GOM - yet another ditching [Archive]

bigfoot206

3rd Sep 2004, 05:31

NTSB Identification: FTW04IA217
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Thursday, August 19, 2004 in South Pass 65, GM
Aircraft: Bell 412, registration: N22347
Injuries: 9 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On August 19, 2004, approximately 0705 central daylight time, a Bell 412 twin-engine helicopter, N22347, sustained minor damage during a forced landing following a loss of tail rotor control near South Pass 65, an offshore platform located in the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter was registered to and operated Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana. The commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, and 7 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. The cross-country flight originated from Boothville, Louisiana, at 0635, destined for Viosca Knoll 989.

The 11,750-hour pilot reported in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2) that while in cruise flight he heard a loud bang followed by an uncontrolled 30-degree yaw to the right and a 15-20 degree "nose tuck." The pilot stated that he attempted to correct the situation by lowering the collective and "trimming the yaw with the pedals;" however, the helicopter failed to respond to his inputs. Subsequently, the pilot reduced power and initiated an autorotation. Prior to water touchdown, the pilot successfully deployed the emergency floats. At an altitude approximately 10 feet above the water, the pilot "pulled pitch" until the helicopter settled onto the water. Both pilots and their passengers evacuated the helicopter to an inflatable life raft.

The helicopter was recovered from the water and transported by truck to the PHI facilities near Lafayette, Louisiana. Examination of the helicopter was conducted by personnel from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), PHI, and Bell Helicopters. The tail rotor blade assembly and a section of the 90-degree tail rotor gearbox were separated.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was removed from the wreckage, and forwarded to the NTSB laboratories in Washington, D.C., for review.

Mars

30th Sep 2004, 15:14

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 9/30/2004 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 34CA Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 09/29/2004 Time: 1300

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: GULFPORT State: MS Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N34CA, A BELL 206L HELICOPTER, CRASHED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO, NO INJURIES
REPORTED TO THE FOUR PERSONS ON BOARD, ACFT WAS SUBMERGED, APPROXIMATELY
60 MILES SOUTH OF GULFPORT, MS

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: NOT REPORTED

OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: General Aviation

Departed: UNK Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: UNK Flt Plan: UNK Wx Briefing: U
Last Radio Cont: UNK
Last Clearance: UNK

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 09/30/2004

Delta Julliet Golf

30th Sep 2004, 15:42

Again one down in GOM?

Glad that they all survived..

DJG

SASless

30th Sep 2004, 16:52

: N34CA
Aircraft Serial Number : 45089
Aircraft Manufacturer : BELL
Model : 206L
Engine Manufacturer : ALLISON
Model : 250-C20 SER
Aircraft Year : 1977
Owner Name : PANTHER HELICOPTERS INC
Owner Address : 2017 ENGINEERS RD
BELLE CHASSE, LA, 70037-3118
Type of Owner : Corporation
Registration Date : 28-Jan-1997
Airworthiness Certificate Type : Standard
Approved Operations : Normal

bondu

2nd Oct 2004, 16:59

How many is that this year?

slgrossman

2nd Oct 2004, 21:53

From the NTSB web site:

NTSB Identification: MIA04LA132
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 29, 2004 in Gulf of Mexico
Aircraft: Bell 206L, registration: N34CA
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On September 29, 2004, about 0800 central daylight time, a Bell 206L helicopter, N34CA, registered to and operated by Panther Helicopters Inc., as a Title 14 CFR part 135 on demand air taxi flight, ditched into the Gulf of Mexico. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed. The airline transport-rated pilot and two passengers were not injured, and the helicopter sank in the Gulf of Mexico, and is presumed to have incurred substantial damage. The flight originated in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, the same day, about 0700.

The Director of Maintenance for Panther Helicopters Inc., stated that the hour-long flight from Belle Chasse, Louisiana to Viosca Knoll, oil platform No. VK817, had initially been uneventful. He further stated, that during the approach to land on the oil platform, while on short final, as the pilot pulled collective to slow the rate of descent there was a power decrease, and the pilot glanced at the gauges and noticed that N2 and Nr had fallen to 90 percent. He said that the helicopter was about 150 feet above the surface of the water, at that time, and was not positioned to land on the platform, so the pilot lowered the collective to maintain rotor rpm, and ditched the helicopter in the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter was equipped with flotation gear, but it was not deployed. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter and were rescued by a nearby boat, and the helicopter sank in about 700 feet of water.

Mars

3rd Oct 2004, 15:11

Is there a de-facto news blackout? Or is it that we are becoming inured to such events - remember a similar lack of discussion on the B412 tail rotor failure last month. The only posts so far on this thread have been factual.

Nothing will be solved by not being open about such issues!

SASless

3rd Oct 2004, 19:24

How many discussions do we need about the results of flying single engined aircraft over vast amounts of salt water. If the engine ceases to cooperate....you go swimming unless you are very lucky.

I could suggest topics that would be fun to debate....such as is there an approach profile that would allow for a successful low power or autorotative landing on a oilrig helideck? Or, should single engine aircraft have saltwater activated float switches thus allowing for an automatic inflation of the floats should the pilot forget to punch the button or pull the lever or hit the water inadvertently? Or, should Northsea offshore safety standards not be applied worldwide? Or, suggest the costs of applying Northsea standards is cost prohibitive and would only drive up the cost of petrol(gasoline for you Rednecks) and lost lives are cheaper to pay for rather than the safety improvements?

The Gulf Of Mexico offshore oil industry is a joke. The US Government's(particularly the FAA) oversight of the industry there is certainly a joke. The helicopter industry standards in the GOM are a joke. No one is laughing beyond some folks with very nice cash bonuses and stock options.

But what is the use....anything said here about the situation is wasted. The pilots in the GOM cannot see beyond their noses and gladly accept the situation as well as shoddy treatment by the operators.

slgrossman

4th Oct 2004, 18:41

SASless,

Thanks ever so much for your insightful analysis of helicopter operations and those of us who fly for a living in the Gulf of Mexico. Thanks also for your concern about our vision.

Single engine operations automatically entail a certain degree of additional risk, however, the reliability of todays turbine engines makes the risk acceptable under certain conditions. If your primary objection to the way we do things in the GoM is based on our extensive use of single-engine machines, then I submit your concern is misplaced.

