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UNCTUOUS
28th Sep 2005, 05:40
A Skeptic Under Pressure part 1 of 2

VIENNA — Ever since the Mangans gave up their comfortable house in Kansas City, Kan., and moved here a year ago, the family has been living in a kind of suspended animation.

It almost looks as if they just moved into their two-bedroom apartment near Austria's old Imperial Palace: Some boxes shipped from the U.S. have never been opened and the bedroom windows are still covered with sheets because the family ran short of money before they could buy curtains.

The three young Mangan children have stopped asking about their plight, although 9-year-old Timothy gets angry every once in a while. "I wish I can yell at them," he blurted out recently about his father's former employer.

Joseph Mangan, 41, is a whistle-blower. As a result he and his family find themselves in a foreign country with unfamiliar laws, fighting a legal battle that has left them almost penniless.

A year ago, Mangan told European aviation authorities that he believed there were problems with a computer chip on the Airbus A380, the biggest and costliest commercial airliner ever built. The A380 is a double-decked engineering marvel that will carry as many as 800 passengers — double the capacity of Boeing Co.'s 747. It is expected to enter airline service next year.

Mangan alleges that flaws in a microprocessor could cause the valves that maintain cabin pressure on the A380 to accidentally open during flight, allowing air to leak out so rapidly that everyone aboard could lose consciousness within seconds.

It's a lethal scenario similar to the 1999 crash that killed professional golfer Payne Stewart and five others when their Learjet lost cabin pressure and they blacked out. The plane flew on autopilot for hours before crashing in South Dakota.

Mangan was chief engineer for TTTech Computertechnik, a Viennese company that supplies the computer chips and software to control the cabin-pressurization system for the A380, which is being assembled at the Airbus plant in France.

In October, TTTech fired Mangan and filed civil and criminal charges against him for revealing company documents. The company said the information was proprietary and he had no right to disclose it to anyone.

Mangan counter-sued, saying he had been wrongly terminated for raising legitimate safety concerns.

Unlike U.S. laws that shield whistle-blowers from corporate retaliation, Austrian laws offer no such protection. Last year an Austrian judge imposed an unusual gag order on Mangan, seeking to stop him from talking about the case.

Mangan posted details about the case anyway in his own Internet blog. The Austrian court fined him $185,000 for violating the injunction.

And the Vienna police, who are conducting a criminal investigation into the matter, searched the family's apartment for four hours, downloading files from Mangan's computer as his children watched.

Boxes of documents detailing his allegations clutter the living room, but Mangan can't show the material or talk about the case — at least in Austria.

To discuss his case with The Times, Mangan took a five-hour train ride to Munich, Germany, where the gag order doesn't apply. "I don't want to destroy TTTech," he said. "But I still get nightmares of people dying. I just can't let that happen."

To help pay living expenses and legal fees, Mangan sold his house in Kansas. With only about $300 left in his bank account, Mangan missed a Sept. 8 deadline to pay his $185,000 fine and faces up to a year in jail. Next month he's likely to be called before a judge on his criminal case.

The family expected to be evicted this month from their apartment, but their church in Vienna took up a collection to pay their rent.

At the moment, Mangan is hiding out at a church member's home because he fears he could be arrested at any time.

Mangan's wife, Diana, has been reading a book, "Lord, Where Are You When Bad Things Happen?" to make sense of the family's ordeal. "He's trying to do the right thing. Why are we suffering for it?" she said.

On both sides of the Atlantic, Mangan's case has raised eyebrows in the close-knit aerospace community, which is fascinated by his allegations but unclear about how serious they are.

Hans Weber, a veteran aviation consultant in San Diego, can't say whether Mangan has a legitimate claim because he hasn't seen the evidence. But he is baffled by the extent to which Airbus and TTTech have "gone after" Mangan.

"There is something really unusual about this case in the sense that there is this hard standoff between Airbus and the individual," Weber said. "It doesn't make any sense to me."

One of Mangan's key allegations is that because of the A380's unusual design, any loss of cabin pressure would be extremely dangerous.

Most passenger jets have two cabin-pressure valves, with separate motors operating each. Because aircraft makers want redundancy on safety systems, the planes have three motors for each valve, with different chips controlling each motor. The Boeing 777, for example, has cabin-pressure chips made by Motorola Inc., Intel Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Most jetliners also have a manual override so that the pilot can take control in an emergency.

Airbus has acknowledged that its designers faced challenges as they attempted to reduce the A380's weight. Early on, the company elected to go with four outflow valves on the A380, with only one motor on each valve, which is slightly larger than a cabin window. Each motor uses a TTTech controller chip, and there is no manual override system.

