US incident LGW 6/11

[PaperTiger]

This been mentioned before ?
(A search on 'US Airways' returned thousands of threads !)

NTSB Identification: DCA06WA006
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of USAirways, Inc
Incident occurred Sunday, November 06, 2005 in London, United Kingdom
Aircraft: Boeing 767-200, registration: N653US
Injuries: Unavailable
On November 6, 2005, at 0745 local British time, the flight crew of a USAirways Boeing 767-200, registered in the United States as N653US,, failed to lower the landing gear until notified by the air traffic control tower to go around. The tower controller then observed the gear extend and amended his instructions to allow the aircraft to land. This is being investigated by the British Air Accidents Investigation branch as a serious incident.

[non sched]

It must have been tough ignoring that annoying gear warning. Somehow, I think there is a lot more to this story.

[Localiser Green]

Something about this incident doesn't really hang together.

If I am not mistaken, the 767 landing configuration warning sounds at 800ft AGL (Radio Alt). That's both Master Warning Lights, the config warning light, aural "TOO LOW GEAR" and EICAS warning "GEAR NOT DOWN" (RED)

This would therefore occur at 2.3 miles on the LGW approach.

I assume most SOPs would require an immediate go-around at this point, but let's say not in this case, even if it then took the crew a short time to figure out what was going on (assuming they decided to continue the approach which it seems they did), the gear would probably be fully down and locked at approximately 500ft (1.4 miles).

Would the tower controller really even be able to see that the gear was not down when the aircraft was on a 2+ mile final? Unless of course he/she was looking with the binocs?

[PaperTiger]

Something about this incident doesn't really hang together.Agreed. If this had been a meeja report I wouldn't have bothered with it, but the NTSB is not normally given to hysteria. Wondered if anybody knew the real story.

Easy for a practised eye (like an ATCO) to determine the gear position from 2 miles. Obviously if it's still up then not what you would classify as a stabilised approach :uhoh:, but then there may have been a good reason for that.

[Farrell]

I know I'm stepping into the lion's den here, but how would an incident like this have actually made it to the NTSB?

I can remember bygone days when an incident like that would have resulted in a go-around and the resultant omission being noticed in the climbout.

Hence the "Farrell probably getting flamed question" but do people not cover each other's asses anymore?

[Localiser Green]

but how would an incident like this have actually made it to the NTSB?
I'm not an expert but will hazard a guess, if the UK AAIB feel that this incident is serious enough to warrant investigation then I imagine they are under obligation to advise the regulator of the state of the operator (the US FAA in this case) that such an investigation is taking place.

[vespasia]

Sorry Farrelly but you asked for it, you got it. We try not to do "ass covering" for these kind of incidents. It's called a safety culture. If something was wrong with this airplane and it landed wheels up everybody would have looked pretty stupid at the enquiry
:mad:

[Farrell]

I stand as ever, humbled by the experience.

Just don't EVER call me Farrelly again ;)

[AirRabbit]

The fact is that sometimes people forget to do things that are thought to be commonplace. Since pilots are people, they’re just as prone to forget things. However, in this case, it would seem to me that the issue just might be blown out of proportion. The controller noticed the gear was not down. S/he issued clearance to go around and then noticed that the gear was being extended. At that time the controller amended his/her clearance and cleared the flight to land. Obviously, the flight was far enough out on final to allow for all this to take place. It is more likely that the crew delayed in extending the gear and final flaps until later in the approach than the tower controller was used to seeing.

As everyone knows, sometimes flight crews delay final configuration although I’ll admit I’ve never been able to figure out why. However, in all instances there is a point which may not be passed unless the airplane is configured for the landing, the airplane is in trim, the engines are spooled up, and the airplane is stabilized on the approach. If the airplane gets to this point and any one of these conditions is not met, the correct response is to go around. We know that in instrument conditions, this point is always the final approach fix. However in visual conditions this point may, and often does, vary from airline to airline – most of which, I think, pick 1000 feet above the ground. However, some choose to allow the descent to 500 feet before all these conditions have to be met.

I don’t know USAirways procedures for being “configured, trimmed, spooled, and stable,” but I would imagine it isn’t much above 1000 feet and certainly not below 500 feet. Be that as it may, I won’t quarrel with the controller. Whenever a controller (or anyone else for that matter) sees something that isn’t right, s/he has a duty to call attention to that fact. That is what this controller did. The crew responded. The controller revised the clearance. It is likely that the story should have ended there. HOWEVER, as I harp on these forums all the time, one never knows ALL of the story until ALL of the FACTS are made known.
_______
AirRabbit

[scanscanscan]

And the recorded fuel remaining was?

