Effects-based operations

[ACW599]

So there I was sitting in the crew-room and whiling away a few minutes with the current edition of 'Air Power Review'.

In this august publication is an article about something called 'Effects-Based Operations'. A sidehead in the article (page 36) says "EBO, put simply, are those operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted as a result of a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change behaviour or capabilities by exploiting the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed objectives".

To which my rejoinder is a) if that's putting it simply, God help me because I don't understand a word of it b) some of it sounds like a candidate for Pseud's Corner and c) if I wrote or edited prose like that, I'd have no clients left.

Can some kind soul please explain to me what 'Effects-Based Operations' are in words of one syllable?

[Rakshasa]

My malformed coffeeless mind is interpreting that as; "doing the job with what you're given rather than what you need..."

[bowly]

EBO is a more comprehensive way of considering aims, the effects required to achieve them and the actions required to realise such effects.

[SirToppamHat]

I agree it's gobbledegook. Personally:

What Effect are you trying to create?

I want to stop the enemy seeing me coming.

Traditional Approach:

Kill the Radars, C2 Sites, Comms Nodes etc etc = Bomb everything = V.Expensive.

Effects-Based Approach:

Destroy 1 radar by long-range HARM or similar. Use info ops to make sure he knows exactly how you did it and how simple it would be to do it again if he even thinks about radiating. Radars remain switched-off and the effect is achieved.

OK, I accept this particular example may have holes in it, but the point is that you don't have to destroy everything. Other people will, I am sure, produce better real examples. Here's another one:

10 AWACS airframes. Requires at least 10 weapons on tgt to take them out (assuming on ground). One PGM on the flight catering section, or destruction of the pie lorry would have exactly the same effect and for a fraction of the cost

;)

That's one interpretation of the theory anyway - in practice, there are those who see this as a political line to justify cuts, and we all know that once you lose a capability it is virtually impossible to get it back!

STH

[Twonston Pickle]

Aren't all operations effects based? Surely every operation is planned with a desired outcome (effect) or did we in the past just carry out ineffective-based operations? And what is an "instrument of power"?

Why not just say "EBO are operations using all the assets at your disposal to plan and co-ordinate blowing the enemy/insurgency to bits thus ensuring their surrender/capitulation/acceptance of a US-led constitution"?

[Talking Radalt]

One syllable each:

Blow stuff up :)

[ACW599]

Thank you, STH -- I think I get the idea. Having just re-read the article, there's more sense in your example than there is in the entire piece!

So EBO = GICASI but subtly :-)

[Pontius Navigator]

I like the idea. Bit like the effect the Israelies wanted to achieve - knoick out the Egyptian Air Force. First kill the runways.

Or the classic anti-air-war system. A hard kill can be achieved by killing all the aircraft or killing all the aircrew. Pebble Island was a good case of the former; the Argies were just lucky the guys didn't go for double top.

Bombing Stanley Airport or sinking a cruiser were both EBO. So really what is new?

[Red Line Entry]

My understanding of EBO is that it tries to move away from the "typical" military approach of simply aiming to inflict overwhelming damage on the opponent, and specifically, on his fielded military forces. At the operational level, this means considering what the overall campaign objective is and creating a plan that aims to achieve this effect as efficiently as possible.

Perhaps the most famous example is the first Gulf War. John Warden wanted to conduct a purely strategic (this does not mean nuclear) campaign against Saddam's control apparatus to isolate him as a leader. His plan was to completely ignore the deployed troops in southern Iraq and Kuwait and effectively run a decapitation plan. Without effective leadership, Warden proposed that the deployed troops would revolt/retreat/surrender thus achieving the campaign goal: removal of Iraqi presence in Kuwait.

In the event, he was overruled (well, he was only a colonel) and only a small proportion of the Desert Storm sorties were strategic. Nevertheless, we all remember the footage and effectiveness of what was done in Baghdad. Within 24 hrs, the capital's infrastructure had been brought to a halt and Saddam spent most of his time running from one hideout to another. EBO - QED.

At the tactical level, STH's comments are also examples of EBO. To muse for a moment, at the Grand Strategic level, one could argue that Reagan's economic arms race with the soviets was also a good example of EBO - Goal: win cold war; Solution: bankrupt enemy; Avoid: blood and destruction on the North German plain.

Possibly all b**ll*cks, just my 2d worth.

[Pontius Navigator]

There was an air power article around the time of GW1 that was really EBO just didn't have the catchy name. Basically the enemy and allies could be considered as onion rings.

In the case of Saddam you either had to peel away each layer or go for the executive option. At the time EO was frowned upon as not quite sporting - I think it was based on Carter's orders.

In the case of the allies Sadam's target set was the outer layer of our onion. Kill people create a peace movement.

Both EBO depended upon the correct selection of target and aim.

[Sloppy Link]

My understanding is EBO is providing the effects to achieve your aim. What it does not mean is having the spare capacity for unexpected occurences.
In short....nothing in reserve. If the task requires a Company of men, that is what will be deployed. Actually, it wil be Coy(-) because a Coy ORBAT maintains a reserve force. It is a bit like ignoring flying to a MLA.
Bean counters involved in decisions they have no practical grasp of.

[Onan the Clumsy]

I thought the Pie Lorry was allways heavily armoured - for just such an eventuality.

[Impiger]

Sir TH's description is spot on and ought to be titled EBO for Dummies.

Another good example - effect required = disrupt or deny enemy C2. Possible course of action drop PGMs on hardened, submerged bunker from which enemy conducts war. Alternative course of action drop single PGM on power transforming station which supplies said bunker with all energy.

Simple really.

[BEagle]

How to neutralize the entire Leuchars F4 wing?