"Just there, I would not be happy," said Chris Lomax, a retired engineer who helped design the cabin-pressurization systems for Boeing's 737 and 747. "If all four valves [on the A380] were driven wide open, it would be nip and tuck for the crew to get their [oxygen] mask on and begin a descent."

Airbus says that the A380 has achieved redundancy by installing the extra cabin-pressure valves, which provide a safety cushion in case a valve fails. As for Mangan's allegations, they are "an unsubstantiated crusade," Airbus spokesman Clay McConnell said.

"Don't you think we would look into it, and if we found it was true we would do something about it?" McConnell asked.

The A380, which is undergoing flight testing, is a year behind schedule because of unspecified problems. But Airbus has told aviation authorities that there is ample time to fix any problems that are discovered during the certification process.

TTTech executives insist that their product is safe. They portray Mangan as a disgruntled ex-employee seeking retribution and eager to blackmail them. "He's trying to destroy the company," Chief Executive Stefan Poledna said.

TTTech supplies parts to Hamilton Sundstrand, a United Technologies Corp. unit that is building the A380's cabin-pressurization system. "The matters raised by Mr. Mangan have been thoroughly reviewed," a Hamilton Sundstrand spokeswoman said, "and safety of flight will be assured."

The European Aviation Safety Agency, which is handling the A380's flight worthiness certification, has reviewed Mangan's allegations. "We have done the research and acted accordingly," spokesman Daniel Holtgen said. "We can't comment on it because it is a matter for Airbus."

Mangan believes that the European aerospace establishment is whitewashing his claims because of enormous cost savings that will be realized if TTTech's chips are approved for the A380.

TTTech's chip originally was designed for use in autos, and the company is trying to get it certified as an existing, "commercial off-the-shelf" product that is acceptable for the A380, according to court records.

Mangan, however, alleges that the chip is being customized for aviation purposes, and thus must undergo stringent testing before being approved by regulators.

If regulators decide that TTTech's chip is a simple commercial device and can be used in the A380, it would then be available for other new aircraft without having to pass costly safety reviews.

That's why the industry is so adamant about squashing his claims, Mangan alleges. Airbus, owned by Dutch and British companies, surpassed Boeing in 2003 as the world's largest maker of airliners.

Mangan's attorney, Franz Karl Juraczka, advised him last spring to leave Austria before his legal problems snowballed. Mangan refused: "I wouldn't be able to live with myself if anything went wrong with that airplane."

Despite his ordeal, Mangan remains enthused about aerospace design. He can talk for hours about arcane subjects such as fluid dynamics with the same sense of excitement as a kid with a new toy.

Mangan was born in Ohio and grew up in San Jose, and he always had a fascination for science and technology, family members and friends said. When Apple introduced its first personal computer, the 12-year-old Mangan took apart the family's television set to try to build a PC for himself. He also made a satellite receiver out of coffee cans to try to get weather data from an orbiting satellite.

At 16, while still in high school, he got a part-time job at IBM in San Jose helping to design robotic manufacturing machines. He attended San Jose State University and the University of Massachusetts, but never received a college degree.

Later, while working for Honeywell on a military jet project, he came into contact with TTTech, a company founded by two professors in Vienna to market their computer chips.

They say the chips contain 20 times more memory than the processors currently used in aviation, while having half the electrical wiring required for data communication systems that oversee aircraft controls. The chips also can be used on the steering and braking systems of autos. Moreover, they would cut the cost of aviation chips to about $20 apiece, versus $500 for previous designs.

Mangan was drawn by the firm's potential. His future seemed bright in February 2004 when he was hired as chief engineer at a salary of $100,000, plus $25,000 in moving expenses. Diana Mangan packed up their three children — Shelley, now 12, Timothy and Jarrod, 6 — and they arrived in Vienna in the summer of 2004.

With its subsidized medical care and after-school-care programs, Austria looked like a great place to raise a family. And the family was pleased to discover that Vienna had a Baptist church.

Mangan began work on the chip for the A380's cabin-pressurization system.

Until the 1940s, commercial airplanes were not pressurized and could fly only at about 10,000 feet. Flying above the clouds, around 30,000 feet, would make flights smoother, but at that altitude a lack of oxygen and temperatures of 140 degrees below freezing would kill passengers within minutes.

Then Boeing launched its Stratoliner, the first passenger plane with a sealed cabin. Internal pressure was maintained by regulating the intake and outflow of air during flight. This breakthrough helped lead to the age of modern air travel.

