Chinook - Mull of Kintyre

[Floppy Link]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsid_474000/474093.stm


just stumbled across this

[Skycop]

See my later posting.

[This message has been edited by Skycop (edited 18 October 1999).]

[PVR]

Check out this months Pilot magazine. http://www.pilotweb.co.uk/
I don't think you can access the article on the web but it will give you something to read in Smiths when you pop in to pick up her Cosmo.

[PNVS]

RIP all.


[This message has been edited by PNVS (edited 18 January 2000).]

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

So PNVS, you believe that a 150 kt cruise is normal in a Chinook? and that in the event of a run up, the vibration which would undoubtedly follow with the NR sitting above 100%, combined with an outrageous amount of lever to try and contain the NR would not preclude the reading of the instruments.......Bollox! The fadec at that time was not serviceable. We were told to fly on regardless that the TPs had thrown the towel in at Boscombe. Whilst I agree that run ups are not 'normal' let me say that when we got fadec it was supposed to be perfect with continual monitoring to prevent overtemps and the like, well how many overtemps have we had? DOZENS! I personally have had one run up during start and several attempts at overtemp. The issue of wx and icing clearance is a red herring. OK they flew into a cloud covered hill, but if you had any experience of SH ops you would know that the legal wx limits are quite low and that all SH crews are able to operate in ****e wx, especially guys from their flt. Nobody knows exactly what happened on that day, and for that reason we should not have blamed the crew! We may speculate but we will never really know.

[piston broke]

Seems to me all this talk of FADEC is a red herring. Clearly a lot of people have an axe to grind over various technical aspects of the new machine.
The facts are clear. The crew were grubbing just below cloudbase in filthy wx when they should have been at FL100 or home in the bar. The wreckage was just a few tens of feet above the cloudbase, exactly where youd expect to find it in the event of a sudden pull-up at the last second. I recall the report said it was in a somewhat nose-up attitude at impact. This all points to CFIT. I simply cannot imagine how engine problems could have caused this crash, short of distracting both pilots from their lookout. The sad conclusion is that the drivers werent looking where they were going.
Now why they were not IFR is a different matter, I dont know the icing situation at the time, perhaps that was the reason. If so why did they accept the trip, "company pressure"? Is pleading safety frowned on on the RAF? Was the ILS/radar at destination u/s? Why didnt the service put them in a Herc instead. Although rated for such conditions just how much experience did they actually have in real grubbing? I doubt very much. Terribly sad, and a great loss to so many.
Iam sure this post will offend someone, for which I apologise in advance, but I feel too little attention has been payed to the commonsense aspect of this event.

[barsandstars]

Looks very similar to Sundeland crashes about 60 years ago (hit high ground in bad weather).
If you are in a Chinook with full IF gear there is no way that you should be grovelling around with a full load of passengers aboard.
Imagine, just above you, flying into Prestwick in an aeroplane are a couple of pilots in shirt sleeves and 300 passengers going to the airport. Mr RAF has enough nav equipment to take him to the same destination, but decides to travel visual.
The basic thing here is airmanship, and I really think that despite any supposedly engine problems, you must look at basics and wonder why passengers were subject to pilots not seeing where they were going.

[MBJ]

As a complete outsider (but 11,000 hrs on helicopters) the balance of probabilities has to be CFIT, whatever defects the aircraft may have been subject to and personally I'm surprised at the attempts to apportion blame elsewhere.

[Skycop]

I do not think the FADEC was the direct cause of this accident, however, it does have a significance. Because of the ongoing problems with it (old software, no-one able to debug it) the usual procedure for bringing a new type of aircraft into service appears to have been bypassed for reasons not publically known (how long overdue in service was the HC2?). If Boscombe Down had not completed their test flying then it appears that the aircraft type cannot have had a full CA release and therefore it would not normally have been in squadron service i.e. NO-ONE should have been flying it operationally. (The pre-service test flying was stopped because the test pilots refused to continue until the FADEC glitches were sorted. Therefore icing trials were not completed and the aircraft was not cleared for flight in cold cloud conditions).

It seems these guys were ordered to fly in circumstances they were very unhappy about, especially as the aircraft had other unserviceabilities. Anyone not having seen active military service will perhaps not understand the pressure on these guys to go ahead despite their concerns. (NI being an operational theatre, a court martial is a possible alternative!). If the aircraft did not have an icing clearance then there was no IFR option - so please stop bleating on about it. We all know these guys should have been on an IFR flight or in the bar. The crew knew it too. They wanted to take a Mk1 which had that IFR option and requested it. Instead they were ordered to take an aircraft of questionable serviceability over the sea in poor weather, well below MSA and below reliable radio navaid coverage. Why? Never published. They would probably have been obliged to rely on Dead Reckoning backed up by a GPS (which apparently had previously been giving some significant cross-track errors prior to the final flight). At the end of the day they were probably finally killed by a simple navigational error followed by CFIT.

Military discipline sadly appears to have over-ruled airmanship (and the normal flight authorisation safety net) and the rest is now history. Jon Tapper and Rick Cook were not grossly negligent, they were high calibre, intelligent and experienced guys carrying out bad orders to the best of their ability and they paid for it with their lives. Why the flight was allowed to take place in those circumstances is another matter. The label of gross negligence is perhaps better placed elsewhere, further up the chain. Labelling the deceased crew with it was a scandal.

RIP Guys. The truth is out there. Let's hope it comes out soon.

[This message has been edited by Skycop (edited 18 October 1999).]

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Well said Skycop. Piston Broke, if you knew these guys and the job that they did when they were not on detachment to NI then you would be in no position to query their experience in crap wx. All UK mil Helo pilots are trained to operate in marginal wx as they routinely have to operate in NI, Bosnia, Kosovo, Falkland Islands etc etc so that we can support the British Army at all times in order for the Army to achieve their goals.

[piston broke]

Gentlemen, when I penned last evenings post I was aware that perhaps I had made a simplistic judgement, hence the apology. Today I’ve read the Pilot Magazine article and also your replies and now feel a little more in command of my thoughts. I was astonished to learn of the Delaware incident, and all other FADEC problems, I had no idea. Still, let me to run through the post on this thread;
PVNS, (17 Oct) I agree entirely with the sad fact that this case will run and run as there is no Proof. I once took a Chinook (not this variant, I admit) to it’s top whack, perhaps 140Kt and found it most unpleasant and I can sympathize with the instrument panel point raised by Hydraulic Palm Tree (HPT, if I may?)
HPT, I note that your remarks (17 Oct) re overtemps seem limited to starts or have you seen them on flight too? I think this is a important point, and if so limited does not necessarily reflect on the FADEC performance in flight. However I cannot see why wx & icing clearance are a red herring, and as this accident occurred in low cloud and poor vis this must be a factor; can you or anyone else please quote the Met actual/forecast for the area, along with icing levels? Also to judge fairly we need to know the icing clearance of the Chinook.
barsandstars, bear in mind that the Chinook is one of the very few helos cleared to fly in only LIGHT icing conditions. However I feel compelled to object to your “Mr RAF…enough nav equipment”. Military nav equipment historically lags a decade or more behind what’s found in even basic club aircraft, though in this case the advanced TANS was reasonably up to date. As Devil’s advocate, though, I would be looking hard at the DR plot.
Skycop, I agree entirely, and find it incredible that a product rejected by Boscombe Down could ever find its way into squadron service. Your remark re “ordered to fly…” is exactly what I meant by ”company pressure”. As an ex-mil pilot I can visualize the pressure these guys were put under, this is exactly my point; [theory…] some poor sod was tasked to fly a new and untrusted Chinook variant on a VIP trip in vile wx. He objected and asked for a good old Mk 1 but was told that none was available (perhaps one wasn’t, perhaps it was just politically expedient to fly these bods in the new cab). Perhaps he tried to cry “Safety” and got told “You an operational RAF helo jock or a pussy? Eh? Sort youself out!!Go fly!!” I fancy military discipline, as you suggested, may be a major cause of this accident, and feel your summary of “carrying out bad orders to the best of their ability “ is likely to be right on the mark.
HTP. Sorry again, I knew I’d upset someone, I didn’t question their ability, I only speculated on their experience in such conditions and meant no criticism by it. I will stand in the front rank to deny their gross negligence, an outrageous and unsustainable slur. However they did fly into a stuffed cloud whilst grubbing at low level when anyone , by choice, would have been IFR at FL100. I, too, have spent many years grubbing like this amongst the terrain, the management and my better judgement in Chinooks and various civvy types.
Ideally we’d like to know how they got there. Ultimately I just think they were suckered into an all too human mistake.

[Skycop]

Piston Broke, glad you can see things more clearly now. The crew were put in a situation that not many would have escaped from. If their radio navaids were not available due to their very low altitude there would have been no way of cross-checking an erroneus GPS output. A Dead Reckoning plot is next to useless over the sea - there are no track or timing check features apart from the coast - and they hit that. Over the sea in poor conditions it is easy to get a false impression of groundspeed and rate of closure. It is quite probable that they were unwittingly fully IMC, not realising they had actually coasted in until seconds before impact. Was the intercom u/s? (one of the switches in the wreckage was found in the emergency position). If the normal intercom failed just before coasting in it is quite possible that vital crew co-operation broke down at this critical moment, especially as the crew were possibly not so familiar with the switchery of this type as that of the HC1.

The passengers were of extremely high value in the anti-terrorist role (which is presumably why such a previously highly regarded crew was nominated to fly them). It was a poor management decision to "put all the eggs in one basket", especially as the basket was known to have at least one hole in it. Was this internal politics trying to show that there were really no problems with this unproven new aircraft?. When it all went terribly wrong was it perhaps more convenient to blame the dead crew rather than where it perhaps really belonged, at a senior management level?

In any event, there is so much doubt over the circumstances that it was unreasonable to apply the spiteful stigma of "Gross Negligence", especially as this was not the findings of the RAF's own Board of Inquiry. If we can all see this verdict is open to reasonable doubt then why won't the MOD? Is there a can of worms waiting to be opened? "Cause not known" would have been more satisfactory and would not have caused so much extra grief to the breaved.

The following might be considered by any future enquiry:

1. Who was responsible for ordering the crew to fly in these circumstances?

2. Who was responsible for the "Gross Negligence" verdict?

A correlation between anwers 1 and 2 would not be a great surprise to many of us.

[piston broke]

Skycop, the more I look at this the clearer it seems to become. I have to disagree strongly with your remarks re nav and crosschecking the TANS though.

Given a dodgy GPS and with minimal radio nav coverage at 2-300ft dr should have been the order of the day, and if they had the same opinion of dr as you’ve described it would have been very irresponsible to launch at all. May I respectfully point out that the RN has been using dr alone to return to a moving ship in similar weather since the 1930s. My marginal weather training included offset NDB approaches to rigs that prevent you bumping into anything if you overshoot, we even learned to judge ground speed and rate of closure but then we were only supporting some oil company or other. Rigs are nowhere near the size of a mountain, but flying directly at them in crap wx, even when we knew where they were was just not done. They even taught us to recognize when we had gone inadvertently IMC… So when someone aims to make an actual landfall straight at a 1400ft high mountain in 300’ cloudbase and 1500m vis it seems rather imprudent to me. Why not dr in perfect safety to a point west abeam the Macrihanish VORDME (10 NNE the Mull) and then intercept a low coast at a known and shallow angle.. This also provides the “impossible” cross-cx of the suspect TANS before coasting in. That, surely, is quite basic operational dr and good airmanship. Wouldnt you slow down if theres a cliff in the fog ahead? Shoulda diverted to Prestwick with a throbbing great VOR at TRN to help if you ask me. A sliver of doubt is beginning to trouble me over this whole nav business. It all looks to me like a CAVOK plan that has ignored the implications of lousy wx conditions both in the planning and the execution, with several elementary principles of Navigation (intentionally capitalized) simply omitted. Could it be that the RAF of the 1990s has become so adept at following a push-button nav-plan that dr and foul wx visual div nav have fallen into disuse on the squadrons?

Additionally, I find it hard to see how an experienced aviator (be it the crew, the Ops Officer or the CO/Flight Commander) would plan anything (except a follow-up SAR mission and a fleet of taxis) around a VMC-only transit from Ireland to E Scotland via Glen Mor (I assume that was the route) given the wx. I should have thought it almost certain that wx in the valley would be worse than offshore, ie cloud on the deck, and then its a very long way to hovertaxi in fog disregarding every rule in the low flying manual. Given the pax were such high value how could they even consider risking a forced landing in the bundhu or the hazards of mountain rescue flying techniques?
This is one big can of worms.

My feeling is this is an institutional problem that involves the servicewide attitudes to aircraft acceptance procedures, procurement, squadron and group maintenance, the training system, CRM and, as someone said, military discipline.

Christ, cant blame the RAF, make it an engine runaway and blame the crew!

Stinks.

[Skycop]

Piston Broke, there may be some truth in what you say although I am unsure why you think that low flying rules were broken, the WX limits for SH are surprisingly low. As you can see, the more you think about this the more doubt there is. I agree, perhaps the sortie should not have gone. So why were the crew grossly negligent for going as ordered? As I implied, being unable to defend themselves they were the softest target.

[This message has been edited by Skycop (edited 19 October 1999).]

[PVR]

To solve it once and for all, why don't we listen to the voice tapes......ah that's right, they skipped that $500 extra on the $12 million upgrade, but it did get a nice launch party at Boeing.

[Pinger]

A sad sad tale of cock-ups that starts at the top and seeps its way down. You're right pissed & wotsit, they couldn't blame the whole RAF, that would never do. Not nice.

[This message has been edited by Pinger (edited 19 October 1999).]

[This message has been edited by Pinger (edited 20 October 1999).]

[Skycop]

Pinger, I'm glad you amended your comments. Your previous post was completely uncalled for. However, if you still want some friendly banter - Sorry to see that you had to settle for a Navy job..

------------------
May the Force be with you - and may Gravity treat you gently..

[Tornadoboy]

Just found this web site but been interested in the chinook crash for a while. Hope you don't mind a non helicopter type butting in. Having read the full board of inquiry (BOI) I think that in many ways talk of engine failures, FADEC problems, spurious warning captions etc. etc. is missing the point somewhat. All of the previous messages are just speculation. True, most are informed speculation from what appears to be experienced operators but they are still just opinions. Which is what the BOI was. Speculation and opinion from experienced chinook operators. In his closing comments the president of the BOI said, "With no ADR or CVR, survivors or eyewitnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available. There were MANY POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT and despite detailed and in depth analysis, the Board was UNABLE TO DETERMINE A DEFINITE CAUSE."

And this is the whole point, all of the conclusions were best guesses. No one can argue that good pilots don't fly into the lumpy stuff. We all know they do. But in this case there is no conclusive proof of anything apart from they are all dead. Rick and Jon may have made a mistake but we can never be 100% sure so why do we condemn them?
Just a thought from someone who has only flown in helicopters as baggage.

