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Bluntend
13th Oct 2005, 07:56
The armed forces may be left without vital equipment because of the Ministy of Defence's "Woeful" management of major procurement projects, MPs say
BBC News 13/10/05

These would be the same MPs who effectively hold a gun to the MoD's head forcing them to buy unproven, highly expensive British kit (Eurofighter, Astute, Nimrod MRA4 etc) rather than proven, off the shelf, value-for-money kit from, for example, the States. I know that not everything that comes out of America is fantastic but wouldn't a Sqn or two of F16s or F18s been more cost effective than Eurofighter?

Logistics Loader
13th Oct 2005, 08:09
I just read that on Teletext...

But like someone pointed out in a separate thread, it would appear too many Civil Serpants are feathering their own nest by "procuring crap"....

This trend has been going on for years, but no-one seems to do anything about it....

You complain up the chain of command, who's at the top ???....the guy with the yes/no vote on your career pattern, so effectively you are in a no win situation....

BEagle
13th Oct 2005, 08:12
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4336302.stm for the full article.

Just what does go on at the Bristolian Waterworld?

Logistics Loader
13th Oct 2005, 08:15
Certainly not buying the right kit i would have to say..!!!

flash13
13th Oct 2005, 09:10
This is hardly a new topic. Not so long ago I was given an official brief that when the RAF looked into acquiring new AFT trainers, it did its own study and said 'we'll have the aeromacchi please. they do exactly what we need, they're available, and they're (relatively) cheap'. The Government/MOD then turned around and said no, you're going to have the Hawk 128, which is not available, and 6 times the price, from trusty BAE...

Obviously there was the deal with the Indians to consider, who agreed to buy it if we'd train their pilots with all our spare capacity. No problem there of course, only just about every abo is off to Canada to do the equivalent of 19 Sqn. I'm sure that course isn't free of charge...

So what? All this proves is that major acquisition has more political than operational concerns. That is hardly news either. One might think, however, than when considering spending such astronomical sums of money, explaining to the public (as in dealing with the political side of life) why we might be buying an Italian or Czech or Korean aircraft and not British would become important...

If the BBC is choosing to make this newsworthy now i'd assert it was a slow news week. Considering how many examples of politically motivated acquisition there are, and how much each one costs (not just cash, but morale!) it shouldn't take some MPs' comments to bring this to the fore.

I'm not confident that things are set to change, either. Does the vast majority really mind if spending tax payers' money is spent inside the country on inferior kit for the military? Probably saves a few jobs too. Infact, put it like that, most will positively prefer it.

Oh well. 'Life is Political' said Napoleon.

Logistics Loader
13th Oct 2005, 09:28
F13,

I agree with your view of a quiet news week, but is this not the same thing that has happened ove the Nimwacs saga?? or any other procurement project...????

Whilst i fully support keeping our own country's industry going, the MOD always seems to branch out and buy kit the is not only vastly more expensive, but not available for years...!!

Jackonicko
13th Oct 2005, 10:32
Bluntend,

The problem with blokes like you is that you assume that American kit is any less prone to development problems, cost escalation, delays and maturity issues. I refer you to the C-130J and the Chinook HC.Mk 3.

We a get a very skewed impression of US kit, because the problems and delays and f*ck ups seldom make the news. US media are supportive and tend to sit on negative stories (look at the easy ride that Boeing get in AWST) and their industry folk are "very good at keeping their traps shut (it's the American way)."

There is not the same pressure to “get it right first time” in the USA and while US industry is much better than ours at producing something on time and to cost, they will often produce kit that is often quite severely flawed. That's no problem, because they know that they are going to get paid to fix the problems. Being launch customer for a US aircraft can be an eye-opening experience, however.

I'm told that the avionics in Raptor were far more unstable than Typhoon was and they are only now getting to grips with it - hence its late and problematic IOT&E and the need for an FOT&E.

There may be a case for arguing that the procuremen of older, proven, developed US kit offers a low risk solution than buying new UK/UK collaborative kit, but I'd challenge you on cost.