There are a number of initiatives in progress which will enhance safety in the long run, not the least of which is acquisition of new, more capable aircraft.

There have been significant improvements made over the past five years, with more to come. Things are changing, though perhaps not rapidly enough to suit you.

-Stan-

Devil 49

5th Oct 2004, 11:35

SASless, et al:

Two engines do not mean twice as safe. Been there, done that, and generally available stats confirm my opinion. The added complexity comes with a price and magnifies poor pilot training and errors in general.

I can't think of anything I'd rather do less than an autorotation to a platform or a rig- especially a rig! I'll go the water every time- just as was done a dozen times in every annual training. I miss that big flat unobstructed surface every flight I make these days.

My experience in the GOM was that the safety culture was more scientific, realistic, and universally applied than anywhere else I've been in 36 years. The military takes a distant second, and most civilian operators aren't even in the same league.

The GOM has a lot of traffic. I've done hundred takeoffs in a day, and that wasn't unusual. The GOM also has a lot of single engine VFR, and incidents make thrilling copy. Don't mistake the media for the real world.

SASless

5th Oct 2004, 15:31

Devil 49....how many ditichings occurred this year due to engine failures while in cruise? How many twins ditched following an engine failure at any stage in flight? The numbers are interesting and put paid to the notion that twins are not worth the money (if it happens to be yer butt sitting in them). One 105 ditched a year or so ago...but it was overloaded for its "stay-up" weight limit. Wise loading (not a GOM practice) would have prevented that accident. (Ditching in the ocean equals accident in my book)

Devil 49

5th Oct 2004, 21:21

If your argument is limited to cruise flight power failures, it has merit. Add mismanaged power, fuel,- heck, systems- and finally factor in "twin engine power reduncy invulnerability syndrome", which affects judgement (You've seen it or you haven't looked.) and things quickly get iffy. I've seen flyable aircraft in the water because a pilot mismanaged systems. My opinion, that's the reason singles are statistically safer- aside from cruise power failures, which shouldn't be more than an inconvenience, anyhow. It's a solo maneuver, for Pete's sake.

I'm not saying I don't want a twin. In the right operation, there's no substitute. But, you've gotta do the Cat A thing, and a whole bunch of other stuff to make it worthwhile, or it's increased risk. Cat A orientation type operations aren't always a reality, no matter how much we wish it to be. It's a customer world. He who pays the piper inevitably calls the tune.

You do GOMers a disservice. The big 3 at least are as professional as there is- how many touchdown autos do you do in recurrent? How many do you do with prospective employees? Routine in the GOM, and usually a half dozen or so, not counting power chops at typical platform height and zero airspeed.
Can you call your training/standards guy with a question and have a problem resolved, or support right down to the wire with your issue? Will your issue be a case discussed in the succeeding recurrent classes?
If you operate multiple types, how does your program train and field them? GOMers routinely fly 2 types and all the subvariants.

I did the GOM for 13 years, and saw some of the best wrenches and greatest pilots in the world on the line, well trained, well supported and doin' the job.

SASless

6th Oct 2004, 12:51

49....my gripe is not with the individual pilots....but rather more with the system....look at the problems the guys have doing IFR flights....getting clearances....the problems of lack of radar flight following...weather reporting.....that is why lots of scud running goes on when IFR would be safer. I agree wholeheartedly about the excellence of the pilots and mechanics...but the sad thing is they are granted the respect and treatment they deserve. Crawl yourself up into the crew shack on some of those platforms for your week away from home......

There are real problems in the Gulf that could be addressed that would greatly enhance safety.....afterall....helicopters kill more people in the GOM oil patch than any other cause. That is not the claim to fame I would like to have.

How many pilots die in the Gulf Of Mexico each year? How many have died on the North Sea since operations began there?

gomex

6th Oct 2004, 18:21

I agree with SASLess, as a active pilot in the GOM, for some 27 years. I have seen a lot of improvement in the industry, but, why are we still flying single-eng. helicopter in weather conditions that create sea states in excess of what the floats systems were designed to land in. I know the floats are only designed to get you in the life raft. The FAA allow flight over the water, using the water as a safe landing area with floats. Most of the winter the sea state is such that no safe landing can be made with the equipment thats available. We are only now putting rafts outside of the aircraft. We still have aircraft with the rafts located in the aircraft behind the pilot. We all know how long a 206 will float in the upright position, with a sea state of 3 to 4 feet. About 5 minutes if you lucky, and you remember to pop your floats. They need to be water activated, like the Bell's twins. My company does an outstanding job with training for such events. I believe that only twin engine aircraft should be used over water, that is in excess of the floats systems capabilities of the single engine aircraft. There are now a varity of light twins available for this work, I know it will increased operating costs, but I do not believed the oil companies will go broke, with the price of oil hitting 50 dollars a barrel.

Mars

29th Apr 2005, 06:31

Report created 4/28/2005 Record 1

IDENTIFICATION

Regis#: 5743B Make/Model: B06 Description: 206A/B/L, 406, TH-206 JETRANGER, LONG

Date: 04/26/2005 Time: 1710

Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N Damage: Minor

LOCATION
City: LAFAYETTE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION

AN AIR LOG BELL 206 ROTORCRAFT AUTO ROTATED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO OFF THE COAST OF LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: LCH METAR 261653Z 32009KT 10SM FEW036 25/16 A2977

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: Air Taxi (On Demand)

Departed: Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: Flt Plan: Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 04/27/2005

Hippolite

29th Apr 2005, 08:45

Mars

I saw it on the FAA website and I was going to post it but couldn't be bothered!!. Its just routine now really, isn't it.

Sad state of affairs but that's the nature of the GOM ops.

Still, Airlog has other issues right now!

HH:cool:

Old Man Rotor

29th Apr 2005, 09:03

I agree, aren’t we becoming to casual about our colleagues in the Gulf?

I hope Air Log and all those companies, both helicopter operators and oil mobs alike have the guts sued out of them, for not providing the safest occupational work place.

Any smart young lawyer here want to start a test case?

