Jackonicko
22nd Mar 2006, 15:33
Will it be ready on time?
GR7/7A/9/9A will struggle to get to the planned OSD of 2017.
Will it be 'all that'?
Everest Riccioni has already cast doubt on the value of stealth and the practical limits of super cruise, while the GAO seem to be slinging huge rocks at JSF, and urging major delays.
Wouldn't we be better off putting Typhoon N/Rafale M or F/A-18E/F on the carriers, or just buying hundreds of Gripens......?
The US GAO say:
While relatively early in its acquisition program, the JSF program has experienced design and weight problems that, if not solved, will affect aircraft performance. These problems have led to increased development and procurement costs and schedule delays so far. In addition, the program's customers are still not sure how many aircraft they will need. The combination of cost overruns and quantity reductions has already diluted DOD's buying power and made the original JSF business case unexecutable. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use more time right now to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case for its substantial remaining investments. The JSF's current acquisition strategy does not embrace evolutionary, knowledge-based techniques intended to reduce risks. Key decisions, like the planned 2007 production decision, are expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. Time taken now to gain knowledge will avoid placing sizable investments in production capabilities at risk to expensive changes.
Unlike the F/A-22 program, which is near the end of development, the JSF program is approaching key investment decisions that will greatly influence the efficiency of the remaining funding-over 90 percent of the $245 billion estimated total program costs-and determine the risk DOD is willing to accept. DOD has not been able to deliver on its initial promise, and the sizable investment greatly raises the stakes to meet future promises. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use more time to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case and moves forward. Any new business case must be accompanied by an acquisition strategy that adopts an evolutionary approach to product development-one that enables knowledge-based decisions to maximize the return on remaining dollars-as dictated by best practices.
Increased program costs, delayed schedules, and reduced quantities have diluted DOD's buying power and made the original JSF business case unexecutable. Program instability at this time makes the development of a new and viable business case difficult to prepare. The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF has increased by more than 80 percent. Development costs were originally estimated at roughly $25 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, these costs increased almost $10 billion, and by 2004, costs increased an additional $10 billion, pushing total development cost estimates to nearly $45 billion. Current estimates for the program acquisition unit cost are about $100 million, a 23 percent increase since 2001 (That's £58m - already perilously close to the programme cost of Typhoon - and much more than the price of additional Typhoons would be). Ongoing OSD cost reviews could result in further increases to the estimated program cost. At the same time, procurement quantities have been reduced by 535 aircraft and the delivery of operational aircraft has been delayed. Figure 2 shows how costs, quantities, and schedules have changed since first estimates based on data as of January 2005
Ongoing program uncertainties-including uncertainties about the aircraft's design and procurement quantities-make it difficult to understand what capabilities can be delivered with future investments. For example, DOD has been working over the past year to restructure the JSF program to accommodate changes in the aircraft's design; until this restructuring is completed, it will be difficult to accurately estimate program costs. The need for design changes largely resulted from the increased weight of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant and the impact it was having on key performance parameters. The other JSF variants' designs were affected as well. The program plans to have a more comprehensive cost estimate in the spring of 2005. However, a detailed assessment has not been conducted to determine the impact that the restructured program will have on meeting performance specifications.
Until the detailed design efforts are complete-after the critical design review in February 2006-the program will have difficulty assessing the impact of the design changes on performance. While the program office anticipates that recent design changes will allow the aircraft to meet key performance parameters, it will not know with certainty if the weight problems have been resolved until after the plane is manufactured and weighed in mid-2007.
Program officials are also examining ways to reduce program requirements while keeping cost and schedules constant. Design and software teams have found greater complexity and less efficiency as they develop the 17 million lines of software needed for the system. Program analysis indicated that some aircraft capabilities will have to be deferred to stay within cost and schedule constraints. As a result, the program office is working with the warfighters to determine what capabilities could be deferred to later in the development program or to follow-on development efforts while still meeting the warfighter's basic needs. It may be some time before DOD knows when and what capabilities it will be able to deliver. The content and schedule of the planned 7-year, 10,000- hour flight test program is also being examined. According to the program office, the test program was already considered aggressive, and recent program changes have only increased the risks of completing it on time. Finally, uncertainty about the number and mix of variants the services plan to purchase will also affect JSF's acquisition plans. While the Air Force has announced its intention to acquire the short takeoff and vertical- landing variant, it has yet to announce when or how many it expects to buy or how this purchase will affect the quantity of the conventional takeoff and landing variant it plans to buy. The number and mix of JSF variants that the Navy and Marine Corps intend to purchase-and their related procurement costs-also remain undetermined. Foreign partners have expressed intent to buy about 700 aircraft between 2012 and 2015, but no formal agreements have been signed at this time. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review-an examination of U.S. defense needs- could also affect the procurement quantities and schedule. In developing a reliable business case, knowing the quantities to be purchased is equally as important as other elements. Without knowing types and quantities the program manager cannot accurately estimate costs or plan for production.