Today, most airline passengers — besides experiencing mild popping in their ears — rarely notice that air inside the cabin is in constant flux as air is taken in through the engines and let out through the valves in the belly of the plane.

However, if the valves are stuck open the cabin can depressurize in seconds before anyone can don emergency oxygen masks. In most cases pilots have time to bring the plane down to a safe altitude, but several recent incidents have raised concerns.

Authorities suspect that cabin-pressure problems caused the August crash in Greece of Helios Airways' Boeing 737 in which all 121 aboard died. And investigators believe that an abrupt loss of cabin pressure may have led to the in-flight breakup of a China Airlines 747 in 2002, killing all 225 aboard.

Mangan said he found serious flaws early last year in TTTech's computer chips and the software for the A380's cabin-pressurization system, according to legal documents. The system was executing "unpredictable" commands when it received certain data, possibly causing the pressure valves to open accidentally.

Because all four motors in the A380's cabin-pressurization system use the same type of flawed TTTech chip, Mangan says, "if one fails, they all fail."
part 2 of 2 follows

No Need to Wonder why the A380 hit sudden delays. It takes many months to build up genuine software, and prove it module by module, to replace this unqualified COTS program (that had been pressed into service for the A380\'s CPCS...)

CPCS = Cabin Pressure Controller System

cont\'d:-

Yet his employer ignored his concerns, he alleges, because fixing the glitches would be costly, could take up to a year and would further delay the A380\'s launch. TTTech tried to cover up the defects and forged Mangan\'s signature on documents to suggest that the software passed internal tests and reviews, he alleges in court documents.

"Once they slip this onboard the A380, they can justify using it on all other aircraft," Mangan said.

Indeed, Boeing Co. has ordered TTTech\'s chips for the flight control system for its upcoming mid-size 787 Dreamliner. Boeing executives said they were unaware of any problems with TTTech\'s chips, but said further questions should be addressed by TTTech.

TTTech executives denied any wrongdoing. They said there had been a minor glitch but that it had been fixed.

Within days of firing Mangan last fall, TTTech sued him in civil court to try to force him to retract his statements to aviation authorities about the potential defect.
In contrast to the U.S. legal system, in Austria individuals can file criminal charges. A few weeks later TTTech also sued Mangan in criminal court.

Then, in December, a civil court issued an injunction barring Mangan from talking about his case.

By May, the family was short of cash, so Mangan returned to the U.S. to borrow money to help pay his legal bills, and while there he also set up an Internet blog to publicize his safety concerns about the new Airbus.
The Mangans developed a circle of Austrian friends at their church who were eager to help. When Mangan decided his first lawyer wasn\'t aggressive enough, the church referred him to attorney Juraczka, who agreed to represent him for free.

These days the family\'s living room looks like a legal library, holding Mangan\'s voluminous whistle-blower records. He wryly notes that the clutter prevented police from finding all of his documents during their search.

Throughout the family\'s ordeal, Mangan remained dogmatic about not being chased out of Austria and about standing up for what he believed in. Diana said that she wondered at times whether it might be better to move on, but that the family was "very supportive that it will all work out."

The Mangans live day to day, not sure what will come next. If they can\'t pay their rent, they hope to return to the U.S. to live with Diana\'s parents in Ohio, although they have maxed out their credit card and can\'t afford plane tickets.

Mangan is getting ready to file for personal bankruptcy.

TTTech has offered to drop its legal action against Mangan, court records show, and pay him three months of severance, if he retracts his statements. But Mangan has refused.

Mangan said he was looking for a new job. He has contacted dozens of aerospace firms in the U.S. and Europe, but none have returned his calls. "Nobody wants to touch me," he said.

Mangan Blog: www.eaawatch.net/

matkat
2nd Oct 2005, 10:05
Why is it all airbus bashing articles have Boeing People on them? and secondly I would like to know what Dutch Company owns Airbus? if They cannot even research Who owns such a large company then I am afraid the whole article is fundamentally flawed,also if I went the the regulators instead of My Employers then I would also expect the bullet.

Dani
2nd Oct 2005, 11:53
If you ask me, too many embarassing errors in this story to be taken serious. Dutch own Airbus? A380 flying as high as a business jet (comparison to the Payne Stewart case). Even if an outflow valve fails, there are still the PSU (oxygen generators), working completly undependent. The list goes on.

This is just a scam, based on half wisdom and based on fear in the aftermathes of the Helios crash.

