S76 down in Baltic Sea (Now incl NTSB Safety Recommendation)

[Konkordski]

Not a lot more than that, but being reported on UK TV.

Edited to add - 14 reported on board.

[Fernando_Covas]

Sky News are reporting that a helicopter with 12 persons on board has crashed into the Baltic Sea. More news to follow.

Sky News (http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30000-1191778,00.html)

[Cyclic Hotline]

Helicopter crashes in Baltic Sea

A helicopter with 14 people on board has crashed into the Baltic Sea off the Estonian coast.

Rescue services said the crash was about five kilometres (three miles) from shore, near the capital Tallinn.

Two pilots and 12 passengers were on board the Sikorsky 76 helicopter flying from Tallinn to Helsinki, according to the Estonian rescue service.

There are no details of casualties or why it crashed. The area has been stormy. A rescue mission is under way.

[alexmcfire]

2 US passengers, 4 Estonian passengers and rest Finns onboard, the crashed near the island of Narissar (Nargö in Swedish) and
Estonian coast guard has lifted the helo with inflatable rafts.
No word about the outcome for the people onboard....

[Cyclic Hotline]

Chopper with 14 passengers crashes

From correspondents in Tallinn
August 10, 2005

A HELICOPTER with 12 passengers and two crew on board has crashed into the Baltic Sea off the coast of the Estonian capital, Tallinn.

"The tail of the helicopter can be seen sticking out of the water, t there is no sight of any people," a pokeswoman for the Estonia border guard, which is in charge of the rescue operation, said.

"The water at the site of the crash is 60 metres deep.

The helicopter, a Sikorsky S-76 C+, was operated by the Copterline company, and was flying a regular route between Tallinn and the Finnish capital, Helsinki, 80km away.

"The helicopter left Tallinn for Helsinki at 12:40pm (19:40 AEST) and crashed into the sea 5km from Tallinn," a rescue services spokesman said.

Rescue officials were alerted to the crash at 12:45pm, the spokesman said.

The spokesman was unable to give information about the fate of the people on board the helicopter.

Finnish company Copterline has been running the Tallinn-Helsinki service since 2000.

The company has a clean safety record.

[NorthSeaTiger]

See the Rotorheads forum for more info


NST

[xano]

Hello,

some more details that you might want to know.

First of all it is more or less comfirmed that all people in the chopper are dead and still trapped inside. Secondly, it was premature information that the chopper is lifted from the bottom of the sea, it´s not.

The pilots were Finns. A 41 years old ex frontier guard pilot (I believe that he was the captain) and a 57 years old pilot who have flown for Copterline 10 years.

Even though there are reports of storm, wheather was not a factor (most likely). It seems that there were no thunderstorms at the area, visibility was good and cloud base was not very low. The accident site is located in an area of low pressure but a satellite photo some 15 minutes after the accident shows no significant weather. It should have been a normal flight but during the cruise phase something went wrong.

Even though the company has a clean safety record it has had it´s shere of problems with the FAA. About a year ago their operating lisence was limited for only good weather operations for three months. Thats because their pilot had too much trouble at check rides. Also some under minima flying was discovered and some other things.

This is a bad day in Finnish aviation. :(

[JimL]

More details here:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4138170.stm

and here:

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Estonia-Helicopter-Crash.html?ex=1124337600&en=2f485cfd6959dc31&ei=5040&partner=MOREOVERNEWS


Jim

[LatviaCalling]

Can't add much to this except that wind was 10-15 meters per second. I'm used to mph or kp/h so I can't translate the above, but weather has been discounted as a problem.

Yes, all 14 aboard apparently perished because the copter plunged into the Gulf of Finland and did not feather into the water. The crash happened 3-5 minutes after takeoff.

As has been pointed out in above posts, the company has enjoyed a good safety record during the 10 years it has been in operation. We're also talking about two experienced Finnish pilots and not some ex-Soviet cowboys, whose last command was a Hind.

[LatviaCalling]

To PPrune admin,

I believe the that the Tallin, Estonia, chopper crash in which 14 (all) people died in today should be moved back to Rumours & News. The cax count is too high to be devoted only to Rotorheads. This is a general interest story.

[M609]

Tallin:

EETN 101520Z 12013KT 9999 -RA SCT008 OVC012 15/13 Q0991 NOSIG=
EETN 101450Z 13014KT 9000 -RA OVC012 15/13 Q0991 NOSIG=
EETN 101420Z 12013G23KT 9999 -RA OVC014 15/13 Q0991 NOSIG=
EETN 101350Z 13014G24KT 9999 -RA OVC014 15/12 Q0991 NOSIG=
EETN 101320Z 12013G23KT 9999 BKN014 OVC018 15/12 Q0990 NOSIG=
EETN 101250Z 13014KT 9999 FEW010 OVC014 15/12 Q0991 NOSIG=
EETN 101220Z 12013G23KT 9999 BKN011 OVC016 15/12 Q0990 NOSIG=
EETN 101150Z 12014G25KT 9999 BKN009 OVC014 15/13 Q0990 NOSIG=
EETN 101120Z 12014G26KT 9999 OVC009 14/13 Q0990 NOSIG=
EETN 101050Z 12013KT 9000 -RA OVC008 14/13 Q0990 NOSIG=
EETN 101020Z 12013KT 9999 -RA BKN008 OVC014 14/13 Q0989 RERA
NOSIG=
EETN 100950Z 11014KT 9000 -RA BKN008 OVC014 14/13 Q0989 NOSIG=
EETN 100920Z 11014KT 6000 RADZ OVC008 14/12 Q0989 TEMPO 3000=
EETN 100850Z 11013KT 8000 -RA BKN006 OVC014 14/12 Q0989 RERA
NOSIG=

Helsinki:

EFHF 101450Z 10016G27KT 070V140 9999 BKN011 BKN016 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101420Z 10017G28KT 070V140 9999 SCT011 BKN015 BKN019 15/13
Q0993=
EFHF 101350Z 11015G26KT 070V140 9999 BKN012 BKN026 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101320Z 11016G27KT 070V140 9999 BKN012 BKN025 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101250Z 10015KT 070V150 9999 SCT011 BKN015 BKN025 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101220Z 11014KT 070V150 9999 BKN012 BKN017 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101150Z 11015G28KT 070V140 9999 BKN012 BKN016 15/13 Q0993=
EFHF 101120Z 11013KT 060V150 9999 BKN012 BKN017 15/13 Q0992=
EFHF 101050Z 09014KT 060V130 6000 -RA FEW008 BKN010 BKN018 14/13
Q0992=
EFHF 101020Z 10016G26KT 060V130 9999 -RA BKN013 BKN019 14/13 Q0992=
EFHF 100950Z 10015G27KT 040V140 9999 -RA BKN017 15/12 Q0992=
EFHF 100920Z 09015G27KT 050V140 9999 -SHRA BKN017 15/12 Q0992=
EFHF 100850Z 09017G31KT 060V140 9999 -SHRA SCT018 BKN021 15/12 Q0992=

Norwegian media states, that the company involved was not auth. to fly in "bad weather" by the finnish regulator due to lack of crew training. The company have since taken measures to fix this, and they stress that the crew of the accident helo was very experienced


Finske luftfartsmyndigheter bestemte i fjor at helikopterselskapet Copterline bare skal fly under gode værforhold på grunn av manglende kunnskaper hos besetningen. Begrensningene ble innført etter at Copterline gjentatte ganger hadde ignorert pålegg om å sørge for bedre opplæring, ifølge nyhetsbyrået STT. Selskapet har siden tatt skritt for å rette opp manglene, og understreker at pilotene i ulykkeshelikopteret var svært erfarne.

www.dagbladet.no (http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2005/08/10/439810.html)

(Whatever that means in hard facts, no operations in IMC?)

[JJflyer]

Helicopter in question was a Sikorsky S76C registration OH-HCI.

Crew of two was from Finland with 6 Finns, 4 Estonians and 2 Americans as PAX.

Copterline operates 30 flights a day between Tallinn and Helsinki during weekdays and 9 flights during weekends.

[AndyJB32]

Anyone got any info on this. As far as i know they fly S76's, not sure which model. There was a little bit on the news last night, and a small article in today's paper, but not much in the way of details.

[Joker's Wild]

down the page, there's a thread referring to a crash in the Baltic.

They fly the S76C+ and they only have two of them.

[donut king]

Not a good day!

Condolences to those affected.

DK

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4140988.stm

[tecpilot]

Sikorsky S-76C+, OH-HCI, (c/n 760508)

All trapped inside the wreckage.
Divers today recovered the first of 14 bodies.

Estonia's police commander Robert Antropov said divers were not able to open the doors of the helicopter and had to lift the bodies through the shattered front windows.

Last year, Finnish aviation authorities temporarily banned the company from flying helicopters in bad weather due to inexperience of pilots. The restriction was lifted after the company made policy changes.

[Aser]

From Copterline website:
Press release
A Copterline helicopter on its normal route between Helsinki and Tallinn crashed into the sea near Tallinn today. Inside were 12 passengers and two crew members. Copterline expresses its deepest condolences to the families of possible victims.

The flight from Tallinn to Helsinki departed on schedule at 12.30 pm. According to yet unconfirmed information from the National Board of Aviation, the connection was lost at 12.40 after which the helicopter fell into the sea. The crash took place in horizontal flight, at normal altitude. The weather at the crash area was windy but quite normal and safe for a helicopter. The company has no knowledge of the cause of the crash or the course of events.

The helicopter was an American Sikorsky S76C+ and it was built in 2000. The model is one of the most used and safest ones in the world. It has two engines and can be flown and landed safely by using only one of them. It also has two emergency pontoons for landing on water. The helicopter was last inspected on 9th of August, 2005 and no faults were detected. The last 50 fly hour service had been carried out on July 21st, 2005 in Finland. The annual service was carried out on June 20th, 2005. The helicopter had 6253 flying hours before the crash.

The captain of the helicopter was an extremely experienced 41-year-old former captain of a frontier guard rescue helicopter, who has been serving at the Finnish Frontier Guard for over 20 years. The copilot was a 57-year-old, extremely experienced professional which had been with Copterline since 1995. Both pilots had effective helicopter pilot licences, which met every licence condition.

The personal information of the passengers can not be released. There were six Finnish, four Estonian and two American passengers on board. Both pilots were Finnish.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes that all information requests by the families would be made to the Central Police, phone number 09-8388 6766.

Very sad news... :(
Condolences to the families.

Aser

[Farmer 1]

The copilot was a 57-year-old, extremely experienced professional...

