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cavortingcheetah
10th Jan 2006, 07:49
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Airbus says pilot misunderstood use of sidestick position indicator, causing him to inadvertently reduce pitch-up after VR

The Airbus Emirates A340-300 take-off overrun incident at Johannesburg in April was caused by an elementary blunder in the crew's use of instruments to judge pitch attitude during rotation, Airbus says.

Flight International has learned that the crew misused an indicator showing sidestick position to select rotation angle - an unapproved and flawed technique - which resulted in the Dubai-bound A340-300 failing to get airborne until it had passed beyond the end of the 4,420m (14,490ft) -long runway. As the aircraft overran the runway end, it struck lighting, bursting three main gear tyres and damaging the flaps - which subsequently locked in a partly deployed position (Flight International, 20-26 April). After the incident on 9 April, the aircraft, with 230 people on board, returned to Johannesburg after dumping fuel.

The bizarre circumstances surrounding the incident were revealed in a flight operations telex (FOT) issued by Airbus to A330/A340 operators earlier this month, and confirmed to Flight International by the manufacturer's chief test pilot Jacques Rossay.
<snip>
Rossay says that the pilot flying incorrectly believed that the sidestick position symbol could be used to select pitch attitude for rotation. This is thought to be an unprecedented error, and Rossay cannot explain why the pilot thought it was a valid technique.
<snip>

The official investigation into the incident is ongoing, with an interim report expected within a couple of months.

Emirates' senior vice-president for flight operations Chris Knowles recently resigned, but the airline has revealed no reason for his departure (Flight International, 8-14 June).
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More at www.flightinternational

FlightDetent
10th Jan 2006, 09:11
OK. The question to all (bearing in mind that the bus' "german cross" is not a flight instrument yet mixed fleet flying has its difficulties): how early on rotation do you look down to the screens?

FD
(the un-real)

Algy
10th Jan 2006, 09:26
Direct link to the Flight story...
http://shortlinks.co.uk/8h

Streamline
10th Jan 2006, 12:33
There are two runways in Jo’burg a 3400 (03R 21L) and a 4400 m (03L 21R) long.

They landed relatively deep on the shortest runway (03 R 3400m), knowing they had multiple tyre failure (ATC) with auto brakes armed and flaps in Take Off position at MLW.

The longer 4400 m runway was available in CAVOK conditions served by a non-precision approach.

The ATIS was favouring runway 21R (4400 m) however ATC in contradiction to the ATIS advised runway 03 R wind conditions were better.

The A 340-300 was not fitted with TPI (tyre press ind) however the crew was also qualified on another type that was fitted with TPI.

There is no checklist in case of low TPI indication. The crew has to use common sense in order to conclude that without tyre……. there is no transducer ……hence no antiskid …..hence not to use autobrakes.

Landing on 21 R and the use of reversers in order to transfer the deceleration on the engines iso the gear would have been completely compatible with a 4400 m runway.

VC10 Rib22
10th Jan 2006, 13:29
I believe we are all in agreement that the only thing that saved a disaster in Jo'burg was a huge amount of luck. The information that has since come into the public eye is a perfect example of what can happen when people not suitably qualified, even with the best of intention, try to perform the function of a flight testing department. Historically, pilots are renowned for trying to tinker, adjust and improve their aircraft - hence the pilot and dog 'ideal' cockpit - sometimes with devastating consequences.

I don't think anybody can come out of this smelling of roses. Airbus' flight testing department, who will argue that the sole reason for this occurrence was a blatant disregard of approved operating procedure, should question whether their brain-storming session on 'what ways can those stupid lineys kill themselves?' was extensive enough.

As much as Emirates' ambition to reduce tailstrike occurrences is understandable, the first thing they should have done once they had created this new procedure and before approving it, should have been to phone or fax Toulouse and let the professionals both run it on the computer and on a real aircraft to allow a go/no go answer.

The pilot himself was in a very difficult situation. Inexperienced on type, and no doubt very aware of the potential for a tailstrike on such a long aircraft, he would obviously be very susceptible to accepting helpful tips to reduce the chances of such an event. The fact this help seems to have come directly from the airline and not from another line pilot would only increase his susceptibility. Some people will argue that, as a pilot, you are paid big money to look after the folks on the other side of the door, who expect the person at the controls to operate their aircraft in accordance with approved methods only, and that he chose not to do so, inviting Sod’s Law.

Lastly, there is also the issue about this being only both pilots' second actual flight in this particular variant. Not knowing either pilot's previous flying experience, nor having the experience to comment on the significance of actual time on type compared to simulator time, especially when starting on a new variant, I will leave this for those who have the experience to make comment to do so.

If there are others out there who are using their own tweaked version of the aircraft flight manual or operations manual, hopefully this event may encourage them to fax the manufacturer and make sure what they are doing is safe.

If I remember correctly, the P.F. is a pprune member and made a posting after this particular flight. We are all glad you are still with us and know you will have learned so much since then. Take the flak, dust yourself down and get back on the horse. I wish you well in the future.


Happy flying!

VC10 Rib22
:ok:

Streamline
10th Jan 2006, 14:41
According to the report EK started operations in 1986 and the UAE CAA came into being in 1996.

So EK has effectively been operating without a CAA for about ten years.

Hence a lot of very personnel interpretations of training and performance issues by the few in control, became law. Effectively the EK FOM a complilation of notes and FCI's was the bible and there were many serious mistakes in it.

During this period EK hired the wrong people to run it’s OPS department, people that also bluntly ignored the advice of many very capable pilots in the EK pilot pool.

Genuine professionals were slaughtered in their attempt to raise important safety related issues and some others simply resigned.

To setup an aviation authority that is effective and efficient takes a very long time. It is time that EK realizes that pilots, who are critical, often do so because they are genuinely concerned. If mistakes are made they should be admitted and corrected.

Those that knew that things were wrong were afraid to stand up against it and they were right not to do so. It's too dangerous.

I feel sorry for the Captain and First Officer on that flight. They were not given the tools to do their job properly and were rostered to a restricted or even a restricted + Airport.

I am pleased to see that for the A 380 induction, EK has chosen a capable chap but he needs all the help he can get.

Good luck James and thanks for your help in the past.





Flight Detent.

On the B 737-800 we have the same problem, it’s very critical.

I look outside during the takeoff run and rotation. As soon as directional cues disappear I transfer inside.

Rotation continues but never above 10° pitch until I am airborne.

To determine that, I use the “click noise” that emerges from the solenoid in the gear handle locking mechanism.

It’s very difficult to judge a rotation rate; the issue is not to go to high in pitch with the gear on the ground. As long as Boeing does not provide us with a specially designed tool to determine that moment we have to use something else.

Maybe we could use the radio-altimeter but I don’t think I could do that (get it in my scan) since I really need to focus on that pitch, my ears do the rest.