[Skycop]

Ask MOD. Someone fouled up and it wasn't necessarily the crew.

[baldspot]

And what about the lovely new HUMS system that was ordered by MoD following Mull of Kintyre?
MoD blame tech difficulties for the year on year delay - first time I can recall that they've haven't blamed the crew.

[starflex]

Lots of letters in this month's PILOT magazine about the aforementioned article, including one from Wratten.
Well worth a read - at a UK airport newsstand near you
cheers
starflex

[Tornadoboy]

I heard along the grapevine that a Chinook MK2 had a forced landing last week (possibly 25/11). Everyone got out OK but people remain tight lipped about what happened. Anyone heard anything?

[PUP]

Word has it that the aft pylon came off just as they were landing! No-one hurt amazingly!!

[Skycop]

According to the Daily Express (Friday and Saturday) it appears that MOD are settling of court to the families of the pilots unjustly blamed for this. Well well. Does this mean that someone in high places is listening at last?

[sparecrew]

Strangely enough the aft pylon on the Chinook can be made to detach by selecting too much nose up during a zero speed dust landing: suddenly introducing the rapidly rotating blades to the ground in this ungentlemanly manner upsets them somewhat and they decide to jump ship along with most of the rest of the back of the aircraft. But it takes Sqn execs to do it properly!!!

[Multp]

Well said, Skycop. Perhaps some justice at last, through the back door.
If memory serves me right, the Board members did not find the crew Culpably Negligent. They, like many of us, may have believed that the crew, doing their best in the circumstances, made an error of judgement. The crew may also have been distracted at a critical moment: possibly by a spurious systems warning. It seems that they were not happy with the integrity of the FADEC, or their conversion to and familiarity with the new Chinook Mark 2. Perhaps the Board had this in mind.
What borders on the incredible is that up the chain from the Board, senior officers managed to attach the 'Culpable' label. What's the point of having a BOI then? Why not just let the Group Captains and Airships make their own minds up....bearing in mind the political and economic consequences, rather than the outmoded concepts of justice and loyalty.
Cynical,me? Never!

[Tipstrike]

There are some accidents that just run and run, look at the assassination of JFK, there were millions watching and they still can't decide who shot who.

The Chinook accident on the MoK had very few people watching, and there wasn't much left unburnt after the impact to draw any substantial conclusions. In these circumstances one has to look at the probable cause, which is what I believe the BOI did. However when it comes to apportioning blame, then it should attach itself (formally) to everyone who formed part of the links in the chain of events. It is far too simplistic (and often too easy) to just blame the pilots.

The FADEC COULD have been a contributory cause, as COULD a thousand other things such as autopilot runaways, jammed controls, in fact anything that could have put the aircraft where it was. We just don't (and won't)know. Sad to say but that part of the coast over the years is littered with aircraft that unexpectedly hit cumulogranite. They weren't the first and certainly won't be the last.

It would appear to me that there are an increasing number of "plastic aircraft" these days that crash and leave very little behind to enable the investigators to determine the cause - Mathew Harding and Kent Air Ambulance Squirrel crashes to name but two. The best epitaph that all these guys could have is for flight data recorders or at the very least CVR's to be fitted to all military and commercial helicopters. If anything drastic happens to me, I for one would like my family, my friends and the wider aviation community to know WHY, even if it means letting the world know I ****** up!

From experience with bereaved relatives, it's the "not knowing" that hurts the most.

[Floppy Link]

more correspondence in this months' "Pilot" magazine...

[Tandemrotor]

Agaricus:
Further, testimonials from acquaintances of the pilots tell the all too familiar story of how professional they were, how they strove for perfection and took such pride in the job - none of which I doubt for a moment but sadly after so much repetition of these sentiments from the Mull to Battersea, Sumburgh, that S76, possibly Glasgow and now this latest incident it seems to show that no matter how professional, careful and dedicated pilots are they (we) are frighteningly susceptible to "company pressure" to do things we don't like or know we shouldn't be contemplating.
As you will well know, you are UTTERLY out of order involving the Mull of Kintyre Chinook in your 'roll call' of pilot error! Though that may be your personal 'opinion' it is clearly unsupported by any facts, which is precisely why both pilots have, after a long battle for the truth, been unambiguously cleared of any blame whatsoever!

Though clearly you 'think' you know better than the experts!

[satsuma]

you are UTTERLY out of order involving the Mull of Kintyre Chinook in your 'roll call' of pilot error!

I think he was drawing parallels with an occasion where the crew went flying despite nagging doubts, in this case about the aircraft, in the back of their minds.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem rotor. Nobody has ever really explained in the Mull case why the two crew descended to 1000 feet over the sea and flew straight at the mull. If they had observed the simple concept of safety altitude that accident would never have happened. Sometimes there are none so blind as those that cannot see!

[Tandemrotor]

satsuma

If you are correct that agaricus' point was that the Chinook Mk 2 was, at that time, un-airworthy, then I apologise. He was absolutely right.

DOUBLE BOGEY

We really shouldn't digress, so all I will say on the matter of the Mull is this. If you were discussing issues of fact, we could have a debate. However due to the lack of any survivors, any eyewitnesses, or recorded data, we are left only with matters of opinion. Yours appears different to mine, but then I am probably as familiar with that accident as it is possible for anyone to be. After a long fight by many of us for justice, my opinion is now in accordance with the official view. Yours is not, but of course if you too have the courage of your convictions, you could always now do as many of us did, and embark on a 17 year fight. Rather than simply bumping your gums together.

Apologies for the digression, but the link (if there is one) is the value of data/voice recording in accidents. It provides a window to the truth. Rather than allowing 'opinions' to prevail.

[jayteeto]

Double Bogey, there are a LOT of Chinook pages to read. We don't want to start a new Chinook argument, I'm sure?????
If YOU wish to reverse the new decisions made on that accident, please start a new thread. Blind cannot see guff is your opinion to which you are entitled, but the last I heard, the crew were exonerated due to a lack of credible evidence. I'm happy with that new decision and I am, frankly, sick to the back teeth of people who slag my dead mates off when they were not there at the time. I suppose you think the Hillsborough report is covering up that those killed actually brought it on themselves and the police didn't really cover it up.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem rotor, I appreciate your implied proximity to the Mull incident but! Sometimes fighting a corner in one direction, in the absence of recorded data, is juxtaposition to the progression of safety. Which I am assuming is the goal we all want. In the Mull case the Radar data was fairly clear. I think you would have to agree they descended, then flew straight and level, until the Mull got in the way.

In the absence of any other evidence we are all free, if we so wish, to decide what we believe is the most likely causes of such events. In doing so our conclusion can lead to a moderation of our own behaviours in an effort to improve our own chances of avoiding an albeit assumed, similar event.

Blame has nothing whatsoever to do with this process. In fact if the Chinook had a WX Radar, or a modern EGPWS surely we would not be having this discussion.

For the RAF to recognise the value of such equipment they have to identify the likely role, its absence may have played in accidents like the Mull.

So Tandemrotor, please do not dismiss me simply because I have chosen a path that serves for a positive tangible benefit rather than the road many others have taken which, for the most part, actually seeks to blame someone or something!

Accidents are just that! Events nobody wanted, planned or in many cases, envisioned would happen. Complex conspiracy theories, whilst entertaining, in my humble view generally serve to distract us from reacting appropriately to what are, in most cases, very simple events.

DB

[satsuma]

Double Bogey


Remind us all what the icing clearance was for the Mk.2 Chinook at the time.


Then remind us all what safety altitude would be for military aircraft flying from the Mull to Inverness.


Then remind us all how it gets a bit colder when you're up at those altitudes.


Then write your apology.

[jayteeto]

Ditto, times five

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Satsuma so what are you saying, the could not climb due ice so instead they elected to fly IMC below safety altitude.

Like I said we all draw our own conclusions and Half baked conspiracy theories cut no ice.

Court Martialed for making a Command decision - I do not think so in British Military Aviation! Utter cobblers. Sorry.

I am not in a blame culture. Just a learning culture.

[jayteeto]

So can we rename this Chinook thread????
Bogey, start a new thread and #### off. Your fabulous knowledge places those pilots IMC on purpose. The Chinook thread discusses a number of INADVERTANT reasons why they might have been there. I really would like the mods to stop this now. Otherwise Bogey, on your next post, could you please PROVE they went IMC BY CHOICE, or, well, you know.................

PS, just to help, it wasn't just an icing clearance they lacked, it was an Instrument Flying clearance that was denied as well. Trust me, I know, I walked out to the aircraft with them that day.

[ShyTorque]

Court Martialed for making a Command decision - I do not think so in British Military Aviation! Utter cobblers. Sorry.
I am not in a blame culture. Just a learning culture.

Then learn from some of us who worked under the regime.

Look at the comments made by the Air Rank officer who ran rough-shod over the findings of the BOI for the Mull accident. They could not positively determine the cause(s), and could not therefore put blame on the crew. The Air Rank officer, during the Lord's Inquiry, made a point of trying to belittle the President of the BOI, calling him "A relatively junior officer" (he was in fact of the usual rank/status for the job and now runs the RAF, btw).

Think why the crew were ordered to fly in an un-airworthy aircraft in the first place, despite the request of the captain.....

The introduction of the Mk2 was a compete c**k up; the department responsible for test flying it prior to it's introduction to service ceased flying theirs the day before because they thought it unsafe to continue, even in controlled test flying conditions. The "Mull" crew was made to "fly the flag" for political and /or career saving reasons against the request of the captain and it resulted in the tragic deaths of all on board.

Don't try to tell us there was no pressure from on high in British Military Aviation!

FYI, There was a court martial of an aircraft captain following events in the FI, after a higher command decision was disputed. Without going into great detail, crews could see the enemy air threat and could see that they needed to to fly their aircraft off ship to a dispersed location on shore asap. They were not allowed to, for reasons never made clear. This decision was challenged and one aircraft captain was formally disciplined by CM for doing so. The fact that the majority of the SH force went to the bottom of the sea shortly afterwards, indicated that the request was correct and reasonable.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

FNW;


its been a looong week!


SND

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jayteeto I have not blamed anyone nor am I trying to for the Mull crash. Just observing the few facts available. I certainly mean no disrespect to the crew, RAF or those close to the incident.

If you knew me you would mark well how I stand my corner when many others do not. My dogmatic refusal to take 19 pax into an air mass producing lightning being just one. This is LEARNED behaviour having seen what happens to aircraft that have been struck.

Jayteeto and Shytorque, I fully understand your emotional reaction to anyone even talking about the Mull. However even your own arguments paint a picture of events very close to what has happened to to this threads subject aircraft and crew. A crew under pressure making a forced error. That is MOST PROBABLY what lies at the heart of this matter.

Jayteeto, your incredible rude remark for me to *****Off is forgiven on the understanding this subject seems more personal to you than most.

Shytorque, being disciplined in war for failing to follows orders is far too complex to chuck in this mix.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Shytorque, I do want to cause you any more grief but can you tell us if there are any lessons we could or should take from the Mull accident?

DB

[jayteeto]

Believe me, I wanted to say it far far worse and it was designed to be rude. Thank you for your forgiveness, however it isn't required, thanks anyway.

You are absolutely entitled to your views and I actually respect that far more than you think. Over the last year, I have been rude to a number of people on pprune. It's weird, because it is often how they have presented their comments, not the actual comments themselves. The mull, Glasgow or Norfolk included a lot of posts where people stated things as factual; these were THEIR views not facts.
My issue was that you included the Chinook crash as CFIT in your list. Whilst 'controlled' could have been true, we don't actually know this as a fact. And there is my BIG personal problem............ without going over and over and over. No CVR, no proof, no public execution. Here's another little one to throw in. Dave Traill has been slated for not making a May day call, with a double engine failure, the number one radio drops out. So did he or didn't he?? We will never ever know without that CVR. No public execution??????? Not quite!!
Your views on other events may be 100% correct, but you can't prove it. That's all I mean to point out.

[jayteeto]

Any lessons to learn? Loads.

1. Don't shift the blame onto defenceless pilots without any evidence. You will eventually be found out, even after 10 years+ (ditto Hillsborough fans)

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jayteeto, I have not, to my knowledge, included the Mull on any CFIT list. I think you might be mistaking me for another poster.

Just so we are clear, we are all entitled to reasonable opinions provided they are supported by our experience and intelligence.

IT IS A reasonable opinion that the Mull was simply a CFIT! Just as it is reasonable to have an opinion that a spurious, 12 second indication of engine failure from the FADEC could have distracted the crew. However, in the absence of clear evidence we are left to our own opinions. My opinion is not based on blame or cause. Simply what can I draw from the event that may help me.

In this directive, planning a route in poor or likely deteriorating WX with a turning waypoint on high ground, rather than over open water, could, if circumstances conspire, cause a greater problem regardless of what else may be happening in the cockpit. In addition, maintaining very high Groundspeed towards rising terrain coasting in, in DVE, is a very poor practice best avoided.

I have read every report on the Mull and my opinions are unchanged as to the most probable cause. In that opinion I conclude that had some money been spent on a WX radar I very much doubt the Mull would have happened as a crystal clear paint of the coast would become a primary navigation aid.

As it is some people's continued pursuit of other causes do not readily support the requirement of manufacturers and operators (RAF) to equip aircraft such that the flight crew have the best information available to them when they need it.

None of the above involves blaming anyone or anything. It is simple a discussion based on most probable cause, and drawing from that, what lessons can or should be learned.

Any finding of crew negligence is hopelessly naive and serves no real purpose other than to close, forever, and accident report.

[Agaricus bisporus]

DB, you are quite right that the inclusion of the Mull in the list of apparent CFIT events was another poster, it was I and you shouldn't have been subjected to a slagging-off for it.

Unfortunately there is a human tendency among those close to events to sometimes lose perspective and the flat refusal of some to accept that the Mull accident itself was in all probability plain CFIT (albeit associated with a great deal of appalling mismanagement by whole sections of the RAF which has no evident direct connection with the accident) is likely a symptom of that.

A lack of conclusive proof does not in any way mitigate against the familiar expression "beyond reasonable doubt". We have no "proof" that the recent Battersea accident occurred under control, but equally we have no indications otherwise, yet I hear no dissent as to what in all probability happened in that case. The physical situations appears broadly similar (poor vis, bumped into something solid) yet once a head of steam is built up the perceptions can diverge in opposite directions.

Of course it is natural to try to protect the good name of your colleagues and the appalling decision to apply the phrase "gross professional misconduct" (iirc) to the Mull pilots rightly created a sh!tstorm. That I unhesitatingly agree was wrong, utterly wrong and went a long way to achieving temperatures seldom seen in accident investigations.