I can’t believe with all our hungry legal folk around, that no one has yet taken up the challenge.

SASless

29th Apr 2005, 18:34

Answer this one question guys....

Why do the passengers, customers, pilots, and operators accept these kinds of risks? Why does the FAA not change the rules and actually enforce them in the Gulf?

What is the right answer to the situation?

The Gulf has a pilot's union but the offshore workers are not. The North Sea has a very strong union mentality that sets a very high priority on safety....as do the governmental agencies having oversight over the offshore industry in the North Sea. I would suggest the GOMERS could learn something from that.....and make safety more of an issue, also the FAA, OSHA, and other safety groups should be more proactive.

It must be nice to know you are in a twin engine, IFR equipped helicopter when you start plodding offshore in cold weather over rough seas.....doing it in a VFR only Jetranger seems a bit daft to me.

slgrossman

29th Apr 2005, 20:48

I find myself in agreement with SASless on this issue.

Several of the major oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico have already begun the transition to using only twin-engine / IFR capable aircraft. Liability is probably the driving factor, and there's still a ways to go. Nonetheless, if you're flying for one of the "big boys" things have gotten a lot better over the past few years.

GoM helicopter operators have instituted some policies specific to small ships and we now have enhanced operational control from management, both of which help mitigate the risk. However, if the customers can afford to operate the better equipped aircraft - and all indications are that they can quite easily - it seems pretty short-sighted of them to accept the additional risk in order to try to save what amounts to a "drop in the bucket."

-Stan-

Gomer Pylot

29th Apr 2005, 23:18

Adding more restrictive regulations would cost companies money, reduce profits, and weaken the world economy. Anything that is 'anti-bidness' is verboten in the US. There is no use in wringing one's hands or wasting time fretting about it. It will not happen during this administration, no matter how many deaths occur. 'Tort reform' has made it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to sue large corporations successfully, and the FAA, by law, must consider the economic impact of any regulation.

Mars

30th Apr 2005, 07:35

I tend to agree with all that has been said so far and particularly that this will not be resolved by a change in regulations. With quarterly profits declared in the last week from each of the big three in the order of $6 Billion, I cannot agree with Gomer about the knock-on effect of re-equipment.

This appears to be a uniquely GOM issue with no parallel in the other oil provinces. That the present policy is defended by the very pilots who operate there appears to indicate that it will take a great deal of effort to inculcate in them an appropriate safety culture.

I well remember the comment to the oil company when a BO105 ditched following an engine failure that "they were prevented from operating with OEI cruise performance by the FAA". This was one reason why that particular oil company immediately initiated moves to introduce a more modern light twin fleet for inshore operations and insert the requirement for a minimum performance standard into their contract.

Slgrossman is correct that the liability line has now crossed the re-equipment line for the majors, making the investment decision for the accountants a simple matter. The work that has been done on that calculation is a tribute to a number of responsible members of the very oil companies that we continue to criticise.

That this thread has taken several days to reach 5 posts indicates that this is less of an issue to most pilots than say "VAT on flight training" and belies the claim that this is a professional forum; either that or we have become inured to a situation that exposes passengers to unacceptable risk.

TheFlyingSquirrel

30th Apr 2005, 09:48

I find this debate amazing. I have been researching the GOM lately and although certainly not an expert, I find the attitude of the US firms incredible. The way cost is driven before safety issues is unbelievable. Pilots making regular transitions over large stretches of water, whether warm not, deserve to fly in twin aircraft. It is obvious that Gomer Pilot has had economics brainwashed into him since a nipper and will take the stance of profit before people first. The North Sea guys, although flying in a more extreme enviroment most of the year woudn't do the majority of the work in singles. The difference is, is that the management and clients wouldn't expect them to do it either ! This is one example of the CAA being a superior body to the FAA.

S92mech

30th Apr 2005, 11:24

The aircraft that went in the water was registered to Island Operators, long know as one of the lowest bottom feeders in the GOM. I have no idea what kind of deal Airlog and Island have going as to why Airlog was operating the aircraft. Just to give you an idea of how cheap this oil company is, when PHI had a contract with Island, the pilot had to take his own food offshore with him.

Devil 49

30th Apr 2005, 12:12

I hope the discussion in this thread does not equate more engines with increasing safety- it isn't so, and it's been pretty well demonstrated. Besides, an operator's safety culture, maintenance program and pilot training are much more important in the safety equation. Issues in any of those areas are magnified with aircraft complexity.

I'm not saying I don't prefer multis- I've got sufficient time in them and in the GOM to know there's considerable advantages. But they come with considerable cost and twins are not appropriate in some circumstances. More complex aircraft present more complex pilot challenges, even assuming safety culture and maintenance issues are satisfactorily dealt with. Consider you're offshore and have to pull one offline... Did you consider this in your fuel planning? Or- Is having a beach landing option a dispatch requirement? If you answered "no" to either of these, and there's nowhere you can safely put the aircraft single-engine- that second engine is an illusory safety enhancement. Yes, there are circumstances where a forced landing to the water in a single is safer than dealing with OEI twin work, not to mention the other system complexities in multis, more complex systems also equal increased probability of failure.

Increasing the pilot crewing has a demonstrated safety advantage. Well?

If I was operating a multi, anywhere:
I'd have a cat-A capable twin, that I could operate cat-A as appropriate and with company support;
My multi would be as simple to operate and robust as a single without sacrificing twin redundancies (seperate fuel tanks, electrical, fail-safe power-train, etc.);
Throttles on the collective and arranged as in a 222;
I'd be dispatched only when I had some place to go OEI;
Proficient technical help on-site dedicated to the on-site aircraft only;
No time critical dispatch interfering with maximized good multi-practice;
And an autopilot or an SIC, even in a VFR assignment.
Strikes from this hurried list are arguments for single engine operation.

The Rotordog

30th Apr 2005, 13:29

Guys, guys, guys...it's not about absolute safety. It's about the COST of safety. Anyone who does not know this hasn't been around very long.

Mars started this thread with a report of a 206 that autorotated to the water. Evidently nobody got killed or even hurt (maybe they didn't even get wet). This event is supposedly meant to incite us in high dudgeon?

