LAFD Aviation Boss speaks out at a SAR Conference

[SASless]

While searching for the Thong photos of the day at a progressive helicopter web site, I ran across this post.

It was not as interesting as the photos but does raise some issues for the American Helicopter Industry.

SAR 2006 Day One: LA Fire Department Chief Pilot Takes Industry to Task

Lee Benson, Chief Pilot at the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LAFD), pulled no punches in addressing here in Bournemouth what he sees as key issues facing the helicopter industry. First he highlighted the chronic shortage of airframe and powerplant (A&P) mechanics. Commercial operators tend to rely on the military to train helicopter mechanics but, said Benson, military training is too task specific because mechanics in commercial operations have to be able to work on all a helicopter's systems. Part of the answer is to support the technical colleges, ‘give them parts, invite classes into the operation.’

He went on to comment that commercial operators fail to provide enough pay, security and benefits to retain experienced mechanics. LAFD itself had had a severe problem with retaining mechanics. All had offers of US $1,000 per month above what they were being paid. He acknowledged that they are motivated by more than money, but noted that the $900 per month raise for 14 mechanics that LAFD was able to offer 'represents two tenths of one per cent of the money spent on new helicopters.'

Engineers are also short changed on the glory, which tends to gravitate to pilots and paramedics. Benson is very robust in ego management advice to new paramedics: ‘You can piss me off, you can piss the pilots off, but if you piss the mechanics off you’re out of here.’

There is a shortage of pilots skilled in operations at high altitude, particularly in conditions where tail there is low tail rotor authority, something the US Army has found in Afghanistan, said Benson. He also tackled the interrelated issues of safety, training and pilot attitudes. 'The current accident record is not sustainable in the long term… The airline CAST system is the model for change, but the airlines are only facing one environment, helicopters operate in many environments. The Integrated Helicopter Safety Team has just started work.' One area in which there has been significant safety improvement is in offshore oil and gas support, but Benson is unequivocal about where the credit is due: ‘Don’t applaud the operators, applaud the oil companies.'

'The biggest problem in the US is CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) at night.' Part of the answer, he said, lies in the wider use of NVG that is constantly held up by FAA resistance. Night CFIT accidents have happened to operators fitted out for NVG but unable to use them because of slow FAA approval stemming from strange attitudes probably borne from out-of-date experience gained in the military many years ago. 'FAA is pushing for NVG pilots to have an instrument ticket. I don’t understand the connection… It’s short sighted.’

While Vietnam era helicopters seem to go on forever, the same can't be said for pilots of the same vintage and the industry will have to replace a significant number soon. These Vietnam veterans, he said, often retain Vietnam era macho, envelope pushing attitudes: ‘If you are not taking the top off a palm tree with the rotor you are not a pilot.’ He'd like to see pilots taking pride in operating a helicopter within its limits! Yet the flight instructors who will have to train the new generation of commercial helicopter pilots in the US 'are the lowest time pilots we have.' His answer would be to set up a scholarship fund and take the top 20 students each year to train them in CRM and risk analysis etc, then give them a higher level instructor rating. Then to recognise students taught by these instructors as having a higher level qualification.

Next, he took aim at heliport standards. 'Heliport standards are wrong. The smallest area you can legally land in is 1.5 times the length of the helicopter from the tip of the main rotor to the tail rotor. In an H3 that gives you 24 ft of clearance, in an MD500 it gives you 10 ft. That’s more than enough for the H3 but much to little for the MD500.'

Helicopter OEMs were his next target. Commercial operators who buy new aircraft often find errors in flight and maintenance manuals, said Benson, who has recent experience of two OEMs and has had problems with both. ‘I took delivery of an aircraft and found that the wiring diagrams for the AFCS were 100% wrong.' Now he insists on a clause in LAFD contracts stipulating that correction of all errors in manuals will be paid for by the OEM, and these must not be pen and ink changes, but complete page-for-page reprints.

Most aircraft are modified, costing 15 to 20% of the total paid for a new helicopter, so Benson also insists that the OEM shares all information with the primary modification company, which really needs the data. 'It sometimes seems as if the OEM wants to force customers to use their own completion house.' This is not the only practice upon which he frowns, third party indemnification is another. OEMs, said Benson, require the completion house to sign an indemnification that protects the OEM even if any incident results from wrong information provided by the OEM. ‘That is not acceptable.’ Peter Donaldson

[albatross]

Agree or disagree I admire the man for saying it.