In recent years, DOD has revised its weapons acquisition policy to support an evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy based on best practices-key to executing a future business case and making more informed business decisions.18 With an evolutionary acquisition approach, new products are developed in increments based on available resources. Design elements that are not currently achievable are planned for and managed as separate acquisitions in future generations of the product with separate milestones, costs, and schedules. While JSF's acquisition strategy calls for initially delivering a small number of aircraft with limited capabilities, the program has committed to deliver the full capability by the end of system development and demonstration in 2013 within an established cost and schedule for a single increment, contrary to an evolutionary approach. In addition, JSF's planned approach will not capture adequate knowledge about technologies, design, and manufacturing processes for investment decisions at key investment junctures. Our past work has shown that to ensure successful program outcomes, a high level of demonstrated knowledge must be attained at three key junctures for each increment in the program. Table 2 compares best practice and JSF knowledge expectations at each critical point.
Failed to separate technology and product development. Critical technologies not mature and sound preliminary design not established. Several technologies not expected to be mature until after production begins.
The program estimates 35 percent of the engineering drawing packages are expected to be released at the critical design reviews. Also, prototype testing will not be done prior to the design review. The design will not be stable until after production begins.
Program does not expect to demonstrate that the critical processes are under statistical control until 2009. Program expects to demonstrate that a fully integrated aircraft will work as intended and meets reliability goals in 2010-2012 timeframe.
As shown in table 2, the JSF program will lack critical production knowledge when it plans to enter low-rate initial production in 2007. The department has included about $152.4 million in its fiscal year 2006 budget request to begin long lead funding for low-rate initial production. This production decision is critical, and the knowledge required to be captured by knowledge point 3 in our best practice model should be achieved before this critical juncture is reached. If production begins without knowledge that the design is mature, critical manufacturing processes are under control, and reliability is demonstrated, costly changes to the design and manufacturing processes can occur, driving up costs and delaying delivery of the needed capability to the warfighter. The size of the potential risk is illustrated in the production ramp-up and investments planned after this decision is made. Between 2007 (the start of low-rate production) and 2013 (the scheduled start of full-rate production) DOD plans to buy nearly 500 JSF aircraft-20 percent of its planned total buys- at a cost of roughly $50 billion. Under the program's preliminary plan, DOD expects to increase low-rate production from 5 aircraft a year to 143 aircraft a year, significantly increasing the financial investment after production begins.
Between 2007 and 2009, the program plans to increase low-rate production spending from about $100 million a month to more than $500 million a month, and before development has ended and an integrated aircraft has undergone operational evaluations, DOD expects to spend nearly $1 billion a month. To achieve its production rate, the program will invest significantly in tooling, facilities, and personnel. According to contractor officials, an additional $1.2 billion in tooling alone would be needed to ramp up the production rate to 143 aircraft a year. Over half of this increase would be needed by 2009-more than 2 years before operational flight testing begins. Figure 3 shows the planned production ramp up, along with the concurrently planned development program for the JSF.
Following are examples of technology, design, and production knowledge that should be but will not be captured when the low-rate production decision is scheduled to be made.
Only one of JSF's eight critical technologies is expected to be demonstrated in an operational environment by the 2007 production decision.
Only about 40 percent of the 17 million lines of code needed for the system's software will have been released, and complex software needed to integrate the advanced mission systems is not scheduled for release until about 2010-3 years after JSF is scheduled to enter production. Further, most structural fatigue testing and radar cross section testing of full-up test articles are not planned to be completed until 2010.
The program will not demonstrate that critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control, and flight testing of a fully configured and integrated JSF (with critical mission systems and prognostics technologies) is not scheduled until 2011.