SASless wonders why "pilots, and operators accept these kinds of risks?"

The Flying Squirrel splutters, "the attitude of the US firms incredible. The way cost is driven before safety issues is unbelievable. Pilots making regular transitions over large stretches of water, whether warm not, deserve to fly in twin aircraft."

We do?

slgrossman agrees. "Several of the major oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico have already begun the transition to using only twin-engine / IFR capable aircraft. Liability is probably the driving factor, and there's still a ways to go. Nonetheless, if you're flying for one of the "big boys" things have gotten a lot better over the past few years."

"Better" meaning, I guess, fewer single-engine helicopters.

I suppose there are those who feel that no fare-paying passenger should ever be flown over water in anything but a fully CAT-A capable, twin-engine, two-pilot, IFR helicopter. Yes, that should do it, eh what? That would be the ultimate in safety...the gold standard...the minimum duty of care that we owe to those passengers, hmm?

...And then I think about the "field ship" jobs I've had, bouncing from small platform to small platform...forty, fifty, or as many as 100 landings per day...as I ferried around the various things (men and equipment, tools and supplies, newspapers, lunch...) that keep the field running. Oh, how I would love to do that in a Super Puma...NOT! I didn't even like doing it in a BO105 on the few jobs that used to have them as field ships. The extra workload of operating the twin was simply not worth the effort in my humble opinion, given the fact that the old 105 had marginal single-engine capability at best (and negative single-engine capability at gross!). I kept thinking to myself, "This is safer than a 206? How come I'm working so much harder?"

So I ask: Should all field ships be outlawed? Should we tell the GOM oil companies, "Sorry guys, we don't care HOW your fields are constructed and laid-out, NO MORE SOUP FOR YOU! I mean, NO MORE SINGLE-ENGINE HELICOPTERS FOR YOU!" Mars says it best: "This appears to be a uniquely GOM issue with no parallel in the other oil provinces." Exactly, Mars, EXACTLY! The GOM is not like any other place on earth. To understand why things are the way they are, one must learn about the very nature of GOM operations. (And evidently, slgrossman hasn't flown a single-engine helicopter in a long, long while.)

Do not tell me that every helicopter in the GOM should be a twin. Twins are not necessarily "better." They are not necessarily "safer." Yes, with a single there is always the risk that a power failure will result in a ditching. Depending on the time of year (and sea-state and phase of the moon) that ditching may or may not be successful. The oil companies look at the hard numbers of what the unsuccessful ditchings might cost them and they decide whether to accept those risks or not. And you know what? Maybe these risks aren't as high as some people (Mars, SASless, slgrossman, The Flying Squirrel to name a few) perceive them to be.

Aha! That gets back to the question: Who defines risk? And how is risk defined? Many, many pilots believe the risks to be acceptable. In fact, they vote with their feet every morning, launching at sunrise in their 206's, 407's and 120's and heading offshore with a full load of people and things. Are they, and the people riding with them and the people who dispatched them and the people who own the companies that employ them all deluded?

TheFlyingSquirrel

30th Apr 2005, 13:56

And that's the beauty of pprune Rotordog - tales from the front line - telling it like it is !

slgrossman

30th Apr 2005, 14:49

RotorDog,

While it has, in fact, been quite some time since I last flew a single-engine single-pilot aircraft, I think I'm still able to see things from that perspective. Contrary to your assertion, I don't advocate the elimination of small ships. As you correctly pointed out the increased workload of operating a twin (even a light one) in certain jobs offsets any increased safety provided by the second engine.

As others have said, the safety enhancement of the larger multi-engine aircraft comes not so much from the second engine, but from their increased size and payload which justifies incorporation of such safety enhancements as a copilot, weather radar, radar altimeters, improved communications, autopilots, etc.

When I said things had gotten BETTER I meant that the larger oil companies are less inclined to tolerate risk. Ten years ago no one had traffic alert systems. VFR aircraft had barely sufficient instrumentation for VFR flight. We flew the Bell 206 extensively, an aircraft which has marginal power and tail rotor authority margins when heavy. Navigation was by quirky Loran or dead reckoning. Rafts, if you can believe it, were optional!

We still fly some 206s, but many of their jobs have gone to 407s, a much more capable aircraft. Traffic alert is on the way to becoming universally installed throughout the fleet. We have much more restriction on the distance from rescue and the weather conditions in which we allow the small ships to operate. Customers have become much better educated on the risk - benefit equation, and are now much less inclined to pressure a pilot to exceed his or the aircraft's limitations. While it's still far from perfect it is decidedly BETTER.

Our IFR program has likewise experienced growth and improvement. The "grid" system of intersections has allowed us to take better advantage of the capabilities of GPS navigation. We are upgrading our fleets with new, more capable aircraft. We are operating our aircraft with much more consideration given to mission planning and performance. We have become firm believers in Crew Resource Management for our multi-pilot crews. Again, not perfect, but BETTER.

Much of the impetus for this has come from our larger customers who are no longer willing to accept the previous level of risk. And rightly so. Regulations should SUPPORT a conscientious safety culture rather than drive it.

-Stan-

The Rotordog

30th Apr 2005, 16:20

The trouble is, we get into what I call a twin-engine mindset whereby we get to believing that twins are simply "better." Want an example, you say? Done, sir!

On the one hand, slgrossman says (and I quoth):
Several of the major oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico have already begun the transition to using only twin-engine / IFR capable aircraft.

Then, on the very next hand he says:
Liability is probably the driving factor, and there's still a ways to go. Nonetheless, if you're flying for one of the "big boys" things have gotten a lot better over the past few years.

Linkage, man. Saying those two things, even though *you* might not have meant them to mean the same thing, get connected in people's minds. "Well yes, slgrossman is quite right! More operators *are* going to twin-engine aircraft and things *are* getting better!" Which misses the point a bit.

Flown within it's meager limitations, a Bell 206B does fairly well in the GOM. Personally, always operating at <3000' DA, I never wished for more tail rotor. I did fly all the old Lorans and found them to be quite acceptable...let me qualify that...most of the time. GPS's are "better" of course, and far lighter than some of the old lorans, so that's a plus (...or, a minus when it comes to empty weight). Speaking of weight, it is true that with a raft and all the other accoutrements necessary for offshore flight, a lowly B-model becomes a three-passenger helicopter locally and a two-passenger if you actually want to go anywhere and if the guys are carrying anything more than a box of Kleenex.