But we must beware of allowing emotions to overrule logic and due process in accident investigations when all the available information (despite no conclusive proof) point to an unpalatable conclusion. That isn't an intellectually rigorous process.

Blame. Bad word in this context, an one that the AAIB at least avoid tho the military may sometimes be less conscientious. We really shouldn't be thinking in terms of "blame" in these cases, despite what the meeja say and do. We should accept reasons though, and accept that we are all human and thus subject to making mistakes. A refusal to accept that our colleagues made a mistake, or most probably made a mistake when there is no indication otherwise is equally unhelpful. The tendency to hunt feverishly and endlessly for esoteric and ever more fanciful and unfeasible mechanical reasons while refusing to consider human inputs is a common feature of all the accidents we've mentioned here. There's no doubt that the human is increasingly becoming the weak link in the chain and the sooner we take this on board the quicker we may find a way to work around it.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jayteeto you see it only from the perspective of the Flight Crew. Just for a moment consider the relatives of the Pax. They might reasonably ask why the AC was less than 1 mile from the Mull, doing 170 knots Groundspeed below 500 feet heading straight at the mountain shrouded in fog. At this point the new TANS Waypoint was reselected by the crew. The new waypoint track was never acquired.

After that the AC began a climb but failed to clear the mountain, the final flight path onsistant with late visual acquisition of the terrain.

Those are the facts that we know. Post 431 was an inaccurate summary.

Agaricus Bisporus - I hear you five by five and agree. Some people seem unable to emotionally detach. The job that day was to transport passengers. When you read some posters they seem to have forgotten that. I also believe fighting in the wrong direction runs the risk of missing the obvious. In the case of the Mull, if they had WX Radar and used it, I doubt very much whether the event would have occurred.

Q. Do large Military UK helicopters now have Radar?

[jayteeto]

Not really, I feel for the families too, they deserve facts, not opinions. I think your last post was correct. Problem is that if that was a reliable in service aircraft with a CVR, like this 139 in Norfolk, I would be with you 100%. It's been pretty simple to solve this one with the facts available. Sadly, we can criticize this crew..... unfortunately. Poor decision, poor flying skills, all backed by CVR FACTS!!
It's not emotion that drives me, really!

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jayteeto - once again I do not blame the crew! That is far too simplistic and utterly counterproductive. It's worth remembering the crew had already extended their shift and Captain Taplin had expressed strong reservations in regard to his currency and the urgency at which the HC-2 was rushed into service on his Squadron.

Sadly if the RAF had concentrated on fixing these and other serious shortcomings I suspect you would feel a whole lot better. However it does not change my view of the prime causal factor but my mind is open.

[jayteeto]

Bogey, ok, I actually don't think we are that far apart.
Hope that was autocorrect with the pilots name, Tapper.

[Tandemrotor]

I apologise to those interested in G-LABL but I'm not prepared to see garbage written about the Mull accident.

DOUBLE BOGEY
In the Mull case the Radar data was fairly clear.
Utter fantasy. No such radar data exists!
I think you would have to agree they descended, then flew straight and level
Utter fantasy. No such evidence exists. Not that they ever descended. Not that they ever flew straight. Not that they ever flew level. You are prepared to make assumptions!

Frankly your recollection of the incident is very poor. You can't even remember the name of Flight Lieutenant Tapper for chr1ss@ke!:ugh:

There are so many holes in your statements of what you believe to be 'facts' (when they are no such thing!) that it is difficult to know where to begin!

You say you are motivated by some commitment to flight safety. Tell me, what do false assumptions based on opinions (NOT fact) do for flight safety?:rolleyes:

You say you don't want to blame anyone, yet that is precisely what you are seeking to do. Looking for scapegoats based on your poor understanding of the facts, and prejudice. You have prejudged these two pilots on the basis of no reliable evidence whatsoever! Shame on you.

The enlightened amongst us may at least console ourselves that your prejudiced and ignorant 'opinions' are diametrically opposed to the official verdict into this accident.

Your cheap shot about the relatives of the passengers was 'interesting'! Some of us have met them, and know exactly how they feel about this disgusting chapter. Have you? Do you?

I would like to ask the mods to prevent any further muck-raking over an incident not even slightly linked to the subject of this thread. Anyone who wishes to discuss the Mull should start another thread, and let's all re-hash the last 20 years!:mad:

Once again, apologies to those interested in the subject of this thread. DOUBLE BOGEY should be ashamed of introducing his jaundiced views here!

[Flying Lawyer]

Tandemrotor
DOUBLE BOGEY didn't bring the Mull accident into this discussion. It was brought in, unfortunately IMHO, by Agaricus bisporus.

Agaricus bisporus the Mull accident itself was in all probability plain CFITthe appalling decision to apply the phrase "gross professional misconduct" (iirc) to the Mull pilots rightly created a sh!tstorm. That I unhesitatingly agree was wrong, utterly wrong
I'm pleased to see you've toned down your views a little.
Even after the publication of the extremely thorough Mull of Kintyre Review, you continued to argue (in the Chinook thread in the Mil forum) that the pilots were grossly negligent: it is pretty clear also that had the definition been properly worded (ie, beyond reasonable...) then that GN charge would still have been made and would stick to this day unchallenged.
In my world it is hard to see what else one calls CFIT. Even if the standard of proof required had been 'beyond reasonable doubt' (it was much higher than that, for very good reasons) I disagree with you - for the reasons given by the original BOI which were set out in detail and upheld by the Review. That isn't an intellectually rigorous process.No comment. ;)


DB Just for a moment consider the relatives of the Pax. They might reasonably ask why the AC was less than 1 mile from the Mull, doing 170 knots Groundspeed below 500 feet heading straight at the mountain shrouded in fog.It would be entirely reasonable for them to ask that question.
The answer is: No-one knows.

Nobody was in a position to give a precise description of the either the cloud situation or the visibility over the south end of the Mull of Kintyre as they appeared to the pilots as they approached from the south west.
Although the BOI were reasonably certain that the helicopter was flying fast at low level in proximity to the southern end of the Mull, in the absence of a CVR, a flight data recorder or the evidence of the crew or any other witness, they could not know how or why the crew got into that situation.
All the BOI were able to do was to put forward three possible scenarios as to the cause of the accident and, because they believed their ToR required them to choose one, they chose the one they considered to be the most probable.

we are all entitled to reasonable opinions provided they are supported by our experience and intelligenceDo you mean a hunch?

NB: When I refer to the BOI I mean the Board presided over by Wg Cdr (as he then was) Andy Pulford – before AOC No1 Group and AOC-in-C Strike Command came to different conclusions based upon their 'experience and intelligence'.
The Review considered their reasoning to be flawed and rejected their conclusions. It upheld the findings of Andy Pulford's Board.
(He became Chief of the Air Staff in July last year.)



FL

[Tandemrotor]

Flying Lawyer

I stand corrected regarding the introduction of the Mull into this discussion. Many thanks.

You refer to "Wing Commander (as he then was) Andy Pulford." For anyone who doesn't know he is now Air Chief Marshall Sir Andy Pulford, Chief of the Air Staff! A man of considerable integrity in the face of significant coercion to change his view, during this particular Board of Inquiry!

The board considered it incorrect to criticise the captain for any human errors based on the available evidence. It further considered that the co-pilot could not be criticised for failing to identify any errors.

Now PLEASE anyone wishing to discuss anything other than G-LABL, may I suggest you start a new thread?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem rotor, if for one moment you would clear the paranoia that creates your prejudice you would have at least read my posts correctly. Just why do you think your views are the only ones that are valid! The only Unserviceability found by the investigation was a possible malfunction of the RADALT. I am sure you know that the RADALT simply records the height of the cliff at impact.

RADAR - read again. I know there was no WX radar that is my point.

BLAME - read again. My posts are clear.

Flying Lawyer - I may be mistaken but the lighthouse staff reported the lighthouse in fog??? The forecast mentioned possible DVS at the mainland coast.

Both - the final flight path, cyclic flare, turning left, 30 degrees nose up could be interpreted as a late acquisition of the surface but of course we will never know.

There are no definitive answers to this accident but we can reasonably speculate based on the facts as they are available. There is no "Shame" in doing this.

The Burden of Proof is there to protect the innocent from the slightest chance that there is another explanation. Its process does not conclude AT ALL, the most probable cause. TANDEMROTOR your anger towards me suggests you think because the Burden of Proof could not be met for negligence it automatically cancels any possibility of CFIT. This is simply not the case!! It just means there is insuuficient evidence to support negligence. In any other aviation operation this should open up the debate for a more progressive, productive discussion. However, the Mull, shrouded in implied controversy, seems to hold an immunity from this supported by near hysterical ranting posts like yours.

Again I apologise if the crew were your friends but this is aviation and if we do it long enough and hard enough we will lose friends. Sometimes the circumstances beggar belief and sometimes luck runs out. However getting emotional every 5 minutes because someone expresses an opinion, or worse ACCIDENTLY posts an inaccuracy, means you either have PTSD or you are manipulating posters emotionally to support your own views.

TANDEM - I have no doubt you will react with another emotional tiraid for something I have said in this post. But caution, I am fairly certain that apart from my summary of the overall flight path in post 431 I have recognised the emotion connected with this events and everything thereafter is information contained in the reports.

From the overall perspective of the very many CFITs into land and water the Mull accident is relatively unremarkable save for the appalling loss of life. Ultimately there may be a very different prime cause but as such we can learn nothing. However, if we consider the most probable cause as CFIT we can learn a great many lessons. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we are free to hypothesise for this purpose just as you do TANDEM when accident threads you post on are not so close to home.

[Tandemrotor]

DOUBLE BOGEY

Come come. You don't make me angry at all. But after 17 years of fighting to successfully clear the names of the pilots, purely on the basis of evidential arguments, you might forgive some of us for being a little frustrated, that out in the shadows lurk opinionated ignoramuses such as yourself.
The only Unserviceability found by the investigation was a possible malfunction of the RADALT.
Yet another distortion of the facts. Of course the AAIB (you'll have heard of them?) we're not able to positively determine the pre-flight serviceability of this aircraft, (though there were indeed two OTHER potentially serious faults!). Just to remind you, here's why. There was no Cockpit Voice Recorder. No Flight Data Recorder. Tragically no survivors. No eyewitnesses to the accident. No radio calls. Only the aircraft wreckage. (70% of which was destroyed by the post impact fire) Yet you KNOW what caused the accident??:rolleyes:

Congratulations. You either have ESP, or you're a talented spiritual medium.

Oh, and by the by. When you said in an earlier post:
In the Mull case the Radar data was fairly clear.
Did you MEAN to say:
In the Mull case the Radar data was NON EXISTENT.
A simple slip of the key board I'm sure? Or was it deliberate invention of 'fact' that you seem to so enjoy? You really don't know this case very well at all do you?

I challenge you to start another thread on the Mull rather than discuss it here. This is the wrong place. We can have a good debate, and re-hash the last twenty years elsewhere. I would welcome it.

Alternatively the mods may be able to split these discussions off?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

TANDEMROTOR - firstly the Mull Tragedy is marred by the intimation that the HC-2 was not fit to be released to service, the crew currency may have been inadequate and the Commander forced to fly against his will. Some parallels that others have mentioned blight the Corporate flying world. So if you can keep your composure we have every right to discuss the Mull topic here.

You journalistic rhetoric places great value on facts. However you are wrong about the fire! 80% of the fuselage was damaged by fire but only 20% destroyed.

If you are that familiar with this accident then tell me what possible reasons, other than low cloud, would cause a crew to fly below 500 feet over the sea towards high ground at a Groundspeed of 170 KIAS. witnesses on the Mull reported visibility below 500m. The yachtsman saw the aircraft estimated at 200-400 feet, flying below the cloud base, heading straight for the Mull.
TANS data infers that the crew may have been distracted after the second waypoint selection. The final flight path strongly infers inadvertent IMC.

The exact reasons why the crew flew towards the Mull below the Safety Altitude are unknown but on the few facts available described above the most probable cause, in my opinion no more and no less, is inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.

Crucially, and this is the point TANDEM you seem incapable of processing, this conclusion does not necessarily mean that the crew were to blame. Equally it does not necessarily mean they were not to blame! There is simply not enough evidence in this regard, to know for certain and thus the required legal Proof cannot be met.

Now instead of being incredibly rude and calling me an "Ignoramus" just what do you have to offer that counters any of the above (which to the best of my recall is accurate in regards to the accident review).

Or alternatively keep bleating for us to move the topic to another thread.

I may well be an "Ignoramus" but like I said at the start, there are none so blind as those that cannot see.

I have drawn my own conclusions based on the evidence in the reports. If you want to modify my opinion you need to explain what is wrong in the reports and my mind is open.

DB

[Tandemrotor]

Firstly, thanks to the mods for splitting these discussions off from the previous thread. Much appreciated.

DOUBLE BOGEY, in your post #34 you said:
In the Mull case the Radar data was fairly clear.
Would you be so kind as to explain precisely what you meant by that?

Thank you.

[Cows getting bigger]

I lost one good friend and a working acquaintance on the Mull Chinook. We will never know what happened and conjecture just raises the blood pressure.

I'm left wondering how many scores of military accident reports I have read where a recommendation has been to fit CVR/FDR. The real travesty is that there are so many aircraft still flying which could now be easily and cheaply fitted with such devices.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem, clearly you have nothing to offer beyond the official reports. My meaning is simple. Once clear of the Irish coast the aircraft descended to below 1000 feet. That was recorded on Radar.

Why, seeing as you were clearly not in the aircraft, did you feel the need to spend 17 years trying to prove the crew were not to blame. How do you know? Enlighten me so I can begin to understand the seemingly irrational response to this accident! What do you know that is not in the report?

Cows Getting Bigger. I am sorry about your friends truly. I am sure most of us on Pprune have experienced something similar.

[jayteeto]

None of us tried to prove anything, that was the whole argument, NOTHING could be proved. You really are making a knob of yourself. It wasn't emotion, that was the mistake many people made about the campaign. Many who argued actually believed in private that CFIT was a credible cause, but without proof you can't hang a good man.
Keep digging, Australia is near

[Boudreaux Bob]

Umpteen Million Pounds a Chinook costs and the MOD cannot fit a CVR?

Penny wise and Pound foolish I would say.

But then again, how many Military aircraft have CVR's particularly in the Helicopter Fleets of every Nation?

Reading the Accident Report and related documents suggests that anyone that tries to lay blame on the Crew alone is in denial of reality.

That it was attempted at all is a gross miscarriage of justice.

An old fashioned Radar in the nose of the aircraft would not cost all that much one would think. It is not as though the Chinook doesn't fly in IMC conditions ever.

The American Army for way too many decades considered Helicopters to be aerial Trucks of various sizes. How many Lives has that cost over the Years?