On the A 340 the click could be replaced by the disapearing of the SSOI indicator. I do not agree with the conclusions of the report to use the nose gear air/ground sensor iso the main gear sensor to remove the SSOI from the PFD.

Hope that answers your question.

readytocopy
10th Jan 2006, 18:14
We are so worried half the time about the FOM and FCI's and covering our a*s, that we forget to fly the plane. We claim to be professionals, yet we brief each other to death. We talk about CRM; aren't we both there in the flight deck...just fly.

Streamline
10th Jan 2006, 18:23
Bigilla

There is a difference between discrediting a pilot and pointing out that inadequate training may be the cause.

I consider the pilots concerned to be a victim of the system. In order to do so you have to point out the shortcomings. I never attacked the pilots, only made observations about the decision making process and I consider that a training issue.

As such what I said was very relevant and it now seems to turn out that the error made was training induced.

As far as the thread you refer to is concerned , I would like to mention that it now turns out that I was completely right.

Maybe the pilots concerned should have refused to apply the rotation technique as it was being trained and get fired. Your choice.

They were actually fired and the only reason why they are still there is that the incident happened outside the UAE and got an international dimension that needed their cooperation.

Airbubba
11th Jan 2006, 00:06
>>According to the report EK started operations in 1986 and the UAE CAA came into being in 1996.

So EK has effectively been operating without a CAA for about ten years.<<

Well, they had a DGCA or something before 1996 since a lot of us have UAE ATPL's from earlier years...

Jet_A_Knight
11th Jan 2006, 01:11
Does anybody have a hyperlink to the actual report please?

vapilot2004
11th Jan 2006, 06:58
Does anybody have a hyperlink to the actual report please?

I've looked in all of the usual places. I wanted to post the link after reading it myself - but no luck thus far.

One thing of interest I didn't know was that the Emirates A340's came by way of !! Boeing from SN. (part of a 777 deal with SN to takeover the A343's they had)

Poor poor training !

Streamline
11th Jan 2006, 08:17
I've looked in all of the usual places. I wanted to post the link after reading it myself - but no luck thus far.
One thing of interest I didn't know was that the Emirates A340's came by way of !! Boeing from SN. (part of a 777 deal with SN to takeover the A343's they had)
Poor poor training !


Elaborate please, very unclear what you want to point out here.





The report states that the crew did a magnificent job when recovering directional control of the aircraft during the landing roll after they became aware that they had lost complete braking due to ANTISKID failure.

I agree with that but one must look at the reason why they got into such a situation. Again, I contribute this to poor training.

One of the main objectives of training is to focus on the weak spots a certain Aircraft design has and it’s consequences.



Today’s Aircraft design is based on high performance engines, wings and light weight. However these advantages can not be used when they are not matched with very effective braking technology.

As a consequence the penalties on landing and take off with ANTISKID inoperative are often the highest.

In other words; when one looks at a single failure that has the biggest consequences on landing performance; ANTISKID is very high up in the list; often more restrictive than flaps up landing.

These issues need to be pointed out in training and should be known by hart.

I would even urge the manufacturers to publish advisory tables on landing distances (deceleration till about 80 kts) using reversers only or at least demonstrate it in the sim. Often it is stated that the crew should use sound judgement. These tables would be useful tool for any condition where braking is seriously impaired for whatever reason.

Zomp
11th Jan 2006, 08:31
if you ask anybody who did the 330 to 340 conversion in EK he would tell you it's a load of s**t.
the standards in EK went down the drain the last few years and for sure the management will operate like that until the loose an A/C or they retire with their big bonuses, whatever comes first.

even 6 month after the incident I was told by an not so popular TCI or TCE, whatever he is, to use the german cross.
told him to forget about it I rotate it like the 330 or any other widebody
A/C.

the CAA in UAE is ruled by the royal family who owns EK, the EK CEO is the head of the CAA.
the whole thing is a joke

Streamline
11th Jan 2006, 09:06
Throw in the towel and come back to Europe …….we need you

Shuttleworth
11th Jan 2006, 09:43
even 6 month after the incident I was told by an not so popular TCI or TCE, whatever he is, to use the german cross.

Jesus!!!

Emirates need to sort this out before they kill 350 passengers who are sadly unaware of thier omissions in pilot training.

fatbus
11th Jan 2006, 09:48
theUAE CAA is not run or controled by the EK boss
PS cant wait to get back home

Streamline
11th Jan 2006, 10:37
If that is true then ask the UAE CAA to release the complete safety audit report done on them by ICAO and ask the FAA why they took IMMEDIATE action AGAINST EK!

Also, why did the others do nothing while they knew very well what was going on.

fatbus
11th Jan 2006, 11:45
Streamline
-good ? go ahead you ask
-another good ? why?

David Learmount
11th Jan 2006, 13:11
For those who wish for a copy of the report, if you ask the South African CAA they could send it to you. We contacted them and they were very helpful, but despite our request for an electronic version of the report the CAA preferred to send us a hard copy.

We originally got our information that the report was available from an interested party who had been sent a copy and kindly gave us access to it. So the report's existence was not exactly publicised.

DL

sky9
11th Jan 2006, 17:56
David
In the interests of Safety you wouldn't like to scan it onto Adobe and place it on the Flight website ( with the permission of the SA CAA). I've looked on their website and they are about a year behind on electronic publication.

1 to go
11th Jan 2006, 18:24
I totally agree with the post by READY TO COPY. I must say that the management of the Flight Operations department of EK should be reviewed (no more YES men), I think only one face has disappeared post the accident. I am a non EK pilot but one who has experienced their approach to flying the Airbus, they are looking for a standard solution rather than encouraging good airmanship. The 2 pilots involved in the accident were not give proper exposure to the A340-300.

Streamline
11th Jan 2006, 18:55
The report goes on by stating that the crew had looked at the landing performance data and concluded that the reference figure was 1400 m

This figure is not factored and should be at least factored in the same way as the normal configuration figures are. (factor 1.67)

In non-normal configurations they should at least be doubled, so 2800m in this case; definitely if non normal flap configurations are concerned because of the difficult flare.

But the tables were not valid in this case since the brakes were affected!!!!!!

Also, on the take off, it is not advisable to change any configuration (gear and/or flaps) if performance does not require you to do so in case you have reason to suspect substantial damage. It takes a lot of force to make a 250 ton aircraft vibrate severely.Nobody wants a crippled tyre to explode in the wheel well.

Climb to a safe altitude and get to manoeuvring speed. Then take your time.

The real safety issue is not the passengers’ life; IT’S YOUR OWN life.

You are entitled to a good training and be well rested.

You are entitled to ask any question to the training department without having to sit on your knees.

But beware! What happened at Air Mauritius has happened in EK many times already.

And His Highness Sheigh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum knows about it personnaly and directly!