...and no doubt with a lifetime of stories to tell, and perhaps looking forward to recounting them through many happy years of retirement.

So very, very sad.

[Brilliant Stuff]

Can we wait for the Accident Report before we start guessing and making up things we might have heard or read.

After all the Pilot's are dead and they can not defend themsevles.

Manners please.:(

[Finnrotor.com]

Thank you Brilliant Stuff. In the country of a VERY small helicopter business almost everybody know each other personally and speculation without facts just makes things worse. We are all still shocked.:(

[Aser]

Just a question:
How are fitted the floats on a S76? I can't see them in these picture.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/898477/L/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/898362/L/

Thanks

[slowlane]

Just a question:
How are fitted the floats on a S76? I can't see them in these picture.

The S76 has four floats. One each side of the nose wheel (fitted internally) and one on the underside of each of the rear undercarriage doors. They are inflated via individual inflation bottles that cross inflate. ie each front bottle inflates half of each front float. Likewise for the rear.

I hope this answers the question adequately.

A sad day!

[tall and tasty]

Deepest Condolences to all those involved and to the friends and families .

Very harrowing for the poor rescue teams too

TnT :(

[Aser]

Thanks slowlane.

[tecpilot]

@Brilliant Stuff

After all the Pilot's are dead and they can not defend themsevles.

Sorry at the moment i couldn't read any speculations about the accident reason. And up to time nobody wants to blame the pilots!!!???

I you are pissed about the words to copterline tell us your opinion.

I think it's in the same way interesting to hear facts about the operators as to the a/c in case of any accident or incident.

[Brilliant Stuff]

Someone ... (made some allegations against the company.) But looking over the thread it has vanished now.
Must mean the moderators were at it.
So all is well again.




I haven't deleted any posts but, since the allegation you mention has now been removed, it's better not to repeat what someone wrote and then removed.

Heliport

[Heliport]

tecpilot

If you're not raising the possibility of pilot error, why did you mention some incident last year which concerned inexperienced pilots?


Heliport

[xano]

What was earlier reported and now disappeared about sharp pencilling the logbook etc. seems to be true. The president and biggest shareholder of Copterline has been banned from flying by the FAA for 9 months. He took the case to court and lost the first round. At the moment the case is still open so he can keep on flying.

So far all the passengers and one pilot has been raised from the chopper while the other pilot is missing. The chopper is planned to be raised either later today or tomorrow.

I can neither see anyone blaming the pilots. According to eyewitness reports a technical malfunction seems to be more likely reason but we shall see what comes up in the investigation.

[Brilliant Stuff]

Thank you Heliport.:ok:

I think enough has been said.

[tecpilot]

If you're not raising the possibility of pilot error, why did you mention some incident last year which concerned inexperienced pilots?

I couldn't see any line between a company fact and "raising the possibility of pilot error"???

In the GOM discussions it seems to be normal to discuss the operators and their way to operate the ships and to organize the work. Why is it in this case a question?

Fact is a S-76 modern ship is down, killing collegues and passengers. Thats the only accident fact at the moment.

But a fact is also that copterline in the past had some trouble with the kind of their operations. And in fact with the kind of operation on this route across the baltic sea.

I think enough has been said. Same to me.

[Thomas coupling]

To the newbies on the block:
This is a rumour network, we thrive on it.
As long as no-one is disrespectful or litigous then fair game.

I remember the Scilly Isles S61, just short of finals, fly itself very smoothly and quietly into the flat calm sea on a beautiful day.
I think it was poor CRM and rad alt settings that caught them out.

[Mr Toad]

Moderater,

Please take charge of this increasingly unpleasant thread.

[cl12pv2s]

Hello People!

Obviously, emotions are running quite high on this thread...

However, before everyone loses their minds, let's just put into perspective what's going on.

Whenever there is a tragic accident, there will be people wondering what happened. That's human nature, because it is a 'self-preservation' response. The intellectual challenge is natural. You'll not stop it.

Some asked, "Can't we just wait for the accident report?" That report could be months away. People aren't just going to forget about the accident until then.

The problem is, as details of the accident are sketchy at first, so the number of possible causes will be high. Still, I don't see anything wrong with going through scenarios based on what I know. That might just save me from a different accident.

Some scenarios will inevitably apportion blame to a crew who are sadly are unable to defend themselves. Is it so wrong to consider these though? Sometimes, even the best can make a mistake, and if they have, we should all learn from it.

However...

There is however a moral and ethical responsibility to that we owe to the lost crew, the families and friends and those involved.

This is a public forum and we don't know who may be reading at all. So for that reason alone, it is prudent to keep some views off this list and to yourself. Isn't this is a basic rule of society.

It always amazes me how people seem to lose their social skills, simply because they are on an anonymous internet forum. Why is that? A good test for whether something is appropriate for this board is this.

Imagine yourself in a very public place...would you stand up and shout it out loud? If not, then don't post it here!

Another problem (seen on this thread) is where people have tried to link unrelated issues to the accident.

If there is absolutley no connection between a company's past record and this accident, then why mention it? That is irresponsible to say the least.

So to sumarise what I'm saying...

1. Some need to accept that people are going to question and speculate, when they hear of an accident happens.

2. Others need to be more responsible when posting after an accident...maybe it's better off the list, simply for the benifit of those close to or involved.

cl12pv2s

[Martin1234]

This thread is strange. Everything here is pure speculation so either you allow speculation or don't. You possibly can't allow speculation as long as it doesn't allude that the pilots or the operator was to blame!

It is about the same likelyhood that the pilots would defend themselves on a public forum like this no matter if they are dead or not. I assume that everyone here is anxious to find a possible cause of the accident. I am quite sure that the pilots and their loved ones want the truth to get out. As an example - it's possible, but not very likely and can't be ruled out at this stage that the maintenance department used the same BIC pen as some of the executives did last year. I say again, I don't think that's the case but why shouldn't we be allowed to discuss such things openly? Let's just be open-minded to all possible causes, likely or not. If the accident is due to irregularities of the operator, I am sure that the pilots involved would have wanted this to get out..

I think that it's time for everyone opting to read this thread to accept the fact that everything written here, before the accident report arrives, is pure speculation.

[xano]

The chopper has been raised from the bottom of the sea. Blade parts will be raised later. Here are some pictures of it. As I understand it the door that is open was opened by divers. http://www.iltalehti.fi/2005/08/13/200508120123100_uu.shtml

Both pilots were either not wearing their seatbelts or they survived the crash and then opened their seatbelts. Anyway their seatbelts were found open. All the passengers weared their seatbelts when they were found. One of the pilots is still missing.

Now it’s also reported that the Estonians have labelled the investigation as secret???

There is already a lot of information available about this accident. I am confident that the reason of this accident will be found shortly. What will take longer is to find what lead to the accident.

The chopper was equipped with a “black box”. Some reports say it’s CVR some say it’s FDR some say it’s both. Anyone know what’s the fact in this case?

[Aesir]

I think it´s unlikelikely that it has FDR (Flight data recorder) However it should be equipped with CVR (Cockpit voice recorder) and since it´s a C+ it has FADEC (Full authority digital engine control) engine control so it should be possible to extract engine data from the Mini HUMS (Health usage monitoring system).

Interesting to see that the wheels are down and floats deployed!

So highly unlikely that it was CFIT, more proof that this was NOT the pilots fault.

[NickLappos]

I guess Martin1234, the difference is that we must keep to speculation, and avoid defamation or slander.

It is one thing to speculate as to what might have happened and another to say, "The crewchief/pilot/manager/passenger was/is a known jerk/felon/incompetant/murderer and that's why the accident happened." Those statements are not speculation, they are outright slander. It is possibly bad form, probably actionable, and certainly not defensible from someone who is now dead.

My thoughts are to those lost, and to those among the company, regulators and manufacturers who now are working hard to understand this one so as to prevent a next one.

[JimL]

We are all eager to know and understand the cause of this accident so as to avoid a similar occurrence in the future. This is the reason why Flight Recorders are mandated and carried.

It is difficult to understand Aesir's comment on the presence of the FDR (as he comes from Iceland - a signatory to the Cyprus Protocol); JAR-OPS 3 requires both a CVR and FDR for a helicopter of this size and date of individual Certificate of Airworthiness - it is therefore likely that it would have been fitted with a combination recorder satisfying both functions.

Most accident investigations are extremely thorough and therefore take a considerable time to publish the results of their deliberations; not to discuss the accident, and even speculate on the causes - in crew-rooms and even on PPRuNe - would be unnatural.

The more we discuss the probable causes of accidents the sooner we begin to understand our own (and mechanical) frailties.

Jim

[cl12pv2s]

Martin1234,

If the accident is due to irregularities of the operator, I am sure that the pilots involved would have wanted this to get out..

The problem is, by saying this, you are in effect accusing the company of manslaughter.

This is a very serious allegation indeed, and that is why the investigators will dedicate serious time in finding the truth.

I don't think we (at this time) have the right to make that sort of allegation based on the little evidence we have in an open forum.

Not only is it a little insensitive (I'm sure the company is grieving too as well as the family), but it is also pushing the boundries of defamation, libel and slander by implying the link. What if you are completely wrong and there is no link between the accident and the past history?

So we must be careful in what we write, both from a sensitivity point of view, and also a proffessional point of view.

cl12pv2s

[Aesir]

JimL

"It is difficult to understand Aesir's comment on the presence of the FDR (as he comes from Iceland - a signatory to the Cyprus Protocol); "

?? Uhh.. well its just because I fly helicopters of this size which do not have FDR!

But thanks for pointing out that helicopters of this size should have installed FDR if issued certificate of airworthiness after 1999. This particicular aircraft was a 2000 model so it's likely that it had a FDR installed.

Reference: JAR-OPS 3.715

[Martin1234]

The problem is, by saying this, you are in effect accusing the company of manslaughter.

Firstly, I doubt that a company, as opposed to an employee, in Finland can commit manslaughter. Secondly, I never ever accused the company for anything.

This is very important; I just, in order to give an example, gave a possible but not likely reason for the accident. That's it. If you draw any conclusions based on this that's not my problem. I even pointed out that I don't think that's the case but if someone thinks it might be relevant they should be allowed to express themselves.

Let's go through another example;

Fact: The company has a history of flying with only one pilot even if two were required.
Fact: After the accident, the rescue team found out that one pilot is missing.
Question: why?

cl12pv2s, if you think that there is some sort of accusation in what I just wrote it probably says more about what conclusions you draw. As NickLappos pointed out, we must avoid defamation or slander. I can't speak for what someone else is posting here, but if you accuse me of slandering you are the one guilty of just that.