[Tandemrotor]

DOUBLE BOGEY you said:
Tandem, clearly you have nothing to offer beyond the official reports. My meaning is simple. Once clear of the Irish coast the aircraft descended to below 1000 feet. That was recorded on Radar.

Would you please be so kind as to tell me where I can find the evidence that anything at all "was recorded on radar"? It's just that I can't ever recall seeing any such thing.

Many thanks TR.

[jayteeto]

Bob, one of the wisest statements on this case. It would have made umpteen enquiries a lot simpler

[Flying Lawyer]

DOUBLE BOGEY Flying Lawyer - I may be mistaken but the lighthouse staff reported the lighthouse in fog??? You are mistaken.
Further, the Pulford Board concluded that nobody was in a position to give a precise description of the cloud situation over the south end of the Mull at the time of the accident, and they did not attempt to do so.
The yachtsman saw the aircraft estimated at 200-400 feetEstimates of aircraft heights by non-aviators are notoriously unreliable. (Estimates by aviators are also often inaccurate but, generally, not as far out as those of non-aviators.)
Post-accident examination of the SuperTANS revealed that it was at 468 feet above sea level +/- 50' a few seconds after the waypoint change/about 15-18 seconds prior to impact.
The aircraft struck a rocky outcrop on the side of Beinn na Lice, approximately 0.28 nm east of the lighthouse, at 810 feet amsl.

The forecast mentioned possible DVS at the mainland coast. There was a forecast 30% risk of conditions below VFR limits around the Mull of Kintyre.
The captain planned the sortie as a VFR flight at low level on the way out and at medium level on the return to RAF Aldergrove. The decision to fly a low level VFR sortie was consistent with the weather forecast provided by the Belfast International Airport Met Office for the area around RAF Machrihanish (some 17 km to the north of the lighthouse) and operationally acceptable but required contingency options to avoid any bad weather.

The only Unserviceability found by the investigation was a possible malfunction of the RADALT. 80% of the fuselage was damaged by fire but only 20% destroyed
The helicopter continued almost 200m from the initial impact point before impacting the ground while inverted. It manoeuvred violently while being struck by the rotor blades, breaking into two with substantial parts breaking off during the crash. Fuel tanks on both sides were ruptured at initial impact resulting in extensive ground fire which severely damaged much of the wreckage.
Tony Cable (Senior Inspector of Air Accidents - Engineering) with 18 years experience as a crash investigator told the House of Lords Select Committee and the Review that: “... throughout this investigation the evidence was remarkably thin, from my point of view, I must say. We spent a great deal of time trying to find evidence.”
He could not dismiss the possibility that a malfunction had occurred but had left no evidence in the wreckage.
NB: Absence of evidence is very different from evidence of absence.

You ask the campaigners: Why ….. did you feel the need to spend 17 years trying to prove the crew were not to blame. How do you know? Enlighten me so I can begin to understand the seemingly irrational response to this accident! What do you know that is not in the report?
jayteeto has already explained this to you.
It's all in the report of the independent Review. You would have seen it for yourself if you'd read it with an open mind.

It took a very long time but the campaigners were eventually vindicated by the independent Review.
The campaign might not have been necessary if the senior Reviewing Officers had accepted the findings of the Board presided over by Andy Pulford.

Why do you regard it as an 'irrational response" to try to achieve justice for deceased colleagues? :confused:

[Axel-Flo]

More in search of others opinions rather than any claimed knowledge, I also hope I haven't missed the answer in a previous post too, but something that's always seemed in favour of a last minute issue causing the aircraft to become inadvertent IMC is that SH phrase "go down slow down". It's not in any crews mentality to press on IMC below safety altitude when other options are available. We're an inadvertent IMC event handled where an icing clearance and IFR option were available a pull up in cloud to Safety altitude and a turn to a safe heading of course would be logical and unquestioned. That said with neither and if the aircraft was seen VFR, VMC below cloud by the yatch, wether it was 4, 5 or 600ft above the sea a descent to stay VMC would be automatic for crews used to flying a lot lower level than where they were, like wise a slow down for the prevailing visibility also. Unless of course from contentedly cruising VMC below something occurred and put them IMC at minimal if any notice while dealing with an internal issue at the same time perhaps.... NR runaway up? FADEC issues as reported by the Odiham TP?:confused:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

ALL - I cannot get past this all encompassing suggestion that any intimation of inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT was the prime causal factor in this accident AUTOMATICALLY MEANS the crew were to blame.

FL - witnesses on the Mull reported low cloud and poor visibility. The Yachtsman saw the helicopter flying below the cloud! Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!

Bob - I agree 100% re the WX radar BECAUSE I believe it was an IMC CFIT.

Malfunctions - the aircraft had flown a lot that day. No evidence of malfunction was found in wreckage that was assessable. No MAYDAY call. No further HC-2 catastrophic accidents. No significant deviation of flight path ( the TANS evidence had it climbing at 1000 fpm at 150 knots, CONSISTANT with a cruise climb, until the very last moment before impact. Cyclic flare, sharp turn, pancake impact damaging rear fuselage and sponsons, leading to blade strikes and disintegration.

I agree with the review findings. There is insufficient evidence to meet the legal burden of proof for negligence or blame.

I come back to Bobs point and original issue. In most legal battles the first casualty is often the truth. In this case the truth is that military aircraft, certainly at that time, were very poorly equipped for IMC flight. I remember well flying IMC, in a Gazelle, unstabilsed, with only Doppler mini-tans, with VIPs in the back (well, Generals etc).

In the Mull Tragedy, WX Radar and data NAV would have made a huge difference BUT only if you accept the most probable cause was IMC CFIT.

It is therefore a crass disservice to military crew that the review, investigation and the continued crys solely to exonerate the crew, combined, have singularly failed to call for improvements in navigation and avionics equipment fits in military aircraft. I recently had a look at a Merlin. Shocked at the lack of avionics.

In the absence of clear evidence we should consider the principles of Occums razor! The most simplistic explanation is the most probable. Given the evidence available in the report the investigation concluded inadvertent IMC and CFIT. The review does does specifically disagree with this conclusion. it simply identifies that there is no evidence to suggest that the crew were negligent in their duties at the time.

Furthermore the crew were at the end of a long days duty and extending. The report indicates they may not have had current training on the HC-2 and that the Captain had asked to delay the HC -2 into service. Notwithstanding this they accepted the task. This reads like very poor management and culture conspiring to place the crew in unfavourable conditions from the outset.

Like I have consistently stated. I do not blame the crew. They were hand picked special forces pilots of extremely high calibre not prone to recklessness or mistakes. This does not mean that given the right (or wrong) circumstances such crews will not make an unforced error. Tiredness, time pressure, poor training leading to unfamiliarity and an aircraft prone to spurious engine indications in a culture of "get on with it" might just be enough to force an error.

With the exception of deliberate "wazzing" blaming a crew for an accident will always mask the underlying causes and deficiencies in the system.

If the HC-2 was cleared IMC and had its proper (eventual) icing clearance, the safest way to Inverness that day would be IFR at or above safety altitude. This is also missed by the investigation and the review.

Jayteeto - "Privatley many of us who fought thought it was a CFIT". If this is the case what did you believe at the time caused the CFIT.

[tucumseh]

the Mull accident is relatively unremarkable save for the appalling loss of life.The single most important fact reiterated by Lord Philip was that the Controller Aircraft Release (signed by Sir Donald Spiers) was mandated upon Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (AVM Anthony Bagnall).


The CAR stated the aircraft (Chinook HC Mk2) is NOT airworthy and CANNOT be released to service. The primary reasons are (a) FADEC is not permitted in the aircraft (b) the entire Comms and Nav systems are NOT to be relied upon in any way whatsoever. The Comms bit was actually largely irrelevant, because the Intercom was NOT cleared to be fitted to the aircraft. I'm not a pilot, but I suspect this would prevent the aircraft taking off.



Despite this, and the legal obligation he was under, ACAS withheld this rather "remarkable" information from the rest of the RAF and signed to say the aircraft was compliant in every respect. He also withheld, from the BoI, AAIB, Police and all subsequent inquiries that he was sitting on a 1992 report detailing precisely the systemic failings reiterated by Haddon-Cave some 17 years later.





"Unremarkable" is not a word I'd associate with these actions. Criminal, yes. Please don't fall into the MoD trap of only looking at the final act.



Added:

Sorry, I noticed you mention "Icing Clearance" again. What Icing Clearance? A properly amended RTS had no Icing Section in it on 2nd June 1994!! This was an administrative error, but nevertheless it did occur.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tecumseh - "FADEC is not permitted in the aircraft" ???

What did this statement in the CAR mean?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Flying Lawyer:

Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet

SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.

You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!

Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing?

[tucumseh]

Double Bogey


The necessary testing and clearance of the Safety Critical Software had hardly begun before it was halted. The reasons are well documented. Essentially, Boscombe were following mandated regulations; parts of the MoD were telling them to ignore them.

Therefore, there was no Certificate of Design for FADEC, therefore it was not permitted to be fitted in a Service aircraft. Under MoD(PE) rules, it was only permitted in the PE Fleet aircraft for trials and testing. As advised to both MoD(PE) and RAF, that trials aircraft was not a recognisable Chinook HC Mk2, and Boscombe awaited delivery of one. Therefore, valid testing and trials in general could not be conducted as the results would be of no relevance to the Mk2 CAR recommendations. Hence, Boscombe declined, correctly, to recommend CAR be granted. The aircraft had Switch On Only clerance, which means (as stated above) you are not permitted to rely upon it in any way whatsoever. All testing and trials activity had ceased on the day of the crash.

You must follow the lies. MoD consistently claimed the FADEC software was not Safety Critical. This was debunked once and for all during the Philip Review, when the policy document showing it WAS Safety Critical was produced in evidence. It also helped that the author of the relevant Defence Standards of the day, an RAF officer at Boscombe, was tracked down and his original copies of these "missing" Standards produced. (Hitherto, MoD had declined to acknowledge their existence and, in fact, still do).

Upon production of this evidence, MoD's 17 year campaign against the pilots stopped overnight and they put up no further argument. It must have come as a bit of a shock that their challenge for "new" evidence to be produced was met head-on.


Hope this helps.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tecumseh - really interesting read your last post and a bit shocking!
Was their any evidence of potential serious malfunctions arising from that original FADEC software?

[jayteeto]

Dahdaaaahhhhhhhh!!! G'day mate, welcome to Oz!

What do I think caused it????

I DON'T KNOW, therefore innocent until proved guilty.

My hunch? Before the flight, they were worried about two things (a fact I discussed with them). No IF clearance and FADEC run-up/down. They even spent 10 mins running through the drills. What could cause an aircraft to climb into cloud, go balls out 165kts and prevent slowing down? A FADEC run-up at the worst moment. A lack of IF/ICING clearances would discourage a climb to SA.

PS. They did the morning tasking in a Mk 1 Chinook that was not available for this task.

I am currently weighing up the pros and cons of my next insult, I think in this case it may be worth a ban from the site......

[tucumseh]

SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.


But was SuperTANS displaying information after waypoint acceptance? That question has never been addressed (except in the evidence to Lord Philip) and both Racal and MoD have studiously avoided the issue. If I switch my PC monitor off now the system is no use to me, but the computational part of it still works. The existence of data on my hard drive does not mean I have seen it.

According to the AAIB report SuperTANS was switched off before impact. Photographs clearly show the switch off. Switching off was a recognised means of clearing EMC problems. SuperTANS had a battery backup which meant (I believe) it continued processing in the background, just like my PC would. The dangers of letting Racal write their own report. It is very selective. And for many years key parts of it were withheld. Yet, Trimble were not permitted to write the report on their GPS, which had multiple faults including no Time of Day output; something perhaps significant in a crash where the timeline is of such import.

May I strongly suggest reading the evidence to Lord Philip. It really does make you think more deeply about the underlying failures and why MoD would seek to blame the pilots.

[Flying Lawyer]

DOUBLE BOGEY

FL - Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!If you read what I said more carefully and with an open mind you will see that I did not suggest that.

Flying Lawyer:
Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!
Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing? Based upon the S-T data, the yachtsman's upper estimate was not far out. You will, I hope, have noticed that I posted all the available evidence relating to height.

Feel free to make quips about lawyers if you wish.


FL

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Jayteeto - why are you so angry again - what you have written in your last post is exactly what I have been saying from the outset. You need to read your own handle and "Calm down kidda"

Now you are telling me they used two variants on the same day, one of which (the accident aircraft) they felt ill prepared to operate. It just gets worse. Maybe you need to take a time out before you dig a hole to Australia!

[tucumseh]

Was their any evidence of potential serious malfunctions arising from that original FADEC software?

In short, yes. However, one could argue the main problem was lack of understanding of how FADEC was meant to work. Maturity of understanding leads to a safer system. Maturity is key to this whole issue. Under the mandated rules governing System Maturity, there was no authority to enter Production. It could be argued there was none to enter Full Development either, although I'd argue that would be too strict an interpretation.

In 1993 MoD sent a team to Boeing to learn as much as they could about FADEC, so they could "train the trainers". A misunderstanding meant they were greeted by Boeing staff who thought MoD were there to teach THEM!! Again, a former RAF officer who led this team came forward during the Philip Review. This tells you much about why FADEC was such a mess. Boeing had little to do with it due to the contracting arrangement. They were expected to simply sit back and wait for MoD to deliver it. Compounded by the LRU hosting the Safety Critical Software (DECU) being managed by a mechanical committee, not the correct electronic committee, which would never, in a million years, have permitted such a nonsense. Again, the evidence to Lord Philip explains this in detail, with a quote from the deputy chair of that committee.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Flying Lawyer - Sorry Sir but you do not fool me! Using carefully crafted script to illustrate a point you wish to make will not hoodwink me.

So we are now a little clearer, the AC was almost certainly low level 468 feet when the yachtsman saw it. They climbed shortly thereafter and hit the hill around 800 feet. People in the vicinity of the lighthouse reported low visibility on the Mull.

Feel free to postulate and drawn reference to minor inaccuracies BUT the AVAILABLE evidence strongly suggests inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.

Before you try to draw me again bear in mind I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction.

It is pricesly because of this experience that I recognise that a simple decision, made in a heartbeat, amidst a myriad of complex problems can determine the success, or otherwise of the outcome. Often luck joins in as well. For these reasons, more than anything else, trying to blame a flight crew for an accident is wrong, inappropriate, distracting and counterproductive. This has been my stance from the beginning.

I doubt I can make myself any clearer and unless there are any objections I will now bow out and leave this subject.

DB

[zorab64]

Whilst I don't wish to intimate blame (and have always been appalled at the big-wigs / political decision to slate the crew without real evidence), I've always been puzzled at the crew decision to plan a track over high granite in marginal weather, in any aircraft, let alone one in which the crew had less than full confidence.