Put sugar in the Houchin fuel tanks......

[Art Field]

There would seem to be at least one danger in putting too much confidence in EBO and that is a reliance on intelligence to ascertain the right power station, pie wagon (by smell at ground level but from the air ?) etc. A crafty enemy could feign your EBO effectiveness and come back to life as you move to take advantage of your apparent success with his fighting force virtually undamaged. Whichever way you look at it a destroyed weapon can not fight back.

[Red Line Entry]

You are right Art in that EBO is absolutely dependant on understanding the enemy "as a system". Based on the plans of the Army Corps Tactical School of the 1930s the Americans chose the Germans' ball bearing production to be a critical vulnerability. Thus the abortive attacks on Schweinfurt which achieved nothing.

Bottom line - intel is everything, but only when right and on time.

BTW Beagle, it's an urban myth that sugar in fuel tanks kills engines. In reality, the sugar does not dissolve - the only way it will cause problems is if there is enough to block the filter - but sand will achieve just the same objective in this regard. (pedantic mode OFF)

[FB11]

EBO. This is going to be like the ebola virus. Something that we hoped would be kept within monkeys (at JDCC) but has leaked out like the thread in a Tom Clancy novel.

EBO=common sense. It's what we've been doing for years.
Cliches such as 'sledge hammer to crack a nut' spring to mind; don't waste brain power on something that is a clever way of packaging what the military has been doing for years.

To add to the thread, the genesis of EBO is EBB. Effects based Bollocks.

[JessTheDog]

Part of the reason for the systemic phraseology is the media age we live in - all mention of death is to be suppressed to maintain the illusion that modern war is advanced and bloodless.

It is entirely consistent with brainless MoD policy to invent an new language to describe warfare. The next big thing will be a series of expensive glossy pamphlets entitled "EBO for Dummies" paid for out of the public purse, money that could have been spent on things that go bang or that benefit the man or woman in uniform. There will still be puzzled looks in crewrooms across the world wherever the map is Imperial pink.

[GICASI]

(ACW599) Anyway, it woke me up. I'm with FB11 - it's EBB. You can have any effect you want, so long as it's kinetic.

[Gainesy]

[QUOTE]brainless MoD policy to invent an new language to describe warfare.

They that produced the mind-numbing gobbledebollocks that was/is AP3000?

Defence Studies lot?

[Duplo]

Having just had the brief, I think you'll find it is Effects Based Approach as part of the overarching Comprehensive Approach (based around EBOC...!)

How riveting is that...!!??

Dupes

[theboywide]

My impression of EBO is that you look at disrupting rather than destroying a target. For instance if you wanted to knock out a coal power station for a week you'd not need to flatten it to the ground you would maybe just knock out the coal elevator which would take a week to replace. Its mainly about avoiding high costs to rebuild a country's infrastructure post conflict.

[JessTheDog]

What about money as the ultimate "effect" tool in the inventory?

Take a hypothetical dicatator X, for example. The cost of a war and occupation could be evaluated (say £5million) and used to derive a "retirement package" (say £1billion). If dictator X was offered £1billion and a home in a neutral state in return for stepping down, then bloodshed could be avoided at a fraction of the cost.

If former members of the Iraqi Army (shouldn't have been disbanded) had been offered a generous pension for 10 years, then this may have prevented a damaging insurgency at a lesser cost.

[BEagle]

Bolleaux!

As we used to say once upon a time "Nuke 'em till they glow!"

[The Fin]

Clearing alcohol weary, doctrine battered throat...

I think what it's really getting at is that military activity is only one option in order to achieve the effect and the comprehensive approach embraces that. So for example, if you require a particular end state eg country A stops committing human rights crimes, you could use military force, or you could employ economic sanctions or you could humilite the leadership. So the end state, is that government A stops doing bad stuff, how you achieve it doesn't matter. Militarily, the effect could be achieved by parking a frigate in the harbour (coercion) rather that the traditional approach of blasting everything in sight. It's keeping firm sight of the aim and blending all available means to achieve it.

I'm spent

[Pontius Navigator]

The Fin, you wouldn't by any chance be refering to gun-boat diplomacy would you? A force in being has often had a deterrent value far in excess of the military muscle it might employ.

A few Hunters in the whole of the Arabian peninsular would not have lasted 5 minutes against a well equipped and determined enemy but they were more valuable than that as they showed political intent.

Similarly relatively small forces during Confrontation were rapidly boosted with sqns from UK and Germany and again showed political intent.

The problem arises when these forces prove inadequate to deter and ineffective in operations. Then you need to scale up to brigade, division, army, air component etc. Then we get the 'peace' and we scale it all back down again. So far in the Iraq case the the initiative appears lost and we are faced with having to scale up again.

GBD worked; now we call it EBO? Will it work?

[US Herk]

EBO in a nutshell is, "don't tell me what weapon to use, tell me what effect you want to have or goal you want to achieve"

During opening days of OIF, we asked for several radars to be taken out - the Joint Fires guys came back & said we were asking incorrectly! They had several questions:

1 - Do you want them to not see you at all?
2 - Do you not care if they see you, just not be able to shoot you?
3 - Do you not care if they can shoot, just not be accurate?
4 - Do you just want them to be distracted?

After patiently listening to his mini-doctrine lesson on EBO, I told him I wanted them dead & I didn't care what weapon or tactic he felt was best - kill them. :D

The above is a targeting/fires application, but that's where the concept originated. They are now applying it to everything - even staffs!

It is empire building that creates more process over product justifying the stupidly bloated staffs.


One of my favorite quotes during the war (probably been heard before), "Never before in the history of armed conflict have so few been led by so many."