Needless to say, my thoughts are with everyone involved in the accident and especially the loved ones to the victims. I don't think that the past history of the operator contributed to the accident. The only reason that I speculated about this was to point out that all views should be accepted as long as it's speculation.

[Aser]

I would like to comment the pictures because I'm regularly flying over water with passengers in a medium twin and I have always in my mind the possibility of something like this... I'm sure it would be good for everyone.
But for the moment seems too hot this thread.




Anyway...

Xano: could you please translate
"Näkyykö Eesti-TV:ssä näytetyissä hylkykuvissa lentäjän tyhjä istuin? " ;)
http://www.iltalehti.fi/2005/08/13/paikkatm_uu.jpg

Thanks.

[Finnrotor.com]

I hope i can answer on behalf of Xano:"Näkyykö Eesti-TV:ssä näytetyissä hylkykuvissa lentäjän tyhjä istuin? "
=
Is there an empty pilot's seat in the this picture that Estonian TV shoved about the wreckage?

Happy? Hope that helps your "quality" conversation.

[Aesir]

Source: ITAR-TASS
Link: http://www.tass.ru/eng/level2.html?NewsID=2308115&PageNum=0


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estonian witness says helicopter crashed into sea after 2 plops

11.08.2005, 01.12

TALLINN, August 10 (Itar-Tass) - Passenger helicopter crashed into the Baltic Sea after two loud plops that resembled explosions, an Estonian port pilot told the Tallinn-based Channel 2 television.

Matti Ojase, the captain of a port pilot boat, said he was in the area of Rohuneeme wharf east off Tallinn when he heard the two plops coming from the direction of the sea and saw the helicopter falling in a spin into seawater.

Ojase also said he did not notice any traces of smoke or fire.

The Sikorski helicopter belonging to the company Copterline fell into the Gulf of Finland between the Rohumee wharf located in the Tallinn Bay and Najssaar Island Wednesday afternoon.

The disaster that the claimed the lives of fourteen people, including Estonians, Finns and Americans, occurred minutes after the helicopter had taken off from a pad in Tallinn and started towards Helsinki, which lies on the opposite shore of the Gulf.

Toenis Lepp, Copterline’s executive director, said earlier a terrorist act might have been one of the causes of the disaster. He also indicated another two possible versions – bad weather and equipment failure aboard.

Rescue teams managed to locate an object resembling a helicopter on the seabed with the aid of sonar, and underwater footage made by a diver robot confirmed the supposition that it might be the perished Sikorski.

The final answer can be given, however, only after the object is recovered from the sea and taken up to the surface.

[Aser]

Happy? Hope that helps your "quality" conversation.

This type of comment is exactly why I wasn't expecting any "quality"... :yuk:
What's your fu***** problem? I can't ask about a text in a picture ?
My god... it's so sad.

[xano]

First of all thanks to everybody who have had the time to answer my questions or otherwise commented this accident.

Helsingin Sanomat (mostly reliable source) now reports that the plane has both CVR and FDR that will be flown to US to be analyzed. They quote Effie Lorende Ward from NTSB. What is weird is that the Estonian prosecutors now do not allow that even though they can not read it in Estonia. First of all the reason is because US is the manufacturers home country and secondly because of the distance to be flown.

A preliminary report should come out at 10th of September while the final report should take about a year. Helsingin Sanomat also quote Estonian investigation commission member Tõnu Ader that three floats did not float and nothing indicates that there was any pilot input for the floats nor should the floats operate automatically. I wish someone familiar with S-76 could comment on that. Also now the investigators are not anymore sure if all the passengers had their seatbelts fasten.

To Martin 1234: Your second example ( 1 pilot scenario) is actually something the investigators have been looked at and they believe that there was 2 pilots based on surveillance camera pictures and that both pilots passports have been found. I am sure that passengers of earlier flights have also been asked.

To Aser: Finnrotor.com has a good translation. What I would like to add is that Iltalehti is a tabloid so take it whit a grain of salt what they write. The only reason I posted that site was because of the pictures. What you write is quite interesting at least for me. I would like to know your view. If not on this site please PM me.

To Finnrotor.com: What do you mean by "quality" conversation? After all this is as good as it gets. Many of the posts have been quite good in my opinion. In about a week the media will forget this accident but many of us will never forget it. I don’t have any agenda neither for the company nor against it. All I am interested is to get views from pilots, mechanics etc. to find out what happened. After all I believe that this is the best site for that purpose. I know I should wait for the final report but we are all humans and we all are eager to know what happened. Safe flying.

[Finnrotor.com]

Hi Aser,

Sorry about that, i did not have a problem with your question, but reading this topic is more about "what you can write here and what not", other than talking about this tragic accident. That's what pissed me off, not your question.

This is an international forum and almost everytime there is an accident someone here knows pilot(s), work in the same company etc., so we should be really careful what we write here in the public. Blaming someone or something without any facts is not what we need.

It will be interesting to see what investigators will find. There has been photos of the accident chopper in the Finnish media after it was lifted from the seabed in the morning, and it raises more questions than answers. Machine seems to be in one piece, only (all) mainrotor blades are gone (Media speculates that it was a "nosedive" from 1000 ft). Mainrotor head seems to be in it's place and looks like transmission is still in place (bladefailure has been speculated as a cause of the accident in Finnish media)...

Here is an article from Finnish media ( Helsingin Sanomat) in English, if someone is interested:
http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/english/article/1101980583770

Safe flights to all.

[Thomas coupling]

JimL: well said that man.

Anyway: plop, plop............

Sounds like a bit's fallen off. My guess is a tail rotor problem or MRB.

[widgeon]

From the photos I would say that main blade failure is unlikely , if one blade failed the vibes would tear the transmission off its mounts . The housing appeared intact . I would guess from the pictures that the aircraft entered the water at fairly low speed , the windshield seems to be intact . Only speculation of course.

[xano]

That black box now most likely will read in the United Kingdom.

At least one windshield is so severyly dammaged that a pilot can get out of it.

[cl12pv2s]

This message was deleted (see AirSober's below!)

AirSober and I have taken our discussion off the list, as it did not necessarily relate to the topic of this thread.

Happy flying everyone!

cl12pv2s

[Air Sober]

I sent a lengthy message here concerning the topic plus communication on this thread on this subject. After reading cl12pv2´s response plus his PM´s I understand his point of view better, and will continue discussing them privately with him instead of this thread. Thus have I deleted the original message.

AS

[Hilife]

Having seen Copterline’s name on Rotorhub in the past, I found an archived press release detailing the following:

FARNBOROUGH, U.K., 18 July, 2004 - Finland-based passenger carrier Copterline has exceeded 10,000 hours of Sikorsky S-76C+ operation. This is quite an achievement for a helicopter airline where each flight sector is only 18-minutes, served by two S-76C+ aircraft.

In a striking display of reliability, Copterline’s two S-76C+ aircraft have achieved an overall dispatch rate of 99.7 percent on more than 35,000 flights during the company’s first four years of scheduled helicopter passenger service between Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, Estonia.

Whatever or whoever ends up taking the blame for this, these are pretty impressive statistics for both the operator and the aircraft alike and I take my hat off to them all.

[Martin1234]

Speaking of dispatch rate, didn't the Finnish aviation authority find Copterline to fly below minima?

You can prove anything with statistics - fact remains that half of the fleet have crashed.

[Heliport]

You can prove anything with statistics - fact remains that ............... if someone posts something positive there's always someone who'll post something negative.

[xano]

To Martin 1234: Yes, Copterline was caught of flying under minima once. Captain of that flight got a 6 months suspension for his licence and the co-pilot got a warning from the FAA (as far as I know). And half of their fleet has not crashed. Only half of their fleet of S-76C+ have crashed and we don’t know yet what caused this accident. As far as know the company has 8 choppers left, some of them working as rescue helicopters.

That 99,7% dispatch rate in incredible. Especially considering their timetable. Basically they fly an 18 minutes leg followed by an 18 minutes leg after being on ground 12 minutes(schedule time 20 minutes, flight time 18 minutes). Here’s their schedule: http://www.copterline.com/kopterilennot/aikataulut/fi_FI/aikataulut/ . At the moment they don’t fly at the weekends though.

[Martin1234]

True, even though I think that you missed the point. The phrase referred to was meant to exemplify the possible irony that could evolve by interpreting statistics biased. In addition to this, the post was partly written with a facetious undertone in order to put all badmouthing on this thread in perspective. I seem to have succeeded even though my underlying intention went unnoticed.

[Cdn driver]

First off let me say my post has nothing to do with the company in question.

With regard to dispatch reliablity, any operator that gloats on it's dispatch reliablity is normally a company that is not conforming to all standards set out by it respective regulator or maintence directives. Lets be honest, no operator stocks all neccesary parts and unforseen snags can not be predicted. Plus, Sikorsky is not known for its great parts support (no offence Nick).

99.7 % ??

[xano]

Remember that they had 2 choppers to do the job that required 1 (excluding maintenance downtime, charters etc.) So if they had problems with one of their chopper they could easily brought another one in. Of course this is only speculation on my part that it ever happened.

[Aesir]

According to information received by Helsingin Sanomat, the blades overheated some time ago, as the pilot was taking off. The turbine exhaust gases heated up the blades to such an extent that the rotor-blades began to shake on ascent.

Helsinginsanomat news (http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/english/article/1101980583770)

Interesting! The blades had been replaced so were not an factor in the accident but I didn´t know this could happen. Is it because the engines are started with rotors still on the S76?

[NickLappos]

Aesir,

The S-76 has a rotor brake which allows the pilot to start the engines and then engage the rotor. If there is significant tail wind, the brake should not be used, as engine exhaust can be turned upward by that wind and impinge on the blades, perhaps causing local hot spots that could bubble. The operating instructions explain all this.

If that had happened, replacing the blades (which would show obvious overheat damage on the lower surface) would eliminate this as pertinent information relative to the accident.

[RotorSwede]

This accident already seem to be forgotten on the news. I for one have not.

Anyone know when the preliminary accidentreport will be official ? Anyone heard or read anything new ?

Regards

RS

[Aesir]

Source: Helsingin Sanomat
Link: http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/english/article/1101980643479


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post mortem results indicate helicopter crash victims died from drowning

http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/kuvat/iso_webkuva/1101980606025.jpeg
A CCTV image of the Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopter in Tallinn, shortly before it took off on its fatal flight.