I especially like:
"Commercial operators who buy new aircraft often find errors in flight and maintenance manuals, said Benson, who has recent experience of two OEMs and has had problems with both. ‘I took delivery of an aircraft and found that the wiring diagrams for the AFCS were 100% wrong.' Now he insists on a clause in LAFD contracts stipulating that correction of all errors in manuals will be paid for by the OEM, and these must not be pen and ink changes, but complete page-for-page reprints.

Most aircraft are modified, costing 15 to 20% of the total paid for a new helicopter, so Benson also insists that the OEM shares all information with the primary modification company, which really needs the data. 'It sometimes seems as if the OEM wants to force customers to use their own completion house.' This is not the only practice upon which he frowns, third party indemnification is another. OEMs, said Benson, require the completion house to sign an indemnification that protects the OEM even if any incident results from wrong information provided by the OEM. ‘That is not acceptable.’

I wish my employer would do the same to OEMs we deal with. There should also be penalty if spares are not available - The OEMs make them and should be forced to support them. If the OEM is not willing to support the product and engrave it in stone we should buy from someone who will. Anyone can make promises!

[PANews]

I sat through Lee Benson's presentation - not spellbound but certainly impressed - and here was a man with a history who had fought hard for his funding time and time again [the LA County FD is no giant organisation] only to have his suppliers rip him off using the methods he explained [as above].

So he has plenty of experience, lots of burned fingers and now plays what he would call 'hard ball.' I do not blame him.

The lessons he learned the hard way could be of great use to others also wishing to play hard-ball when formulating their contracts. But first they needed to either be in the SAR2006 hall in Bournemouth or on Pprune!

[msuldo]

He makes some good points when talking about things that he is knowledgeable of, but the Gulf ain't one of them.

"One area in which there has been significant safety improvement is in offshore oil and gas support, but Benson is unequivocal about where the credit is due: ‘Don’t applaud the operators, applaud the oil companies.

Most GOM oil companies, with one or two exceptions (and they only mainly fly with one GOM operator) look more at price than safety equipment.
For instance, we have put, ongoing on our small ships and about complete, Apical floats/rafts, IFR GPS moving map (with TCAS displayed on it), satellite tracking / phone, pulse lights, 2nd VHF, and more. NO oil company requested this or agreed to pay for it, WE did it. Two simulators at $850K each, again - no one asked for it - we did it. Vibration analysis, HUMS and EGPWS on the new medium twins both here and international - we just bit the bullet and did it.

When most oil companies call for a flight, which do you think they ask?
"What's the price?"
or
"What safety equipment is on the aircraft?"

Sure, they like to see that stuff on there, but they would rather not pay for it. It's in our best interest to reduce accidents for a number of reasons, the biggest of which is to keep from hurting people. That's our motivation and it doesn't come from most oil companies.

[SASless]

Most GOM oil companies, ...look more at price than safety equipment.


What is a human life worth in the oil patch?:suspect:

[msuldo]

Not sure what you mean by that, maybe it's so late that I just don't understand your attempt at humor or sarcasm.
Like you, however, I've been to my share of funerals of people that I've worked with, and each one gets harder. Life is not cheap anywhere.

[Ned-Air2Air]

Mike - Where is Air Log heading with regards to their medium to heavy equipment. Obviously ERA have the 139 and now EC225s and PHI is banking on the S-92.

Just wondering where the Air Log/Bristow family is heading in the GOM. Are they looking at using some of the 225s that Bristows have in the North Sea??

Ned

[ATPMBA]

Msuldo's quote:
Most GOM oil companies, with one or two exceptions (and they only mainly fly with one GOM operator) look more at price than safety equipment.
For instance, we have put, ongoing on our small ships and about complete, Apical floats/rafts, IFR GPS moving map (with TCAS displayed on it), satellite tracking / phone, pulse lights, 2nd VHF, and more. NO oil company requested this or agreed to pay for it, WE did it. Two simulators at $850K each, again - no one asked for it - we did it. Vibration analysis, HUMS and EGPWS on the new medium twins both here and international - we just bit the bullet and did it.


