD’ strip or dials?
Two sets of throttle levers; note the asymmetrical arrangement of the outboard levers.
The inability to lock out an inoperative throttle lever – some civil aircraft have latched / combined levers and HP cocks.
Strip airspeed and altitude appear to be on EFIS, but where are the ‘strip’ displays of AOA and Rad Alt located (assuming mechanical strip displays in the old flight deck).
How many simulators have been modified to the new flight deck standard?

The animation continues with discussion on ‘boxes’ and ‘speed’ apparently relating to the PFD, RA 6-500ft, 4-3.5nm: – “check speed now” – 148kts (for 146Vapp). The voice ‘chatter’ again appears to be ‘non normal’. The tone was explanatory, similar to an instructor or more knowledgeable pilot/crewmember explaining an aspect of the aircraft or display. Comment on the (EFIS?) ‘checkerboard’.

Supposition:- this point was probably the last chance of identifying and recovering the situation, thereafter there was insufficient height to dive to maintain speed and then raise the flaps, or speed was always too low to raise flaps. The only plausible recovery would have been the identification of the engine mix-up and applying full power.
RA 480ft, 138kts (Vapp -8), Eng 1&4 N1 95%. A call for ‘flaps 40 – no disregard’.
Was the cancellation in recognition of the low speed?
Was the focus of attention in this situation the drag / speed, but not thrust?
Was power ‘assumed’ to be max on Engs 1, (3) & 4.
What was the crew's understanding of the situation?

There were comments and discussion where the pilots were aware of the increasingly low approach. Background voices (independent discussion amongst other crewmembers?) were querying the flap setting, whether they should advise/question the pilot – they appeared to be unaware of the situation, the planned approach, SOPs, or the precise stage of flight.
At RA 210ft (Vapp –16) there is a movement of Eng 3 throttle lever to 30%, but without any noticeable change in N1.
Who moved the throttle lever, was it done consciously or subconsciously?
Did this indicate that someone had doubts about which engines were being used?

The short remainder of the animation and audio relates to being low and slow, except at 170RA (Vapp -18) there was a call from an indeterminate source to ‘get the flaps up’; flaps retracted to 40. The aircraft encountered stick shake; there was a stall warning before ‘touchdown’.


This review is not to find fault with any crewmember or make judgment on anyone’s responsibilities or actions; it is to seek a better understanding of what appears to be an accident of human error. The narrative above is provided to encourage others to explore the vast range of ‘what ifs’ and why didn’t … , and all those seemingly innocuous issues that should have been taken account of.
For those who have sought a single cause or unwittingly allocated blame in earlier posts, take time to reflect on the vast range of human factors that could have been present in this accident. Take time out for ‘Self Reflection’ – “it could happen to me”.
A detailed understanding of this accident might provide a good example of the difficulties of Threat and Error Management, whether it is conducted by an individual, the crew, operator, management, command, or even at regulatory/senate level.
An accident is a lesson to be learned. Detect and avoid, or alleviate those error provoking situations (foreseeable events) which can be identified beforehand so that whatever human capability remains can be used to counter those unforeseeable diverse events such as those apparent in this accident.

[BEagle]

"For those who have sought a single cause or unwittingly allocated blame in earlier posts, take time to reflect on the vast range of human factors that could have been present in this accident. Take time out for ‘Self Reflection’ – “it could happen to me”. ""

Oh no it b£oody couldn't!! Because the training I received, and later delivered, made damn sure that a higher level of professionalism was invariably displayed than by that bunch in the C-5.

[misd-agin]

At 900 RA (4.5nm), the throttle positions retard to idle (N1 50%), 165kts for 146 kts (Vapp). As the throttles are advanced, #2 and #3 are interchanged, thus only Eng 1&4 provide thrust, 70% N1 becoming 90% or greater for the remainder of the flight. The animation shows eng 2 at 15% N1 (shutdown) and eng 3 at 30% N1 (idle), landing checklist complete - Rad Alt 700 – thus a relatively short time for all of the above to have occurred.