Dani

Riverboat
2nd Oct 2005, 12:28
I was just thinking how good it was to read an intelligent and serious post, when along came Matkat's juvenile assessment of it all. Oh well, back to the lowest common demoninator, I suppose.

Belgique
2nd Oct 2005, 15:59
To simplify this for those who find many sequential words and developed arguments too challenging (icw the Sunday comics), I'll provide this simpler explanation.

1. TTTech and Nord Micro tried to pull a fast one by pressing into service a COTS program (Commercial Off The Shelf). Unfortunately that program, although used in many surface transport systems that have nothing to do with pressurization, had known bugs in it.

2. Even without the known bugs, OPS software that is required to drive critical systems, cannot be reverse engineered and cannot be COTS. It must be built up and certified module by module. Them's the rules and it makes Level A software expensive. Short-cutting that process can be very remunerative. We're talking tens of millions here.

3. Once the COTS genie was out of the box, and they became aware of the fraud, Airbus had to pull a quick cover-up and shut Mangan up. They, together with TTTech and Nord-Micro used the very utilitarian Austrian legal system and some compliant Judges to do just that. There's no protection for whistle-blowers in Europe.

4. They also had to start developing the bona fide article. Unfortunately that process takes six months at least (funny how the A380 got delayed by just that amount of time - yet it has been blamed upon JIT imbuggerances during customization of a/c for individual customers). That's a real weak pretext - but they had to think fast and just couldn't afford to admit that they'd been hoodwinked.

5. The possibility of all four outflow valves opening at 41,000 feet is there, mainly because the same software drives the CPCS and all facets of it. It would lead to a rapid depressurization and it would be a clear and present danger (akin to Helios flt 522)....... particularly as some failure modes are latent.

6. Of equal concern are the other airplane types flying around now with the same bogus and fraudulently COTS software. If you're interested, the types are identified by Mangan on his website.

MarkD
2nd Oct 2005, 17:07
EADS is incorporated in Holland. Thus the Dutch reference.

Carnage Matey!
2nd Oct 2005, 17:16
Unlike U.S. laws that shield whistle-blowers from corporate retaliation

This is an interesting claim as there is a documentary around about the Alaskan crash off LA which suggests otherwise. A mechanic who tried to blow the whistle on maintenance short cuts claimed to have been fired and never found work in the industry again. Anybody else seen that program?

Zeke
2nd Oct 2005, 18:42
Had a look at that Cabin Pressurization and Control Systems (CPCS) Operational Description (http://www.eaawatch.net/CAT_CPCS_operation.html) on the www.eaawatch.net site, seems each valve has a seperate controller, on earlier airbuses the one active controler would operate both valves.

From the scematics for the system, the valves are in different locations, some in front of the aircraft, others in the rear, they receive different inputs, eg the forward ones receive inputs from ADIRU 2, and the rear ADIRU 1.

The outflow valve control module (OCM) schematics it clearly shows "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" processing modules. So it does have a manual over capability.

My reading of the OCM schematics does show three processors, one for automatic, one for safety, and one for emergency.

Had another look at the article "Mangan alleges that flaws in a microprocessor could cause the valves that maintain cabin pressure on the A380 to accidentally open during flight, allowing air to leak out so rapidly that everyone aboard could lose consciousness within seconds."

He does however fail to mention the "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" that each valve has on the schematics on that web site.

"Airbus has acknowledged that its designers faced challenges as they attempted to reduce the A380's weight. Early on, the company elected to go with four outflow valves on the A380, with only one motor on each valve, which is slightly larger than a cabin window. Each motor uses a TTTech controller chip, and there is no manual override system."

Having looked at the schematics, the majority of the paragraph is correct, however the "Each motor uses a TTTech controller chip, and there is no manual override system" is somewhat misleading, the automatic controller which is the TTTech one is separate from the "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" processors.

So it is true that the TTTech chip does not have a manual override, however manual over ride done using two other processors "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position". Whilst it is true that the TTTech processor (i.e. the automatic mode) does not do the manual override, for redundancy it is provided by other processors.

What the article does not state is the valve assembly has no independent manual override, just the TTTech chip has no manual override. The schematics show that the valve assembly does have "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" capability.

The article also states "Most passenger jets have two cabin-pressure valves, with separate motors operating each. Because aircraft makers want redundancy on safety systems, the planes have three motors for each valve, with different chips controlling each motor. The Boeing 777, for example, has cabin-pressure chips made by Motorola Inc., Intel Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Most jetliners also have a manual override so that the pilot can take control in an emergency. "

and "Airbus says that the A380 has achieved redundancy by installing the extra cabin-pressure valves, which provide a safety cushion in case a valve fails. As for Mangan's allegations, they are "an unsubstantiated crusade," Airbus spokesman Clay McConnell said."

