What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey? [Archive] - Page 6

Dan Reno

19th Oct 2011, 18:11

Son of Osprey’ Could Replace All Army Copters (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/son-of-osprey/)

The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor flown by the Marines and Air Force crashes or burns much more often than the military cares to admit. But that hasn’t stopped Osprey-maker Boeing from pitching a new tiltrotor for an ambitious Army program aimed at replacing almost everything the ground combat branch flies … with a single aircraft design.

That’s potentially thousands of new tiltrotors, which take off vertically like helicopters but fly fast like airplanes, thanks to their rotating engine nacelles — but which are also vulnerable to dangerous aerodynamic phenomena and, in the V-22’s case, have been plagued by engine problems.

By continuing to invest in the V-22, the Pentagon is doubling down on a risky bet. If Boeing’s “son of Osprey” gets the greenlight for the comprehensive Joint Multi-Role program, the military will be going all in. But a lot could change between now and 2025, when the first of the new rotorcraft is (loosely) scheduled to enter service. And there’s reason to believe a new tiltrotor could avoid the pitfalls of the Osprey’s design.

Boeing showed off some preliminary artwork of their Joint Multi-Role tiltrotor at an Army confab in Washington, D.C., last week. The art shows a small, sleek scout version and a larger cargo model. “Those images are nothing more than artist concepts and not necessarily associated with a specific design philosophy,” Boeing spokesman Chris Haddox told Danger Room. “The work is just getting underway.”

All the same, the Boeing concept shows apparent improvements over the V-22. Specifically, simpler wings and better rotors.

To fit aboard the Navy assault ships that carry Marines into battle, the V-22 had to have a wing that could fold back along the fuselage — at the cost of extra weight and complexity. The Osprey’s rotors also had to be smaller than ideal for a 25-ton aircraft, forcing the engines to work harder and run hotter.

Over the years, engineers have proposed solutions to this problem. Farhan Gandhi, an engineer at Penn State University, proposed a telescoping rotor blade that would automatically increase in length during a tiltrotor’s helicopter mode, increasing its lifting ability. One retired V-22 engineer told analyst Lee Gaillard that replacing the V-22’s three-blade rotor with a new, five-blade model (.pdf) would boost performance. In the end, Boeing opted for tweaks to the V-22’s software to squeeze every last bit of performance out of the existing design.

Boeing’s conceptual future tiltrotor seems to avoid these half-measures by incorporating bigger rotors from the outset on the scout model, and twin rotors — that is, two sets of blades on each nacelle — for the cargo version. An Army tiltrotor could probably also skip the folding wing mechanism, as seems to be the case in the artist’s renderings. The result could be a safer, better-performing tiltrotor than the troubled V-22.

V-22 May Need New Engine (Updated)
<LI class=entryAuthor>By Sharon Weinberger (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/author/sharon-weinberger/) http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/wp-content/themes/wired/images/envelope.gif ("")
March 19, 2008 |

The revolutionary V-22 tiltrotor, which was recently sent to Iraq (http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200778214447.asp), has a little problem. Or actually, it has a big problem: its engines are wearing out, and fast (http://www.star-telegram.com/business/story/536059.html). Yes, engines wear out, but this isn’t quite like wearing down the tires on a car. The Fort Worth Star Telegram reports (http://www.star-telegram.com/business/story/536059.html):
Marine Col. M. D. Mulhern told reporters that, although the dual engines in the tilt-rotor aircraft perform well, they are not lasting as long as the Marine Corps expected under a 1998 agreement with Rolls-Royce.
"Now, as we are operating the airplanes, the engines aren’t lasting as long as we would like or as long as they would like," Mulhern said at a briefing during an exposition sponsored by the Navy League.
Muller said the Marine Corps is working with the manufacturer but also plans "to cast a wide net to see what’s available," acknowledging that rebidding the engine is a possible option. "We have some long-term issues with Rolls-Royce that we need to work out," he said.
A new engine? It’s not clear yet what the full implications of this will be, but reporters who attended the briefing and have covered the troubled tiltrotor for a long time described the announcement as jaw-dropping. While the engine wear isn’t related to Iraq’s harsh environment, according to the Marine Corps, the news takes the winds out of much hoped for good PR. The aircraft’s deployment to Iraq was supposed to demonstrate that all of the cost overruns, schedule delays and accidents were worth it in terms of the capabilities the V-22 provides.
UPDATE: "This shouldn’t come as a surprise," writes one Kiowa Warrior helicopter pilot.

The Rolls Royce 250-C30R/3 (http://www.cavalrypilot.com/engine.html) on the OH-58D had wear problems too. When my unit deployed 16 aircraft to NTC [the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin] from Colorado Springs in June 2002 (a regularly scheduled rotation, but with a heavy emphasis on preparing for Iraq) we replaced several engines – I want to say six. This was mainly due to wear on the compressor from the poorly filtered airflow. Until around 2002, the 58D
did not have what you would think of as an air filter – it used a
"particle separator" that kept big chunks out, but let a lot of smaller particles in.
The compressor blades were being damaged, and it was impacting the engine performance. At the time we were experimenting with filters -
including panty hose. Prior to deployment to Iraq, we fielded a much more robust filter system, using petroleum coated filter elements similar to a cars air filter. The new filters improved performance, and greatly reduced the wear and tear on the engine compressors. I can’t speak to the exact nature of the Osprey’s problems, but I think the issue is likely due to a less robust filtering system, and extended operations in the sandy/dusty environments in Iraq. I would think that the Osprey’s engine air filtering system was designed for the
"occasional" sand/dust landing, but meant to live on tarmac. Now they’re living like the Army and Marines live…in the dirt.
Contrary to some perception… we frequently operated in sandy and dusty LZs [landing zones] at our training areas, and it got even worse at the deserts of NTC. Long term wear caught up with us, and the result was a lot of engine replacements. Our OPTEMPO [operational tempo] in Iraq was pretty high – I think we flew roughly a (garrison) years worth of flight hours in a couple of months in Iraq, so it’s possible that it’s a
"normal" amount of wear and tear is catching up with with V-22 engines.

SASless

19th Oct 2011, 18:20

all the information shows an out of envelope approach which might have worked if that damn ditch wasn't there says it all. If they had been in a Chinook or 53 their would have been more injured and killed,

Now how does the presence of a ditch figure into an out of envelope approach technique?

Crashing.....which I define as an unplanned touching down at excessive speed, excessive sink rate, and out of control is not going to work out anytime.

No matter the actual cause...once you arrive high, fast, steep,heavy....outside the operating envelope of the aircraft....and insufficient power to prevent the premature contact with the ground...aircraft crash, people get injured and killed.

Now how do you reckon more people would have been injured or killed if it had been a 53 or Chinook?

They carry more people....but are sure a lot easier to fly, transitions from forward flight to a hover is much more straight forward....or is this just your usual bash helicopters mindset whenever possible line of crap talk Sultan?

Throw out some facts, figures, data, research that supports your dumbass comment!

SansAnhedral

19th Oct 2011, 19:35

Well, theres the survivability aspect here. Yes you can crash land, with a robust airframe that can absorb impacts from a overspeed run-on landing, but when a nosewheel catches a wadi and causes the airframe to cartwheel, thats unarguably a worse situation, is it not?

Cant compare to 53/47, apples to oranges in envelope, though if you were to throw either of those two airframes at the ground at the approach speed of the crash, they probably would not have stayed intact as well as the V22 (before the wadi) with its composite structure. They were not designed with this in mind, however.

Lonewolf_50

19th Oct 2011, 20:34

Dan: interesting to see that Axe grinder has a mouthpiece here on the PPRuNe boards. I think he's drinking and writing pure moonshine.

U.S. Army is on track to buy some hundreds more UH-60M Black Hawks. Don't see Osprey, or a small version of it, in their Air Order of Battle any time soon. Spending for new systems is retracting, not growing, under the Five year forecast, and I suspect it is more austere in the out years beyond that. However, actually functional crystal balls are in very, very short supply. Mr Axe does not own one such. I don't either.

Engines: check out the F-14 and its history with engines. That program also had to play catch up after the engine originally procured showed a few flaws in the fleet.

"Doesn't perform as expected per the 1998 expectation" is a pretty weak data point for criticism, when one considers aircraft systems development. That said, I am glad to see Admiral Mullen's point on looking to see if something better is available. If they can, replacement through attrition can be programmed in, as with other aircraft programs over the years. I wish him luck, see funding environment I mentioned above.

You might be aware that the original T-700's that the Blackhawk came with aren't the current configuration. Oh, the Scandal! :eek::eek::eek:

Also, the Navy bought a different T-700 than the Army did.

OH, the scandal! :eek::eek::eek:

The Acquisition system is utterly broken. :eek::eek::eek:

Sorry, the sarcasm just kept leaping at my keyboard.

JohnDixson

19th Oct 2011, 21:55

Now how does the presence of a ditch figure into an out of envelope approach technique?

Absent any info re the engine or engines being at fault, I'd agree that is the point.

Any of the V-22 pilots out there care to enlighten on the "out of envelope approach" and what it means in specifics?

Thanks,
John Dixson

SansAnhedral

19th Oct 2011, 23:01

Did you guys forget we already had this discussion 3 times over in this very thread?

http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101215-009.pdf

http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101215-007.pdf (http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101215-007.pdf)

At the DP, 3 nm from the LZ, the winds were 060 degrees at approximately 17 to 20 knots. The MA crossed the DP at approximately 300 feet AGL and 230 KCAS (270 KGS). The MP started the deceleration maneuver one half mile late, at 2.5 nm from the LZ, instead of 3 nm as stated in SOPs.As the MA slowed, the MP started a descent to 100 feet AGL. The MCR relayed the “one minute” call to the MA passengers. The MA slowed rapidly as the nacelles were rotated towards the helicopter position. At 0.79 nm from the LZ, the MA was at approximately 147 KCAS (180 KGS) and 150 feet AGL.The normal speed at the 1 nm point should have been approximately 110 KGS. At 0.5 nm to the LZ, the MA had slowed to approximately 115 KCAS (128 KGS). The normal speed at the 0.5 nm point should have been 60 to 70 KGS. The MP’s rapid deceleration slowed them down from 147 KCAS (180 KGS) to 102 KCAS (125 KGS), between 2008:58Z and 2009:08Z. Due to the right quartering tailwind, the MP maintained an approximate eight degree right crab as he corrected his ground track en route to the LZ.

SASless

19th Oct 2011, 23:46

John,

....and touchdown speed was? Rate of Descent at touchdown?

Please to recall this was at night in Afghanistan at a fair ol' height in the middle of no where.

The ditch just put the icing on the cake....

I will accept the ditch made for the final mechanism that caused the deaths, injuries, and write off of the aircraft.

I will not accept that the event would have played out much differently absent the ditch.

Just as we do not for sure what the engines were doing...Other outcomes can only be surmised....and not guaranteed.

JohnDixson

20th Oct 2011, 14:56

Sorry, Sans, I had not read the documents, but thanks to your links, have now done so.

That said, I remain of the opinion that SAS brought up as the central point, and I agree with his take as written in the post above this one.

As to the conjecture about the V22 having superior survival characteristics in this sort of situation, permit me to demur by pointing out that both of those machines, by virtue of having large main rotors with higher stored energy, would permit their pilots to much more easily salvage a low hot approach, and especially so if one motor was sick.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

21st Oct 2011, 02:41

We might note the nose gear had already collapsed prior to hitting the ditch and the Main Gear were scouring tracks eight inches deep following a touchdown between 75-80 knots all the while the Nr had slowed to between 70-80% instead of the expected 104%. The Ramp was dragging before the nose gear collapsed which would suggest a strong fall thru upon touchdown due to the lack of sufficient Nr and'or control authority to compensate for the ROD existant at time of touchdown.

Had the nose gear not collapsed perhaps the ditch might not have been as instrumental as it was in the destruction of the aircraft. It would appear the crash was well underway within 45 feet of the touch down point and before hitting the ditch. Again....the ditch was the last bit of very bad luck.

SASless

24th Oct 2011, 19:16

If one assumes a 5000 foot elevation and say 15-20 C temperature....and an aircraft weight at about 40,000 pounds......would not the rotor system be very close to stall? Would a sudden large demand in power lead to blade stall and if the Nr was allowed to droop....not exacrebate the situation?

The Osprey rotor system by design has a high loading and is tweaked for high speed rather than hover performance.

Was this crash more of a design issue than is being acknowledged? Is the design so critical that Pilot errors are far more unforgiving due to the proximity to adverse rotor dynamics at which the aircraft operates in a combat environment?

Would reducing the demand for power....thus undrooping the Nr..have been the better reaction....and thus obtaining increased lift by increasing Nr. I experienced that on one very memorable occasion during a takeoff downwind with a slingload. I diddled the pooch...bled Nr to the point the Generators dropped offline and upon realizing things got better while gently and ever so slowly lowering the Thrust Lever (Collective)....Nr increased and we were able to climb above the obstacles.

Any Engineers out there that could explain this in language we all can understand?

Lonewolf_50

25th Oct 2011, 15:28

Program cost thirty lives, and that's a data point?

Go back to the early 1980's. In a single CH-53E mishap in WESTPAC, tail disconnect failure, over Thirty Marines died.

CH-53E is still flying, and doing good work.

Whittle makes a good point, that the cost of development, steep as it was in blood and treasure, resulted in a better aircraft ... albeit expensive.

The point Korb makes about cost isn't confined to Osprey. What Osprey means is opportunity cost: if you buy the full run, what is the USMC prepared to sacrifice in other capability? If not, how many on the full program run get lopped off at the end? DoD all have to make those hard calls (see VH program cancellation as a data point to that end).

Korb's "stop buying them at all anymore" is a rather myopic approach, since I doubt that he's done the mid-to-long term posture development for USMC roles and missions. That said, the Commandant may indeed come back with precisely what Korb suggests -- to preserve, for example, CH-53K program funding, or other critical mission equipment needs.

Put another way, if the USMC sees an OPTEMPO decrease in the next five years, how many do they need? Forecasting like that is a real SOB, if you consider a USMC posture forecast in 1999 versus where they were in 2004, for example.

What I smell in Korb's quote (possibly out of context) is an attempt to scapegoat V-22 for the sake of dollars elsewhere.

What's his pet project?
What's his pet program?

Jack Carson

25th Oct 2011, 20:28

Lonewolf 50 makes a very good point. I believe that we have all become numb with respect to the cost of things. While we waited for the V-22 to be fielded and the bugs to be worked out the Marines were forced to keep the CH-46s in service for an additional 20 years totaling more than 40 years of service. During the same period, the Marines spent $22,000,000,000 on the V-22. This money could have procured more than 1400 Blackhawks or 800 C/MH-53E’s. One has to ask, did the Marines gain 22 billion dollars of improved capabilities with the V-22?

Lonewolf_50

26th Oct 2011, 19:45

Dan, as I've pointed out before on this topic, the USMC didn't want to pay the manpower bill (2.2x) for the maritime blackhawk idea back in the 90's.

Different pots of money that have differing program and life cycle costs to the taxpayer.

Some folks forget that we cut the DoD manpower by about 40 percent in the post Cold War drawdown. During the critical decision time on the V-22 program, each of the services was in the position of having to be careful what the manpower and training costs accrued to any weapons system.

I have a friend who worked on the DCSPER staff in the Army, early 90's, who had as one of his staff projects keeping or losing a gunner in the Blackhawk/Huey for the TOE in a given aviation battalion. That's a difference of a few thousand soldiers, if you look at how many Blackhawks and Hueys the Army had at the time.

That kind of problem, numbering a few thousand different but similar problems, was being solved or not by staffs all over all four armed services. In that environment, the larger plane with fewer pilots (expensive to train, 2-5 million per currently, through the FRS) and fewer crewmen for the total USMC manpower bill was a selling point for V-22 that had nothing to do with pros and cons of a given airframe.

Manpower costs are not borne by the APN-1 type of acquisition cost, so the apples to apples comparison being attempted here (Jack, your numbers in terms of S-70 substitutes) isn't one.

Commandant of USMC had to look at which area to optimize in, or how to suboptimize in both areas (machines and manpower and program sustainment) to both meet his budget and manning limitations, and get the mission done.

I don't find a lot of people who only work in the aircraft/helicopter industry who grasp how those kinds of problems are framed, funded, and solved.
I find less in the media who have a clue.

All we seem to get is people who can see one thin slice of a very large pizza.

All that said, Jack's question remains valid:

Is it $22 billion more in capability? If so, how do you measure that, or show it? What are the metrics? :confused:

I don't have the answer to that.

SASless

27th Oct 2011, 00:15

How much has been spent on the Over the Horizion Assault concept for what actual capability?

If one is honest....money for actual capability....the OTH Concept has been a very, very...very expensive failure!

Added to the cost of the Osprey and the new ships needed for it to operate effectively with the Fleet....is the cost of the now defunct Jet Sled Amtrac (whatever the thing was called)....the special design Mutts and French Mortar wagons for the Osprey....and to what end Operationally? All that money so the Navy could keep its ships further offshore and safer from land launched anti-ship missiles! Yet....right now the USMC has no more amphibious capability than when the force had 53D's, 46's, and UH-1N's.

The LCAC's are too big and vulnerable for standard amphibious operations and the current Amtracs are too slow for OTH....and no matter how many 22's you field....they cannot haul the weight the 53E's do in a standard amphibious operation.

How many Black Hawks, 53E's, Chinooks, 53K's could the USMC have bought with all that wasted money?

Rub your hands over the crystal ball now and figure out what kind of War we will fight next...where it will be....and who will we be fighting? Care to bet the house on a single wager or do you want to cover all your bets as best you can....but remember you have to win as losing doesn't bear thinking about!

Dan Reno

27th Oct 2011, 01:41

You're right Lonewolf.

Lonewolf_50

27th Oct 2011, 20:49

SAS:

I asked a question back in the 90's (when it was perceived that Osprey would not make it through the acquisition cycle, which is what happened to Comanche during LRIP) along the lines of "Why not just use all 53Es and simplify?" At the time, the Navy Helo Master Plan, which toyed with KMAX on MSC ships to replace -46's for VERTREP, was mostly "Sikorsky Are Us."

The answer in re V-22 versus CH-53 was complicated, but part of the answer was

"We are not going to sole source to Sikorsky our Helicopter requirements, and we will diversify vendors to keep the industrial base warm."

No small amount of that answer was political in nature: whose district has how many defense industry jobs? Ask your local Senator, if you like ... :cool:

Your point on ship mods is noted, and agreed. They aren't cheap either. See also the fun and games with the AV-8B Harrier and which spots on an LHA one can, or cannot, use to launch and recover a Harrier ...

(Edited due to being on a bad day for spelling ...)

strey

27th Oct 2011, 21:01

I had a friend ask me about the Osprey and emergency procedures and what action must be taken if one of the engines fail at a hover?

Can anyone familiar with it give me a good answer to give him.

SansAnhedral

28th Oct 2011, 19:00

If an engine fails in a hover, you keep hovering. The osprey is capable of OEI hovering due to the crossover shafts.

Jack Carson

28th Oct 2011, 20:05

SansAnhedral, I believe that it would be more accurate to say that both rotors continue to turn after an engine failure because of the cross shafting. I do not believe that the V-22 is capable of hovering OGE on one engine except at much reduced weights. Even the V-22's OEI IGE hover capability would be very limited.

Lt.Fubar

28th Oct 2011, 21:03

From the performance charts I have, the V-22 can't fly on one engine slower than 40kts at any weight, therefore no OEI OGE hover. If an engine fails with necells at higher angle than 60° it is advised to lowering them, and accelerate to safe airspeed for climb - dependent on weight and environmental conditions. With both engines INOP it is advised to pull necells all the way back (95°) and try achieve autorotation at 110kts and 5000fpm descent.

riff_raff

29th Oct 2011, 00:01

I think the OEI rating on the AE1107C is around 6800hp. That's probably about 10% more than its T/O rating. Of course, I also believe the V-22 PRGB is normally limited to less than 5200hp in hover (AEO). So a rough estimate of the difference in hover power between normal AEO (5200hp x 2) and OEI (6800hp x 1) would be around 3,600hp. I also understand that the power turbine shaft on the AE1107C has a somewhat modest torque limit, but I won't try to speculate what effects that would have on an OEI hover scenario.

The most current version of the AE1107C may have somewhat better performance than the above numbers I quoted from memory. So take my calculations with a grain of salt. :confused:

SASless

29th Oct 2011, 01:20

Found this while looking for OEI data.

The Marana crash wrote off two Ospreys....not just the one that killed 19 Marines. A second aircraft landed hard after the crash explosion "blew away the second aircraft's ground cushion"....according to this Summary.

Target Lock: V-22 Osprey : Development (http://www.targetlock.org.uk/osprey/development.html)

SansAnhedral

29th Oct 2011, 18:34

Jack,

Once again we are doing the 5 page rehash. This topic was discussed a mere 2 months ago right in this thread.

Post 1236 (http://www.pprune.org/6642024-post1236.html)

I seemed to read much more into the following comment, which seemingly flies in the face of the low altitude hover survivability argument against the V22:

Page 35

Due to its high power, the ability of the V22 to survive single engine failures during low altitude hover is excellent -- better than the legacy transport helicopters it replaces.

So in the work done to study THIS PRECISE SITUATION, the DOTE found in 2005 that youre better off in a V22 than legacy helicopters it replaces (CH46). But you all will just "agree to disagree" with such a stark black and white conclusion.

JohnDixson

30th Oct 2011, 10:41

Sans, if you could post the current single engine HV charts from the V-22 Chapter 31 Emergency Operations, perhaps the CH-46 pilots, and others, would be able to compare with what they are flying.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Lt.Fubar

30th Oct 2011, 12:28

John, the debate is, can Osprey maintain hover on one engine, the HV chart can't be used here. We could deduce it if there were hover charts like for the Blackhawk, with clearly shown single engine and transmission operations limits. The way V-22 manual is made, suggest that in case of power loss in hover, you have to transition to level flight ASAP - then you'll find single engine operation charts, like the Single Engine Level Flight Envelope, that is one page after the HV chart you mentioned.

SASless

30th Oct 2011, 12:49

Mr. Dixson.....unless I have been completely ravaged by the perils of old age...my memory does not contain a single Post from a serving Osprey Pilot that directly addresses such performance figures or a frank discussion of NATOPS procedures for handling Engine Failures at a hover.

It seems my memory tells me all this gets cloaked by the "If I Tell You...My Employer Will Kill Me" refrain.

Is there a single Osprey Pilot in the audience that can...and will...explain how the Osprey performs on a single engine and following an engine failure in the various modes of flight? Surely to God....this isn't classified information or way too many folks have divulged the same exact information on other aircraft and would thus be someplace looking between Iron Bars.

Is it just me that thinks this?

Dan Reno

30th Oct 2011, 13:19

No SASless, they're just covering for the biggest military fraud in American history. IMO

JohnDixson

30th Oct 2011, 14:03

Lt Fubar,

I was posting in response to:

"Due to its high power, the ability of the V22 to survive single engine failures during low altitude hover is excellent -- better than the legacy transport helicopters it replaces. "

HV plots are directed at the survival of the machine following power failure ( single or dual as may be the case ).

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

30th Oct 2011, 14:37

HV plots are directed at the survival of the machine following power failure ( single or dual as may be the case ).

Does that include long-term visits to Intensive Care Facilities and a subsequent rehabilitation of the "Machine" (the Osprey in this case)? Or....as in the past....meaning a "safe" landing could be effected following an engine failure or the failure of the last remaining engine?

This also kicked off a bit of pondering....what does a three engined helicopter HV diagram look like? Do they have a section that says something along the lines of ..... OEI, TEI, AEI or something to that effect?

JohnDixson

30th Oct 2011, 15:57

SAS,
Sorry for my lack of clarity and precision. I was trying to differentiate between the two quite separate issues raised by Lt Fubar.

Your point is well taken. Unless things have changed since I retired, both the FAA and the military require the HV diagram to be written based upon "safe" landings. Typically, the limit points as far as the landings are concerned are defined by reaching the limit landing gear loads. HV Diagram test flying has resulted in bent machines at all manufacturers, as the flight test crews try to establish the limit points. Have to be on your toes and leave your ego at home for that stuff.

I didn't do really any of the original 53E development, but as I recall, I think you surmised correctly that they have one more chart than a two engine machine.

Added Note: SAS, the new CH-53K will have three 7500 shp engines, so their one engine out HV curve will be based upon 15000 shp, which is slightly above that available from all three engines on the original CH-53E ( 416's ).

Thanks,
John Dixson

Jack Carson

30th Oct 2011, 22:19

John,
To validate your point. The primary reason for going to the T-64-419 engine in the MH-53E was to reduce the possibility of the machine going into the water after sustaining a single engine failure at gross weight during a down wind sea level TOW. Towing operations were performed at a maximum of 137% Q (4380 ESHP/engine 13,110) all three engines operating). The 419 engine OEI rating is 157% Q or 5,000 ESHP. By jettisoning the TOW 10,000 ESHP was more than enough power to fly away. In essence OEI operations in the MH-53E resulted in a reduction of only 24% installed power available. By most standards this is pretty good.
Have a Great Day
Jack

SansAnhedral

15th Nov 2011, 15:14

Osprey in the Catbird Seat (http://www.usni.org/print/9202)

Osprey in the Catbird Seat

By Lieutenant General Terry G. Robling, U.S. Marine Corps
Created 2011-10-31 08:49
The tiltrotor MV-22 has come of age. Moving larger payloads—faster and farther—it broadens Marine Corps capabilities and gives commanders more choices.
On 22 March, Marines returned to the shores of Tripoli. While in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an American F-15E fighter had gone down over Libya, and both crewmen had ejected. The rescue that followed was not only a textbook example of what the MV-22B Osprey brings to the fight, but also a testament to the agility, flexibility, and effectiveness of the Navy–Marine Corps expeditionary force. Whether ship- or land-based, the MV-22B has become a key component of that team.

The Osprey is a revolutionary machine, providing the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander the flexibility he needs to influence the battle space. The aircraft shrinks the battlefield, flying Marines higher, faster, and farther than ever, thus providing MAGTF and joint commanders unprecedented options in supporting ground forces. In the MV-22B Osprey, now on its 11th deployment, the Marine Corps has a truly groundbreaking aircraft. It has proved itself in combat to be operationally effective, safe, and survivable in the most difficult conditions—and cost effective. The Osprey is rewriting the art of the possible, and in concert with other newly fielded and soon-to-be-fielded aircraft, it is creating a new array of possibilities of what the Marine Corps can provide the nation and how it can meet all warfighting requirements.

A Record of Versatility

The V-22, in both its Marine (MV-22B) and Air Force Special Operations Command (CV-22) versions, has shown itself to be a tremendously versatile platform in both peace and war. Since its operational debut, the V-22 has conducted a variety of missions that demonstrate its multi-role capability. In Iraq and Afghanistan, combat-troop inserts and extracts as well as long-range battlefield logistics operations have showcased the aircraft’s speed and range, which are unrivaled by any previous rotorcraft. Raids against defended targets have shown that it is not just safe—it is survivable. We have conducted medical and casualty evacuation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, stability and security operations, and sea-based operations, all effectively and efficiently. Exploiting the V-22’s long range, aviators have flown it on multiple transatlantic crossings.

Examples of those missions are forthcoming—but first, back to Libya: In the middle of the night, less than two hours after that F-15E crew ejected over North Africa, two MV-22Bs, along with other elements of the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel package—including organic AV-8B Harriers, CH-53E Sea Stallions with a quick-reaction force on board, and a Marine rescue force on board the Ospreys themselves—were turning up engines on board the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) about 130 nautical miles from the downed fliers. The Ospreys launched into the darkness and closed the objective at an average speed of more than 260 knots, supported by Marine Corps and Air Force jets aloft of the downed pilot.

Once in the objective area, one Osprey landed, recovered the downed pilot, and departed—all within 90 seconds. Twenty minutes from the time he was running for his life in hostile North Africa, the aviator was safely back in American territory on board the Kearsarge. (The other F-15E crewman was located by friendly rebel forces, who saw to his safe passage and eventual recovery.)

Proven Capabilities

Ground commanders and their Marines have seen what the Osprey can do: They have flown in the back of it, they have run down its ramp into landing zones in combat, and they have run up its ramp into the sanctuary the aircraft provides. Those Marines have one message for Marine aviation: We want more of these. They know that they can move three times as many Marines five times farther and twice as fast as they could move Marines on conventional helicopters. As they transit to the objective, those Marines are at elevations as high as 13,000 feet, out of the range of the rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades that are the weapons of the irregular fighter. The aircraft can carry 24 combat-loaded Marines to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles. By comparison, a CH-46E carrying half the available payload has a radius of 75 nautical miles.

The MV-22B is also amazingly quiet. A Marine rifle battalion commander in Afghanistan reported that as Ospreys delivering one of his companies to a raid objective spiraled down atop an enemy force, he watched startled fighters literally drop their weapons and scatter because the aircraft were right there—in the zone—before their approach was seen or heard.

In March, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was given the order to redeploy its Afghanistan-based Ospreys to the Mediterranean. Using their aerial refueling capability and employing organic Marine KC-130J refuelers, the six MV-22Bs self-deployed in two waves of three more than 3,000 nautical miles, flying from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, to recover on board the Kearsarge. Those Ospreys then turned promptly to operations at sea. That sort of dynamic re-tasking is what expeditionary forces do.

The range and speed of the aircraft widen the range of possibilities not only for the kinetic fight, but also across the range of military operations. When a patient on board the Kearsarge required medical support beyond the ship’s capability, for example, officers realized that the nearest site that could provide the required services was an onshore facility 500 nautical miles distant. A section of Ospreys was tapped to perform the mission, because, in the words of the MEU commander, “The V-22 is the only aviation asset that can bridge the long ship-to-shore expanse.”

In another instance, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263, deployed in the USS Bataan (LHD-5), flew a casualty evacuation mission of 147 nautical miles in 37 minutes. In the words of a Bataan corpsman, “If it hadn’t been for the Osprey, there’s no way we could have gotten the patient to where she needed to be to receive the care that ultimately saved her life.”

The versatility of the platform was again illustrated in the Marine Corps’ humanitarian assistance/disaster relief role following the devastating Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The MV-22B reached multiple inland locations during one period of daylight, and again saved lives by carrying much-needed relief supplies and medical personnel into remote and isolated areas of the country.

Safety and Survivability

The following month the V-22 program as a whole—both Marine Corps and Special Operations Command airframes—exceeded 100,000 total flight hours. More important, the MV-22B crossed that milestone while maintaining a tremendous safety record: it had the lowest Class A flight-mishap rate of any Marine Corps tactical rotorcraft for the decade of January 2001–January 2011.

The Osprey’s performance record in Iraq from September 2007 to March 2009 is telling. During 18 months of combat operations the aircraft completed every assigned mission, and it did so flying faster, farther, and safer than its legacy counterparts. Despite being the target of enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles on numerous occasions, none of more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight.

Likewise, in Afghanistan the MV-22B has been the target of small arms and RPG fires—and in some cases hit. In every instance, the aircraft has been able to safely continue and conclude its flight with no injuries to crew or embarked personnel.

Challenges and Opportunities

The MV-22B reached operational capability in June 2007. On the heels of that significant event it was decided to deploy the Osprey to war, fully one year before its planned material support date. That decision put additional stress on development of a logistics support infrastructure, but with the Marine Corps simultaneously committed in two conflicts there was no good reason to hold back this revolutionary capability from supporting those forces in combat. Simply put, it was the right thing to do.

As with any new aircraft, the Osprey had its share of setbacks over the course of development, including fatal flight-test crashes that caused many to call into question the program’s future. Far more commonplace, however, were the sort of logistical and technical hurdles routinely encountered in such projects, and especially when making a leap in aviation technology as we did with this aircraft. For example, in some cases engineering predictions for Osprey component service-life were inaccurate, problems that began being corrected once actual in-service data became available.

It is instructive to keep in mind, too, that although the program began in 1981, the V-22 community has flown nearly half of its total flight hours in just the past two years. Against a backdrop of rapidly increasing flight hours and multiple combat deployments—through which the aircraft has operated under the most rigorous environmental extremes—the Osprey is meeting the challenge. Aided by on-time and on-budget deliveries of aircraft since 2007, Ospreys are replacing the legacy CH-46E helicopter at a rate of two squadrons per year; the transition should be complete in 2017.

Critics of the V-22 frequently focus on procurement and operating costs. While it is true that the Osprey costs more than a legacy helicopter to buy and operate on a per-unit basis, the discussion shouldn’t end there. Operating experience with the Osprey has validated the multitude of studies undertaken during its development. Flying “twice as fast” and “five times as far” with “three times the payload” are not simply snappy talking points. They are direct expressions of value gained from every dollar spent procuring and operating the aircraft. Given current operating costs, the Osprey carries its payload more economically—on a dollar-per-passenger-mile basis—than any legacy rotorcraft currently in the Marine Corps inventory. Beyond the importance of cost and value of a military aircraft, however, is the protection afforded our nation’s most valuable assets, the passengers and crew. In the Osprey, they travel well above the range of the majority of currently utilized threat weapons, and therefore are safer than when carried by lower and slower helicopters.

Future Operations and Possibilities

In 1988, then-Commandant Al Gray asserted that “if I am a MEU commander off of North Carolina, I want every bad guy from Manhattan to Miami to be nervous.” What he meant was he wanted to be able to move swiftly hundreds of miles and then go over or around a defending force—or simply go where it was not. Aided by the capabilities of the MV-22B (and its sister aircraft the CV-22) the quantum leap in capability that he envisioned is now reality.

Today the United States faces a difficult fiscal environment. With declining defense budgets looming, a fresh, fact-based look at our tactical mobility requirements across the services may be in order, with an eye toward leveraging existing, proven, and currently fielded assets to fill current and projected operational gaps. In the long view, we have only begun to scratch the surface of exploiting the capabilities of the MV-22B. Its demonstrated multi-role capability may make this aircraft a potential candidate for other DOD and coalition requirements. The Osprey’s unparalleled success in the harsh deserts and mountains of Iraq and Afghanistan, the sea-based execution of the Libyan recovery mission, and its long-range self-deployment capabilities make it the aircraft best suited to effectively enter an equally demanding arena in the future—the ongoing battle of the budget.