For those who've flown around the area (many) a small diversion around the MoK would have made little difference to their overall ETA & logic says a low-level visual route between MoK & Arran, or going up the West side & hopping over the Machrihanish saddle, would have reduced workload in the event of malfunction or systems doubt? It would also have had significantly less risk than a, potentially system-affected, climb to get over the biggest bit of cumulo-granite on the immediate planned track? I still fail to believe that, with the fair (witnessed/TANS) certainty that they were VCF over the water, that any systems/FADEC failure would have interrupted the ability to change heading at 400/500'?

I'm afraid I'm with Ag-B & D-B that the likelihood of CFIT is greatest, but there would appear to have been so many other pressure factors that personal, corporate or political ar*e-saving may not have been high enough up the priority list, very sadly.

D-B - I'd strongly advise not attacking FL or his views & certainly not his balanced, but legal, approach to his posts. He's FL because he's just that - there's nothing "barrack-room" about his views on law or aviation, and most of us (certainly those who know what he's done for aviation in the courts) welcome his sagacity on this forum.

[tucumseh]

With respect, I think people need to read the evidence about Uncommanded Flying Control Movements. A Special Flying Instruction was uncovered during the Philip Review notifying aircrew of serious and sudden changes in direction, especially after a long straight run. (Think the course alteration after Waypoint acceptance).

This was precisely what the Odiham test pilot, Sqn Ldr Burke, had experienced a number of times and reported; but MoD called him a liar. He gave evidence to Lord Philip that this SFI had not been promulgated to aircrew, and he knew nothing of it when he visited Aldergrove shortly AFTER the crash to investigate yet another occurrence. None of this was made available to the BoI. The SFI was dated AFTER the pilots underwent their "conversion" course; after which they primarily flew the Mk1.

[jayteeto]

The mark 1 was u/s, read the report. Read the report, read the report.

I don't need to dig, I enjoy watching other imbeciles doing that

[ShyTorque]

Before you try to draw me again bear in mind I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction.

Double Bogey, before attempting to belittle him, I think you might be advised to do a little homework. Flying Lawyer is an experienced helicopter and fixed wing pilot (and has owned his own Gazelle). He has also just completed his term as Master of what is arguably the most prestigious aviation organisation in the UK.

[pulse1]

As the parent of a military pilot at the time, I was drawn to the MoK campaign right from the beginning. As a PPL I could only play a very minor part in the years of repetitive debate but the fear of ever finding myself in the position of the Tapper and Cook families has driven me to take an above average interest in developments. The resurrection of this debate depresses me for the following reasons:

1. As far as I recall, no-one has ever denied the possibility of CFIT, so why are we arguing about it? Unless new information becomes available, this debate will go nowhere.

2. Hearing the same distortions of facts used to support arguments e.g. witnesses report that the Mull was shrouded in cloud. Well, the bit they were in obviously was but that doesn't necessarily mean that, FROM THE PILOT'S VIEWPOINT it was completely covered. Remember the pictures we were shown of orographic cloud covering parts of the Mull?

3. And the most depressing of all. The way that MoD and VVSO's have lied about the airworthiness of the HC2. This is compounded by the fact that they continue to to do so while people die. I particularly found it amazing that anyone would fly an aeroplane, especially with passengers, which required a DECU connector to be checked every 15 minutes because there was a history of them becoming detached. As an expert in light duty electrical contacts this was one area which I felt competent to comment on. I did ask at the time how many pilots would take to the air in such a machine and nobody responded. Interestingly, when I have asked a variety of civil and military pilots face to face, everyone said that they wouldn't.

It seems that, the introduction of the MAA and MAAIB has, as far as the FAA is concerned, made thing worse. I understand that they did have a fairly robust Air Safety organisation which relied on middle ranking officers who were unlikely to see further promotion and were therefore much more independent. I believe that this has now been superceded by a far less independent MAA.

[Boudreaux Bob]

DB,


Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer...

Now you are being plain stupid and offensive at the same time.

FL's flying experience as well as his "Lawyer" credentials are impeccable along with his personal integrity being of the highest standard.

It is time you take a holiday or sober up, whichever will allow you to regain your senses and manners.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Shy torque, if someone wants to try and discredit an eyewitness on the basis that they are "Notoriously Unreliable" despite the facts indicating they were albeit spot on TOUGH! This is what I inferred from FLs post. If He did not imply this then maybe he can explain the relevance of his statement when in fact the witnesses evidence was, from my perspective, very accurate. I believe he used that statement to "Belittle" my post on the same subject, as if the yachtsman evidence was not worth considering.

As regards Experience I am non the wiser and have made no indication that I think FL is not experienced OR that I disrespect him. However, this is an Aviation forum not a forum of Law and as such the perspective of a Lawyer may differ considerably from the perspective of an operational pilot.

I do not know but I doubt FL has flown either commercially or in the Military. Thus his aviation experienced may be limited to recreation only, which whilst it sounds a lot more fun than commercial flying does not provide the kinds of pressure proffessional aviators can be subjected too.

I am sure FL is a nice guy to boot and a very good Lawyer.

[ShyTorque]

commercial flying does not provide the kinds of pressure proffessional aviators can be subjected too.

Thanks for the advice, I had no idea. I'll try to bear that in mind.

Shy torque, if someone wants to try and discredit an eyewitness on the basis that they are "Notoriously Unreliable" despite the facts indicating they were albeit spot on TOUGH!

But do remember that the yachtsman eyewitness (a Mr. Holbrook, iirc), changed his mind at least once.

I agree with the above comment by Boudreaux Bob.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Shytorque, As usual a post filled with veiled insults and cynical responses. Just what possible purpose do you think you have brought to this debate other than stirring the pot.

You think Bobs post is good! On one hand he calls me offensive and then he calls me an Idiot. A post so lacking in either moral, litary or intelligent fibre I could not bring myself to answer it.

Being rude and calling people names is childish behaviour not worth of a response.

[Boudreaux Bob]

DB,

I did not call you an "Idiot".

I did say your recent posts were "plain stupid and offensive". There is a difference between that and calling you an Idiot, although your interpretation is not far from the mark I guess.

I give far more credence to a very experienced Private Pilot and owner of several different airplanes and helicopters, who is also a very respected member of the Legal Profession, with qualifications in both aviation and legal proceedings, over a guy whose sole qualification is limited to just aviation.

That being said, it takes only a decent up bringing to grasp the basic tenets of courtesy.

I am reliably informed that Flying Lawyer is a very skilled Pilot with a control touch that would be envied by anyone with an appreciation for such attributes.

Ratings alone do not the Pilot make.

For sure, manners do the Gentleman make.

Honesty has always been considered a virtue.

Crab all you want DB, but you need to re-think the tone and content of your posts.

Surely you can be more professional sounding than you have lately?

[satsuma]

Double Bogey

Your opening salvo in this going over of old ground was to suggest that if the crew had observed the simple concept of safety altitude then the accident wouldn't have happened.

If that wasn't apportioning blame, it was certainly very scathing by someone who clearly isn't as familiar with some parts of the report as he claims to be.

Therefore please stop trying to pretend that you don't now blame the pilots, when you clearly do.

[Agaricus bisporus]

In what other air accidents have the UK Military found pilots guilty of gross professional negligence? It might be instructive to see what it has taken in the past to achieve this accolade...

The more I read of this the more it seems that the MoD used that device in an attempt to slam the door on further enquiry which they feared would lead to hugely embarrassing revelations of their gross professional misconduct in various aspects of certification and operational use of the aircraft. The amount of sitting on files and obfuscation amongst the Top Neddies is pretty damning and reeks of a big, embarrassed cover-up at the highest levels.


This upset over the word "blame" doesn't help the discussion either. The "gross professional..." epithet was eventually removed and I gather has been taken by dome to amount to absolving the pilots of all blame. I can't see how one reaches that conclusion, there are infinite levels of "blame", though responsibility is probably a better word. Thank God the civvy accident investigators avoid the blame culture entirely, the mil would do well to do so too. Still, whichever way you cook it the primary responsibility of a pilot is to keep his machine from violent impacts with the ground, and failure to achieve that is generally considered to involve some degree of less than perfect piloting (discounting catastrophic failures etc)

DB has a point re safety altitude, had a safe altitude been achieved no such accident could have taken place. I think it is rather an overreaction to suggest that statement implies blame - something that occurs whenever the B word is used here, but it is nonetheless a factual statement.

Equally, I cannot understand why anyone would plot a route to a waypoint that is on a thousand ft high rock when cloudbase is 500ft, let alone when it is also forecast to have a PROB30 of being in IMC. The next leg to Fort William as planned ran along the length of the mountainous Mull. That too is inexplicable as a VMC route though would have worked for the trip home at medium level, excepting any question of icing conditions (I'm not aware of the temps forecast). Surely if you were expecting IMC over land and had 500ft cloudbase over water you'd plot a waypoint a mile or two SW or W of the lighthouse then go to Ft William over water the whole way? Again, this isn't blame at all, just questioning what seems to me a curiously impractical style of navigation. Why one earth would you not just fly up the western coast of the Mull - it takes you where you want to go?

Too many question with answers we'll never know, but suggesting that a pilot who flies into a stuffed cloud is devoid of responsibility is taking it too far, unless you can prove - that is conclusively prove - something catastrophic or entirely beyond his control caused it. And of course no one can even start to suggest any evidence for that. Unequivocal proof works both ways.

Quid pro quo, isn't it called?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Bob, do you actually read any posts properly. In the absence of anything to offer you resort to taunting me. Stay out of other people's discussions and let FL speak for himself.

[ShyTorque]

The more I read of this the more it seems that the MoD used that device in an attempt to slam the door on further enquiry which they feared would lead to hugely embarrassing revelations of their gross professional misconduct in various aspects of certification and operational use of the aircraft. The amount of sitting on files and obfuscation amongst the Top Neddies is pretty damning and reeks of a big, embarrassed cover-up at the highest levels.

Agaricus, that's just about the nub of the matter. Hence the reason for the Mull of Kintyre campaign.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Satsuma - my opening SALVO remains valid and correct. If they were at Safety altitude they would never have hit the hill.

My view is this was most probably inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.

I do not agree the crew were negligent. That does not mean I believe no mistakes were made!

Now stop goading and add something of value if you have it.

[Boudreaux Bob]

if they had not taken off it would not have happened either, DB.

Why the need to be at Safety Height if they were intent upon remaining VFR/VMC?

Likewise, plotting a waypoint to a known bit of rock does not mean one has to get to the Way Point before changing course. After crossing some water, without Radar to show the coastline, perhaps they wanted to ensure where that bit of Rock was so as to facilitate a Visual point of Reference.

As there were no Survivors and no CVR, we shall never know what the Pilots were thinking, planning, or doing when they met their end in this tragedy.

What we know for sure is the aircraft struck the ground while in flight, the weather was not good, the aircraft did not have all the Avionics it could have had and in some views should have had, the aircraft itself had known issues that challenged it being declared air worthy, and that there was a huge miscarriage of justice when the RAF Management both attempted to cover all that up and did so by trying to laid sole blame upon the Pilots.

Coming along later with all this supposition with scant knowledge of the facts and putting forth as having any relation to what happened that day is a bit presumptuous in my view.

How many times by how many people must you hear that before you understand that?

Yes, I do read your posts. This is a public forum and thus any discussion is open to all and sundry.

Hate that as you might, you will just have to deal with it.

[jayteeto]

I have been posting for a long time, the only person I ever used the ignore facility was Walter. Bogey now makes two. A shame really because I promised to be more tolerant after getting involved in the fiasco Glasgow thread. I did try, but he caused overload.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Bob, read Agarus last post. He has summed it up very neatly and better than I could have. Then read the accident report on the section about the VFR rules and VMC minima in place at the time.

[MOSTAFA]

Jay, take a day off. 'Opinions are like' you surely you know the rest.

I would suggest DB's - 'I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction'

Eloquently put.

Bar being in same country what has Glasgow got to do with it - nothing except you have a problem with DB. Try doing it privately or even give him a ring I'm sure he will give you a number should you so wish. The barrack room bit might be a bit of a freudian slip but I'm guessing FL has never seen the inside of a barrack room and as for qualifying experience levels on the fact somebody owns a Gazelle - pure crass - as being the Master of a guild, again crass albeit a pilot guild.

Dbs had his say and you yours - move on, agree to disagree.

[jayteeto]

I have, he's been set to ignore, I don't see his posts anymore.

[[email protected]]

We appear to have reached the same impasse that this highly emotive subject eventually resolves itself into.

Any perceived cover-up or whitewashing of the events may have had much to do with who was on the aircraft and where they were going - a lot of assets in one basket (sorry to mix metaphors) for the sake of what was essentially a social event. Having, by design or by accident, put pressure on the crew to complete the task in a less than perfect aircraft in less than perfect weather, it is no great surprise to me that an element of ar*e-covering then ensued by career-minded senior officers.

I haven't read the full report for quite some time but I don't remember any mention of GPS inaccuracies which I believe had been noted on the Chinook in that part of the world before.

[Flying Lawyer]

DOUBLE BOGEY

I posted the entirety of the evidence relating to height including the ST data in post #64 in order to provide all the relevant information for those who have not read the reports in detail, or at all.
Surely it was very clear from what I posted that, in this instance, the witness's upper estimate was reasonably accurate? If I had been trying to "fool" or "hoodwink" anyone, as you suggest, I would not have posted the ST data.
Perhaps my general comment about the unreliability of height estimates was superfluous in this instance – although his lower estimate was way out (relative to the height being discussed). I readily admit that it is a hobby-horse of mine because, over the years, I've seen many pilots put at risk in court (prosecutions and civil actions) by the inaccurate estimates of witnesses.

You are correct. I have never flown commercially and, although I was fortunate to be taught to fly by the RAF, I have never flown in the military.
I have never claimed to be an experienced pilot. I've been lucky to get wider experience than many PPLs but that doesn't make me an experienced pilot.

I have not offered any opinion about what happened and would not presume to do so. (I find it irritating when PPLs, and even non-pilots, spoil the flow of discussions with their theories and argue with professionals in areas in which they have no expertise or experience. I confine myself to those aspects of discussions where I do have expertise and experience.)

However, this is an Aviation forum not a forum of Law and as such the perspective of a Lawyer may differ considerably from the perspective of an operational pilot. I agree. I have focused on the evidence. I'm a lawyer so naturally I would.

You clearly have enormous experience of flying in challenging conditions. I respect that. (A few years ago, I travelled to Aberdeen in the hope of observing the sort of conditions with which off-shore pilots often have to deal. Unfortunately, for my purposes, the weather on both my jumpseat flights out to rigs was benign: Bristow Aberdeen (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/380254-pictures-bristow-aberdeen.html))
I don't have the same experience as you, but I do have many years' experience of studying accident reports (AAIB & BOI), working closely with experts in accident investigation and aviation matters, examining evidence and dealing with aviation fatal accident cases.
Is it your view that I don't have appropriate experience to comment upon the evidence or, more to the point, the lack of it?