**********************************************************

20 kts above Vapp, roughly 450' below normal glidepath. The answer is idle power to slow the a/c???? How about maintaining the current power setting, decrease descent rate, and trade excess airspeed to attain typical glidepath?

Three pilots, along with two experienced F/E's, and this is the result?

The FDR and CVR explained what happened. Curious as to what might have lead up to the start of the event.

Something not addressed was the short sleep all crewmembers had. Happens at times. But 1 AM brief for a post 6 AM launch? Airline crews show up 1 hr prior to fly anwhere in the world. That the military still operates this way is dumb IMO.

[misd-agin]

But 1 AM brief for a post 6 AM launch? Airline crews show up 1 hr prior to fly anwhere in the world. That the military still operates this way is dumb IMO.[/quote]

Friend flew 727's civilian and military. Civilian showtime was 1 hr prior. Military? 4 hours. "We rebuild the friggin' aircraft in the preflight..."

[alf5071h]

Oh dear! Beag’s your post (20 July) reflects the best and worst of the issues that currently plague our industry.
At best you engage the subject and express the incredulity of this accident; at worst you perhaps exhibit denial, and circum to errors of personal assessment.
Whether you like it or not, you and I are history. I suspect that we had similar, if not identical training. You twirled your 4 jets or provided airborne refreshment while I made fruitless efforts to intercept, and latterly was thankful for a top up every 20mins.

In our time the training was exceptional – in places it still is; I have spent many hours trying to understand what it was, capture those special components which provided discipline, awareness, and judgement for so many situations. Other pilots may not be so fortunate; they are not given the length or quality of our training, nor the opportunity for extensive and meaningful experiences. They, all of us to some degree, now suffer the constraints of modern commercial pressures.

I am sure that even the tiniest bit of self reflection would enable you to identify precursor situations in your career which could have developed into something just as serious as happened with the C5 (good ‘war stories’). What was the ‘special’ item from your training that closed the hole in the ‘Swiss Cheese’; or was it one of your crew that prevented all of the components of an impending accident from coming together. Then an analysis could consider contributions (or lack of) up the chain of command, facilities, personal support, safety culture, etc.

I won’t argue the point that ‘it’ wouldn’t happen to you, but I wouldn’t bet on it, particularly with my own life. You, like many other less experienced pilots, apparently fail to accept the human vulnerability to error. If it is not going to be your error then it will probably be someone else’s.
Alternatively, with acceptance of error what gems can you pass on to others? Instead of stating what you see as obvious, “Because the training I received, and later delivered, made damn sure that a higher level of professionalism was invariably displayed than by that bunch in the C-5”, please pass on this ‘wisdom’ and help us all to move towards that higher level of professionalism which aviation requires.

You will recall that:-
We do not plan or decide to commit errors.
Errors do not cause accidents - it is our failure to identify them with time to act.
Errors are only determined after an event, they are ‘labels’ - symptoms of the situation.
Errors are there to be used, to be learnt from; they are an essential ingredient of the professionalism that we all seek.

For those looking for something more positive from this discussion, try some Reason ( http://qhc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/11/1/40); CRM with a photocopier.

[ORAC]

I seem to recall there have been occasions where the RAF CRM has not been exemplary, Victor XL191 at Hamilton in 1986 comes to mind. Thankfully they also all walked away from that one..

[GlueBall]

:eek: Brigadier General misd-agin: "...FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Unauthorized recipients will delete it and advise the sender to do the same as well as notify all those who were sent the file...."

...Is that an order, Sir? :ooh:

[Ignition Override]

Lots of repetition, even in the simulator, can be the first trap waiting to grab you. For example, an engine failure is expected and almost always happens at or just after V1. Why not skip the PRM approach training and (as briefed) set up an engine flame-out while dragging in the fog at Localizer minimums {about 400' agl} with gear down and flaps 40 at a very low energy state such as Vref+5?
For what it is worth, I've never been a superior pilot, nor flown a widebody jet. But partial automation on the B-757 could be a concern, with both pilots fairly new on the plane.