It's sounds like his company is proactive in the area of safety.


Check out "Harvard Business Review", I believe it's the March issue has an article on "Value Proposition". Basically it means the customer doesn't always award the contract to the lowest bidder but the one that will satisfy the customer's needs. One needs to communicate the value they have to offer to the customer. Value proposition lays out to the customer the benefits of doing business with your firm, favourable points of difference between you and your competitor’s offer, and resonating factors.
Best practice suppliers value their proposition on a few elements that matter most to the customer, demonstrate value of superior performance and communicate it in a way showing a sophisticated understanding of the customers business.


PM me if you want to know more.

[SASless]

Mike,

Where am I going with that? Simple....the oil companies that brag about their safety programs then turn around and use differing standards throughout the world in their operations. If they were concerned about safety (translated to meaning preventing injury and death to their employees and contractors) they would require the highest standard used everywhere they operate. At least that is how I see it.

That certainly isn't the case world wide for any oil company I have ever flown for. They seem to go for the lowest standard required in the country they happen to be in far more than they do holding to the highest standard.

I said about the same thing you did but a lot more bluntly.

As long as the oil companies encourage cheap rates no matter the safety standard then we have a situation where the operators cannot afford to make the changes and improvements that are needed.

I would suggest the operators play a role in this by undercutting one another in prices and offering that cheap service. The helicopter industry needs to find a way to work together in raising standards of service and equipment and convince the oil companies of the value of it.

As long as the oil companies go the cheap route....you cannot convince me they are looking at the human side of things as they should and are placing more value on the bottom line than they are on their employee's welfare.

At this period in time, with the oil companies making historically high profits, it is not like they are suffering for money to spend on improvements that will better protect their people.

If one takes the ERA S76 crash, that killed ten people, and used the cost of that accident alone....how many Ground Proximity warning systems could you install on a fleet of helicopters? How many Data Recorders would you be able to install?

My basic point is the oil companies will happily pay that amount of money after and accident but refuse to pay that before the accident.

[msuldo]

Mike - Where is Air Log heading with regards to their medium to heavy equipment. Obviously ERA have the 139 and now EC225s and PHI is banking on the S-92.
Just wondering where the Air Log/Bristow family is heading in the GOM. Are they looking at using some of the 225s that Bristows have in the North Sea??
Ned

Ned - one of the things we are working hard for as a global company is the use of our assets on a global basis. We don't buy aircraft on spec and have them sit around. We buy specific aircraft, either for a specific customer need or fleet replacement of older aircraft.. If I have a need for a type of aircraft in the GOM that I don't have, and can make an economic case for it, I can transfer it, and our supply support, and experience, from another part of Bristow Group. I don't want to buy something like an AW 139 and have it sit on the ramp, hoping someone wants it, all the while I'm paying for it. We have positions from the major manufacturers on probably all current aircraft, just need to see if/where we can use them. Will I have a 225 here? If I need it and can make an economic case for it, yes.
Mike

[SASless]

Ned,

Its a bit hard to land a 225 on a toadstool...that is what small singles are for in the GOM plus they are cheap.

[msuldo]

In a macro sense, there is some logic to what you say. I would caution, however, against painting all oil companies with that broad brush. You will notice I always said some or most. There are oil companies that are VERY proactive in safety, and force the operators to upgrade to the latest spec, there are others however that don't.
One of the reasons that we are now "Bristow Group", is to have a worldwide standard in equipment, safety, and training, so that no matter where you get one of our a/c, it's equipped the same (given local regulations). Same for training, support, audits, - everything to one global standard that will satisfy the most demanding customer. But you are right, there are oil companies that will think that is too expensive and there are "bottom feeder" helo companies out there who will get their work, and you will read or see about them in the accident stats.

[PANews]

Before you knock Lee's comments on the oil industry be aware that the original article is not a verbatim quote of his words during a 20 minute address and Peter Donaldson necessarily left out a fair few pertinent words here and there to keep it of a publishable length.

Among the deletions were more specific references to the real position in the petroleum industry.

[SASless]

Heli-Torque had this article posted about a shortage of money to do some float tests. How many Billions of pounds profit did the oil companies make just this past quarter?