Streamline
8th Feb 2006, 18:30
I think it is time to put the incident and other EK safety audit reports on the web any hints where?

boeingboeingbong
9th Feb 2006, 12:26
Statement in Flight International:

The co-pilot was looking out to ensure the aircraft was tracking the runway centreline, says the report, adding that his expectation of lower performance from the A340-300 than the Airbus types he was more familiar with, the selection of flexible thrust rather than full power, and Johannesburg’s high airport elevation had led him to expect the take-off run would be unusually long, so he did not intervene in the sequence.

Now I dont know much about flying widebody passenger jets but my understanding is that they would have worked out the take off performance and anticipated V speeds prior to take off - so why would alarm bells not start ringing in their own minds when they exceeded these pre-determined parameters?

Also, can we take from the underlined statement that perhaps the FO did see what was happening but this was simply a case of poor CRM skills/part of the culture in UAE that prevents the FO from speaking up/confronting someone in authority in such circumstances. Pure speculation here of course so please dont be offended if I am way off the mark with my comments!

ibelieveicanfly
9th Feb 2006, 13:43
Last year I flew 2 months in lease for Comair and I tell you the T/O roll can be very long!5558ft!
WHen I went back home,this was guess what... an A340 with the poor ROLLS ROYCE engine(version of a swiss company).DUe to perfo about 20 PAX were left at check-in gate!
Why not sending another kind of plane at such airports?!

EGGW
9th Feb 2006, 14:37
ibelieveicanfly Actually Monsieur, engines fitted to the 340-300 are CFM-56, fabrique en France... and the USA. Joint venture by GE and Snecma.

The Rolls fitted to the 340-500/600 are excellent.

Next

EGGW

Streamline
9th Feb 2006, 15:52
The report states that a no bleed Take Off was made in order to have more power. This is complete B******.

A no bleed in this case was made in order to be able to select a higher assumed temp. Lower EGT and safe money on maintenance.

I have the impression that the investigator(s) do not know what assumed temp really is.

Why use assumed at this field if you know there is a performance problem anyway?

This field is a restricted Airport, EK training dep does not understand the implications nor do they understand ETOPs or AWO and much more.

VP TAA
9th Feb 2006, 16:04
I dont think that the person who suggested this techinique intended that the maltese cross be kept at 10 degrees . I dont use it . But I vaguely remember it being mentioned as an initial elevator possition to initiate rotation,around the time I was trained,as a possible way to prevent a tail strike.
I guess the person who recomended it is going to be canned because the person who applied the techinique didnt listen properly and what is more didnt realise that it wasnt working out.Tell me.. how long does it take for a pilot to realise that the aircraft is not getting airborn.
It sounds like a huge lack of experience or confidence here...strange
VP TAA

ibelieveicanfly
9th Feb 2006, 19:22
To EGGW : Have you got something against french people? I agree they are sometimes annoying, like could be also people across the channel?
Here is not the topic and I have absolutely nothing against Rollsroyce but here is a fact that Swiss A340 which are fitted with these engines,by the way, have somtimes to climb in the hold when taking off from Geneva rw23 due to perfo. So I wonder why not sending in JNB another kind of plane if operationnaly feasible?

EGGW
9th Feb 2006, 21:55
ibelieveicanfly

Here is a link to a photo of a Swiss 340-300, fitted pal with CFM-56 engines, made in France or US like it or not.

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0999655/M/

Picture 2

Emirates 340-500 powered by Rolls Royce Trent 500's.

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0996453/M/

Please get you facts straight before you bother replying.

Nothing against you Frenchies, just you getting your facts wrong!

EGGW :rolleyes: (Le Rostbif)

bushbolox
10th Feb 2006, 12:20
Streamline,
Why would you factor performance in flight ref data. That is only for despatch to meet the criteria of perf a probability formula.
Ref distances from NNC/qrh etc are based on actual distances and not factored, or you would never achieve a landing distance in a non normal situation.The PI distances are conditional only on entering the tables in the right config/conditions/problem. Follow the sequence in these charts and you will have a actual distance for the condition and techniques so followed.

Oblaaspop
10th Feb 2006, 12:45
Also, can we take from the underlined statement that perhaps the FO did see what was happening but this was simply a case of poor CRM skills/part of the culture in UAE that prevents the FO from speaking up/confronting someone in authority in such circumstances. Pure speculation here of course so please dont be offended if I am way off the mark with my comments!

Sorry, I actually do take offence at that quote!

Perhaps it would help you and others to understand that only about 2% of the pilot work force here is actually local. The rest are expats mainly Brits (me included), Aussies, Canadians, Yanks and other Europeans (well about 60 other nationalities to be exact).

No such "culture"/CRM problems exist at EK! In fact the company takes great pride in the fact that soooooo many different nationalities fly together.

Indeed the 2 guys involved were from "Western" countries.

I have only one rule when I fly, and thats to land safely at the other end! If that means shouting at/ taking control from the captain before we pile into the ground then so beit, regardless of where he's from.

For the record, I flown with several different "locals" and other Arabs, and have enjoyed flying with them, they're generally good/able guys with good CRM. (of course there is the odd exception, but you'll find that anywhere!)

I hope this helps with your question about this airlines environment, which you clearly know nothing about!

TE RANGI
10th Feb 2006, 19:08
To use (or recommend the use) of the Maltese cross for rotation implies an absolute ignorance of its purpose or function. Although it's superimposed on the attitude indicator, its indication is the flight control input on a fixed scale that bears no relation whatsoever to aircraft attitude. Every Airbus pilot knows this!

I find it hard to believe that an A340 crew does not know how to properly rotate the aircraft. And harder still, the fact that such a flawed technique was taught at a major airline. Or is there something more than meets the eye here?:confused:

Streamline
11th Feb 2006, 21:01
Streamline,
Why would you factor performance in flight ref data. That is only for despatch to meet the criteria of perf a probability formula.
Ref distances from NNC/qrh etc are based on actual distances and not factored, or you would never achieve a landing distance in a non normal situation.The PI distances are conditional only on entering the tables in the right config/conditions/problem. Follow the sequence in these charts and you will have a actual distance for the condition and techniques so followed.

You are wrong AND A DANGER TO YOUR PAX IF YOU REALLY BELIEVE WHAT YOU ARE SAYING

Dan Winterland
12th Feb 2006, 00:17
Look at the facts. Crew new to the variant, difficult airport, minimal training. The factors were lining up in a row prior up to this accident.

But I'm not suprised that Airbus found the crew at fault with their using an incorrect technique. Anything else would put their Cross Cockpit Qualification system (a big seller for Airbus') in jepoardy.

Flyingphil
12th Feb 2006, 09:16
Is the Report anywhere avbl as pdf-Download?