I disagreed with your interpretation of the absence of evidence of a defect in the helicopter, pointing out the extent of the damage and referring to the AAIB expert's comment about it
I pointed out that a causative defect could not be discounted. I did not suggest that the accident was caused by a defect.
Is it your view that I'm not qualified to make such comments?

I have also been critical of the BOI procedure then in force. The independent Review concluded that the BOI "was conducted under a system which was, by generally accepted standards of justice and fairness, manifestly unfair to deceased aircrew." That is also my view.
Is it your view that I'm not qualified to express such an opinion?

I repeat: I have not offered any opinion about what happened.
I have a hunch, based upon my experience of dealing with such matters, but I would not presume to post it.
For some reason, you appear to assume that I disagree with your view about what happened.


FL

[Boudreaux Bob]

DB,

As there are numerous investigations and reviews, I am not sure to which you suggest i read.

I found this in a summary. Is this what you are referring to when you talk about RAF Minimums and such?

RAF Visual Flight Rules (VFR) require the crew to have a minimum visibility of 5.5 kilometres above 140 knots, or minimum visibility of one kilometre travelling below 140 knots;[25] if VFR conditions are lost an emergency climb must be immediately flown.[26] Nine out of ten witnesses interviewed in the inquiry reported visibility at ground level in the fog as being as low as ten to one hundred metres at the time of the crash; in-flight visibility may have been more or less than this. The tenth witness, a yachtsman who was offshore, reported it as being 1 mile, though he is regarded as a less reliable witness as he changed his testimony.[27]

If witness accounts of visibility are correct, the pilots should have transferred to Instrument Flight Rules,[28] which would require the pilots to slow the aircraft and climb to a safe altitude at the best climbing speed.[29] In the area around the Mull of Kintyre, the safe altitude would be 2,400 feet above sea level, 1,000 feet above the highest point of the terrain.[30] The height of the crash site of ZD576 was 810 feet, 1,600 feet below the minimum safe level.[6] The Board of Inquiry into the accident recommended formal procedures for transition from Visual Flight Rules to Instrument Flight Rules in mid-flight be developed, and the RAF has since integrated such practices into standard pilot training.[31]

Regarding negligence on the part of the pilots, the 2011 Report said "the possibility that there had been gross negligence could not be ruled out, but there were many grounds for doubt and the pilots were entitled to the benefit of it... [T]he Reviewing Officers had failed to take account of the high calibre of two Special Forces pilots who had no reputation for recklessness."[32]

[satsuma]

Double Bogey

You said:

Nobody has ever really explained in the Mull case why the two crew descended to 1000 feet over the sea and flew straight at the mull. If they had observed the simple concept of safety altitude that accident would never have happened

Nobody apart from the President of the Board of Inquiry that is. The icing clearance was +4, safety altitude for the entire route would have been about 6500 feet (at a guess). As our American cousins say, do the math.

[Tandemrotor]

ShyTorque

You said:
But do remember that the yachtsman eyewitness (a Mr. Holbrook, iirc), changed his mind at least once.
Can't be certain what you mean, but I'm not sure I necessarily agree. As an adviser at the FAI, I saw Mr Holbrook on the witness stand. He is (was) a scientific instrument maker by trade, and he was a very convincing witness. When asked how he had judged the helicopter's height, (200-400') he stated he had used the height of the Mull lighthouse (which he knew precisely) as a reference, and built in a boundary of error. For Flying Lawyer, I don't believe any height assessment Holbrook made can be contradicted by the evidence of RNS252 Supertans. (Which itself is of course a piece of navigation equipment never designed, or intended to provide historical data.) As FL will recall, Holbrook's evidence is referenced to a fairly precise time. Whilst the Supertans 'snapshot' was referenced to a geographical location. Indeed some of Supertans data was wildly inaccurate, though conveniently 'excused'!

I believe it was right at the end of the first week's evidence, when out of frustration with one barrister's obtuse questioning, Holbrook volunteered: "If you are trying to ascertain whether I believe the pilots of the chinook could see the location of the Mull lighthouse? Then the answer is, yes I believe they could."

This is the last eyewitness to see ZD576.

ShyTorque, having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.

DOUBLEBOGEY still hasn't answered my question of what he meant when he said the "radar data was clear". Perhaps because he knows as well as I do that there WAS no 'radar data'! It's a made up 'fact'! He's making it up, along with many other of his assertions!

As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident. Only one of which was CFIT. But it is simply not possible, on the available evidence to say with any certainty which of these options caused the accident.

Opinions on this matter are as valuable, or worthless, as you wish them to be.

There's little else to say!

[ShyTorque]

TR, I defer to your direct dealings with Mr Holbrook. I can only refer to what was published because I was not in attendance at the time. I believe BB posted the summary to which I referred on the previous page, two posts before yours.
---------------------------------

Also in that summary is a reference to the RAF's rules about the limits for VFR flight. Despite what the summary stated, it was more normal (quite normal) to land if the minimum visibility rule could not be complied with, rather than make an emergency climb to SALT. A climb in cold weather would put any of the RAF SH helicopter types into known icing conditions, which was definitely not allowed because they were not equipped for that.

[Boudreaux Bob]

..having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.

I am sure anyone who has been involved in an investigation of events such as this tragedy, even when seeking the absolute right answer, understands exactly how true that statement is re Witness Statements.

Witnesses, sometimes go home with accurate, reliable, and relevant information simply because they were not asked the right question and did not think to offer it up at the time of Interview.

That the very information surfaces later is no reflection upon them but rather to person doing the interview. Likewise, it helps if the Interviewer knows the right questions to be asking.

Lawyers in my Country use Depositions to gather information prior to Civil Litigation in Court. Many a case was lost because they failed to ask the right Question, especially when questioning folks testifying in Court.

All this talk about the Rules, once again, proves to me there is far too much concern about something written on paper as though it were really etched in Stone. That assumes the commentator "knows for a fact" what the Crew was seeing at the time. That is something that simply cannot be.

Likewise, there are so many Rules that at some point they paint you into a corner and no matter what you do, you violate a Rule. Which Rule do you choose Violate?

Stay down in VMC, clear of Cloud and Icing, or pop up and get an IFR Clearance.

In my Country, you must have the Clearance first and maintain VMC.

Is that what the attempted Radio Call was about, trying to get some sort of IFR Clearance before going IMC?

Just who would they have talked to in trying to obtain that IFR Clearance that could hear them at that Altitude and location? How long would it have taken to obtain that clearance?

[Agaricus bisporus]

As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident.

No it wasn't. It was because the MoD finally accepted that there was no "unequivocal proof". PROOF.

There can be any number of reasons postulated for the accident but to suggest they can all be dismissed as of an equal probability as you seem to imply is simply dishonest.

CFIT is by far the greatest probability. All circumstantial evidence points to it. No evidence whatsoever that I am aware of points to or even suggests/implies anything else.

[Bronx]

It was because the MoD finally accepted that there was no "unequivocal proof".

The MoD did not overturn the BoI.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Flying Lawyer, thank you for your very honest and clear post. I was wrong about you. You are clearly a very decent person with a clear and balanced view and. I accept that your previous post was not meant to distort the evidence from the yacht guy.

Please accept my apology for my comments. In mitigation I was fighting a somewhat rearguard action for my opinions and taking fire from many directions.

I will PM you. I have something to offer in way of reparation.

Best Regards

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem. Thank you for your post on the yacht guy.

RADAR - I am referring to the initial radar trace as they left Aldergrove. It was my understanding they were cleared at 3k and descended to below 1 k after coasting out. However this is a memory buried deep and I cannot find any evidence today that supports that. In hindsight I made the remark as a rather crude tool to support my conclusion that the most probable cause was inadvertent IMC followed by CFIT.

Tandem - what is your view on the suggestion that in the later stages they made a cruise climb because reading the other ST data it seems to infer only that there was simply a clear difference in height by the point of first impact, when calculated against the time base, equated to 1000 fpm at 150 KIAS. However, with a serious double FADEC runaway this height accrual could have occurred in a very short space of time which could have led to inadvertent IMC and CFIT.

A lot of hypothesis but I am inclined to believe this rather than two good pilots simply forgetting where the mountain was and Fying into it in a cruise climb.

Of course if this were the case the crew could be said to have made an error in ending up so close to cloud beyond there VFR limits before the defining event took place. The real environment, as we know, is very difficult to maintain clear dimensional separation from cloud and this could be construed as an honest error. I certainly have ended up in such situations albeit with a machine behaving itself.

Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!

[Art of flight]

Some might think it a little strange that a witness such as Mr Holbrook did not 'offer' his complete recollection of the events and by implication not say something that would have been relevant. It simply doesn't work like that. Having been the main prosecution witness in a L@ser case I can say that the court draws from the witness what they need, and only that. I had a very clear idea of what had happened, but was never invited to (or given the chance to) describe the incident from my perspective in full, I was asked specific questions and answered them. I left the witness box feeling a little under used and wondering if the court had fully understood what had happened, but the result was the right one in my opinion.

[tucumseh]

The icing clearance was +4, safety altitude for the entire route would have been about 6500 feet (at a guess).


While I know what you mean, it has been established beyond any doubt whatsoever that there was no legitimate clearance to fly the aircraft, and that in any case the illegal Release to Service did not have an Icing Section. The +4C you mention was removed at Amendment 1 (March 1994 - there only was one amendment as of 2.4.94). It was reinserted a couple of months after the crash. This was an administrative error, but nonetheless fact.

This is part of the evidence fully accepted by Lord Philip.


We have gone over all this in the past. I think the pertinent point today is this. For 17 years MoD railed against any notion that the pilots were anything but grossly negligent. They consistently called for "new" evidence. Just before the Philip Review was announced, we had the retired VSOs, and indeed current VSOs, writing to the press asserting they and MoD would continue their fight against the pilots.

Then, when Dr Fox made his announcement, NOTHING. Not a murmur. Not a word of dissent, except privately from those who had been caught lying (Alcock, for example, when claiming CHART didn't apply to Mk2. It mentioned Mk2 373 times!). You need to ask WHY. What "new" evidence was presented to suddenly make MoD shut up and retreat? Answer: The aircraft was not cleared for operational use and VSOs had made a series of false declarations that it was. As more than one knew of this, and acted together to present the same argument (i.e. lies), that was a conspiracy. Why are THEY not being pursued with the same vigour?

[jayteeto]

The weather that day was pretty poor. As previously mentioned, I walked out with the crew to take part in a 3 ship Puma trg sortie on the NE Antrim coast. Around the Cushendall area, the cloudbase was about 3-500' Amsl and we could see the scottish coastline in excellent visibility underneath that. We heard Scottish trying to call the Chinook on 243.0 but thought it wasnt answered because they were too low. Even though the cloud was so bad, we managed to get some useful training done underneath. The rest is history.

[Tandemrotor]

This thread has reminded me of a very interesting TV programme I saw recently entitled "How we make decisions." Here's a brief, edited, summary.
With every decision you take, every judgement you make, there is a battle in your mind - a battle between intuition and logic.

And the intuitive part of your mind is a lot more powerful than you may think.

We like to think that our beliefs, judgements and opinions are based on solid reasoning. But we may have to think again.

Prof Kahneman realised that we actually have two systems of thinking. There's the deliberate, logical part of your mind that is capable of analysing a problem and coming up with a rational answer. This is the part of your mind that you are aware of. It's expert at solving problems, but it is slow, requires a great deal of energy, and is extremely lazy.

But then there is another system in your mind that is intuitive, fast and automatic. This fast way of thinking is incredibly powerful, but totally hidden. It is so powerful, it is actually responsible for most of the things that you say, do, think and believe.

Most of the time, our fast, intuitive mind is in control, efficiently taking charge of all the thousands of decisions we make each day. The problem comes when we allow our fast, intuitive system to make decisions that we really should pass over to our slow, logical system. This is where the mistakes creep in.

Our thinking is riddled with systematic mistakes known to psychologists as cognitive biases. They affect our beliefs, our opinions, and our decisions, and we have no idea it is happening.

It may seem hard to believe, but that's because your logical, slow mind is a master at inventing a cover story. Most of the beliefs or opinions you have come from an automatic response. But then your logical mind invents a reason why you think or believe something.

Those wondering what I mean, please bear in mind the quite stunning paucity of FACTS in the case of Chinook ZD576!

Please allow me to summarise them for you:

1) Ground witness marks at the accident sight.
2) Physical wreckage, of which (as I was corrected) 20% was destroyed, and 80% affected by the post impact fire.
3) precise positions of components in the flight control system at the moment of impact, including the Differential Air Speed Hold, and the Longitudinal Cyclic Trims.
4) Approximately three or four items of data from Supertans. This data was simply 'snippets' of information used by the navigation computer in the course of it's ongoing calculations. Non linked to each other. Supertans was never designed to provide historical data, nor has it's accuracy in that mode ever been verified, however at least one of those 'snippets' was demonstrably wildly inaccurate.
5) Weather reports from walkers on the Mull who described hill fog. The only weather report which had any bearing whatsoever on conditions from the cockpit came from a lady with a sea view from Antrim, and a yachtsman. Both of whom could clearly see the coast around the Mull, and conditions of bright sunshine.

I am unaware of anything else FACTUAL, though I am prepared to be corrected.

What there was NOT, is Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, survivors, eyewitnesses, radar traces, or radio conversations, though one call from F4J40 did go unanswered.

From this limited evidence, the BOI, had no choice but to resort to a computer model which was constructed in an attempt to tie together the dirth of factual information in a possible scenario which might 'fit'. This model was only ever designed to model the final 3.9 seconds of flight, but from a pre-existing trajectory. 3.9 secs! No more!

Apart from this there is no other evidence.

Against all this there is the fact that no versions of RAF Chinook we're recommended for low level flight due to problems with DASH which had caused numerous UFCMs. Chinook Mk2, and ZD576 in particular, was an extraordinarily unreliable machine, with very serious flight control and FADEC faults, both of which we're evident in the wreckage. Much later it has been discovered that Mk2 was not even cleared to fly, having 'switch on' clearance only. This was a criminally immature development.

So what could possibly have caused the accident? As far as I'm concerned it's anyone's guess. UFCMS due to DASH or flight control faults? (seen previously in ZD576 AND in the wreckage) Absolutely. FADEC malfunction which would have left no physical trace? Absolutely. CFIT? Absolutely. Powerful visual illusion? Absolutely - it caused a previous RAF Chinook fatal accident, and is another form of CFIT I guess.