Aviation in the Marine Corps exists—in the words of its first flier, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Cunningham—to “assist the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions.” Marine Corps expeditionary operations will always center on the MAGTF, and Marine aviation therefore is inherently naval, expeditionary, and supportive to a ground force as part of a combined-arms team. Better technology is driving better tactics to provide lethality and battlefield mobility to that warfighter. The Osprey is just such a successful combining of tactics and technology. It will not be just a basic component of Marine Corps aviation; it will be the keystone of tomorrow’s air-ground task forces.

Lieutenant General Robling is Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation. He has commanded at the squadron, air group, air wing, and Marine Expeditionary Force levels. He has accumulated more than 5,200 hours in both tactical jet and rotary-wing aircraft, primarily in the F-4 Phantom and F/A-18 Hornet.

Aerobot

15th Nov 2011, 15:41

Lt.Fubar said:
"With both engines INOP it is advised to pull necells all the way back (95°) and try to achieve autorotation at 110kts and 5000fpm descent."

110kts and 5000fpm descent isn't an autorotation - it's a deorbit.

SASless

15th Nov 2011, 17:44

I love such stats.....amazing the carrying ability of the aircraft when properly tasked!

During 18 months of combat operations the aircraft completed every assigned mission, and it did so flying faster, farther, and safer than its legacy counterparts. Despite being the target of enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles on numerous occasions, none of more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight.

Do they really average 4.44 passengers per hour? Gee....whiz!

For our Marine Brothers....that is an Army Warrant Officer smart ass remark suggesting.... ya'll are in risk of breaking your arms....slapping yerself on yer own back! (Without having the commonsense to read what the heck you are writing!)

Next thing you know they will be saying the Pilot's name was "Gordo Cooper"!

SansAnhedral

15th Nov 2011, 19:37

I suppose correlation in statistics eludes you, SAS.

Whats the average flight endurance? What are the total seat miles? What was the cargo loadout versus pax? Ferry time?

Heck I cant even find any information like this on any other flying airframe, so how would you even know that 4.44 would be "bad"? The MH60S has been flying since 2002 and has amassed 370,000 flight hours. You suppose its had more than 1.6 million riders? Who knows. :zzz:

Lonewolf_50

15th Nov 2011, 20:52

John/SAS/Sans/Jack:

I took a look through a 1744 page (WTF??) V-22 NATOPS manual.
Not sure if it is current.

I will confess that the illustration entitled
Figure 16-36. HVR CPLD Regions of Potential AFCS Directional Axis Saturation
mostly made me dizzy.

Methinks they are using words too large for the garden variety helicopter pilot ... :E

My takeaway ...

1. H-V diagrams are where you'd expect them, in performance section (in the back, hashed pages).

2. Single Engine failure discussion fits John's remarks: H-V boundary represents the envelope of height-above-ground and forward speed that result in safe Single Engine landing. Max vertical speed assumptions are 6 or 12 fps for high and low altitude charts respectively. [/QUOTE]
a. Messing about in the charts for a bit, at 50k GW you'd need to be a few hundred feet up to get a landing in the envelope ... may depend on the headwind you have that day.

3. If you lose both engines -- at 3000 feet, looks like you'd better have at least 100 kts. At 1500 feet AGL, at least 130 knots. This is to stay outside "AVOID" part of the H-V for dual engine failure.

I expect most flights have well in excess of that, at speeds V-22 flies.

4. Summarized from the EP section:

Auto's in the Osprey (say that three times fast) are not for the faint of heart! :E

For an auto, it looks like you expect a 4-5000 fpm descent at ~ 120 knots, flare at 150 feet AGL, cushion landing.
There's a thrilling ride. :}
IIRC, that's twice the RoD for a Seahawk auto, if not a bit more than twice.

b. Single engine failure in a hover - hmmmm- looks like the prospects of a single engine hover are dubious. Unless you are in a high hover with some wind in your face, it looks like you are committed to putting the bird on the ground as best you can. Scooping out ... not for the faint of heart. :E

My dos centavos

Jack Carson

15th Nov 2011, 22:28

Lonewolf 50
I believe that the most significant element of the MV-22B HV diagram is located in the upper left hand corner of the chart. It probably states:

Model - MV-22B
Data Basis – Estimated or Analysis (Not Flight Test)
Date - 00/00/0000

I have to wonder if the person or persons publishing the manual would be willing to ride through the published procedure and bet their lives on the outcome.

jeffg

16th Nov 2011, 15:59

Sasless,

none of the more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight

Do they really average 4.44 passengers per hour? Gee....whiz!

I guess you're trying to imply that everytime you flew an insertion into an LZ back in your day if you dropped off X passengers you always picked up X passengers for the return flight? You never rtb'd with an empty ship and you never flew cargo only resupply missions? 40,000 passengers and 9,000 hours are two mutually exclusive variables, that should be pretty obvious to an observer with pracatical experience which I know you have.

Or perhaps you are just a Army CWO who didn't have the commonsense to read what the heck he was writing?

SASless

16th Nov 2011, 17:50

Well now....I reckon one can argue all one wants to about loading of the vaunted Osprey...but averaging fewer passengers than a loaded UH-1N can carry does not show a passenger centric tasking does it?

Thus...it must be cargo they are carrying....which begs the question what kinds of cargo are they carrying and why is it mission essential for the vaunted Osprey to carry it rather than trucks, airplanes, and helicopters? What is it that demands such a cargo focus as I always thought the Osprey was the Battlefied Force Multiplier by being able to tote Mud Marines far, fast, and rapidly.

If one is dedicated to Medevac....hopefully the passenger count remains as small as possible as that would tell us only a few Marines are being hurt...which is a good thing....the fewer the better.

If one is dedicated to Air Assault....I would prefer to see a fairly high passenger count...as in most cases...our guys ride both ways usually.

If one is doing logistical support....then it shoud be a mixed bag of folks and freight.

As you must be a Marine....I will try to re-phrase the comment so you can understand it maybe.

There appears to be lots of flying going on....for very few passengers being moved per average flight hour.

I wonder why that is?

Can any of you Marines out there provide a better statistical analysis of Iraqi/Afghanistan Osprey Flight Operations than the garbage thrown at us by these USMC PR pieces that are all big on self praise but very short on proof?

Has anyone in the USMC ever done a comparative analysis of utilization of the various types in the combat zone to detail the application of assets to tasks so as to document the effective utilizataion of assets available when applied to demand?

I would suggest with an average load rate of 4.44 passengers per flight hour...there is damn little getting done for a lot of expense. Osprey's are a very expensive way of moving ordinary freight about the AO.

SansAnhedral

16th Nov 2011, 19:33

There appears to be lots of flying going on....for very few passengers being moved per average flight hour.

Is that really so? Whats your benchmark? This data is nowhere to be found for any other service rotorcraft. You have absolutely nothing to compare 4.44 passengers/hour to. You just see a pair of numbers, generate a rate, and claim its substandard compared to a nonexistent baseline.

I tried to re-phrase my former comment so you could understand it.

jeffg

17th Nov 2011, 02:04

Thus...it must be cargo they are carrying....which begs the question what kinds of cargo are they carrying and why is it mission essential for the vaunted Osprey to carry it rather than trucks, airplanes, and helicopters? What is it that demands such a cargo focus as I always thought the Osprey was the Battlefied Force Multiplier by being able to tote Mud Marines far, fast, and rapidly.
Maybe because it's part of the assault support mission? Just like the 46s were probably carrying more cargo than Marines if you averaged it out over time. Or maybe because there are more resupply frag request than insert/extraction frags? In fact in my recent experience the assault supports generally make the initial insert and then spend the rest of the day conducting resupply, generally 2 to 4 resupply sorties for every insert/extract sortie. Factor that into your analysis and see what numbers you get.

If one is dedicated to Air Assault....I would prefer to see a fairly high passenger count...as in most cases...our guys ride both ways usually.
Not when the last time you flew an assault support mission in combat was, but normally they stay for awhile and are picked up hours or days later. Do you think the aircraft shutdown and sit in the zone or depart and either refuel or get new tasking?

As you must be a Marine....I will try to re-phrase the comment so you can understand it maybe.
I'll ignore that as you were probably already drunk when you wrote this.

There appears to be lots of flying going on....for very few passengers being moved per average flight hour.
This is a USMC combat aircraft, not American Airlines. Passenger/hour count isn't a usefull stat. Again, two mutually exclusive s]numbers that you are trying to turn into something they are not.

SASless

17th Nov 2011, 12:01

Sultan....we resolved your doubts about my bonafides a while back as I recall. You were told by others here to accept the fact (and remember it as well...) that I have served in the military and in combat. You again seem to be unable to accept the truth as it is. As you have a major problem in dealing with folks that have combat experience ( is it a case of Penis Envy you are dealing with here?)....and have an established record of being told to mind your manners....perhaps you might take a minute or two and reconsider your comments. Argue with the point I make all you wish....but you walk on very thin ice when you denigrate anyone's military service around here.

JeffG....I am sure the aircraft are used for all sorts of tasks and as in any airmobile/air assault/ vertical envelopment (whatever term you wish to describe helicopter combat operations) do not live with the Guys on the Ground all day long. I also understand the support lifts start as soon as the first casualty occurs or immediately after the troops are inserted. The level of that support varies directly with the size of the force being supported and the pace of operations.

The key point being made....once you get past the bait that being thrown out....is the stats the Marines put out in their PR pieces are useless...and given any kind of review such as mine....actually put them in a position to be criticized. No matter how you dress it up....averaging 4.44 pax per hour sounds bad. There are no State Secrets in a discussion about flight hours per category of task....as there are no State Secrets in having a discussion on NATOPS Emergency Procedures for the Osprey.

There does appear to be a huge concern by the USMC to openly discuss anything about the Osprey....and in light of the previous instances of there being a concerted effort to hide and mis-lead the true performance of the aircraft....all of which lead even impartial folks to wonder what the real situation might be.

What I continue to do....is simple. I delight in pointing out how silly the PR Pieces sound.....it starts with the PAO at Camp Lejeune talking about the Forest Fire that was caused by the Osprey to such things as have been posted here at pprune. The Marines just cannot get their act together when it comes to the Osprey and publicizing its progress. The Osprey Program for whatever reason causes lots of problems for the Marine PR folks....and it appears the Order has been given but was not well thought out.

Sans,

I do have something to compare.....the USMC PR Piece.....using the numbers they posted in their article. Their data...their article....right there in front of your eyes too. You may not like the way it turns out....and if I were an Osprey program participant I would not like those numbers either.

The numbers are crap data....not the calculation. They posted the numbers....not me. I just did one very simple bit of math....divided one number by another to arrive at an average number of passengers per flight hour. Show me the error in my math?

JohnDixson

17th Nov 2011, 13:57

It may have been missed in the discussion that the V-22 was to also replace the CH-53D. With the V-22 probably getting to 40,000 lbs with just the crew and a full bag of fuel, the ability to move the USMC ( and Army ) new 155mm M777 ( 9300 lbs ) is limited in hot/high conditions. Might be the reason why the USMC has increased the buy of the 53K to somewhere in the 220 range.

Re Jack's observation on the HV charts: my guess would be that the charts marked as Data Basis: Estimated, simply means that the charts are from very early in the test program, when not all of the testing had been completed.

Sultan: I see you are from Arlington TX. Suggestion: meander around to the Bell Pilots Office, where there may be some white haired guys who flew in Vietnam and ask them about resupplying firebases, troops in the field, mountain top positions and the whole spectrum of what helicopters did after the troops were lifted in. The main difference that distinguishes Afghanistan is that it is higher, thus hover performance at altitude becomes the critical factor, a design attribute that wasn't a major requirement when the V-22 was initiated.

Thanks,
John Dixson

jeffg

17th Nov 2011, 14:55

There does appear to be a huge concern by the USMC to openly discuss anything about the Osprey

Perhaps because V-22 detractors tend to take statements out of context and make an issue out something that isn't really an issue? Just a thought.

SASless

17th Nov 2011, 16:10

Jeff....in the absence of accurate, bonafide, proveable information....anything less suffices as data in the discussion.

The gist of the detractor's argument has long been ....enlighten us. Do you see that happening? We are not talking about violating OPSEC criteria here....just a discussion amongst Pilots and Engineers of the flying of the Osprey in normal and mechanical emergencies.

I suppose if one were to lay out a specific task loading....say....12 Man Spec Ops Team, total weight of load, fuel loading for the mission, all the pertinent weather information....then discuss what the max AEO Hover OGE weight was.....it might have some use to the Bad Guys.

A generic question of what the OEI Hover OGE height limit is for the Osprey...might not provide any use to the Bad Guys....as it has nothing to do with the "Operational Capability" of the aircraft but does provide the rest of us with some understanding of its performance following an engine failure.

Most of us here are prior military and understand the difference between Mission information subject to OPSEC and ordinary aircraft performance information. I suppose one could take a wander through various web sites and compile dozens of examples of what I am saying.

Again....the whole absence of any input from the Osprey community in such discussions begs the question....."Why the stunning silence?"

How does one take "out of context" something as simple as a OEI HOGE weight limit/density altitude chart?

21stCen

17th Nov 2011, 17:09

Again....the whole absence of any input from the Osprey community in such discussions begs the question....."Why the stunning silence?"

Hi SAS,
Unfortunately I have the answer for you. We have a large contingent of V-22 pilots from the Marines and AFSOC here this week in Dubai for the Airshow and I asked exactly the same question. Some were not aware of PPRune forums at all, but those that were said 'they looked at it and laughed' at the 'ridiculous claims and lack of knowledge' on the forum and do not believe it is worth their effort to post. That is a sad commentary that resulted from a few very vocal individuals who previously thought it was best to 'chase away' those who were involved in general operational and combat missions in the aircraft. As a result those with combat experience who possess a pro-tiltrotor attitude no longer take us seriously on this forum.

Hopefully things will move to a more open and balanced discussion of the true facts in the future, but that will not happen until those who are actually flying successful combat missions on a daily basis see that their comments will be taken seriously and not dismissed by those with little or no knowledge of the operational capability of the aircraft.

JohnDixson

17th Nov 2011, 17:27

Hello 21st Century,

Perhaps you could hit up one of the V-22 pilots for a copy of their HOGE Chart and paste it here?

Thanks,
John Dixson

21stCen

17th Nov 2011, 17:53

Hi John,
You've been around long enough to know that the guys on the operational end are not authorized to do that.
21stC

SASless

17th Nov 2011, 18:55

21st.....interesting thought that it was not worth their time in their view.

As to taking them seriously.....it is hard to take something seriously that does not exist.

I distinctly recall standing up for one of the active duty guys....and seconded what Ned Dawson had to say about the guy. I told all present that if Ned said a fellow was someone to listen to....then I was fully prepared to accept that reference without any hesitation.

As I am portrayed as being one of the worst for criticizing the Osprey Program...that should mean something about how Osprey Pilots would be accepted should they not only show up but actually contribute. We have had a very few show up...but the general response was simply "we cannot say anything about that....because of OPSEC....or some other excuse why they could not or would not respond with specificity to some question.

With the looming budget cuts coming down the road...it would behoove them to start lobbying with folks to get people interested in saving the program should (more like "when" it comes under the budgetary axe) pressure be brought to seriously curtail if not end the program altogether. There are not a lot of Tiltrotor jobs out here on civvie street and even those shall disappear if the program gets axed.

For comparison....speak ill of the Chinoook, 53, or Blackhawk and see how quick you get a response in defense of the them.

jeffg

17th Nov 2011, 19:10

SAS you are mixing up your conversations. I've stayed out of the OEI conversation as I'm not a V-22 pilot and therefore have nothing to offer wrt it's performance. I was however a Marine pilot and can comment on you taking out of context the 40,000 passengers and 9,000 hours statement as I can also comment as a pilot in general on others who still take out of context a statement made wrt a compressor stall.

Maybe people are concerned about posting RFM information on here because statements like these on the title page of every NATOPS:

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C — Distribution authorized to U.S. Government
Agencies and their contractors to protect publications required for official use or for
administrative or operational purposes only (30 Sep 2009). Other requests for
this document shall be referred to Commander, Naval Air Systems Command,
PMA-275, RADM William A Moffett Bldg, 47123 Buse Rd, Bldg 2272, Suite 149,
Patuxent River, MD 20670−1547
WARNING — This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by
the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., See 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administrative Act of 1979, as amended (Title 50, U.S.C., App 2401 et seq.). Violators of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties.

I don't think PPRUNE falls under a Govt agency or contractor. Of course you could always make your request to the address above and get your own copy.

Perhaps as a show of good faith someone could paste the Army -10 HOGE charts for the H-60 the NATOPS HOGE charts for the 53?

SASless

17th Nov 2011, 19:21

21st....

It would appear it just isn't here at pprune where this Osprey debate goes on.....

http://defensetech.org/2010/04/15/afghan-osprey-crash-speculating-upon-a-hypothesis/

Jeff...dig out a Ten Dollar Bill and hit this site....you too can own your very own Chinook -10....you can also buy the -20 as well if you want to have a maintenance manual.

No US Army -10 or -20 are considered Classified Documents to my knowledge. I am sure some of the equipment installed on the aircraft are considered classifed and thus their related manuals.

As to the NATOPS warning you posted....each service can make the decision to classify whatever they want. But recall within classifed documents...not all the information is in and of itself classified and normally within the document each classified section is well marked by its classification.

The question I would pose to you....is the MV-22 NATOPs Flight Manual a classified document? If so...what level is it classified?

FOUO, SECRET, TOP SECRET, or BURN BEFORE READING?

The Caveat without a classification attached would seriously challenge the legal aspects of the issue.

Again...no one is asking for sensitive classified information.

I think we can all safely assume the Osprey is very vulnerable following a single engine failure at or very near an Out of Ground Effect Hover as it is not a helicopter and the emergency procedures that are in the public domain do not describe a small narrow H-V diagram....but rather a large broad one.

Dan Reno

17th Nov 2011, 23:17

Jeff,

What part of the Bell spokesman's statement regarding compressor stalls was 'taken out of context"?

Bell says engine compressor stalls "are very normal"

Ref: http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcont...2.17ad314.html (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/0711dnbusv22.17ad314.html)
The article above reportis that one of the 2 V-22s (actually 3) experienced a compressor stall and was having the engine replaced, Bell spokesman Bob Leder said compressor stalls in such engines were "really nothing." "These kind of engine problems are very normal, not only within military aircraft, but in commercial aircraft," he said.

REALLY! I wonder what else Bell puts out that's "very normal" like this?

21stCen

18th Nov 2011, 11:31

Dan,
I've experienced compressor stalls in two different helicopter types, and don't think there is a problem with characterizing it as a "normal problem" (with emphasis on the word 'problem' of course!). It is not a life threatening condition in almost all flight regimes (I experienced it in the hover both times), but it can definitely jeopardize a given mission even though it is most often a 'brief encounter,' it lets you know you don't want that to happen at a critical moment (ie., exiting a hot LZ). None of the V-22 guys I have asked the question of have ever experienced a compressor stall in the Osprey, so it is certainly NOT a "normal occurrence."

Two or three compressor stall events out of 130,000 hours of operations with over 150 a/c in service does not seem alarming particularly in light of the fact that the events are a thing of the past and have not been reported in recent years. How many years ago was the last event reported (your link is no longer active)?

21stCen

18th Nov 2011, 11:50

Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey to make Dubai Air Show debut
Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey to make Dubai Air Show debut | Textron | AMEinfo.com (http://www.ameinfo.com/281008.html)

The Bell Boeing V-22 Program, a strategic alliance between Bell Helicopter, a Textron Company and The Boeing Company announced that the V-22 Osprey titlrotor will be featured at the Dubai International Air Show in the United Arab Emirates from November 13 - 17.

http://static.amefiles.com/images/news/small/2/1290082-work-image004C.jpg (http://media.ameinfo.com/interstitials/ad.html?oldURL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ameinfo.com%2F281008-large.html&timer=60000)
V-22 Osprey.
"The Dubai Air Show is one of the world's fastest growing aerospace events and it presents an excellent opportunity for Bell Boeing to showcase the tiltrotor Osprey's one-of-a-kind capability, unique value proposition and outstanding record of operational performance with a new audience," said John Rader, executive director of the Bell Boeing V-22 Program. "The V-22 is the right solution for Middle East customers seeking range, speed, payload, and mission flexibility for military and humanitarian operations."

The Dubai International Air Show is a biennial show held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. It is organized in cooperation with the Government of Dubai, the Department of Civil Aviation and Dubai International Airport in collaboration with the UAE Union Defense Forces. Now in its 22nd year, the show is a key international aerospace show.

The V-22 Osprey is a joint service, multirole combat aircraft that uses tiltrotor technology to combine the vertical performance of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. With its nacelles and rotors in vertical position, it can take off, land and hover like a helicopter. Once airborne, its nacelles can be rotated to transition the aircraft to a turboprop airplane capable of high-speed, high-altitude flight.

The Osprey is currently flown by the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the operational fleet has amassed more than 130,000 flight hours, nearly half of which have come in the past two years. A total of 10 Marine Corps and two AFSOC squadrons are operational today, and the two services have together logged 16 successful combat, humanitarian, ship-based or Special Operations deployments since 2007.

"The V-22 is proven and forward-deployed, supporting combat operations and responding to contingency operations around the world," said Marine Corps Col. Greg Masiello, head of the V-22 Joint Program Office (PMA-275) at the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). "The Osprey brings unprecedented range, speed and survivability to the warfighter and will continue to excel in combat and remain ready, effective and survivable."

According to Naval Safety Center records, the MV-22 has had the lowest Class A mishap rate of any rotorcraft in the Marine Corps during the past decade. The aircraft's reduced susceptibility, lower vulnerability and advanced crashworthiness have made it the most survivable military rotorcraft ever introduced.

"At 130,000 flight hours, safety, survivability and operational efficiency have become standards of the operational fleet," said Willie Andersen, deputy program director for the Bell Boeing V-22 Program.

In early November, the Naval Air Systems Command Joint V-22 program office was awarded a U.S. Department of Defense Packard Award for efforts in reducing cost-per-flight-hour. Fiscal Year 2010 Navy flight-hour cost data also show that the Osprey has the lowest cost-per-seat-mile (cost to transport one person over a distance of one mile) of any U.S. Navy transport rotorcraft.

More than 150 Osprey tiltrotors are currently in operation. Marine Corps MV-22s are currently deployed in Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit supporting contingency operations, while AFSOC CV-22s are deployed in support of ongoing Special Operations missions.

Bell-Boeing Sees Mideast Interest For V-22 Military Aircraft Executives
Bell-Boeing Sees Mideast Interest For V-22 Military Aircraft Executives (http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=201111130747dowjonesdjonline000158&title=bell-boeing-sees-mideast-interest-for-v-22-military-aircraft-executives)
DUBAI (Zawya Dow Jones)--The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey, a tiltrotor military transport aircraft, is likely to get its first international customer from the Middle East, where its debut at the Dubai Airshow received interest from United Arab Emirates royals, program executives said Sunday.
"The first international customer will come from the Middle East," said John Garrison, president and chief executive of Bell Helicopter, which runs the program in an alliance with Boeing Co (BA (http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/ba)).
"While I can't share (http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=201111130747dowjonesdjonline000158&title=bell-boeing-sees-mideast-interest-for-v-22-military-aircraft-executives#) names, we continue to work closely with countries in the region," Garrison said as part of a presentation at the show.
Jean Chamberlin, vice president and general manager of Boeing Mobility, said some U.A.E. sheiks at the Dubai show "found it quite interesting."
A third executive, the V-22 Joint Program Manager Col. Greg Masiello, said: " Our confidence level is quite high for international customers beyond the U.S. to be flying the V22."

21stCen

18th Nov 2011, 12:55

This past week I was fortunate enough to catch a ride on the jump seat of the MV-22 visiting Dubai to provide a little working knowledge of the local airspace environment during a dressed rehearsal prior to customer demo flights. The crew were incredibly professional and did an outstanding job of demoing the a/c to middle east customers who were lining up for the opportunity to ride in the back (I'd rather be up front for the view!). We got to do the only things I miss from my fixed-wing days: doing almost 90 deg bank turns, pulling Gs, and going over 270kts!! Lots of fun... (see below)

Today we did a three-ship multi-type air to air photo flight with the Osprey that would have made Ned jealous! Will post when I receive photos.

http://i267.photobucket.com/albums/ii305/tiltrotors/IMG-20111112-00004.jpg
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SASless

18th Nov 2011, 14:23

Compressor stalls are common events...they happen. If they are only a temporary situation then little problem but at certain critical points in flight they can be a real problem. Engineering (design) being what it is today...compressor stalls should not be a serious proble as they are well understood by those who desing and build the engines.

jeffg

18th Nov 2011, 14:38

Sasless,

You are right, for $10 I can buy a 47D -10, but not a 47F or the 60M. Nor can I get a NATOPS for the 53E, UH-1N, UH-1Y, AH-1W, AH-1Z. I wonder what they are trying to hide? Again, if it's no big deal perhaps someone (how about you Sas? ) would be willing to cut and paste the IGE/OGE perfromance pages for the 53E, 47F, and 60M as a show of good faith? I've searched the web and oddly enough no one has seen fit to copy and paste performance data for the above listed aircraft to any forum site. Maybe you know of some I don't? If not then just maybe our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving today don't see any a just reason to post -10 or NATOPS data on forum site which has as part of it's name 'rumor' so some unnamed guy who goes by Sasless can use the data as he sees fit? The reality is it's none of your nor my business.

Lonewolf_50

18th Nov 2011, 14:59

Jack:

FWIW: the OEI H-V I can look at says (in the little box above the diagram)

Model: MV-22B
Date: December 2002
Databasis: Estimated
Configuration: FE = 33.0 Sq Feet
Engine: (2) AE1107C
Fuel: JP-5/JP-8

The Dual Engine Failure chart is based on a 2009 "Piloted Simulation."
I don't remember if that means two test pilots putting the engines in idle, and seeing how soon they got the airspeed/glide/auto performance they desired, of if they were doing it in a simulator. I think it means a couple of pilots were out there checking it out. (If I'm wrong, please advise).

The Single Engine Flight envelope charts I have leafed through are based on work done in 2009. Most of the single engine data, and "Bingo" profile charts, have a label of "Estimated." I suspect that they are well suited to use in the field. The Bingo profiles in the aircraft I flew typically worked out Very Well when put to use, in terms of fuel on board, what you thought you'd burn, and what you actually burned.

I concur with the reluctance by anyone to post NATOPS charts on the internet. I will NOT post what I have found. Call it an old habit if you like, but it doesn't feel right.

Dan Reno

18th Nov 2011, 16:25

21st

The comment was made by Bell following a press inquiry as to why one V-22 had to abort and the back-up used to complete the transatlantic trip to an air show quite a few years back. So there were very few hours on the engines back then and this was directed at Greg's comment that Bell's statement was 'taken out of context', but thanks for the interest.

So, from what I can derive from comments here and Bell regarding compressor stalls, they are normal and I, nor anyone flying accross North America should not be concerned when they hear them while flying(?!). Actually, since they are normal, passengers sould therefore expect to hear them rather than not, since that would be abnormal.

Interesting.

Jack Carson

18th Nov 2011, 16:52

Lonewolf 50,
Thank you for your response. You are right, it would be difficult establish exactly what estimated means. The H-53E HV charts are also labeled estimated even though the single engine failure data points were verified during contractor flight tests at Patuxent River in the early 1980s.

Also, I believe that some of the data for the E model was brought forward from the D where actual full touchdown autrotations were performed during development. Discussions with one of the pilots that actually did the full touchdown autos lead me to believe that forward ground speed at touchdown was the major issue. The length of the airframe dictated the flare pitch attitude. The higher the pitch attitude resulted in a higher flare altitude above ground. The best combination of pitch attitude/altitude resulted in touchdown speeds between 40 and 60 kts. Anything slower resulted in a significant increase in touchdown rate of sink.

SansAnhedral

18th Nov 2011, 17:37

[quote]No matter how you dress it up....averaging 4.44 pax per hour sounds bad[/q

SansAnhedral

18th Nov 2011, 17:41

No matter how you dress it up....averaging 4.44 pax per hour sounds bad

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

Compared to what????? How can you say its bad? I contend its not bad, because I've never seen anything lower (or higher for that matter).

How many pax per hour does a UH60L get? CH53? CH47?

American Airlines 737? MD80?

Jack Carson

18th Nov 2011, 18:05

A 270 passenger 777 flying from Chicago to Hong Kong would only average 16 pax per flight hour. 4.4 might actually be pretty good for a 25 pax aircraft.

SASless

18th Nov 2011, 18:05

That gives you a basis for disputing what I said? Explain that to me Sans....normally in the process of intellectual discourse one provides factual data to challenge the assertation of those with whom he differs.

Your comment is baseless.

Darn Champ....can't you come up with something a bit more interesting that the typical "Oh Yeah?" when someone says something the jolts your preconceived notions?

Jack...if that same airliner was on the Charlotte/Pittsburh run at 1.2 hours....and was fully loaded on every sector...how would your numbers compute?

As Ospreys do not routinely operate on such leg lengths....and one would think they make multiple stops along most runs in the Log mode....a bit of book keeping would show up lots and lots of folks carried.

But...bear in mind...that is not what the Marines reported in that PR piece. They listed two numbers....flight hours and passengers carried. One of two things have happened....they are piss poor at book keeping and documenting the actual number of people carried or they should have used a pax per sortie number which would make far more sense. If we assume a one hour sortie...we still come up with 4.44 pax per hour don't we?

Lonewolf_50

18th Nov 2011, 18:13

Dan:

1. How many flight hours do you have in helicopters, or any aircraft that uses turboshaft or turboprop engines?

2. I find your insinuation that Bell considers compressor stalls "normal" to be a bit of word smithing of shady provenance. (Full disclosure: I do not work for Bell, never have, but I do have some time in Hueys and Jet Rangers.)

The fact is that any turbine engine can experience a compressor stall.

That one happens on a particular day cannot lead you to conclude much about an entire aircraft program. If, on the other hand, a particular engine, a particular airfcraft, or a particular combination of aircraft and engine have a history of compressor stalls, you'd want to look at the design to figure out why, and in what flight regime, the airflow gets disrupted. Is it an airframe, a system, an engine, or a combination issue?

There are a variety of reasons (improper vane scheduling being one) that turboprop and turboshaft engines will experience a compressor stall.

I had four compressor stalls during my time flying Naval aircaft, fixed and rotary wing. I also had NATOPS manuals that gave me good procedures for dealing with such an occurrence.

You appear to be making a mountain out of a molehill.

SansAnhedral

18th Nov 2011, 19:56

That gives you a basis for disputing what I said? Explain that to me Sans....normally in the process of intellectual discourse one provides factual data to challenge the assertation of those with whom he differs.

Your comment is baseless.

Round and round we go, SAS. Seems you are employing the exact same "dodging" tactic you level against the marines and V22 supporters. I asked you for ONE SINGLE valid stat of ONE SINGLE other rotorcraft, which would PROVE that 4.44 pax/hour is somehow a deficient value. I contend it is not, you MERELY contend that it is. How does that make your argument any less baseless than mine?

I've never seen this value anywhere for anything else, I cannot find it published anywhere, and you cannot seem to answer how it compares to anything whatsoever, which would support your thoughts on the matter.

In this intellectual discourse, I am simply calling you out. You have ZERO factual data to support your own contention that 4.44 pax/hour is bad. Perhaps if you were to preface it with "compared to the UH60's performance in the last 100,000 hours of flight of 20 pax/hour, the Osprey's 4.44 is seriously deficient"

Instead all we get is "4.44 sounds bad". Coming from a guy who already has displayed his bias against the aircraft in question, boy that's a shocker.

Again, I'll ask simply, bad compared to what?

SASless

18th Nov 2011, 20:56

Sans,

From past experience....Bell 212 with Eleven Seats for Passengers...on a 1.3 hour flight with 3 stops in the field...returning to the Heliport....pax count was 44. All eleven seats full from departure to return. That would equate to 33.84 pax per hour.

Or...say an "A" Model Chinook...33 Pax on an insert and empty return....then six pax and a 105 howitzer and A-22 bag of ammo on the return... 2.0 hours flown..... that provides 19.5 pax per hour plus the Howitzer and Ammo.

Get the point....4.44 pax per flight hour is not an impressive number. No matter how you want to skin this Cat....the PR piece failed its goal...it did not make the case for the Osprey.

In case you missed the other point of the argument extant....it could have been about five ton Trucks and the point of bad stats remains the same.

If they are going to pat themselves on the back....at least produce the stats that earns that back slapping. They did not do that!

Dan Reno

18th Nov 2011, 21:24

Lonewolf

My flight hour history regarding this isn't the subject.

What is though, and particularly at the time Bell's spokesman made the statementis; If they'll make such an assine statement as this, what else that they have said is bogus.

And this has been at the very core of what we hear here. No, or bits of information that cannot be validated. Doesn't sound like something one would be proud of if the facts/data are intentually hidden.

We all know what the manufacturer and their customers will tell us isn't accurate so when they actually do make ANY statement, we have to take it as written. No?

jeffg

19th Nov 2011, 02:55

The real take away from this is that the V-22 detractors have nothing left but to nit pick press releases. First they said it wouldn't go Iraq, then it went. Then it wouldn't see any real action, then it did. Then 'why isn't it in Afghanistan, what are the Marines hiding", then it went.

Now they are left with nothing but to try and make up their own statistics by taking a press release a little to literally. Never mind that the end customer is happy with what they got, because they obviously don't know nearly as much as some ppruner does.

21stCen

19th Nov 2011, 09:29

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Dan Reno

21st Nov 2011, 12:17

Jeff

Words mean something.

