Human Factors

[shiftinio]

I am a Cpl Techie based at a FJ unit somewhere near the home of golf. I am involved in the delivery of the Stations Human Factors training and I am looking for any accounts that illustrate cross cockpit gradient or a lack of situational awareness that I can include in these sessions. I have some examples from the usual publications but I hope that this forum may provide me with some more candid accounts. Each course will contain one or two aircrew but the bulk of the attendees will be from ground trades so I ask that you limit the jargon as much as possible.

Many thanks and Merry Christmas.

[Leo Sayer]

Try calling Army Standards CRM Officer at Middle Wallop 94329 4028. They take CRM issues very seriously and have been quite instrumental in some of the new CRM videos, particularly highlighting the link between aircrew and groundcrew. Will probably have finished for xmas though:ok:

[shiftinio]

Thanks Leo but what I'm after are more conversational accounts. Still, a useful contact.

[Vidal]

This vid was used at a recent Unit Safety Management Officers Course on cross-cockpit gradient:

http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/videos/

Demonstrates quite well that even those who think they're the greatest aren't really after all....

Edited to include - look for the vid entitled "Will It Fit Through The Gap ?"

[CarltonBrowne the FO]

From a civilian flying viewpoint I can give you one example, I think it might transfer across to military flying too.
When a senior crewmember is flying with a very junior one, it can be very intimidating to the junior. On occasion, I have flown with "the boss" and been slightly unnerved by the silence from the other side of the cockpit. With hindsight, this is easily explained by (a) his having plenty of other things to worry about and (b) not wanting to distract me; however, this often comes across as disapproval.
The best example I have experienced of the boss putting me at ease was some years ago: I was flying with the chief pilot for the first time. At the end of the briefing, he said:
"I can guarantee I have made more mistakes in my flying career than you have. I daresay I will make more mistakes than you will today. Please help me correct them whenever I do." He then flew a textbook flight; by spending a few seconds beforehand, he had eliminated the cross-cockpit gradient.
If you reckon this example is not relevant, PM me and I'll remove it to avoid cluttering up your thread.

[Runaway Gun]

CB,

Please leave that excellent reply up there !

Cheers, RG.

[SirToppamHat]

The following links to several videos that are not great in themselves, but the third of which is about a Runway Incursion at Theodore Francis Green State Airport, near Providence, Rhode Island.

Rhode Island Runway Incursion (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2000/incursion/incur_video.htm)

This was recently presented to the Unit Safety Management Officers' (USMO) Course at HQ STC. Unfortunately, the video itself is not that good except in giving an indication of how bad the visibility was at the time.

The way it was presented to us was with an overview of the airport from above, showing where all the ac are at each stage. There was no ground radar to help the air trafficer, and you can really sense the effect of stress as the situation deteriorates around her, and she eventually realises that one of the ac is sitting on a runway that she has just given clearance for another ac to take-off from. It is an excellent example of the impact of humans on a procedural system that was not sufficiently robust to be safe in low-visibility ops.

In essence, one crew misunderstands an instruction/takes a wrong turning, and the controller fails to pick-up the clues given by their ongoing position reports. Disaster is only averted when another crew, given clearance to take-off rejects the clearance because they have worked out that another airliner is on the runway in front of them (even though they can't see it due to the fog!). In my view, equally responsible was the management that allowed the procedures to continue without Ground Radar. IIRC, (and I will happily be corrected) this had been delivered several months earlier but was sitting in boxes waiting for the management to have it installed.

If you PM me, I will get you contact details (after Xmas) for the SO2 who showed it to us - with a bit of luck he will let you have the package as it was presented to us - it is quite scary! It may be worth you getting you SATCO or DSATCO to present it, as they should have been on the USMO Course and may remember it.

STH

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

CarltonBrowne the FO

This is cut and pasted from the Late Great George Brown (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=148367) Tribute Thread from a post by Blakey

The approach into Sibiu was an Eastern Block PAR with "you are 20 metres right and 3 metres above the glidepath. I had no idea whether that was well above or slightly above. So I just used the traditional tad, followed by a smidge to correct in the knowledge that George would pipe up if I was screwing up. When we had shut down I asked him if he had any advice about the approach and was told "The approach was fine but work on your landings. Yours woke me up."

[Neptunus Rex]

POWER DISTANCE DIMINISHED

Many moons ago, a Maritime Patrol crew was preparing for a night training flight, which would include MAD trapping (steep turns at 300 feet over the Oggin.) The Squadron Commander (Wg Cdr) was in the right hand seat with the crew's normal captain (Flt Lt) in the left. The Boss was one of the best pilots and QFI's I have ever flown with but, being the CO he did not get as much stick time as the rest of his pilots. Behind them was the Flight Engineer, a Flight Sergeant. The Wg Cdr turned to the F Sgt and said:

"Tell me, Jack, what's your job then?"

"Well, Sir, I'm your Flight Engineer. I run the fuel Howgozit, monitor the engine performance and the aircraft systems and advise you on any abnormalities."

"Not quite, Jack. Your job tonight is to keep my a*se out of the water!"

[buoy15]

Neptunus

Exactly

So why is the MRA4 having a glass cockpit, with no engineer to monitor them, whilst they are focussed on the Tac situation, trusting the computer will not let them descend into the sea

I will go back a few years when Nimrod pilots were encouraged to be involved with the Doppler Loop and Tactical decisions

We had calls of "How about Barra" - "Tried long cables" and "How about a MAD search"?

Eventually we had to say "Just drive the bus"

The persistant offenders usually got a tea bag sandwich

[Avtur]

As a young Sarge in the second week of my first operational Nimrod Sqn, I had to fly with the father of Sir Peter Harding's lovechild. He was in the left hand seat and my Flt Cdr was Captaining from the right; I was the Eng.

During the 6 hours spent flying low level over the SWAPS, I found myself repeatedly calling "Height" and "bank angle" as the ACM poled us around the oggin at 200 feet (ish). He didn't seem phased by my constant nagging and to my surprise thanked me for looking after him as he got off the aircraft.

That day taught me to ignore the rank or position of the people that I flew with and interject appropriately if the situation dictated, ie do my job as trained... Obviously worked as I'm still here to tell the tail.

[gashman]

wasn't the crash at Teneriffe with the two 747s partly due to no-one wanting to question the chief pilot as he began his take off run in order to stay within his crew duty time?

Personally, I've had issues whilst going through training. Like ultra low flying over the highlands as my instructor/cowboy took control for the most interesting part of the trip to relieve the boredom. On the frontline, I've flown with the staish, squadron bosses etc, and I think that they are aware of the problems and encourage young pilots to exercise their rights as captains. Maybe I've just been lucky with the dudes I've flown with.

[HEDP]

Don't discount the Army contact. The REME had a very good video made that relates to an engineering chain of events causing an accident. There have been a couple of instances of this and a lot of lessons learned by the army. I dont mention this in any derogatory way but think that this may be more what Shiftinio is looking for.
Regards

HEDP