So what they are basically saying is this ...

Airbus has on the 380 four valves, in different areas of the aircraft, each vale with its own motor, each valve with Automatic, "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position".

Boeing with the 777 has two valves, with three motors and three processors.

Having 4 independent valves in different locations is a like having 4 engines, and one valve like one engine. Whilst we know you are statistically more likely to have an engine failure on a quad turbine than a single engine turbine, doesn’t matter how you dress up the single engine turbine, one it fails your in trouble, and on a quad you continue on with your other three.

Dagger Dirk
3rd Oct 2005, 01:08
My understanding of the system is that it doesn't matter how many components it has, if the CPCS sofware is a centralized controlling medium and it is bugged, it is capable of doing "bad" things to the system as a whole.

Even if it wasn't a known bugged software program, you cannot incorporate it within a critical airliner system (as was done) unless it is qualified by the specified software qualifying process. Trying to cover up the fact that it allowed TTTech and NordMicro to hoodwink it does Airbus no credit. There's no suggestion that Airbus was complicit, but it certainly has now gone into active denial and supported the concealment of the TTTech and NordMicro illegality.

It also does the Austrian legal system no credit that all their courts have done is try to legally gag Mangan and send him broke (as well as sending the Gestapo around to roust his home and terrify his family).

Shame on Airbus. If the FAA was worth the paper it wipes its collective rear end with, it too would be looking at all the other airliners that run on this unqualified COTS software. But of course they're a tombstone organization that specializes in attending crashes, blame-shifting and cost-recovery.

We've not seen the end of the bogus software game within airliner certification. What Mangan has, and what worries all the fraudsters, is the paperwork that proves all his assertions; the paperwork that pretends that all the qualifying work WAS done - but which is palpably false. He has it - and this worries them terribly - as it should.

Mangan has pricked the balloon that represents all the pseudo-qualified COTS software that's floating around out there, masquerading as qualified under the regs. That balloon will now bounce off quite a few walls before settling limply to the floor. The question is whether any body cares. If no-one cares and we'd rather wait and see what happens (the first COTS software induced accident) then by all means tear up the rules and regs governing software qualification and wait for the echoes that will certainly emanate from the first such event.

But Zeke, don't just go on pointing out how much duplication there is in the number of valves and controllers. That matters not a whit in a centrally controlled system. We've already seen the example of the A340-500/600's faux redundancy within the fuel transfer system. The two computers just kept handing the flaw over to each other until eventually the inboard tanks ran dry, the inboard engines failed and the very confused Virgin crew diverted to Amsterdam. That A340 system had plenty of valves and pumps and plumbing too. No-one has looked closely at how that flawed system was qualified and certified. Airbus has just been allowed to patch it.

This one is due to reverberate even before the first accident gets a chance to echo up and down the Airbus and DGAC corridors.

OVERTALK
3rd Oct 2005, 10:18
LETTERS from link (http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-letters2.2oct02,1,1744198.story?ctrack=1&cset=true)

Defending A380's Safety

"A Skeptic Under Pressure" (Sept. 27) paints a very inaccurate picture of our company and our commitment to providing our customers with safe and reliable technology.

The certification of the systems used in the Airbus A380 is an ongoing process, which is not yet completed. All products must pass extensive qualification tests in strict compliance with all regulatory requirements.


The TTTech component will be certified under the rigors applicable to newly designed aircraft, and safety of flight will be assured.

Product safety is an absolute priority for our company.

Stefan Poledna

Chief Executive

TTTech Computertechnik

Vienna

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
I have to tell you how very, very disappointed I am about the way your story turned out.

While it makes for interesting reading, you have attributed to Joseph Mangan hugely disproportionate weight and credibility — and you have done your readers the very disservice I was most concerned about: giving the false impression that there is some sort of looming safety issue with the Airbus A380 and the Boeing 787 as well despite the fact that there is no evidence whatsoever to support that impression.

There is no evidence to support Mr. Mangan's assertions, and information from the involved parties point to his being wrong. Just because an individual is unable to let go of his worldview does not mean that view is worthy of being given the status of supposed fact.

Clay McConnell

Vice President,

Communications

Airbus North America

Herndon, Va.

There's now no looming safety issue with the A380. That's now been nipped in the bud. But what about the other a/c types fielding the same unqualified COTS software?

cwatters
3rd Oct 2005, 10:55
Question...