If Bell's words don't mean what they say, then who are we to believe about the V-22?

Anybody...anybody...anybody......?

Lonewolf_50

21st Nov 2011, 13:46

Dan:

Having flown a variety of aircraft procured under the general rubric of minimum bid (which as I see it is all I ever flew, with exception of the T-28), I have a reflexive habit of taking anything an aircraft manufacturer says with a grain of salt. It helps that I've never been contaminated by working for an aircraft manufacturer.

As for contamination: having been in the production end of things that I saw later in the press (while in the military) and knowing what I know, I also take with a grain of salt pretty much anything a spokseman in the armed services says. Some of the remarks I see from the field in re the V-22 look a bit, shall we say, manufactured. I had a few issues with 21st century's remarks some months ago about how quiet an Osprey is. (Having seen actual Ospreys in flight in Fort Worth a few years back, I noted that they make noise. There's a shocker ... )

Are you as critical of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's public utterances as you are of Bell's utterances? I'll ask for an honest assessment.

V-22: it's operating. The operators appear to like it, but for most of them, they don't get to choose another aircraft if they don't like it. :cool:

21stCen

21st Nov 2011, 14:25

Dan says:
So, from what I can derive from comments here and Bell regarding compressor stalls, they are normal and I, nor anyone flying accross North America should not be concerned when they hear them while flying(?!). Actually, since they are normal, passengers sould therefore expect to hear them rather than not, since that would be abnormal.

Dan,
There is a difference between a "normal problem" and a "normal occurrence." Think about it... A "normal problem" like a compressor stall can and likely has happened on every type of turbine engine being produced today, but it does not happen with great frequency. Regardless of the verbiage, I don't believe anyone is saying that it is a "normal occurrence" that should be regularly expected on a recurring basis.

The compressor stall experiences I had were rectified by a simple bleed valve adjustment!!

Talking about a ‘mole hill’ over and over will not turn it into a ‘mountain.’

Lonewolf says:
I had a few issues with 21st century's remarks some months ago about how quiet an Osprey is. (Having seen actual Ospreys in flight in Fort Worth a few years back, I noted that they make noise. There's a shocker ...
Lonewolf,
Fortunately we were able to clear up those concerns and made completely clear that the noise discussed was relative to other aircraft as attested to with firsthand experience from a fellow PPRuner observing side by side CH-53 and MV-22 repeated landings/departures as well as supplemental posted videos.

21stC

Lonewolf_50

21st Nov 2011, 16:00

Yes, we were. :)

SASless

21st Nov 2011, 16:16

After the Huey....how can anyone describe a helicopter as being "noisey"!

I loved flying the Huey....despite some its shortcomings...it was and still is...a wonderful machiine especially for its time. Its younger sibling....the 212 is also a great machine...but noisy.

The Chinook, 53, and other big machines are "noisy" but then so is the Osprey in certain aspects. When you get to moving all sorts of air around by means of Rotors Blades and Prop Rotors....there is going to be noise created....and until someone figures out an easy way to quieten Tail Rotors and Turbine engines...."noise" is a relative concept when comparing the various aircraft.

Lonewolf_50

21st Nov 2011, 17:28

Comanche was a different story. Pretty quiet, for a helicopter.

Dan Reno

21st Nov 2011, 18:18

LoneWolf,
If the fellow who made that statement is really a "Spokesman" for Bell then they picked a dousey. I'm sure he was pressured to say something good about the compressor stalls and one A/C having to be replaced and when surrounded by the media, he perhaps blurted-out whatever excuse came to mind. Not smart.

I'm confused about your reference to me about 'contamination'.

I certainly would be as critical about any SA product but when the V-22 'discussions' peaked here some years back, common sense and facts prevailed against the V-22 whereas there wasn't a peep of factual info presented from the V-22 side...citing OPSEC. Right.

I am a bit disappointed the S92 didn't incorporate the "Lessons Learned" from ALL other Helos regarding back-up MBG oil supply and hope other LLs were not ignored due to cost and weight concerns.

"V-22: it's operating". Yes. The MC deserved a superior replacement to the H-46 & H-53 and they didn't get it using y tax money to develope it.

Dan Reno

21st Nov 2011, 18:33

21st
I don't recall Bell discussing compressor stalls in categories of being a 'normal problem" and a "normal occurrence."

Your confusing 'normal problem/occurrence' explanation would have perhaps helped out their tap-dancing ‘Spokesman’ when he needed it though.

The public doesn’t care nor needs to know how/what/why about compressor stalls occur on military or civilian A/C. The point is that Bell made a ludicrous statement that included ALL A/C worldwide and what the public should expect, i.e., "They are very normal." Really?!

So AGAIN, the point is if they make such asinine statements about this, what other asinine statements have they fed to the unknowing public?

Lonewolf_50

21st Nov 2011, 21:15

I certainly would be as critical about any SA product but when the V-22 'discussions' peaked here some years back, common sense and facts prevailed against the V-22 whereas there wasn't a peep of factual info presented from the V-22 side...citing OPSEC. Right.

Here isn't where decisions are made, it is where programs are second guessed. (Heh, it's the internet we know and love. ) We addressed this a few pages back in this thread.

In re your finding the Bell PR mill lacking ... no argument there. (IIRC, Bell Boeing put the V-22 together ... which makes one wonder where the Boeing PR expertise hid at various times ...)

Par for the course.

21stCen

22nd Nov 2011, 04:12

Your confusing 'normal problem/occurrence' explanation...

Dan,
Sorry, I tried to put it in the simplest possible way so it could be easily understood. But I can see you're right, you certainly are confused...

Mars

22nd Nov 2011, 07:24

How many contributors on this thread do not represent a vested interest (shareholder, employee, spokesperson)?

No objective conclusion can be reached from these posts - no wonder the military practitioners visited and left after such a short period.

Mars

SASless

22nd Nov 2011, 10:35

Perhaps you meant to post in the S-92 thread Mars....as it has exactly the same kind of content.

Dan Reno

22nd Nov 2011, 10:53

21st

Yes, I guess I am conffused because I couldn't find ANYHERE where your terms were used unless it's just a smoke screen so PLEASE reference the terms 'normal problem/normal occurrence' when and where the 'spokesman' used them. Thanks.

21stCen

22nd Nov 2011, 13:09

Dan,
Once again you choose to twist other people's words. Nobody ever said somebody else used those terms, they were used to describe what compressor stalls are, and what they are not: compressor stalls are a 'normal problem,' compressor stalls are not a 'normal occurrence.'

Dan says:
I certainly would be as critical about any SA product...

There's only one person putting up smokescreens here...

Lonewolf_50

22nd Nov 2011, 13:54

jeffg

22nd Nov 2011, 14:04

A quick thread observation would be that the MGB incident has all those who ride in the S-92 spooked and wanting to be confident in it once more before getting back on this horse.
Military aviators would simply put this type of issue on the long list of other things trying to kill them and get on with it but civilian types haven't the luxury of having bullets and rockets lobbed at them to help them forget about a questionable MGB issue. I don't believe the helo will ever be as reliable as that most perfect engineering design, the single ball bearing but you can bet SAC works the hardest to make it that way..IMHE.
Dan Reno

This is Dan's take on S-92 fatal mishap. Does anyone think he would say 'Military aviators would simply put this type of issue on the long list of other things trying to kill them and get on with it ' for a V-22 mishap? Yup, he's totally unbiased or perhaps he blurted-out whatever excuse came to mind. Not smart.

SASless

22nd Nov 2011, 15:14

Well there is some truth in that statement....as during the early years of the Chinook, Huey/Cobra, Sea Sprite and Blackhawk (notice...four different manufacturers and types of helicopters) military pilots did exactly that and carried on flying the machines. We might also talk about the early days of jets and aircraft carriers...and century series fighters...all endeavours fraught with peril at certain times.

I don't suppose it would hurt to remind folks of the speckled history of the errr...uhhhhh....ahhhhh.....Osprey?

I think back to days at Fort Rucker when two Hueys shucked tail booms in one day....and later when Chinooks were shucking blades....and a bit later when they were losing Power Turbine wheels....or Jet Rangers were pitching transmission mounts.

Perhaps one is a bit quick on the trigger which puts one's own toes at risk.:=

21stCen

22nd Nov 2011, 16:14

SAS is right -- the history of the Chinook, Huey/Cobra, Sea Sprite, Blackhawk, early days of jets and aircraft carriers, century series fighters, and the Osprey all need to be looked at from the same perspective.

Let's judge them equally...

Jack Carson

22nd Nov 2011, 22:18

I could not disagree more. This is the 21st century. Years ago, the air transport industry demanded that their airplanes be built to a 10 to the minus ninth safety standard. We in the helicopter industry should all be advocating for something similar. The Blackhawk and the Apache were built to a new standard in the 1970s. They are both fine machines. The AW-139, EC-135 and S-92 were also conceived and built to a new much higher standard then their predecessors the S-76, B-212, A-109 and EC-225. Even with these higher demands, some aspects of their designs have slipped though the cracks. The S-92 MGB oil pump mounting studs and the AW-139 tail boom problems are just two examples. The emotional issues discussed on this forum concerning the V-22 are all justified as long as everyone’s concerns match mine, the operation capabilities of the machines and the safety of those that operating them.

Happy Thanksgiving to All:ok:

21stCen

23rd Nov 2011, 04:26

This is the 21st century... The Blackhawk and the Apache were built to a new standard in the 1970s.

The V-22 was designed and built in the 1980s (first flight in 1989). But your point is well taken -- the much higher standards of today should be applied to operational aircraft with redesigns and upgrades of systems and components integrated into them to bring them up to those standards. One of the Bell pilots who was in town last week was explaining that the Ospreys being produced today are a very different aircraft from the original design. And so it should be...

Happy Thanksgiving!
21stC

SansAnhedral

2nd Dec 2011, 15:01

Dan it would be better for your arguments sake to post the source article rather than more of David Axe's biased drivel. The anti-V22 propaganda machine has to have its gears greased every now and then by that hack, and he is lumped together with Bob Cox and Carlton Meyer as the perennial "Down With The Osprey!" crusaders.

But re: to the data from the star telegram article (shockingly NOT authored by Bob Cox, I'm sure his skytalk post referencing it is forthcoming), I would certainly love to see the "report" from the "pentagon's buying office" (whatever the hell that is supposed to be referring to) that bloomberg got their hands on.

Cant find that report "released" on 10/31 anywhere. I'd really like to see how those numbers were calculated, and how their assumptions changed from 2008.

Dan Reno

2nd Dec 2011, 16:41

SANS

Email the author and ask him.

FH1100 Pilot

2nd Dec 2011, 17:00

It would be funny if it were not so potentially tragic. The U.S. seems to have a philosophy in which the governement feels that they must be prepared to counter every conceivable threat anywhere on earth; we never again want to be caught with our pants down like we were on December 7, 1941 and a few times since. To prevent that, certain programs are forced down our throats with the justification of: We need this (weapon/aircraft/whatever) no matter what it costs!

The problem with such a philosophy is that the U.S. may well go broke in the name of national defense. Why, if we don't have the Osprey then we run the risk of not being the biggest, baddest, most powerful nation on the planet! And that is, after all, our manifest destiny, isn't it?

The hard reality that all branches of the U.S. military must face in the future is that the money is not limitless. The American public is getting tired of sending troops to die in distant countries for unclear or sketchy causes. The old "fight 'em over there so they won't come over here," is weak and we're not buying it anymore.

And remember, the U.S. isn't the only country having a financial crisis. Worldwide, there's not a whole lot of money for weapons.

Also, I talk to fighter pilots here in Pensacola, Florida where we have a couple of large military bases (NAS Pensacola and Eglin AFB). The new kids understand that they are probably the last of their type. Fighters aren't going to be flown by humans in the future...probably the very near future, too. Those shiny, new F-35's that sit idle down the road at Eglin Air Force base may go operational...or may not.

I know that there are some people in the U.S. that get simply horrified at the prospect of a shrinking military. They want unlimited funding for every possible...thing...that is deemed necessary "for American safety and security!" Anyone who argues otherwise is portrayed as unpatriotic.

Thus, we get the V-22 and F-35. I hope to God we can afford them.

21stCen

3rd Dec 2011, 10:53

News from Bell

Patuxent River, Md. – The Bell Boeing V-22 Program, a strategic alliance between Bell Helicopter and The Boeing Company, drew wide international attention at the Dubai Airshow held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from Nov. 13 to 17.
“The V-22 Osprey received significant interest at the Dubai Airshow from potential customers from around the world,” said John Rader, executive director of the Bell Boeing V-22 Program. “It is clear the V-22 is the right solution for those seeking range, speed, payload, and operational efficiency for military and humanitarian operations.”
http://www.rotor.com/rotornews/Dec11/BellBoeing.png
The V-22 Osprey is a joint service, multirole combat aircraft that uses tiltrotor technology to combine the vertical performance of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. With its nacelles and rotors in vertical position, it can take off, land and hover like a helicopter. Once airborne, its nacelles can be rotated to transition the aircraft to a turboprop airplane capable of high-speed, high-altitude flight.
"The amount of interest in the V-22 exceeded our highest expectations leading up to the show, with many regional officials requesting briefings and demonstration flights," said Michael Andersen, deputy director, Bell Boeing V-22 Program. "We are now working on follow-up visits and providing information as requested by several governments."
The Osprey currently is flown by the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the operational fleet has amassed about 125,000 flight hours, nearly half of which have come in the past two years. A total of 10 Marine Corps and two AFSOC squadrons are operationally deployable today, and the two services have together logged 16 successful combat, humanitarian, ship-based or Special Operations deployments since 2007.
“The V-22 was very well received by the international community in Dubai,” said Marine Corps Col. Greg Masiello, head of the V-22 Joint Program Office (PMA-275) at the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). “With its unprecedented range, speed and survivability, the Osprey is perfectly suited to many of the missions that Middle Eastern forces require.”
RotorNews® (http://www.rotor.com/Publications/RotorNewssupregsup/tabid/177/newsid1237/74297/Default.aspx)

SASless

3rd Dec 2011, 11:53

Ah yes.....but lets see who has the money to put up for fleets of these things. How many of these countries have the ability to field and operate these aircraft?

The Middle Eastern countries are well known for their Humanitarian operations are they not?

We are not going to sell anything to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Doha, Kuwait. We will have to pay for anything Jordan buys....and that just ain't gonna happen. Turkey....perhaps, Saudi Arabia maybe. Greece no...Italy no....France NO...the UK...nope. Do they see any of the Horn of Africa nations as being viable buyers...Somalia, Ethiopia???

For the sake of the US Economy and jobs at Bell/Boeing....I hope they are very successful but I am not going to run out and buy a lot of shares in the company in the expectation they will strike paydirt in foreign sales.

21stCen

3rd Dec 2011, 13:13

For the sake of the US Economy and jobs at Bell/Boeing....I hope they are very successful but I am not going to run out and buy a lot of shares in the company in the expectation they will strike paydirt in foreign sales.

SAS,
I don't think any of us will be running out to buy shares any time soon (it's not over until the fat lady sings)! The main interest is that foreign sales will increase the volume of a/c sold and by economy of scale will lessen the per unit costs to US taxpayers for planned acquisitions (although with the current situation in congress there is the possibility that reductions may come in other ways as well).

The rumors in this part of the world are that there are two or three countries that are seriously interested in the middle east and will have no funding difficulties if they decide to move forward. Although the interest is not at a 'fevered pitch,' the interest has apparently increased dramatically lately to the point where V-22 demos may be about to become a much more common occurrence here!
21stC

SASless

3rd Dec 2011, 15:05

Which countries are named in these vaporous rumours?

Israel, Saudi....and....?

Now that would be a joint venture made in Heaven!:eek:

21stCen

3rd Dec 2011, 15:43

Now SAS, you used to reside in this neck of the woods and I think you know better than that!!

Of course there will be no "joint ventures" as well you know...
:)

Hilife

3rd Dec 2011, 15:51

Thoughts from a casual observer east of the Pond.....

Let’s be honest, the USMC never did like going to a party dressed in anything anyone else was wearing (V-22, CH-53K and UH-60 Series are cases in point (VH-60 White Hawk not relevant)) and also no one likes to admit they might have been wrong, but can the DoD afford to continue to invest in the V22 program in such austere times?

Lifetime cost of V-22s rose 61% in three years

Posted Tuesday, Nov. 29, 2011

By Tony Capaccio
Bloomberg News

In three years, the lifetime cost to operate and support the U.S. Marine Corps' fleet of V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft has increased 61 percent, or $46.1 billion, according to a Defense Department estimate.

The 2008 estimate of $75.4 billion has swollen to $121.5 billion, adjusted for inflation, according to a report approved Oct. 31 by the Pentagon's weapons-buying office.

The new figure may increase scrutiny of the Navy's plan to spend $8 billion to buy 122 more V-22s, made by Textron's Bell Helicopter unit and Boeing.
The previously undisclosed estimate stems from increased maintenance and support costs, according to the report obtained by Bloomberg News. The cost model factors in many variables and assumptions for operating the 458 aircraft through their service lives, extending into the mid-2040s, said Col. Greg Masiello, the program manager.

The $53 billion V-22 Osprey is the Pentagon's sixth-largest acquisition program, according to cost estimates from December 2010.

The Pentagon is seeking to trim $450 billion in overall spending during 10 years to meet deficit reduction targets outlined in the Budget Control Act.
Christopher DeNicolo, primary defense credit analyst for Standard and Poor's, said in a Nov. 21 report that the V-22 and its suppliers are at risk for budget cuts.

The Navy, which includes the Marines, is seeking to cut V-22 costs "by pursuing repair and maintenance improvements, maintenance concept changes, and reducing repair turn-around times," the document said.

The Marines also want to buy more parts directly from the original makers rather than from Bell and Boeing "to eliminate contractor pass-through costs," the document said.

The $8 billion in proposed V-22 spending, in the early discussion stages, would supply aircraft to the Marines and Air Force through 2017, renewing a current deal of 174 aircraft for five more years. A multiyear contract almost guarantees that the aircraft can't be canceled because of steep termination costs.

The V-22 is a fixed-wing plane with rotors that tilt so it can take off and land like a helicopter. Bell builds components for the V-22 at plants in Fort Worth and Grand Prairie.

Read more: Lifetime cost of V-22s rose 61% in three years | Business | Dallas Business, Texas Busin... (http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/11/29/3559148/lifetime-cost-of-v-22s-rose-61.html#ixzz1fUQBlX59)

21stCen

3rd Dec 2011, 16:19

In three years, the lifetime cost to operate and support the U.S. Marine Corps' fleet of V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft has increased 61 percent

And in that same period the operational use has increased by what percent?

...the operational fleet has amassed about 125,000 flight hours, nearly half of which have come in the past two years.

SASless

3rd Dec 2011, 16:29

Lets assume the Israeli's dig into their "Reserve" money and buy the 10-12 Aircraft they have indicated a need for to suppport their SpecOps units and Long Distance CSAR missions. Now who else in the area is going to ante up for the aircraft?

Previous cancelled orders or Letters of Intent might be reconsidered if the unit price is improved over those previously offered. I don't see the US Army or US Navy getting into the deal as they have committed all their funding on other airframes.

Likewise the USCG has opted for other choices in aircraft and ships.

It must be a tough sell for Bell....as they have a very expensive Pony.

Perhaps Saudi Arabia and Norway will dust off their old notes and see what the changes in cost have been. That would be a potential order book of up to 36 aircraft.

Tcabot113

4th Dec 2011, 00:09

Sasless,

How is a $120M S-92 which will never see combat a better choice for the Marine Corps than the combat proven Osprey?

TC

SASless

4th Dec 2011, 01:57

Tcabot....pray tell what provoked your post? When has the 92 been compared to the V-22 in this thread?

You best check your numbers....S-92's cost more like 17-20 million US Dollars per copy.

Lonewolf_50

5th Dec 2011, 16:19

SASless, IIRC, the number you cited looked a lot like a UH-60M flyaway cost ... are you sure S-92 to a Mil Spec is that low?

I take a peek at the Canadian figures for their buy

(Granted, a notoriously unreliable source, wikipedia)

Unit costUS$32 million[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)
CH-148 appears looks to cost about 30 million dollar each. Or so. .

I have no idea what numbers/support/parts/spares and all that goes into such a number.

Also, given numbers of a buy, if one bought in the dozens the price might go down ... you seem to have lowballed it, that's all.

EDIT:

OK, from a defense news article on Ch-148. (Accuracy unknown).

28 maritime helicopters ... by 2010 ... cost of purchasing, providing 20 years of in-service support for, training personnel for, and extra spending to keep the CH-124 Sea King fleet operational during project delays ... C$ 6.2 billion.

Not sure how to break that down to a per unit flyaway cost, to be honest, given how muddy the cost categories are.

SASless

5th Dec 2011, 18:36

I googled S-92 and price....took the highest of the prices shown.:ouch:

I am not a 92 Salesman....just a guy who took exception to the ridiculous price Tcabot threw out for the 92.:uhoh:

When the 53K is far cheaper than the MV-22....it seems logical the 92 was also be far cheaper. Or....do I miss something here?:ugh:

Also...from a Defense Tech article.

The CH-53K is steadily eating away at the V-22 Osprey market. In late 2009, the Marine Corps decided to go with the CH-53Ks to replace their 40-year old CH-53D fleet (MV-22 Ospreys were originally slated to replace the CH-53D). At about the same time, Israel decided to forego the Osprey for the CH-53K, killing the Osprey’s best hope of snaring an international buyer. And with the Osprey 65% availability and the MV-22s high operating costs of about $11,000 dollars an hour, the CH-53K posed a serious threat to the MV-22 program.

Even worse, studies from the Pentagon demonstrated that a CH-53K-equipped big-deck amphib provided a lot more logistical support for embarked Marines than the MV-22, suggesting the mix of embarked MV-22s and CH-53Ks needed tweaking (and possibly fewer MV-22s).

Slowing CH-53K development will keep the new helicopter out of the air (and prevent real-data comparisons between platforms) until after a second multi-year MV-22 contract gets signed in FY 2013. Even worse, slowing the CH-53K schedule raised the program price by at least $1.1 billion dollars, raising the per-unit price.

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2010/04/29/whats-strangling-the-ch-53k/#ixzz1fguJWTqC
Defense.org

Lonewolf_50

5th Dec 2011, 18:59

I googled S-92 and price....took the highest of the prices shown.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/shiner.gif

OK. Defense News suggests that the price paid by Canada is very high due to them being the first buyer and basically paying for the first/initial mil version. But aren't you comparing civ S-92 to an unknown Mil Spec cost package?

I am not a 92 Salesman....just a guy who took exception to the ridiculous price Tcabot threw out for the 92.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/worry.gif

Concur, that price made no sense to me.
When the 53K is far cheaper than the MV-22....it seems logical the 92 was also be far cheaper. Or....do I miss something here?:ugh:
The only fact I see you missing is a problem with using current tenst. The CH-53K is at least 3 years away from IOC, if not more, so you cannot pretend that you have a price that compares to what is settling down as the V-22 price ... which is quite steep, as we've discussed before.

As to S-92 version, I think your logic (if you actually had a price on CH-53K that meant anything) would be sound, given the Stallion's greater complexity and payload. If we posit a 53K @ about 60 million per copy -- I am not sure if that's a realistic high ball or low ball, given how cost creep infests every aircraft program that I am aware of -- we might have a useful basis for cost comparison ... which would put the "30 million per" for the Canadian S-92 variant at least in the ballpark, and be supportive of your reasoning.

According to wikipedia, cost for CH-53K is about $128 million each, but I am not sure what they base that on, nor what program production run it assumes. (I heard 200 or so, but numbers like that vary wildly in reality, see also C-17 numbers and the roller coaster that went on ...)

Consider this: the CH-53K's rotor hub and transmission weigh 15,000 pounds – about the empty weight of a UH-60 Black Hawk. :eek:

EDIT: SAS, you seem to be using 2009 mission readiness figures. In the last year we seem to have seen some figures that are an improvement ... but take them all with a grain of salt.

I've seen numbers massaged a variety of ways in the past, and am aware of some of the moonshine pedalled here and there.

EDIT 2: SAS, you also have, within a couple of posts of each other, an older reference to the IAF not buying V-22's coupled with the newer info that IAF is looking into V-22 again. Won't those people make up their minds? :\

henra

5th Dec 2011, 21:34

28 maritime helicopters ... by 2010 ... cost of purchasing, providing 20 years of in-service support for, training personnel for, and extra spending to keep the CH-124 Sea King fleet operational during project delays ... C$ 6.2 billion.

In all fairness to Tcabot113 it has to be noted that doing the math with the above mentioned figure would give us an overall cost of ~217 mio US $ per copy ! :sad:

Real Unit price price will probably be somewhere in between but the 20 mio figure for the civilian 'public transport bus' will be surely exceeded by a solid margin for a fully equipped military version including defensive/navigation/communication avionics / ballistic protection, uograded engines, transmission, etc.

Jack Carson

5th Dec 2011, 21:43

At this point in time one could only guess what the actual unit price of the MH-53K will turn out to be. Likewise the one cannot even come close to estimating the unit cost or price of the Canadian CH-148 Cyclone at this time. Other than basic size and shape any comparisons of the Cyclone with a basic S-92 are ludicrous at best. A few of the many Cyclone modifications to the basic S-92 include:
• Increase Gross Weight – 30,000 lbs
• Run Dry Gear Boxes
• Increased Engine Performance
• Fly By Wire
An entire recertification effort is required, and on going, to accommodate many of the specific Canadian requirements. All of this is born by one customer at this time. Additional projected sales will help bring down the cost of this variant of the S-92. Comparing the cost of a basic747-200 to the cost of the VC-25 (Air Force One) provides a similar but exaggerated example.

SASless

5th Dec 2011, 21:55

The problem with pricing is how it is calculated. Remember the legendary "Hammer", "Ash Tray", and "Toilet Seats" flap?

When one takes the multi-year total package price and tries to do simple division of total cost by aircraft numbers purchased...the per aircraft cost is really huge and has no validity as the resulting number is not representative of the actual cost of the aircraft itself....as it includes spare parts, training, simulators, special tools, admin overhead costs, fees, bonuses, kennel fees for executives and the lot.

If you think that simple math works....read up on the allocation of Overhead Expenses by Defense Contractors and you will gain an education on just what goes into total program costs.

The two year set back of the 53K IOC added Five Million Dollars to the cost per airframe...and if the production run is cut then the cost goes up yet again.

I defy anyone outside the procurement system to correctly calculate the per aircraft cost for any of these aircraft. Me and Google sure aren't definitive sources....and never claimed to be.

The old rule was never fly the "A Model" of anything......and I reckon the rest of that rule would be never "pay for the development costs of the A model of anything" as well.

21stCen

6th Dec 2011, 09:07

December 5, 2011

Bell Boeing to brief India on V-22 Osprey (http://www.stratpost.com/bell-boeing-to-brief-india-on-v-22-osprey)

Minister of State for Defense, Mallipudi Mangapati Pallam Raju, accompanied by the deputy chief of the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Satish Soni, asked the Bell Boeing V-22 Tiltrotor Team for a briefing on the aircraft.

http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/MV-22-Hero-for-print-600-x-400.jpg A US Marine Corps MV-22.

The US Bell Boeing collaboration on the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor is to brief India on the aircraft sometime early next year. In a meeting held at the Dubai Air Show last month, Minister of State for Defense, Mallipudi Mangapati Pallam Raju, accompanied by the deputy chief of the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Satish Soni, asked for a briefing on the aircraft.
Bob Carrese, Executive Director of V-22 Business Development of the Bell Boeing Tiltrotor Team spoke to StratPost at the show, saying, “We did have an Indian delegation that came by, the minister – we briefed him on this. We’ve been invited to give another brief to the staff – the naval staff.” Carrese says Admiral Soni was the ‘gentleman who actually requested the brief on the airborne early warning platform on the V-22′. “V-22 as an AEW (Airborne Early Warning) platform,” he said.
This is not the first time the navy has been briefed on the aircraft, but as India moves to firm up designs of the two aircraft carriers it is building at Cochin Shipyard, the navy’s plans for aircraft acquisitions to fully equip the carrier groups with onboard and complementary land-based platforms, replace aging platforms and move towards all-round aerial capabilities, are also due to be set in stone. Carrese says they’ve briefed India on the platform earlier and will make an updated presentation again, ‘probably at the beginning of next year’.
“We’ve made presentations at a number of Heli Power conferences and also presented to the air force chief of staff – responded to a navy RFI (Request for Information) for land-based and ship-based search and rescue platforms,” he says, adding, “We keep refreshing our briefs at the Heli Power. We continuously get inquiries – usually about our ability to reach islands that are well off the coast and (airlift) a rapid reaction force.”
The Indian Navy currently operates a fleet of helicopters and land-based surveillance and transport aircraft that include Dorniers, IL-38s and Tu-142s, besides other, smaller aircraft. Many of these are coming to the end of their life. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has also noted the age of the navy’s rotary assets (http://www.stratpost.com/navy-looking-for-more-helicopters). The navy has, so far, ordered eight Boeing P-8I Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft, with an expected follow on order of four, and also plans to shop around for Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance (MRMR) aircraft.
Carrese says his team has ‘done some early work on airborne early warning systems’. “There’re a number of different radars that could be mounted on the aircraft,” he says, adding, “This is not the first time that we’ve been asked to present some kind of application in that regard.”
The aircraft is already replacing a number of types in the US Marine Corps and the US Air Force. In the US Air Force, alone, 50 Ospreys will replace around a 100 aircraft, both rotary as well as fixed wing. The Marines, too, are planning to replace their CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift tandem rotor and the earlier model CH-53 aircraft with the Osprey. The US Navy has also been considering the aircraft as a replacement for their C-2 Carrier Onboard Delivery aircraft. But so far, there hasn’t been any move to configure the V-22 for the AEW role.
Since both, the INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) as well as the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, are STOBAR (Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery), a vertical lift or short take off aircraft would appear to suit an Indian requirement for a carrier-borne AEW platform.

Jean Chamberlain, Vice President, General Manager of Boeing Mobility, says the Osprey is designed for requirements that include shipboard operations, pointing out that its automatic blade fold and wing stow in 90 seconds can reduce its footprint on the ship deck.
John Garrison, President and CEO of Bell Helicopter, points out that the vertical take-off and landing capability allows delivery of critical supplies to any aviation ship, ‘not just big deck carriers’. Colonel Greg Masiello, US Marine Corps, the Joint Program Manager for V-22 at NAVAIR PMA-275, agrees. “It can go to a spectrum of ships. It doesn’t have to go just to an aircraft carrier,” he says, adding, “It works on our amphibious carriers now – they can do a short take off and landing,” or ‘operate ‘from a helipad’.
Marine V-22 pilot, Major Benjamin Debardeleben, who used to fly the CH-46 Sea Knight tandem rotor helicopter, says, “It really provides you more flexibility than I had before because I can taxi on the deck myself, so I don’t have to get towed around. I can also do a short take off from the front – I can do a running take off and take off with a much heavier weight.” The nacelles on the aircraft rotate 96 degrees backwards, allowing the pilot to reverse the aircraft, as well.
http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/footprint-370-x-309.jpg (http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/footprint-370-x-309.jpg)He says, “Most helicopters fly a little under 2 miles a minutes anything about a 120, 100 knots – we fly around 240/260 – its 4 miles a minute. And that’s what shrinks the battlespace.”
“I flew the CH-46 before. And it was a helicopter that did about 110 knots. And with that, the ship was always very close to the shore. And so we had to deal with very short legs. And with the Osprey we’re able to be much further away from the shore or operate in two locations and be able to conduct the mission instead of being just focused on one location,” says the Marine, adding, “You need less bases, you can reach farther with the same aircraft.”
The Osprey could be configured for a variety of other roles, as well. Garrison points out, “As an aerial and ground refueler, the Osprey can serve not only as aerial refueler for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, it can also land and quickly deliver fuel to ground vehicles.” He thinks the ‘aircraft can easily be modified to serve as an excellent intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance and command and control platform’.
“So if you had an ISR platform we could roll that capability on it – launch of a navy ship or land-based over pretty long distances. This aircraft can fly up to 25,000 feet, so you get range well beyond – you get the speed – lot of coverage there,” explains Masiello.
Garrison also cites rescue and medevac as obvious applications for the aircraft, something that has been demonstrated during Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya, as well as in Afghanistan.
http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/cross-600-x-320.jpg (http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/cross-600-x-320.jpg)
According to Masiello says six V-22 Ospreys flew around 3,400 nautical miles from the Afghanistan theater to the Mediterranean to deploy for operations in Libya, with aerial refueling by KC-130 aircraft. “It left, in this case, Afghanistan and ended up landing in Greece and Sigonella. 15 hours and 25 minutes,” he recounts. “We flew them – two flight of three – six V-22s – they took off, flew across three continents, and ten countries and over 3, 000 nautical miles – and we did that in less than 15 and a half hours of flight time. We don’t have another aircraft that’s able to do that,” he says.