So yes, 407's are "better" in that the oil companies can carry more crap and still allow us to have TCAD (why, WHY can't we have TCAS???). But mentioning the artificial limits put on how far singles can venture offshore is a red herring. Back in the days of yore, there weren't any rigs or platforms south of 28 degrees anyway, until...what was it...Bullwinkle? Which is just a hop, skip and a jump away from ST300 which for years and years and years had a 206 field ship. So in that regard things haven't gotten "better." They just haven't gotten worse.

So what has really changed in the GOM over the years? Oil companies and helicopter operators have become more risk-averse, okay, but they're still pretty much taking those same risks anyway. We're still out there in our new, modern, more-powerful(?) EC-120s, flying in 500' ceilings and three miles viz, and we're still out driving around in forty k-nots of wind. Just kinda gives you a warm-fuzzy, don't it?

bondu

30th Apr 2005, 21:36

Rotordog (mainly!)

I operate a 332L Super Puma on the North Sea and have done now for 15 out of the last 18 years. 3 of the other years were spent flying single pilot IFR in a Bo105, based on an offshore platform in the northern North Sea, on a week on /week off routine, with the other two as an EMS pilot, again in Bo105s. So I have seen both sides of single pilot/ twin pilot operations. Yes, all of my North Sea time has been in twin engine machines. I did fly singles in the Army (Gazelles and Alouettes).

Now a question: how many ditchings/ accidents have occured in the North Sea during my 18 years? I think we have had FOUR in the UK sector. How many have we seen in the GoM THIS YEAR?
If you are a GoM pilot, I say to you and all GoMers, as SASLess did earlier on this thread,
WHY DO YOU ACCEPT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS!
Do you put such a low value on your lives?

For f**k's sake, stop arguing about whether singles are better than twins or worrying about the poor oil companies' and heli operators' profit margins! They will NOT go out of business!

Start thinking about yourselves and your families and your passengers and their families. YOU have a duty of care for yourself, so why not start to do something about it!

bondu (totally bemused UK pilot!!)

North Sea Safety

I forgot to say, we North Sea guys are not totally happy with the current safety regime over here. We have a system called the Dacon scoop, which is supposedly capable of picking me out of the sea in sea states of 6 metres or more (thats 20 feet upwards for you guys!). The trials carried out some years ago, by specially trained Danish Navy divers, could only demonstrate a maximum capability of 4.8 metres! Currently, the maximum sea state for North Sea operations to cease is anything from 6 to 8 meters: determined, not by the CAA, Health and Safety or the helicopter operators, but by the OIL companies!!!
I was once tasked to take 18 pax to the Magnus platform, 290 nm north of Aberdeen, but the sea state was over 8 metres. The oil company was informed that the sea state was out of limits. OK, they said, flight cancelled. The sea state remained high (above 8 metres) for two more days. On the third day, I was tasked to take freight only to the Magnus, as the sea state was still too high for passenger flights!! I politely, (well not so politely, actually) refused! Obviously, the oil company, BP, did not think my life was worth as much as a passeger\'s.

All passengers on North Sea flights now have some form of rebreather system. Although trials were carried some EIGHT years ago on STASS, no pilots on the North Sea have STASS or anything similar yet. There are no plans to bring STASS in at present.

We still have problems with fast jet conflictions over certain parts of the North Sea. Concerns that still have not been fully addressed, THIRTY years after helicopters started flying to the installations. Yet another study has been set up to discuss the issue, but it will take a mid air collision, killing upto twenty people, before anything is actually done.

But we will continue to chip away at the complacency of the operators, the oil companies and the CAA until we resolve these and other issues.

bondu

ATPMBA

30th Apr 2005, 22:38

Hypothetical question.

During the warm summer months in the GOM, let say a S-76 heads out to a distant platform and has an engine failure. It's only landing option would be to ditch or make a platform landing. Do they have enough power to hover or will it be a running landing? If they do a running landing is there enough room to stop?

Gomer Pylot

30th Apr 2005, 23:18

It appears that some of you need to have your annual sarcasm meter calibration done. I am not defending the way things are, I'm just pointing out the excuses of the oil companies, who are making obscene profits, and of the politicians who have been bought by them.

I am definitely not happy that things are unlikely to change, I'm just pointing out the facts.

ATPMBA, it depends on the model. The A model would likely have to ditch if it didn't have enough fuel to return to the beach, but those generally are required to carry beach +30 min fuel. The A++ likely can't hover, but can successfully make a platform landing if is is operating with one-way fuel. Departing the beach at MGW, the aircraft will be well below that after an hour or more of flight, and properly done, the platform landing shouldn't be that dramatic, probably less exciting than a rejected takeoff. It's about the same for a 412.

Red Wine

1st May 2005, 01:04

Apart from one small area on the Northwest coast, all Australian Offshore Ops are undertaken with Performance Cat 1 or 2 multi engine, multi crew IFR helicopters. {That one small operation is between close monopods within 10 nm of shore with SAR Multi’s and a fast boat available].

• All Offshore flights have beach return fuel on departure.
• All onshore departures AUW is less than:
1. MTOW
2. OEI at LSALT [including diversion to Alt Fuel]
3. WAT Chart
• Offshore departures is limited [RTOW] down to normally the OGE weight.

As I have said before…an Oil Platform with any performance limiting failure onboard is not the place to be. Far better on your floats beside it. [Remember heli ops is the most dangerous part of offshore ops, its not smart to take a “bomb” onto a platform and endanger another 100+ workers.]

diginagain

1st May 2005, 01:14

As an offshore employee I have to agree with the last point made by Red Wine - we have it tough enough out here without taking onboard potential emergencies, although we regularly practise drills for dealing with helicopter emergencies on the helideck.

Back on thread, I've just turned down a position in GoM, mainly due to the comparison between flight safety standards there and the rest of the World. No thanks.