The cause of death of the victims in last Wednesday's Copterlines helicopter crash was drowning, according to the Estonian State Prosecutor's Office. Post mortem examinations had been carried out on most of the victims by Tuesday afternoon.
Twelve passengers and two crew members died when the helicopter plunged into the sea on Wednesday afternoon, a few minutes after take-off on a scheduled flight from Tallinn to Helsinki. The body of one of the two Finnish pilots is still missing, but all thirteen of the other victims apparently died in their seats.

Final results of the forensic examinations will be published in September. An Estonian police official stated that the bodies had been in remarkably good condition considering the nature of the accident, and the Finnish forensic odontologist Helena Ranta, who was among those sent over to help in the identification process, said that there had been no problems in identifying the deceased.
The cause of the crash remains a mystery, and a commission of inquiry has been set up to examine the incident. The onboard flight recorder is to be sent for analysis in Great Britain.

[xano]

According to investigation commission member Tonu Ader, Tallinn radar recording shows that shortly after take off the helicopter deviated 20- 30 degrees from course and changed course several times. After that it turned back towards south then to west. Shortly after that it turned to north. While this happened its speed decreased fast and it lost altitude rapidly from 1000 ft. All this took about 30 seconds.

The preliminary report is expected at 10th of September.

[Aesir]

From Svenska dagbladet (http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/utrikes/did_10369394.asp)

Apparantly the pilots tried to transmit several emergency calls before ditching. The reason for the mayday calls not beiing received anywhere is under investigation in connection with the analysis of the CVR.

The engines were running at the time of crash and the weather is not considered to be factor, also a birdstrike is ruled out.

One pilot is still missing.

All flights were cancelled monday due to spare parts awaiting delivery from the manufacturer for the remaining S76.

http://www.svd.se/images/ettan2005/050810/helikopter339.jpg

[Cyclic Hotline]

Amplification of Aesir's earlier post.

Crew of ill-fated helicopter tried to send emergency message

Pilots understood something was wrong 35 seconds before crash

The pilots of the Copterline passenger helicopter, which crashed into the Gulf of Finland soon after takeoff while en route from the Estonian capital Tallinn to Helsinki tried to send an emergency message shortly before the crash.

On Monday, a week and a half after the crash, in which all 14 people on board were killed, the Estonian Ministry of the Economy and Transport announced its findings after the helicopter's flight recorder was returned from Britain to Estonia.
"The crew knew that something was wring 35 seconds before the helicopter splashed into the water", said Taivo Kivistik in Tallinn on Monday at a press conference reporting on the findings from the flight recorder.

Kivistik said that there was not much of a conversation going on in the helicopter. The voice recorder revealed that one of the pilots repeated the word "mayday" three times.

However, the call was not heard at air traffic control. "I cannot say if there was a technical fault, or if the pilots failed to push the right button", Kivistik said.
He added that the successful sending of an emergency message would not have speeded up the rescue operation, which was launched immediately.

The voice recordings in the flight recorder of the US-made Sikorsky S-76+ model helicopter did not reveal any obvious causes for the crash.
"Nothing in the examination of the wreckage or the black box indicates that there would have been a collision with a bird or a flock of birds", Kivistik says.

An act of terror is considered unlikely, but not completely impossible. So far, nothing in the evidence suggests any such event.
The flight recorder reveals that the engines functioned until they came into contact with water. The engines have been sent to France, the country where they were manufactured, for additional investigations.

One of many possible causes under investigation is a fault in the gear transmission between the engine and the rotor. The transmission mechanism is also under investigation. The possibility that a fault in the rear rotor would have caused the crash is also under investigation.

The wreckage of the helicopter has been taken to Tallinn Airport, and is being examined by investigators of Estonia's criminal police. The commission of inquiry has promised its initial report on the 10th of September. A final report could take a year.

Copterline had to cancel all of its flights between Helsinki and Tallinn on Monday because of a delay in the delivery of a spare part from the United States.

Copterline still has one helicopter operating on the Helsinki-Tallinn route. The spare part was expected to arrive on Tuesday morning.

[RotorSwede]

Hello rotorheads!

Any news on the initial report of the accident that was scheduled for the 10th of september ?

If anyone has read it, please post a summary here.

Best regards

RotorSwede

[xano]

I can’t find anything in English but Helsingin Sanomat has fresh news in finnish so here’s simple translation. I'm sure more presice news in english will follow tomorrow.

The chopper had just reached it’s cruising altitude at 130 kt when its nose suddenly raised up and it turned first left then right and started to spin (13 times before it hit water). When the spinning started captain asked for more power witch was followed by noise level increase and a mayday call (3 maydays). During the spinning co-pilot asked “did we lose our tail”. Everything happened in 37 seconds.

Speed was too fast so floats did not inflate properly. With the floats it is possible that the chopper might not have sunk but turned upside down.

The preliminary rapport rules out metal fatigue, braking in the air, problems with main transmission etc. According to Suomen tietotoimisto, preliminary rapport rules out pilot error and pilots were not able to prevent the accident. Control systems and some other systems are still under investigation.

The reason why this rapport is not public is because lawyer for one of the Estonian victim(s family) asked that it would not be published. New decision will be made in a few days.

Also the missing captain was found by some voluntary divers some time ago.

Final rapport is expected next august.

regards,

xano

[Aesir]

This was on the "S92s grounded" thread!

the S76 losing part of a blade in the Southern N Sea killing crew and pax and the recent Baltic S76 crash.

Anyone have any more info about that?

[RotorSwede]

From what I've heard, if the S-76 would lose tailrotor controll the fin would not be able to prevent the ship from starting to spin. Not even at maximum speed. Correct me if I'm wrong.

My question is, if you lose your tailrotor, start to spin uncontrollably and then shut off both your engines and enter autorotation, would you be able to regain controll off the machine ? Let's say from 1000 feet AGL and you loose the tail in about 130 kt speed? Maybe someone has done this in a sim?

Best regards

RotorSwede

[The Nr Fairy]

Aesir:

Check the UK AAIB site for details of the formal report into the loss of G-BJVX (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/1_2005_g_bjvx.cfm).

[FLI]

RotorSwede,

In a past life, I flew simulators of the same helicopter type but built by different manufactures. The failed tail rotor situation was controllable in one simulator but almost un-controllable in the other!!

In one you could fly, with a lot of lateral cyclic, to a suitable area to carry out an EOL but in the other simulator, if you did not enter auto, and shut off the engines, immediately, you spun!

Simulation depends partly on software engineers.

FLI

[xano]

Preliminary report is expected to be published on Wednesday 14.9 according to Estonian finance and transportation ministry.

[Aser]

Accident of helicopter Sikorsky S76 C+: Preliminary report

http://www.mkm.ee/index.php?id=2787

Aser

[The Nr Fairy]

A link to an English language version of the report here (http://www.mkm.ee/doc.php?10248).

[cpt]

Could someone briefly describes what this report says ? From where I'm it's difficult to download. I'm very interested since I use to fly this type of bird....by the way I have heard another one went down recently, with a successfull ditching in GOM...is it true ? have you got more infos about it ?
Thanks.

[The Nr Fairy]

cpt:

In essence, no real cause found at the moment.

The tail rotor appears to have been intact at the time the aircraft hit the water, the blade roots are still attached, and the other blade portions have been recovered.

All in all, it took something like 37 seconds from the initial problem to hitting the water.

[Mars]

cpt:

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 9/16/2005 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 90421 Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, Spirit, Eagle (HE-24
Date: 09/06/2005 Time: 2105

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
City: SABINE State: TX Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N90421, A SIKORSKY S-76 ROTORCRAFT STRUCK THE WATER, CAUGHT FIRE AND SANK,
THE TWELVE PERSONS ON BOARD WERE RECOVERED AND SUSTAINED UNKNOWN INJURIES,
GULF OF MEXICO 23 MILES SOUTH OF SABINE, TX

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: Y
# Pass: 10 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: Y
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: METAR KGLS 2152UTC 08015KT 10SM CLR 31/20 A3005

OTHER DATA

Departed: Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: SABINE PASS, TX Flt Plan: Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 09/08/2005

HOUSTON, Sep 07, 2005 (BUSINESS WIRE) --
Rowan Companies, Inc. (NYSE:RDC) reported today that a Sikorsky S-76 helicopter carrying 10 passengers and two crew members crashed in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday afternoon. All 12 persons aboard, including eight Rowan employees, were rescued last night by the U. S. Coast Guard and transported to nearby hospitals. Six Rowan employees have been treated for minor injuries and released. The other two employees remain hospitalized for treatment and observation. Neither appears to have suffered any life-threatening injuries.

The helicopter had departed Rowan's jack-up rig, the Bob Keller, located in High Island Block 346 at approximately 3:45 PM (CT), en route to the Company's Sabine Pass, Texas facility. At just after 4:00 PM, a distress signal was received by the Federal Aviation Administration. The helicopter was found approximately 23 miles south of Sabine Pass.

Rowan Companies, Inc. is a major provider of international and domestic offshore contract drilling services. The Company also operates a mini-steel mill, a manufacturing facility that produces heavy equipment for the mining and transportation industries, and a drilling products division that has designed or built about one-third of all mobile offshore jack-up drilling rigs, including all 24 operated by the Company. The Company's stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the Pacific Exchange - Stock & Options. Common Stock trading symbol: RDC.

SOURCE: Rowan Companies, Inc.

Rowan Companies, Inc., Houston William C. Provine, 713-960-7575 www.rowancompanies.com

[cpt]

Thank you NR Fairy an Mars....
A bit concerning actualy ! I just hope the actual cause will be found soon now....at least the "baltic case"

[malabo]

The first indication of anything going wrong is the collective going to full up, followed by a lot of aft cyclic movement. Considering that control movements can usually fit in a matchbox the amount of control travel of both the collective and cyclic could be considered extreme.

Full collective up pulls the engines through blowaway power after the NR droops from 107 to 101, then the NR continues to droop down to about 70% NR. Starting at 130 knots, this would quickly lead to retreating blade stall, accounting for the roll to the left.

Low RPM, the tailrotor is ineffective, airspeed is low and the aircraft yaws to the right since the engines are still trying to get the rotor back to 107 and the torque would be significant.

Thirteen turns to the water at 2.5 seconds per turn, or about 150 degrees per second, similar to a flat spin in an airplane. They kept it upright and pulled the throttles off, not sure why it would have kept rotating and they were unable to regain airspeed.

So why did the collective get pulled all the way up and was left there until the rotor drooped so far? Hydraulics? Servos? Autopilot? Evasive action by the pilots?