Debardeleben had a special role to play during that deployment. He remembers getting from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean as a ‘very long day, very long flight’. He was the V-22 pilot that led two aircraft into Libya in March to rescue the crew of a downed F-15 fighter. “I don’t have the timeline in front of me,” he says, but roughly, “I flew for about 40 minutes. There were two MV-22s – I was the section leader. And then we landed for about 2 minutes and then flew back for 40 minutes. So it was an 82-minute flight. We were very quick – in and out.” http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Libya-418-x-168-300x120.jpg (http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Libya-418-x-168.jpg)
“We had all the right information. When I landed there was nothing (no hostiles) going on. It was all quiet. I did have jets overhead to provide security,” he recounts.
“We have done the timing and the estimating for that – if we had used a helicopter it would have been at least an additional hour,” says Masiello.
http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Afghan-600-x-478-300x239.jpg (http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Afghan-600-x-478.jpg)In June, 2010, an aircraft crashed near Kunduz in Afghanistan, stranding 32 coalition forces. Masiello narrates, “It’s bad weather, it’s at a bad spot where people are less than friendly for the forces in there – we launched two CVs in this case – they flew right over the top of a 15,000 foot mountain range, penetrated the weather, came down, picked them up, brought them home and in less than four hours.” The distance one way was around 400 nautical miles.
The aircraft has also taken fire in Afghanistan and survived. “It’s been engaged by some less than friendly people – I guess they wanted to shoot at it at different times. And fortunately the systems on board and the built-in survivability aspects of the V-22 make it very hard to hit. But on the occasion when that aircraft has been hit, it’s incredibly survivable. And it’s repairable right in the field – the composite structure lends itself to great amount of abilities even in the field for repairs,” says Masiello. “This aircraft is the safest tactical rotorcraft that the Marine Corps operates,” he says.
Chamberlain says, “The V-22 is designed to carry troops into the danger zone and return those troops safely. The features that allow for this are ballistic tolerant fuselage, design redundancy, advanced warning systems, and counter-measures.” She says the times spent in these high threat zones are dramatically less than what is experienced by legacy aircraft.
http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/GC-300-x-546.jpg (http://www.stratpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/GC-300-x-546.jpg)The distinctive profile of the aircraft makes it instantly recognizable. The Osprey has rotating engines on fixed wings that enable vertical lift like a helicopter and it the ‘speed and range of a turbo-prop airplane’.
“It covers most of the envelope that a helicopter as well as our fixed wing transport aircraft in a single platform,” says Chamberlain. She says the aircraft can execute missions at speeds of 282 knots, ‘more than twice as fast as conventional helicopters’. It has a maximum load range of 1000 nautical miles, but she says, “Since it is refuelable, that range can be extended indefinitely.”
Masiello says, “This is not a heavy lift aircraft, but with the exception of those extreme heavy lift missions, there’s not much that this aircraft couldn’t do. And it can do it farther, faster and it can carry still the significant amount of 20,000 pounds (around nine tons),” besides an external load of 12,000 pounds (around six tons).
Walking to the V-22 at the flight line at Dubai, your correspondent marveled at the sight of a C-27J Spartan aircraft performing a 360 degree roll. This elicited a snort from a member of the Osprey team, “Yes, but can it hover?”
The aircraft has, however, been criticized for its cost. At USD 70 million (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/us/costly-osprey-symbol-of-fight-to-cut-pentagon.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss) a unit, it’s as expensive as some fighter aircraft and its cost of operation has also increased, according to one report (http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/11/29/3559148/lifetime-cost-of-v-22s-rose-61.html), by 61 percent.
Masiello says cost management is a continuing focus for his team. “We’ve got a very deliberate plan,” he says, explaining, “We’ve made almost a 20 percent decrease in our cost per flight hour.”

His team has gone over ‘42 different components’ to bring down the operating cost. “It’s almost 130,000 flight hours. Whether it’s a component or a different methodology to maintain the aircraft and we’ve put that back into the calculus, if you will, and we’ve been able to dramatically and steadily decrease the operating cost. And we’re not done, we’re going to continue with that.”
Masiello also says they’re also working on improving the performance of the aircraft. “Our previous software drop – this is a software driven aircraft, so without any hardware changes we increased the air speed by 20 knots.” He says the next software drop will increase the power of the aircraft ‘just by changing the pitch of the prop rotor, no physical change’.
The Bell Boeing team is planning to ramp up full rate production, up to 40 aircraft a year, in 2013 and Garrison says they can begin deliveries to international customers from 2015 onwards.

Bell Boeing to brief India on V-22 Osprey | StratPost (http://www.stratpost.com/bell-boeing-to-brief-india-on-v-22-osprey)

bast0n

6th Dec 2011, 10:30

SansAnhedral

6th Dec 2011, 15:01

When the 53K is far cheaper than the MV-22

Is that so? :=

SEAPOWER Expo Online (http://www.seaairspace.org/2011/stories/20110411-ch53k.html)

CH-53K Unaffected by Force Structure Review
By RICHARD R. BURGESS, Managing Editor
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. - The Marine Corps still plans to procure 200 Sikorsky CH-53K heavy-lift helicopters, even in light of the Marine Corps Force Structure Review released in March.

Even with the proposed force structure reduction, the Corps still had a requirement for 200 CH-53Ks to replace the 152 CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters in service, Col. Robert Pridgen, the Navy’ s program manager for H-53 Heavy-Lift Helicopters, said April 11 at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exposition. The CH-53Es are heavily involved in warfighting and humanitarian operations in several areas of the world.

“The is no shortage for work out there,” Pridgen said, speaking of the worldwide demands on the Corps’ heavy-lift force. “We’re working at risk with fewer 53s than we need.”

Last month, two CH-53Ks were transferred from HMX-1, the squadron that provides helicopters for presidential use. The two are being upgraded and returned to the operating forces.

The CH-53K is an extensive redesign and features numerous improvements, including the new GE-38 engine, which delivers more than 7,500 shaft horsepower, compared with 4,380 for the T64 engine on the CH-53E. The new design also features a new airframe, transmission system and tail rotor, as well as composite rotor blades and a cargo cabin that is 12 inches wider than that of the CH-53E. The new helicopter also will feature a fly-by-wire control system, the first in such a large helicopter.

Pridgen said the CH-53E “has historically been very expensive to operate,” and that one of the program goals is to reduce operating costs for the CH-53K.

The Navy’s Critical Design Review for the CH-53K has been completed. First flight of the helicopter is scheduled for 2013. Initial operational capability is scheduled for 2018.

Pridgen said the expected unit cost of a CH-53K when built in full-rate production is $55 million to $65 million.

Sikorsky Aircraft is under way with assembly of the CH-53K ground test vehicle (GTV) and work has begun on the second test article.

Tcabot113

7th Dec 2011, 01:12

The price for the 53K is a fantastic bargain, but I am surprised it is fantastically cheaper than the 60M:

July 13/11: The US DSCA announces [PDF] Thailand’s official request for 3 UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters,... The estimated cost is $235 million.

That works out to $70+M a piece.

Make Sikorsky commit to that price and the US can avoid the S-92 Canadian fiasco.

TC

21stCen

7th Dec 2011, 04:25

expected unit cost of a CH-53K when built in full-rate production is $55 million to $65 million.

A manufacturer's rep recently advised (hearsay only) that the current price being charged for the V-22 is within $2mil of the high end price above, and if the 5yr extended contract is signed the cost would go down to within $2mil of the low end price above ($67mil/$57mil)!! The price of the two aircraft may fall within the same range, although the projected costs of programs in development have a tendency to go up exponentially in military acquisitions.

Of course in the end it's an 'apples and oranges' comparison. The 53K is a heavy lift a/c with great lifting and high alt hover capability, whereas the V-22 is a medium lift a/c with very high speed and long range capability. I can see why the Marines would want both to carry out a wider range of missions.

Lonewolf_50

7th Dec 2011, 14:56

21st:
Last chart I saw on "costs per flight hour" for Osprey and one of the 53 models (not sure if it was D or E) put it around 13k.

I am not sure what costs and assumptions go into arriving at that figure.

21stCen

7th Dec 2011, 16:09

LW,
Sorry, I'm probably behind you on that, your info may be more up to date. I haven't been privy to any details on hourly costs. The last info I heard in the open press was that the V-22 rate was at 11k/hr (although claims of late are that it is now 20% lower) and the 53E was higher than the 11k figure. No official confirmation, and unfortunately as we all know we cannot rely on numbers floating around on the internet.

Like you, I do not represent a vested interest in the V-22 (shareholder, employee, spokesperson). We are an offshore helicopter operation in the middle east, and a future operator of the 609 (whenever it gets here!!). We only have peripheral access to the manufacturer reps and some current and former military personnel engaged in the program at the operational level.
21stC

riff_raff

9th Dec 2011, 23:21

This may be a silly question - but why does the V22 not have it's engines horizontally mounted over or under the wing roots driving the rotors by shafts and gearboxes that I presume it already has for cross coupling?

This would avoid having to tilt the engines and make FOD ingestion easier to handle, reduce the weight slung a long way outboard and probably ease maintenance.

I await the incoming flak for not seeing the obvious.............bast0n,

That's actually quite a good question, so you'll get no flak here. And there have been some recent tilt-rotor designs proposed with just such a drivetrain configuration. The primary advantage of this arrangement is that the engine (and its lube system) would not be required to operate at various attitudes. The disadvantages are that this configuration is a bit more complex (requiring an additional set of bevel gearboxes), and the interconnect driveshafts would be required to handle 100% of single rotor torque for the life of the drivetrain, thus these parts would be much heavier. The current V-22 interconnect system is only required to handle something like 55% of single engine OEI power for a brief period. For the large majority of its life, the V-22 interconnect system is only required to transmit a very small amount power, likely less than 5% of single engine MRP.

While designing a tilt rotor drivetrain like you propose is quite possible, getting the interconnect driveshaft system design safe and reliable would take some work.

http://sitelife.aviationweek.com/ver1.0/Content/images/store/3/15/b3762690-534b-4246-9f0a-5a3bc962881b.Large.jpg

Regards,
riff_raff

Tcabot113

10th Dec 2011, 02:04

BastOn

Only one rotor drive can pass through a rotating joint. Nacelle mounted engines along with an interconnect shaft provide dual drive paths to both rotors. All others would make the aircraft as survivable as a Chinook to a single hit. Germany in 82 showed that you do not have to be in combat for catastrophic failure in the Chinook, only a clogged oil port.

So the question may be why did the Chinook be allowed to live with a serious design flaw. A "simple" design change would be to have one engine driving the front rotor and one the after rotor and the top shaft behaving as a redundant path.

Tcabot113

21stCen

10th Dec 2011, 15:21

Marines: Personnel not weapons to be cut
United Press International -
Thursday, December 08, 2011

Marines: Personnel not weapons to be cut
WASHINGTON, Dec 8, 2011 (UPI via COMTEX) -- The U.S. Marine Corps will cut costs by reducing troops rather than weapons programs, a military official said.
Assistant Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford said the Marines will meet debt-ceiling mandated budget cuts by reducing troops from 202,000 to 186,800, The Hill reported Thursday.
The Defense Department has been ordered to make $350 billion in cuts in a decade. Military officials have said they can make the cuts without hurting national security.
"In terms of procurement, we have protected that," Dunford told The Hill. That means plans for high-profile programs like the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft, a variant of the F-35 fighter and a new amphibious personnel craft remain on track, the newspaper said
Dunford, however, warned steeper budget cuts proposed by some lawmakers would require "difficult decisions" for the Marines.

Marines: Personnel not weapons to be cut - UPI.com (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/12/08/Marines-Personnel-not-weapons-to-be-cut/UPI-73061323358511/)

SASless

10th Dec 2011, 18:17

Tcabot....somehow I fear you do not understand the Chinook systems at all.

The wee fallacy with your idea is the overlap of the two rotor systems...something on the order of 11.5 feet as I recall. As long as the two rotors turn at the exact same RPM....having each head driven independently would work fine (assuming the "redundant path being the synch shaft between the two rotor heads were to fail).

As it is designed....the engines transfer their power to the rotor systems by means of a nose mounted engine gearbox....which connect to the combining gearbox...which then drives shafts to the forward and aft main gearboxes.

The Chinook has some critical components....more so than single rotor helicopters but then it is much more efficient than comparable single rotor helicopters due to its tandem rotor design.

The discussion is about the Osprey and tilt rotor designs....not the Chinook.

Try comparing the current Osprey design to that suggested with fixed engines and variable rotors if you will....that is what is under discussion.

bast0n

10th Dec 2011, 21:46

OOOHHH!

Only one rotor drive can pass through a rotating joint.

Differential on my car springs to mind - but then again perhaps I am missing a salient point. Help Sas!

I shall refine my original question tomorrow. Perhaps.
David - Ignoramus V22 wise.

Well after a good nights sleep I am ready for the fray!

With two engines driving into a coupling gearbox with one output shaft going to both Rotors/propellors so that they are linked in speed and drive, it does not seem to me to matter where the engines are within reason. I just feel that the complexity of tilting engines/oil/hydraulic systems et all is not an elegant solution.

I am of course assuming that the rotors are constant speed in flight and that all control is by some form of collective/cyclic pitch change. Loss of one engine will not matter and the drive will be coming from the remaining engine in the centre of the aircraft rather than across the whole shebang.

SAS - do I know what I am talking about?

Dan Reno

12th Dec 2011, 10:15

December 9, 2011: The U.S. Marine Corps recently admitted that the lifetime cost of operating their new V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft had increased 64 percent over the last three years (to $121.5 billion). Although the marines MV-22s have flown over 100,000 hours in Afghanistan and have an excellent safety and reliability record, they are very expensive. With major cuts in the defense budget (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20111209.aspx) coming, there is pressure to cease production of the MV-22, and put more money into cheaper helicopters. That is already happening.
Four years ago the U.S. Marine Corps began working on an updated version of their heavy, CH-53E, transport helicopters. The new version was the CH-53K. First flight of a CH-53K was to take place this year, with first CH-53Ks entering service in 2015. But now this has all been delayed. First flight won't take place until 2013, and the CH-53K won't enter service until 2018. Technical problems are blamed, although helicopter advocates imply that the marines don't want to take money away from their MV-22 program to keep the CH-53K program on schedule.
There is still a lot of enthusiasm for the CH-53K. Two years ago, the marines decided to replace their elderly CH-53Ds with CH-53Ks, rather than the more expensive MV-22s. The CH-53K was to cost about $27 million each, compared to about three times that for an MV-22. However, delaying the introduction of the CH-53K will cost over a billion dollars, and add about $5 million to the cost of each CH-53K. Replacing the CH-53Ds means more CH-53Ks, for a total of about 200. It's expected that the final costs of the CH-53D will be higher, but still about half the cost of an MV-22.
The Marine Corps currently operates a number of different helicopters and for years has been planning to shrink the number of types to save on operational and procurement costs. Medium and heavy lift helicopters such as the CH-46E (over 200 in use) and the CH-53 A/D (about 70) were originally to be replaced by 348 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. But delays in that program, and a reduction in the number of V-22s to be built, led to the CH-53K. While the 38 ton CH-53K is a better cargo (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20111209.aspx) hauler, the 27 ton MV-22 moves twice as fast, and the marines have found that to be a major advantage in combat.
The CH-53E remains one of the few heavy lift helicopters that can operate in the high altitudes in Afghanistan, and they have been heavily used there. The CH-53Es average age is fifteen years, and over 3,000 flight hours. They require 44 man hours of maintenance, for each hour in the air. As a result, it costs (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20111209.aspx) about $20,000 for each flight hour. CH-53Es are good for about 6,000 flight hours, before metal fatigue makes them too dangerous to fly. The CH-53K will get cost per flight hour down to about $10,000 (about 30 percent less than the MV-22).
At the present rate of use, the Marines will begin running out of heavy-lift helicopters by 2012, thus the decision to put the CH-53 back into production as the CH-53K. The new model will be 15 percent heavier (at 38 tons) than the CH-53E and be able to carry nearly twice as much (13.5 tons). The CH-53K will be much easier to maintain, and cost about half as much, per flight hour, to operate.
While the MV-22 is a superior helicopter transport (greater speed and range) in a combat zone, it's also a lot more expensive. The coming budget cuts will probably seeing the marines cutting MV-22 purchases and falling back on conventional helicopters like the CH-53K to maintain their battlefield mobility. It's another case of good-enough beating out better.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20111209.aspx (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20111209.aspx)

Dan Reno

12th Dec 2011, 10:43

December 11, 2011 5:17 AM

By now, many people would have given up the fight.
Not Connie Gruber and Trish Brow. Their husbands were killed on April 8, 2000, when the V-22 Osprey they were attempting to land in Marana, Ariz., crashed in a fiery explosion, killing all 19 Marines aboard.
The findings of the Marine Corps crash investigation later cast a shadow over the actions of pilot Lt. Col. John Brow and his co-pilot Maj. Brooks Gruber, and statements from high-level Marine officials at the time contributed to blame being cast at the Marine aviators.
Connie Gruber and Trish Brow have battled to remove the taint from their late husbands’ record. Enlisting the tireless assistance of Congressman Walter B. Jones, they have sought to have the Marine Corps’ official position clarified, once and for all, to state that the pilots were not at fault in the accident.
More than 11 years after the crash, their efforts continue. Through legislation in Congress and personal pleas to the Marine Corps commandant and the secretary of the Navy, Jones has pressed the case on the widows’ behalf. So far, they have failed to receive a satisfactory response.
As indicated earlier this year in an Oct. 5 letter to Jones, Marine Commandant Gen. James F. Amos stands by the “contemporaneous record” of the accident investigation. Amos has expressed his personal admiration for Brow and Gruber, blaming “outside observers” for mischaracterizing the pilot’s actions.
Much has been learned since the initial investigation, however, and Amos now should go a step further. He should give the Brow and Gruber families what they seek and what they deserve. He should issue a definitive statement that would put this question to rest once and for all.
The April 2000 crash occurred during a difficult and sometimes tragic period of the Osprey’s development. There were design flaws and many unknowns about how the innovative tilt-rotor aircraft would respond in certain situations. Those Marine aviators involved in the early flights were true pioneers who could not have known about some of the dangers they faced, including the conditions that caused the Marana crash, and therefore cannot and should not be held responsible.
“They introduced this aircraft and because of their life sacrifices, the Osprey of today is safe for the pilot, the crew and their passengers,” Connie Gruber, who lives in Jacksonville, told The Daily News (http://www.jdnews.com/sections/infocenter/newsracks/) in July 2009.
The Marine Corps can put an end to the legacy of mischaracterizations. It can clear the names of John Brow and Brooks Gruber for posterity — and for the peace of those who paid the highest price in the service of their nation. It should do so without further delay.
[/quote]http://www.jdnews.com/opinion/marine-98327-brow-gruber.html (http://www.jdnews.com/opinion/marine-98327-brow-gruber.html)</H1>

Dan Reno

12th Dec 2011, 10:53

By David Axe (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/author/davidaxe/)
December 1, 2011

http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2011/12/040701-N-9999J-001-660x471.jpg (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/osprey-costs-soar/040701-n-9999j-001/)

The cost for the Marines to fix and fly their full fleet of V-22 tiltrotors has grown by nearly two-thirds (http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/11/29/3559148/lifetime-cost-of-v-22s-rose-61.html) over just four years, according to a Pentagon estimate. In 2008, the Defense Department calculated the “lifetime” cost of operating 360 V-22 Osprey transports at $75 billion over roughly 30 years. Today the figure is more than $121 billion — a 61-percent increase.
The rapidly escalating bill could could not come at a worse time for the Marines and Osprey-makers Bell and Boeing. The Marines are struggling to pay for an ambitious, carefully coordinated aviation modernization plan, elements of which have begun to unravel all at the same time. And that’s not even taking into account the looming prospect of deep defense cuts.
Bell and Boeing, meanwhile, are hoping to convince the Pentagon and foreign governments to order more V-22s (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/V-22-Osprey-The-Multi-Year-Program-04823/), providing years of work at the companies’ factory in Amarillo, Texas.
The V-22, which takes off like a helicopter but cruises like an airplane thanks to its rotating engine nacelles, has been controversial since development began nearly 30 years ago. Several early models of the Osprey crashed during testing, killing 30 people. A redesigned version, though safer, still crashes or burns (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/osprey-down/all/1) at a rate far higher than the Marines like to admit.

Leaving aside its safety record, the V-22 ain’t cheap. A single Osprey costs $60 million to purchase, plus millions more to support. For comparison, a Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter is actually slightly cheaper to buy. And the Army’s workhorse UH-60 Blackhawk chopper can be had for around $15 million apiece.
The price increase should come as no surprise to close observers of the Osprey’s tortured development. In order to make up for its small wings and rotors, which are sized to fit on Navy assault ships, designers fitted the V-22 with unusually powerful Rolls-Royce engines. They run hotter than normal airplane motors and break down faster. Engine problems have caused many of the V-22′s worst accidents and also account for much of the ballooning operational cost.
The Marines have tried different approaches to driving down the V-22′s maintenance bill. At one time the Corps even considered replacing the current engines with entirely new models. So far, nothing has worked. Four years after being declared combat-ready, the V-22 has readiness rate of just 69 percent, compared to 85 percent for a Blackhawk.
The Osprey’s growing pricetag could threaten other Marine programs. Despite their reputation for doing more with less (http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/military/article_a74b5718-833a-5cb2-9438-78b1d3b18470.html), the Marines actually have the most ambitious aviation modernization plan of any of the military branches, according to Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group in Virginia.
The Marines want to buy F-35B stealth jump jets (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/?p=38359), modernized AH-1Z and UH-1Y light helicopters and the new heavyweight CH-53K chopper in addition to the V-22 — and all at the same time. Budgets are so tight that a cost increase with any of these new aircraft forces the Marines to cut back on others. Already, the Marines are considering eliminating H-1s (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=8248956) to pay for F-35s. What would they sacrifice to afford more Ospreys?

[/quote]
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/osprey-costs-soar/ (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/osprey-costs-soar/)

SansAnhedral

12th Dec 2011, 12:33

So what are we doing now, Dan? You posted this last piece of hit-garbage by David-Axe-to-grind the same day it was published back on december 2nd. Now you went back and deleted your old post to re-post the same article to keep it at the front of the thread? Why?

Oh and this is interesting...

The CH-53K was to cost about $27 million each, compared to about three times that for an MV-22. However, delaying the introduction of the CH-53K will cost over a billion dollars, and add about $5 million to the cost of each CH-53K.

So an article on "the strategy page" website with no sources and no listed author is being used in a cost/budgetargument, which flies in the face of the cost stated by the marine H53 program manager of $55 to $65 million each...and we all know your opinion (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/406987-nh-90-problems.html#post6823183) of military program managers

Publicity on ANY government aircraft will ALWAYS find the users (government employees) and manufacturers saying what a fantastic machine it is (if they value their jobs and/or ever want to get promoted) which is why PPRuNe is such a valuable tool in trying to sort out the wheat from the chaff (BS from the facts).

Take the V-22 for example....

...you cant trust them at all, can you!!

So, according to you, since Col Pridgen is a US military program manager he must be CLEARLY biased when hes claiming $55-65 million, what do you suppose the REAL costs are?

jeffg

12th Dec 2011, 13:13

which is why PPRuNe is such a valuable tool in trying to sort out the wheat from the chaff (BS from the facts).

LMAO!!!!
Does someone actually believe that? How sad.

21stCen

12th Dec 2011, 16:03

Dan,
Repeatedly posting inaccurate information contained in articles being published that have already been shown to contain false statements will not make the false information become true. Read the previous posts and where you disagree, please provide evidence to counter. :ugh:

On the article about the Marana crash, my heart goes out to the families and friends of the pilots and others on board that lost their lives that night (too many of us have gone through that loss without having to suffer the additional controversy). I think we can all agree with their advise that, “They introduced this aircraft and because of their life sacrifices, the Osprey of today is safe for the pilot, the crew and their passengers…”

thanks,
21stC

SansAnhedral

13th Dec 2011, 16:19

The Israeli Air Force : Unlike any other (http://www.iaf.org.il/5642-37961-en/IAF.aspx)

Unlike any other
There isn’t another one like it in the world. The Bell-Boeing V-22 "Osprey" has been the source of much curiosity since it entered service in the U.S military and it still isn't clear if the tilt-rotor has more positives or negatives. Last month, two IAF pilots arrived at the U.S. to try the new aircraft themselves and try to answer these questions
It took weeks for the Marines staff to plan Operation "Cobra's Anger". Around 100 Marine solders and over 100 Afghan soldiers would land deep in the Taliban stronghold in the dead of night, ambush the terrorists and deactivate mines in the area.
In the beginning of December 2009, in the late night hours, the forces took off from a base in Southern Afghanistan toward Nawzad Valley in Helmand Province. Even though they were armed with optimal weaponry and military technology, the aircrafts carrying the soldiers were the ones that caught the eye. Tilt-rotors with broad underbellies, affixed wings and engines with changeable axes: V-22s.
Three decades earlier, immediately after the failure of Operation "Eagle Claw" (1980) to rescue American hostages in Tehran, the U.S. congress determined the need for a "new kind of plane that will be able to take off and land vertically and also carry forces in high speeds".
Thus began the development of the first tilt-rotor in the world. The prototype already took off in 1989 and ever since, the U.S. has been the only country in the world that supplied its forces with the aerial interbreed, which is manufactured through a cooperation of "Bell" and "Boeing" companies.

Not Either, Both

The V-22 is neither a plane nor a helicopter. "It is a new platform", Bell-Boeing claim. It is a new platform that can shift in configuration at the touch of a button and become a plane or, alternatively, a helicopter.
"The aircraft has the advantages of a helicopter. It can take off like one and has the ability to fly at slow speeds. Additionally, it combines its advantages with the stability, speed and ranges of a regular plane", says Bob Carrese, Boeing's Vice President of the V-22 Business Development. "While other manufacturers around the world are demonstrating technology, we already have it. We're demonstrating a tilt-rotor as a concept that changes the aeronautical world".
With a speed of 270 miles per hour and the ceiling height of a plane, there is no doubt that Bell-Boeing is introducing a new player to the field.
"There aren't other planes on the market that can function like a helicopter and reach the heights of a Hercules. These abilities give the aircraft an immense advantage in operations. It can function as a helicopter throughout the entire operation and yet between take off and reaching the destination, the plane can rise to tremendous altitudes and dodge threats and dangerous weather hazards throughout the flight".
The capabilities of the aircraft contribute, among others, to execute more rapid evacuations. "The plane reaches a point from which you can adjust the autopilot to search mode", says Carrese. "From that moment, the plane can maneuver in-air in the desired way and pilots are free to search for evacuees on ground".
Bell-Boeing doesn't forget to stress the system's durability. "Every system has two or three backups. Moreover, there is a far stronger chance that flight crew members and passengers were to survive had an accident to happen than on a regular helicopter".?

Checked It Off

Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod and Lieutenant Colonel Avi, both helicopter pilots in the IAF, arrived last month to a Marine Airbase in Carolina to test the unique tilt-rotor.
"The IAF determined that we need to test the plane and examine the possibility of purchasing it", said Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod, a pilot in the "Rolling Sword" squadron. "We spent four weeks in the United States. For the first two weeks, we studied the plane from morning to night and logged in 80 hours on the simulators. The final two weeks were spent flying the plane almost every day and examining every exercise with it".
In daylight, in pitch darkness, through dust landings and in extreme conditions, the Israeli pilots tried to test and understand the plane and determine how well it would suit the weather conditions in Israel. "We realized that the plane will absolutely change the name of the game. It will be able to carry out operations that we never imagined that one of our planes could execute. If we purchase the plane, our ranges of activity will dramatically change and we'll be able to reach points we've never even dreamed of", says Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod.
Bell-Boeing has even thought of possible uses for the plane in Israel of the next decade. "When we arrive at the day that we have oil wells out there in the Mediterranean, the plane will be able to carry out actions that no helicopter in the IAF will be able to. It can reach a point at sea, stay there for a long while and return", said a Boeing executive representative in Israel. "Countries in the order of magnitude of Israel don't have a plane with similar abilities to that of the V-22".
In spite of being trained helicopter pilots, Lieutenant Colonel Avi and Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod quickly adapted to the new platform. "Throughout the studying period we learned everything we could about the plane and broke records in regard to hours spent on the simulator", says Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod. "The plane's systems are very user-friendly and easy to operate, so we were able to get used to them quickly".
One of Bell-Boeing's main goals is to help the new tilt-rotor pilots to adapt rapidly to the planes. "The Fly-by-wire system installed on the plane reduces much of the load on the pilots' shoulders and allows them to focus more on completing the task than on flying the plane. The unique auto-pilot installed on the plane also assists to reach a point in a sky and quite literally, 'stand stilll'", says Carrese.

A Take-Off with a Glitch

The flying technique may be a gradually acquired skill, as Bell-Boeing claims. But Lieutenant Colonel Avi, a Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter pilot at the Flight Test Center, points out several rifts that might be more difficult to bridge.
"The plane is naturally energetic. The accelerations are literally breathtaking and the mid-stage in which the plane transitions from a vertical standpoint to a horizontal one is problematic as well", he explains.
Although Bell-Boeing insists that the acclimation to controlling the plane when transitioning from one standpoint to another is a matter of time and simple practice, the reality isn't always so.
"The pilot uses a control stick and a system that is similar to a throttle. In one standpoint, the control stick serves to determine altitude while the 'throttle' serves to determine speed. In the other standpoint, each of them serves the opposite role. In the mid-stage you feel like you're losing control of the plane. I imagined that the Fly-by-wire system would function more smoothly, but discovered that in some cases we needed to intervene".
In all other areas, Lieutenant Colonel Avi says that the system surpassed his expectations. "One of the biggest problems that helicopter pilots have when flying a plane with fixed wings is stalling", he explains. "On regular planes it's very easy to lose control while on the V-22 you need to try very hard to stall".
In some cases, the heat emanating from the plane's engines can burn the grass in the area of landing. "Sometimes issues arise and there are operations that the plane won't be able to carry out, such as landing on a roof, which could be dangerous because of the tilt-rotor's weight and force", says a Boeing executive.
Thus, the question is raised once again: To what extent does the IAF really needs the plane?
"We examined how the plane would alter operational activities we've carried out and will carry out in the future deep in enemy lines. While some of the operations would have changed completely with its help, there are some that would not have been altered at all. For example, in the situation in which we needed to bring back forces from Lebanon, I suspect that the plane had no real advantages", says Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod. "It's safe to assume that when evacuating injured people inside Israel, the plane would be a less efficient choice, but when rescuing from far away land, using the plane would make a significant difference".
Bell-Boeing adds that one of the platform's disadvantages is its price, which is higher than the average price of helicopters and planes on the market.
"The price of the tilt-rotor is still unknown and we hope we'll be able to determine it soon", says Carrese. The question of the necessity of the plane has even been raised in the U.S. congress. In the year 2000 the project was stalled by the House of Representatives, after 19 marines were tragically killed in a crash.
Bell-Boeing, on the other hand, claims that the plane's bad reputation is purely a result of narrow-minded competitors. "There is not another platform like this in the world. It's a lot safer than many other planes and helicopters", says the executive.

An Improvement or a Replacement?

Another advantage of the said tilt-rotor is its maintenance department. "The plane's maintenance is very similar to the maintenance of existing platforms, such as the Sikorsky CH-53", explains Carrese. "Because the plane is more sophisticated and intelligent, it requires a slightly different maintenance plan than 60-year-old helicopters. Anyhow, we estimate that its upkeep will be easier: after all, half of the plane is crafted out of compounded materials that rust and age more slowly than regular materials".
Additionally, flight crew members who will fly the plane won't notice a professional difference and will not need a separate flight course.
"Flying the plane is like flying a regular plane, but the tilt-rotor's missions are similar to those of a typical helicopter", said Lieutenant Colonel Nimrod. "It's safe to assume that most pilots flying it will be helicopter pilots".
The situation in the United States turns out to be similar. "Pilots here complete their course as helicopter pilots and then go through preparation to become V-22 pilots", says Carrese.
For now, it doesn't seem that the tilt-rotor will be replacing the trusty Sikorsky CH 53. "The size of the tilt-rotor's cargo area is two-thirds of the size of the Sikorsky's, but the cost per-hour-of-flight is quite similar in both cases. There are operations that we would rather carry out with the CH-53 and not with any other helicopter", says Lieutenant Colonel Avi. "We need to remember one thing: The tilt-rotor is a platform in itself. At the end of the day, it will have tasks of its own and will need to integrate with the existing aircrafts in the Force without replacing any of them".

SASless

13th Dec 2011, 16:48

So....the Israeli's give an honest appraisal....the Osprey has its merits and its warts....does some things very well...some things not so well...and should not be used for some other things.

Now...let's see how much money they ante up..as that is the absolute final vote of confidence.

SansAnhedral

13th Dec 2011, 19:10

To me, the article and the assessment states the obvious: Israel wont be replacing any of its fleet with V22s......because it does not operate any medium lift helicopters.

I honestly don't understand the constant contrasting of the V22 and CH53X (and I mean "X" as a variable, not as the previous designation of the K). They are completely different machines, and the V22 was never intended or designed to perform the 53 series missions. Its a Ford F150 versus a CAT 770 dump truck.

Lonewolf_50

13th Dec 2011, 20:50

Regardless of what the operators say, the price per unit will doubtless be a factor. I appreciate the comments of actual operators, but my own experience with hardware, budget approval, and recommendations (which do not all get funded) tells me that "Want to have" by any operating forces does not equal "We'll buy it for you" from budget authority. (Were that not the case, Comanche might still be flying today ... )

This raises the question: Is the US taxpayer going to get soaked to fund the IAF Osprey buy?

If so, why?

There may be good reasons, but I'd like to hear them, and consider those myself.

turboshaft

13th Dec 2011, 22:35

the V22 was never intended or designed to perform the 53 series missions

Sans, was this comment intended to refer to the Echo/Kilo only? Because the Osprey certainly was designed to replace the CH-53D in service.

V-22 Osprey (http://www.marines.mil/unit/aviation/Pages/tiltrotor.aspx)
Description: The V-22 Osprey is a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor aircraft designed for combat, combat support, combat service support, and Special Operations missions worldwide. It will replace the Corps' aged fleet of CH-46E and CH-53D medium lift helicopters.

SASless

13th Dec 2011, 23:16

the V22 was never intended or designed to perform the 53 series missions.

That is a patently false statement....we hashed that out way back in this thread....and many quotes from official documents proved the MV-22 was to replace both the CH-46 and CH-53D airframes and off course their mission sets.

Must we go back over plowed ground on this one?

Sans....if you doubt us....take a few minutes and go back through the thread and you shall (that is the imperative tense) see this is very much the truth.

Granted the situation gets a bit muddled as the USMC has called back mothballed D Model airframes from AMARC and pulled them from the Reserves and other units (HMX-1) even to meet operational requirements.