Decks

2nd May 2005, 11:05

Folks,

What it ultimately boils down to (IMHO)is the regulators and the influences on them. In the states any changes in regs have to be justified to all lobbies. And in terms of safety you need to have the balls to stand up and make the rules even when you cant statisically justify them to the nth degree.
Eg.....There is ATC at small fields all accross the U.S. and none in Fourchon. Why... no one will pay for it. Crazy I say... there are a bozillion aircraft operating from there. You shouldnt need ten mid airs to see the logic that it is required.
The FAA refuses to put in place sensible regs for EMS either.

The helicopter companies are always under pressure from the small start ups and until the FAA makes it harder for those guys and their standards the situ will continue. Fullstop.

And the north sea shouldnt get too smug either. In the GOM under IFR in IMC you need a full IFR clearance for a non radar environment all the way to the deck. The seperation required really slows things down. This is not the case in the north sea.

SASless

2nd May 2005, 17:28

Question....

Workload of twins vice singles while well checking or otherwise engaging in "rat killing" in the field....as I see it...you start two engines up....vice one....push levers up to fly...or roll throttles up to fly....start your lilypad hopping...rolling throttles/pushing-pulling levers up and down as needed....till you either shut down to refuel or hot refuel....all that I see clearly.

What I do not see is the "excessive workload" involved....am I missing something here? Other than the full startup checklist...the workload is the same with the exception of an extra lever or throttle that is moved simultaneously with the other.

Pretty lame reasoning for refusing a twin over a single in my book.

Devil 49

2nd May 2005, 21:06

SASless, if you won't buy "workload" as a reason to operate S/E in the GOM, how about (Gasp!) safety? I've lost the link, but there was a study done a couple years ago in, I think the UK, that showed that single-pilot twins had a poorer safety record than singles? The GOM has many factors that make it dissimilar to the UK and the North Sea, but they all should act in favor of the present mode- S/E.

There's an an accepted, analgous heresy on the fixed wing side of aviation- again, "light" single-pilot twins have a poor safety record. The commonalities in the two, fixed and rotary single-pilot twins, and accident rates is this, in my opinion: They're not very user-friendly.
Logically, there really should be a safety advantage to even limited power redundancy- that's common sense. That wished for safety advantage is especially tempting when one's working in region of increased risk- limited forced landing areas, for example.
This results in the real world pilot being: in an aircraft that's designed using big-iron ergonomic principles, e.g. overhead throttles; operating it in a more hazardous situation; in an aircraft that's more likely to have issues because of systems complexity; and the crowning touch in the safety hallucination- the pilot thinks the aircraft is SAFER!

Evidence? Look here:

http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/366.pdf

A quick glance thru yields:
Accidents per 100k hours- Single engine (turbine) 4.73, light twins 5.26.
Per 100k stages flown- S/E (T) 1.31, light twins 2.1.

Pretty much as I recall the '99(?) report.

I flew the GOM SE and twin, and they *fly* the same. The workload in a twin is higher- systems management.

IHL

2nd May 2005, 22:23

ATPMBA :

According to the performance charts : with a gross weight of 10,500 lbs On a 30 degree C / 86 F day, 500 PA, 30 min OEI power should result in a +100 FPM ROC.

It will stay aloft [zero ROC] under similar environmental conditions on max cont OEI at a weight of 10,000 lbs.

helmet fire

3rd May 2005, 00:18

Devil 49

As for workload: totally disagree.

As for the stats, I am sure you know the Lies, lies, statsitics....saying. The raw stats you rpovide as "proof" that singles may be safer than light twins ignores allsorts of variables. In this case, it ignores those accidents casued by night/weather CFIT rather than "engine failures". As it turns out, only twins are allowed to operate close to such risks (night/wx), thus singles are not going to have this risk exposure featured greatly in their statistics.

Indeed, as has been stated time and again on rotorheads, our greatest threat is CFIT. As twins are more exposed to CFIT, then accident rates are slewed.

The simple fact remains, no matter what statistics you throw down (excluding twins that do not stay up in the OEI cruise): twins are twice as likely to suffer an engine failure, BUT the consequence is negligable.

As risk equals frequency times consequence you have a simple outcome.

Single engine: frequency is low. Consequence is generally catastrophic over adverse terrain such as water, mountains, night, IFR. Thus risk is moderate for these ops.

Multi engine (and I will consider PC2 here that are exposed on take and landing briefly, giving, according to Nick Lappos,a 0.017% exposure): frequency is twice a single, but still low. Consequence is negligable. thus risk is negligable.

Even during that brief exposure time, you will assume less risk than a single because you still have one donk to give you increased RRPM as you cushion on.

Every time one of our colleagues loses his/her life from engine failure, I am sure it is a comfort to them to know that the statistics can be used to proove it was safer than having another donk.

But I am not comforted.

The Rotordog

3rd May 2005, 04:03

In the U.S., helicopters operating under FAR part-135 do not have to actually calculate the gross weight and c.g. for every takeoff *IF* an approved loading schedule is available, adhered to and the numbers are "checked" prior to departure. Load 'em up, initial the little box that says the c.g. and gross weight have been checked, and off you go. "With 200 pounds of fuel I can take 1050 in payload. Four 250 pounders is 1,000 and they got about, err...let's call it 50 in the boot. (Maybe they're not all really 250.) They're loaded in the proper seats...good to go!"

For twin-engine aircraft operating under part-135, the pilot must calculate his *actual* gross weight and center of gravity for EVERY takeoff. Which means that the single-pilot will do a LOT of button-pushing on the computer/calculator and writing on the manifest when he's doing forty takeoffs per day and doesn't have the luxury of doing it on his own personal schedule. (Some operators had slightly different procedures for this. At mine, we had to calculate the actual numbers.)

Downtime is coming and you have to "clean up the field" (i.e. bring all the guys from the outlying platforms back to the main quarters). They've waited until the VERY LAST MINUTE before launching you, to let the guys get as much time working as possible. You've told the foreman what time you need to start the cleanup to get done by downtime, but there are ALWAYS changes in the plan...guys running late, the infamous "swing-by's" ("Oh, we need to swing by Delta on our way back to Fox") which you didn't plan for and cannot really refuse...