But does reliance on having at least two or three other experienced flightcrewmembers ('having a staff') also create a trap, even with some automation, or is automation the main focus when it is a novelty? If an aircraft can be safely flown with a basic autopilot and "heading select", especially when returning to a nearby airport, then why try to use all of the automation-especially when many crewmembers have little or no line exposure to it?
A 'classic' L-1011 with a highly-experienced crew crashed many years ago into the nighttime Florida Everglades due to the focus of all three pilots (one was FE) on a burned our lightbulb. Reportedly, nobody simply flew the plane. Did the active role as "handling pilot" seem too simple and was always assumed, at least back then? A bump against the control yoke somehow initiated a subtle, gradual descent over dark swamps-from only about 1500 or 2,000' !
The crash of the United DC-8 in Portland OR, due to overemphasis on a fairly minor problem, and no seriously stated, very clear warnings by the FE, or awareness by the Captain, led to an emergency fuel situation and a crash.
This might not pertain to the C-5 disaster, but the United crash inspired United Flight Ops to create the concepts of CRM.

The horrible nightmare at Tenerife was also excellent motivation for teaching Captains to listen to crewmembers' concerns. A television episode about the influence of human factors on the Tenerife tragedy tonight described a phenomenon whereby a pilot who instructs in a simulator and does limited line flying can have a different "mission-oriented" or "mission reset" thought process compared to those who only fly the real airplane. The Captain who was the flying pilot felt pressure to depart, and yielded to the temptation, being quite aware of rigid limitations on the crew duty period.

Did the C-5 Wing require at least one pilot to have about 100 hours (or 5 legs etc) in the glass cockp1t before being paired with a pilot who had no training on the FMC/MCP etc?
Most of these reviews of some accidents are for the benefit of the younger pilots who might not be aware of them. Most, if not all of those crewmembers were highly-experienced, often 16-20 years or more. And nowadays, the younger generation relies on the automation or other technology to save them from using (developing?) flying skills :ouch: . This mindset was apparent on the first/last cruise of the Titanic.

[HotDog]

Accident report blames crew for C5 crash at Delaware on April 3, 2006.

http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060614/NEWS/60614001/-1/NEWS01

[Soundbarviolatr]

Unfortunately sad but true. Throttle swap resulted in having 2 effective engines (1 was shutdown and the other was at idle from the swap) and flaps were extended beyond what SOP called for 3 or less engines operative. :mad:

CRM: ALL CREW MEMBERS (INCLUDING Nav, FEs, LMs, Boom, FAs) need to speak up when something bothers you!

[EGGW]

Bunch of muppets. If you here and see the replay that was put together by the Accident people in the USAF, the crew made some mad errors. Someone did say at one point on the final approach that he was concerned, but it went no further than that. Luckily no one was hurt!

EGGW

[vapilot2004]

I was unaware of the cockpit upgrades until now. Perhaps a review of training and procedures wouldn't hurt. This is a good example of both the importance of proper CRM and the benefits of fuel inerting.

[XL5]

The throttle swap from the pilot's perspective isn't too astonishing, less understandable is why the flight engineer/support pilot didn't question the lack of thrust on both inboards.
It's also a bit muddled from the human factor view point. The PIC was qualified as and acting in the role of instructor yet made the inappropriate selection of the all engines operating flap setting for the approach.
It took both throttle and flap mix-ups to run out of speed short of the runway.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NqbT7ukUiI (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NqbT7ukUiI)

[Two's in]

Classic hindsight of course, and I apologize somewhat in advance for that, but some very basic CRM errors all the way down; there are no challenge/response identification of critical switches/controls before adjustments or changes, i.e. flaps and throttle settings, no sign of positive captaincy, no indication by anyone on the flight deck that their energy management was rapidly failing before they even turned final, with the airspeed bleeding off all the way from an already low value without any apparent recognition.