But that was long after the sales pitch to Congress and the rest of the Guvmint on why they needed the numbers of 22's they were asking for.

SansAnhedral

14th Dec 2011, 09:05

I guess I should clarify my opinion (yes my opinion, nothing more).

Yes, the V22 was intended to replace the USMC CH53D/CH46 mission.

However,

The 53 is classified by the manufacturer and all users (outside the USMC) as a heavy lift helicopter, even the 53D. Now I would argue that the 53D is a heavy lift airframe used for a "medium lift" role in conjunction with the CH46 for the USMC, seeing as how the former has approximately double the MGW of the latter. (Was the 53D "medium lift" in the Marines' books prior to the introduction of the CH53E?)

The simple fact that the USMC was using the CH53D as a medium lift asset does not make it something inherently "medium lift" for everyone, which is why I would not expect Israel to replace their 53s with V22, as they are using them as intended/designed workhorse heavy lift assets, with missions catering to that performance no doubt.

SASless

14th Dec 2011, 12:20

Sans,

With the advent of the E and now K model 53....the USMC demoted the "D" from the "Heavy Lift" category. That decision relegated the D to Medium lift status as a direct result.

That is why they sold the 22 as being a replacement for the 46 and 53D.

Their end game was to justify greater numbers of the 22 by doing so.

Now they are using the Airframe Life data on the E's to justify more K's.

Nothing wrong with any of that except once the dice are rolled....you have to read the dots as they appear on the table.

Where the knife cut both ways was when they started bringing back D models despite fielding substantial numbers of 22's (in my opinon) which told me things were not going as they had hoped. Otherwise those D models would have stayed at AMARC and the other places they were.

Now that Iraq is "over", operational demands are limited to Afghanistan, in addition to the normal deployments of Afloats and training missions....should we not begin to see the D's and 46's being taken out of the force structure?

Especially since we are seeing the looming money cuts coming! Granted the Commandant announced there would only be Manpower cuts rather than "gear" cuts but still the 22 is to "replace" the 46's for sure...and the 53D's....the measure of success for the 22 program will be the progress in replacing the legacy airframes .

Is anyone tracking the promise versus accomplishment on that?

JohnDixson

14th Dec 2011, 13:02

The following paper, written over ten years ago sheds light on the USMC thinking. Its a Masters Degree Thesis re the 53E, but addresses the V-22 vs 53E roles and missions concepts:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404092&Location=U2...

One Approver, Col Paul Crosetiere, was the 53 Class Desk Officer around that time and one very, very intelligent Marine Aviator.

It also might help readers to know that the USMC had underwritten a CH-53D 50,000 lb flight test qualification program in the late 70's ( which was later used by the IAF, but not the USMC ), so the USMC is/was well aware that the V-22 could do some but not by any means all, of the 53D missions.

Someone will inevitably raise the question of whether moving artillery is a USMC medium lift mission, but it appears that they have decided ( ? ) to make it exclusively a heavy lift mission.

Thanks,
John Dixson

jeffg

14th Dec 2011, 13:06

the USMC demoted the "D" from the "Heavy Lift" category
Actually not true. The 53Ds are reside in HMHs (Marine Heavy Helicopter)Squadrons 362, 363, and 463 not in HMMs (Marine Medium Helicopter) Squadrons. Per the FY2011 Marine Aviation Plan it looks as though the Ds will be gone by 2013 replaced by a combination of 22s and 53E/Ks.
As far as the -22 replacing the Ds from what I've heard the Ds are averaging (8) pax in Afghanistan and the 46Es (4), the -22 (15-16) (but that's just word of mouth from Marine aviators) so I would call that mission accomplished for the 22. Keep in mind that the H-1Y is capable of carrying 8 pax in that environment so one could say that the new Huey can perform the mission of both the 53D and 46E, does that make it a medium lift assest or is it still light attack/utility?

FH1100 Pilot

14th Dec 2011, 15:01

I hate to stray from the "53: is it or isn't it heavy lift?" discussion but I have to digress to something 21st Century said about Majors Brow and Gruber who were involved in the infamous "Marana crash::
I think we can all agree with their advise that, “They introduced this aircraft and because of their life sacrifices, the Osprey of today is safe for the pilot, the crew and their passengers…”
I hear this a lot, that the V-22 is way different now...how much "safer" the V-22 is now than it was "back then." And so I have to ask: Just HOW is the aircraft different from the one that Majors Brow and Gruber flew in April of 2000? Does it have a reliable VRS indicator now? You know, like the stall-warning horn in an airplane, that can physically sense when a wing is at a critical angle of attack? Does it even have an A-VRS indicator? Something that would tell the pilots when one proprotor is entering into VRS? Or does it just come with a computer program that tells the pilots when they are entering a critical range of speed and rate of descent, which is not nearly the same thing as an actual stall-warning sensor in an airplane.

I guess what I'm getting at is this: If two more pilots in one of these new, modernized, competely-different V-22s, pilots with perhaps not a lot of helicopter time, get into the very same kind-of-rushed, kind-of-behind-the-power-curve situation as Majors Brow and Gruber, could they still find themselves getting to A-VRS without sufficient warning?

You might counter this with, "Well, the synthetic warnings programmed into the FMS will give them plenty of warning!" And I will say, "Really?" Let me ask you how many times the stall-warning alarm went off in the cockpit of that Air France 447 Airbus that stalled its way down into the Atlantic Ocean? Answer: 75 times. THREE pilots in that cockpit, stall-warning going off and not ONE of those geniuses suggested lowering the nose and, you know, flying out of the stall. Because they were confused. But that will never happen to pilots in combat, will it?

And V-22 pilots will do okay with a warning that tells them only when they're getting into dangerous airspeed/rate of descent combinations.

So again, how is the aircraft different?

Lonewolf_50

14th Dec 2011, 15:55

FH1100: should the Army and Navy and Marines have stopped flying Hueys because they can experience mast bumping? (If flown in certain profiles).

Hueys are still flying, today. I learned about mast bumping during flight school in about 1981. It was roughly 20 year old information at that point. (Don't recall just when in the sixties that the issue was documented, but some of my instructors were Viet Nam era Huey drivers who discussed how important knowing that limitation was for tactical flying ... )

jeffg

14th Dec 2011, 20:14

FH since you always seem to be so concerned about VRS and A-VRS why don't you take the time to go AHS and read the following papers:
-V-22 Low-Speed/High Rate of Descent (HROD) Test Results
-V-22 High Rate of Descent (HROD) Test Procedures and Long Record Analysis
-The Nature of Vortex Ring State

As to whether the V-22 has a cockpit warning device I do not know. However the ROD limits imposed on the V-22 are the SAME as for every other helicopter in the USMC fleet. If you review the above papers you will find that with those limits, the V-22 has as much or MORE margin between the limit and VRS onset then do the helicopters. Currently helicopter crews honor those limits through crew coordination and by using established approach profiles, both in peace time operations and combat just the same as a V-22 crew does. Why do you imagine that a V-22 is more susceptible to a VRS incident then is a helicopter given the above information? Given the above should all helicopters have a VRS warning? How is it you have managed all these years to avoid VRS without a cockpit warning device? How many hours have been flown since the Marana incident and how many A-VRS mishaps have there been? The fact that the aircraft is being flown in combat as we speak and they aren't falling out of the sky due to A-VRS might be a clue.

21stCen

15th Dec 2011, 12:34

FH1100,

When it is said that "because of their life sacrifices, the Osprey of today is safe for the pilot, the crew and their passengers…" there is much more to it than just the modifications made to the aircraft. As a result of the Marana crash an in depth study of VRS specific to the V-22 was conducted that resulted in greater knowledge, event-specific training, and the a/c mods. It is likely that the training for recognition/avoidance and recovery are more important than the a/c modifications (in the Marana case the aircraft was too low for recovery as would have been the case in an equivalent class helicopter, so recognition/avoidance would have been the key).

It is well known that it takes a higher rate of descent for a tiltrotor to get into VRS than a helicopter due to the higher disc loading and resultant greater downwash. The problem is the asymmetrical aspect unique to the tiltrotor that has been discussed at length on this and other threads.

It is easy to determine whether the training and modifications developed as a result of the Marana accident were effective or not -- almost 11 years after the tragic loss, not a single VRS incident in a V-22 has occurred. Unfortunately it was too late for Lt. Col John A. Brow and Major Brooks S. Gruber, and the 17 others on board that night. At least it is clear that their loss resulted in action that today allows pilots to avoid a repeat of the tragedy, even in combat operations as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. That unforgettable night in April of 2000 is 'burned' into the minds of all Osprey pilots. And if you don't believe that, ask one of them...

Here is an article that contains some of the information you were asking about:
Dispelling the Myth of the MV-22

By Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Gross, U.S. Marine Corpsv
Proceedings, September 2004

http://www.military.com/pics/NI_Myth_0904.jpgIn 2000, two tragic accidents grounded the Marine Corps’ newest and most innovative aircraft, miring it in controversy and casting doubt on its future. Rigorous testing since then, however, has resulted in measures that should prevent the unusual aerodynamic condition that caused the first accident from happening again. (Photo by Mike Jones, U.S. Navy)
The MV-22 Osprey (http://www.military.com/Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=MV22&cat=a&lev=2) is a very capable medium-lift military transport aircraft the Marine Corps (http://www.military.com/Community/Home/0,14700,MARINE,00.html) has needed for a long time. It is twice as fast, can carry three times as much, and goes six times farther than the CH-46E (http://www.military.com/Resources/EQG/EQGmain?file=CH46DE&cat=a&lev=2), the aircraft it is replacing. It is no reach to say that if the MV-22 continues its current run of success in testing and is fielded as planned, it will change everything about how maneuver warfare is conducted.

The Osprey, however, also is an airplane with an image problem, primarily resulting from two highly publicized mishaps that killed 23 Marines four years ago. The investigation into these accidents resulted in the discovery and subsequent resolution of an aerodynamic condition affecting all rotorcraft but unduly linked with the MV-22: vortex ring state (VRS).

On the evening of 8 April 2000, a flight of four MV-22s was conducting a night assault mission to a small airfield in Marana, Arizona, when the second airplane (or “Dash 2”) rolled nearly inverted on short final and crashed, killing all on board. During the subsequent investigation, it was discovered that the lead aircraft was almost 2,000 feet higher than planned at the initial point (the location where the conversion from airplane mode to VTOL [vertical take-off and landing] mode for landing begins). The lead aircraft entered a steep approach profile with a high rate of descent while it rapidly decreased speed for landing. During the rapid deceleration, Dash 2 no longer could remain in trail as briefed but came abeam of the lead’s right side. To return to the trail position, Dash 2 flew slower and with a higher rate of descent than his lead. At approximately 300 feet above ground level, with a more than 2,000-feet-per-minute rate of descent and with less than 30 knots forward airspeed, the mishap aircraft started a right roll that could not be corrected by the pilot.
The mishap investigation, having ruled out all other possibilities, soon focused on the extremely high rate of descent at low altitude as the primary cause of the accident. It was concluded that during the descent, the aircraft entered an aerodynamic condition called vortex ring state.

Vortex Ring State
Our search for the VRS boundary started with a thorough review of analytical and wind tunnel research and slow-speed, high-rate-of-descent flight testing. We soon discovered that the body of known actual flight-test data for VRS in other rotorcraft was very small. There were only two other rotorcraft flight research projects known to us at the time we began our initial flight testing, one by NASA Langley in 1964 and one more recently by the ONERA organization in France with a Dauphin helicopter. There was a larger amount of theoretical data available, however, from the private and academic sectors of flight-test research. The principal work we reviewed was from a paper published in 1965 by Kyuichiro Washizu and Akira Azuma of the University of Tokyo. [1] (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.htm#Ref1)

VRS is an aerodynamic condition in which the tangential airspeed at the rotor is small (associated with low forward airspeed) and the airspeed perpendicular to the rotor is high (associated with powered rate of descent). VRS typically becomes a concern below 40 knots forward airspeed at high rates of descent. To reach this condition, power must be applied during the steep descent. Some might think that during VRS the rotor stalls, but that is not the case. VRS is a reingestion state, not a stalled state. Rotor lift creates a down flow of air, called induced velocity (Vi), and the up flow created by the nearly vertical rate of descent is called vertical velocity (Vv). When the induced velocity equals the vertical velocity, VRS may occur, causing a reduction in rotor lift or increased sink rate. VRS can occur as a rotorcraft settles down through its own vortex field at slow forward airspeeds.

This condition is not peculiar to the tiltrotor; in fact, every rotary winged aircraft is susceptible to it. A helicopter pilot flying a single rotor system exits VRS by lowering his collective (reducing power with his left hand) and pushing forward the cyclic (tilting his rotor disk forward to accelerate) with his right hand. A tiltrotor pilot has another, more-effective, option: he can move the nacelles into clean air.

Test Objectives
In developing the plan to understand VRS, Naval Air Systems Command directed the MV-22 Integrated Test Team at Patuxent River, Maryland, to conduct flight-test exploration of the Osprey tiltrotor’s high-rate-of-descent/low-airspeed boundary. The initial test plan was developed to conduct partial- and minimum-power descents to investigate the low airspeed descending flight characteristics and determine the effects of the thrust-control lever and cockpit-control inputs on handling qualities in this flight regime.

The objectives of the test effort were to define the boundary of VRS, derive a fleet operational envelope, define the recovery technique from VRS, determine applicability for warning systems, and document the condition in pilot training ground school simulations and the NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization) flight manual for the tiltrotor. The first two objectives initially were approached as two phases, to validate the current fleet low-airspeed rate-of-descent limit and document the VRS boundary, and to evaluate the capability to expand the current fleet limit. As the testing progressed, however, we soon realized that breaking the test effort into two phases was not necessary, and we added multiaxis control inputs and dynamic maneuvers to our test effort.

For the third objective, we knew that recovery from VRS, like the poststall departure recovery of a fixed-wing aircraft, requires proper and timely procedures. For the Osprey, the most powerful flight control is the pilot’s ability to change nacelle angle (thrust vector) at up to 8° per second through a thumb switch on the thrust-control lever. This ability to change nacelle angle (and hence inflow angle at the rotor disk) would lead to an effective and immediate recovery tool.

For the fourth objective, several crew-alerting methods were discussed to determine the feasibility of active VRS avoidance. A few of the mechanical and tactile methods considered were a mechanical stick shaker, seat shaker, or rudder pedal shaker, but these were quickly rejected because of complexity, weight, and systems integration concerns. Instead, a visual and aural warning system was developed to alert the aircrew when the aircraft exceeded the NATOPS flight manual’s rate-of-descent limit.

For the fifth objective, data obtained from flight testing were used to develop pilot training courseware, update the simulation model to replicate VRS if deemed necessary, and update the NATOPS flight manual with a comprehensive narrative description of VRS to include pilot cueing to aid avoidance and emergency procedures for recovery should VRS occur.
Our first six-month period of flight testing started within two and a half months of the Marana mishap, and only weeks after preliminary mishap board results had been reported. On 11 December 2000, a second MV-22 mishap not related to vortex ring state occurred, taking the lives of all on board and resulting in the grounding of the Osprey fleet. Several investigative bodies evaluated the MV-22, the most significant of which was the blue ribbon panel.[2 (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.htm#Ref2)] The cause of the second accident was found to be the combination of a software anomaly and a hydraulic line failure. The grounding allowed the test team to analyze flight data collected to date, refine the test plan, and develop instrumentation, including a new low-airspeed measurement system. After evaluating several low-airspeed sensors, the test team selected the R. M. Young Model 81000 Ultrasonic Anemometer to provide the desired airspeed to as low as ten knots forward velocity. When integrated into the aircraft, this sensor provided the low-airspeed confidence required to complete our flight test. In addition to the normal aircraft display of flight information on the pilot primary flight display, we added two flip-down liquid crystal displays that indicated sideslip in one-degree increments and calibrated airspeed with one-knot accuracy from the ultrasonic anemometer. The addition of the flip-down digital displays, within the pilot’s central field of view, greatly reduced workload and increased test-point efficiency.

Flight Test
Our test-plan strategy was simple: approach the unknown boundary from higher air speed and down from above with increasing sink rate increments. For the purpose of pilot build up and standardization, only one pilot, chief test pilot Tom Macdonald of Boeing, flew each test point with a small group of copilots assisting. The aircraft was configured with nacelles full aft at 95°, flaps auto, and landing gear down. Each descent track was completed at the same target airspeed, with a package of data points at each 500-feet-per-minute descent increment, where we checked stability, handling qualities, ride quality, aural signatures, and descent arrest and recovery effectiveness.
Our testing was conducted at altitude with a target test band of 8,000- to 7,000-feet altitude to allow for recovery well before the hard deck of 3,500 feet above ground level. Each aircraft input at the target airspeed and rate of descent required one dedicated descent. With the addition of the Young Model 81000 low-airspeed system, we gained flight efficiency by omitting the sawtooth climbs to determine true winds in the test band for the next descent profile. By the end of our VRS test effort, we had flown 62 flights for 104 flight hours and exceeded 5,600-feet-per-minute rate of descent and flew as slow as ten knots calibrated forward airspeed.
During our testing, we experienced 12 roll-off events, 8 to the right and 4 to the left. The direction of roll off was not predictable from the cockpit. In fact, the cockpit characteristics approaching VRS were not as well defined as in single-rotor helicopters. We noticed a slight increase in vibration, rotor noise, and flight control loosening that would not in every instance foretell of an impending roll off. Each roll off, however, was characterized by a sudden sharp reduction of lift on one of the two proprotors, resulting in an uncommanded roll in that direction. We also noted that roll offs required nearly steady-state conditions to trigger them. Any dynamic maneuvering tended to delay or prevent a roll off from occurring. On many occasions, we entered the VRS boundary during dynamic maneuvers and then exited the boundary without encountering a roll off.
http://www.military.com/pics/NI_Myth1_0904.jpg
Improvements to the Osprey’s pilot display include an expanded rate-of-descent scale and a red line added behind the vertical sink scale. Both features should help prevent future encounters with vortex ring state. (Photo couresty of author)

Pilot recovery procedures from a VRS roll off are easy, immediate, and effective. The pilot fixes the thrust-control lever and simultaneously pushes the nacelle-control thumb wheel forward for two seconds. This two-second beep forward moves the nacelles 12° to 15° lower, which immediately takes the rotors out of the VRS condition as the aircraft accelerates rapidly. If required, the pilot then uses lateral stick to level the wings and then adds power to stop the rate of descent.

Avionics Improvements
Now that we knew where the VRS boundary was located, how the aircraft responded during VRS, and the proper recovery procedures and techniques, our focus turned toward avoidance of VRS. Boeing and Naval Air Systems Command avionics and crew systems engineers developed a simple yet eloquent method of keeping pilots away from VRS. We made two changes to our avionics displays that increased the pilot’s situational awareness during low-speed, high-rate-of-descent flight. First, we expanded the rate-of-descent scale from 1,000 feet per minute to 2,000 feet per minute in 200-feet-per-minute increments. Second, we added a red line behind the vertical sink scale at the rate-of-descent limit along with a visual and aural “sink” warning when the airspeed and rate of descent exceed the limits. The flight display used by the pilot as the primary performance instrument in the Osprey is shown above. The scale on the right side is the vertical speed indicator. The indicator’s arrowhead is pointing to an 800-feet-per-minute rate of descent. The airspeed box is on the left of the display and indicates 39 knots. With this combination of airspeed and rate of descent, the pilot has exceeded the existing rate-of-descent limit and now hears “sink rate, sink rate” in his headset and sees the red “sink” warning in the display near the top and to the right of center. It is important to note that this warning system is not a predictor of VRS, but a rate-of-descent limit to keep the pilot away from VRS.

Where We Go from Here
Our ultimate goal for this flight-test effort was to understand fully the aerodynamic effects of vortex ring state on the tiltrotor, to define the recovery procedures should the pilot encounter VRS, and, most important, to develop warning signals to keep pilots away from this condition. Pilot awareness of VRS and avoidance with rate-of-descent limits are the only tools available to prevent a high-rate-of-descent mishap from taking more lives. Our current rate-of-descent limit is 800 feet per minute below 40 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS), increasing linearly to 1,600 feet per minute at 80 KCAS. Presently, Naval Air Systems Command is evaluating the potential to expand the rate-of-descent envelope in the 30-to-50-knot airspeed range to provide the user communities more capability during flight tests and approaches to landing.

So what have we found in our 14-months of low-airspeed, high-rate-of-descent testing in search of VRS?

Above 40 KCAS, VRS will not occur, regardless of sink-rate magnitude.
The lower the disk loading (the ratio between an aircraft’s weight and rotor size), the smaller the sink rate where VRS might occur. Conversely, in the case of the MV-22 with higher disk loading, VRS may occur at a much larger sink rate.
VRS requires a nearly steady-state condition. Any maneuvering tends to delay or prevent a roll off.
As both sink rate increases and airspeed decreases, periodic rotor thrust fluctuations increase.
As the VRS boundary is approached, handling qualities degrade because of unsteady flows at the rotor(s).
Entry into fully developed VRS may be characterized by a sudden, sharp reduction of net thrust at the rotor.
Recovery from VRS is immediate and effective using two seconds of forward nacelle tilt.
There is a large margin of safety between rate of descent limit and VRS boundary below 40 KCAS.
With our test effort behind us, the Integrated Test Team at Patuxent River is confident we fully understand the location of the VRS boundary for the tiltrotor, the aircraft roll-off characteristics during steady maneuvers within the boundary, and the immediate and effective recovery procedures. We have developed avionics warnings to aid pilots in avoiding high rates of descent at low airspeed. The fleet now has a better understanding of the capabilities of the MV-22 and will be confident to fly in harm’s way knowing vortex ring state never will be encountered again.
Kyuichiro Washizu and Akira Azuma, “Experiments on a Model Helicopter Rotor Operating in the Vortex Ring State,” University of Tokyo, presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Symposium on Structural Dynamics and Aeroelasticity, Boston, MA, 30 August-1 September 1965.[back to article (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.htm#Back1)]
“Report of the Panel to Review the V-22 Program,” Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, John R. Dailey, Chairman, 30 April 2001. [back to article (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.htm#Back2)]

Lieutenant Colonel Gross was the government flight test director for the MV-22 program from August 2002 to August 2004 and participated in several test flights. He currently is assigned to the V-22 Joint Program Office at Patuxent River, Maryland. He would like to acknowledge Tom Macdonald’s and MV-22 lead government engineer Ray Dagenhart’s contributions to this article.

Dispelling the Myth of the MV-22 (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Myth_0904,00.htm)

JohnDixson

15th Dec 2011, 17:08

Very interesting article.

Two questions that come to mind, which are probably covered in the test reports, but which I have never seen discussed in online writings, are:

What aircraft reactions accompanied those instances where they actually encountered vortex ring state?
In any of the actual vortex ring state events, was the effect of prop pitch increase evaluated?

BTW, Tom Macdonald, the V-22 Project Test Pilot for the V-22 had, during an earlier stage of his USN career, been stationed at the Naval Plant Representative Office at Sikorsky in Stratford Ct., where he certainly impressed all with his intelligence, flying skills and ability to navigate the shoal waters involving US Government flight acceptance of production aircraft!

Thanks,
John Dixson

21stCen

15th Dec 2011, 19:25

BTW, Tom Macdonald, the V-22 Project Test Pilot for the V-22 had, during an earlier stage of his USN career, been stationed at the Naval Plant Representative Office at Sikorsky in Stratford Ct., where he certainly impressed all with his intelligence, flying skills and ability to navigate the shoal waters involving US Government flight acceptance of production aircraft!

He's certainly one of the best!!
:ok:

FH1100 Pilot

15th Dec 2011, 21:19

21st Century, I actually had read that article by Lt. Col. Gross some time ago, as it is from 2004. It does not dispel any "myth" about the V-22. In fact it confirmed something I've known about the V-22 with respect to A-VRS. Lt. Col. Gross reports:The direction of roll off was not predictable from the cockpit.Whoops! You mean to tell me that WHEN a V-22 gets into A-VRS the crew won't be able to know which way it's going to "break?" Yikes!

Let us acknowledge that the Marana V-22 did not get into a sustained 2000+ fpm rate of descent at 300 feet above the ground. If it did, it was only a momentary excursion. Otherwise, it would have hit the ground on its wheels in a couple of seconds. No, the RoD momentarily dipped to 2,000fpm+ and that was enough to excite one of the proprotors into VRS. Remember, Majors Brow and Gruber were trying to hold position on the lead V-22, "Dash-1" who was also having a hard time slowing down with the tailwind (and in fact they ended up crashing as well, something that gets glossed-over when speaking of the tragedy).

Lt. Col. Gross's article also does not answer my question, which was: How is the V-22 fundamentally "different" or "safer" now than it was back in 2000?

Answer: It is not.

Lonewolf asks:should the Army and Navy and Marines have stopped flying Hueys because they can experience mast bumping? Uhh, didn't they actually do just that? Why do you think the military flies UH-60's now and not UH-1Ns? Why are they developing the UH-1Y? Seems to me that if the 2-blade system was so great we'd still be using them. But what do I know...

jeffg asks:Why do you imagine that a V-22 is more susceptible to a VRS incident then is a helicopter...I've never said the V-22 is more susceptible to VRS than a helicopter. I say the V-22 is more susceptible to A-VRS than a helicopter. ASYMMETRIC VRS: One proprotor goes into it while the other one does not. Why do some of you guys keep denying the importance of this?

jeffg persists:How is it you have managed all these years to avoid VRS without a cockpit warning device?I actually have gotten into VRS in a helicopter. It was quite unexpected, inasmuch as my attention was diverted elsewhere at the time and it caught me by surprise. (And nobody was shooting at me either!) However I have never accidentally or inadvertently stalled an airplane. Why? Because the stall-warning horn gave me sufficient warning that I was approaching a critical angle of attack.

21st Century notes:in the Marana case the aircraft was too low for recovery as would have been the case in an equivalent class helicopter...Wait a minute. If an equivalent helicopter got into VRS at the same altitude as Majors Brow and Gruber, the helicopter would've settled vertically. If it hit the ground it would have done so upright, on its landing gear...not inverted like the V-22 did. See, for those of you who don't know, it's pretty hard for a helicopter to get into A-VRS.

Yes, I harp on this. Because only a true idiot...or someone who knows next to nothing about helicopters would downplay the importance of what I consider to be the fatal flaw of the tiltrotor design: Asymmetrical-VRS.

Now, I acknowledge that no A-VRS accident has happened since Marana. However, I will not go so as to say that another "Marana" accident will never happen again just because we're aware of it now.

The article that 21st Century posted by Lt. Col. Gross tells us that the V-22 crew now gets a "SINK!" warning on their PFD and an audible warning if the a/s drops below 40 knots and the RoD gets to 800 fpm. Great. Those are pretty conservative parameters.

The PFD and audible sink rate warnings are, in my opinion insufficient. I think that in practice, when the sh*t hits the fan, those warnings will be summarily ignored by V-22 pilots just like the stall-warning alert was ignored 75 times by the crew of AF447.

Bottom line: All those who claim that the V-22 is "a different aircraft now!" or "safer" than it was when first introduced are just putting out bullsh...uhh...propaganda. Yeah, yeah, we know more about VRS now. And we give the V-22 crews alerts. And if a V-22 pilot ever gets into A-VRS up at altitude he can just beep the nacelles forward and "fly out of it!" But we still can't tell the V-22 pilot with any certainty when one of the proprotors is close to VRS.

So it's still the same aircraft as it always was.

My book on the V-22 will be titled, "Fatal Flaw."

21stCen

16th Dec 2011, 14:23

FH1100
You certainly know how to turn a polite, straight forward discussion into one that is confrontational. To make it worse, you add your demonstrated lack of knowledge, exaggerations and distortions (see below).

FH1100 says:

Because only a true idiot... would downplay the importance of… Asymmetrical-VRS

And only a “true idiot” could fail to realize that nobody on this thread has EVER marginalized the danger of A-VRS. Those who fly tiltrotors understand it far better than you ever will. That’s why not one aircraft has experienced A-VRS inadvertently in the past 11 years. I’m not sure how many times that has to be repeated before the significance of it sinks in. That doesn’t mean it will never happen again. It does mean that the post-Marana actions to train the pilots and equip the a/c to avoid it have been effective to date.

FH1100 says:
Whoops! You mean to tell me that WHEN a V-22 gets into A-VRS the crew won't be able to know which way it's going to "break?" Yikes!

That is true, and that is why all the post-Marana actions that have been successful so far were taken: to allow pilots to avoid the conditions that would permit A-VRS to develop.

FH1100 says:
Let us acknowledge that the Marana V-22 did not get into a sustained 2000+ fpm rate of descent at 300 feet above the ground. If it did, it was only a momentary excursion.
The logic claiming that because reaching that extraordinary vertical descent rate at that low altitude was only 'momentary' has no relevance. Yes the a/c was ‘momentarily’ at just over 2400fpm at 285 ft above the ground as it entered into a Vortex Ring State, but prior to that it was at 1900fpm, 2000fpm, 2100fpm, etc., getting deeper into the VRS envelope while rapidly slowing the aircraft forward speed with a tailwind present, and at the same time power was rapidly being pulled in to arrest the descent. Whether it be a helicopter or a tiltrotor, this scenario was going to result in a fatal crash.

FH1100 says:

Wait a minute. If an equivalent helicopter got into VRS at the same altitude as Majors Brow and Gruber, the helicopter would've settled vertically. If it hit the ground it would have done so upright, on its landing gear...

A CH-46 or CH-53 experiencing VRS with a rapidly increasing ROD starting from 2400fpm at 285ft AGL might allow it to hit wheels down, but the impact with the rotor system coming down around you and an inevitable rollover would almost certainly be fatal for all. And as far as recovery starting at 285ft with a 2400fpm descent and ROD rapidly increasing, sufficient time/altitude would not be available to lower collective and move the cyclic forward to exit the VR state before impact just as recovery for the V-22 was not possible at that point in time. Again, the key for both helicopters and tiltrotors is to avoid those conditions to begin with.

FH1100 says:

Lt. Col. Gross's article also does not answer my question, which was: How is the V-22 fundamentally "different" or "safer" now than it was back in 2000? Answer: It is not.

Wow, is this ignorance, arrogance or both? The pilots who have been flying the a/c and whose lives depend on it say, “it is a very different aircraft today.” You without any experience, knowledge, or connection to the program say, “it is not.” Those pilots who have flown the different a/c over time including the FSD, Block A, Block B, and Full Rate Production a/c including those with post production mods all attest to improvements that make the current production a/c very different from the a/c flown in 2000 (how many crashes have occurred due to hydraulic pipe chaffing like the one that occurred in 2000 is one easy example to back their claims). BTW, none of the pilots or support personnel I have spoken to or communicated with have ever claimed it is the perfect aircraft, in fact they all have their suggestions for additional improvements many of which they say are in the pipeline.

FH1100 says:
However I have never accidentally or inadvertently stalled an airplane. Why? Because the stall-warning horn gave me sufficient warning that I was approaching a critical angle of attack.

Wow, if that statement is true, you are an even a worse pilot than we have been led to believe! In the decades that I flew fixed-wing a/c I never once encountered a stall warning horn in normal flight operations that was needed to give me sufficient warning that the critical AOA was being approached. The only time I heard the stall warning horn was during training. We teach our students how to recognize and avoid stall conditions, and only engage them in imminent and full stall practice to instill immediate action responses in case they had screwed up and allowed the aircraft to be flown into a dangerous flight regime that should have been avoided. The stall warning horn is a last resort warning – if you rely on it to give you stall warning information on routine flights, you should not be flying. It is a very simple electronic device that is aerodynamically activated (AOA indicators are more advanced) – and they do fail!!

FH1100 says:

Now, I acknowledge that no A-VRS accident has happened since Marana. However, I will not go so as to say that another "Marana" accident will never happen again…

Nobody disagrees with that, but those flying the aircraft say that all efforts are being made to continue to do the best they can to see that the ‘goal’ of preventing a future reoccurrence comes true.

FH1100 says:

The article that 21st Century posted by Lt. Col. Gross tells us that the V-22 crew now gets a "SINK!" warning on their PFD and an audible warning if the a/s drops below 40 knots and the RoD gets to 800 fpm. Great. Those are pretty conservative parameters.

Agreed. Applying the standard US military helicopter limitations of 40kts/800fpm is certainly too conservative considering a tiltrotor will not enter VRS as early as a helo. The ex-CH-53 guys now flying the Osprey have said if they would at least make it 1200fpm the V-22 will still have a larger safety margin than a 53 over the 800fpm limit. However, looking at the safety record over the last 11 years it would be hard to argue changing it.

FH1100 says:

My book on the V-22 will be titled, "Fatal Flaw."
You should write that book, but it should be an autobiography instead as you’ve already chosen the perfect title.

jeffg

16th Dec 2011, 20:53

What becomes abundantly clear reading FH1100s post is that he does not understand VRS(or A-VRS) nor has he taken the time to actually read and study the literature available about it. It's also obvious that FH1100 has absolutely zero comprehension of how military operations are flown, how pilots are trained and how crews are scheduled, how tactics are developed and how through training and tactics approach profiles etc. address issues such as VRS (yes A-VRS). Furthermore it's obvious that FH1100 has no concept of how tilt rotors are flown however he has come to his own conclusions based what he has read on blogs and pretty much nothing more. If only he would choose to pontificate about something he knew about, like being a raconteur.

FH, in your first post you asked
"Just HOW is the aircraft different from the one that Majors Brow and Gruber flew in April of 2000? Does it have a reliable VRS indicator now? You know, like the stall-warning horn in an airplane, that can physically sense when a wing is at a critical angle of attack?"
This implies that if it had such a device it would be safer, well it does but now that is not sufficient for you.* No it doesn't have an A-VRS sensor, but if one avoids VRS then one will avoid A-VRS. No it doesn’t sense how close a proprotor is to VRS but provides the pilot both visual and aural cues of approaching limits. Remember that no device can ultimately keep a pilot from exceeding limits. If that is your design criteria then I suggest that we ground every aircraft out there because everyone of them has limits that if exceeded will result in a fatal mishap.
*
In your second post you state:
'However I have never accidentally or inadvertently stalled an airplane. Why?'
So you triggered the stall warning then you inadvertently got too slow and if it weren't for the stall warning you would have stalled.