Are the valves in series or parallel?

I can understand why they might be in series because that way each one protects the other. In other words all 4 need to be open before any air is released. However the above says that they are in different parts of the plane which would imply long ducts to connect them all up. It implies they are connected in parallel.

If you had a plane with 3 valves then adding a 4th valve in parallel would increase the risk of loosing pressure accidentally but would reduce the risk of not being able to depresurise for landing. Which is a worse failure?

matkat
3rd Oct 2005, 15:41
I was just thinking how good it was to read an intelligent and serious post, when along came Matkat's juvenile assessment of it all. Oh well, back to the lowest common demoninator, I suppose.

Riverboat My apologies the way You received My post it certainly was not intended to be Churlish or Juvenile,having worked in the engineering dept of Airbus in Bremen(no longer)i do take exception to these statements(as I also did whilst working for Boeing)The post may well be intelligent and serious however that does not mean it is true which was exactly My point.
matkat

quote:
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Unlike U.S. laws that shield whistle-blowers from corporate retaliation
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This is an interesting claim as there is a documentary around about the Alaskan crash off LA which suggests otherwise. A mechanic who tried to blow the whistle on maintenance short cuts claimed to have been fired and never found work in the industry again. Anybody else seen that program?

Yes I saw it,the prog was air accident investigation of the crash itself.

Nardi Riviera
4th Oct 2005, 09:23
Also watched the Alaska Airlines’ MD-80 elevator jackscrew failure on National Geographic Channel (may still be rerun). Clearly stated that a whistleblower in the states can forget about ever finding work again in the same industry.

UAL 811 was aired the other day. A survivor dryly observed: “Manufacturers/operators budget the loss of a hull or two and some hundred souls every few years. COST OF DOING BUSINESS.” Improved parts may only be a few bucks, but the down-time to replace them is what really threatens safety. Also, these a/c were designed in an age when the cost of proper maintenance was never questioned.

What else to be expected? We demand cheaper airline travel, so they gotta cut costs anywhere.

:uhoh: :oh: :uhoh:

Dani
4th Oct 2005, 10:46
NR, your post is much too simplistic and much too wrong!

In spite of ticket prices going to the floor, air safety has always been improved and still is inclining in relation to miles/seat offered.

Also it has to be mentioned that low cost carriers are very safe compared to higher cost business models. There is no direct connection between costs of an airline and air safety (the mentioned Alaska and UA are conventional airlines). The only safety relevant factor is culture and safety awareness in management.

Dani

4PW's
4th Oct 2005, 11:42
Dani, was this comment ("There is no direct connection between costs of an airline and air safety") made with tongue planted firmly in cheek?

Dani
4th Oct 2005, 12:39
4PW's, you mean because your airline's costs is much lower than those from the US or Europe ;)

wombat13
4th Oct 2005, 16:55
As a PPL I normally only read in this forum, but this is fair game for a comment since it is business / safety and I am well placed to speak on the first and have a vested interest in the latter.

To begin with the quality of the lengthy posting that got this started is poor. For such an "important" assertion it lacks objectivity and has the sound of something that has been lifted from another source.

There is nothing that has been done by TTTech (as reported in the initial posting) that I would have done differently. When you have an emplyee who behaves in this way, you use all legal methods to contain the situation. Equally, the Austrian authorities appear to have conducted themselves properly. That the employee is happy to put himself and his family through this is his look out.

Perhaps a more sensible route would have been to resign from the company, citing his concerns as the reason, copying his letter to Airbus et al.

Two final points. First is that I don't see a cost saving to Airbus from using this chip. I have first hand knowledge of this type of chip and frankly we are talking about small change.

Second, there is nothing to stop this chap seeking employment outside of the aerospace industry.

broadreach
4th Oct 2005, 23:22
ND, just an observation.

Manufacturers and operators budget the cost of insurance as part of the cost of doing business. It's the insurers who determine risk, premiums and deductibles.

UNCTUOUS
5th Oct 2005, 02:16
Wombat13

That article has been written by a very reputable journalist from the LA Times and it has earlier been reported upon by other equally reputable news organizations. This particular update of the Joe Mangan story has been carried by a number of non-tabloid papers.

It has nothing to do with the chip, just the immutable fact that TTTech and Nord Micro tried to pass off a COTS program as a bona fide built-up fully certified piece of OPS software. There's no suggestion that Airbus was aware of this at the outset - but they have certainly actively participated in (and even orchestrated) the subsequent cover-up and persecution. Whether the Austrian courts have been flim-flammed (or are complicit) is another question. Perhaps the Austrian legal system is just aligned with "shonk" as an art-form.