If this had been at the end of a 12 hour flight, maybe it would be more understandable; but it was minutes after take-off, supposedly while managing an in-flight emergency shutdown near to the ground, so it's hard to see a situation where your full attention would have ever been in more demand.

The BOI result will be an interesting scenario for those who naturally equate experience to infallibility - these were all individually very experienced airman, it just seems that they never ever became a crew.

[Ignition Override]

XL-5: A question about unclear crew concept and another about a system improvement.
Were some of the crew feeling a bit subordinate and intimidated, either because of their lack of familiarity with the 'glass cockp1t' and/or the fact that BOTH the Flying Pilot and one of the Flight Engineers were Instructors? :confused: 'Glass' can easily intimidate pilots who have 8,000 hours experience in jets with TOW of 100,000#. The C-5 accident seems to be a case of very complex and unclear CRM, in which the number of very experienced crewmembers, with Instructors at each position, lulled the entire crew into a rushed return to the active runway? In a turboprop plane with a complex propellor problem (i.e. E-2, C-130 or P-3) where feathering was not possible, or if there had been some smoke in the cargo compartment or cockp1t, this would have been more of a priority. Was there a third pilot observing from a bunk or jumpseat?

Did C-5 squadrons have different methods of using or not using a throttle which was for a failed or shutdown engine? On some two engine jets, the flying pilot continues to use BOTH, because of advantages such as thrust- reverser, go-around buttons and the ability to stow spoilers (handle) during a 'balked' landing: last second 'go-around' (bounce around).
Years ago, the C-5 had no such warning for a "Reverser Unlock", "Rev Thrust" light or whatever. A C-5 crashed during takeoff at Ramstein because of this.

Did this system improvement also lull the crew into some complacency?

[Soundbarviolatr]

Funny how this accident is disected so much out of proportion. The a/c does not hold altitude with 2 engines at heavy weights. It WILL sink. In addition, the flaps were extended and stayed beyond 40 % which made obviously made matters worse.

The situation could have been salvaged if the Jump and the FEs noticed AND voiced the throttle swap situation -- especially when the outboard engines were redlining and the good inboard was at idle. The FEs could've also bought some time and maybe even afford a succesful driftdown to landing (even with the throttle swap) if they only VOICED their observation about the non-standard flap position to the Pilots instead of keeping the concern on hot mic.

There's also more to this, but the bulk of the cause is pretty much what you guys have already seen.

[HotDog]

Difficult to understand how an engine shut down developed into this disaster. In my days , engine out drills whether for real or simulated, required the utmost monitoring of engine thrust on remaining engines, flap settings, speeds and landing procedure breefings, thrust reverse callouts of inboards or outboards only on landing, depending on which engine was out. I was not in the military.:confused:

[411A]

I wasn't in the military either, HotDog, and my experience was the same as yours...close gauge monitoring was mandatory.

Perhaps these sad folks were looking at the new FMS fitted and wondering....what's it doing now?:}

There can be absolutely positively NO reasonable excuse for this very unfortunate accident to have happened.
The crew members concerned should me marched out of the AirForce, pronto.

[Soundbarviolatr]

I started responding to this thread in a very detailed manner that would've probably explained the actions of the Crew. I decided to edit out these parts however for obvious reasons.

All your concerns about SOPs were addressed at one point or another. The video that was illegally released only covered the last moments of the flight so you did not hear checklists, performance/data or emergency return briefings/intentions completed. The a/c can fly on 3 engines all day at max gw. @ 769,000/840,000 lbs (and soon to be 1 million lbs), the C5 is a big airplane and requires the epitome of CRM between Crew Members, particularly the Pilots and FEs. These individuals go through intense training for 2 years before they are released as primary Crew Members. Accidents however, do happen and is usually the cause of a myriad of things gone wrong. And yes...even in the military.

[rodthesod]

I started responding to this thread in a very detailed manner that would've probably explained the actions of the Crew. I decided to edit out these parts however for obvious reasons.