- Posted on on Monday, February 06 @ 22:48:08 GMT


Oil companies and offshore operators have refused to fund research into a helicopter safety device which could help save lives in a crash offshore, it emerged. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has withdrawn from plans to test the "side-floating" helicopters because of a £250,000 shortfall.


It had appealed to members of the Aviation Safety and Technical Group (ASTG), including the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) and Shell, for financial assistance for the project. But the group rejected its request, telling it they were "unable to support this particular project at this time".


Aberdeen North MP Frank Doran said he was shocked by the news at a time when companies such as Shell were making billions of pounds of profits. John Taylor of the Aberdeen TGWU, which represents some offshore workers, described the decision as "fundamentally wrong". The ASTG chairman defended the decision, saying that it did not consider the project to be a sufficient priority for such funding.



The floating kits aim to stabilise a helicopter in a crash, allowing people to evacuate the aircraft more quickly. In a statement, the Civil Aviation Authority said: "Funding partners were lobbied via the Helicopter Safety Research Management Committee to provide assistance but the response was that potential partners were unable to support this particular project at this time."


The CAA said it was still prepared to support partial funding of the research if this could be matched by adequate external funding and that the project could be taken up by any interested party.

[Ned-Air2Air]

Mike - Here is a question for you.

In your opinion whose responsibility is it to set the safety standards for offshore, you as the operator, or the oil companies who write the contracts around whichever aircraft they want, and obviously this relates to the GOM since this is where you work.

Ned

[rjsquirrel]

SASless,

We saw that "side floating air bag" item a while back. It is a shame there are no parachutes for helos, and no parachutes for passengers, and no submarine sealing compartment for helos, either. How about concrete helos that survive 1000 mph impacts into mountains? How about wheels on the bottom that allow the submarine helos to roll along the bottom and come home? How about we leave the rotors off and have 1,234 safety systems take their place, and the helo never leaves the hangar? Exactly when does it get silly to plan on the failure of a back-up to a back-up system? The side bags are an example of the old Boy Scout adage "Pack your eggs at the bottom of your pack, so WHEN they break, they don't run over everything else".

You have a helicopter, it is designed to not fail. You test it to try and be sure it won't. Then you have a safety system like floats. They are designed so that when a highly reliable system fails on the basic helicopter, these floats allow the helo to ditch safely. Now you get somebody to say that WHEN the floats fail, you use the float back-up system to keep the heli on its side. All the while, as Lappos has said a lot, the pilot is the cause of 80% of the helo accidents - how about a side floating bag that prevents the pilot from touching the controls?

When would we simply ask that the basic problem with the heli be fixed? Or that the problem with the floats (that let the helo flip over) be fixed? The silly nature of this side float bag is why it died still-born. There is little doubt that it had a British designer, same guy who makes all those Morse code training tapes, I bet.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Dear Captain Ludite - sorry RJSQUIRREL

It pays to have all the facts. This is an extract from a paper by Dave Howson at the UK CAA SRG. I believe it was presented in Montreal last October. The figures (illustrations) are beyond my skills to paste here. The other numbers refer to the Bibliography which is included at the end for completeness.

You will be interested to learn that emergency float certification has been troubled by the ability of the OEMs to produce tank trials that generate unrealistic wave profiles. They wave creation process can be 'tuned' to replicate high, but unbreaking, waves. This gets you through the certification process at Sea State 4 but unfortunately the real world is not that perfect and as many have found to their cost, the first breaking wave that comes along will have you over. This is what happens when your 'highly reliable helicopter' comes up against the vagaries of human performance (manufacturing, maintenance and operations). Personally I think it's a pity that this system appears to be lost. I have long favoured the 'wet floor' approach with floats mounted higher and the stability improved when sitting in the water. ( a la Lynx but not quite that high).