Further, because of the risk created by the extreme overlap of development and production, the program office plans to place initial production orders on a cost reimbursement contract, placing a higher cost risk burden on the government than is normal. These contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. They are used when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract and place greater cost risk on the buyer-in this case, DOD. In the case of the JSF, a fixed-price contract will not be possible until late in the development program.
Regardless of likely increases in program costs, the sizable continued investment in JSF must be viewed within the context of the fiscal imbalance facing the nation over the next 10 years. The JSF program will have to compete with many other large defense programs as well as other priorities external to DOD's budget. JSF's acquisition strategy assumes an unprecedented $225 billion in funding over the next 22 years or an average of $10 billion a year (see fig. 4).
Funding challenges will be even greater if the program fails to stay within current cost and schedule estimates. For example, we estimate that another 1-year delay in JSF development would cost $4 billion to $5 billion based on current and expected development spending rates. A 10-percent increase in production costs would amount to $20 billion.
What is the immediate need for JSF aircraft? Delivery of its ultimate capability or replacing aging aircraft with an initial capability? Does the acquisition plan satisfy this need?
Does the program have the required knowledge about needed quantities and capabilities and resources (mature technologies, design knowledge, time, and money) to develop a reliable business case at this time?
Does DOD have the right acquisition strategy to develop and produce a JSF that will maximize its return on the more than $220 billion investment that remains in this program?
While the JSF program started off with a higher-risk approach by starting system development with immature technologies, now is the time to implement an evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy to manage the system development phase and stabilize the design before making large investments in tooling, labor, and facilities to test and manufacture the aircraft. The JSF is relatively early in its system development and demonstration phase and has an opportunity to learn from the F/A-22 program experience. It must take the time needed now to gather knowledge needed to resolve key issues that could ultimately result in additional cost increases, delays, and performance problems. Our March 2005 reports on the F/A-22 and JSF made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that would require answering some of these questions before making significant additional investments. …. For the JSF, we recommended the establishment of an executable program consistent with policy and best practices, including an affordable first increment with its own business case, and the implementation of a knowledge-based acquisition approach to guide future investments and reduce risks.
GR7/7A/9/9A will struggle to get to the planned OSD of 2017.
Will it be 'all that'?
Everest Riccioni has already cast doubt on the value of stealth and the practical limits of super cruise, while the GAO seem to be slinging huge rocks at JSF, and urging major delays.
Wouldn't we be better off putting Typhoon N/Rafale M or F/A-18E/F on the carriers, or just buying hundreds of Gripens......?
The US GAO say:
While relatively early in its acquisition program, the JSF program has experienced design and weight problems that, if not solved, will affect aircraft performance. These problems have led to increased development and procurement costs and schedule delays so far. In addition, the program's customers are still not sure how many aircraft they will need. The combination of cost overruns and quantity reductions has already diluted DOD's buying power and made the original JSF business case unexecutable. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use more time right now to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case for its substantial remaining investments. The JSF's current acquisition strategy does not embrace evolutionary, knowledge-based techniques intended to reduce risks. Key decisions, like the planned 2007 production decision, are expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. Time taken now to gain knowledge will avoid placing sizable investments in production capabilities at risk to expensive changes.
Unlike the F/A-22 program, which is near the end of development, the JSF program is approaching key investment decisions that will greatly influence the efficiency of the remaining funding-over 90 percent of the $245 billion estimated total program costs-and determine the risk DOD is willing to accept. DOD has not been able to deliver on its initial promise, and the sizable investment greatly raises the stakes to meet future promises. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use more time to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case and moves forward. Any new business case must be accompanied by an acquisition strategy that adopts an evolutionary approach to product development-one that enables knowledge-based decisions to maximize the return on remaining dollars-as dictated by best practices.