What utter nonsense! If you are in a position to give details that would in some way explain the actions of this crew of comedians more favourably than all the evidence so far, then surely this would be in their interest as well as anyone else's.

All your concerns about SOPs were addressed at one point or another. The video that was illegally released only covered the last moments of the flight so you did not hear checklists, performance/data or emergency return briefings/intentions completed.

It is a sad indictment of the military that they appeared to try to 'bury' the evidence from an understandably curious public and a very confused professional pilot community. The illegal but highly informative video covers far more than the last moments of the flight as you say. I can't think of a single current civilian professional pilot, trained in the last 20 years or so, who would not agree that this accident was the result of a complete 'shambles' on the flight deck. There was virtually no worthwhile Crew Cooperation and certainly no MANAGEMENT of resourses. If this crew, as you seem to suggest, followed SOP's, then those SOP's require a long hard inspection and review if the Airforce wish to avoid dropping a million pound brick on the unsuspecting American public who seem to have amazing, if ill-founded, faith in their military.

[Soundbarviolatr]

What utter nonsense! If you are in a position to give details that would in some way explain the actions of this crew of comedians more favourably than all the evidence so far, then surely this would be in their interest as well as anyone else's.

It is a sad indictment of the military that they appeared to try to 'bury' the evidence from an understandably curious public and a very confused professional pilot community.

The illegal but highly informative video covers far more than the last moments of the flight as you say.

I can't think of a single current civilian professional pilot, trained in the last 20 years or so, who would not agree that this accident was the result of a complete 'shambles' on the flight deck. There was virtually no worthwhile Crew Cooperation and certainly no MANAGEMENT of resourses. If this crew, as you seem to suggest, followed SOP's, then those SOP's require a long hard inspection and review if the Airforce wish to avoid dropping a million pound brick on the unsuspecting American public who seem to have amazing, if ill-founded, faith in their military.




There is no reason for me to repeat the facts already stated by previous entries. The so called "buried evidence" were in plain view in the newspapers and TV even before this video was leaked to the public. Coupled with the information provided on this board, there is more than enough information to come up with the conclusions that everyone else has.

The animation was not illegal in itself, but illegally released and it only picks up close to where the CRM failures begins. It did not show all the associated actions in preparation for the emergency landing, hence my implication that it was incomplete in trying to rate the overall performance of the servicemen that you call "Crew of Comedians".

The only reason why I even mentioned SOP is because there was a comment on why the audio did not mention checklists, performance or breifings, which were all done during the Approach and Emergency Engine Shutdown checklists, BEFORE the start of the animation.

It is no secret and every single pilot reading this thread can see and hear that there was a myriad of failures in CRM/Crew Coordination (NOT "Cooperation" as you stated because that implies an unwillingness to act upon). The situation was further accented by the lack of SA (flap extended beyond 40%), which I'm surprised you did not mention being that you are such a professional pilot.

I am not defending the Crew's action. I gain nothing by contributing to this thread. I gave my 2 cents in hopes that a bit of insight may be enough light to explain what happened to those that welcome it.

Despite the A/C's great track record there obviously is room for improvement just like everything else in life. BTW, this is a Professional Pilot forum not a political opportunity, so keep the propaganda in your shorts Bub.

[barit1]

Withholding the simulation video, prepared at taxpayer expense, from the taxpayer is ample evidence of a legal / political mindset that prevades not only the military, but virtually all of our "open and transparent" government. It is vital in a free society that we know how our tax megadollars are used and misused.

As the sign over my boss's desk once read:
"No one is totally useless; he can always serve as a bad example!"

Thank you very much.
:)

[Soundbarviolatr]

Withholding the simulation video, prepared at taxpayer expense, from the taxpayer is ample evidence of a legal / political mindset that prevades not only the military, but virtually all of our "open and transparent" government. It is vital in a free society that we know how our tax megadollars are used and misused.