G

:ok:
Helicopter Emergency Flotation
Forced landing on the water (‘ditching’)
For extended over water flights (being in the UK beyond autorotation distance from land for a single engine helicopter, and more than 10 minutes flying time from a suitable forced landing site for a multi-engine helicopter), emergency flotation systems (EFS) have been mandated on UK offshore helicopters since the 1970s. However, it is difficult or impossible to design practical flotation systems that will keep a helicopter afloat and stable in the severest weather conditions. In [5] it was shown that, on average in the North Sea, a helicopter making a controlled landing on the water, and fitted with an emergency flotation system compliant with the guidance [6], might expect to be capsized by the waves in about 30% of cases.
Research into the design of EFS was undertaken in an attempt to improve the odds. Model tests conducted by British Hovercraft Corporation in the mid 1980s had investigated raising the float attachment positions in order to float the helicopter lower into the water, and the addition of water scoops to the emergency flotation bags (as routinely used on inflatable liferafts in order to improve stability). The former was found to give variable and inconclusive results, depending primarily on helicopter type and loading condition. The latter was seen to provide a uniform benefit, however, increasing the helicopter capsize threshold by about one sea-state. The benefits of float scoops, and their relatively low cost were described in [7].
Even with float scoops fitted, the probability of a capsize when alighting on the water on the UK continental shelf was still considered to be too high, hence the decision was taken to attempt to mitigate the consequences of a capsize by preventing the helicopter from turning to a completely inverted attitude. When this happens the cabin rapidly fills with water, and escape becomes very difficult and hazardous because all the escape routes are submerged. The incompatibility between the time needed to escape and typical breath hold times in the low water temperatures prevalent in the region means that occupants who do not escape from the cabin within seconds are likely to drown.
Additional emergency flotation systems were devised (e.g. see Figure 2) to prevent total inversion following capsize. A total of ten schemes were initially proposed and ranked by a team of naval architects and helicopter designers. The top three were tested using a helicopter model in a wave tank, and two found to be practical and effective [8].

Figure 2 - Tank test model of helicopter fitted with additional auxiliary emergency flotation to prevent total inversion [8].
Figure 3 shows the floating attitude of the helicopter following capsize, illustrating that the windows and doors remain above the waterline on one side of the fuselage. In addition, there is a significant air pocket remaining in the cabin, removing the time pressure to escape.

Figure 3 - Floating attitude with auxiliary flotation following capsize [8].
Following the demonstration that the auxiliary flotation was practical and effective, a human factors study was conducted in a helicopter underwater escape trainer (HUET) to check that it was indeed easier to escape from a side-floating helicopter than a fully inverted one.

The study used 30 naive subjects who were trained, and then evaluated in simulated escapes from fully inverted and side floating cabins in the training facility tank. This confirmed the expected benefits of the side floating arrangement [9]. Work on a helicopter type-specific design study on emergency flotation systems designed to prevent total inversion following capsize originally scheduled for 2002 was delayed due to budgetary pressures following 9/11. It is now planned that work will start in 2005. This study is necessary to establish the practicality of the scheme for both retrofit to existing helicopters and for new build aircraft.
Crashes onto water
The primary purpose of emergency flotation systems has always been to keep the helicopter afloat following a controlled landing on the water. These systems tend to be much less effective when a helicopter crashes into the water either because they are damaged in the impact, or because they have to be manually triggered to inflate by the pilot who may be disabled by the impact. Studies of helicopter crashes onto water [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] have concluded that the primary cause of loss of life following water impact is drowning, and that improvements in the capability of helicopters to remain afloat after impact long enough for the survivors to escape is the major factor in improving occupant survivability.
Research was therefore commissioned by CAA to investigate ways of improving the crashworthiness of emergency flotation systems. Two studies were performed [15, 16]. The first investigated water impacts and their effect on the helicopter airframe in general, and on the emergency flotation system in particular. Non-linear finite element analysis was used to study three specific accident scenarios from which there were a significant number of survivors, but which were all outside the Federal Aviation Administration proposed 95% survivability ditching envelope [ ]. The three scenarios comprised a vertical drop from a helideck, a horizontal ‘fly-in’ impact, and a loss of control accident featuring intermediate vertical and horizontal impact velocities. A review of EFS design was also undertaken to identify design features that would improve overall system functionality, reliability and operation following an impact. A high-level cost benefit analysis and a review of regulatory requirements were also performed.
Although good validation was achieved for vertical impacts, the results from the non-linear finite element analysis demonstrated a number of major difficulties in adequately modelling the physics of the airframe / water impact for horizontal ‘fly-in’ scenarios. Figure 4 shows an example result, in this case for a vertical water impact. The study also came up with several EFS design modifications (automatic EFS arming/deployment in particular) that would be expected to improve performance following a severe impact. A high level cost benefit analysis indicated that the modifications were also cost-effective, and a number are already incorporated into modern EFS design.


