US Airways incident LGW 6/11

[PaperTiger]

This been mentioned before ?
(A search on 'US Airways' returned thousands of threads !)

NTSB Identification: DCA06WA006
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of USAirways, Inc
Incident occurred Sunday, November 06, 2005 in London, United Kingdom
Aircraft: Boeing 767-200, registration: N653US
Injuries: Unavailable
On November 6, 2005, at 0745 local British time, the flight crew of a USAirways Boeing 767-200, registered in the United States as N653US,, failed to lower the landing gear until notified by the air traffic control tower to go around. The tower controller then observed the gear extend and amended his instructions to allow the aircraft to land. This is being investigated by the British Air Accidents Investigation branch as a serious incident.

[non sched]

It must have been tough ignoring that annoying gear warning. Somehow, I think there is a lot more to this story.

[Localiser Green]

Something about this incident doesn't really hang together.

If I am not mistaken, the 767 landing configuration warning sounds at 800ft AGL (Radio Alt). That's both Master Warning Lights, the config warning light, aural "TOO LOW GEAR" and EICAS warning "GEAR NOT DOWN" (RED)

This would therefore occur at 2.3 miles on the LGW approach.

I assume most SOPs would require an immediate go-around at this point, but let's say not in this case, even if it then took the crew a short time to figure out what was going on (assuming they decided to continue the approach which it seems they did), the gear would probably be fully down and locked at approximately 500ft (1.4 miles).

Would the tower controller really even be able to see that the gear was not down when the aircraft was on a 2+ mile final? Unless of course he/she was looking with the binocs?

[PaperTiger]

Something about this incident doesn't really hang together.Agreed. If this had been a meeja report I wouldn't have bothered with it, but the NTSB is not normally given to hysteria. Wondered if anybody knew the real story.

Easy for a practised eye (like an ATCO) to determine the gear position from 2 miles. Obviously if it's still up then not what you would classify as a stabilised approach :uhoh:, but then there may have been a good reason for that.

[Farrell]

I know I'm stepping into the lion's den here, but how would an incident like this have actually made it to the NTSB?

I can remember bygone days when an incident like that would have resulted in a go-around and the resultant omission being noticed in the climbout.

Hence the "Farrell probably getting flamed question" but do people not cover each other's asses anymore?

[Localiser Green]

but how would an incident like this have actually made it to the NTSB?
I'm not an expert but will hazard a guess, if the UK AAIB feel that this incident is serious enough to warrant investigation then I imagine they are under obligation to advise the regulator of the state of the operator (the US FAA in this case) that such an investigation is taking place.

[vespasia]

Sorry Farrelly but you asked for it, you got it. We try not to do "ass covering" for these kind of incidents. It's called a safety culture. If something was wrong with this airplane and it landed wheels up everybody would have looked pretty stupid at the enquiry
:mad:

[Farrell]

I stand as ever, humbled by the experience.

Just don't EVER call me Farrelly again ;)

[AirRabbit]

The fact is that sometimes people forget to do things that are thought to be commonplace. Since pilots are people, they’re just as prone to forget things. However, in this case, it would seem to me that the issue just might be blown out of proportion. The controller noticed the gear was not down. S/he issued clearance to go around and then noticed that the gear was being extended. At that time the controller amended his/her clearance and cleared the flight to land. Obviously, the flight was far enough out on final to allow for all this to take place. It is more likely that the crew delayed in extending the gear and final flaps until later in the approach than the tower controller was used to seeing.

As everyone knows, sometimes flight crews delay final configuration although I’ll admit I’ve never been able to figure out why. However, in all instances there is a point which may not be passed unless the airplane is configured for the landing, the airplane is in trim, the engines are spooled up, and the airplane is stabilized on the approach. If the airplane gets to this point and any one of these conditions is not met, the correct response is to go around. We know that in instrument conditions, this point is always the final approach fix. However in visual conditions this point may, and often does, vary from airline to airline – most of which, I think, pick 1000 feet above the ground. However, some choose to allow the descent to 500 feet before all these conditions have to be met.

I don’t know USAirways procedures for being “configured, trimmed, spooled, and stable,” but I would imagine it isn’t much above 1000 feet and certainly not below 500 feet. Be that as it may, I won’t quarrel with the controller. Whenever a controller (or anyone else for that matter) sees something that isn’t right, s/he has a duty to call attention to that fact. That is what this controller did. The crew responded. The controller revised the clearance. It is likely that the story should have ended there. HOWEVER, as I harp on these forums all the time, one never knows ALL of the story until ALL of the FACTS are made known.
_______
AirRabbit

[scanscanscan]

And the recorded fuel remaining was?

[Airbubba]

Maybe it was an old Piedmont crew. Under their procedures the approach had to be stabilized by 80 knots (which was also taxi speed).

US Air uses 500 feet stabilized in VMC, look for that to go up to 1000 feet stabilized after this incident.

[ironbutt57]

HAHAHA airbubba, that's classic, and probably not too far from the truth as well:cool:

[Jonty]

I notice from the report that no distances are mentioned, they could have been five miles out!

The config warning also sounds when you select landing flap and the gear is not down and locked.

So there are three separate warning systems for the gear: Lights (three greens), EGPWS (TOO LOW GEAR) and the config warning on selection of landing flap (a siren so loud it can be heard in the first ten rows!)

Something doesn't quite sound right to me.

As for delaying the config of the aircraft on approach, its done to save fuel, reduce noise and keep up with the speeds given to you by ATC (160kts to 4DME and the like)

[330 Man]

AirBubba,

That was sooo funnyyyy.