‘Because the stall-warning horn gave me sufficient warning that I was approaching a critical angle of attack.’

You admit that warnings work! If it worked for you why won't the VRS warning work for a V-22? They indeed have a warning device installed and there have been no further VRS(or A-VRS) mishaps since its installation. You should be happy. Apparently it works. Case closed. Oh wait, you always have a straw man argument to prove why it won't. Sorry, I can't counter those as they are pretty much devoid of reality. Will another V-22 crash at some point due to A-VRS? Probably. Will another fixed wing aircraft crash due to stall? Probably. Will another Biz jet run off a runway because the brakes failed? Probably. Should I continue?

But then you go and contradict yourself by implying that stall warnings don't work, stating the Airbus accident.* In fact you disrespectfully state:
'THREE pilots in that cockpit, stall-warning going off and not ONE of those geniuses suggested lowering the nose and, you know, flying out of the stall.'

Actually I believe if you were to read that report again you would find the facts to be slightly different. However are you suggesting the Airbus a dangerous aircraft with a fatal flaw and should be grounded because pilots failed to react properly?

‘The PFD and audible sink rate warnings are, in my opinion insufficient. I think that in practice, when the sh*t hits the fan, those warnings will be summarily ignored by V-22 pilots just like the stall-warning alert was ignored 75 times by the crew of AF447’
Yet you didn’t ignore the stall warning you received? I wonder why it worked for you but will fail for V-22 pilots? Maybe you’re just a better pilot then they are. No, apparently you think your 206 can do aerobatics (previous post) because your RFM doesn’t say it can’t, you’ve flown yourself into VRS and you apparently need the stall warning to keep you from stalling, I’d say you are about average like the rest of us.

So FH do you think stall warnings work or don't they? Your argument is a bit confusing since you take both sides.

‘Because they were confused. But that will never happen to pilots in combat, will it?’
Yes it will. They will get confused in the V-22 and make mistakes, sometimes fatal. Just as pilots have gotten confused in H-1s and made fatal mistakes. Just as they have CH-53s and made fatal mistakes. What’s your point? That they will only make mistakes in the V-22 or that only mistakes in the V-22 will be fatal?

“Uhh, didn't they actually do just that? Why do you think the military flies UH-60's now and not UH-1Ns? Why are they developing the UH-1Y? Seems to me that if the 2-blade system was so great we'd still be using them. But what do I know...'

That was completely ignorant. Payload, range, speed and other factors. Not safety. The two bladed rotor is perfectly safe but there are gains to be made with more blades. In fact don’t you fly a 206? Is it unsafe? Are you afraid to fly it because it only has two blades? What’s the safety record of the two bladed rotor system?

“I've never said the V-22 is more susceptible to VRS than a helicopter. I say the V-22 is more susceptible to A-VRS than a helicopter. ASYMMETRIC VRS: One proprotor goes into it while the other one does not. Why do some of you guys keep denying the importance of this?”
Thank you for the explanation but unlike you I’ve actually studied the issue. It would be nice if you did the same. Nobody denies the importance of it, we just understand it, unlike you.

'The article that 21st Century posted by Lt. Col. Gross tells us that the V-22 crew now gets a "SINK!" warning on their PFD and an audible warning if the a/s drops below 40 knots and the RoD gets to 800 fpm. Great. Those are pretty conservative parameters.'
The same exact parameters that apply to all rotary wing aircraft, not just tiltrotors. Sorry if you don’t like it, but it’s true.

“Wait a minute. If an equivalent helicopter got into VRS at the same altitude as Majors Brow and Gruber, the helicopter would've settled vertically. If it hit the ground it would have done so upright, on its landing gear...not inverted like the V-22 did. See, for those of you who don't know, it's pretty hard for a helicopter to get into A-VRS.”

2400 fpm is 40 ft/sec. If a 53 were at 285 agl at at 2400 fpm ROD and tried to recover from VRS, if the correct action was taken the pilot would lower the collective and push the nose over, both of which would increase the ROD so it would impact at at least 40ft/sec. I’m sure there is someone on here who can tell us what would happen to CH-53E if it settled vertically and upright onto the tarmac at 40 ft/sec. I’m going to guess that 40ft/sec is well beyond where the gear would yield and the OEM guarantees an chance of survivability. But I could be wrong. You are correct FH, the V-22 in A-VRS would roll over, the 53 wouldn’t. 21 century is right in that the end result would have been the same.

21stCen

19th Dec 2011, 15:44

JohnDixson asks:

1. What aircraft reactions accompanied those instances where they actually encountered vortex ring state?
2. In any of the actual vortex ring state events, was the effect of prop pitch increase evaluated?

Hi John,
Your first question has been discussed on this thread on occasion and as JeffG suggested, the best source for more firsthand information is in the AHS papers he mentioned:
-V-22 Low-Speed/High Rate of Descent (HROD) Test Results
-V-22 High Rate of Descent (HROD) Test Procedures and Long Record Analysis

Regarding your second question, a non-manufacturer source familiar with the trials mentioned:
Prop pitch is not even a remote issue here. Tiltrotors use beta governors - unlike an engine governor on say, a UH-1. Just like a turboprop airplane, as you add power, the prop pitch changes to maintain the set rpm. Once you command helicopter mode within the conversion corridor, the rpm is ramped up automatically to helo mode rpm and there it remains governed and constant. At low power in the descent, the rpm still remains constant and the blade pitch has been increased by the governor, naturally.

Hope that helps,
21stC

Lonewolf_50

20th Dec 2011, 21:10

Uhh, didn't they actually do just that? Why do you think the military flies UH-60's now and not UH-1Ns? Why are they developing the UH-1Y? Seems to me that if the 2-blade system was so great we'd still be using them. But what do I know...

You don't appear to know, much, FH1100, or you deliberately attempted to misunderstand my post.

Mast bumping was known issue in 1960's.
I trained in Hueys in early 80's.
Navy was still flying November Hueys well after the year 2000.
(A guy I know dinged a November tail pylon in Texas a few years before they all got retired).

The US Marines were still flying Huey's in COMBAT in 2004 (when I had a chance to participate in operations), typically in a two ship mix of one Cobra, one Huey.

The AIR FORCE is still flying TH-1H Hueys, and UH-1N Hueys, even as you and I speak. Those aircraft are expeced to be in service with USAF until 2020 something ... but that last is subject to change.

So, NO, "they" didn't actually "do just that," nor did they do it "due to "mast bumping" as a motive.

The Army bought the Blackhawk for a lot of reasons, which included more durable, more crashworthy, and more payload ... but that's a discussion for another time.

Cheers, and Merry Christmas

Lonewolf_50

Darkhorse30

21st Dec 2011, 13:10

According to a briefing i attended last spring the Army is keeping 42 UH-1H's. Also, the DoS is buying refurbished and upgraded Hueys for use in several different places. Lots of life left in the two blade Huey!

SansAnhedral

21st Dec 2011, 13:21

Osprey crew awarded medals in historic fight | osprey, crew, marines - News Source for Jacksonville, North Carolina - jdnews.com (http://www.jdnews.com/articles/osprey-98534-crew-marines.html)

Osprey crew awarded medals in historic fight
December 16, 2011 6:06 PM
LINDELL KAY - DAILY NEWS STAFF
Four Marines were awarded medals Friday for action taken during the first engagement of enemy forces by an MV-22B Osprey.

Capts. Thomas Keech and Matthew Cave, Sgt. Justin Barfield-Smith and Cpl. John Cederholm received the Air Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device for Valor for actions during a June 12 mission.

After several ground missions failed to re-supply Marines fighting in the Sangin River Valley of Afghanistan, an Osprey was sent into the combat zone. The four-man crew of Keech, Cave, Barfield-Smith and Cederholm flew in with food, water, medical supplies and ammunition for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which had sustained heavy casualties throughout the day, according to award citations.

While unloading supply crates, the crew came under small arms and medium machine gun fire from Taliban forces. The pilots called in cover fire providing the crew enough time to unload supplies and re-board the aircraft.

The Osprey’s pilots told The Daily News on Friday that their aircraft was on the ground and under enemy fire for around three minutes, but it felt like time had ground to a halt and everything moved in slow motion.

As soon as the last crate was unloaded, the Osprey took flight with Cederholm firing the aircraft’s only weapon, a ramp-mounted machine gun, at approaching Taliban troops. Cederholm became the first Marine to ever engage the enemy from a MV-22B.

He downplayed the historical aspect of his mission Friday, saying he was just doing his job.

“I may have been the first, but I won’t be the last,” he said. “Others have done it since me and we will keep doing it as long as we have to.”

Cederholm’s father, Marine Col. Mike Cederholm, was present for the awards ceremony held at the VMM-264 hangar aboard New River Air Station.

“I’m so proud of my boy,” the elder Cederholm said of his son. “I’m in awe of these young men and women who continue to answer the call.”

Col. Cederholm said the four Marines receiving the award were representative of the around 250 members of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264.

Cpl. Cederholm’s mother, Rebecca Cederholm, said she didn’t realize until the citations were read at the ceremony that her son had gotten off the aircraft to help ground troops unload supplies.

Each member of the four-man crew exhibited courage during their mission, according to their individual awards.

Cave and Keech landed the Osprey on the first run and provided accurate enemy positions to friendly forces, which allowed support aircraft to suppress Taliban forces with rocket fire. Barfield-Smith helped unload supplies and called out targets to Cpl. Cederholm once the Osprey was back in the air.

The pilots and crew showed their “skillful airmanship, steadfast aggressiveness, and exemplary devotion to duty in the face of hazardous flying conditions,” their award citations read.

Receiving the Air Medal is not uncommon among flight crews, but being awarded the combat distinguishing device for valor is rare, said 1st Lt. Kristin Dalton, the director of public affairs for MCAS New River.

(I didnt post David Axe's rehash of this story because even though there was absolutely no information with which to slam the V22, he couldn't just grit his teeth and report on it without stuffing his treasure trove of weasel words in his attempt to continually taint public perception.)

SASless

21st Dec 2011, 13:58

Times do change I guess....in days of yore....the cargo would have been an underslung load....the load would have been set down...released...and the aircraft moved over...landed and wounded/KIA or whatever people going out would have been loaded...and a quick departure made.

Our SOP was for the crew never...never... to get off the aircraft except in an absolute emergency. If you had to leave hastely....you did not want to leave a crewman on the ground....and have to operate the aircraft short handed or be forced to return to the LZ.

There are times externally carried cargo is a better idea than it being carried internally....when unloading time is critical due to the risk of being taken under accurate gunfire, mortars, rockets, or RPG's.

To gain airspeed...do we increase vulnerbility unloading at the LZ? Where is the trade-off point at which LZ Time outweighs Airspeed in transit?

Oh....I forget....we have been told Operational planning nowadays means we don't land in hostile LZ's like we did in that small Asian country far away.

The one thing that has not changed is the courage and dedication of the crews! In combat there are great acts of courage every day...some might even get noticed and it is good when they do.

I am confused however.....

Cave and Keech landed the Osprey on the first run and provided accurate enemy positions to friendly forces, which allowed support aircraft to suppress Taliban forces with rocket fire. Barfield-Smith helped unload supplies and called out targets to Cpl. Cederholm once the Osprey was back in the air.

Just this week, Vice President Joseph Biden, stated the "Taliban" is not our enemy in Afghanistan.....it is Al Qaeda that is the Enemy".

Look, the Taliban per se is not our enemy. That’s critical. There is not a single statement that the president has ever made in any of our policy assertions that the Taliban is our enemy because it threatens U.S. interests. If, in fact, the Taliban is able to collapse the existing government, which is cooperating with us in keeping the bad guys from being able to do damage to us, then that becomes a problem for us.

Have the Marines not received the Word?

Lonewolf_50

21st Dec 2011, 16:04

FFS, SASless, when a politician utters something like that, don't you first add a grain of salt before you make an assessment of what he said? (And two grains for "pull it out of my backside Joe" Biden, our erstwhile VP).

Yes, things do change over time. Go figure. Sometimes, change for the better and sometimes, not so much.

Other times, change is for the sake of change. *shrugs*

SASless

21st Dec 2011, 16:22

Just pointing out the incongruity of the situation...Gongs for combat against an Armed Enemy....but the VP (The Walking Gaff Machine) talking bollocks about how they are not the "Enemy" despite the threat they pose. I am sure the Marines present at that fight would clearly construe the Taliban as being the "Enemy" and very rightly so.

Just what says I should just giggle and fergeddaboutit when either the Prez or VicePrez talk stupid?

This is the number one guy's stand-in should we have a sudden change of command at the very top for crying out loud.

JohnDixson

22nd Dec 2011, 11:14

Let me explain a bit further re the questions I posed.

First, however, someone forwarded my post to Tom MacDonald and I received a very appreciated response from Tom, and it was good reconnecting after many years. I probably should mention that in 1992 or so, I instigated an attempt to offer Tom a job flying at SA, which, unfortunately for us, but probably crucial to the Bell/Boeing V-22 Team, he did not take. In his response, Tom mentioned his intention to write an in-depth SETP paper at length on the subject, saying that the 2003 paper was limited by the 20 minute presentation time allotted by the SETP at their functions.

Anyhow, as to the first question on V-22 aircraft reactions to VRS, the underlying reason for the question is that there is a separate aerodynamic situation that perhaps some may mistake for VRS, and while it is clear that some posters have very obviously encountered true VRS, some others may have mistaken what I am about to describe for VRS.

This particular phenomenon was demonstrated to me just after I joined SA in 1966, by our Sr Exp. Test Pilot Byron Graham ( I was the ad hoc copilot, but that's another story ) He was doing a 53A flight loads survey at max weight and on the card was something called a " Rough Approach ". Up and away, he slowed the machine almost to a hover, and then began a descent. At about 20 KIAS and 1500-2000 fpm, that machine went from dead smooth to an ungodly N/rev hammering. Zero pitch or roll perturbations and zero effect upon cyclic control power/sensitivity. Other than the exceedingly high vibration levels, the aircraft was hands-off stable. Byron explained the SA aero people's analysis as being that the advancing blade tip is intercepting the tip vortex from the preceding blade. So, over the years, I can say that I saw probably a couple of hundred of these events, in 4,5,6 and seven bladed models. Behavior is the same, but the indicated speed/rate of descent for the event is controlled by the blade loading, attitude ( really the CG influence ) and the behavior of the particular airspeed system of that ship ( sometimes the speed is bouncing off zero ). Some forward speed is necessary, and the descent angle is very very steep, but not quite vertical.

The second question I proposed asked whether the V-22 testing included prop pitch increases after VRS was encountered. I was asking about pitch, and do understand that the V-22 has isochronous governing, and that the prop Nr is increased automatically when in helo mode. I suspect that answer will have to wait for the longer SETP paper. My curiosity derives from thinking, based on some hand-done CT/sigma ( blade loading ) calculations that the prop rotor is already at fairly high Ct/sigma values already when coming to a hover. Just curious.

Again, thanks to whoever sent my previous post to Tom MacDonald.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

22nd Dec 2011, 12:46

My curiosity derives from thinking, based on some hand-done CT/sigma ( blade loading ) calculations that the prop rotor is already at fairly high Ct/sigma values already when coming to a hover.

It seems to me that Nick Lappos, during some of the early discussions on the Tilt Rotor design (particularly the MV-22), discussed the Prop Loading issues and talked about Ct/sigma values. Maybe we can search back through the thread or related threads and see if we can resurrect those posts.

Am I correct to assume those values are very high on the Osprey.....and by high mean they are approaching the level where blade stall might be encountered?

A few seconds of googling found this......

Aerodynamic Blade Loading: [CT/σ] [Ct/sigma]

is a simple concept that lets us see how far from stall the rotor is operating, similar to the coefficient of lift for an airplane's wing. It is the coefficient of thrust divided by the solidity.

For most modern airfoil sections, deep rotor stall is experienced at a Ct/sigma of about .20 to .21 at hover. As retreating blade stall takes over, the Ct/sigma for stall at 160 knots is about 0.10 and by 200 knots, it is about 0.06.

For a tilt rotor, the blades are purposely made with less chord than a helicopter, because the thinner blades are then operating at a higher angle of attack in a hover, and are more efficient. This means that they can save power in a hover by operating at a high Ct/sigma. The downside is that there is little margin left over for maneuvering at low speed. For helos, the blade chord is sized up to allow flight at high speed, so it is way oversized for a hover. Tilt rotors don't need the extra chord for high speed because they are on the wing by then, and the rotors are props!

The V-22 has a hover Ct/sigma of 0.175, which means that it will stall at only about 1.2 to 1.3 g's in helo mode (.21/.175). A typical helo has a hover Ct/sigma of about 0.09, so it never gets close to stall at low speed (ever pull 2.4 g's at 40 knots? It's a wild ride!)

~ Nick Lappos

The Sikorsky ABC has demonstrated blade loadings up to 0.185, but the full lift capacity of the rotor system has yet to be demonstrated ~ (1976)

From Prouty "Helicopter Aerodynamics - p.68" "Most rotors are at the peak of their efficiency in forward flight when CT/σ is about .08.

A second source of information....a research paper done by a Naval Officer.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA204856

The other issue that is important is Disk Loading and its effect upon Autorotational capability which has had a very major effect upon the Osprey performance.

JohnDixson

22nd Dec 2011, 13:58

SAS, you are correct re Nick being the first to bring up this aspect.

I was interested and did a calc on my own recently, using what I have seen posted re the increased hover Nr and what has been posted re V-22 blade area.

The paper that Tom MacDonald will be writing ought to answer all of the conjectures and will, I am certain, be very interesting reading.

This thread seems to have two separate subjects, one being the strategic/tactical financial justification for the machine, and the second being the flying quality acceptability with the VRS issue wrapped up into that second area.

I'll leave the first subject area to others, and make a simple observation regarding the second. The USMC discovered a serious problem in the Marana incident. The Bell/Boeing/USMC test team did what appears to be an extensive and technically rigorous flight test to establish the boundaries of the problem and establish corrective action procedures. They did that and the USMC and USAF aviators are now happy with what they fly.

There will inevitably be some comment that Marana represented a failure of that same test team to discover that particular problem. In response, my experience is that prior to flight test beginning on any new model, the entire test planning sequence is reviewed at many levels for rigor, completeness and of course adherence to contractual/specification requirements. What I am suggesting is that none of the experts involved saw this one coming, and along those lines, it is not the first time it has occurred within the industry.

Thanks,
John Dixson

Lonewolf_50

22nd Dec 2011, 19:53

Well said, John.
I'll leave the first subject area to others, and make a simple observation regarding the second. The USMC discovered a serious problem in the Marana incident. The Bell/Boeing/USMC test team did what appears to be an extensive and technically rigorous flight test to establish the boundaries of the problem and establish corrective action procedures. They did that and the USMC and USAF aviators are now happy with what they fly.
There will inevitably be some comment that Marana represented a failure of that same test team to discover that particular problem. In response, my experience is that prior to flight test beginning on any new model, the entire test planning sequence is reviewed at many levels for rigor, completeness and of course adherence to contractual/specification requirements. What I am suggesting is that none of the experts involved saw this one coming, and along those lines, it is not the first time it has occurred within the industry.
Repeated for emphasis, and truth, with the doubled comment that this was a new technology being undertaken.

You won't predict it all. R & D means R & D, and part of the "D" ends up being "discovery."

For a case in point, consider how long it took to get the T-45, a fairly simple aircraft in comparison, untracked for the USN jet training missions and roles, adapted from a simple light attack aircraft. Even with a well known design, things come up that need fixing. Ten years into its service, there were still issues with nose wheel steering and ground handling that were being addressed in ECP's by NAVIAR and the manufacturer.

For a case nearer and dearer to my rotary flying days, there was the matter of how to die in an S-70 / Blackhawk when the Horizontal Stab runs itself full down, uncommanded. :( That too got fixed after the team looked into a rigorous root cause anaysis and effective engineering solution. But as with many technologies (the moving horizontal stab was relatively new feature, and its FBW control, when Blackhawk entered the field) what we enjoy today was earned in blood. :uhoh:

As to Kadon bearings, :mad:

JohnDixson

23rd Dec 2011, 00:52

Lonewolf, you were doing absolutely fine until you got to the UH-60 stabilator. Probably as much myth there as for VRS, I'd guess.

The real history is that there was a single fatal UH-60 stabilator caused accident, and that occurred on the first prototype UH-60A, 21650 at the Sikorsky facility in Stratford and flown by a SA crew of two pilots and a flight test engineer. It sounds as if someone has given you bad information about what actually happened, so I'll provide the short version of what actually transpired here.

The ship was scheduled to do two things on accident day. First, provide a flight demo for Asst Sec. of the Army for R&D Dr. Percy Pierre. Second, I was to ferry the ship down to the Dev Flt Test Ctr we had established in West Palm Beach so that the Maturity Phase Test Program could commence.. The ship had been worked on since completing its last test program in Stfd and needed a maintenance test flt, which I did late the preceding afternoon, and after which I wrote up the stabilator for being a degree outside the trailing edge down tolerance limit for cruise. Another crew was to fly the demo and the stabilator maintenance was to be done overnight.

At about 2 AM the job wasn't complete and the stab system engineer and second shift left the job incomplete and departed. First shift came to work, did the daily, buttoned up the stabilator connections, the inspector did his backup inspection and the crew took off on a second maintenance test flight to recheck the stabilator schedule.

But the paperwork did not reflect that the airspeed inputs to the stab amplifiers was not reconnected. The crew made an aggressive takeoff, the stabilator didn't come up, and they, for reasons never understood, did not use the 28V DC backup emergency switch to raise the stab. With the stab full down, they ran out of aft control by 100 KIAS or so and went in the adjacent river upside down. After the wreckage was pulled out of the river the 28v DC Emergency backup system was found to be functional, and the airspeed connections to the amps undone.

Thus it didn't take much analysis to get at the root cause. What made it hard for me to believe was that the pilot who was flying had a lot of time flying with me in the company owned prototype which had ONLY a electric manual stabilator system and so to him it should have been second nature to go for the DC switch. Additionally, there had been two instances during development of the system wherein the stabilator did not come up during takeoff and in both cases the pilot flying brought up the tail manually via the switch without issue. So there was sufficient time.

However it was 1978, the production aircraft were on the line and a lot of high ranking individuals were involved ( I have to say that all whom I met seemed to be honestly motivated ), so there were nonetheless a number of after the fact activities, more stabilator controllability and hardover testing at West Palm, simulator work at Ames and the Army version of the H-60 got the claw switch on the cyclic, which the USN and yours truly thought was unnecessary.

Apologize for the rant, but there was no dearth of mis-information afoot for years regarding mysterious stabilator caused accidents( the most popular one being the Ft Bragg accident which finally turned out to be caused by an unsafetied bolt or associated nut ( can't recall which ) falling into, and jamming the longitudinal control system in the mixer/limiter area).

Thanks,
John Dixson

21stCen

23rd Dec 2011, 11:59

JohnDixson says:
In his response, Tom mentioned his intention to write an in-depth SETP paper at length on the subject, saying that the 2003 paper was limited by the 20 minute presentation time allotted by the SETP at their functions... The paper that Tom MacDonald will be writing ought to answer all of the conjectures and will, I am certain, be very interesting reading.

Hi John,
I haven't met Tom, but have a friend who worked with him on V-22 flight test projects and has been involved with him on other tiltrotor research efforts. He like you has nothing but good things to say about Tom including that he 'does not say or write what people want him to,' he 'reports the facts' as proven by the research. His paper will be interesting, and we can all count on it being completely credible.

JohnDixson says:
The USMC discovered a serious problem in the Marana incident. The Bell/Boeing/USMC test team did what appears to be an extensive and technically rigorous flight test to establish the boundaries of the problem and establish corrective action procedures. They did that and the USMC and USAF aviators are now happy with what they fly.

There will inevitably be some comment that Marana represented a failure of that same test team to discover that particular problem. In response, my experience is that prior to flight test beginning on any new model, the entire test planning sequence is reviewed at many levels for rigor, completeness and of course adherence to contractual/specification requirements. What I am suggesting is that none of the experts involved saw this one coming, and along those lines, it is not the first time it has occurred within the industry.

I completely agree. Again, I am not in any way connected to the program, and am not quoting others who are. From what I read in open sources during the post accident period, it appears that instead of doing the VRS flight testing that was planned for in the initial development program, computer modeling was used in place of actual flight tests. Computers can do great things, but they have their limits. In an attempt to save cost and time the decision was made not to engage in a full program of flight testing at the upper management level, perhaps directed from the government side(?), and it was the wrong decision. Just like with the S-92 gearbox, when corners are cut in aircraft development programs, tragedy and loss of life can be, and too often are the final result.

If flight testing on the V-22 to explore VRS thoroughly was accomplished before operational testing commenced, it seems likely the dangers of the asymmetrical aspects would have been fully understood at that stage with the appropriate warning systems and training programs developed and put in place. But I don't blame those at the research and flight test level, as they can only recommend what tests they believe need to be accomplished, in the end they are told from above what they can and cannot do sometimes despite their recommendations. I would guess that the elimination of recommended test series does not happen often, but it should be completely removed from the equation with the flight test team being given the last word.

SASless

23rd Dec 2011, 12:43

21st.....that has been one of the complaints all along about the Osprey Program.

It went from being the "Universal Soldier"...capable of all things....all missions...for all Services and over time the Mission Set has been altered (read "reduced") when the aircraft was found unable to carry out a particular mission or task. Then, compounded with the pitiful record of Testing, there have been about 30 Marines killed in accidents that very most likely would have been avoided by adhering to the planned Test Schedule.....one can begin to understand why some critics of the Osprey Program are as strident as they are.

Then to put the icing on the Cake....we learned the USMC deliberately mis-stated the situation and were publically denounced for doing do. Which unfortunately casts a rather large shadow over the Program yet again.

If one takes a big step back....reviews all the justifications for the program...that being the Over-The-Horizion Amphibious Assault...and the current status of that pipe dream...then again, the very justification of the Osprey Program gets a leg knocked off that stool.

For those that are new to the argument....OTH was based upon the US Navy insisted their Amphib Support Ships being kept much further out to Sea to keep them safe from attack by land based artillery, rockets, missiles and the like.

OTH Amphibious assault requires the Osprey and a new fast Amphibous Tractor for the assault phase and the LCAC (air cushion landing craft) and CH-53E/K for the support phase.

The Marines finally accepted defeat on their super dooper jet Amtrac after spending Billions of Dollars.....leaving the OTH concept yet/still useless. The USMC in modern times (Post WWII) has always been in jeopardy as budget cutters and inter-service rivalry for the available budget money allows for some to seriously consider doing away with the Marine Corps amphibious mission and in some circles...doing away with the Marine Corps all together.

As modern warfare and the prospective Wars are being considered....that situation is not going to change. There is some merit to the argument the USMC Jet Squadrons are really "Navy" squadrons in numbers, aircraft, and mission sets....and thus Marine Air should be transferred to the Navy. The Helicopter/Tilt Rotor ground assault mission will always be a Marine mission but some see it as rightfully being limited to On-Shore "Army" type operations and thus only an Amphibious Asault capability limited to "Raids" or other limited scale operations need be maintained with a resulting decrease in the need for large numbers of long range helicopter/tilt rotor aircraft.

I don't profess to know the answer....but certainly see why the questions are asked.

I do know for sure we need our Marines....as they are a first class fighting organization made up of very fine Men and Women, with a great heritage which they live up to today as they have in the past. What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.

All this being said....the Osprey excels at some Missions....far fewer than it is being used for and is expected to be used for.

21stCen

23rd Dec 2011, 14:22

Sas says:
It went from being the "Universal Soldier"...capable of all things....all missions...

Hi Sas,
One should never believe the marketing hype of any program, it will always be far more than they are capable of delivering.

Sas says:
If one takes a big step back....

Hind sight is always 20/20. Taking a "big step back" is not possible in reality as expenditures of the past are already gone. It is better to look at the present with how the a/c has become vital to the Marine medium lift mission, and how it will add to the effectiveness of the USMC aviation capability requirements in the future. In other words it is better to instead 'take a big step forward' to see if the program should be adjusted today for future requirements expected. That is something that you and I can talk about, but those who are in a better position to assess its true effectiveness under battlefield conditions in Iraq and now in Afghanistan will decide its future (modified by upcoming fiscal restraints no doubt!).

Sas says:
I do know for sure we need our Marines....as they are a first class fighting organization made up of very fine Men and Women, with a great heritage which they live up to today as they have in the past. What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.

I certainly agree with that.

Sas says:
All this being said....the Osprey excels at some Missions....far fewer than it is being used for and is expected to be used for.
The Marines flying the Osprey in Afghanistan say they feel that the aircraft is doing far more than they expected, and those flying it wouldn't go back to what they were flying before. Guess they didn't get the 'marketing brochure.'

21stC

SASless

23rd Dec 2011, 15:14

Mine Sweeping was a proposed mission....and very quickly was found to be impossible. That is an example of what I meant by a reduction in Mission Set capability. Then we might bring up HOGE capability at altitude...again very quickly one can see the aircraft is not capable of that. It is not alone in that problem but it is what it is as they say.

Does the Osprey beat the CH-46 in most taskings.....for sure.

How much money do we spend looking forward...and when is it a pipe dream and not a necessary goal?

What value proposing a three legged stool with but two legs installed?

Intellectual honesty requires one be able to discuss the actual situation and discount the hoped for result that not only has not been achieved but has no real hope of being achieved in the next decade or so.

Without the ability to land forces by boat or vehicle....beach assaults from OTH are just that....a damn pipe dream. Either we accept the Navy shall have to put ships at risk or the Marines cannot claim to be able to do real Amphibious Assaults from OTH.

Neither service will admit the extent the lack of the fast amphibious tractor harms the OTH strategy....as one of the two services shall have to surrender its position and that just ain't gonna happen.

In the mean while....huge amounts of Tax Dollars are being squandered on a capability that does not exist...and will not for the foreseeable future.

It is not just the Osprey that is expensive...but the special vehicles being bought that will fit inside the aircraft, the special ships that are needed to handle the Osprey, the R & D money that has been wasted so far on the fast Tractor and that shall invariably be spent yet again trying to come up with an Armored Amphibious Tractor that can cover ground like a speedboat.

Pardon me if I sound pessimistic about all this....but when Pigs Fly....we'll see that fast Tractor built and made operational. I dare say it will not be in my life time. So...the Marines are into Vertical Envelopment to secure a small beach head safe from enemy fire....where LCACs can land heavy equipment, supplies and large numbers of troops. Which is not in any sense an OTH amphibious assault.

21stCen

23rd Dec 2011, 15:35

Sas says:
How much money do we spend looking forward...

Way too much. But those fighting on the battlefield in Afghanistan today as we speak think it is worth it...

arismount

24th Dec 2011, 07:55

SASless said:

What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.

Then SASless said:

How much money do we spend looking forward...

To which 21stCentury replied:

Way too much. But those fighting on the battlefield in Afghanistan today as we speak think it is worth it...

Gents, both those sets of thought sound like circular arguments to me. The U.S., like every other power in history, is spending itself out of existence through militarism. The true test of American exceptionalism might be America's ability to recognize this and be the first power in history to avoid the mistake.

I see no sign or that happening, however, and the two sets of thought you have expressed being more or less universally accepted or at least unquestioned, are in fact clear indications to the contrary.

21stCen

24th Dec 2011, 08:51

The U.S., like every other power in history, is spending itself out of existence through militarism. The true test of American exceptionalism might be America's ability to recognize this and be the first power in history to avoid the mistake.

Arismount,
Your thoughts are welcome.
21stC

SASless

24th Dec 2011, 12:31

Militarism can be defined in way too many ways to be accepted merely by stipulation.

You will have to provide us your definition if we are going to have commonality of definition by which we can discuss your view of things.

The Japanese immediately prior to WWII can be said fairly to have been Militaristic....whereas the UK and USA at the end of the War would not have been despite the sheer size of their Military Forces.

If you are making reference to the Military-Industrial Complex that Eisenhower warned us of....you might have a point.

Perhaps recent history of "Pre-emptive War" would indict the Bush Administration in some folks view....but not in all.

As a percentage of GDP....we are spending far less than at most of our history as a Nation which would belie the usual definition of Militarism.

What say you?

Another view of the OTH Amphibious Assault situation including remarks by General Amos....it appears the super fast Armored vehicle is history and the USMC is looking at more traditional boats and/or Air Cushion craft for that role. But....if as the article suggests...the Marines have to buy both watercraft and armored vehicles...it shall be very expensive. It would make the current AAV obselete but yet deprive the Marines of that current capability....an armored vehicle that could swim ashore.

James Hasik (http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/)

Lonewolf_50

3rd Jan 2012, 20:39

John:

Many thanks for the recounting of the actual mishap circumstances. You do indeed dispell some myth I had been fed some years ago.

Much appreciated.

Militarism: a one sized fits all perjorative used (carelessly) far too often. I'll put my chips on SASless' point regarding its lack of utility in this discussion.

SASless, all shadows of the past aside, time moves forward, as do events. The mistakes are part of the record, but you cannot go back and undo them. So, the Marines have chosen to use an expensive aircraft for their medium lift.

Fifteen years ago, a very astute Marine Colonel argued to me that the tank was OBE. I think he ws 20 years ahead of his time, but the foundations of his argument are beginning to show substantial merit.

His point, however, at that time, late 90's, did not necessarily match the realities in Iraq ... but if we look at Afghanistan, he seems prescient.

SASless

3rd Jan 2012, 23:43

Now who would have guessed the American Military would go to an all armored transportation system? Think of the money spent putting armor on all manner of vehicles as a defensive measure against the IED. Who would have guessed that would become necessary?

The sad thing is the next War may not be similar in that respect and all that expense, weight penalty, and transport demand will be wasted.