Would be interesting to read the details:ok:

Thanx

Airbus340FO
12th Feb 2006, 10:16
OK. The question to all (bearing in mind that the bus' "german cross" is not a flight instrument yet mixed fleet flying has its difficulties): how early on rotation do you look down to the screens?
FD
(the un-real)
good morning Flightdetent,
mixed fleet flying - Airbus has the GERMAN cross ( I like that ) on every airbus, so there shouldn´t be a problem with that. But to be honest, I do not like flying 3 different Airbus at the same time.
how early on rotation do you look down to the screens?
Rotation on the big birds is done by reference to the PFD ( primary flight display ), the chance of a tailstrike is way too high, if done by visual reference. On rotation your eyes should be more in than out.

Payscale
12th Feb 2006, 10:41
Stremline

Back to the study room with you. You are mixing pre departure planning with inflight requirements. Forget about 1.67 in this case.
A million factors brought this incident about. Luckily the guyes are here to tell the story. On that day you might have done the same. I know I could! Pilots who are involved in incidents/accidents are not the worst pilots around. The swiss cheese was just lined up wrong that day.

Someone mentioned you were fired from EK. Care to elaborate?

williewalsh
12th Feb 2006, 11:34
What?? Streamline fired from EK. did he fail his perf refresher? I notice his profile says "SENIOR ailrine capt".OOOOOEEErRRR Maybe his yerkes dobson has flattened out on the way to being senior :-)
I concede that some companies recommend factoring a PI figure for prudence, but it is not a legal requirement and having landed on a 1600 metre rwy with a PI pf 1300metres on a wet day, actual stop was 800 metres, i have every faith that the 1400 metres these guys calclated was a valid stopping distance for the emrgency config and conditions.

By german cross do we mean maltese cross...just curious

bushbolox
12th Feb 2006, 12:10
Streamline,
I asked a reasonable question and you accuse me of being a danger.

Landing distances taken from a QRH are not factored I agree, but do YOU understand the difference between despatch performance and performance in flight and its legal implication. Quite obviously you dont. The distance claculated in flight from your Qrh (or rather mine) will produce the actual LDR this is what you physically need. Factored LDR is a function of despatch and subject to the factoring you mentioned. To sum up YOU MAY NOT DESPATCH to a destination without factoring,amonst other considerations. YOU MAY USE the PI as a real time indication as to whether LDA is sufficent for the actual conditions or non normals you find yourself in. Conversely you can not use PI to determine LDR for despatch as its not factored only advisory.If you choose to factor it , it is still only advisory and a pointless exercise as it would preclude alot of potential options. (The decision is yours in flight).The PD section of VOL1 of your ops manual is for performance despatch (or your afm, or your perf dept). Hope this is clear.
A landing distance produced just last night on a Boeing LAptop Tool was identical to one careful taken from the PI. You Sir obviously have a misunderstanding of the topic and i would suggest you are the danger , that is if I was as petty as you. If you need more advice on the conditions surrounding despatch and PI I'll be happy to guide you......Try applying your theory to say a slippery runway with medium BA. A PI of say 2500 metres then so factored as you suggest would rather limit your options to runways of Shuttle proportions. Where necessary the PI have factoring notes as in the case above. Now I speak confidently about the manufacturer i Fly. If yours is different You may have a valid point and opinion but dont ever makean accusation as to my being a danger. That would make you an ignorant ******** and we wouldnt want that would we?

PS I operate into many limiting, cat c, wet, slippy contaminated runways where PI is a daily occurrance.I recently underwent a caa refresher on the topic. On behalf of my pax i would like to thank you for your concern but assure you we are safe. I shall pass your concerns on to my DFO who was sitting next to me and had such a discussion on this topic and the misunderstanding common amongst enthusiasts.

PPS Just in case :LDA is landing distance available, it includes 300metres of air distance and is from 50 feet over the threshold. Cant be too careful when such ignorance is manifest...have a nice day

Gulf News
12th Feb 2006, 15:57
Bickering aside, does anyone know what implications the publication of the report will have for the two pilots involved, who incidentaly have been suspended since the event?

Streamline
12th Feb 2006, 16:19
Gulf News
There should be no implications for the crew since we will show clear indications that the UAE CAA themselves are lacking the competence to make any judgment.

Bushbolox
I suggest that you read JAR OPS 1.515 with special attention to point 1.515 (d).

1.515 (d) If an operator is unable to comply with subparagraph (c) (1) above for a destination aerodrome having a single runway where a landing depends upon a specific wind component, an aeroplane may be dispatched if 2 alternate aerodromes are designated witch permit full compliance with subparagraphs (a),(b) and(c). Before commencing an approach to land at the destination aerodrome the commander must satisfy himself that a landing can be made in full compliance with JAR-OPS 1.510 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.That is factored.

Referring to JAR OPS 1.475 (a) (1) one should read clearly that despatch rules are NOT the same as mass at Take Off. What JAR OPS states is that when starting the approach you NEED to factor normal landing distances based upon the latest available met conditions at estimated arrival time. From that point they work their way back to the Take Off mass.

Any possible confusion as to the application of this rule is clearly phrased in point 1.515 (d). This clearly indicates that if they want to refer to explicit dispatch conditions they use the term as appropriate.

Your assumption that, once the gear is up, unfactored LDA calculations are allowed would put us in a real mess. I realize that following your reasoning you would be flying to an aerodrome that met factoring LDA at an earlier stage in the flight (Take Off interpreted as despatch) but if conditions changed enroute, your reasoning would imply that the regulator allows you to act as a factory pilot and I do not believe that that was his goal. The non factored data, obtained during certification actually put the Aircraft almost in an emergency condition after landing. I am sure you do not want to do that.

For non-normals factoring is not stipulated but a VERY wise thing to do.
I would like to point out clearly that thinking like a lawyer is exactly what you do not want in this business.

I guess that your life is as important as that of your pax so they should not have to worry.

As far as my communication style is concerned I can assure you that it is appropriate to these circumstances as this is the only way EK communicates themselves. EK pilots do not realise I am and always have been on their side.

I do not care if your DFO was next to you in the classroom, it's the DFO's at EK who got them in this mess anyway.

helen-damnation
12th Feb 2006, 17:47
Both crew now flying again after a scandalous delay :*

FO has (2 year :confused: ) delay on command.

Capt is an FO for 12 months.

Good to have you back guys :ok: :ok:

bushbolox
12th Feb 2006, 18:19
Streanline,
Thank you for your guidance. I shall read the appropiate jar sections just before wiping on my next visit.:}
But erm... I should factor my distances before commencing an approach to comply with jar ops blah de blah....but ....i' m not intended to be a factory pilot.......speak English man.
It does what it says on the tin.If it needs 900 it uses 900. Been there ate the rubber.

145qrh
12th Feb 2006, 19:12
What triainline is trying to say is that for a normal landing at destination you must apply a factor of 1.67 dry and 1.92 wet to the qrh figures. It is not just a case of if you are airborne you use qrh figures, a lot of EK guys believe this to be true, but its bullsh..... Only time you dont apply factors if it is a non-normal landing ie eng fail, flap/slat fail, then its qrh figs with no factor...