You just cannot do anything expeditiously in a twin. Even fueling requires more time, because instead of taking on a quick 25 gallons I have to wait for 50 to get uploaded by that slow-ass pump.

Even without rushing (which none of us ever do), operating a twin as a "field ship" in the GOM is a lot more work than a single. It's not a matter of, as one guy who's obviously never flown a twin stated, simply a matter of pushing two throttles up instead of one (how naive is that?). I for one am not convinced that a BO105 is *that* much safer than a 206. At least, I never felt so. In fact, I'm with Devil49, it is a hallucination to say that twins are always "safer" than singles.

But pilots will convince themselves of anything. Two of anything are better than one, so twins *must* be "safer" than singles! That just stands to reason, Rotordog! An engine-failure is the ONLY thing that matters...the ONLY criteria we look at. Why can't you see that? Are ye daft, laddie? Well, are ye?

Okay, okay...BO105...bad example. No power. No Cat-A capability most of the time (especially with that dad-blamed rear-facing seat option). So sh*tcan the Bolkow! Get a brandy-new EC-135 or -145. Oops! Now we're too heavy to land on some of the smaller platforms out in the GOM. So we have a choice: either beef up the platform (yeah, riiiiight) or only go there by boat - which exposes the oilfield worker to a whole 'nother level of risk when he swings on and off the field boat via the rope or must get lifted onto the platform via the crane/basket.

Or...let's just tell that oil company to abandon that platform...shut it in! and not use it because the "safe" helicopter we need to use is now too heavy to land on it. Maybe some of you guys aren't aware of it, but there are a bunch of platforms in the GOM that have heliports rated for only 4,000 pounds. Did I land on some in my BO105 at 5,000 pounds? You betcha! Shhh, don't tell the boss. He'll tell me I was being unsafe.

Get real, people.

The point of this drivel is that "safety" is a nebulous term, the meaning of which varies depending on just who you're talking to and what numbers you're examining. Does a twin always prevent a ditching? Well, no, obviously. Is a ditching always a catastrophe? Well, no, obviously. "Risk" is another one of those relative terms. Is the mere possibility of a ditching so horrifically objectionable that it must be avoided at all cost? Umm, your mileage may vary there, pardner.

As I pointed out, if we stopped all helicopter flying in the GOM, then the rig/platform hands would have to do all of their business by boat. We've most certainly eliminated the aviation risk, but have we made their lives safer? All we've done is substitute one risk for another. And since it's simply not possible to do all GOM flying in twins, maybe...just maybe flying them around in a 206 or EC120 is "safer" and "less risky" than not flying them at all.

I'd like to live in a perfect world, but I don't. I'm for reducing risk as much as the next guy, but those who criticize GOM ops (and the FAA that allows them) should come over and take a look at what we really do before spouting off about this or that. It's easy to make indignant, breathless claims that all GOM pilots simply deserve the increased safety of twin-engine aircraft, but it's really not practical. Or logical. Or correct, for that matter.

212man

3rd May 2005, 08:52

"Even without rushing (which none of us ever do), operating a twin as a "field ship" in the GOM is a lot more work than a single. It's not a matter of, as one guy who's obviously never flown a twin stated, simply a matter of pushing two throttles up instead of one (how naive is that?)"

I take your point, but you will find that that "guy" actually has a considerable range of twin engine experience. Perhaps a degree of 'devil's advocacy' was involved!

Devil 49

3rd May 2005, 10:24

Helmet Fire- I aplologise if I gave the impression that the OGP stats were proof of my contention. My intent is to provide evidence that what appears to be logical isn't always indicative of reality.

I will respectfully disagree with your contention that a twin is not more work. Actual control manipulation, yes- twin and single are identical. My experience of 13 years in the GOM, evenly split between one and two motor machines, is that the intellectual challenge of managing the systems in a multi is a significant increase in work- more complicated procedures re: fuel, electrical, power train, MUST yield more head work. Compare checklists between a 350 and a 355...

Fundamentally, I believe the most dangerous part of the helo is the pilot and most accidents involve perfectly good helicopters. Increase pilot workload unnecessarily, and you unjustifiably increase error probability. The increased workload has to be weighed against the increased risk- IFR, for example. An IFR flight is more complicated than VFR. In IMC, IFR is inarguably safer, or at least more reliable, than a VFR attempt- in spite of the extra workload. Advocating twins as the answer to the infrequent ditching in the GOM is similar to requiring all GOM flights be IFR and IMC. Pilot error is greater hazard than the occasional power loss, even if it does result in you getting wet in a single engine.

Do I prefer twins? No question, yes. But that depends on the specific operation- Operated improperly, a twin is more dangerous, for what gain? The facts you cited appear to be twins preferred inappropriately. How do the number of engines decease the risk of CFIT?

Captain Pheremone

3rd May 2005, 14:44

For the record.......

Well done to the pilot - an individual - after all the politics who got the helo down without anyone getting hurt.
Good on you mate.

slgrossman

3rd May 2005, 17:14

Gentlemen,

There's lots of oil left in the GoM and at $50.00 a barrel it's well worth the expense of going after it. However, as the saying goes, "it takes money to make money." Some of the major oil companies which are in a favorable financial position are now divesting themselves of their older close-in properties and constructing newer technologically advanced facilities in deep water which consolidate and automate the production and transportation of oil and gas to a much greater degree. With modern technology a single platform can now service dozens of individual wells. These facilities can be serviced efficiently by larger aircraft without the need for a "field ship."

The 30-40 year-old fields of multiple individual wells are gradually being left to the smaller operators. The facilities are in many cases run down and use older technology and techniques which produce oil and gas much less efficiently. To bring these fields up to modern standards would be economically unfeasible. Thus, while these fields can still be made to turn a profit, it often requires cutting corners - something the majors have found to be fiscally detrimental (read unacceptable liability) in the long run. The majors are in effect transferring the risk to the smaller operators whose pockets are not quite so deep. However, as long as the smaller operators can continue to squeeze a few dollars out of the old properties they will perpetuate the higher risk operations.