I guess DARPA needs to get cracking on a military version of the Crystal Ball if there is any hope to get our Force Structure and Unit TO&E's correct for the nex t Dust Up!

We are not supposed to say this....nay....not even think this...but if we are making such progress in Afghanistan then why are we fielding Pilotless Re-Supply helicopters to relieve the demand on our helicopter fleet which has had to replace the trucks normally used for re-supply over the road ways?

Lonewolf_50

4th Jan 2012, 16:35

SAS:

Because technology makes putting together remotely operated land mines so damned easy.

Just over 7 years ago part of my job involved bits and pieces of countering that problem. You eliminate the problem if you avoid road networks. As with air travel versus rail, it is far easier to secure NODES than entire Lines of Communication. So, secure launch and land sites, and you secure Nodes.

Cheers.

ospreydriver

5th Jan 2012, 05:10

I said goodbye to this thread some time ago, because it seemed ridiculous. I still believe that, but I've checked in and am amazed that it's still the topic of almost daily discussion.

I'm willing to modify my views based on data and new information, but the Osprey haters seem to be unable to even acknowledge the slightest bit of merit in the airframe. If I told one that the V-22 cured childhood leukemia, they'd counter that it costs too much, the side effects are horrible, and that it's surely a lie perpetrated by Big Pharma. I'll say it again. I've flown or flown in about everything we've got, and the V-22 is the best platform going. Ask whether the cost has been worth it, I'll acknowledge that there can be very legitimate debate on the subject.

The most bizarre thing is, "WHY are we talking about it?" There IS NO GOING BACK at this point. Over half of the FMF medium-lift force has been replaced. Going back and replacing the V-22s we've got already ISN'T going to happen. Even replacing the remaining CH-46s with something different isn't happening either. That's just reality.

So, are we discussing this from some kind of hypothetical historical analysis standpoint, like debating what the world would be like if the US hadn't entered WWII? That's an interesting topic, but is really just mental masturbation when one gets down to it. The decision's been made and isn't going to change.

One can argue, "In the future, we shouldn't buy expensive weapons systems like this one," or "The next generation of vertical lift should not be based on tilt rotor technology," but arguing the specific merits of the V-22 is just a waste of time. The train's left the station. Get on board or don't, but stop bitching about whether the train was on time.

SASless

5th Jan 2012, 10:19

OD,

Welcome back....hang around this time and contribute to the discussion. Despite being a Chinook pilot and naturally loving the old girls....I learned to accept the British would never accept the Chinook as being a very good aircraft due to the reception it was given by them when put into operation on the North Sea Offshore Operations. I maintain it was a case of Penis Envy but that is another story.

Care to give us your views of the OTH strategy status now that the Fast Track program died a failure?

How does the USMC achieve that capability now there is no replacement for the AAV's currently in use and were due to be replaced by faster vehicles?

As the USN is adapting some of the new Amphib ships specifically for the Osprey....what does that say about the overall capability of the Gator fleet to operate organic air units....are there major alterations or design changes that shall need to be made to accomodate the Osprey?

With massive budget cuts arriving....what is the future of the USMC in general and the Osprey program in particular....and how will those cuts affect the Amphibious Assault Capability the USMC sees as its core mission? Is OTH dead.....in spirit and reality if not in words?

If OTH remains un-doable....and the USN will not change its position of demanding its ships staying well offshore....what then?

bast0n

5th Jan 2012, 11:47

OD

Great post!

I love this thread as it never fails to amuse us old "penis envy" British!! Like watching a "Cock Fight" - pun intended.:ok:

heli1

5th Jan 2012, 14:34

SASless...Why wouldnt the Brits accept the Chinook...After all it was Jock Cameron of British Airways who pioneered the use of tandem rotors with the Bristol 173 in 19953 and British designers and engineers who went to Phily in the early 1960s to help Boeing to complete design of the Chinook and get it to work after their own design ,the Bristol 194/Westland WG.1 was abandoned by the government as too expensive !
Mind you the CH-47 's still only got a three bladed rotor rather than the four blade head the Brits offered.

SASless

5th Jan 2012, 20:15

Heli....there's some folks that post here that can far better answer your questions as they were involved in the Chinook operations and some in the Bristow decision process that led to the Puma/Tiger/Super Puma decision.

Costs, lack of uses in other kinds of tasking, vibration levels, are among some of the complaints but one must also remember the marketing campaign (or anti-Chinook campaign as some believe) that painted the Chinook in a bad light as being part of the reception the old girls got on the North Sea.

There have been some recent discussions about this in Rotorheads....cannot recall which thread.

ospreydriver

6th Jan 2012, 06:21

I think the USMC is going to return to the expeditionary, sea-based crisis response force that it should have been all along. The 202K plan was a fiction from the get-go. I don't know whether it was a fiction to buy gear and infrastructure or whether it was poor planning, but we were never going to stay there.

The Osprey is going to replace all medium lift in the USMC. That's a fact. Now, there were going to be squadrons added as part of 202K. Those will probably go away.

If the Corps is lucky, it will stabilize at either 180K or 172K, where it was before GWOT started. If not, it will end up in the 140s.

In my view, either is fine. The Corps is meant to be a light crisis-response force, not a second land army. Put us in to rescue AMCITs stuck in a country falling apart or secure an airfield for follow-on forces. That's what we've done since the days of Samuel Nicholas (not the airfield part, but you get the idea).

We aren't going to do an amphibious assault against an opposed beach, especially OTH. But OTH is still valid for the missions we should be doing--embassy reinforcement, NEOs, IHR, etc, etc. Navy shipbuilding reflects this, even if the official statements don't--the America LHAs don't have well-decks for AAVs.

The Osprey gives us the capability to do all those crisis response missions from the sea to well inland. Need TRAP coverage of a bombing campaign (Libya)? You got it. Need a NEO done while the gators are still steaming? The Ospreys could've done the Somalia NEO without AAR, unlike the 53s used at the time.

The Osprey is better suited to the new reality than any other aircraft.

Savoia

14th Jan 2012, 07:07

The Marine Corps V-22 Osprey’s safety, combat effectiveness and reliability have improved in the past year, according to the Pentagon’s test office.

New aircraft software evaluated in tests from August through early November “performed largely as expected,” the test office found. The improvement gives Osprey pilots greater capability to track, monitor and communicate from their cockpit with U.S. ground forces and to avoid bad weather.

“Software enhancements were modest but provided new piloting options and power margins” during flying operations,“increasing safety and reducing pilot workload,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation said in a report released today.

The report is good news for makers of the $53 billion V-22 Osprey, the Pentagon’s sixth-largest acquisition program. The Navy plans to spend $8 billion this year to buy an additional 122 V-22s, made by Providence, Rhode Island-based Textron Inc. Bell Helicopter unit and Chicago-based Boeing Co.

“Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements,” Gilmore wrote. Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to Gilmore.

The Navy should continue “development and testing to improve overall reliability and availability,” he wrote.

More (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-13/v-22-osprey-aircraft-s-reliability-improves-in-pentagon-testing.html)

A 53% dispatch rate .. wow! This programme really is an 'amazing' commitment by the US government. Let's hope the technology eventually trickles down into those markets with slightly smaller budgets; I'm especially thinking of long-range offshore rescue missions where, presumably, this type of vehicle would excel!

FH1100 Pilot

14th Jan 2012, 14:38

“Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements,” Gilmore wrote. Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to Gilmore.

Well, it's never met the 82% requirement. So what are we to take away from this...that with a fleet-wide availability of 53%, the reliability and maintainability requirements have loosened? Do they now accept a 53% availability because they cannot expect anything better? It would seem so.

Look, we must face the fact that the technology that allows the V-22 to exist simply has not been developed yet. "WHAT?!" you ask incredulously. "Look Bob, the V-22 is flying!! How can you say the technology doesn't yet exist?"

Well, Bell has been working on the (inherently flawed) tiltrotor concept since 1953, so let's give them credit for forcing the aircraft to this point. But I think we've hit a wall here. Using conventional technology and materials, the V-22 is just too hugely complicated to have any kind of reliability. Thus we've seen the military admit that the availability of the V-22 has actually gone down as more and more of the things come into use.

Some of us are not surprised. Some of us are not impressed. Some of us have not lost our objectivitity and are not blown away by the "gee-whiz!" factor of the V-22. Cheney had it right: We should have cancelled it and developed something else...something cheaper and more reliable.

In the 1970's there was a well-known TV weatherman in New York. His name was Tex Antoine. He was a "character." One day, the lead-in story to the weather segment involved a five year-old girl who'd been raped. Antoine, thinking he was a funny guy, quipped, "With rape so predominant in the news lately, it is well to remember the words of Confucius: 'If rape is inevitable, lie back and enjoy it.'" I'm sure the family of the 5 year-old girl appreciated the remark. Needless to say, Antoine's career at WABC-7 was over.

But that's where we're at with the V-22: It's too late now to cancel this albatross...sorry, Osprey. The American public is being...err, raped, and all we can do, as Confucius (supposedly) advised, is lie back and enjoy it.

...53% availability. And they call that acceptable.

Dave_Jackson

14th Jan 2012, 19:36

Look, we must face the fact that the technology that allows the V-22 to exist simply has not been developed yet.
http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/infopop/icons/icon14.gif

The obvious problem is that the V-22 is a compromise between the helicopter and the airplane (http://www.g2mil.com/tiltrotors.htm). It can never have the efficiency of a helicopter in hover (vertical thrust) because its disk areas are too small for low disk loading, and, it can never have the efficiency of an airplane (horizontal thrust) because its disk areas are too large for working with high velocity free-air.

Sikorsky has approximately a dozen patents covering 'Variable Diameter Tiltrotor' (http://www.unicopter.com/1621.html). However, it appears that the complexity of physically changing the length of the blades has been its handicap.

There have been a few other ideas over the years but every one is subjected to a common limitation. That being; all of mankind's successful developments are extensions of nature and nature has only provided examples of rotating airfoils that move axially in their environment.

Perhaps the AeroVantage (http://www.unicopter.com/AeroVantage.html) with its aerodynamic 2:1 change in disk area (http://www.unicopter.com/1612.html) might be the answer. And, it is openly and freely available for any company, institution, university, or RC hobbyist to build and develop.

Dave

SansAnhedral

16th Jan 2012, 16:31

So let me get this straight, the tiltrotor concept is "fundamentally flawed" because it does not simultaneously outperform a helicopter in hover and a fixed wing in cruise?

Has anyone ever argued that a tiltrotor is NOT a compromise between the performance of the two? This is pretty tired old strawman. Its not as if it CAN'T hover, or that it ISN'T absolutely faster than any helicopter.

And with the newest bloomberg report, where is this "53%" data coming from???

March 2011
While the availability rate of the Osprey in the field has remained constant at just under 72 percent, the Marine Corps would like to see 75 percent across the board. (https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/438299/file/56762/PBL%20from%20Seapower%20V-22%20Osprey%20-March11-Final.pdf)

Feb 2011
Readiness rates for the Marine version are around 70 percent, which is quite respectable for a new and novel airframe. (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/v-22-is-the-safest-most-survivable-rotorcraft-the-marines-have?a=1&c=1171)

jeffg

16th Jan 2012, 17:02

Might I point out that the quote has two parts to it:

Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements"
considers fleet wide data which is probably similar to the numbers from the early 2011 articles.

Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required
considers data from a few, maybe even one aircraft. Was the non availability from mechanical issues, instrumentation, weather (did it have test instrumentation that made it a dry aircraft?), issuse with the new software, etc. There are many reasons why a test aircraft may not be available when a fleet aircraft would be. There is not enough information in the article to draw a conclusion either way. To do so is pure speculation.

FH1100 Pilot

16th Jan 2012, 18:10

SansAnhedral:So let me get this straight, the tiltrotor concept is "fundamentally flawed" because it does not simultaneously outperform a helicopter in hover and a fixed wing in cruise?

No, that's not the reason the tiltrotor/tiltengine concept and design is fundamentally flawed. If you do not understand why, then you do not understand much about helicopters. Sorry.

jeffg

16th Jan 2012, 18:14

FH1100 if you could please enlighten us as to why the tiltrotor is fundeamentally flawed. Or is this going to be another AVRS rant?

SansAnhedral

17th Jan 2012, 21:41

No, that's not the reason the tiltrotor/tiltengine concept and design is fundamentally flawed. If you do not understand why, then you do not understand much about helicopters. Sorry.

Yes, enlighten us. Preferably without using your A-VRS soapbox, as jeffg suggests, which is a laughable excuse for a "fundamental flaw"...seeing as how the fleet is now at what, 130,000 hours which is 100% of deployment time without an incident stemming from A-VRS?

Perhaps you also think the single rotor helicopter is "fatally flawed" as well due to LTE?

Or maybe the under slung teetering rotor is "fatally flawed" due to mast bumping?

I'm seeing a constant thread here.

I think its you, sir, who may be lacking in helicopter understanding.

SASless

17th Jan 2012, 22:33

Sans,

Perhaps you also think the single rotor helicopter is "fatally flawed" as well due to LTE?

Hopefully, you will recall the "LTE" you reference is a Bell Helicopter alibi they use to explain putting too small a tail rotor on their helicopters. Other Single Rotor designs do not have that problem thus applying that to all Single Rotor helicopters is not really valid.

Anyone who has flown several different models of Bell's understands this....especially when also having the benefit of flying things built by Sikorsky.

Sikorsky understands tail rotors.....Bell surely doesn't.

Oh....hang on a mo'....Bell Engineering....a common trait between the LTE and other aerodynamic issues extant. Surprise...surprise!

Ian Corrigible

18th Jan 2012, 05:32

There are many reasons why a test aircraft may not be available when a fleet aircraft would be. There is not enough information in the article to draw a conclusion either way.

Additional background data, from the DOT&E's FY2011 Annual Report (http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2011):

The Navy’s OT&E Force/Marine Tiltrotor Test Squadron VMX-22 conducted an FOT&E (OT-IIIG) from August 12 to November 8, 2011. This dedicated test was preceded by two years of integrated developmental/operational testing (IT-IIID) from May 1, 2009, to May 31, 2011. During IT-IIID, MV-22s accumulated 419 flight hours and during OT-IIIG, aircraft accumulated approximately 100 flight hours. We expect to receive all the data and complete the analysis by December 2011.

OT-IIIG was conducted in accordance with the DOT&E‑approved Test and Evaluation Master Plan and operational test plan.

The purpose of OT-IIIG was to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of new software version B4.01, Blue Force Tracker, Netted Weather, and the defensive weapon systems. This software suite includes modest enhancements in aircraft performance, correction of existing deficiencies, and reliability improvements. Blue Force Tracker provides cockpit and cabin connectivity to a world-wide digital network of joint forces enabling digital messaging and near-real-time sharing of friendly and enemy unit locations. Netted Weather provides map-based overlays to the pilots and embarked troops on the location of significant weather (clouds, winds, rain, and thunderstorms).

VMX-22 deployed three production-representative aircraft from Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, where the majority of OT-IIIG missions were performed. Due in part to a hurricane on the East Coast, VMX-22 returned to New River earlier than planned and completed the final missions in North Carolina. DOT&E observed as passengers on most of the OT-IIIG missions.

I/C

SansAnhedral

18th Jan 2012, 15:54

SAS your prejudice is showing through, as if it wasn't enough you hammer on Bell in roughly every-other thread.

Other Single Rotor designs do not have that problem thus applying that to all Single Rotor helicopters is not really valid

To claim LTE is a Bell-specific phenomenon is frankly laughable. One could argue all day it is apparent in MOST small gross weight helicopters, and with the sheer numbers of 206s flying around, your judgement is a bit skewed from anecdotes.

Ah here is an old post/thread talking about B206, Enstroms, Hughes etc

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/75644-hughes-tailspin.html#post720544

SansAnhedral

18th Jan 2012, 18:23

India sizes up V-22 Osprey (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/india-sizes-up-v-22-osprey-367058/)

India sizes up V-22 Osprey

Print
By: GREG WALDRON SINGAPORE 6 hours ago Source:

India has shown interest in the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey, although it has not stated a formal requirement for the tiltrotor aircraft.

Boeing confirmed that it was "invited in-country to provide more information" on the V-22, but that it has not received "an official, written [request for information] from India".

In addition, Indian officials visited the V-22 aircraft during the Dubai air show in November 2011, where they asked questions about the aircraft.

The V-22 would be well suited to operations along India's vast Himalayan frontier, where high altitudes and long distances hinder helicopter operations.

At last year's Paris and Dubai air shows, Osprey representatives made much of a mountain rescue mission in June 2010 conducted by two US Air Force CV-22s. The aircraft flew a 1,290km (700nm) round-trip at 15,000ft (4,570m), landed amid mountainous terrain in dust storm conditions, collected 32 personnel and returned to base.

In response to a query about whether the V-22 could be fitted with a radar array for use on Indian aircraft carriers, Boeing said: "While AEW&C [airborne early warning and control] has been identified as a future mission well suited to the Osprey's performance profile and specifications, it is not a mission performed by current customers and it would be premature to speculate on what specific equipment would be utilised for that mission."

In 2010, the Indian navy requested information from Northrop Grumman on the E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft, which is capable of operating from aircraft carriers using steam catapults. This aircraft may not be suitable for current and planned Indian carriers, which rely on "ski-ramps" to launch aircraft. This restricts them to using airborne early warning helicopters, which are far less capable than their fixed-wing counterparts.

Lonewolf_50

18th Jan 2012, 19:03

SASless, LTE was experienced in the SH-2F in certain shipboard landing configurations, and IIRC, SH-60B was susceptible to it at high GW and hot/heavy/cross wind conditions. (Been a few years since that nut roll in the safety meetings ...)

I can't recall at the moment whether or not the SH-2F problem came from wind to left or right, but I seem to recall the SH-60 risk as coming from significant left cross wind ... but I may be confusing the two in my memory. Seahawk was far less likely to encounter that problem.

You could lose TR effectiveness boost off, but that's a different story ...

Sans to FH1100:
I think its you, sir, who may be lacking in helicopter understanding.
Ya think? :}

Tcabot113

19th Jan 2012, 01:30

SASLESS,

You forgot this LTE incident on the un-LTE'able Sikorsky.

TC

Blackhawk Down - YouTube

Arm out the window

19th Jan 2012, 02:07

There's no way that's LTE! Loss of SA due to lack of horizon, more like it.

JohnDixson

19th Jan 2012, 02:44

Glad of the post of the UH-60 snow roll, as it provides an excellent point of departure, one which applies to both S-70 models.

There have been a few cases where pilots have reported running out of left pedal. The above video is one. In each of the cases of which we are aware, however, the ship has been in a situation where the pilot has increased collective to the point, and beyond the point, at which the engine TGT limiter has been reached. The Nr has drooped, and the tail rotor thrust has decreased as the square of the Nr droop ( lift is a velocity squared function ), but with the engine on the limiter, the torque will still rise with that increased collective which caused the Nr droop. Thus the pilot, attempting to hover in a situation where there is insufficient power to do so in the first place, can droop the Nr enough to create a shortage of tail rotor thrust. The relative wind can be an influence, for good or for bad, on this situation, as it influences the magnitude of tail rotor thrust required.

Hope this clarifies the subject a bit. Bottom line: the ship is outside the flight envelope.

Thanks,
John Dixson

SASless

19th Jan 2012, 13:10

Yes there are lots of 206's flying around...and everyone of them has the same potential of LTE....the fact Bell mod'ed the L series with the more powerful TR proves the point.

Anyone that flew the Huey in Vietnam understands planning for a takeoff path that curves to the right...and remembers the number 5800....as being the point you can droop the Engine RPM to...and still fly away....with a turn to the right.

The Sikorsky S-58T had a "Tail Rotor Buzz" warning...but that was about airflow and vibration....not loss of effectiveness unless the tail rotor shucked bits.

I have flown the 500C, D, E....and never ran out of Tail Rotor....also the 58T and 76....again plenty of TR, the Alouette III....yards of TR.....the BO/BK...never a hint of lack of TR. But...in the 204,205, and 206 series of helicopters....have encountered LTE.

I beat up on Bell whenever it is appropriate....as their engineering department has never been known for its inventiveness. They copied the Bell 47 into many different versions....but the same concept. It works....works fine....but it does have its limitations.

I love the Huey....anyone that has flown the old thing usually does as it is a good and reliable helicopter. The 206 is reliable.

But....LTE in Bell's is real....and not just when you droop the Nr!

SansAnhedral

19th Jan 2012, 16:23

I beat up on Bell whenever it is appropriate....as their engineering department has never been known for its inventiveness

Yeah, that whole tilt rotor system, FBW, and transmission certainly isn't a technological marvel.

Not quite sure what you expect? Whats so revolutionary about Agusta, Eurocopter, Sikorsky etc? Unlike Bell, the past few decades they have all dumped all their R&D money into conventional aircraft (as opposed to tiltrotors, as something like 15 yeas ago one of Bell's former CEOs claimed they were no longer and helicopter company and were instead a "tiltrotor company"), and they best things we have seen are basically iterations of 20-30 year old systems as well (including the X2, er I mean XH59C).

SASless

19th Jan 2012, 18:33

Sans,

Check out the sales performance of Bell versus Eurocopter....then tell me about how successful they are.

EC has been cleaning Bell's Clock!

They are not able to sell to the US Army for crying out loud!

SansAnhedral

19th Jan 2012, 19:46

And Frank Robinson is kicking the pants off of Eurocopter.

I dont see the connection.

You claim Bell engineering is lacking, and cite sales number to substantiate the claim. Did it occur to you that Bell may have been focusing their "substandard" technical expertise on tiltrotors and military programs (H-1) for the past 20 years? The army wants Hawks, which stems from decisions made 25 years ago when the procurement strategy went something like "its Sikorsky".

(Though the army does seem to like their Kiowas)

Theres argualby nothing more technically advanced in any current market civil Eurocopter that cannot also be found in a machine from a competing manufacturer. Its about making something profitable for an operator, and how often does that contain anything even remotely leading edge?

jeffg

19th Jan 2012, 20:17

I beat up on Bell whenever it is appropriate....as their engineering department has never been known for its inventiveness. They copied the Bell 47 into many different versions....but the same concept. It works....works fine....but it does have its limitations.
If you take a close look at ECs biggest selling aircraft today, the Astar, it's essentially the same design as the 47 with some updates. Let's not forget that the EC145 is really a BK117C2 with a new cockpit and new fuselage sections. What version of the Blackhawk are we on? What's so 'inventive' about the 53K? Is the S-92 a clean sheet design or just a different version of the H-60?

SASless

19th Jan 2012, 21:36

If you take a close look at ECs biggest selling aircraft today, the Astar, it's essentially the same design as the 47 with some updates.

Bell 47.....AStar...the same?

Please do explain the similarities you think they have in common?

Shall we start with the Rotor Head....blades....for a start.

This I want to hear!

turboshaft

19th Jan 2012, 22:42

And Frank Robinson is kicking the pants off of Eurocopter.

That's like saying Cirrus (264 deliveries worth $148m in 2010) is kicking the pants off of Dassault (95 deliveries worth $3,927m). And even in unit terms Eurocopter out-delivered Robinson in 2010, with the 2011 numbers likely to be similar between the two. Torrance has claimed for years that Robinson is the world's leading producer of helicopters, but Eurocopter and Sikorsky are the big dogs in terms of revenues; Robinson is in a different league.

riff_raff

20th Jan 2012, 21:53

....Torrance has claimed for years that Robinson is the world's leading producer of helicopters, but Eurocopter and Sikorsky are the big dogs in terms of revenues; Robinson is in a different league....Robinson's $200M/yr revenues are definitely much smaller than EC or Sikorsky. But Frank Robinson deserves some special consideration for what he's done. He created Robinson Helicopter from scratch with his own two hands, the company is profitable, and he still owns it lock, stock, and barrel. Besides being a good engineer, he also knows how to run a business. Can't think of anyone else that has done something similar in the modern aviation world.

As another famous Frank once crooned,
"Yes, there were times
I'm sure you knew
When I bit off more than I could chew
But through it all, when there was doubt
I ate it up and spit it out
I faced it all and I stood tall and did it my way" :cool:

TukTuk BoomBoom

21st Jan 2012, 06:09

Poor ol Sasless is getting beat up now, first he goofs on LTE being a Bell specific problem then he blows on about Bells specifc lack of inventiveness
Yeah compared to Eurocopters Alouette 2,3,Astar,EC130 line that are so similar ( Eurocopter even tells people the cabin on the EC130 is practically the same dimensions as the Alouette 3) and Sikorskys S76A,A+,C,C++,D.
What about Robinsons R22,44,66.
Etc Etc
Aviation design is about minimising the risk (unless youre Burt Rutan). Example..after years of Rolls Royce saying they werent going to design any new engines they produce the RR300.

Lets get back to the point of this thread which is talking about what a magnificent aircraft the V-22 is.
Magnificent..

SASless

21st Jan 2012, 12:36

Tuk....please don't speak for me as you have difficulty enough on your own.

I said the LTE terminology was invented by Bell to explain the shortcomings in their tail rotor performance....and that language was grabbed by the FAA and others and then applied to all single rotor helicopters.

I did say other types do not have the problems that Bell does in the 204/205/206 series of helicopters re tail rotor performance.

So...back under the bridge with you.

From a post made by Brian Abraham here in Rotorheads a while back that pertains to the discussion of LTE.

The Bold print was my doing....

kflexer - The following is what Nick Lappos has to say on LTE. (Nick was test pilot for Sikorsky and did the work on the 76 - among other things).

The real skinny on LTE is simple and quite easily stated:

All rotors lose thrust when operating in disturbed air, including tail rotors, main rotors and fantails. LTE sets in when there is so little thrust margin that the loss of the maybe 5 or 10% of the thrust is enough to kill you. With a really marginal design, that slight loss of thrust unleashes the massive main rotor torque, and the aircraft bites its pilot big time. I cut my teeth on the old AH-1G snake, with its way too small tail rotor, and had at least my share of 360 turns while trying to get over someplace to cut the throttle.

LTE only affects those helicopters that have too little tail rotor thrust margin. Period. It is really not LTE it is "Not Enough Tail Rotor".

LTE happens when the tail thrust is consumed by several possible upsetting factors, and when the remaining thrust, by marginal design, is simply inadequate. Yes, inadequate. These possible tail thrust reducers are:

1) main wash into the tail rotor, as illustrated in the LTE handouts that we've all seen.
2) using somewhat too much main rotor thrust (collective pitch) at the bottom of an approach, especially in critical tail thrust conditions. I can touch the left pedal stops on any helo by simply raising the collective pitch until main torque washes out all tail margin. One inch more collective and WATCH out! You get LTE, surprise, surprise.
3) terminating an approach with a critical wind condition, where the wind is a few knots more than your helo can stand.

I did a study on "LTE" accidents to support a regulatory change meeting I was attending, and , wow, it was some surprise to find that about 95% of all LTE accidents were restricted to one brand name, and all LTE accidents were experienced by helicopters with very little cross wind capability.

The cure for LTE is quite simple - get a helicopter with a bigger tail rotor, as proven by the certified crosswind capability. Don't get in one that has an LTE history, and don't buy the bull that LTE is a pilot error problem. Don't buy into the new certification rules that allow you to operate with a helo that has no crosswind capability. If you do, get a good helmet, and a good insurance agent.

BTW, the LTE study that I did was opposed by an engineering manager from that particular manufacturer because "LTE is a pilot error problem, plain and simple" I asked how so many bad pilots were flying his helos, and expressed our luck that so few of these dumbos were flying all the other brands.

In the fantail, sometimes I can feel the main rotor wash flow into the tail, the pedal moves a few percent the noise increases, and that is that.

The big tail surfaces on the fenestrons and fantails are because the fan doesn't respond to small yaws, so the aircraft will snake a bit, unless the vertical tail is big enouigh to keep the nose ahead of the tail. On regular tail rotors, the tail rotor responds strongly to change thrust when some sideslip develops, and the yaw stability to small disturbances is strong. In fact the tail rotor area is as powerful as a vertical fin that is about 4 to 8 times bigger than the tail rotor.

This is one of the reasons why the Fantail is able to snap turn, because the fan doesn't care where the wind is from, it keeps its thrust and bending closer to normal. Under big sideslips, a tail rotor is positively screaming from the big stresses it develops. With the same maneuvers, the Fantail is calm as can be.

A quote from the FAA's AC on LTE.....one can form one's own opinion of just what the truth of the matter is....whether the FAA is covering its own Ass by what they say in the AC or what a very experienced Test Pilot and Research Manager has to say.

I put my money on the Accident Statistics, Research, and expertise of Mr. Lappos and definitely not on Bell and the FAA. BELL and the FAA are entitled to their opinions but not their own "facts"....as we all know true "Facts" are obstinate things.

You will notice the FAA mentions mechanical malfunction but ignores design failure when describing the cause of LTE as they stake their position on their standards being adequate. How do they now admit they are not after all these Bell 206's have been built?

LTE is a critical; low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic which can result in an
uncommanded rapid yaw rate which does not subside of its own accord and, if not corrected, can result in the lossof aircraft control.

6. LTE is not related to a maintenance malfunction and may occur in varying degrees in a single main rotor helicopters at airspeeds less than 30 knots. L T E is not necessarily the result of a control margin deficiency. The anti-torque control margin estab- lished during Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) testing is accurate and has been determined to adequately provide for the approved sideward/rearward flight velocities plus counteraction of gusts of reasonable magnitudes.This testing is predicated on the assumption that the pilot is knowledgeable of the critical wind azimuth for the helicopter operated and maintains control of the helicopter by not allowing excessive yaw rates to develop.

Jack Carson

21st Jan 2012, 13:35

Much of the concern over LTE comes from an early design flaw built into Bell 204 and 205 tail rotors and later carried over to the AH-1G Cobras. These early Bell tail rotors were situated on the left side of the tail boom and turned in an anti clockwise direction. This combination resulted in the tail rotor blade traveling down through the main rotor flow rather than up through it. Certain low speed and cross winds situations dramatically degraded tail rotor performance resulting situations identified as LTE. Bell rectified this by retaining the same tail rotor but relocating it on the right side of the tail boom. In this configuration the tail rotor blades travel up through the main rotor flow and were less susceptible to LTE.

There have been many instances where modern helicopters have experienced some form of LTE. The Blackhawk rolling down the hill and Erickson Aircrane rotating out of control during a water pickup are two recognizable examples. In these examples main rotor torque required exceeded tail rotor anti torque available. The tail rotors were operating as designed but in excess of there capabilities resulting in a loss of directional control.

SASless

21st Jan 2012, 17:33

Is LTE caused by a mechanical defect?

No.

LTE is caused by an aerodynamic interaction between the main rotor and tail rotor. Some helicopter types (Jetranger) are more likely to encounter LTE due to the insufficient thrust produced by having a tail rotor which meets certification standards, but which is not always able to produce the thrust demanded by the pilot.

Quote taken from a UK Safety organization report on LTE.

TukTuk BoomBoom

21st Jan 2012, 18:15

I see theres been another CH-53 accident in Afghanistan, reported as a D model which seems surprising as theyd be long in the tooth now. Also mentioned the Hawaii based unit will be transitioning to the V22.
The article talks about a possible technical fault but who knows with newspapers these days.
Either way a new V-22 has to be alot safer than an old CH-53D.

ospreydriver

22nd Jan 2012, 21:01

It was a D model. There are still two Hawaii 53D squadrons. They're both in line to be replaced by the V-22.

21stCen

12th Feb 2012, 11:47

Exclusive: Pentagon budget eyes $178.8 bln for R&D, procurement

By Andrea Shalal-Esa (http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=andrea.shalal.esa&)
WASHINGTON | Sat Feb 11, 2012 3:33pm EST

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon's $525 billion budget plan for fiscal 2013 calls for spending of $178.8 billion to develop and buy new warships, fighter jets and other major weapons, a 7.5 percent drop from the level initially projected for the coming year, according to a detailed budget document obtained by Reuters.
The total acquisition spending amount is about 12.2 percent down from the level the Pentagon requested in last year's budget, the document shows.
The fiscal 2013 plan foresees spending of $109.1 billion for procurement and $69.7 billion for research and development, compared with earlier projections of $117.6 billion for procurement and $75.7 billion for R&D.
The document shows that the U.S. military is maintaining high levels of spending on most aircraft and ships as it shifts its focus to the Asia Pacific region, a new military strategy announced last month by President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.
At the same time, funding for ground vehicle programs will be far lower as the U.S. military reduces the size of the Army and Marine Corps after 10 years of war in Afghanistan (http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan) and Iraq.
Panetta last month gave highlights of the 2013 budget, his first as defense secretary and the first that takes into account a deficit-reducing measure passed by Congress that requires cuts of $487 billion from projected spending over the next decade.
It is also the first Pentagon budget since the September 11, 2001, attacks that requests less funding than the year before.
Weapons makers like Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co, Northrop Grumman Corp, General Dynamics Corp, Huntington Ingalls Corp and Raytheon Co have been anxiously awaiting details about their programs.
The Pentagon is due to formally release the details on Monday when Obama sends his 2013 budget request to Congress, which must approve the spending plan.
AIRCRAFT FUNDING DOWN
The plan for the 2013 fiscal year, which begins on October 1, requests $9.17 billion for the Pentagon's biggest weapons program, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, down slightly from $9.25 billion requested in fiscal 2012.
That includes $2.7 billion for ongoing development of the radar-evading supersonic jet, and $6.15 billion to pay for 29 jets, down from $6.33 billion for 31 jets in 2012.
Panetta announced last month that the Pentagon would slow the ramp-up in production of the new fighter to allow more time for testing and avert costly retrofits.
Overall spending on aircraft programs will drop 12 percent to $47.6 billion in fiscal 2013 from $54.2 billion in the fiscal 2012 budget request, mainly due to a 41 percent drop in funding for the Lockheed-built C-130J transport plane, and a 32 percent cut in funding for the V-22 Osprey.
The Pentagon proposed spending $835 million on seven more C-130J airlifters in fiscal 2013, down from $1.43 billion for 12 planes in fiscal 2012.
Funding for the V-22, a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Boeing and Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc, would drop to $1.91 billion for 21 aircraft, from $2.8 billion for 35 planes in fiscal 2012.
The plan foresees spending of $1.25 billion for six high-altitude unmanned Global Hawk spy planes built by Northrop Grumman - three for NATO and three for the Navy. Panetta announced last month that the Pentagon was cancelling work on the Air Force's Block 30 variant.
The plan would increase funding for the AH-64 Apache helicopter built by Boeing by 55 percent, funding 40 remanufactured helicopters and 10 new aircraft. Northrop Grumman
and Lockheed also have a big role in the program.
Funding for the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter built by Sikorsky Aircraft, a unit of United Technologies Corp, would continue a five-year procurement agreement with $1.3 billion for 59 of the twin-engine helicopters.
GROUND VEHICLE BUDGET DROPS 32 PERCENT
The Pentagon's spending plan includes $10.9 billion for ground vehicles, 32 percent less than the $16 billion requested in fiscal 2012. The new request includes $117 million for continued development of a new light tactical vehicle for the Army and Marine Corps and a heavier new Ground Combat Vehicle.
Funding for the Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles built by Oshkosh Corp would drop to $58.1 million for 1,534 vehicles from $650 million for 9,336 vehicles funded in fiscal 2012.
Missile defense spending would remain fairly stable at $9.7 billion under the fiscal 2013 request, maintaining work on several air and missile defense capabilities such as the Patriot PAC-3 missile built by Lockheed.
It would fund the MEADS joint program with Italy and Germany (http://www.reuters.com/places/germany) at $400.9 million, completing development testing.
Shipbuilding programs would get $22.6 billion in the fiscal 2013 request, down from $24 billion in the fiscal 2012 request. That will fund 2 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines, 2 DDG-51 destroyers, 4 Littoral Combat Ships and the first year of construction of a second new aircraft carrier.
Space programs would get $8 billion, a drop of 22 percent from the $10 billion requested in fiscal 2012, due to fewer satellites and launches, and the cancellation of Northrop's Defense Weather Satellite System.