A lot of its down to EK perf instructors not really knowing what they are talking about, it's a specialised subject that requires dedicated intructors...pity EK try to save money everywhere ( every Dh is a prisoner )
including safety!!!!!

Streamline
12th Feb 2006, 20:12
That is the exact truth.

To get EK back on track we had to reeducate the whole training department on basic performance issues.

The performance engineer was so fed up that he left the company and was hired by Boeing, only to come back a few months later as their rep to explain EK how to finally and legally dispatch an ETOPS flight something the A 330 Technical pilot did not understand.

We caused some waves and EK used a spin to deal with it. They are dangerous.

plovdiv
12th Feb 2006, 20:32
So we all agree, including Streamline, that in this abnormal scenario factoring was not a legal requirement. Furthermore the correctness (or at least not the incorrectness) of this is confirmed by the fact that the aircraft landed and all on board walked away from it.

Streamline has got his teeth into this and he will not let go.

I support the suggestion that he is being deliberately contentious in order to prolong the life of this thread, with the intention of maintaining a medium that allows him to mock his former employer and its associates.

This confirmed by the random snipings at EK/GCAA that are scattered throughout his postings.

In short, he has hijacked this thread for his own ends.

electricjetjock
13th Feb 2006, 02:06
Streamline:confused:

I think you need to have a rest and re-read some of your posts you are mixing up your requirements from dispatch and airborne. You also quoted in bold colours that JAA rules require ..blah blah... for DESTINATION Airport. Well old chap the destination of the EK flight from JNB was DXB was it not! They had to RETURN to JNB due to damage to the aircraft. They were NOT planning to return to JNB when they started the takeoff run.;)

I fly three types of Airbus A330-300, A340-300 and A340-600 and use exactly the same technique on all three as per my company and Airbus manuals/procedures. Looking outside and inside not solely one or the other.

The "cross" be it German or Maltese is a stick position indicator and that is all it is. We fly our aircraft by ATTITUDE, and with sometimes!!:E

There are tables for Actual Landing Distance and Required Landing Distance. In our QRH's we have tables for Landing Distance without Autobrake (and that is the Test Pliot type landing) and it has corrections for contaminant wind slope etc. We also have Autoland with autobrake. The first = shortest distance the latter = longest, if we had runway length = to the longest NO problems. Assuming we had adjusted the Landing Distance Config Full by the appropriate factor, in the initial calculation,( and it covers every possible mixture of Slats and Flaps position). If I still was not happy I could go to FCOM 2 landing performance and by using the tables there could probably come up with a figure that is between the two from the QRH.

Here are a few snippets from my Co. manuals

DISPATCH REQUIREMENT - required landing distance at forecast landing weight shall not exceed LDA Dest and Altn/ most suitable runway nil wind / forcast wind. Effect of aircraft system failure affecting LDA "KNOWN" before dispatch MUST be allowed for in LDA calculation. The effect of thrust reversers is SHOULD NOT be included.

IN FLIGHT FAILURE - Runway lenght considered for landing is ALD without failure multiplied by appropriate factor given in FCOM 2 and QRH. It should be noted that the LD is the absolute minimum achievable only margin being reverse thrust IF available.

ROTATION - At Vr promptly and smoothly apply and hold approximately 2/3 aft sidestick to achieve a rotation rate of approximately 2 to 3 deg/sec, assessed primarily by outside visual reference. Avoid rapid and large corrections that will result in a sharp reaction in pitch from the aircraft. THE ROTATION RATE MAY TAKE TIME TO ESTABLISH FOR A GIVEN STICK INPUT, once it has established it remains fairly constant. Rotation rate is important too low compromises performance too high = risk of tailstrike. As the rotation progresses and runway environment disappears transfer to the PFD to establish initial PITCH ATTITUDE ( 15 330 / 12.5 340-300 / 15 340-600). Once airborne and SRS commands have lowered follow the FD's.

ROTATION PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES - A330 considerable excess thrust so a normally flown rotate will generally achieve a stabilised speed in excess of V2+10, do not increase the rotation rate to contain the speed excess. at heavy weights the A/C has more inertia and it is slower to commence rotation, as it starts to rotate MAINTAIN the back pressure to achieve steady rotation to target attitude, mainwheels lift off around 9-10deg pitch attitude. The A/C could stop rotating at this point if the back pressure is NOT maintained. There is a slight "sensory" difference in the rotation of the -600 due to the A/C being longer and more flexible, do not react to this, use the same techniques, as the rotation law has been adapted to cater for this.

From all of this one can only assume the training fell over somewhere and it also seems strange that they EK do not roster the trainees to fly at least two sectors with a trainer after the CCQ training in the simulator, if that was really the case. It could have prevented this incident!

7x7
13th Feb 2006, 05:14
Disregarding all the rights and wrongs of this sorry situation, hands up all who are sick and *** tired of this streamlined individual from Belgium? Car-, the man you so love to hate from DGCA is no longer with them. He was replaced by a local gentleman quite some time ago, (LONG before this incident), so give your "DGCA are all fools" line a rest or you rsk being Politically Incorrect.

At least you haven't (yet) deleted your posts (a habit you've indulged in repeatedly both as 'Streamline' and 'Cap56' and God only knows in what other guises here on Pprune) when, as in your "you are dangerous" quip back on page 2, you have been proven to be wrong over and over again in your assertions - (as well as seriously flawed in your technical knowledge, a subject you obviously believe yourself to be infinitely superior to every other pilot in the world).

One question you never seem to get around to answering: why did you leave EK?

Mysalami
13th Feb 2006, 11:14
Very good point there 7X7. I seem to remember a EK FO who was the holder of all knowledge. In fact he knew soooo much he never had to listen to anyone else. Think he was let go because of some reason that would probably stop him from holding a licence in most parts of the world.
Streamline, I think you need to let go of the past and get on with your life.

plovdiv
13th Feb 2006, 11:26
Actually, two Streamline posts did disappear on Sunday evening. They were rather short lived and probably moderated.

One was a rather unCRMish outburst concerning CRM in multi national crew complements in which he mentioned three names.

The other post was a suggestion that he left his previous employer of his own free will.

Streamline
13th Feb 2006, 13:33
Plovdiv

What you say is completely beside the point.

If factoring is required for normal operations then there are very good reasons for that.

In non normal situations you get a basic figure (no factoring). I am only stating that it is a very wise thing to apply some factoring anyway. It is just common sense to do so definitely if one understands how these numbers are obtained.

Ignoring this is a serious lack in training. We can all sum up cases were one could legally get into trouble. I think any pilot or judge with common sense would agree.