All I would counsel is, never forget that 'absence of evidence' is NEVER equivalent to 'evidence of absence' and this case could almost have been designed to demonstrate that precise concept!

When you have such limited evidence, how can you even begin to assess the probability of each possible cause? How can you determine which was 'most' likely, and frankly what's the point? Not flight safety that's for sure! Very occasionally we may have to accept, we'll never know for sure. That's a tragedy to all concerned, and the responsibility for that lies with those choosing not to fit FDR and/or CVR. Not those at the controls of the aircraft!

Finally I refer you back to the quote I commenced with:

Your logical mind is a master of justifying what your intuitive mind has 'decided'!

For me, there is insufficient reliable evidence to reach any reasonable conclusion. Others think differently. That's fair enough, but they are now opining beyond what is officially accepted. It may occasionally be necessary to accept we will never know what caused certain accidents. That is a tragedy for those involved, but the responsibility for that inadequacy lies squarely with those responsible for decisions not to fit CVR/FDR. Those at the controls of this aircraft have lost their lives, they shouldn't also be required to lose their reputations simply due to the decisions of others!

[Pittsextra]

Then, when Dr Fox made his announcement, NOTHING. Not a murmur. Not a word of dissent, except privately from those who had been caught lying (Alcock, for example, when claiming CHART didn't apply to Mk2. It mentioned Mk2 373 times!). You need to ask WHY. What "new" evidence was presented to suddenly make MoD shut up and retreat? Answer: The aircraft was not cleared for operational use and VSOs had made a series of false declarations that it was. As more than one knew of this, and acted together to present the same argument (i.e. lies), that was a conspiracy. Why are THEY not being pursued with the same vigour?

Why is that, because its not as if he tried to hide his position and it was re-stated not all that long ago...

The link is via here from 2010...

Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/6942522/Comparing-the-effects-of-the-snow-on-attempts-to-travel-to-work.html)

Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1

[air pig]

Gentlemen, has this crash not been the subject of much speculation since the crash. Is it not better after all the time and effort put in by others led by Brian et al to let this tragedy rest.

Please think of the effects and distress caused to the families of all on board the Chinook that days in particular to the families of Rick Cooke and John Tapper by this debate being re-opened.

Mods, please lock this thread and discourage its continuance.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

TANDEM - I do not entirely disagree with your post but for me, I see I significant difference in the balance of probabilities between:

1. A serious malfunction occurring at exactly the required moment to cause a crash on the Mull mountain, and;

2. The potential for a crash on the Mull mountain caused at that moment by a combination of poor visibility and airmanship.

I would like to think that a distraction, leading to inattention, to inadvertent IMC causing CFIT is the most probable. However the crew somehow made the decision to fly into a position where this likelihood was able to become a reality. Airmanship plays a role here surely whatever caused the final outcome.

Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.

While there is an argument for both cases, for entirely differing reasons, the lack of radar and avionics must surely be recognised as a contributing factor. In other words, the lack of FDR and CVR would not have been apparent if the radar worked, they used it and responded with appropriate airmanship as the coast approached.

This kind of logic has been lost in the heat of discussion and the dogmatic approach you and others pursue in the light of any intimation that the crew may have been responsible for the final flight path.

As our helicopters have become more sophisticated with many systems providing situational awareness, in offshore SAR and O&G support there is a trend towards downgrading, mentally, the essential role of the WX Radar in identifying and avoiding lumpy bits over the ocean or coasting in. 25 years ago in an S61 with Decca VOR and NDB we placed very high value on the black and white storms cope picture as we coasted in! In this respect nothing has or should change. In my view!

[philip2412]

tecumseh,thank you for your post.
Humans will make errors and faults and we must do everything to avoid that those mistakes cost lives.
here we have 25 VIP`s in relation to the national safefy of GB and a pilot with a lot of experience and renomme an it was his opinium that this heli was not airworthy.
So who was responsable to deny the pilots another heli even in light of the importance of the passenger on board.
Whar arguments had had been there to deny this request ?
IMOP this is the root cause of this accident throwing the well founded opinium of the pilots in the bin.

[Boudreaux Bob]

DB,


Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!

Having a bit of experience messing about in foul weather over the water and around large rocky ground, I also understand that "VFR Limits/Requirements (Rules)" have relevance but are not etched in Stone. They certainly have the weight of Gold in Tribunals reviewing a Pilot's decisions and actions.

The bottom-line for me is to remember that it is easy to remind others of the Rules after the fact and sometimes ignore the reality of life that occurs when it comes to the practical application of those very Rules by Pilots.

With the risk of Icing in Cloud and yet another of one of the "Rules" runs foul of reality.

The CVR would not have prevented this Accident but it would surely have aided in the determination of the actual cause of the Tragedy. That in itself is very important as it might lead to the prevention of another event of the same.

I have been harping about poor Decision Making lately.

As in almost every aircraft accident, we see poor Decision Making playing a role.

Sadly, we tend to limit our application of blame to just the Crew as they commonly are not around to defend themselves. If the Crew erred in this tragedy, they paid a price for it. Those that put them into the situation seemed to have escaped.

How does One address the fact the Aircraft was in service without a proper Airworthiness Release? If Senior RAF Officers lied under Oath, why were they not prosecuted?

If the Aircraft did not have a proper Release to Fly and the Senior Officers knew it beforehand then why were they not held accountable?

Bad Decisions, even if it was only to remain silent when someone in the chain of command should have stood up and refused to allow that aircraft to be flown operationally, should bear liability and should have been addressed.

[tucumseh]

Why is that, because its not as if he tried to hide his position and it was re-stated not all that long ago...

The link is via here from 2010...

Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/6942522/Comparing-the-effects-of-the-snow-on-attempts-to-travel-to-work.html)

Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1 This letter from 2010 was written before Alcock and Graydon knew that the author of CHART had come forward. That gem was withheld deliberately, the aim being to help them dig their hole deeper. They did. Far deeper than we dared hope for.

At this period, these VSOs and the MoD staffs they briefed, consistently referred to the "53 page" CHART report. However, when I discovered there was nearly 350 additional pages, containing the most damning evidence, a Freedom of Information request was satisfied. The 53 pages had been lodged in the House of Commons library. We now had evidence that these VSOs had withheld the bulk of the report from the BoI, the FAI and both Houses. That was a serious offence.


At more or less the same time, many of the missing pages from the RTS were provided by the same MoD office, including the SFI from March 1994 warning of UFCMs. (I won't name names, but the RAF officer who provided them turned out to have a VERY close interest in the case, being aware the FAI had been misled by MoD and that the RTS was a fabrication. He is a good man). Those involved from the early days, such as Tandemrotor, Brian Dixon, Shy Torque, John Blakeley and others will confirm that the many requests for the CAR (i.e. Part 1 of the RTS) did not produce these pages; so MoD were again proven to have withheld vital evidence. Lord Philip was NOT amused. (A key clue in this case was MoD always referring to the CAR, never the RTS. You ask why this deceit, and follow the lies).


In parallel with my RTS request, I asked one of the widows to make the same request. The strategy here was we knew a different part of MoD would reply to her, because she was an "interested party". This proved correct, and MoD replied to her denying the very existence of RTSs, saying they didn't exist until 1996; naming and blaming Sir Donald Spiers for signing the only Release (his Switch On Only, not yet airworthy, CAR in Nov 1993, and AL1 in March 1994, current as of 2.6.94). So, literally on the same day, I received a full RTS (or at least, much more complete than hitherto provided) and the widow got a letter saying there was no such thing. That naming and blaming of Spiers was a gross lie, and the first indication of a break in the VSO's ranks.

Yet again, MoD were seen to lie through their back teeth, and Lord Philip was, again, NOT amused. In particular, Baroness Liddell was incandescent. The Review demanded the widow receive a written apology. She did. It is the most grovelling letter I've ever seen from a Minister's office. THAT was the day I think we knew we'd won. That Minister turned against MoD, his own Department. He did not like being lied to (whereas many are completely ambivalent about it).



Alcock and Graydon say;


You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence? Their bluster was exposed by the uncovering of the complete CHART report. It debunked their entire argument. This vital evidence HAD, demonstrably, "been hidden for all these years". There were only two names on the distribution; Alcock and Bagnall. Lord Philip agreed that it was inconceivable CAS was not informed by Bagnall, as it hit Bagnall's desk in his first day as ACAS in August 1992. The CHART Leader's Terms of Reference, signed by Alcock, specifically forbade him speaking to MoD's airworthiness experts or departments, thus compartmentalising the issue.

With hindsight, the content of CHART (Aug 1992) explained the (at the time) inexplicable behaviour of Alcock's immediate subordinate, Baker, when in Dec 1992 he threatened to dismiss civilian staffs who were saying the same thing. That is, complaining about systemic airworthiness failures under Alcock's policy of "savings at the expense of safety". (A policy that had its roots in another policy promulgated by one of his predecessors, prepared in 1987. He used to post on here).


There, you have the cadre who conspired to hide this evidence. It simply did not cross their arrogant minds that the author would come forward after all these years and that he would still know exactly what to ask for. Or that anyone in MoD would know enough to prepare comprehensive and irrefutable evidence that the Chinook HC Mk2 was NOT airworthy on 2.6.94, and that ACAS knew this to be so yet still signed a false declaration that it was. You will appreciate the significance of ACAS's actions. he was both a recipient of the CHART report and signatory to the RTS. MoD withheld the former from all inquiries, and denied the existence of the latter. Alcock, Spiers, Graydon, Bagnall, Johns; none have ever been called as witnesses in this case. Yet they are the appointed mouthpieces of MoD. If they think they know so much, let them give evidence and answer questions about the offences they have committed. No? Oh dear, what a surprise.

[Tandemrotor]

DOUBLE BOGEY
Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.
To back that statement up, you would need to know the cause of the accident. But you don't. Nobody does.

We are denied that knowledge due to lack of CVR/FDR.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tecumseh, that is truly an appalling story of deceit and lies.

I do not want to dilute the nature of the deceit so please do not take this the wrong way, but....do you believe or have evidence to suggest that the accident aircraft actually suffered failure(s) or indeed that the NAV suite was so ****e that it may have directly caused the accident.

You will appreciate that despite all of that paperwork and deceit the crew still planned a marginal flight on a less than ideal route that ultimately took them close to the Mull. I recognise that without an IFR clearance for the AC their options were severly limited but still.....the route selection does not make a great deal of sense if VCF was their only legal option at the planning stage.

In addition, what major changes if any, apart from the FADEC software, were made to the HC2 variant before the RTS was legal. If the answer is none or very little then the deceit you have outlined, although shocking in nature, may not actually be that relevant to the actual accident. I have an open mind so if you think otherwise I would be interested to share your views.

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem, I appreciate your point but do you believe all IFR capable military helicopters in the transport category should have a WX radar or not?

[Tandemrotor]

DOUBLE BOGEY

I'm not sure it is easy to be prescriptive. In general terms, personally I would like every piece of equipment known to man to be on board any aircraft I fly. Including EGPWS which is specifically designed to counter CFIT. AFAIK that's not fitted to any British military helicopters.

[tucumseh]

Double Bogey

Thank you. The point many very knowledgeable people here make is that the actual cause of the accident is in many ways irrelevant, and certainly I have never thought to speculate. My very simple position is that I knew the pilots were wrongly blamed, by the people who knowingly made them fly an unairworthy aircraft; but who did not tell them it was not airworthy.

This simple, demonstrable and now accepted fact (confirmed by Lord Philip) meant that, by definition, there existed doubt, when the MoD's regulations required no doubt whatsoever. They may have made an error of judgement, I do not know. But I have demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever that various VSOs committed serious offences. They were a directing influence on events. You may choose to conclude the blaming of the pilots conveniently detracted attention from their actions. I have always said, follow the lies. What MoD consistently lied about was airworthiness.


Despite MoD's claims, there were many known faults and defects (two entirely different things) in the aircraft. There was a significant and unexplained safety issue with UFCMs. There was a mandatory DASH modification outstanding, yet ACAS stated in the RTS it was not. (This need arose from a previous fatal Chinook crash, and its omission was one reason why Boscombe would/could not declare the aircraft airworthy). Parts of the transmission were being maintained using captured Argentine publications from 1982, as ours were no use. The FADEC software implementation was "positively dangerous". The complications arising from that prevented proper testing and trials, hence the statement by Controller Aircraft that the aircraft could not to be released to service. Lord Philip confirmed this was mandated upon ACAS.


THIS damning confirmation is what most commentators completely miss, and is the "new" evidence that called MoD's bluff. Lord Philip clearly stated Bagnall was not permitted to issue an RTS permitting operational flight. At best (according to respected pilots) the constraints meant one could do a rotors turning ground run, which requires the aircraft to be able to take off. But anything else? Don't ask me, ask a pilot. Would you fly operationally when you are not permitted to rely upon the entire aircraft in any way whatsoever? (The Switch On Only clearance applied to the whole aircraft, but was led by the FADEC, Nav and Comms SIL immaturity). Tapper and Cook weren't afforded the option, because this information was withheld from them and they were told the aircraft was airworthy.

In summary, this is entirely relevant, because if ACAS had met his legal obligations, the Mk2 would not have been flying on 2.6.94. That Wratten knew of this is beyond doubt, because AFTER the accident he wrote to Bagnall pressing him to have Boscombe declare it airworthy. How astonishingly stupid to place in writing that he, a Reviewing Officer, knew the aircraft was not airworthy! But entirely typical of their arrogance. Both he and Bagnall, and many others, were duty bound to come forward with this evidence. None did. I can't speak for anyone else, but in 2010 when the new Review was being mooted both MoD and plod approached me with polite warnings that I should cease and desist. I told them to **** ***. Those people are equally guilty.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem I do not know what you do for a living these days but......

GPWS - is a database linked to a GPS. It is not and never will represent the real world. It is a good awareness and alert tool if its limitations are properly understood.

RADAR - the most reliable indication of obstacles and coastline when offshore. Used in conjunction with GPWS it can validate at least in part, that the GPWS coastline is accurate.

HOWEVER - I specifically excluded GPWS from my post. Not only for the reasons above but because, to the best of my knowledge. It was not available on helicopters at the time of the Mull crash, therefore it is irrelevant to the subject matter in hand.

But nice try yet again attempting to deflect the object of my post from its original, and valid purpose and avoiding having to answer the most simplistic of questions.

Like I said, I do not know what you do but if you are in current flying practice, in respect of the various merits of GPWS and WX Radar, when over water, you can take the radar information to the Bank! The GPWS, well she comes second, always.

Over the land of course, the priority reverses but only to the extent that the red blobs on the GPWS are database blobs. Not real world radary type blobs.

What else have you got!

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tucumseh - I hear you but....if, and I recognise it is a speculative if, there was no failures then the crew determined their final flight path that ended in the crash.

