topendtorque
7th Mar 2006, 08:30
Heliport:-
Topic for a thread on a subject that may be a good idea or not, I leave it to you my peers to comment. This has been brought about by a noted and continuing disengagement from real supervisory leadership by CASA in the last many years.
The latest OZ crash comic has sparked me to action. There are two very good articles in it; 178 seconds to live and especially for RH’s the ATSB brief on a fatal accident at Roma Qld. See mag at http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2006/feb/index.htm
In oz of late we are seeing accidents which seem mighty indicative of attitudinal error, a symptom of lack of supervision. The two articles mentioned talk about the age old problems of too-late–too-dark, or no-turn-back-when-I-should-have.
Two recent OZ accidents have claimed the lives of two of Australia top ten cattle barons. I mention that as I lead to the thread topic / logic. One is detailed below and the other accident happened when a chieftain, continued without radar into a storm front three states wide and guess what, it spat an engine completely off before final annihilation.
Many threads have covered subjects where newbies have sought advise on autos, landing lights, where to learn, how much it all costs, you name it it’s there except, for when as a PIC how and when to say NO.
This is a subject that is not covered in any curriculum, and even though it may be touched upon by a forward thinking and careful instructor, that is when the student is at his most vulnerable in the way of picking up tips because of all of the other info that he is trying to absorb.
The Roma accident might be typical. For full detail including a veeerrrrry interesting hand held GPS flight path you can go to ATSB page
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/investigation_reports.aspx report #200403351.
The pilot, a PHL arrived on a pre-arrangement???? The pilot used to work for the deceased passenger, the property owner, an OZ cattle baron and the owner of a reputable corporate F/W charter op, many years before as an F/W driver.
Now what is a newbie? I cannot go past the limits set by this case 10,000 hours F/W ATPL, and a mere 582 R/W PHL, who by dent of his F/W IFR extensive experience may have thought “he would be right mate”.?????
What is a mentor? It seems that anywhere you go if newbies encounter pilots with a mere one thousand hours or more, then, whether they (the 1,000 jock I mean) know it or like it or not they are a mentor. They will be listened to!!!!!!!!
They need to be very careful what they say in the presence of impressionable inexperience.
This can be put to good advantage, as mentor steer the chat around as to how the newbie might react were he (assume both gender) in a situation where he has to tell clients that he is concerned about a flight and would really LIKE TO CANCEL OR TURN BACK NOW.
If the newbie shows insecurity then help him understand the reasons for and HOW TO SAY NO. Explain that it is not just the ordinary client that one encounters in ordinary charter ops. All of these dudes have enough money to pay for an expensive pastime, like hiring aeroplanes, and many of them are very, very successful people who may well have gotten their success from always getting their own way!!!!
How does everyone feel with that?
There is another aspect of the report which was touched on in another thread recently, that of investigators not resorting themselves to experience. I quote, “the only abnormality found - - - - clutch warning globe filament was stretched”
Now, a conversation set in a civilised manner with an experienced Robinson pilot may have allowed the super sleuth to realise that there is nothing abnormal in the fact that the clutch light may have been illuminated during the A/C’s encounter with rain, all forecast at the time. They refer to leaking fuel tanks and there was no fire, anyone wants to lay bets on the rain??
Instead they irresponsibly say, “may have activated during the crash sequence”. What extra terrestrial illusions will that little gem crank up in the minds of inexperienced newbies? Usually during the crash sequence is when all the bloody lights go out, in this case quite quickly.
One thing for sure is that if he was using the LL, as was observed earlier, then an interior light, bright and right in front of the eyeball, and dancing around the curved plexi windscreen cabin and doors would have immediately cost the pilot his outside vision and cast him into questioning his orientation long before the old ear-hole pressures start to sway around. If all doors were on that is where you can guarantee you will not see out to the ground, sideways, or in front.
Goose bumps anyone???
Topic for a thread on a subject that may be a good idea or not, I leave it to you my peers to comment. This has been brought about by a noted and continuing disengagement from real supervisory leadership by CASA in the last many years.
The latest OZ crash comic has sparked me to action. There are two very good articles in it; 178 seconds to live and especially for RH’s the ATSB brief on a fatal accident at Roma Qld. See mag at http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2006/feb/index.htm
In oz of late we are seeing accidents which seem mighty indicative of attitudinal error, a symptom of lack of supervision. The two articles mentioned talk about the age old problems of too-late–too-dark, or no-turn-back-when-I-should-have.
Two recent OZ accidents have claimed the lives of two of Australia top ten cattle barons. I mention that as I lead to the thread topic / logic. One is detailed below and the other accident happened when a chieftain, continued without radar into a storm front three states wide and guess what, it spat an engine completely off before final annihilation.
Many threads have covered subjects where newbies have sought advise on autos, landing lights, where to learn, how much it all costs, you name it it’s there except, for when as a PIC how and when to say NO.
This is a subject that is not covered in any curriculum, and even though it may be touched upon by a forward thinking and careful instructor, that is when the student is at his most vulnerable in the way of picking up tips because of all of the other info that he is trying to absorb.
The Roma accident might be typical. For full detail including a veeerrrrry interesting hand held GPS flight path you can go to ATSB page
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/investigation_reports.aspx report #200403351.
The pilot, a PHL arrived on a pre-arrangement???? The pilot used to work for the deceased passenger, the property owner, an OZ cattle baron and the owner of a reputable corporate F/W charter op, many years before as an F/W driver.
Now what is a newbie? I cannot go past the limits set by this case 10,000 hours F/W ATPL, and a mere 582 R/W PHL, who by dent of his F/W IFR extensive experience may have thought “he would be right mate”.?????
What is a mentor? It seems that anywhere you go if newbies encounter pilots with a mere one thousand hours or more, then, whether they (the 1,000 jock I mean) know it or like it or not they are a mentor. They will be listened to!!!!!!!!
They need to be very careful what they say in the presence of impressionable inexperience.
This can be put to good advantage, as mentor steer the chat around as to how the newbie might react were he (assume both gender) in a situation where he has to tell clients that he is concerned about a flight and would really LIKE TO CANCEL OR TURN BACK NOW.
If the newbie shows insecurity then help him understand the reasons for and HOW TO SAY NO. Explain that it is not just the ordinary client that one encounters in ordinary charter ops. All of these dudes have enough money to pay for an expensive pastime, like hiring aeroplanes, and many of them are very, very successful people who may well have gotten their success from always getting their own way!!!!
How does everyone feel with that?
There is another aspect of the report which was touched on in another thread recently, that of investigators not resorting themselves to experience. I quote, “the only abnormality found - - - - clutch warning globe filament was stretched”
Now, a conversation set in a civilised manner with an experienced Robinson pilot may have allowed the super sleuth to realise that there is nothing abnormal in the fact that the clutch light may have been illuminated during the A/C’s encounter with rain, all forecast at the time. They refer to leaking fuel tanks and there was no fire, anyone wants to lay bets on the rain??
Instead they irresponsibly say, “may have activated during the crash sequence”. What extra terrestrial illusions will that little gem crank up in the minds of inexperienced newbies? Usually during the crash sequence is when all the bloody lights go out, in this case quite quickly.
One thing for sure is that if he was using the LL, as was observed earlier, then an interior light, bright and right in front of the eyeball, and dancing around the curved plexi windscreen cabin and doors would have immediately cost the pilot his outside vision and cast him into questioning his orientation long before the old ear-hole pressures start to sway around. If all doors were on that is where you can guarantee you will not see out to the ground, sideways, or in front.
Goose bumps anyone???