7x7

I will publish the audit that states that EK did not meed the minimum international safety standards when I was there. I know it must hurt but it's in your own interest that you face the reality of the place. Leave your emotions behind and face the facts.

plovdiv
13th Feb 2006, 14:10
I rest my case.

williewalsh
13th Feb 2006, 22:04
Streamline,
The paragraph you refer to but dont post 1.510 states that ( my words) you must satisfy that there sufficient distance to landetc etc etc. It doesnt say you have to factor it which is a function of belt and braces to meet the probability requirements of PERF A and is not a real time landing distance but a theoretical equivalent.Therefore PI figures need to fit thats all. The rest is the decision of the commander or company policy. Not JAR. Get your head out of the books and get a life. Because you obviously cant read legal documents.
Companies that factor do so out of policy not requirement.

7x7
14th Feb 2006, 06:03
I see that 'Streamline's' at it again - this time amending rather than deleting his earlier posts so they don't contradict his later ones.

Ca**, it pains me to say this, but in your ridiculous attempts to punish all things even vaguely EK, you're achieving almost the opposite, deflecting the thread away from the real topic.

The sad fact is that no matter how remiss many of us may feel EK (not the crew) may have been in their handling the before and after of this sad event, not one of us who know you (ie, who flew with you), can bring ourselves to agree with you, because we know you for what you were then, (and to judge by your ever changing if not disappearing posts, presumedly still are).

Still waiting for the answer... why did you leave EK?

Dagger Dirk
14th Feb 2006, 12:57
Download Menu for Report in MS Word format (rar'd) is at this link (http://www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm)
.
Files are each around 9mb in size and will require WINRAR to decompress to their native format.
link (http://www.download.com/3000-2250-10007677.html) for free download of WINRAR (shareware).
.
Courtesy of "STREAMLINE"

guttersnipe
15th Feb 2006, 23:43
even 6 month after the incident I was told by an not so popular TCI or TCE, whatever he is, to use the german cross.

Jesus!!!

Emirates need to sort this out before they kill 350 passengers who are sadly unaware of thier omissions in pilot training. What is a German Cross? After 13 years flying Airbus large and small I have not heard that one! Are U an ATR guy? As for killing 350 pax which model of Airbus are you talking of? Do a little research and avoid embarrasing yourself! and others in the profession. Both of the individuals concerned in this serious incident were and are considered to be ABOVE average. Whilst I expect your comments are meant to be taken with a "grain of salt" and consequently lightweight and I bear you no malice I do implore you as a fellow aviator ( I presume, perhaps rashly) think before you post. Furthermore what direct knowledge have you of EK training? other than what you heard in catering!

EGGW
16th Feb 2006, 03:19
I think hew mean't the "maltese cross" which is a side stick position indicator. On the ground you move the side stick and on the PFD, you will see the "Maltese Cross" move Bro. Have a look the next time u fly :hmm: The cross is not to be used for anything but the control check and to see that a control demand is being made during rotation. The hint/tip given by a Airbus instructor was false. The bottom line the company was somewhat paranoid about the risk of a tailstrike, but perhaps lost focus on letting the guys fly the aircraft. Just my take anyhow

EGGW

mermoz92
16th Feb 2006, 19:42
There is a difference between discrediting a pilot and pointing out that inadequate training may be the cause.
I consider the pilots concerned to be a victim of the system. In order to do so you have to point out the shortcomings. I never attacked the pilots, only made observations about the decision making process and I consider that a training issue.
:uhoh: An Air France Captain did like you say for AF358 Toronto accident. He is still indefinitely grounded since last october....
This notwithstanding the fact that he has been flying Airbus A343 for more than 11 years and accumulate more than 5000 hours on this type of aircraft and 17000 hours total flying hours, and is recognized as a valuable insider at both IFALPA and ECA (he is former ECA Vice-Chairman) since last 10 years.

Streamline
17th Feb 2006, 11:22
www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm


The last part will be avail on monday

Streamline
17th Feb 2006, 12:58
Streamline,
The paragraph you refer to but dont post 1.510 states that ( my words) you must satisfy that there sufficient distance to landetc etc etc. It doesnt say you have to factor it which is a function of belt and braces to meet the probability requirements of PERF A and is not a real time landing distance but a theoretical equivalent.Therefore PI figures need to fit thats all. The rest is the decision of the commander or company policy. Not JAR. Get your head out of the books and get a life. Because you obviously cant read legal documents.
Companies that factor do so out of policy not requirement.

I agree with you as in factual terms that means to use common sense. I never said anything else.

Supertramp
17th Feb 2006, 21:08
You damned well did, Streamline. But you've deleted the post, as I'm told you've often done before.

Streamline
17th Feb 2006, 23:24
Supertramp

You do not know all the facts

I have edited my posts for minor spelling corrections only.

I have indeed deleted some of my posts on the EK incident on another tread, simply because I was attacked out of the context on a personal level.

If the moderator would not have allowed that to happen, I would not have done so, simply because I have not changed my opinion and reality based on common sense proves I was right.

If iasa-int does what they promised, they will put the FAA and ICAO safety on EK audits on the web. It is the FAA and not me who predicted serious problems with EK. I was a victim of the system as you may be tomorrow.

TE RANGI
18th Feb 2006, 13:40
Guttersnipe,

Your quote:
Both of the individuals concerned in this serious incident were and are considered to be ABOVE average.

Well, I don't doubt that, but how could "two individuals above average" not know how to properly rotate the aircraft? No disrespect intended, just for the benefit of a useful debate.

millerscourt
18th Feb 2006, 16:02
TE RANGI I am inclined to agree with you. It amazes me how EK Pilots all seem to stand up for this Captain who showed a lack of Airmanship. They all want to blame EK training dept 100% . He totally ignored all visual clues. He did not help his cause by doing a Flex T/O. When I was on the A340 I rarely did flex T/O's unless very light and only on smooth runways and when operating as second Captain on long haul flights I was horrified at times to see how some Captains did reduced thrust at most inappropriate places and conditions.I think they were worried that the F/O would sneak on them!!

mermoz92
18th Feb 2006, 16:29
I think they were worried that the F/O would sneak on them!!
:eek: In which airline are you, or were you flying where F/O sneaking on Captains is tolerable ?
That's a brand new pratice encouraged by :mad: management pilots at Air France !

BYMONEK
18th Feb 2006, 16:45
Millerscourt

From your post it's presumed that on no occassion then should we consider flex/derate departures from JNB? Come on, unless there are situations such as contaminated runways or windshear forcast for example, and there are several other reasons, then using flex if the performance allows us is normal and standard practice. The Captain did use ' airmanship' ultimately by applying full thrust and pulling back visually. No one on this earth would intentially overrun because thay were simply following instruments.


We do have deficiencies in training which i'm not prepared to go into on a public forum but there's one thing that stands out like a dog's balls.The sooner we as a Company can openly and honestly admit these errors and pass on lessons learned to our very own pilots then the better it will be for all involved. We are quick to use other Airlines accidents as case studies in CRM but our own habit of brushing problems nearer to home under the carpet, prevents us from dealing with far more relevant issues.