Increased program costs, delayed schedules, and reduced quantities have diluted DOD's buying power and made the original JSF business case unexecutable. Program instability at this time makes the development of a new and viable business case difficult to prepare. The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF has increased by more than 80 percent. Development costs were originally estimated at roughly $25 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, these costs increased almost $10 billion, and by 2004, costs increased an additional $10 billion, pushing total development cost estimates to nearly $45 billion. Current estimates for the program acquisition unit cost are about $100 million, a 23 percent increase since 2001 (That's £58m - already perilously close to the programme cost of Typhoon - and much more than the price of additional Typhoons would be). Ongoing OSD cost reviews could result in further increases to the estimated program cost. At the same time, procurement quantities have been reduced by 535 aircraft and the delivery of operational aircraft has been delayed. Figure 2 shows how costs, quantities, and schedules have changed since first estimates based on data as of January 2005
Ongoing program uncertainties-including uncertainties about the aircraft's design and procurement quantities-make it difficult to understand what capabilities can be delivered with future investments. For example, DOD has been working over the past year to restructure the JSF program to accommodate changes in the aircraft's design; until this restructuring is completed, it will be difficult to accurately estimate program costs. The need for design changes largely resulted from the increased weight of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant and the impact it was having on key performance parameters. The other JSF variants' designs were affected as well. The program plans to have a more comprehensive cost estimate in the spring of 2005. However, a detailed assessment has not been conducted to determine the impact that the restructured program will have on meeting performance specifications.
Until the detailed design efforts are complete-after the critical design review in February 2006-the program will have difficulty assessing the impact of the design changes on performance. While the program office anticipates that recent design changes will allow the aircraft to meet key performance parameters, it will not know with certainty if the weight problems have been resolved until after the plane is manufactured and weighed in mid-2007.
Program officials are also examining ways to reduce program requirements while keeping cost and schedules constant. Design and software teams have found greater complexity and less efficiency as they develop the 17 million lines of software needed for the system. Program analysis indicated that some aircraft capabilities will have to be deferred to stay within cost and schedule constraints. As a result, the program office is working with the warfighters to determine what capabilities could be deferred to later in the development program or to follow-on development efforts while still meeting the warfighter's basic needs. It may be some time before DOD knows when and what capabilities it will be able to deliver. The content and schedule of the planned 7-year, 10,000- hour flight test program is also being examined. According to the program office, the test program was already considered aggressive, and recent program changes have only increased the risks of completing it on time. Finally, uncertainty about the number and mix of variants the services plan to purchase will also affect JSF's acquisition plans. While the Air Force has announced its intention to acquire the short takeoff and vertical- landing variant, it has yet to announce when or how many it expects to buy or how this purchase will affect the quantity of the conventional takeoff and landing variant it plans to buy. The number and mix of JSF variants that the Navy and Marine Corps intend to purchase-and their related procurement costs-also remain undetermined. Foreign partners have expressed intent to buy about 700 aircraft between 2012 and 2015, but no formal agreements have been signed at this time. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review-an examination of U.S. defense needs- could also affect the procurement quantities and schedule. In developing a reliable business case, knowing the quantities to be purchased is equally as important as other elements. Without knowing types and quantities the program manager cannot accurately estimate costs or plan for production.
In recent years, DOD has revised its weapons acquisition policy to support an evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy based on best practices-key to executing a future business case and making more informed business decisions.18 With an evolutionary acquisition approach, new products are developed in increments based on available resources. Design elements that are not currently achievable are planned for and managed as separate acquisitions in future generations of the product with separate milestones, costs, and schedules. While JSF's acquisition strategy calls for initially delivering a small number of aircraft with limited capabilities, the program has committed to deliver the full capability by the end of system development and demonstration in 2013 within an established cost and schedule for a single increment, contrary to an evolutionary approach. In addition, JSF's planned approach will not capture adequate knowledge about technologies, design, and manufacturing processes for investment decisions at key investment junctures. Our past work has shown that to ensure successful program outcomes, a high level of demonstrated knowledge must be attained at three key junctures for each increment in the program. Table 2 compares best practice and JSF knowledge expectations at each critical point.
Failed to separate technology and product development. Critical technologies not mature and sound preliminary design not established. Several technologies not expected to be mature until after production begins.
The program estimates 35 percent of the engineering drawing packages are expected to be released at the critical design reviews. Also, prototype testing will not be done prior to the design review. The design will not be stable until after production begins.
Program does not expect to demonstrate that the critical processes are under statistical control until 2009. Program expects to demonstrate that a fully integrated aircraft will work as intended and meets reliability goals in 2010-2012 timeframe.
