Cost of Life models and other quantitative risk analysis techniques

[ClickRich]

I'm studying the new Corporate Manslaughter laws in the UK and in particular trying to review what would be expected of an airport or airline operator's risk assessments/safety management systems to ensure avoidance of a life sentence in the event of an accident. I don't mean to put the cart before the horse, but putting aside preventative considerations for a moment...

It would seem that the tenor of the legislation is about "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) being measured against best practice across all industries (nuclear, petrochemical etc) rather than peers (other airports). These other industries have built up sophisticated analysis techniques of "cost of life models", "target safety levels" and "peak to average ratios" where I believe airports and airlines largely still use rules of thumb without the rigorous quantitative assessment. Don't get me wrong, this has served us well to date and could well continue to- but it might not keep us out of prison!

Does anyone know of any airline or airport operator who applies these advanced techniques? The most sophistication I've found is an 'acceptance' that 2 birdstrikes per 10,000 ATMs is ok/normal... Not what I'd consider a comprehensively defined target or analysis!

[caa19]

the caa do a lot of work on safety management systems (SMS) which may give some good anacdotes

most aircraft manufactures have a designated acceptable failure rate which is normally expressed in terms you refer, i.e. a catestrophic failure is acceptable on 10^9 sectors.

have a dig around on the caa website, other than that try looking at some aviation safety textbooks but that tend to be superficial in detail, thats why most large airlines and employers in general employ outside consultants to advise them

[ClickRich]

Thx caa19. Actually, I should have mentioned the aircraft manufacturers as being up there with nuclear and petrochemical industries for this sort of analysis. Is that good or bad for airports and airlines when it comes to comparing their SMSs? I'd say the manufacturers are a generation more advanced.

I must admit that I work with those consultants offering the advice to airports and airlines... that is why I'm asking as I need convincing that their methods (powerpoint, rules of thumb and meeting minutes) are robust enough a defence in a court of law under the new legislation in the UK.

10^9 sectors per catastrophic failure is the kind of order you would expect. However, I've seen an airport analysis of bird strike risk- likelihood of a multiple loss of life at their location to be 10^4. This was considered acceptable....

...My concern is not the apparent disconnect between the risk aversion of the airport compared to the aircraft manufacturer in this instance. Personally, I believe that the workshop which came to this conclusion understood the nature of the risk better than they understood the logic behind their maths and that this number was not representative. The analysis was inaccurate and I think airports need more help to get it right. How else will they make the right decisions?

The CAA's works on (Airfield Safety Management CAP642, Guidance...Developing...Auditing SMS CAP726) shows that indeed they have been busy. However, they lay out the framework of an SMS and look at industry specific hazards rather than quantitative methods of analysis (even though CAP642 describes safety assessment methodology as one of the 4 key elements of an SMS). The CAPs generally only go so far as looking at "As Low As/So Far As Is Reasonably Practical" as a caveat. With the CAA moving towards Objective Based Safety Regulation of aerodromes, the numbers have to be dealt with robustly and I'm not sure airports are equipped for that.

Or am I wrong?