[cpt]

Strangely enough, I have experienced something looking similar on Flight Safety' simulator the other day. We were simulating a "collective drive" situation with a jaming after the mixing unit; (rudder pedals inefficient and linked to collective) Everything was going not too badly at about 130 kts untill I slowly tried to reduce speed to about 80 kts for an IMC let down. For some reason everything went messy from here ; speed reduced to about 60 Kts, and when I tried to increase it again ,I had a shard nose up motion with (I believe) a left yaw I couldn't counter (collective drive situation) I cannot tell if the yaw then reversed the other side (I was IMC)
It ended up quickly in a simulated crash, with 3 pairs of staring wide eyes,and adrenalyn pumping...in the darkness of this diabolic box. Frightening !

But is the simulator faithfull enough to simulate situations at the edge of flight enveloppe ?

[rjsquirrel]

I was an instructor in the 76, and have quite a few hours in it. It is difficult to diagnose on the basis of so little info, but I think you guys are on the right track. It looks like a jammed or broken tail rotor cable could have been the culpret.

With a powerful tail rotor intact, but driven to full angle, a slowdown from cruise will make the aircraft spin, and the collective driving is a symptom of the pilot's foot trying to push pedal against the jam, and instead back-driving the collective. The nose pitch up and such are artifacts of the strong yaw to pitch coupling of the airframe, so that a left yaw at high speed looks like a strong pitch up.

I wonder what maintenance was performed in the several hours before the accident, if the tail cable was touched, it could be a sign.

[ATN]

This collective pitch/yaw coupling on the S76 is a bitch to understand, cannot be practiced if not in a sim, definitely not user friendly and can have a nasty outcome: 37 seconds between the TR control problem and the crash - assuming of course it's the primary cause. I wonder how this system made it through the certification process.

ATN

[cpt]

Yes, and when I try to understand it a little deeper it makes me suspect the designer was (or is) not a human beeing, a bit like the pyramids mystery. Beside this, I believe this "collective drive" situation due to a jamming beyond the mixing unit is extremly rare ( I have the knowledge of only one case, with a succesfull landing )

[rjsquirrel]

ATN and cpt,

I think you do not understand the mixing on the S76 and its implications, certainly not enough to make those comments.

It is not possible for the mixer to have caused the accident. It is possible for the mixer to have confused you enought to believe otherwise.

PM me or repost, and I will be glad to explain the system.

[Ascend Charlie]

There is an Urban Myth, first heard at FSI, that the original 76 didn't have that complex mixing unit. The engineers put together a system that looked like it would work, and all the external airframe designer had to do was create a bulge on the left transmission to accommodate one of the servos, which poked out a bit.

Oh, no, says the designer, the external appearance must be smooth and sleek. Move the servo so it doesn't poke out. So, the servo was moved and that nightmare mixing unit was devised to allow the control runs (already fixed in the design) to still operate.

Makes a nice story, anyway - thanks Eber!

[NickLappos]

Eber Wright is one of those Flight Safety guys with too much time and too few facts. He can call me to get this one straight, after all, I was there! This bulge crap is an old - wrong- wives tale. The need for a mixer on the 76 was dictated when the delta three coupling was added. I was on the team that did so, and would be glad to provide the details. RJSquirrel is right, the mixer is not a source of black magic, nor is it at all likely to cause a problem.

[NorthSeaTiger]

Is the reply posted by MARS an old report or did another 76 crash just the other day in GOM ?

[Mars]

NorthSeaTiger:

As indicated in the post, the accident occured on the 6th September 2005 - i.e. earlier this month.

[332mistress]

Mars

But the date is written as 9 Jun 05 for those who use a logical date format;)

332M

[Sandy Toad]

When we had our 76A at beginning of 80s I don't recall "Collective Drive" being discussed at original American Airlines Ground School or subsequent Flight Safety Sim visits. However I did encounter Collective/Pedal interlock which was subsequently put down to the Pitch Change Shaft jamming, I believe because tho splined for 6? only fitted with two keys. At cruise position the keys chattered and wore notches thus if keys not exactly in line with spline, the shaft couldn't move, so everytime tried to move pedals collective moved.
Don't see this would cause anything as dramatic as this accident and has probably been addressed in subsequent 20+years.

[SASless]

332m,

Which is best...."logical" or precise?


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[cpt]

Hi rjsquirrel,

For sure I'll always be happy to follow a specialised course on S76 flight controls (with a very patient instructor) .
I know amongst other thinks that, with a high position of collective pitch and right pedal application, we reach a point where the linkage is positioned in such a manner that rudder pedal movment is impaired.
I don't have the faintest idea of what caused this poor S76 to crash, but apparently, there is evidence of "extreme" collective up position and an initial violent yaw to left...
My case on the sim at F.Safety was different in a sense that we were simulating a mechanical link jamming aft of the mixing unit. Nevertheless at one stage I also had to cope with a rapid nose-up attitude and a left yaw (probably when I lowered collective)
Please mail me at: [email protected] if you feel patient enough to enlight me on this flight controls matter.

[Cyclic Hotline]

Safety officials to look into Copterline's operating procedures
Surprise inspections also planned for domestic airlines

The Finnish Civil Aviation Administration (FCAA) have decided to evaluate the entire operating procedures of the ill-fated commercial operator Copterline, whose helicopter crashed into the Gulf of Finland just outside of Tallinn a little over a month ago, killing all fourteen people on board.

The report published on Monday reads that although the reason for the crash remains unclear it is reasonable to call for a re-evaluation of Copterline's flight operations after such a serious accident. According to Kim Salonen, the director of the Flight Safety Authority at the FCAA, it is better to go through the operations now rather than to wait for a year for the completion of the accident report.

Salonen emphasises that Copterline is not suspected of any specific shortcomings in its operations. Rather, this is a matter of double-checking if safety could somehow be improved. "We will go through weather restrictions, refresher training, and safety equipment. Everything related to flying, basically." Copterline director Jorma Kalhola views FCAA's estimate as a resonable one. "The authorities' actions are also going to be evaluated."

The report establishes that regular helicopter services are rare even on a global scale, and therefore the safety of Copterline's operation is difficult to gauge in the light of statistics. The report avoids looking into the reasons for the accident, which are subject to investigation by an examination board in Estonia. The report merely states that the accident resulted from a sudden event that was beyond the control of the pilots. According to the Minister of Transport and Communications Leena Luhtanen - who requested the report - there is no need for drastic measures on account of the accident.

The report also reveals that the Flight Safety Authority want to start performing random inspections on domestic airlines and to increase the number of inspections carried out on foreign carriers. This was prompted by the numerous serious air crashes this summer. Department chief Eero Kausalainen at the Flight Safety Authority says the random inspections of domestic carriers' planes will be an addition to check-ups already performed at regular intervals.

According to International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) norms, surprise inspections are to be carried out evenly and impartially on all airlines. Since 1997, around 30 to 40 foreign planes have been subjected to random inspections each year. Last year's number of random checks was 51. This year about 80 planes will go through an unscheduled examination.

[helirider]

This accident remains quite a mystery. The team (Sikorsky,
NTSB, Estonian authorities, Turbomeca, etc.) are still unable to find any
"smoking gun" associated with the accident. So far, no technical problem
has been found. The MGB has been examined and nothing abnormal was found their, either.

The U. S. NTSB is giving this accident a high priority and is ready to utilize their full range of resources to try and determine the primary cause of the accident.

Press release__________
Sent: Tue Sep 13 01:08:21 2005
Subject: Estonian investigation commission rules out engine failure as cause of August helicopter crash
Estonian investigation commission rules out engine failure as cause of
August helicopter crash
18:59, 12. september 2005
TALLINN, Sep 12, BNS - A commission set up in Estonia to investigate the crash near Tallinn last month of a helicopter of the Finnish Copterline company has ruled out breaking off of the rotor blade and engine failure as the causes of the accident but has so far failed to establish why the chopper crashed.
"We've a fairly true picture of how everything happened but unfortunately we're unable to say why it happened," the chairman of the Economy and Communications Ministry commission probing into the helicopter accident, Taivo Kivistik, told reporters today.
His deputy, Tonu Ader, said the commission has as a result of the investigation ruled out several earlier theories about possible causes of the accident. He declined to say which versions the investigators consider the more likely so as to avoid speculation.
The probe did not establish the breaking off of some parts while the helicopter was in air, Ader said. The parts separated from the chopper were lying near the wreck on the bottom of the sea and the only part lying farther away from the wreck was a blade of the main rotor.
"The commission has serious grounds to eliminate the breaking off of the main rotor blade as a cause of the crash," Ader said.
According to Ader, the commission reached the conclusion that the blade found at a distance from the wreck did not break off until the helicopter hit water. He made it clear that all four blades had broken off and had sustained relatively similar damage.
The commission also ruled out the possibility of the engines failing during flight. Ader said the engines continued working till almost the moment the helicopter struck water.
The helicopter started behaving inexplicably around 37 seconds before plunging into sea, Ader said. In his words, first its nose lifted up while the helicopter itself started to turn to its left side and away from its original course.
Then the chopper turned back right and started falling, making 13 full turns to the right, or one turn in 2.5 seconds on the average, until it hit water.
"The high speed of turning may indicate an overload which prevented the crew from getting control of the helicopter," Ader said.
According to him, the tape of the discussion between the pilot and the co-pilot showed that right before the zero-moment when things started to go wrong the pilot said, "Let's boost power," which was followed by an expression of surprise and, a few seconds later, by a very quiet Mayday
call repeated three times.
A bit later the co-pilot's question, "Have we lost the tail?" could be heard following which the recording contained no distinguishable phrases, he said.
According to Ader, clear evidence exists that the helicopter's tail rotor continued turning until the chopper hit water and that the aircraft's hydraulic systems were in order.

The Sikorsky S-76 C+ helicopter operated by Finland's Copterline company plunged into the Baltic Sea on August 10 shortly after taking off from Tallinn for Helsinki, claiming the lives of all the 12 passengers and two pilots on board.
The investigating commission was supposed to publish its interim report today but did not do so because of a petition against it lodged by the families of Estonian victims of the crash.
The commission is to complete its final report within a year of the accident, or by Aug. 10, 2006 at the latest

[RotorSwede]

Been hearing some rumors (this is a rumours networks so ....) that the rate the machine was spinning was to great to be caused be any kind of tailrotor failure.

The talk is that the machine encountered some sort of weather fenomena like a tornade or a whirlwind and that it cause the machine to get out of hand. Can anyone confirm if this is correct? Turning 360 degrees in 2.5 seconds, is that to fast to be caused by loosing tailrotoreffect?