As shown in table 2, the JSF program will lack critical production knowledge when it plans to enter low-rate initial production in 2007. The department has included about $152.4 million in its fiscal year 2006 budget request to begin long lead funding for low-rate initial production. This production decision is critical, and the knowledge required to be captured by knowledge point 3 in our best practice model should be achieved before this critical juncture is reached. If production begins without knowledge that the design is mature, critical manufacturing processes are under control, and reliability is demonstrated, costly changes to the design and manufacturing processes can occur, driving up costs and delaying delivery of the needed capability to the warfighter. The size of the potential risk is illustrated in the production ramp-up and investments planned after this decision is made. Between 2007 (the start of low-rate production) and 2013 (the scheduled start of full-rate production) DOD plans to buy nearly 500 JSF aircraft-20 percent of its planned total buys- at a cost of roughly $50 billion. Under the program's preliminary plan, DOD expects to increase low-rate production from 5 aircraft a year to 143 aircraft a year, significantly increasing the financial investment after production begins.
Between 2007 and 2009, the program plans to increase low-rate production spending from about $100 million a month to more than $500 million a month, and before development has ended and an integrated aircraft has undergone operational evaluations, DOD expects to spend nearly $1 billion a month. To achieve its production rate, the program will invest significantly in tooling, facilities, and personnel. According to contractor officials, an additional $1.2 billion in tooling alone would be needed to ramp up the production rate to 143 aircraft a year. Over half of this increase would be needed by 2009-more than 2 years before operational flight testing begins. Figure 3 shows the planned production ramp up, along with the concurrently planned development program for the JSF.
Following are examples of technology, design, and production knowledge that should be but will not be captured when the low-rate production decision is scheduled to be made.
Only one of JSF's eight critical technologies is expected to be demonstrated in an operational environment by the 2007 production decision.
Only about 40 percent of the 17 million lines of code needed for the system's software will have been released, and complex software needed to integrate the advanced mission systems is not scheduled for release until about 2010-3 years after JSF is scheduled to enter production. Further, most structural fatigue testing and radar cross section testing of full-up test articles are not planned to be completed until 2010.
The program will not demonstrate that critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control, and flight testing of a fully configured and integrated JSF (with critical mission systems and prognostics technologies) is not scheduled until 2011.
Further, because of the risk created by the extreme overlap of development and production, the program office plans to place initial production orders on a cost reimbursement contract, placing a higher cost risk burden on the government than is normal. These contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. They are used when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract and place greater cost risk on the buyer-in this case, DOD. In the case of the JSF, a fixed-price contract will not be possible until late in the development program.
Regardless of likely increases in program costs, the sizable continued investment in JSF must be viewed within the context of the fiscal imbalance facing the nation over the next 10 years. The JSF program will have to compete with many other large defense programs as well as other priorities external to DOD's budget. JSF's acquisition strategy assumes an unprecedented $225 billion in funding over the next 22 years or an average of $10 billion a year (see fig. 4).
Funding challenges will be even greater if the program fails to stay within current cost and schedule estimates. For example, we estimate that another 1-year delay in JSF development would cost $4 billion to $5 billion based on current and expected development spending rates. A 10-percent increase in production costs would amount to $20 billion.
What is the immediate need for JSF aircraft? Delivery of its ultimate capability or replacing aging aircraft with an initial capability? Does the acquisition plan satisfy this need?
Does the program have the required knowledge about needed quantities and capabilities and resources (mature technologies, design knowledge, time, and money) to develop a reliable business case at this time?
Does DOD have the right acquisition strategy to develop and produce a JSF that will maximize its return on the more than $220 billion investment that remains in this program?
While the JSF program started off with a higher-risk approach by starting system development with immature technologies, now is the time to implement an evolutionary and knowledge-based acquisition strategy to manage the system development phase and stabilize the design before making large investments in tooling, labor, and facilities to test and manufacture the aircraft. The JSF is relatively early in its system development and demonstration phase and has an opportunity to learn from the F/A-22 program experience. It must take the time needed now to gather knowledge needed to resolve key issues that could ultimately result in additional cost increases, delays, and performance problems. Our March 2005 reports on the F/A-22 and JSF made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that would require answering some of these questions before making significant additional investments. …. For the JSF, we recommended the establishment of an executable program consistent with policy and best practices, including an affordable first increment with its own business case, and the implementation of a knowledge-based acquisition approach to guide future investments and reduce risks.