Even with a minor failure, and you should recognise that to me a simplex FADEC failure, including run up, is relatively minor once the crew is beyond TDP and before LDP, and should never result in a crash.

In fact, in my view, no more no less, only catastrophic control failure, occurring 5.5 km from cloud, leading to an inadvertent flight path to the crash site, would completely absolve the crew of responsibility. This is a very harsh black and white statement. However, to those of us actively engaged in such operations, I would say it is the grim reality of our responsibilities as pilots and Aircraft Commanders.

I respect your incredible knowledge and insight into the paperwork debacle and I have accepted it at face value. However I do not readily accept that it had any direct influence on the outcome without being aided and abetted by some poor airmanship along the way.

DB

[Tandemrotor]

What else have I got?

Take it from me I use EGPWS (GPWS before that) and weather radar every day of my working life, in Class 'A' airspace. (EGPWS is of course based on a system accurate enough to post a cruise missile through a letterbox!) I held a procedural Master Green instrument rating when I flew Chinook.

Because at that time, the majority of Chinook flying was entirely overland at low level, for 90+% of the flying weather radar would have been useless! Even when IFR airliners can despatch without weather radar (and I have) it's just that weather restrictions become a little more limiting.

Perhaps your flying experience is less wide-ranging?

[Boudreaux Bob]

DB also knows he could depart sans Radar but had to have his Decca in the old days and I am comfortable that might hold yet today but with some restrictions now that the miracle of GPS is with us.

Radar is a very nice thing to have but it is not a necessity.

That being said I would have gladly launched without the Decca if I had the Radar which I consider an electronic eyeball that sees through cloud, rain, snow, and fog and most importantly is User Friendly compared to the Decca Products.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem and Bob yet again you wax lyrical and completely miss the point.

Departing with something U/S under an MEL generally involves restrictions. Risk based alleviations based on experience and mission requirements.

RADAR - is the only reliable source of obstacle information, IMC, over the sea. The point being, had the crew observed their 5.5 km COCIS rule the need for Radar is extant. However, if you are going to fly at 150 KIAS over water, less than a mile from a mountain in fog, aiming at it, Radar is definitely required.

Tandem, the EGPWS is geographically accurate but the database might be bollocks or the baralt ****e. You could post your missile but it might not hit the bit on the screen you are looking at. I thing GPWS is a great tool but it is second fiddle to the radar over water.

I do not feel the need to enter an argument about my experience or otherwise. Suffice to say I am well qualified to discuss this subject.

Yet again a nice try to deflect the issue from the relevant to the irrelevant.

What else have you got the relates to this thread subject.

[Tandemrotor]

Oh I posted that some while earlier today. When I told you the only known facts in this sad case. I guess you didn't bother reading it?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem I read it, agree with all that you stated as they are facts and it is a Sad case. I respect your hard fight to remove the BOIs conclusion of Negligence and I agree that the BOIs conclusion was unfair given the circumstances you, Tucumeh and Jayteeto have described. I am sure I might have fought alongside you if circumstances were different.

But this debate is not about any of that. It's about the most probable cause and what can be learned from that. Each person has a different opinion. Based on all you have stated, you do not seem to have an opinion on the most probable cause and I respect that too and fully understand given that you fought so hard, for so long, to get justice for those two guys. It would be crass of me to expect you to express any opinion on the subject.

Maybe I have been wrong to press you on it.

In fact I will go further and say I was wrong and I apologise.

However, please do not interpret my interest in the human factors elements that may have been at work that day in that cockpit as trying to blame the crew. Every accident is the end of a long chain of minor contributory events. By definition apportioning blame is not only inappropriate it distorts the reasoning needed to assess and prevent further similar tragedies.

I hope this can put an end to the pointless tit for tat postings that serve no purpose but to cause further upset to those of you most closely connected with the event.

DB

[Tandemrotor]

DOUBLE BOGEY

I'm very grateful for your post, and I'm sure I too have things for which I should apologise. Please take the following simply as an explanation of my position rather than a criticism of yours.

I am as desperate as it is possible to imagine, to know and understand what caused the loss of my dearest friend in life. I know he would have felt precisely the same, but he has been denied the opportunity to posthumously present his evidence by way of CVR and FDR. It is not for lack of imagination that I say, I must accept I will never know.

I understand that some people's opinions are that this was CFIT in poor weather, pure and simple. But if that is your view, then please be certain that every step of that theory is supported by the limited available evidence. In my view it is not. Of course some are not too worried about the limitations of the evidence, and are prepared to judge on little more than 'intuition'. See my earlier quote on how we make decisions.

Not because of my loyalties, but genuinely because I have taken it upon myself to sift and understand every scrap of related evidence, (I scrutinised the wreckage in which my friend perished, twice in my role as technical advisor for the FAI. I visited the accident site. I too was an SF Chinook pilot. I was present at every day of the four week FAI.) it is my genuinely held belief that it is difficult, bordering on impossible, to determine which of the potential causes is most probable.

I would also say that I don't particularly see any value, in even attempting to guess. What can we learn from guessing? What would we miss from mis-identifying the ACTUAL cause?

Allow me to give you an example:

The only weather evidence we have suggests the aircraft approached the cloud shrouded Mull in clear, sunny weather conditions. Flying at about 200-400 feet, the cloud base around the coast of the Mull was described by the yachtsman as around 600-700 feet. Perfect for a low level transit around the coast. No requirement whatsoever to enter a climb into IMC. That is the evidence!

So what could have caused it to commence a climb? Which it clearly did, and very probably into IMC, whilst failing to initiate the turn indicated by Supertans to the next waypoint.

I postulated earlier that amongst numerous, a possible cause of the accident was a UFCM related to un-demanded movement of the Differential Air Speed Hold actuators in the 'pitch' control run. This phenomenon is why, at that time the CA Release to service recommended that extended low level operations be avoided. IN AN ARMY SUPPORT HELICOPTER!:ugh:

The effect of a double DASH runaway which happens without warning, and has occurred on numerous occasions previously, is to cause the aircraft to 'porpoise' very violently. Indeed when IMC, almost uncontrollably. Please feel free to do the spadework, but take it from me there is nothing whatsoever in the available evidence to positively EXCLUDE this as a perfectly possible cause of this accident.

I say again, it's happened before!

So one person's most probable cause, can easily be another's least likely. Knowing the crew as I did, and understanding that the 'cruise climb' suggested is best described as unrecognisable as a Chinook technique, leaves me totally unsure as to what was happening in those final seconds.

So could it have been as Wrattan and Day believe? Possibly. Are there any other equally plausible causes. In the context of the Mk2 Chinook. Most definitely yes. At that time the Mark 2 was a disgrace. Not like any aircraft you or I have ever had the misfortune to fly.

The official position now gives my friends what they always deserved. The benefit of the very significant doubt that they should have been granted from the very beginning of this disgraceful episode twenty years ago!

But of course it was only two men then that wouldn't give them that benefit!

Every single subsequent inquiry (there have been many!) have found their position deficient.

[jayteeto]

On the day of the accident, Jon showed me a document, aircrew handling notes. Blank pages stamped 'to be issued'. His description???
"This aircraft is a joke, look at our handling advice"

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Tandem - thanks for your honest and forthright post.

For what it is worth, on the balance of probabilities I believe it was inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT. However I do not believe they simply forgot where the Mull was, blundered into a cloud and hit the hill.

I believe they were distracted sufficiently to momentarily loose the SA allowing the final flight path to occur.

Looking at the limited evidence available, I would hazard a guess that as the final flight path came IMMEDIATLEY after the very first waypoint change, that unfamiliarity, caused by a combination of poor training, lack of variant recency and possibly a misbehaving AP/Navaids/display was just enough to suck them both in and cause the event.

Reading yours, Jayteetos and Tucumsehs post and the official reports I think anyone looking coldly at the evidence might reasonably conclude the same.

It's easy to critise a crew for minor discrepancies that combine with other more sinister events to generate a serious incident or accident. I think we all make at least one such mistake each time we fly. It is also very easy to sit in an armchair and pontificate about limits. Especially weather!

However, if we were to critically analyse the minutiae of this flight, the crews apparent closure with clouds at high speed, not compliant with their required wx limits, must surely be considered. In my experience, this kind of non compliant act in an informed and generally compliant crew is nearly always related to experience. In this case experience on the variant. Over the sea it's not that easy to recognise just how fast you are going as the surface texture of the sea is infinitely variable and when the displays, controls and feel of the aircraft is unfamiliar the cues available to instinctively recognise when we are going too fast are degraded.

I think that assessment is fair, reasonable in the light of the evidence and most importantly highlights some serious inadequacies in the crews training and their subsequent management of the flight path.

[ShyTorque]

I have always been surprised that little has been made of the fact that in the wreckage the co pilot's intercom was found to be in the emergency position.

It is possible that there a crew communication problem at the critical stage. The copilot would have been responsible for navigation.

Also, regarding UFCM, I understand that the fixing of a critical part of the flying controls on the aircraft (the control pallet) had previously proved to be suspect and had actually detached, or partly detached on another example. This appeared to have been largely dismissed, although it was found to be detached in the wreckage, probably because of the high impact forces experienced during the accident.

Gp Capt. Pete Crawford, at the time the Station Commander RAF Odiham, commented that the very high speed cruise climb was not a recognised technique in the Chinook (or any other helicopter I've ever flown because it makes no sense). My interpretation of his comment was that he couldn't understand how the aircraft got into that situation because it was illogical that it was deliberately flown in that way.

[Tandemrotor]

DB
For what it is worth, on the balance of probabilities I believe it was inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT. However I do not believe they simply forgot where the Mull was, blundered into a cloud and hit the hill.
You use the term "balance of probabilities", which is of course a fairly low standard of proof. Particularly so when the evidence is thin, and the individuals concerned are denied the right of reply.

Just interested to know what you think the probability is? Clearly more than 50/50? So 60/40? 80/20? 90/10? How do you make that assessment?

What enables you to dismiss the probability of other possibilities?

Of what value is such an 'intuitive' (rather than factual) determination to Flight Safety?

Thanks

[Art of flight]

The G-LBAL initial report brings the lack of CVR/FDR on military and police aircraft into sharp focus. In my experience it's long been the military ethos to manage with the minimum equipment required for legal flight in civilian airspace. The real money has to be spent on the aircrafts ability to fly, fight, and survive in the 'battle space'. Whilst it would be nice to have wx radar, I can't see a change in that ethos to fit items that do not contribute to the ability to fight. I think the attitude from above is still 'avoid iimc', land and wait for it to clear if you have to, it's certainly the way the police avoid any sort of instrument qualification requirement.
Certainly from a tactical point of view (with my EWI/EWO/ACTI hat on) a wx radar would be a beacon to the ememy defence sytems in a slow moving aircraft that relies on remaining undetected by using terrain masking, so would not be used in a 'fighting' scenario.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Shy,

The Chinook Cockpit is a very noisy place. Yelling and arm waving is fine so long as standard signals and lip reading skills are practiced.

That being said, in light of the impact forces is it not possible the Intercom selector might have been shifted around from normal due to external reasons or if the Co-Pilot's hand had been on the selector at time of impact?

Even with an Intercom failure, would not the Co-Pilot (or whoever was handling the TANs), have been able to switch to the new waypoint, slew the Nav pointers to that waypoint, and merely used hand signals of some kind to inform the Handling Pilot?

Also, just how accurate was the TAN's indications as compared to actual location and speed?

Much mention was made about the programmed waypoint being 285 meters (or some such distance) from the actual Lighthouse. It would seem to me that would be good enough for Government Work and not in itself have a bearing upon the outcome of the flight.

I also wonder about the 140 Knot Speed Limit imposed by the RAF rules. Besides using Dad's Slide Rule, what method was used to calculate that particular number? Stall Speed of a Piston Prevost?

It seems quite an arbitrary number somehow as 140 Knots is still clipping right along if one's concern is about being able to stop or avoid obstacles.

That high a speed does not comport with the Bush Pilot's "Hover Mosey" technique of going only as fast as one can see ahead which is a variable speed that derives from how far ahead one can actually see.

Again, I am seeing Arbitrary Rules that attempt to fit all occasions when in real life that concept just does not work.

DB keeps banging his Drum over that Rule despite no evidence exists to confirm what distance the Crew could see ahead of the aircraft.

What is it about the RAF Chinooks that caused them to be so unreliable? We do not hear such issues being raised about the US Army Chinook Fleet. There is probably a very sad story behind that which is far from being "Public" knowledge.

I recall the RAF had a Shed full of Chinooks that were put into storage for Years before they could be sorted out well enough to be put into Service. Was this one of them?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Bob, you will be pleased to note I am putting my "Drum" away. I have probably caused enough pain to the wrong people already so no more from me.

DB

[ShyTorque]

Bob, there is a lot of history to the standard of the Chinook aircraft delivered to the RAF and the standard of spare parts sold to maintain them.

I lost a good friend and colleague to the one which nose-dived in vertically from 1,000 feet during a maintenance air test in the Falkland Islands. The quality of certain critical components was found to be the cause.

[Boudreaux Bob]

I do believe there is far more to the story than just the Parts.

As I recall Maintenance Manuals, Maintenance Procedures, and a desire to "Go it Alone" also played a role in the problems. RAF Engineering Quality Control and Management of the Spares, Engineering procedures, updates on Service Bulletins and related issues created an environment that set up a dangerous situation.

Putting it down to shoddy parts grossly understates the situation.

I have looked into the smoking hole made by a US Army Chinook at one end of Goldberg Heliport at Fort Rucker many times as it was at the point where One turned Cross Wind in the Circuit so I understand what it is like to lose friends in a crash.

Anytime an organization starts with a Zero Knowledge Base on a new Aircraft that has been in service for decades with other Military units, taking stock of their Lessons Learned beats re-inventing the wheel on ones on time.

The RAF certainly cannot brag upon its performance in bringing the various Marks of Chinook into Service if one takes an honest look at the history of those endeavors.

Just the information surfaced in the multiple investigations into the Mull Tragedy proves that.

[Flying Lawyer]

DB

Thank you for post 107.

I look forward with interest to receiving the PM you mentioned.


FL

[tucumseh]

I hesitated to post because I simply can't recall the details, but I am absolutely certain a Wx radar was mooted for Chinook in the 90s.

To moot such a possibility, front line would normally have it flagged as an Operational Constraint; then OR would tag it Critical, Major or Minor, and add "safety" if necessary. In practice, only Criticals were funded at this time with Majors and Minors deferred. If it was EW kit, Criticals would also be deferred. In my experience.

That process tells you what questions to ask MoD. The reason I remember is because a VSO visited Emerson Radar in (I think) Texas because the bog standard Wx radar we used (E190/290 and the one bought for Nimrod AEW) were too big for a helo.