Thank you very much.
:)


Sorry my friend, that is beyond my pay grade.

[barit1]

Sorry my friend, that is beyond my pay grade.

Right. :sad:

[Two's in]

It did not show all the associated actions in preparation for the emergency landing, hence my implication that it was incomplete in trying to rate the overall performance of the servicemen that you call "Crew of Comedians".

SB

I'm afraid that all the best actions in the world, completed impeccably and IAW the latest SOP's, are largely meaningless if you don't make it to the runway. Performance is a function of outcome, not intent, ask any commercial pilot.

[HotDog]

I'm afraid that all the best actions in the world, completed impeccably and IAW the latest SOP's, are largely meaningless if you don't make it to the runway. Performance is a function of outcome, not intent, ask any commercial pilot.

They would have made it to the runway if only they used the available thrust from three engines instead of two.:(

[Soundbarviolatr]

SB

I'm afraid that all the best actions in the world, completed impeccably and IAW the latest SOP's, are largely meaningless if you don't make it to the runway. Performance is a function of outcome, not intent, ask any commercial pilot.



And I agree with you completely. Once again, I merely wish to convey that these people did in fact accomplish the actions that were not shown/heard in the animation IAW with SOPs as an answer to questions posted on the board. Again, I am not defending the Crew, there is a C-5 in pieces and it is very evident that they screwed up and jezaz how many times are we gonna beat a dead horse? We all know when, where and what, especially for those of us who fly the airframe.

BTW, I believe the mishap Crew were Reservists and most of us that fly in the Reserves and the Guard are also Airline/Cargo/Charter/Corporate/Test pilots when we are not serving our country as weekend warriors, so lets not even go there.

And I think I'm done here. Thanks again, I hope some of you guys appreciated my input.

[barit1]

Of course there were crew performance issues. But the accident investigation should go back another three or four layers to determine what in their staffing selection, training, experience, etc. allowed the crew performance to deteriorate so dramatically. I have to assume they didn't want to crash.

In this respect the C-5 accident was remarkably similar to last month's KLEX Comair accident.

[411A]

Lets cut to the chase here, and call this accident exactly what it is....very poor crew performance, by forgeting the one rather basic premise of flying aeroplanes, and that is....actually paying attention to details, with a little thought put into using the correct engines, and aircraft configuration.
I have seen better performance from brand new First Officers in the sim (and aeroplane) on their first jet.
Oh gosh, how can this possibly be?
Because, the screws were turned during training, and if they didn't measure up, they were out on their ear, pronto.
Once on line,they knew darn well that if they did not adhere to standard operating procedures, it was back to the sim, removed from line flying.
There was none of this warm and fuzzy CRM psudo-nonsense, where everyone repeats the standard classroom BS, and then apparently can't read the engine gauges, to actually SEE which engine(s) are operating.

Back to basics folks...THAT is the only thing that will keep you and your aeroplane in one piece...and alive.

This accident proves it...in spades.

[skiesfull]

411A
You should post on the SAA - MPL topic......I have a feeling I would agree with your point of view on that subject!!

[Two's in]

Somewhat surprised to see the hull still parked ignominiously in the grass off the end of the runway today. Is this a bit like the "don't drink and drive" wreck left in front of the police station every Christmas?

[Ignition Override]

Two's In:
You explain in a nutshell what might have been the scenario with the MD-11 which crashed near Halifax, Nova Scotia. They might not have survived even if they had flown quickly and straight to the nearest suitable runway.

I'm not judging the crew's actions, but from the perspective of their airline's training/checking philosophy and policies, was the highest priority simply completion of the 'smoke in cabin', 'smoke in c0ckpit' procedures, or a safe landing and evacuation? How can both be equal priorities? How many types of jets etc still have the Kapton wiring etc?

[vapilot2004]

Somewhat surprised to see the hull still parked ignominiously in the grass off the end of the runway today. Is this a bit like the "don't drink and drive" wreck left in front of the police station every Christmas?