Anyone know if a tornado or whirlwind can suddenly appear and then disappear without the met-people knowing of it (seeing it on weather-radar and so on) ?

Best regards

RotorSwede

[Cyclic Hotline]

Technical fault discovered in crashed Copterline helicopter

A technical fault has been found from the control system of the Copterline helicopter which crashed near Tallinn in August with the loss of all its passengers and crew, and its impact on the possible cause of accident is to be further investigated, commercial operator Copterline reported yesterday.

During investigations carried out in Washington, a technical fault was discovered in the front servo of the Sikorsky 76C-helicopter, which is thought to have been a possible cause for a temporary seizing up of the control system.

The front servo is one of the three power steering systems of the control apparatus, which transmits the steering commands of the pilot. The manufacturer of these parts is responsible for their complete overhaul on a regular basis.

"It was discovered in Washington that the front servo did not pass the operational check. It is still unclear what caused the freezing of the front servo. It is also uncertain whether the accident was caused by the front servo malfunction", the Finnish representative of the Estonian-led commission of inquiry, nimi>Hannu Melaranta, announced on Thursday.

Fourteen people died in August, including 12 passengers, when a Finnish Copterline helicopter on a scheduled flight between Tallinn and Helsinki crashed into the Gulf of Finland shortly after take-off from the Estonian capital.

Copterline is also to start lay-off talks because scheduled traffic between Helsinki and Tallinn is not profitable. According to the company, this is a direct result of the helicopter crash in August.

Only one of the company's 12 helicopters is flying the scheduled Helsinki-Tallinn route. However, more than half of the 70-strong personnel is working in scheduled traffic.

[Aesir]

Not so long ago Copterline was planning to add a S-92 on the route!

Too bad if this crash will destroy travelers interest in traveling with helicopters between the two destinations.

I wonder if it is really safer to travel with ferry?

[Heliport]

NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2005/A05_33_35.pdf)

It's a PDF file so you'll need Adobe Reader or similar installed to open it. Adobe Reader is widely available on the met free of charge.

[widgeon]

Is plasma spray part of the std actuator ? , I have always associated it with overhaul / repair before but as this was a fairly new machine one would not think the servos had been through an overhaul cycle.

[Aesir]

Very interesting subject.


I believe the accident aircraft had about 6000 hrs TT.

[widgeon]

Thanks after re reading the article I see the servo had 2,200 hrs since overhaul. Would the plasma spray be a standard repair to an oversized housing ?

[Flapwing]

Within our company it is a requirement for the stick jump and interlock check first flight of the day and a stick jump after every subsequent start. Maybe this would have picked up the suspect servo.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Always sad when you see folk trying to deal with the internal trauma effect that a fatal accident has within an operating company.

The possible demise of Copterline serves to underline the old adage

"If you think safety is expensive - try having an accident".

Estimates we use to illustrate the costs of such an event are between $150m and $250m.

Anybody from management reading this I hope will give people like Dr Steve Walters a call and get him to build you a Safety Management System. No better time like now to get investment cash out of the CEO and the shareholders. The most important aspect of a successful SMS is "buy-in" from the management and now is a good time to get on the bandwagon.

Terrible when something like this happens but at least something good may come of it if a lot of folk get wise to the "cheap and cheerful" philosophy.

G


:(

[SASless]

How long does it take to do a stick jump check?

Once in fourteen starts?

Would I know a "bad" indication if I saw it....and would I report it immediately?

.....or would I say to myself...."Ah...that is not so bad....I'll tell the Engineers about it when I get back."

[ShyTorque]

The Flight Manual says "no stick jump" during the pre-flight hydraulics check. I am absolutely certain this means nothing other than just that. That's what I have always been led to understand, especially on the S-76.

I've never found any problem with the hydraulics (of any helicopter) apart from leaks / pressure loss and so it is easy to become complacent. However, in view of this report I will personally be even more vigilant during these particular checks. I will also be more concerned about the possible implications of an in flight "Servo Jam" warning.

I recall a Chinook crash in the Falklands Islands, about twenty years ago, that killed some colleagues of mine in similar circumstances to this accident. That aircraft nosed over to the vertical from 1,000ft on a post maintenance test flight and went straight in. No conclusive evidence was found although there was some discussion about manufacturing standards / specification and matching of critical hydraulic components. Perhaps there is more we must learn here.

[Flapwing]

A stick jump check takes all of 15 seconds... checking for control binding, roughness, proper tip path, control jump between systems... we have been doing them before each flight for a good 15 years in our fleet... one of the largest in the world.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Sikorsky have issued an AOL stating that they do not recommend following the NTSB's advice. The cause of the accident is still under investigation.

G:confused:

[Collective Bias]

First Sikorsky sent out the NTSB report then the AOL stating to wait for the FAA recomendations, BUT, they reminded all to do the jump check!!!

[Snarlie]

When the Copterline tragedy occurred Sikorsky eventually (after a significant delay) circulated a letter advising of `an S76 mishap`.12 dead - some mishap!

Now the NTSB has identified what it believes to be a good reason for immediate checks to be carried out on the aircraft, yet Sikorsky are quibbling about interpretation of test results and recommending a wait and see policy.

Imagine the fun and games the lawyers will have should another S76 mishap occur whilst we are waiting for Sikorsky and the FAA to find the same page in the hymn book.

Perhaps a note to Eric Hansen, S76 Program Manager at Sikorsky might help.

[FlyingHead]

On another note, if the NTSB is right, and the servo was the problem, if the pilot had turn off the proper hydraulic system, it is possible that he will regain control.
Cheers
FH

[Galapagos]

Might be old news, but I just found this on AIN...

NTSB: ’Urgent’ Action Needed on Sikorsky S-76

An ongoing investigation into the August 10 fatal crash of an S-76C+ in the Baltic Sea has led the NTSB to ask the FAA to take “urgent” action on several recommendations. Flight-data recordings show that the twin-turbine helicopter “pitched up and rolled to the left, followed by a series of rotations to the right before striking the water,” killing all 14 aboard. The investigation to date revealed that one of three main-rotor blade hydraulic actuators had an “uncommanded” extension, resulting in loss of control. Subsequent investigation found a “number of serious discrepancies within the forward actuator.” The Safety Board wants the FAA to require S-76 operators to conduct immediate and recurring tests and corrections for hydraulic leakage and contamination in all of the main rotor actuators with more than 500 hours since new or overhaul. Additionally, the NTSB wants the FAA to reemphasize to S-76 operators the importance of, and requirement for, a preflight check of control movement smoothness and flight control “stick-jump” at every engine start.

G

[Brian Abraham]

Article on Baltic 76 accident.
www.flightinternational.com/Articles/2005/11/29/203372/S-76+operators+urged+to+carry+out+safety+checks.html

[GLSNightPilot]

I, for one, decided to do the stick-jump test for every start, and most takeoffs. It takes all of 2 seconds, and is well worth the time it takes. I would do it for all takeoffs, but I just don't always remember.

[Geoffersincornwall]

For those have yet to catch up with events you should be aware that the guys at Sikorsky feel that the NTSB was a little premature with their Safety Notice.

Once issued this notice was swiftly followed by a letter to all operators from Sikorsky explaining that they disagreed with the NTSB conclusions.

I've spoken with some guys from the factory and know a little more about it now and I'm sure they will publish their own conclusions as soon as they feel able.

Suffice it to say that when the RFM says that you need to do something then the instruction is not there for fun - the stick-jump check is a must.

G
:ok:

[Aesir]

Is it just me or does anyone else feel that this is another of those accidents where everyone feels "Let´s just blame it on the pilots" syndrome is the way out!

We´ll they are not with us anymore to defend them selves so it´s an easy way out.

Has anyone considered that the root cause of the problems is more likely a failure of critical component and that it may or may NOT have been discovered during hyd test! If that component failed it´s just as likely that the FDR failed to register that they perhaps actually DID a stick jump test!

Sure it´s a good idea to do the jump test but just maybe the pilots did it and noticed nothing unusual?

How can similar accident be avoided in the future? Is it by doing the stick jump test always or is it perhaps better to design new components that do not fail!

[exwessex]

Is there a requirement for the stick jump test on other types?Is that what the servo test button is for on the AS365N.

[Flight Safety]

Aesir, according to the FDR, the pilots did NOT perform the stick jump check prior to the accident takeoff.

[Aesir]

If that component failed it´s just as likely that the FDR failed to register that they perhaps actually DID a stick jump test!

That´s my point! If the servo failed who to say´s the FDR didn´t fail as well! No one can say for sure that the pilots didn´t do the test or for that matter if they did, that it would necessarily have indicated any kind of problem.

[hovering]

If the servo actuator itself jammed (as I understand is suspected), not just a jammed pilot valve (as would be indicated by the SERVO JAM warning light mentioned in an earlier post), control of that A/C could not be maintained by any pilot, I would think. Something you don't train for, there is nothing you could do about it. Imagine, any movement of the controls would move only two out of the three actuators, leaving the swash plate fixed at the ceased actuator, giving control responses that would be completely unpredictable to a flying pilot. Add the AFCS giving inputs, some of which would be fed back to the controls, and all through the mixing unit, things get ugly really fast. Catastrophic single point failures, yikes.

[Geoffersincornwall]

It is a dual hydraulic system - just think about it for a moment!!! What the hell do you think the other system is busy doing???

[cpt]

Geoff....I my undrestanding of the system, there is an internal bypass to allow the jammed actuator to freely move ( the bypass activation should lit the "servo" caption) now if for some reason, this bypass is inoperative (dirtyness in hyd.fluid ?) the actuactor will remain jammed and the affected control chain with it, even if the other hydraulic system is operative.
Maybe an internal leak, inducing counterpressures, also could impair the actuator normal operation, in this case I am not sure the "servo" light should always come on.
Well, it's still underinvestigation.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Yes it's still under investigation. My understanding is that as a Cat 'A' certified helicopter a single failure should not cause the failure of another system. The two hydraulic systems are, as far as I recall, completely independent.

Just maybe the presence of waterspouts in the area at the time had something to do with it and the hydraulic problem is a red herring. Who knows? Let's wait and see.

G

[hovering]

A jammed pilot valve should allow its power piston to be moved freely with movements of it's sister hydraulic system. If the power piston itself is jammed, the other hydraulic systems power piston will also not be able to move because they are mechanically joined in a single unit, fixing the swash plate at that point.
As for the Cat A redundency idea, I would love to see how long a list of catastrophic single point failures on any Cat A helicopter could get, I bet it would scare you!