Much of the price of every Typhoon (and the unit flyaway cost, excluding R&D, isn't much higher than F/A-18E, and is cheaper than some F-15 prices) flows directly back to the UK exchequer. The Typhoon programme provides invaluable high tech employment and supports a major export earner. The Typhoon's through life and costs of ownership are much lower than those of the alternatives that you propose. F-16 or F/A-18 would not have been more cost effective, and the damage done would have been huge.

Flash 13,

I wouldn't want to challenge your 'official brief', but I was led to understand quite the reverse, when I spoke to Air Officers involved in making the Hawk AJT recommendation, and in numerous briefings by service and industry people. Moreover the "Aeromacchi" (Aermacchi, or arguably Aeryakky) M346 is neither cheap (it's barely cheaper than Hawk 128 and its support costs are higher) nor is it available in any quicker timescale than Hawk 128, nor does it meet the RAF requirement as neatly. Everyone in the training world I've spoken to is happy that the AJT was procured as a straightforward purchase, and not as part of some woeful PFI.

The interim Indian training arrangement is pretty small beer - six studes at a time - and should not be imposing too severe a burden on Valley. If it is then there's something we should be told.

artyhug
13th Oct 2005, 13:19
Six students at a time Jacko! Really for someone who claims, and it must be said is usually proved, to be well informed you are so far off the ball on this one it raised more than a smirk!!!

Elmlea
13th Oct 2005, 14:19
The interim Indian training arrangement is pretty small beer - six studes at a time - and should not be imposing too severe a burden on Valley. If it is then there's something we should be told.

For a while, 19 closed its doors to ab initio RAF studes. The weight of running Indian courses, coupled with refreshers, crossovers, and RN studes meant there just wasn't the capacity.

Hence everyone for a few courses went to NFTC. NFTC was meant to take a couple of studes per course, and suddenly it was taking 5; even with the reduced course sizes. Ergo, more holding.

Now, there seems to be a small amount of space on 19, but it's still 1 RAF and 1 or 2 RN studes per 208 course getting there, with the remaining all bimbling west.

We were told at the time that the Indians wouldn't affect our throughput, as they'd run separate courses. However, 19 could still only take so many courses per year, and now half of those were Indian....

Soiled Glove
13th Oct 2005, 14:34
Of course the Hawk 128 decision had nothing to do whatsoever with BAES sending out letters to the workers at Brough stating that if the RAF did not buy the Hawk for AJT, then at least 500 workers would be made redundant - where is Brough - right next door to the constituency of the Deputy PM, not to mention those other 6 labour MPs who had a vested interest in keeping the people of Brough happy so they could continue to draw their salaries from the tax-payer after the last election!

What happend to the old adage that 'your weapon system is always procured from the lowest bidder' - obviously now the lowest bidder has been replaced by the 'bidder that allows the payments to be deferred the longest due to late delivery'.

Perhaps detaching a few of the DPA to the operational theatres rather than allowing them to swan about in air-con'd offices might put a bit of perspective on the matter.

SG

PTT
13th Oct 2005, 16:26
We whinge, we moan and we whine, and we would all love to have better equipment - I for one am not entirely happy that every aircraft on the fleet I fly is considerably older than I am, and I'm not in my 20s! The fact remains, however, that for Britain to remain a viable world power - and I mean things like permanent membership of the UN security council - then we have to be considered a country that can develop, build and maintain its own armed forces from the ground up. Lose that hard-won capability and you become a dependant country, losing your ability to effectively conduct diplomacy with other "world powers" and living at the behest of whichever nations do build and maintain your armed forces. BAE and Wastelands have us over a barrel on that front and, without joining Europe ( :yuk: ), they always will.

soddim
13th Oct 2005, 16:37
Find it hard to accept that Jacko so easily dismisses R&D from the cost argument when it is such a major issue in the debate of off-the-shelf versus home-grown.

However, I do know that in my time we procured two really effective fast jets for the RAF outside the normal procurement system as a reaction to the cancellation of TSR2 (another procurement own goal?) and the Phantom and Buccaneer both proved extraordinarily successful.

So why do we bother with an MOD procurement system - what we really need is a few smart buyers and politicians who let them get on with it.