Ramstien and the C-5 comes to mind here. Only 4 people survived that one.
Perhaps the military delays site cleanup as a lesson for all to see on how things should not end up as you suggest, Two's in.

On the other hand the airlines are highly motivated to get the debris out of sight for obvious reasons as soon as the site is released.

[patrickal]

Ramstien and the C-5 comes to mind here. Only 4 people survived that one.
Perhaps the military delays site cleanup as a lesson for all to see on how things should not end up as you suggest, Two's in.
On the other hand the airlines are highly motivated to get the debris out of sight for obvious reasons as soon as the site is released.

I think you all overestimate the USAF "lesson teaching" desires. I will be very willing to bet it all comes down to funding, and which department has money in the budget this year to finish cleaning it up and hauling it out. There may also be environmental issues with all of the fuel that was spilled. In any case, I am sure the reason it is still there has everything to do with some form of bureaucracy and little if anything to do with teaching a lesson.

Patrick

[vapilot2004]

Other than the need to cover damaged areas for security/decency reasons, our military (all branches) rarely tries to hide the physical results of an accident. There is that culture of 'you screwed this up and everyone needs to see the results' when it comes to asset losses and damage.

What could be a better explanation? Bureaucracy! Makes perfect sense, Patrick. :ok:

[barit1]

... There is that culture of 'you screwed this up and everyone needs to see the results' ...

...and yet the video simulation based on FDR & CVR hard data is off limits? :=

At least they should be cannibalizing the cockpit structure to build a procedures trainer. It's just possible MAC could use one. :rolleyes:

[West Coast]

"I will be very willing to bet it all comes down to funding"

I was in the Marines so, I can't speak for the USAF but I don't think that's the problem. Clean up for crashes and other unanticipated events are usually included in current budgets at differing levels under discretionary spending or some other similar funding plan. [

I remember once dealing with a large unexpected funding issue for the Marines back in the 90's after the first Gulf War. Large, and I mean large parking lots were set up at a number of Marine Corps western area bases for deploying Marines, sailors and dependents either deploying or going to momma while daddy deployed. Upon return it was found that a majority of the cars had major damage from rabbits eating the insulation. In the course of about a month the Marine Corps dispensed millions to fix the cars. No additional funding was asked for as the funds came from a stunned G-4 operations funding officer.

[vapilot2004]

...and yet the video simulation based on FDR & CVR hard data is off limits? :=


Only to low clearance personnel and civilians.

At least they should be cannibalizing the cockpit structure to build a procedures trainer. It's just possible MAC could use one. :rolleyes:

Agreed!

[xaf2fe]

At least they should be cannibalizing the cockpit structure to build a procedures trainer. It's just possible MAC could use one. :rolleyes:
They did, but not for a procedures trainer, they did it for a software upgrade lab.
6/6/2006 - ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, Ga. �(AFPN) -- Now that the C-141 Starlifter has officially retired after 43 years of providing strategic global airlift, those who cared for it are left behind to find a new purpose. The 402nd Maintenance Group software support team is filling the void with a new workload -- the C-5 Galaxy.
The C-141 had already undergone extensive avionics upgrades in the 1990s which had newer cockpits than the C-5. In order to bring the C-5 up to speed, the team will receive the cockpit of the C-5 that crashed near Dover Air Force Base, Del

[ABX]

Disclaimer: I have never flown anything bigger than a C172. I start ab initio training for ATPL in January '07, but, I do like to read & learn here at PPRuNe.

A question you might like to look at for me. Have a look at the aerial photo of the C5 at the end of the runway and notice the huge skid marks showing the path of the plane/debris and tell me: Does it look like the plane was significantly to the left of the rwy centerline at impact?

http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060614/NEWS/60614001/-1/NEWS01

If you click the thumb it will open in a larger frame for better viewing.

As I said, I'm only a mug, but it looks the way I described. Any comments, would be most interested in your thoughts.

Cheers,

ABX

Ps. This thread has been a good read and an education. Thanks.