Actually if they were old Piedmont guys they were trying to figure out how "no jobs would be lost as a result of this merger" ( Ed Colodny in 1988)

Or maybe they were trying to figure out just what is northern effenciency anyway

Or maybe they were thinking of the Usair motto: "40 years of tradition uninterupted by progress"

Or maybe they were saying to themselves " Usair ruined a damn good airline"

Or maybe they were tired

Or maybe this event has not been fully reported, or reported inaccurately

Hell, maybe it never happened at all, the brits are still pissed off about that tea party in Boston, and this is a way to get even.

Oh and by the way, we did not have to be stable by 80 knots, but the flight attendant had to be in the process of leaving the flightdeck by then and we had to be thinking about starting to stabalize.

Regards,

330 Man

[vascani]

On November 6, 2005, at 0745 local British time, the flight crew of a USAirways Boeing 767-200, registered in the United States as N653US,, failed to lower the landing gear until notified by the air traffic control tower to go around. The tower controller then observed the gear extend and amended his instructions to allow the aircraft to land. This is being investigated by the British Air Accidents Investigation branch as a serious incident.

[AMF]

Well, by some here I'm sure responsiblity for this incident could be ultimately traced back via an exceedingly complicated and excruciatingly convoluted process of namby-pambyspeak to be laid squarely on U.S. Air's management's doorstep...thereby absolving the crew. After all, U.S. Air has been a showcase for how to mis-manage an airline throughout the 90's, and in dire straights even when times were good for the rest. Certainly morale was low in that cockpit, given the recent gutting of pilot pension funds...what more "evidence" do you need?

On the other hand, it could be that the crew simply....um... f'ed up.

[AMF]

To all: I didn't post the above response to this thread, which I have never read before. How it got here I don't know!

My post was made as part of a continuing response on another thread involving a report on BA maintenance which was discussing where responsibility lies within a company when something as basic as replacing removed access panels is forgotten.. "like a pilot forgetting to lower the gear".

This U.S. air incident was mentioned in response to what I had written, and my response was the above post ON THAT THREAD with respect to concepts of accepting responsiblity and being held to a certain standard if we call ourselves professionals...whether an engineer or a pilot. That is far more important to me than the incident itself.

Whoever moved my post.....in the future please either delete it for not being pertinent (or if you just disagree with my opinion which I suspect is the case), or leave it be.

Arbitrarily moving it, and without even saying it was moved, automatically puts it out of context.

[Uncommon Sense]

Maybe I am reading the original post all wrong, but it doesnt state that the gear was not down. It states the TWR ADC observed it not to be down and then later that it was.

Is the implication that the TWR ADC mis-identified the gear position visually - called the go-round, and the crew just carried out the instruction as a matter of course?

The GPWS would have been screaming by 2 nm.

[Localiser Green]

Maybe I am reading the original post all wrong, but it doesnt state that the gear was not down.

No offense, but I think you are reading it wrong. The report actually says:

"the flight crew...... failed to lower the landing gear until notified by the air traffic control tower to go around. The tower controller then observed the gear extend and amended his instructions to allow the aircraft to land

"Failed to lower the landing gear" implies that it was not down. "The tower controller then observed the gear extend" note "extend" not "extended"

It reads to me as though the crew only initiated the extension when (or around the same time) the controller advised them the gear was not down.

If it were the case that the controller simply made a mistake then revised the clearance, and the gear was down the whole time, I see no reason why the AAIB would investigate the matter, let alone consider it "a serious incident".

The AAIB report in due course will no doubt clarify exactly what happened.

[Flightmech]

I once saw one of our MD11's do a go-around with the crosswinds right on the aircraft limit. On the second approach the gear was not extended until very late and the aircraft landed from this approach. I questioned (not interrogated, i was just interested!) the captain at the gate and he said leaving the gear retracted made the aircraft more stable on the approach with the crosswinds as they were, although they had to leave the CAWS "landing gear" aural warning sounding throughout (ie. not cancel it then forget the gear). Not sure if this is a company SOP or something the crew shouldn't be doing.

Anyway, my point is could the 767 crew have been doing a similar procedure?

[PaperTiger]

AMF, since vascani's post repeats verbatim my original of several weeks ago, I assume this thread has now been merged with another from elsewhere. I agree it should say so in the header.

[Avman]

An immediate call by the ATCO for a go around would, to me, seem that it was on a very short final. Had it been 3 miles or more I would have thought that the first call would have been along the lines of, "confirm gear down and locked"? On the other hand I have watched many landings in my old life and many a time I've witnessed relatively "late" deployment of the u/c. I say "late" because that's how it appears when watching a heavy on final. In actual fact a heavy's distance to the threshold can be quite deceptive and I honestly wonder if this was a relatively inexperienced ATCO over reacting. Wasn't a lady by any chance? You know what they're like with distances :E

[vespasia]

Full facts for all interested.
Ac was first visual from VCR at 3nm final ( due cloud/vis )
Gear observed not to be down at 2nm
Ac asked to confirm if three greens showing
Crew replied Yes
Ac told that visually gear was up and told to go around if this was the case
Gear then observed extending and appeared fully down at 150 - 200 feet AGL
Ac reported "gear down and locked" at this stage
Ac then cleared to land

Not a lady ( tho I don\'t see what that\'s got to do with anything ) and not inexperienced. TWR radar shows distances to touchdown as well as the Mk 1 eyeball method. Those above are therefore likely to be accurate +/- half a nm

[4PW's]

Wow!

That doesn't sound like hearsay.

If the data presented above is factual, this is going to be interesting.

[Avman]

The facts, as presented by vespasia, confirms my first sentence. The rest was pure personal observation & speculation (in absence of any facts at that time). The lady bit was a little tongue-in-cheek (hence the little 'evil' smiley). Anyway, thanks vespasia for filling in the details. Very interesting indeed and now we know why the NTSB are involved.