I'm fed up of reading about ' HF contact lost with Mumbai '. What I and every other pilot wants to read and LEARN from are the incidents that aren't published. The incidents that happen to our Aircraft and our crews!

It all implies rather sadly that there's far too much rhetoric when it comes to the Companies view of Safety and merely highlights the gulf that exists between 'talking' safe and 'training' safe.

So come on EK, we've carried out our own internal investigation into JNB so please reveal the causes behind this incident. Remember our Corporate motto .........Safety Sense! :suspect:

millerscourt
19th Feb 2006, 08:37
BYMONEK I never operated the A340-300 from JNB as it was not on our route structure but unless very light or a very smooth runway I did not derate as I found the A340 take off run most disconcerting with so much clatter and instrument panel bounce that I wanted to get airborne asap!!. Only once have I ever had to reduce thrust to keep below the 930 limit if my memory serves me right.A large number of our A340 flights were at 275 tons so full power was always required in any case.

Far too many Pilots IMHO derate without considering whether it is really appropriate.

Until I went on the A340 I had never operated with other Line Captains as even on the B767 on 13 hour sectors it was just the two of us! It is a real eye opener seeing how some Captains operate into places like SFO and LAX etc. I have cringed at times but also have picked up useful tips from others.

captjns
19th Feb 2006, 11:31
When deciding whether or not to us flex on top of derate should depend not only on runway conditions, temperature, winds etc. but how the PIC feels. You must also take into consideration of the age of the aircraft too. Believe it or not on older jets, the BOW of the aircraft may heavier than indicated than what is contained in your manuals. The older type of insulation used alone absorbs condensation between checks. While hard to believe, your jet does gain weight between heavy checks. The BOW of a narrow body aircraft can increase by as much as 1.5 to 2.0 tons between heavy checks. As all of you know for the matter of expedience, airlines use average weights (summer/winter/vacation) for passengers and their bags. Take a look at some of your passengers and their bags traveling with you on your aircraft. If you have time, take a walk outside while the bags are being loaded into the cargo pits of your aircraft. A number of airlines use the bag count method to determine baggage weights. Therefore, the larger the aircraft, the greater the inaccuracy of total bag weights, especially on long haul wide body flights. Thus the increased erroneous figures will further skew the actual weight of the aircraft. I fly non-fly by wire aircraft. Under non-adverse weather conditions, I have pretty much learned how to determine if my aircraft is loaded (CG wise) as advertised on the load sheet when the rotation is initiated, and then just before the aircraft becomes airborne (weight wise). A lot happens very quickly at this point, especially when the end of the runway is coming up pretty quickly. Hopefully very few times in your careers, but out of curiosity how many times has the end of the runway appeared sooner before your jet came off the ground? Then how many of you after the jet was off the ground and climbing away from terra firma, in silence of course, for a minute or two to regain composure have looked at each other after you cleared the cow in the pasture at the end of the runway and said “S**t! The W&B is all F**ed up!”

Pilots may use different methods when it comes to flex on top of derate. Perhaps add a few degrees to the max flex temperature, assume the jet weighs more than as advertised on the load sheet, or screw the flex along with the derate altogether.

In the heat of scheduled service, we don’t have the luxury to see what’s going on around our jet, and have to take it for granted that the aircraft is being loaded, and fueled properly, and the paper work is accurate as well.

In cruise it’s a bit easier to better approximate the weight of the aircraft by TAT, body angle, power settings to maintain the selected cruise Mach. This will make the approach and landing hopefully less exciting than the takeoff.

Dagger Dirk
19th Feb 2006, 16:32
Last 3 parts of SAA CAA Report now added to this download menu link
.
http://www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm

TheShadow
19th Feb 2006, 16:52
Original 18 page Pprune thread is at
.
.this link (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=126248&highlight=A340+overrun)

Brian Abraham
20th Feb 2006, 02:11
I must say I find it some what worrying that we have people who by their own admission are driving heavy iron (what I drive would come under the classification of extremely light to you guys) but don’t seem to have heard of the Reason model of accident causation. Here we have a pilot who has never flown the aircraft before, making a take off from probably the most demanding port on the network and things come unstuck. Rather than chiding them on the grounds of “airmanship” a less naive approach is to ask how an experienced crew, albeit in other types, came to grief. My reading of the report is that they were most professional in their handling of the flight, from the nose oleo extension and the take off brief as to what to expect ,to the handling of the subsequent emergency. One question I would ask of a psychologist is what role would the company’s continual tail strike message have to play in the event – over compensation by the pilot in its avoidance?

I find it interesting that D P Davies in “Handling the Big Jets” says……For psychological reasons even the final simulator check can never satisfactorily take the place of the aeroplane. It is particularly disturbing to read of those training organisations who are attempting to do virtually all training and testing on the simulator. It is also difficult to accept that pilots themselves will be satisfied with so little flight experience.

Might be a reason here to take a look at the Airbus common qualification perhaps.

Streamline
20th Feb 2006, 07:49
I have to disagree; the handling of the return was a badly analysed.

The best option was to land on the longest runway available without auto-brake and using as few braking as possible in order to transfer the deceleration onto the reversers. As such they would have walked away from it.

Under CAVOK conditions the A 340 is very well equipped to shoot a non-precision approach and bring the aircraft right in slot for landing on the 4400 m. Any pro with some common sense, can see that immediately. The LDA numbers from QRH were not valid under the given circumstances and on top of that wrongly interpreted. Maybe Davies should have elaborated a bit on that. One can argue for days on the legal aspects of the interpretation of those nombers but common sense would wipe sush a discussion from the table.

The reason for that is that EK does not want to spend any money on decent simulator training and does not have a good non-normal management model. You can not expect Airbus to do that for you. It's common sence not to use autobrakes with a crippled gear.

Also on the low thrust ratio of the A 340 the report wrongly states that they increased the thrust by going no bleed. They did not; they went no bleed in order to reduce EGT and increase the assumed temp for commercial reasons only.

The recover from this f***-up however was excellent with loads of luck on their side.

The report is a publicity stunt from the SAA and UAE CAA and their subtle attempt to blame Airbus. Terms like the award winning Airline do not belong in this report and undermine the credibility of the investigators.

May I add that the report is only 68 pages and there are no transcripts related to information that played an essential role in the decision making process.

The A 340 is a fine aeroplane and you have to f**k it up with inadequate training to get into sush a sh**.

For years EK has been making a mockery of other Airlines during their CRM training sessions. Today EK is the role model of how not to do things.

Dagger Dirk
20th Feb 2006, 08:51
Mounted on menu at www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm (http://www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm)
.
FAA IASA Audit on UAE CAA
.
and
.
ICAO Audit on UAE CAA

ima birdbrain
20th Feb 2006, 09:47
And what even sucks is that we STILL have trainers telling the guys on line to "place the german cross here"......