Almost_done
13th Oct 2005, 17:47
I suggest that the Officers/Civil Servants in charge of these procurements stay in post until the new equipment/strategy comes into force with the appropriate Service.

Instead of the 2yr turnaround of Officers in posts, keep them there until they see the work to a satisfactory conclusion, they may actually learn a job before moving on to enhance their career!

This way we actually get a management that may be able to manage and read contracts to the benefit of the Services rather than the detriment.

Now this may seem a dig at the Officer class but it’s not, I would like some sort of accountability for personnel in procurement, but if the managers swap posts every 2 yrs then all they do is pass on the mistake at the end of the tour behind the desk.

If they had to see it through then some people may actually be interested in what they are doing rather than treating the whole experience as ‘just a tick in the box, to get promoted’.

If they get the job done promote them, if not don’t promote rubbish. It may be a simplistic and harsh view but today we cannot afford to have people in charge of important procurement policies changing ¼ to 1/3 of the way through it, you get no continuity. You have to re-establish the network of communication every 2 yrs, from suppliers to workforce to the end user. Airmen can stay in post for 5+ years and they then become specialist on type, why can’t the Officer do the same. It will not hurt his promotion at all; in fact if he/she shows mettle and actually improves the workout put give them the advancement quicker, get rid of the jobs for the boys scenario.

I have been in posts where a new CO comes in and reinvents the wheel, not listening to his/her SNCOs that this has already been tried and failed in the past by a previous CO. (Hum LEAN issues springs to mind here.)

Oh well I am now looking round for that Flameproof CS95 kit………………………
:ooh:

Logistics Loader
13th Oct 2005, 18:25
If you need new kit, try Ebay.....!!!!

Set of Sqn Ldr rank slides £12.95
7 sets of Cpl slides £8.95 ish....

Waiting now to find a used VC10, that might be able to be converted to a road going vehicle, or maybe placedo utside the gate at BZZ as a kebab place...

tucumseh
14th Oct 2005, 07:33
“But like someone pointed out in a separate thread, it would appear too many Civil Serpants are feathering their own nest by "procuring crap"....”


A quick look at the structure of the Joint Capabilities Board, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, his Capability Managers, and their roles, will show there are very few civil servants involved in determining or endorsing military equipment requirements. (Currently two, one responsible for Scrutiny, the other Analysis and Experimentation; they are not afforded the title of Capability Managers, and have no direct input to the requirement).

Military officers (Col/Lt Col/Major level) in the Directorates of Equipment Capability prepare and seek endorsement for their User Requirement Documents, and their Requirement Manager colleagues embedded in IPTs (Lt Col/Major level) prepare subsequent submissions/key documents such as SRD, ITEAP etc. Military ILSMs (Major) determine support requirements for the In-Service Phase. (I have never, ever come across a military equipment Requirement Manager who could tell me his primary role or explain why, by definition, he must be an engineer).

Civil Servants in DPA and DLO are reluctantly engaged by the above once they (the civil servants) have perused the, by now approved, project requirements and quietly advised that most are complete dross or fail scrutiny for a multitude of reasons. In the aircraft world, typical omissions (meaning DEC have not asked for money and years will pass before they get an increase, if at all) include, a simulator (so training and the ISD is delayed), equipment spares (so the a/c is role limited, if not grounded), aircraft spares (grounded), documentation (safety is compromised) - and so on. DEC have a choice – transfer money to these indispensable omissions, don’t buy them, or ditch the program. Normally they abrogate their responsibility at this point and DPA/DLO are left to sort it out. If you’re lucky, this is where efficiency and experience kicks in. I always ask for these decisions in writing. Incredibly, DEC often oblige, and I retain many classics, the best being to the effect that “I want you to buy (kit) for this aircraft, but I don’t want it fitted as my boss has already endorsed something else”. That, friends, is called a scrutiny failure. And, by the time the issue is resolved, it’s too late to spend the money in the desired timescale, and it’s lost forever.

This is not conjecture; I’ve seen it happen on, literally, scores of projects. However, you are correct in that there are serpents of the civil variety – they are the ones who ignore or condone all this in the interests of career progression in the knowledge that they will be supported at the highest level. (And I don’t mean within DPA).