Figure 4 – Example result from [15] showing plastic strain experienced by airframe during a vertical impact with the water.
In contrast to the detailed deterministic investigation of three crash scenarios, the second study [16] looked at the statistics and variability of the wide range of possible crash scenarios and sea conditions. It was found that, as expected, the variability in crash velocity and loading was extremely large as can be seen in Figure 5.
Again, three basic crash scenarios were investigated together with a forced landing or ‘ditching’, using a Monte Carlo simulation to exercise the variability of the impact parameters including the velocities, angles and sea states. The clouds of points in Figure 5 show the variability in vertical and horizontal impact velocity experienced by the helicopter in the simulation. The four main crash and ditching scenario populations are labelled. In each case the  indicate occurrences where the flotation system design loads were not exceeded, while each + indicates overload and presumed failure. The figure also shows the impact velocity boundaries for the current ditching flotation system certification requirements, and the FAA proposed 95% survivability envelope.
This study concluded that a very substantial increase in flotation design loads would be required in order to make a difference to the survivability. In fact doubling the design loads would only result in a very modest improvement in crashworthiness.
The most important outcome of this study was in highlighting the major benefits of flotation unit redundancy, particularly additional flotation units in a less vulnerable impact location high on the cabin walls. (The same floats proposed for preventing total inversion, and shown in Figures 2 and 3.)
Figure 6 shows results from three different flotation configurations with different levels of redundancy. It can be seen that for high impact crashes there is a 30% probability that the 4-flotation unit helicopter will sink, whilst with 6 units the helicopter has sufficient redundancy to remain afloat in the severest of the crashes modelled.


Figure 5 – Scatter plot from [16] showing vertical and horizontal impact velocities of helicopter for four different scenarios: loads on fuselage panel greater and less than design load.

Figure 6 – Percentage of sea impacts causing helicopter to sink. Up to 6 flotation units, with 4 required to remain afloat [16].

Potential changes to airworthiness requirements
The CAA presented the findings from its ditching and water impact research to the JAA Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survivability (HOSS) working group and to the FAA/JAA/Industry Joint Harmonisation Working Group (JHWG) on Water Impact, Ditching Design and Crashworthiness (WIDDCWG). Both groups produced working papers recommending similar changes to the current JAR/FAR 27 and 29 airworthiness requirements relating to helicopter ditching and water impact crashworthiness, both of which have been published in annexes to CAA Paper 2005/06 [17].
The need for a review of the requirements was accepted by the JAA/FAA Rotorcraft Steering Group (RSG). The issues raised in the working papers were split into those requiring changes to the advisory material only, and those involving rule changes. Unfortunately little progress has been made. The two follow-on groups called for by the JAA/FAA RSG have yet to be set up, and the JAA has now been superseded by the new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which assumed responsibility for airworthiness requirements in September 2003. The follow-on tasking, however, presently forms part of EASA’s 2005/7 work programme.
CAA plans to complete the helicopter type specific design study on emergency flotation systems designed to prevent total inversion following capsize in time to feed the results into the regulatory activities.

Bibliography

[5] Laspalles, P.J. Rowe, S.J., Wave Height Probabilities on Helicopter Routes, BMT Fluid Mechanics Report 44140r13, July 1997.
[6] FAA, Advisory Circular AC29-2C relating to JAR/FAR 29.801 Ditching 30th September 1999.
[7] Helicopter Float Scoops, CAA Paper 95010, CAA, London, December 1995.
[8] Devices to Prevent Helicopter Total Inversion Following a Ditching, CAA Paper 97010, CAA, London, December 1997.
[9] Helicopter Ditching Research – Egress from Side-Floating Helicopters, CAA Paper 2001/10, CAA, London, September 2001.
[10] Westland Helicopters Limited, A review of UK military and world civil helicopter water impacts over the period 1971-1992, Stress Department report no. SDR 146, November 1993, published in CAA Paper 96005, CAA, London, July 1996.
[11] Westland Helicopters Limited, An analysis of the response of helicopter structures to water impact, Stress Department report no. SDR 156, March 1995, published in CAA Paper 96005, CAA, London, July 1996.
[12] Federal Aviation Administration, Survey and analysis of rotorcraft flotation systems, US Department of Transportation, Office of Aviation Research, report no. DOT/FAA/AR-95/53, 1996.
[13] Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft ditchings and water related impacts that occurred from 1982 to 1989 - phase I, US Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center report no. DOT/FAA/CT-92/13, 1993.
[14] Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft ditchings and water related impacts that occurred from 1982 to 1989 - phase II, US Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center report no. DOT/FAA/CT-92/14, 1993.
[15] Crashworthiness of Helicopter Emergency Flotation Systems, CAA Paper 2001/02 (Part 1), CAA, London, September 2001.
[16] Crashworthiness of Helicopter Emergency Flotation Systems, CAA Paper 2001/02 (Part 2), CAA, London, September 2001.
[17] Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research, CAA Paper 2005/06, CAA, London, 2005.