[may force be with me]

Things like that happen often, it seems. Last year, on my way to ECC in Belgium, I was in the cockpit during the flight. While landing in EHAM (via, to Bruxselles), nothing (to me) seemed proper. This is what happened and I would appreciate very much if someone, of you guys, could tell me what is "normal" and what isn't. Type was B737-300.
During approach, final that is, even though fully established on the ILS, flaps were up till some 5-4 NM (ILS DME). Then, full flaps were commanded, and both pilots were saying, like a poem learnt by heart, landing check list (they didn't read or use any of the check lists, so that was for the CVR, I guess). It turned very quiet, when, suddenly (2NM ILS DME), FO put his hand on the gear lever and said: "Hm... captain, I mean.....". That was followed by: "Ah.... yes... Thank you". They had lowered the landing gears, and soon after we landed. Great experience. I was pretty silent. Nothing much to say, I guess.

[AirRabbit]

Well, again, I can only speak for what goes on in the US, but what you describe would be considered to be highly abnormal and right on the edge of a regulatory violation, if, indeed, it wasn’t already solidly in that pot. Unless there was some “unauthorized circuit breaker fiddling” either the flaps were not yet in a “landing configuration” or there was a malfunction of the airplane systems that some might call “serious.”

Here is the regulation section under which the B737-300 was certificated in the US …
Sec. 25.729 – Retracting mechanism.
* * *
(e) Position indicator and warning device. If a retractable landing gear is used, there must be a landing gear position indicator (as well as necessary switches to actuate the indicator) or other means to inform the pilot that the gear is secured in the extended (or retracted) position. This means must be designed as follows:
(1) If switches are used, they must be located and coupled to the landing gear mechanical systems in a manner that prevents an erroneous indication of “down and locked” if the landing gear is not in a fully extended position, or of “up and locked” if the landing gear is not in the fully retracted position. The switches may be located where they are operated by the actual landing gear locking latch or device.
(2) The flightcrew must be given an aural warning that functions continuously, or is periodically repeated, if a landing is attempted when the landing gear is not locked down.
(3) The warning must be given in sufficient time to allow the landing gear to be locked down or a go-around to be made.
(4) There must not be a manual shut-off means readily available to the flightcrew for the warning required by paragraph (e)(2) of this section such that it could be operated instinctively, inadvertently, or by habitual reflexive action.
(5) The system used to generate the aural warning must be designed to eliminate false or inappropriate alerts.
(6) Failures of systems used to inhibit the landing gear aural warning, that would prevent the warning system from operating, must be improbable.

And this is the section of the US regulations under which the airplane is maintained for airline operations.
Sec. 121.289 Landing gear: Aural warning device.
(a) Except for airplanes that comply with the requirements of Sec. 25.729 of this chapter on or after January 6, 1992, each airplane must have a landing gear aural warning device that functions continuously under the following conditions:
(1) For airplanes with an established approach wing-flap position, whenever the wing flaps are extended beyond the maximum certificated approach climb configuration position in the Airplane Flight Manual and the landing gear is not fully extended and locked.
(2) For airplanes without an established approach climb wing-flap position, whenever the wing flaps are extended beyond the position at which landing gear extension is normally performed and the landing gear is not fully extended and locked.
(b) The warning system required by paragraph (a) of this section--
(1) May not have a manual shutoff;
(2) Must be in addition to the throttle-actuated device installed under the type certification airworthiness requirements; and
(3) May utilize any part of the throttle-actuated system including the aural warning device.

The rest of the story is up to you, sir.
_______
AirRabbit

[sarah737]

mfbwm,

did you ever thought about the fact they might have been joking? it is very common for pilots to take the piss with wanabees,who talk their way into the flight deck, especially if, once there, they think they know it all..
In the conditions you describe the cockpit would not have been silent during a single second due to automatic warnings.
furthermore the checklist of a 737 is on the yoke, to read it, the pilot just has to turn his eyes down! so your checklist storry can be binned as well.

[Airbubba]

Maybe it was an old Piedmont crew. Under their procedures the approach had to be stabilized by 80 knots (which was also taxi speed).

US Air uses 500 feet stabilized in VMC, look for that to go up to 1000 feet stabilized after this incident.