[NickLappos]

Hovering is right, I think the NTSB finding is important (a bad servo half with failed plating and debris) but it may not really explain the accident. I have no inside word at all, and speak only for myself, but the servo valves on the S76 are double spooled, so that a jam will lead to that servo half going into bypass (sort of forcing itself off line) so no hardover or stoppage is probable. Therefore, while the debris is not good, it does not seem to explain the accident.

A stick jump check is a great idea on every runup (I do that all the time) and any suspect movement, clunks etc should be examined.

The servo system is truly redundant, but lots of structure on a modern helicopter is not. Cat A regulations refer ONLY to engine power and engine/fuel system separation.

[Gomer Pylot]

I wouldn't have expected the crew to do a stick-jump test on the accident flight, because it's only required on the first start of the day, not every start, and the accident flight was well along in the day, as I understand it. I don't know how far back the FDR recorded, but it may not have gone far enough back to get to the first start of the day on a schedule like Copterline apparently ran. Doing many short runs per day means you don't do the systems checks for lots of starts if they're only for the first start of the day.

As has been pointed out, there are many single failure points on Cat A helicopters. If one doesn't understand this, then one doesn't understand Cat A at all.

[Aesir]

Gomer pylot:

The S-76 flight manual contains two preflight checks to be performed at every engine start. The first check requires pilots to check for overall smooth function of the flight controls. (Postaccident testing characterized the accident helicopter’s forward actuator to be “notchy.”) The second check requires pilots to switch off first one hydraulic system and then the other, watching for a change (referred to as “stick-jump”) in position of the flight controls. Such a jump would indicate a difference in hydraulic pressure between the systems and repair would be required before further flight. The accident helicopter’s FDR data showed that the stick-jump test had been performed in that aircraft only three times during the previous 14 engine starts.

This from the NTSB report!

It seems to me that the NTSB strongly hints that the pilots are at fault for "only" doing the test 3 times during the last 14 starts. Its important to remember that the operator may use other procedures than those specified in the manufacturers RFM so the pilots could very well have been in compliance with their operations specifications.

Another thing to remember is that this NTSB report is a "Safety recommendation" and in no way is to be considered any kind of final report on the accident! The Estonian accident investigation board AAIC are conducting the investigation and expect to publish a final report before aug. 2006.

[Gomer Pylot]

I don't have an S76 flight manual handy, but I'll look at it when I go back to work. I can't recall seeing the requirement for doing the stick-jump test on every flight, but I haven't read the flight manual's checklists that closely for a long time. We just use the checklist provided by the company, and that only requires the systems checks once per day.

I saw the part you quoted in the NTSB report, but just assumed that they had misread the manuals again, as they seem to do far too often. If Sikorsky required the checks for every start, it would seem likely that all operators would have to include them on the checklists, wouldn't you agree?

[SASless]

Does not the FAA (as set forth in FAA Inspector's Handbooks) expect an Operator to create "unique" checklist procedures as a part of FAA Part 135/121 policy and regulations? It is my recollection that Operators create their own checklists....get them blessed by the FAA and after that....use of those checklists are mandatory.

Are not only certain portions of the RFM considered to be "mandatory" compliance sections and Normal Procedures are not one of them?

Thus....Nick and a few others might correct me if I am wrong here....I can create the Normal Procedures Checklist of my own choosing....and if it is blessed by the nice friendly folk in the FAA (namely my Principle Operations Inspector (POI) ), then I am good to go.

The hiccup (if I do not incorporate all of the Manufacturers "recommended procedures" from the RFM), is after something bad happens, I am subject to criticism by the litigant's attorney.

Nick,

Is the Normal Procedures portion of a 76 RFM a required compliance section like "Limitations"....or may an Operator vary the procedures to fit their own needs?

[Aser]

Experts solve Copterline mystery

Aug 09, 2006
By TBT staff
TALLINN - Experts have concluded that a servo malfunction was, in fact, what caused the Finnish Copterline helicopter to crash a year ago in the Bay of Tallinn.

Tonu Ader, vice chairman of the commission who met with representatives of the helicopter’s manufacturer, Sikorsky, in the United States last week, told the Baltic News Service that the helicopter crashed because of a rotor servos malfunction. He added that, although the commission’s report will not be finished before this fall, their conclusion would not change.
While the manufacturer finally agreed that it was a servo malfunction that led the helicopter to crash, the commission and the manufacturer still differed on the exact cause.

“Although representatives of the helicopter’s manufacturer do not directly agree with this, the in-depth investigation into the causes of the helicopter crash leaves no room for doubt as regards to the reasons why the helicopter came down. The aircraft was brought down because of a main rotor servo malfunction, which resulted from the fact that parts of the plasma-sprayed coating that is made from a mix of copper and aluminium had broken off from the piston crown,” Ader told the Baltic News Service.

A press release by the Estonian Ministry of Economy and Communications reports that representatives from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said that they, too, had concluded that the accident was caused by the uncontrolled self-extending of one of the servos.
“Representatives of the Sikorsky plant had to admit that their earlier claims as regards a waterspout on the Bay of Tallinn that may have brought down the helicopter were wrong. They admitted that there was no waterspout above the Bay of Tallinn at the time when the helicopter fell, and that the servo failure proved fatal for the helicopter. At the same time, their opinion as regards the cause of the malfunction still differs from that of the investigating commission,” Ader said.

The ministry said the manufacturer’s version that a waterspout had caused the accident was also regarded as ungrounded by the National Transportation Safety Board.
Ader added that the Sikorsky plant had still not answered requests for tests that would satisfy the investigating commission.
“The Sikorsky company had conducted tests on the main rotor servo, but they hadn’t taken into account our requirements and the results of the tests didn’t meet our expectations,” Ader said.
Following Ader’s visit to the United States, the Sikorsky plant agreed to conduct additional tests in line with the investigating commission’s demands. The outcome of those tests is due to be received in October, after which the final report can be completed.

The Sikorsky S-76C+, owned by the Copterline company and operated by a Finnish crew, crashed into the Bay of Tallinn minutes after takeoff from Tallinn to Helsinki on Aug. 10, 2005. All 12 passengers and two crew members onboard were killed in the accident.

http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/16053/

Very uncomfortable news... :sad:

[Algy]

...because Estonians now formally in agreement with NTSB. (http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/08/29/Navigation/177/208702/Fatal+August+2005+Copterline+S-76C%2b+crash+controversy+deepens+as+Sikorsky+rejects+NTSB+ve rdict+of.html)

[Aser]

Copterline and Sikorsky disagree on cause of August 2005 crash
Operator and manufacturer discuss possible compensation issues (http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Copterline+and+Sikorsky+disagree+on+cause+of+August+2005+cra sh/1135222346569)

[Perro Rojo]

To answer the previous question; yes, the Flight Control and Servo System (Stick Jump) check, pages 2-15 and -16 of the RFM, is required every start.

It never ceases to amaze me how many helicopter pilots will take off without checking that their flight control servos are free to move, ie. not seized. A plank driver won't think of it but lots of us seem to do it regularily. Next time you are at an International airport watch when every single piece of heavy iron taxis, the fight control surfaces get a workout.

How about you guys? Do you check all your flight controls for freedom of movement every start?

[Aesir]

http://www.hs.fi/kuvat/pieni_webkuva/1135223993730.jpeg (http://www.hs.fi/english/picture/1135223993730)http://www.hs.fi/static/verkkoliite/img/t.gif
The Finnish passenger helicopter operator Copterline is seeking damages of 60 million US dollars from the helicopter manufacturer Sikorsky over a deadly crash that claimed the lives of 14 people in August 2005.

A Sikorsky S-76 helicopter with 12 passengers and two crew members plunged into the Gulf of Finland soon after leaving the Estonian capital Tallinn on August 10th, 2005.

Copterline is seeking damages of at least 60 million US dollars (EUR 45.8 million) in a US court against Sikorsky, saying that the manufacturer's negligence was the cause of the fatal crash.
Copterline is accusing Sikorsky of breach of warranty, negligence, aggravated carelessness, and neglecting its obligation to give a warning.

Copterline CEO Kari Ljungberg (http://www.hs.fi/haku/?haku=Kari+Ljungberg) says that he is unable to comment on the matter at this stage in the process. No comment was forthcoming from Sikorsky during the company's Christmas vacation.
Copterline and Sikorsky have been engaged in lengthy discussions on matters of liability. The focus of the issue is one part of the stricken helicopter - the servo, which relays steering commands to the main rotor.
Copterline says that the the poor design of the part led to the destruction of the helicopter. Sikorsky has steadfastly maintained that there was nothing wrong with the servo, or any other part of the helicopter, and that the cause of the crash has to be somewhere else.
Now the company appears to be relenting somewhat: shortly before Christmas Sikorsky published an urgent maintenance instruction, calling for more frequent inspections of the servo.

The reason for the new guideline was not given, but it came very soon after the commission of inquiry into the accident had completed a series of thorough servo tests conducted in the United States.
The board is not revealing the results of the test. However, a final report on the Copterline accident is expected in April, according to the vice chairman of the commission, Tonu Ader (http://www.hs.fi/haku/?haku=Tonu+Ader).
Copterline had bought the servo of the doomed helicopter from the Sikorsky subsidiary, Helicopter Support Inc. (HSI) a year earlier, paying 14,500 dollars for the part. HSI is a co-defendant in the lawsuit.