[SASless]

Potential changes to airworthiness requirements
The CAA presented the findings from its ditching and water impact research to the JAA Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survivability (HOSS) working group and to the FAA/JAA/Industry Joint Harmonisation Working Group (JHWG) on Water Impact, Ditching Design and Crashworthiness (WIDDCWG). Both groups produced working papers recommending similar changes to the current JAR/FAR 27 and 29 airworthiness requirements relating to helicopter ditching and water impact crashworthiness, both of which have been published in annexes to CAA Paper 2005/06 [17].The need for a review of the requirements was accepted by the JAA/FAA Rotorcraft Steering Group (RSG). The issues raised in the working papers were split into those requiring changes to the advisory material only, and those involving rule changes. Unfortunately little progress has been made. The two follow-on groups called for by the JAA/FAA RSG have yet to be set up, and the JAA has now been superseded by the new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which assumed responsibility for airworthiness requirements in September 2003. The follow-on tasking, however, presently forms part of EASA’s 2005/7 work programme.
CAA plans to complete the helicopter type specific design study on emergency flotation systems designed to prevent total inversion following capsize in time to feed the results into the regulatory activities.


Nuff said RJS...even the FAA buys into the concept despite the fact they have done nothing about it. Usual lip service to safety by our own bureaucrats.

[msuldo]

Mike - Here is a question for you.
In your opinion whose responsibility is it to set the safety standards for offshore, you as the operator, or the oil companies who write the contracts around whichever aircraft they want, and obviously this relates to the GOM since this is where you work.
Ned

Had to think about that a while.
First - the "oil"companies in the GOM aren't uniform. You have "production companies", such as Grasso, that operate platforms for others. They are about 50% of our business. Then there are smaller exploration and producers, and finally, the real big guys, with lots of money, like Shell, BP, Chrevron, etc.
Each of those has a different knowledge level of aviation safety. Some have very little in the way of aviation safety people, if any, on staff. Those folks trust me as an operator to know what is safe. When we talk to them, we tell them what we are doing to make the helicopter "as safe as reasonably practicable". In other words, we could put so much safety equipment on board that it would be to heavy and expensive to work, so we try to strike a balance and put on all that a reasonable, responsible company would do and still be able to do the job. Then other oil companies, who have their own aviation staff, may want to fly to a higher standard, and be willing to pay the cost. The question really is, how much "more" safety do you get for that incremental spending? For instance, you could require survival suits in the GOM in the winter, but what would that really gain?
Short answer to your question - I think that it's my responsibilty as an operator to set a standard of safety that is reasonable and practible (and lets me sleep peacefully at night). Then the oil companies can increase that if they want, they just have to be willing to pay for it.

[msuldo]

Before you knock Lee's comments on the oil industry be aware that the original article is not a verbatim quote of his words during a 20 minute address and Peter Donaldson necessarily left out a fair few pertinent words here and there to keep it of a publishable length.
Among the deletions were more specific references to the real position in the petroleum industry.