Your status, Wombat, as an Airbus rep and/or retained apologist is equally obvious.

Developing aerospace software that will not produce the aerospace equivalent of the Microsoft BSOD is a very expensive prime cost item. The temptation to short-cut profitably by using a COTS program that appears eminently suitable (and has already done sterling service in many vehicles including other airliners) is understandable - yet reprehensible.

If anybody wants the facts and the proof, just look at Mangan's website (URL above) and don't be misled by these red herring trails being dragged across the thread ("chips?" come on now; nobody's so silly as to believe it's about chips and not bogus software). The facts are there and EASA/JAA and the FAA could go probe if they wished. The only reason that they're not is that, as yet, we're not talking about a certified airplane here, just one undergoing flight trials enroute to certification. Airbus has now moved to rectify the shortcoming - ipso facto the six month delay in certification. As far as the other airplanes go, the FAA has been assured by Embraer that the problem is "being fixed".

There is nothing that has been done by TTTech (as reported in the initial posting) that I would have done differently. When you have an emplyee who behaves in this way, you use all legal methods to contain the situation.

Finagling and finessing the law in order to squelch whistleblowers is exactly what's going on - but I doubt that it's moral, legal or should be endorsed as the "way to go". Hiding behind non-disclosure agreements to conceal fraud is not the intention of that contractual device.

Mangan did advise Airbus - that is how they first became "aware". Keep dragging those herrings - but it won't change the underlying facts.

Zeke
5th Oct 2005, 07:10
That article has been written by a very reputable journalist from the LA Times and it has earlier been reported upon by other equally reputable news organizations.

Ah yes...LA times...Seattle times reputable news organizations... reputation for any story which is anti EU, anti EADS, anti airbus anti WTO, and pro Boeing.

Your status, Wombat, as an Airbus rep and/or retained apologist is equally obvious.

Arr yes..personal attack again the man...not the topic...good form old chap :rolleyes:

Mangan did advise Airbus - that is how they first became "aware". Keep dragging those herrings - but it won't change the underlying facts.

I suppose you have evidence that he advised Airbus...he never worked for them.

Yourself and Dagger Dirk have not been able to put forward a rebuttal to my pervious post...I fail to see the relevance to the 340 fuel system unless that somehow controls the cabin pressure on a 380.

The facts are there and EASA/JAA and the FAA could go probe if they wished.

As for the FAA, they are a joke, they have a dual mandate which compromises safety. Think how quickly the FAA acted when presented with evidence that the 747 forward cargo door could open in flight causing an explosive decompression, and evidence presented to the FAA that a forward door on the 747 opened on the ground by itself. Only after an explosive decompression and loss of life did Boeing and the FAA address the issue, couldn’t ground the 747 that would be against their commercial mandate.

How do you know the DGAC/EASA has not reviewed the claims ? Would be political suicide for the management of the organizations and very short tenure for something which is been public for some time.

The only reason that they're not is that, as yet, we're not talking about a certified airplane here, just one undergoing flight trials enroute to certification.

You mean anyone can just slap together a few materials, a couple of engines, put F-WWOW on the side and fly it in and out of French airspace without any form of certification at all ? WOW them French are dumb.

I guess many here find it amusing to see how quickly some people are to rubbish anything to do with airbus, but praise Boeing when they are using exactly the same TTTech technology for the 787.

I believe that the 380 is not without problems, however I am confident that now is the time to identify problems (i.e. test phase) and address them.

I have read with interest how open Airbus have been in Flight International listing issues they have found in the test phase, and how they are addressing them. Seen nothing like that before from any aircraft manufacturer.

RevMan2
5th Oct 2005, 08:14
This topic is gradually getting the airing that it needs - frontpage news in the Frankfurter Rundschau and a feature on national TV last night, backed by some heavy-duty safety experts
EASA is now investigating and the European Parliament is also in on the act.
So let's sit back and see what's left when the dust settles.....

Zeke
5th Oct 2005, 08:50
EASA is now investigating and the European Parliament is also in on the act.
So let's sit back and see what's left when the dust settles.....

Considering test data for the controllers has been presented at conferances I think as far back as 2002, is available on numerous web sites, and video footage of tests also available... I am not expecting any show stoppers

RevMan2
5th Oct 2005, 09:23
Zeke

My thoughts exactly, but I'm trying to keep an open mind on this one.

Difficult, though - my paranoia detector is off the scale....

wombat13
5th Oct 2005, 18:54
Unctuous, just because you decide to throw some hysterics into the melting pot, it does not change what I said.