Saw this first hand on a recent A345 flight ......

BYMONEK
20th Feb 2006, 12:22
Streamline

Far too many contradictions in your post to bother with a reply. The only thing I will say is that they DID walk away from it!

ima birdbrain

May I strongly suggest that a CHFR form is submitted ASAP if this really is the case.That will get far better results than postings on here.

Streamline
20th Feb 2006, 12:35
BYMONEK

You are right, there are contradictions, but that proves only that I posted from the top of my head and not with the books in front of me and just reacted in a natural way with the culture I had. (Except in this tread on the JAR LDA).

But then again I am having a pragmatic interpretation of the rules. After all I am a pilot and not a lawyer. There are different truths and we all know how they can get twisted by a clever lawyer. A former head of the ICAO performance committee wrote a book about this.

Basically a pilot is what remains when he has forgotten everything.

In other words; how much common sense does he have on his own.

Granted, it turned out that I am a bit more conservative than the regulations….in other words ….a bit more on the safe side and that suits me just fine.

I hope EK will do the same in the future. And yes I did file a CHFR but never got any answer....any idea why?

Satan
20th Feb 2006, 14:32
And yes I did file a CHFR but never got any answer....any idea why?

Maybe because the C stands for "Confidential?" Doh!

Streamline
20th Feb 2006, 15:05
Satan

Are you telling me that I actually did something right without knowing it? Let’s hope ima birdbrain takes his pen quickly.

BYMONEK
20th Feb 2006, 16:42
Regarding CHFR, anyone who files one will get an acknowledgment that the CHFR has been received along with the personal details but after that you'll get no further feedback. It's designed this way!

Dagger Dirk
21st Feb 2006, 10:26
Missing page 29 of the Report is now up at the site menu:
.
www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm

Streamline
21st Feb 2006, 13:45
We do have deficiencies in training which i'm not prepared to go into on a public forum but there's one thing that stands out like a dog's balls.The sooner we as a Company can openly and honestly admit these errors and pass on lessons learned to our very own pilots then the better it will be for all involved. We are quick to use other Airlines accidents as case studies in CRM but our own habit of brushing problems nearer to home under the carpet, prevents us from dealing with far more relevant issues.


BYMONEK

Still waiting for the detailed report.

BYMONEK
21st Feb 2006, 16:49
Streamline

You may be waiting some time. The clue was in my first line....." NOT PREPARED TO GO INTO ON A PUBLIC FORUM" !

Streamline
21st Feb 2006, 17:47
Are you sure CH4 is not there?

Mike Dornheim
22nd Feb 2006, 02:14
I appreciate very much the posting of the report, but as a minor point would request that the WINRAR compression not be used in the future.
It saves about 10% file size (trivial) but requires downloading and installing the WINRAR program. Now when I right-click on Start I have four unwanted WINRAR commands that it stealthily added and that I do not want. What else did this obnoxious program do?
Almost nothing is worth adding potentially dangerous programs like this, and it's certainly not worth saving 10% file size.
-- Mike

electricjetjock
22nd Feb 2006, 03:53
It is becoming a poinless thread. Someone has an axe to grind and unfortunately cannot see the wood for the trees.

There are some ill informed anti-airbus comments,mainly from the ill informed.:bored:

2dotsright
25th Feb 2006, 08:39
I really haven't got the time or enthusiasm to read the 5 pages of posts here, just a few of them, however I feel I need to post something here myself. I flew with the Captain of this flight when he was an F/O and he was and is a very good operator, not to mention a good bloke to go with that. He has been treated like s--t since this incident by EK management (surprise surprise) The whole thing is an arse covering exercise by all concerned, I'd give him a job with any airline I ever ran anyway. Good Luck Mate.

Streamline
27th Feb 2006, 22:27
I appreciate very much the posting of the report, but as a minor point would request that the WINRAR compression not be used in the future.
-- Mike


I will get it in PDF format and add some more interesting reports.

Globaliser
27th Feb 2006, 23:24
I will get it in PDF format and add some more interesting reports.I would very much appreciate this, too. Many thanks!

Dagger Dirk
4th Mar 2006, 15:37
UAE-CAA audit Report will be up at this link for a limited period:
.
link (http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/SAA_CAA/UAE-CAA-AUDIT.pdf)
.
6mb download (right-click and "save as ...")

quarefellah
4th Mar 2006, 21:14
Hi All,
Just been reading the PDF Jo'burg report. Thanks DD for posting it.
It's the first time I've seen it. It's published on a pilot rumour website, I work for EK and am flying the 340 :confused: :confused:
Read that paragraph again. It says it all about this outfit :(

Desert Dingo
4th Mar 2006, 23:26
A good report that makes some very valid points. Thanks DD for the link.

I pity the crew though; they had about 15 seconds to sort out a rotation gone wrong before they hit the lights - and the investigation analysed their actions for 8 months and produced 68 pages of report. It did say some nice things about the crew, but who would want to be a pilot nowdays?

I would like to suggest that Airbus could be partly to blame by putting either too much or too little information on the PFD.
I was taught to rotate by pulling, pushing kicking or shoving - whatever it took - to move the nose up at 3 degrees per second, and to make sure the wheels were off the ground before I got to 10 degrees nose up. Pretty simple and it worked, so as the report suggests, who the hell needs the SSOI for rotation?

On the other hand, if it is so tremendously important to apply 2/3 back stick, then how about marking that position on the PFD as a reference. The corners of the envelope are already marked, so it would not be difficult to do with the software.

(Reminds me of another little trick that crept in to become SOPs. A certain Asian airline thought winding in heaps of rudder trim was a great thing for crosswind takeoffs or landings in the B747).
:confused:

electricjetjock
5th Mar 2006, 13:30
Desert Dingo:hmm:

Your post is okay until you try and BLAME Airbus! They do NOT suggest using the Stick Position Indicator for the rotate. It is purely there so that you can see what inputs the PF is applying whilst PNF. The 2/3rds back stick is required and important it will give you the required 2-3 degrees per second, if you apply it smoothly and do not "snatch" it there. (just like you move the yoke on a Boeing or any other aircraft! You should not be using the SPI to give you the 2/3rds position either, look outside and cross check your ATTITUDE on the PFD as you get airborne. Probably what you were advocating in your "pulling......etc" comment.

The fault seems more of a "training" issue / lack of understanding by the person that devised the training for EK.:sad: There certainly was a misunderstanding by the captain in this case and not all his fault, if at all.

RatherBeFlying
5th Mar 2006, 17:13
A very thorough report.

The only thing I can think of adding is that the pilot's very first takeoff in type was at night.

I wonder how many SOPs call for transfering to the PFD/AH as primary pitch reference at rotation for night time takeoffs?

Daylight would likely have provided an abundance of visual clues that more rotation was required.