Source: Helsingin Sanomat http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Copterline+seeks+massive+damages+in+US+court+from+Sikorsky/1135224029647

[Aser]

Copterline S76 crash - interim official report blames faulty plasma coating in control servo.
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Loosened+servo+piston+plasma+coating+confirmed+as+cause+of+C opterline+crash/1135229348440
Accident report link (Estonian language)
(English Text version to follow 2-3 weeks we are told)
http://ftp.aso.ee/pub/incoming/OH-HCI-vahearuanne-20070806.pdf
Big problems(money) for the servo manufacturer... :oh:

[tistisnot]

http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/material/attachments/otkes/tutkintaselostukset/fi/ilmailuonnettomuuksientutkinta/2005/b42005l_tutkintaselostus/b42005l_tutkintaselostus.pdf

Many findings, including:

Inadequate maintenance and pre-flight practices hindered the discovery of the poorly performing main rotor forward actuator

[Copterline 103]

MEMORANDUM
To: Federal Aviation Administration
From: Michael Evan Jaffe
Date: April 13, 2009
Re: Docket No. FAA-2006-24587; Directorate Identifier 2006-SW-05-AD; RIN 2120-AA64
This Memorandum is submitted on behalf of Copterline Oy in response to the Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Ruling Making – Reopening of Comment Period published by the Federal
Aviation Administration on February 11, 2009 concerning Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model
S-76A, B and C Helicopters.
Copterline Oy suffered the loss of its helicopter OH-HCI, a Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopter on
August 10, 2005. 14 persons died. The circumstances of the crash and the cause – plasma
flaking from the piston head of the pistons in the forward servo actuator – are documented in the
8 August 2008 report of the Estonian Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission. That report,
which was prepared with the active involvement of the National Transportation Safety Board,
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and HRTextron is available at http://www.mkm.ee/doc.php?322962.
Copterline’s concern is that the proposed rules – increasing the frequency of leakage inspection
of the servo actuator – is based on a faulty premise. The proposed rules assume that the failure
that led to the crash of OH-HCI could have been detected by a leakage test conducted within 100
to 500 hours of the catastrophic failure of the servo. In fact, that premise is flawed. The time
between the flaking of the plasma coating and leakage is quite short. It is measured in minutes,
not hours.
The Design of the Piston Head Was Altered During the Overhaul Process
The design of the piston head – as qualified by the FAA in the 1970’s – had the plasma coating,
which acted as a lubricant – located entirely within the stainless steel groove that was formed by
the edges of the piston head. Each piston head has two such grooves. As the piston head was
overhauled, the stainless steel edges were worn down such that the plasma coating was no longer
within the protective stainless steel grooves. Rather, the plasma coating lapped over and across
the head of the piston. In that condition, the plasma coating was vulnerable to cracking and
flaking as the piston moved within the cylinder.
Once the plasma coating cracked and flaked off the piston head, the carbon-teflon seals that
were stabilized by the stainless steel edges in the original design and were also stabilized by the
plasma coating in the overhauled piston, were no longer stabilized. Without the stabilization,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (http://www.pillsburylaw.com) Page 2
testing reveals that the seals will no longer function to prevent leakage across the piston head.
The instability – testing shows – occurs within a very short time after the plasma flaking. The
testing report commissioned by Copterline Oy is attached as Appendix 1.
Attached at Appendix 2 are diagrams showing the piston head as designed originally and as
altered in the overhaul process. Photographs of the pistons and piston head from the failed servo
that was onboard OH-HCI show the “as altered” condition. Photographs from the failed servo
are also attached at Appendix 3.
The Altered Design Was Never Approved or Certified by the FAA
The original design of the piston head was the subject of testing and submission for approval/
certification by the FAA in the 1970’s. This testing during the 1970s included testing arising as
a result of plasma flaking. The overhauled piston design was purchased by Copterline in 2003.
The alteration that resulted from overhaul was, to Copterline’s understanding, never submitted to
the FAA for consideration. In short, the alteration is unapproved/uncertified. To the extent that
pistons with plasma coating lapped over and across the head of the piston are in service, whether
by original design or by altered overhaul design (i.e., all servos designated with part number -110
or lower), they are not, to Copterline’s understanding, airworthy.
Immediate Removal of Servo Actuators with Unairworthy Pistons is Required
Because the deterioration of the seals that are intended to prevent leakage occurs in a very short
time after the plasma coating flakes from the piston head, testing for leakage at 500 or even 100
hour intervals will not provide any assurance that the servo actuator will function even a few
hours after the test has been performed.
Because the overhaul-altered piston heads have not been FAA approved or certified as airworthy
and because the application of the plasma coating presents an unpredictable risk of failure, it is
Copterline’s view that all unairworthy servo actuators with plasma coating lapped over and
across the head of the piston should be removed from service immediately. Until removed and
replaced, helicopters with these servo actuators should not be designated as airworthy and,
accordingly, should be grounded and not be permitted to operate.

[Kor6e]

Copterline 103, are you seriously sure that the servo actuator's altered design was never approved or certified by FAA??

If not, why FAA and Sikorsky keep these helicopters flying? Do you know who made this decision and how many helicopters are affected? :sad:

[Copterline 103]

Copterline 103, are you seriously sure that the servo actuator's altered design was never approved or certified by FAA??

If not, why FAA and Sikorsky keep these helicopters flying? Do you know who made this decision and how many helicopters are affected?

Yes, this is true. Sikorsky and its suppliers kept ongoing overhaul process which had not been approved by the FAA. They made a change in procedures (a major change) which was related to the plasma coating chipping problem (they knew). Also a wrong type of Plasma was used. During recoating process they lost the identity of the pistons serial numbers and historical data because original serial number markings was over coated with new plasma during the recoating process. Despite this, the defective pistons were used until 26.5.2010 (FAA AD. After this, the defective pistons were assigned replacement. Today, some helicopters are still installed unairworthy servos which are not overhauled according FAA approved drawings, or wrong type of plasma has been used. The plasma combination should be (85% copper and 15% aluminum as original Plasma Metco 455 but they used Metco 445 where the composition of plasma was 99 copper and 1 % aluminum). During overhaul process they deviated from FAA approved instruction to strip old plasma away by mechanical process instead of FAA approved instructions where the process was a chemical plasma stripping process. S/n 740512 helicopter’s defective piston had accumulated 24,317 hours / seven times overhauled. Each time overhaul process was using illegal mechanical stripping process. After each rework piston’s origin came smaller and smaller. According FAA approved overhaul instruction the piston origin doesn’t change at all during process due to chemical stripping process.
By each rework process they need to have more and more plasma to reach piston’s target measurement. Finally, after each overhaul plasma coating come thicker and thicker. At time of accident plasma was much thicker than planned and plasma composition was wrong (99 % copper and 1 % aluminum). These combinations together create plasma flakes which were big enough blocks C3 return ports and causing that helicopter came immediately unflyable.

FAA take a note from Copterline's Supplemental Notice of Proposed Ruling Memorandum. FAA released an AD an year later and this AD has mostly likely eliminated this illegal piston problem, but the main problem still exists. The main issue is whole Servo Actuator design not only pistons.

Type Certification requirements insist that Servo Actuator design (whole Servo Actuator system) must be a failsafe or redundant systems. This requirement is a mandatory for all FAR 29 certified helicopters. FAR 29 insist that every critical components and critical systems which may have an affect for flight safety must be designed to be failsafe or redundant system. It doesn’t matter is the root cause piston or something else a single defect should not make helicopter unflyable!

This is an airworthiness issue where is a zero tolerance.

Accident in Lagos could have some other roots than this piston problem. It is possible that this is also related to the main problem which is the servo system design and servo certification process. We are talking offshore operated transportation category helicopter and it unacceptable that helicopter is dropping down to the sea when the sun is shining.

"Kor6e" I hope that this will clarifies your thoughts and open your eyes?

[ericferret]

"FAR 29 insist that every critical components and critical systems which may have an affect for flight safety must be designed to be failsafe or redundant system."

Just about every helicopter I can think of has a single control input into the main servo, the bolt comes out and that control channel becomes inoperative. I see no redundancy in this.
This includes modern designs such as the AW139.

I would question that the S76 servo is somehow different from other manufacturers designs.

Independent pilot valves but a common ram are the norm. The Sikorsky design is different mainly because they needed a low profile servo and placed the pistons in parallel rather than in series. The layout is different but the operation is the same.

"""Today, some helicopters are still installed unairworthy servos which are not overhauled according FAA approved drawings, or wrong type of plasma has been used.""

If you have evidence of this surely you should be reporting this to the relevent Airworthiness Authority and the FAA, I am sure Sikorsky would also be interested.I am sure we would all be interested to know which operators are breaking the rules.

[Copterline 103]

"FAR 29 insist that every critical components and critical systems which may have an affect for flight safety must be designed to be failsafe or redundant system."

Just about every helicopter I can think of has a single control input into the main servo, the bolt comes out and that control channel becomes inoperative. I see no redundancy in this.
This includes modern designs such as the AW139.


FAR 29.695 Power boost and power-operated control system.
(a) If a power boost or power-operated control system is used, an alternate system must be immediately available that allows continued safe flight and landing in the event of-
(1) Any single failure in the power portion of the system; or
(2) The failure of all engines.
(b) Each alternate system may be a duplicate power portion or a manually operated mechanical system. The power portion includes the power source (such as hydraulic pumps), and such items as valves, lines, and actuators.
(c) The failure of mechanical parts (such as piston rods and links), and the jamming of power cylinders, must be considered unless they are extremely improbable.

AW139 servo system is designed to release main control valve in case of jam. The first indication will be SERVO 1 or SERVO 2 caution illuminates. It is very important immediately to start monitory Hydraulic temperature on synoptic page (this is not instructed by QRH).
System pressure 3500 PSI is circulating all the time inside affected servo. This constant 3500 PSI flow continuously through the bypass channels begins to rapidly raise the temperature of a hydraulic fluid (expect 1 celsius degree per each 5 seconds). It is expected that quite quickly the hydraulic oil temperature exceeds 134 degrees Celsius and HYD OIL TEMP warning illuminates. Switch off affected system by moving affected SOV to CLOSE on HYD control panel. AW139 has a philosophy where hydraulic SOV switch has switched off the faulty side! AW139 QRH is not clear at all regarding this SERVO and HYD OIL TEMP cautions.
Far out from shore, in the middle of the night, so it is challenging to begin to read and understand what QRH tells you to do and what QRH tells not to do. This scenario should be trained for all crews during recurrent training. It is not so easy even case has been briefed before sim session.

[Kor6e]

The similarity of these two accidents makes very very scared.

[noooby]

Copterline 103, you mean 3000psi, not 3500. Or, to be more in line with the instrumentation, 207 Bar.

[Thatflight]

Hi,
after following the discussion regarding S76, which went down in Baltic Sea, there seems to be some doubts that some facts maybe has been hidden regarding the facts, that explains what happened.
This is unacceptable. I know how to solve this. Do anyone know the contact information of Jesse Ventura. No questions asked but meny answers will follow. If you have the contact information please write them down in this forum. I will get you the answers.
I think that Copterline 103 has an issues here, because no nobody give us arguments as Copterline 103 if there is no facts behind it, or what do you think?

[Thatflight]

Hi,
after following the discussion regarding S76, which went down in Baltic Sea, there seems to be some doubts that some facts maybe has been hidden regarding the facts, that explains what happened.
This is unacceptable. I know how to solve this. Do anyone know the contact information of Jesse Ventura. No questions asked but meny answers will follow. If you have the contact information please write them down in this forum. I will get you the answers.
I think that Copterline 103 has an issues here, because no nobody give us arguments as Copterline 103 if there is no facts behind it, or what do you think?

The Lagos accident shows how these things may occur.