Your assertion that I am in someway related to Airbus or an apologist for them, as a defense against what I am saying, simply adds credence to my comment that these attacks lack objectivity.

My business is in no way related to aviation. My business style is information and facts.

As for your suggestion that we should visit this ex-employees blog to get a feel for what is going on, you really do need to get out more.

wombat13
9th Oct 2005, 18:55
UNCTUOUS, for such a big man with a big name you have gone all quiet on me. Now, you have had a few days to think of a response, so let's be having it..................

All in good old fashioned sport of course :}

UNCTUOUS
14th Oct 2005, 16:38
There is proof beyond the facts at this link (below) and at Mangan's website (referenced in the first post on this thread).

see this link (http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/mangan-vindicated.htm)

I tend to think that he (Joe Mangan) might now become a legendary figure where the A380 is concerned.

West Coast
15th Oct 2005, 03:57
From Dani

"Even if an outflow valve fails, there are still the PSU (oxygen generators), working completly undependent"

My concern would be it happens somewhere over the Pacific, many miles/minutes from an suitable alternate.

Dani
15th Oct 2005, 06:23
Even in the middle of the pacific, you must have enough fuel to do the emergency descent, enough Oxy for the descent and a bit longer between FL 140 and 100, and make it to your intermediate/emergency aerodrome. ETOPS, FANS and A380 haven't changed this basic rule of proper flt panning.

West Coast
15th Oct 2005, 16:39
I fly domestically for the most part, so thanks. You list ETOPS, will that apply to the 380 as its a four engine job?

PPRuNe Towers
15th Oct 2005, 17:42
There are advanced proposals to replace ETOPS with LROPS West Coast. Engine numbers immaterial in this case - Long Range Operational Performance Standards.

Regards from the Towers

West Coast
15th Oct 2005, 19:19
Adopt the best of ETOPS and require them on all long range acft?

SR71
15th Oct 2005, 23:23
Article on Mr Managan in todays Telegraph.

A380 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2005/10/15/ccairb15.xml)

Dagger Dirk
16th Oct 2005, 03:35
He (of TTTech) said TTTech was never informed by EASA of any alleged non-compliance, and insisted that certification was an on-going "iterative process".

Come in Spinner.
Of course EASA wouldn't think that certificates from reputable companies would have been falsified - so why would they have any requirement to level any accusations of "non-compliance". Once put on the spot however, EASA had no choice but to come clean. Not that they (and Airbus) haven't been aware of all this finagling from the word go.

This one goes a lot further than just the A380, Aermacchi and Embraer. Costs of qualifying COTS software and COTS micro-chips are very considerable under the present system, both in dollar and "lost time" and contractual obligations terms. There's much corner-cutting, and "nod is as good as a wink to a blind regulator" going on out there. This is but the tip of a large calving iceberg.

I know of two top investigative reporters that are now right onto this, including one with a Pulitzer under his belt already.

I hope Boeing is running "above board" with their commitments from TTTech and NordMicro.

This software qualifying scam might yet end up as the media news story and Pulitzer Prize winner of the year. You only have to look back at the great series of prize-winning analytical articles on the 737 rudder to see who might be interested (hint "B.A.").

Above all else it doesn't say a lot for the Austrian legal system or the EU generally. I wonder how many companies are headquartered in Austria just to avail themselves of the protection that that country's laws afford companies that operate on the fringes of aviation regulation?

Zeke
16th Oct 2005, 13:41
Above all else it doesn't say a lot for the Austrian legal system or the EU generally. I wonder how many companies are headquartered in Austria just to avail themselves of the protection that that country's laws afford companies that operate on the fringes of aviation regulation?

I would suggest TTTech is a spin-off from the University of Vienna, specializing in "time-triggered technology". is the reason for their location.

pom
23rd Oct 2005, 02:54
"Even in the middle of the pacific, you must have enough fuel to do the emergency descent, enough Oxy for the descent and a bit longer between FL 140 and 100, and make it to your intermediate/emergency aerodrome. ETOPS, FANS and A380 haven't changed this basic rule of proper flt planning."

Bit of a misconception here. The requirement is to have enough fuel to reach an alternate after a loss of a single system, for example an engine failure. There is no requirement to be able to reach an alternate following multiple failures, for example a wheelwell fire followed by a hydraulic failure which would leave the gear extended, or a total loss of pressurisation followed by a rapid descent to FL100. Of course in the latter case the experienced pilot might consider shutting down an engine to increase his range .....