Haven't seen all of his comments but it's interesting when you talk about his comments about "the real position in the Petroleum industry". I'll make a deal with him. He doesn't hold himself out as an expert on what goes on in the GOM and I won't arrest anyone.
Mike

[Geoffersincornwall]

Gentlemen
The regulators and the oil companies have two different objectives - strange as it may seem. Most regulators - like the FAA - are lobbied to regulate at the lowest common denominator level, come what may. The lobbyists are normally the stakeholders (operators and major users).
In the UK, the CAA are one of the few NAAs that can be sued for 'negligent regulation'. This helps to explain what many see as knee-jerk to every accident and the monies invested in research. It all helps to mitigate their liability if somebody has a go at them.
Customers cannot, as it may be supposed, satisfy their 'Duty of Care' by simply saying " we met the regulatory standards". Safety must be managed at the ALARP level - not cost! If a remedy to a risk is available and affordable then previous litigation indicates that such a remedy MUST be used. By this route we saw pax first wearing survival suits in 1976 whilst we drove them around in the middle of the winter in our shirtsleeves. Eventually the CAA came on board with the concept and today we see (yes, the big boys) leading the job spec with:
Digital CVFDR (with HOMP on the way)
HUMS
ATAS
GPWS/TAWS
HISL
Automatic Float Inflation
HEEL
Bigger pop-out/push-out windows.
External mounted (good quality) liferafts (that are made to be tough and reliable rather tha light and cheap).
Lifejackets with EBS.
The table below is produced from the data provided by Mark Stevens and Bob Sheffied in the recent Rotor and Wing atricle. It correlates the level of equipment with the cost of hiring and the accident levels experienced. I think it speaks for itself.
G
:ok:
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT RATES IN RELATION TO COSTS, EQUIPMENT LEVELS AND OPERATING STANDARDS
(Source – Rotor & Wing Magazine article written by Bob Sheffield and Mark Stevens of Shell Aircraft.
PACKAGE A
ACCIDENT RATE 20 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 7 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
COST PER HELICOPTER PER YEAR BASED ON 1000 FLIGHT HOURS $2.5 million PACKAGE CONTENTS Baseline, with no mitigation measures, and represents twin-turbine helicopters operated globally in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
PACKAGE B
ACCIDENT RATE 15.1 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 5.3 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
COST PER HELICOPTER PER YEAR BASED ON 1000 FLIGHT HOURS $4.6 million PACKAGE CONTENTS Package B contains a mix of PC2 and PC3, partial implementation of HUMS and simulator training with some LOFT and partial use of enhanced quality and safety management systems (SMS) and operational controls (with elements of a structured SMS and helideck management). This represents twin-turbine helicopters operating in the mid-1990s in the North Sea and currently in most other OGP regions. Aircraft types generally are the S-76A++, Bell 212, AS365N, AS332L/L1 and S-61.
PACKAGE C
ACCIDENT RATE 6.19 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 2.17 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
COST PER HELICOPTER PER YEAR BASED ON 1000 FLIGHT HOURS $5.03 million PACKAGE CONTENTS Package C's mitigation measures include a retrofitted HUMS with associated effectiveness, PC2, full JAR Ops 3 quality assurance to JAR 145, effective SMS with safety case and helideck management to CAP 437 standards, partial implementation of design requirements to equivalent levels of safety beyond that claimed in the Type Certificate Data Sheets, full implementation of HOMP and of simulator training and installation of TCAS and EGPWS. Implementation of Package C's measures is representative of most of one major oil operator's twin-turbine helo operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s and all North Sea ops with such aircraft as the S-76C+, Bell 412, AS332L2, and EC155.
PACKAGE D
ACCIDENT RATE 3.2 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 1.1 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
COST PER HELICOPTER PER YEAR BASED ON 1000 FLIGHT HOURS $5.76 million PACKAGE CONTENTS Package D includes all the mitigation measures and is representative of new twin-turbines such as the AB139, S-92, EC225 and EC155B1.
PACKAGE E
ACCIDENT RATE 2.34 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 0.82 PER MILLION FLIGHT HOURS
COST PER HELICOPTER PER YEAR BASED ON 1000 FLIGHT HOURS $6.9 million PACKAGE CONTENTS Package E is a prediction of the potential safety level that might be achieved in the next 10-15 years with derivative technology such as fly-by-wire, enhanced cockpit management and flaw/damage-tolerant design and more rigorous monitoring and operational controls. It assumes that FAR 29 design requirements have closed the gap with FAR 25 and that operations are being conducted to the more stringent requirements of FAR 121 or JAR-OPS 3/NPA 38 (or the equivalent). It also assumes HUMS analysis employs machine-learning techniques and has been extended into the rotor system and that all operations are conducted to PC1 to no smaller than 1D helidecks according to CAP 437.