[may force be with me]

sarah737

Well, I am ATCO, not the pilot, but I know something about aircraft and B733 cockpit. That wasn't my first time on the "observer's" seat either, and as an ATCO, I never put myself in "I know it all" role. Checklists, in our national airliner at least, are not on the yoke. Approach charts are (when you put them), but the checklists are not. Checklists are just under the wind screen, on top of the instrument board (I don't know proper expression, but you know where I mean). They are lovely yellow A4 size papers, wrapped in plastic. I've seen those been used before, that's how I know. About the warnings, there were some, but, they didn't look upset, so why should I be? They told me, actually they answered my question, why the GPWS was off? They were annoyed by it, and it was a nice and sunny day, so they didn't need it. BTW, regarding GPWS, could you tell me all the warnings there are, related to it? I know some, but it would be nice to know more.

mfbwm

[HundredPercentPlease]

mfbwm,

I think you may have mistaken what was going on.

If they were clean at 5 miles, you would not be able to fly down the ILS without accelerating. Selecting full flap at this point would overspeed the flaps by about 50 knots - enough to cause them to fall off. Not selecting the gear would cause a continuous horn (that can not be cancelled), so I doubt it would have "all gone quiet". You would have had a lot of difficulty doing the checklist over that noise.

If there was no long continuous horn, then the gear was down.

[may force be with me]

HundredPercentPlease

As I said, I am not a pilot, so most of things that had been happening in there were not, more or less, familiar to me. For what I remember, there was no continuous horn, but, gears were not lowered before DME 2 (that much I can read :D ), after FO intervene. And that is the part I remember pretty clear. I don’t know how that happened and under which conditions, but I am not making it up, unless, off course, I mixed it all up. It is possible, but somehow I wouldn’t say so. Those certain parts I remember rather well.
Sorry for bothering you all, but I stick to my story.

[ironbutt57]

HAHAHA airbubba, that's classic, and probably not too far from the truth as well:cool:

[Jonty]

I notice from the report that no distances are mentioned, they could have been five miles out!

The config warning also sounds when you select landing flap and the gear is not down and locked.

So there are three separate warning systems for the gear: Lights (three greens), EGPWS (TOO LOW GEAR) and the config warning on selection of landing flap (a siren so loud it can be heard in the first ten rows!)

Something doesn't quite sound right to me.

As for delaying the config of the aircraft on approach, its done to save fuel, reduce noise and keep up with the speeds given to you by ATC (160kts to 4DME and the like)

[Faire d'income]

God help any wannabe trying to extract some useful info from this thread.

Firstly MTFBWM most 737 operators have the Landing check on the Yoke. If there was a warning for the situation you described it could not be cancelled without turning the system off which is not very clever.

Secondly guys have none of you ever dispatched with the GPWS u/s or indeed had it fail inflight?

Finally 100% why would you intercept the glide clean and then select full flap???

[330 Man]

AirBubba,

That was sooo funnyyyy.

Actually if they were old Piedmont guys they were trying to figure out how "no jobs would be lost as a result of this merger" ( Ed Colodny in 1988)

Or maybe they were trying to figure out just what is northern effenciency anyway

Or maybe they were thinking of the Usair motto: "40 years of tradition uninterupted by progress"

Or maybe they were saying to themselves " Usair ruined a damn good airline"

Or maybe they were tired

Or maybe this event has not been fully reported, or reported inaccurately

Hell, maybe it never happened at all, the brits are still pissed off about that tea party in Boston, and this is a way to get even.

Oh and by the way, we did not have to be stable by 80 knots, but the flight attendant had to be in the process of leaving the flightdeck by then and we had to be thinking about starting to stabalize.

Regards,

330 Man

[Whirley]

Could it off been the speed brake ( not in) that the F/O was pointing out to the Capt.

Just a thought:hmm:

[may force be with me]

It was a stick, with a funny little gear on top, placed on the front panel, slightly to the right (closer to FO). Speed breaks are to the right from the throttle, opposite from the flaps handle, in-between CAP and FO, or?
If you take the approach chart out of the Jeppsen, attach it to the yoke (with that mechanism on top, do not know the name), can you still se any kind of checklist there?

[HundredPercentPlease]

The speedbrake is on the LEFT! The flaps are on the right.

So he applied full speedbrake, not full flaps! That's why you didn't rip all the TE flaps off.

The gear went down as normal, because the horn was not sounding, and because they did the checks. You can stick to your story as much as you like (!!) but no horn = gear down (from flap 15 onwards).

The little tut-tut gesture and correction at 2 dme could be for the selection of flap 40 instead of flap 30. Seen/done this several times. Looks like a downward movement from a handle on the right side, near the FO.

GPWS can be disabled subject to certain conditions in the MEL.

AFAIK KLM remove the check list from the yoke. Who knows why - I don't.