Exclusive: Pentagon budget eyes $178.8 bln for R&D, procurement | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/us-usa-budget-pentagon-idUSTRE81A0IF20120211)

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 11:57

Venanzi said autorotation tests have been conducted at altitude, and that “it doesn’t take much altitude” to achieve a power-off full flair to a sink rate of zero fpm.

Agusta Test Piot Veranzi talking of flight tests on the Civil Tiltrotor.

What about the Osprey.....isn't 1,600 feet the number given for the ability to achieve forward airspeed for a fixed wing type emergency landing and no ability to "auto-rotate"?

Certification requirements?

Safety standard criteria difference?

Design difference?

ospreydriver

12th Feb 2012, 15:54

Don't know who is giving out 1600' as a key altitude for a fixed wing emergency landing.

The V-22 does have the ability to autorotate.

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 17:19

Section 2.5 starting on page 27 discusses "Autorotation" in detail, the procedures, probability, shortcomings, and training. It is an older document (circa 2001) but I would assume it is still valid as to describing the situation....and that suggested improvements in training, simulators, and NATOPs procedures have been made.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/v22-report.pdf

I may be getting old and worry about my mortality more than I used to do...but even at spending 30% of my flight time in a phase of flight where the lack of a viable auto rotational capability might prove deadly....it would give one pause for thought.

If it isn't 1600 feet....what does the H/V diagram look like?

Jack Carson

12th Feb 2012, 18:42

I have no doubt that the V-22 has the ability to establish an autorotative descent. The report provided by SASless clearly states that, “that the probability of a successful autorotational landing from a stable autorotative descent is very low.” As a result the manufacturer implies that the recommend method of landing with both engines inoperative would be an airplane type glide to a touchdown to a hard surface. SASless, it sounds as it 30% is the best one might see. From my perspective nearly 100% of the time a viable autorotation is not a choice. An airplane mode glide to a touchdown gets my vote as the procedure of choice, if for no other reason than that it will provide a little additional time to sort out the situation while inroute to the mishap site.

SASless

12th Feb 2012, 23:17

If I had the time and interest I would go back through the thread and find the information John Dixson posted that detailed the Emergency Procedures and a discussion of the H/V diagram which showed a fair old height being required for the transition from Hover Mode into a No-Engines Operating Airplane Glide. It was startling to see how high one needed to be in order to achieve a proper Glide Speed and descent rate.

As the Marines say...it is not a helicopter....it is a tilt rotor and thus cannot be expected to autorotate like a helicopter.:E

Also...the odds of having a dual engine failure is quite remote....but possible as we all know about "Sod's Law".:{

The trick will be operating in the Hover Mode at heights lower than required to make that transition....where one cannot autorotate or go gliding....not that will ever happen mind you!:oh:

The difficulty of a transition from Hover Mode to an authoritative descent and landing must rather sporty as it is only done in the Simulator....and unless I misunderstand....it was not done in much detail during testing.

The other quote I found interesting is the Civil version has a different system for controlling the prop rotors angles and uses "Detents". I wonder why the difference and which system is the better? Could it be the Military froze the design in order to get into production and decided not to use the "Detent" method as Agusta has for the 609.

Lonewolf_50

13th Feb 2012, 14:13

Ospreydriver: curious.
Do you guys do practice autos in the Sims?

That Rate of Descent I saw in a NATOPS manual (not sure how current it is) looked pretty sporting!

Looks like a tough maneuver from the description.

FH1100 Pilot

13th Feb 2012, 15:00

Venanzi said autorotation tests have been conducted at altitude, and that “it doesn’t take much altitude” to achieve a power-off full flair (sic) to a sink rate of zero fpm.

SAS (and everyone else), what Pietro Venanzi was obviously talking about there was the ability of the 609 to flare (correct spelling) to zero sink rate while already established in an auto. He's clearly trying to appease the critics who say the tilt-rotor cannot autorotate to a safe landing.

Presumably, a run-on landing in helicopter mode would be less risky than a forced-landing in King Air mode. Either way, the landing is going to be breathtaking! With regard to the former, imagine timing that flare? Hoo! But even King Air pilots don't practice dual engine failure landings in real life - probably not even in the sim. Then again, King Airs aren't often asked to hover.

However, one has to chuckle a little at Venanzi's clever use of that vague, "doesn't take much" phrase. Sooooo...how much is "not much?" And how much more "not much" would it take for the heavier V-22 to flare to zero fpm in an auto? Ah, semantics, gotta love them.

When it comes to engine failures, we know that the transition from hover-to-stabilized-auto or hover-to-airplane-mode is going to take up quite a bit of altitude. But let's dismiss the idea of having a dual engine failure while hovering and then transitioning to airplane mode. When would that ever happen? When would a V-22 be hovering high enough to even consider such a procedure?

On the other hand, if both of an Osprey's engines quit when it's cruising along up high, it becomes a bank safe with little stubby wings. Look for something soft to land on (hopefully near a hospital), not Interstate-10.

If you have a dual engine failure at the end of a flight when you're on approach and transitioned back to helicopter mode, you're pretty much screwed; we understand this. But you would have to be having a REALLY bad day. (Hopefully nobody would experience a dual engine failure on take-off.)

It's a compromise aircraft. Those who fly it (and fly in it) accept those compromises that come with the increased capability. They look at the instances of dual engine failures in existing multi-engine aircraft and they consider the risk of that particular emergency to be low enough to not worry about.

SASless

13th Feb 2012, 16:14

Osprey Driver.....found a reference to the 1600 Feet AGL number.

The proper wording should be "....following sudden dual engine failure or failure of the operating engine in OEI Flight....".

Indeed, the 2005 OT-IIG report itself says in reference to “emergency landing profiles following sudden dual-engine failure” that: “dependent on altitude, the aircraft flight manual directs conversions to airplane mode or autorotation.”167 Yet this report’s own executive summary states: “Emergency landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not likely to be survivable. ... The V-22 cannot [author emphasis] autorotate to a safe landing.”168 A subsequent comment in the summary states: “Additional flight tests should be conducted to provide validated procedures for dual-engine failure.”169 Any volunteers? Clearly, safe engine-out landing is a major unresolved issue for the V-22.

SansAnhedral

13th Feb 2012, 17:42

The 1600' remark can actually be attributed to (OT-IIG)

http://pogoarchives.org/m/dp/dp-V22-dote-092005.pdf

Page 35 under dual engine failure

To convert the nacelles from 60 to 0 degrees requires about 8 seconds and the aircraft must be above ground level by 1600' in order to complete the conversion prior to impact

I'm not sure how the 8 second/1600' statistic relationship is derived (a standard decent rate?), and I am even less sure how this conversion time yields a "not likely to be survivable" conclusion.

Emergency landing after the sudden failure of both engines in the Conversion/Vertical Take-Off and Landing modes below 1,600 feet altitude are not likely to be survivable

It seems to me that should read, "Full conversion from 60 to 0 degrees of nacelle tilt cannot be achieved in under 8 seconds of 1600' of decent time @ XXX fps"

SAS, where is your quoted text from?

SASless

13th Feb 2012, 18:17

Page 298.....Operational Suitability

Original quote came from the Gailliard article....

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2005/pdf/annex/2005v-22xs.pdf

http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/gailliard%20on%20v-22.pdf

Mr. Gaillard seems a bit unimpressed with the Osprey....and reading his paper does raise some interesting questions. One example that I just read....

the countermeasures dispensing system was found to have insufficient capacity for longer missions, and radar reflection from the V-22’s total propeller disc area of more than 2,267 square feet rivals that of two Boeing 707s in formation.146 (Given that situation, one can only wonder at the logic behind the development of top-secret “stealth paint” for the fuselage at a cost of $7,500 per gallon; the one aircraft they painted required 10 gallons for a paint job costing $75,000—but those huge, whirling discs were still there, bouncing back radar signals with gusto.)

SansAnhedral

13th Feb 2012, 22:30

Sure enough, its there, i missed it in scanned version I linked to.

My question as to how that conclusion was arrived at remains.

Mr. Gaillard seems a bit unimpressed with the Osprey

You dont say?

ospreydriver

14th Feb 2012, 03:56

God bless...I can't believe I'm in this discussion again.

To clean up some smaller issues...

"Detents." I'm not an expert on the 609, but to my knowledge, it doesn't have 0-97 degrees of nacelle settings selectable by the pilot, but only some key settings representative of certain flight regimes or speeds. This isn't a flaw in either design. Long story short, the military design allows for more flexibility on the part of the pilot. Some scenarios call for use of nacelles, e.g. big changes in airspeed. Some require nose attitude, e.g. small adjustments. The military environment is tactical, and thus more dynamic than the civil one. The civil "detent" concept is probably easier to fly, but takes some control away from the pilot. The Osprey can set 0, or 60, or 90 degrees or whatever, but allows intermediate settings as the situation requires.

The Osprey doesn't auto as well as a helo. It autos well enough. It is practiced in the sim. That's no secret.

It glides decently as an APLN, and that's the preferred regime.

In a line squadron, it spends the vast majority of its time in APLN.

As others have said, it's a compromise between a helo and an airplane. It takes strengths and weaknesses from both.

The Marine Corps and Air Force have both decided that in the final analysis, those tradeoffs make sense. I concur. There will always be the corner cases where it isn't better, but in the vast majority of flight regimes, it is more survivable than other platforms. As a 46 turned 22 guy, I'll tell you that there are a lot fewer "land immediately" EPs in a V-22 than a 46.

SansAnhedral

14th Feb 2012, 14:44

These are identical sentiments to every single Marine I have ever spoken with who has been involved with Osprey operations...pilots, chiefs, commanders etc.

Cue up the critics conversation shift in this thread back to costs and OTH mission viability. Round and round we go, no doubt...

Lonewolf_50

14th Feb 2012, 14:51

Ospreydriver: thanks for you insights. :ok:

SASless

14th Feb 2012, 15:09

Of course the Marines do not want to discuss the Over The Horizion (OTH) issue as it cannot be defended with any reasonable basis. The concept sounds good...and if achieved would promise good results in budget battles against the other Forces within DOD.

In shrinking budgets of course Costs are important issues....again the Marines want to avoid the spotlight getting shined on the Osprey Program as it is a huge chunk of their budget.

Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was.

When you pull out the stops to get your Program and keep your Program...and let yourself get carried away in that process....don't be surprised when a critical review finds fault with the advertising claims.

Now...with that being said....let's hear a Marine Corps summary of the OTH Strategy as it stands now...right now....and where has it been a success and where has it failed to meet expectations. What is the true capability of the USMC/USN re OTH. How many Billions have been spent...and what operational capability have they purchased? Did we (the US Taxpayer) get our money's worth?

I plainly think NOT! Did we get something...sure....but what and at what cost?

Osprey Driver and others that think highly of the Osprey are quite welcome to do so and have a basis upon which to make that evaluation. Likewise, as Professional Marines and probably readers of "Proceedings", "The Marine Gazette" and other DOD related professional outlets...they can form an opinion about OTH and its current status.

Perhaps some googling and quoting from those sources might lay out other informed evaluations.

No matter how one wishes to try....divorcing the Osprey Program from OTH is not reasonable as OTH was the driving motivation for the Osprey. In actuality, even if OTH is finally acknowledged to be a complete failure....the Marines will find valuable uses for the Osprey just not the one it was designed for and sold as being critical in need.

This article discusses the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) which was one of the three legs of the OTH Stool...the other two being the Osprey and the LCAC. If you take the time to read the article...compare the thrust of the argument to that of the Osprey program. Consider the EFV program was cancelled by DOD recently as it was a total failure....leaving OTH without a self deployable armored amphibious infantry fighting vehicle. The author politely evades the OTH discussion by stating it is beyond the scope of the article despite the impact success or failure of the AFV Program has on OTH.

Just as in the EFV Program....does not success or failure of the Osprey program not have a similar effect upon OTH?

The EFV | Marine Corps Gazette (http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/efv)

OD,

Having instructed in Simulators at two different helicopter manufactures....I am curious about the techniques used by the USMC in their Sim Training. What scenarios are used to do the Autorotations? It is well briefed, well planned, and done as a stand alone maneuver....or do you mix it up so at times the need to autorotate presents itself as an unannounced emergency situation. Do you introduce the evolution as being a second engine failure after some OEI flight?

What percentage of authoritative landings in the Sim are successful...no damage to the aircraft or occupants? Does that success rate improve with practice?

Lonewolf_50

14th Feb 2012, 20:32

SAS, having done some sim instructing my self, in the SH-2 and the SH-60, I cannot go back and give you all of the debriefing sheets from all of the events I ran,
but
I do recall more than a few "surprise" dual engine failures, or TRLOS (simulated in the 60 sim by losing the whole tail section aft of the IGB) that now and again got the "red screen of death" to appear in unannounced autorotation, and partial autorotation, scenarios. A surprise need to auto is a game of "behind the aircraft, how fast can you catch up" if there ever was one.

Newer sims are often more "like" the aircraft, but of course there are always "simisms" that you have to account for.

"Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was."

Respectfully, no, you are making an incorrect assessment there.
V-22 was not intended to undertake the heavy lift mission.
I cannot understand where you get the idea that it was sold to meet heavy lift mission requirements.

CH-53E (CH-53K in a few years), are the Heavy Lifters, all juggling and shell games in re the CH-53D considered. :p

EDIT: A few years back, I had to become passing familiar with "operational maneuver from the sea" as a doctrinal template. The phasing of bringing assets ashore to the fight needed heavy lift for certain critical tasks and medium lift for most other tasks. Phrogs, at the time, were the medium lift workhorse. What V-22 does for medium lift is pretty good.

I don't know if that buzzword has any currency, since the past ten years have seen more of other sorts of operations, but the basics probably still apply, and are related to your "OTH" template.

SASless

14th Feb 2012, 22:33

I have never said it was to replace "heavy lift" aircraft or do the heavy lift mission. I have said repeatedly that it was billed as the replacement for the 46 and 53D citing official USMC statements that confirmed that. You are quite mistaken when you suggest I ever said otherwise.

The heavy transport task for OTH was to be done by the LCAC and CH-53E/K. The LCAC is seen as being too vulnerable to make beach assaults which is why the EFV and Osprey were seen as the "Assault Vehicles".

As the Osprey can carry only the Growler Vehicle and French Mortar system (Two Growlers each pulling a trailer or mortar) internally and only an unarmored Humvee externally...it certainly cannot meet the heavy lift tasking and was never supposed to do so.

A for instance....it was once going to be a minesweeper....but very quickly that tasking was dropped.

I have read as much as I can about the Osprey's difficult birthing....and if one reads widely it becomes patently obvious the Marines and other Osprey proponents way over hyped the machine and its abilities. They have had to walk back many of their statements.

They were so involved in defending the Osprey at one point intentional false reporting of progress and reliability came to light and resulted in serious repercussions for those found to be culpable.

Rather than continuing to argue about history....lets focus upon current events.

The Navy/Marine Corps are spending Billions of Taxpayer Dollars on OTH based equipment needs....one program was terminated after even its supporters admitted it was a total failure. Now we are left with a growing fleet of aircraft at great cost, a growing number of OTH Amphib ships that are being modified to new standards to accommodate those aircraft, while at the same time removing the multi-role capability they were initially designed to have. The USMC have fabricated at great expense and compromise of safety standards....a specialized vehicle that will fit inside the Osprey, and yet we still have no OTH capability to effectively accomplish that mission as called for by the Marine Senior Leadership.

Pardon me if I sound like I am unimpressed by the situation! All those Billions could have and should have been spent obtaining improved combat capability for the Marine Corps and not plain ol' squandered chasing a pipe dream.

The Marines are used to being at the bottom of the spending barrel....and from what I have seen in the EFV and Osprey programs they certainly suffer from not having the experience of spending money in the past as they sure have pissed away a huge chunk of money for no significant gain in their ability to field unified units of any size all the while chasing the elusive OTH Strategy imposed upon them by the Navy's decision to insist upon keeping Ships further at sea than in the past during Amphibious Assaults.

We have to remember all this spending was to provide the Marines with the ability to do large scale amphibious assaults.....and it has been an utter failure.

http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/MCBQ%20PAO%20Press%20Releases/090430%20CDI%20Docs/CDI_AmphibOps21stCent.pdf

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 16:06

SGA2012: USMC receives first Block C-configured MV-22 Osprey - News - Shephard (http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/rotorhub/sga2012-usmc-receives-first-block-c-configured-mv-/)

ROTORHUB

SGA2012: USMC receives first Block C-configured MV-22 Osprey

15 February 2012 - 6:41 by Beth Stevenson in Singapore

Bell and Boeing used the Singapore Airshow to announce that the first Block C configurated MV-22 Osprey has been delivered to the USMC complete with a new weather radar, as well as improved EW systems and advances in situational awareness.

The upgraded radar stemmed from the fact that 90% of the aircraft's flight hours are conducted as an aeroplane, and therefore the platform has to fly at high altitudes and in turn requires a radar that is suitable for this.

The remaining V-22s that are to be produced out of the USMC's requirement for 360 platforms will now be built to Block C standards, and officials confirmed that some retrofits on legacy systems will occur.

'The V-22 Block C design upgrade includes a new weather radar system that improves navigation in poor weather conditions, and a redesigned environmental conditioning system to enhance aircrew and troop comfort,' a statement from Bell-Boeing read.

Expanded capacity and effectiveness built into the electronic warfare system-including additional chaff/flare dispensers- increases the Osprey's ability to defeat air-to-air threats.'

'Countries generally don't have a requirement for tilt-rotor because they don't know what it is,' Mike Montgomery, V-22 deputy director of new business at NAVAIR told the briefing.

However, Richard Linhart VP of business development at Bell said of the advantages of the platform: 'We have to break that paradigm. With the V-22 [the operators] are finding new and different ways of operating that they didn't think was possible.'

Bell-Boeing is focusing its efforts on exporting the V-22. However, only the MV-22 variant has been approved, as the CV-22 has special operations enhancements that have not been authorised.

'People want to know about it; it's different,' Linhart explained, saying that although the aircraft was not on display at the airshow, feedback from when it was displayed at Dubai air show last year was very positive.

Tommy Dunehew, VP of Business Development for mobility at Boeing confirmed that five potential customers in Asia-Pacific region are interested in the platform, and he said that it would be a suitable system for this area. The officials also said that Bell-Boeing was still in ongoing discussions with Indian and Israeli forces with regards to acquisition of the Osprey.

The team is also holding out for the US Navy to make a decision on whether or not the V-22 will be chosen for the 50 platform requirement for the Aerial Resupply Logistics of the Sea Base programme, and Linhart said 'we are still hopeful that the navy will come on board.

'We have not been as successful in demonstrating this as we would have liked,' Montgomery concluded with regards to export potential, however officials said that this is something that the team is working on, and said that the platform is of high value, demonstrated by USMC confidence in it.

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 16:11

Think what you want about the Osprey in operations it is fit for....but remember it was sold as being the answer to every mission conceivable which it plainly is not and never was.

I have never said it was to replace "heavy lift" aircraft or do the heavy lift mission. I have said repeatedly that it was billed as the replacement for the 46 and 53D citing official USMC statements that confirmed that. You are quite mistaken when you suggest I ever said otherwise.

Poor word choice perhaps, SAS? I don't think you are justified in being defensive regarding Lonewolf's reply....based upon your precise posting.

SASless

15th Feb 2012, 16:33

Sans.....The statement I have said the Osprey was to replace Heavy Lift aircraft is patently false. I have never said it...go back through the thread here and find exactly one time if you can.

Trying to suggest the quoted statement you posted does that is also false.

Let's begin with the definition of the adjective "conceivable" shall we....and add to your grasp of the English language and grammar.

World English Dictionary
conceivable (kənˈsiːvəb ə l)

— adj
capable of being understood, believed, or imagined; possible3we

Any reasonable astute individual, knowing the lifting ability of the Osprey, would instantly realize it could not be construed to be a "Heavy" lifter. Thus, it would logically rule out any suggestion it could be "conceived" to be capable of such a mission.

Care to try again?

If you want to challenge the points being made....do so. At least be accurate in your use of language please.

If you or others are going to put words in my mouth...at least do so with some resemblance to the truth. Post a quote showing I said that as purported.

SansAnhedral

15th Feb 2012, 18:46

There appears to be a disparity in our mutual grasp of the English language.

"Every conceivable mission", in normal accepted English parlance, would include any mission capable of being conceived. In fact, the phrase is typically intended to convey the idea of being all-encompassing limited by nothing more than human imagination...not, as you describe, being limited to what an astute observer would consider to be rational or possible.

Whether or not the "heavy lift" mission for a V22 is considered a technically viable possibility by you or any astute individual is irrelevant; it is still a "conceivable mission" and hence the reason for both Lonewolf's and my interpretation of your post as being self-contradictory.

21stCen

15th Feb 2012, 18:52

There is one word that comes from the military vernacular that describes the current discussion: Quibbling!!
Sorry Sas

Lonewolf_50

15th Feb 2012, 19:35

SAS, I understand your frustration with the hype. I don't think there's an experienced military aviator who hasn't looked at the difference between the press clippings for a new system, and the acutal performance on the hardware they fly, and some of the shortcomings (I seem to remember a few: F-18 tail cracks, F-14 engine stalls in high performance maneuvers? T-45 that initially could not meet shipboard requirements due to spool up and nose wheel and ... and ... and ... SH-60 blade de-ice, early years, and a whole lot more).
We all ruefully acknowledge that what we fly is built under "minimum bid" and get on with it.

The B-2, of which there are lest than three dozen, costs over a billion per copy. (nucking futs, sez I.) It was the perfect aircraft for 1983. Didn't IOC till almost a decade later, yes? Should we have scrapped that?

The Bone had troubles with turkey buzzards. It's still flying, and does good work. Should it have never been?

The F-18A had some trouble with fuel legs in a fighter grid when it first came out. Did we scrap that aircarft? Should the Hornet have been scrapped, and an all F-14/A-6 Airwing been made, per Lehman's inane vision?

So the V-22 is expensive.

We agree that the cost is a salient shortcoming, but that cost growth happened over a period of years, the program was stalled or cancelled what, four different times?

But it's operational, and it works.

It seems to me that you are voicing a complaint that doesn't fit the year we are talking in. Every opportunity to scrap that program, as Comanche was scrapped, was presented, and yet it survived. (Remember, C-46 line re-opening decision, negative, happened early to mid 90's. There was never gonna be a new Phrog).

The operator who has posted here likes the bird, and he's an old Phrog pilot.

Maybe, SAS, your frustration is that none of us can go back in time and undo a variety of mistakes or errors. We can't.

As to other vehicles that the Marines need for the mission, I learned one thing a while back: you never get all the equipment you wish you had.

Cheers.

SASless

15th Feb 2012, 23:18

Eisenhower warned us....history is proving him right.

The now cancelled EFV....an armored amphibious tractor that was to scoot across the water at 25MPH....at a unit cost of just over 22 Million USD ...and a program cost of 10, 000 Million USD....encountered some "burps" according to a Marine Officer involved in the program.

Some expensive burping!

What could the Marines have bought they really needed with that wasted money?

The replacement cost of an M-1 Abrams Tank is billed as being 4.3 Million USD as a comparison.

Current issue AAV's the EFV was to replace cost 2.3-2.5 Million USD. Roughly one tenth of the EFV price.

The USS America, the new LHA(R) that has been modified to support the V-22 (the size of the 22 was the reason for the change) at a cost of 2,300 Million USD does not even have a well deck anymore as it's predecessor did.

Again...more expense...less capability....does this seem a pattern here?

Tcabot113

16th Feb 2012, 00:16

SAS,

America may not need a well deck because the Osprey range and speed does not require the initial assault to be fought at waters edge.

As to ability to conduct missions, the V-22 can stol at 60000 lbs+, while the $200+ million Canadian S-92 is not allowed to fly over water.

TC

ospreydriver

16th Feb 2012, 03:05

To back up a bit. Autos are practiced in the sim. They're initially practiced as a set piece in initial fams, i.e. "here it comes." Later, a sim instructor will whip them out as part of a scenario. At least initially, most students will "crash." By the end, they're typically doing okay.

I personally think that the new LHAs should have well decks. Not because of anything regarding the Osprey, but mostly because we don't always get to fight on sunny days. I'm willing to takeoff near 0/0, but landing is another story. Plus, for serious movements, eventually you'll need trucks and such that even 53s can't carry.

That said, I don't think the EFV cancellation negates all of the OTH concept. Many contingencies that the USMC trains for are conducted purely by air, and the Osprey extends the battlespace way farther than it was before. We've been off the coast of NC and were doing hits in FL. I use that exercise example (which is real, BTW) to illustrate the concept. We've done similar long-range ops in V-22s in real contingencies already.

Again, why are we arguing? Is anything going to change? No? Then stop. We have this capability now. Lets put our heads together and figure out how to use the pluses, minimize the minuses, and kill some GD jihadis.

SASless

16th Feb 2012, 12:05

Now I am in full agreement with Osprey Driver....but wish the Pentagon Crew would have arrived at that position without wasting so much money and had used that money buying equipment that could be used to good benefit today.

Having the Well Deck and that basic capability (they are called Amphibious Assault Ships) would make the LHA(R) a true multi-purpose vessel rather than a cheap CV without Catapults or angled deck.

As the Marines have a tradition and history of doing more with less....and in the expectation of massive budget cuts for all of DOD....the loss of capability in the America Class Aviation support ships might come back to haunt the Navy/USMC. I hope not.

The 21st Century article I linked discusses the Marine's view of Amphibious Assault and supports what OD said.

ospreydriver

17th Feb 2012, 03:13

I'm a slightly conspiracy-minded person...when it comes to budgets, anyway. I think the lack of a well deck is there simply to drive the requirement for LPDs that have a well deck. "We've got to complete the San Antonio class--how else can we get all this other gear ashore?"

Split-ARG ops are an essential part of MEU missions, IMO. No well deck on the big deck means this is a huge degrader for the ARG to maintain presence for extended duration. The Kearsarge ARG in '98 provided port/starboard TRAP and humanitarian assistance coverage for the Kosovo bombing campaign, as an example. Can't do that unless both halves of the ARG have both air and surface capability.

jeffg

24th Feb 2012, 19:55

US Marine Corps retires CH-53D

24 February 2012 - 13:24 by Tony Osborne (http://www.shephardmedia.com/author/tony-osborne/) in London

The US Marine Corps has retired the CH-53D Sea Stallion after 40 years of service in a 'sunset ceremony' held on 10 February at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
The aircraft continue to operate with the HMH-363 squadron currently supporting marines working in Helmand Province as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. When the unit returns, one of the helicopters will be flown from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay to its final destination at the Pacific Aviation Museum, where it will be displayed.
Some 124 CH-53Ds were built in total. The aircraft have operated with the USMC in a range of conflicts from Vietnam and Iraq and finally in Afghanistan. However the hot and high climate in Helmand has tested the type to its limits, restricting summer operations to the cool of night, with the MV-22 Osprey and the three-engined CH-53E Super Stallion taking the bulk of operations.
'Now that the Sea Stallion has retired, the Marine Corps has begun the transition to CH-53E Super Stallions, which will soon be joined by the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and H-1 Huey and Cobra helicopters in Hawaii,' said Col Robert Pridgen, programme manager for the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office.
'This transition will ensure our fleet is equipped with an aviation capability that is flexible and ready today to complete missions as assigned.'

21stCen

27th Feb 2012, 09:07

U.S. eyes V-22 aircraft sales to Israel, Canada, UAE
Sun, Feb 26 2012
By Andrea Shalal-Esa (http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=uk&n=andrea.shalal.esa&)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Florida (Reuters) - The U.S. government is eyeing Israel, Canada and the United Arab Emirates as possible initial foreign buyers of the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Boeing Co (BA.N: Quote (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/quote?symbol=BA.N), Profile (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=BA.N), Research (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/researchReports?symbol=BA.N)) and Bell Helicopter, a top U.S. Marine Corps official told Reuters.
Lieutenant General Terry Robling, deputy Marine Corps commandant for aviation, said U.S. officials were continuing to drive down the cost of the aircraft and hoped to sell it to allies overseas to keep the production line running past 2018.
U.S. officials plan to show off the aircraft, which flies like an airplane but tilts its rotors to take off and land like helicopter, at the Farnborough Air Show outside London in July. It also made appearances at the Dubai and Singapore air shows in recent months, Robling told Reuters aboard a military aircraft after a Marine Corps event at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.
Bell Helicopter, a unit of Textron Inc (TXT.N: Quote (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/quote?symbol=TXT.N), Profile (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=TXT.N), Research (http://uk.reuters.com/stocks/researchReports?symbol=TXT.N)), and Boeing issued a news release in December after the Dubai air show, saying the aircraft had received "significant interest" from potential customers, but it did not identify them.
Boeing and Bell have been trying to generate foreign interest for years, but potential buyers were holding back to see how the plane did in combat, and because of the relatively high price of buying and operating the plane -- both of which are now coming down.
Washington is increasingly looking to foreign military sales to keep the cost of weapons systems from rising as the Pentagon cuts its own orders to strip $487 billion from its planned defence budgets over the next decade.
Robling said Israel, Canada and the UAE had expressed interest in the aircraft, but had not received formal pricing and technical information for the Osprey.
The Marines will ask lawmakers to approve a five-year procurement plan for 91 aircraft that will run through fiscal 2017 -- 24 less than initially planned for the period.
But the service still plans to buy those aircraft and has not changed its overall requirement, Robling said, although he acknowledged that postponing production resulted in more uncertainty given the current difficult budget environment.
Marine Corps Commandant James Amos this month told U.S. lawmakers that the Osprey, which can cruise at 290 miles an hour -- twice the rate of military helicopters -- has performed "exceedingly well" since being put into operation. He said it gives U.S. and coalition forces a "manoeuvre advantage and operational reach unmatched by any other tactical aircraft."
OSPREY HAS FLOWN MORE THAN 130,000 HOURS
The plane got off to a rocky start, with 30 Marines killed during its development, but it has amassed more than 130,000 flight hours since being fielded by the U.S. military in 2007.
More than 160 V-22s are now flown by 10 Marine Corps and two U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command squadrons.
Amos told lawmakers the MV-22B has made multiple combat deployments to Iraq, four deployments at sea, and it is currently on its fifth deployment to Afghanistan.
The Pentagon's chief weapons tester Michael Gilmore in December recommended that the Navy, which oversees Marines Corps acquisition, continue development and testing to improve the aircraft's overall reliability.
Gilmore said the plane generally met reliability and maintainability requirements, but its average mission capable rate was 53 percent from June 2007 to May 2010, well below the required rate of 82 percent.
Robling said the plane's operating cost was declining from rates as high as $12,000 per flight hour to an all-time low of $8,300 achieved last month. He attributed the decline to a variety of factors, including more reliable parts and different flying protocols that cut down on maintenance needs.
Robling said the current average cost-per-flight hour for the V-22, including fuel, parts and labour, was around $10,000, but he was pressing maintainers to drive that number down.
"We've shown ... that we can get it down lower. So we just continue to work on it," he said. "At some point we'll sustain probably somewhere around $8,500 at today's cost."
He said Boeing and Bell Helicopter had also been working to reduce the cost of producing the planes. The companies recently submitted a letter with a "not-to-exceed" price for the new multiyear agreement, which achieves the 10-percent cost savings required for congressional approval, Robling said.
Now, the government will start tough negotiations with the contractors to iron the details, Robling said, adding the process could take six to eight months.
Boeing has said it expects to sign the new multiyear agreement by the end of 2012.
He said the Marines could have saved $6 million to $8 million more per airplane if they had been able to keep the 24 aircraft in the five-year plan, but the Pentagon needed the savings to achieve its cost-cutting goals for fiscal 2013.

U.S. eyes V-22 aircraft sales to Israel, Canada, UAE | Reuters (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/26/uk-bell-boeing-v22-international-idUKTRE81P0M820120226?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-GoogleNewsUK)