I don't disagree that the single-engine small ships are the preferable aircraft for field work, but hopefully, field work is becoming a thing of the past. For you see, no matter how statistically safe the aircraft, 50-75 landings in a day exposes a pilot to a relatively high level of risk. If you eliminate the need to make that many landings each day by consolidating your facilities you've obviously reduced that risk. I don't see it changing overnight, but I suspect that as operating costs rise, even by cutting corners, the older facilities will eventually (for instance when the price of oil drops) become unfeasible and will be abandoned. The GoM will then be in a position where operators are driven by economics to multi-engine multi-pilot aircraft with all the attendant safety enhancements.

-Stan-

ScotiaQ

7th May 2005, 15:51

I am truly amazed that we are having this conversation. The UK CAA and JAR-OPS 3 make it a requirement for twin engined helicopters for Offshore Public Transport. More meaningfully, US owned Oil Companies also make twins a requirement, along with rebreathers, survival suits and personal PLBs. Strange they don't make it a requirement in the US. From this it can be deduced that these august bodies consider twins to be safer.

Unfortunately standards within UK operators, owned by North American companies are not as high as they have been in the past. Maximum return on assets is all that matters. It will all end in tears.

Gomer Pylot

7th May 2005, 18:21

SASless may have lots of twin time, but apparently none in Part 135 ops. I used to fly a 206B in a field where 100 takeoffs was a light day. When I flew that field, I didn't even have time to write passenger names, or takeoff or landing times - I just made a mark to count the landing, and the customer was charged 2 minutes per flight, unless the flight was out of the field, in which case the normal manifest requirements applied. It simply wouldn't have been possible with a twin, because the regulations require computing weight and balance for every flight. That would have taken longer than most of the flights. There is more to flying a twin than just increasing the throttles, at least for commercial operations.

SASless

8th May 2005, 15:22

Gomer.....

I am familiar with FAA Part 135...and other regulations...and have flown Part 135 in twins...at several places....been a training captain as well as a Chief Pilot...also instructed at a few factories on twins.

The question you need to ask....is why you let yourself be rushed to the point you could not do the paperwork....sometimes one must tell the customer and the boss...."NO!"

Gomer Pylot

8th May 2005, 16:00

But that's not the point I was making. If you do everything without rushing, then a twin simply won't do the job here. The paperwork and other requirements take longer than the flights. In short, there are some jobs, even offshore, that are better performed by a single. As is often quoted here, "Horses for courses". It seems rather presumptuous for someone who doesn't, and hasn't, flown in an area to pontificate on how things should be done there, even if he has done everything else everywhere else.

flyer43

8th May 2005, 17:43

In short, there are some jobs, even offshore, that are better performed by a single.
There is a big difference between doing something quicker and doing it better and safer! Maybe that's one of the reasons so many singles fall in the water?

SASless has a very valid point, you have to know when to say "NO" and not give in to pressure from clients or company.

slgrossman

8th May 2005, 21:30

I think the point Gomer Pylot is trying to make is that given the specific operating environment, single-engine small ships are safer than twins for that particular job.

You can debate whether anyone should be allowed to do that job at all, but if you're intent on working in that environment you're better off in a 206.

-Stan-

GLSNightPilot

9th May 2005, 00:12

Face it. Europe does things one way, and the US does them differently. As I understand it, in the UK one can't even fly a single over a city, nor at night. That level of regulation would never be permitted here. We don't try to regulate you, so you shouldn't try to regulate us.

In the scenario above, the helicopter is seldom as much as 1/4 mile from a platform, and a boat is usually in the field, or at least close by. People are not dying from engine failures in these fields, and the oil companies are not about to pay for 2 or 3 twins to do the job that one 206 is doing safely now. Ain't gonna happen. Pissing and moaning about it from the other side of the pond won't do any good at all, and neither will it help from here. Get over it.

Devil 49

9th May 2005, 00:58

Twins are not safer than singles.
Engine failures in the GOM are not routinely fatal, nor are they anywhere else, generally.
If you don't believe this, you need to look at some studies. I'm not digging it up, but the US Army did a study decades ago that showed forced landings following complete loss of power, did not meet "Class A" standards 90 (95?) per cent of the time. Class A, as I recall, is fatal or aircraft destroyed.
Compare that to helo accidents in general- 90 per cent are pilot error. Yes, some of those errors involve power problems poorly handled.
Contrast that with evidence that twins crash more than singles. The OGP study I cited earlier in this thread has shown this for years. Off the top of my head, 46 (47?) of the 69 EMS crashes in the states in the last 4 years, were twins. I've flown'em, in the GOM, something like 25,000 landings and 4000 hours, in the old tech- 355F series, the 412, a very little time in the 222, a single trip in a Puma- and what I've observed many times in the 105 (never had the pleasure, or the curse, of a 'Kow assignment)- these aircraft are NOT user friendly. Oh well "better training," "they're used more hazardously"... perhaps true. Perhaps the ECs and 4th gen twins are better, and perhaps computerization just adds a new failure mode. If you believe twins are better, show some evidence to back it. Not legislation, resulting from the urge to claim accomplishment in resolving a"problem."- show statistics. Not "It's more expensive so it must be better," that's pure bias. Not policies. Evidence.

I'll also point out that the airlines are routinely reducing the number of engines... Which brings another point up- the one thing that is inarguably true is that two pilot crews ARE safer.

Well?

Hippolite

9th May 2005, 01:16

So, it seems to sum up the GOM operations:

Twin engine, perceived difficulty of operation, paperwork, c of g calculations, slow turnarounds, passenger weights, performance calculated, single engine accountability, beach +30 fuel etc etc

Single engine, easy to operate, no paperwork, passengers not weighed, no performance calculations, field fuel only, fast turnarounds, cheaper operation.

The perception that twin engine is no good for field ops is driving the use of single engine, poorly equipped aircraft. There are some Gomex aircraft that don't even have a VSI. That means limited panel from the start and not all pilots have an instrument ticket. What chance when one encounters inadvertant IMC?

There are some responsible oil companies and helicopter operators who are trying to do it safely. Its a shame that it is they and not the regulators who seem to have to drive the safety improvements. Safty is a VERY hard sell in the GOM, many companies just want cheap.

HH :cool:

slgrossman

9th May 2005, 22:41

Hippolite,

You've attempted to paint the Gulf of Mexico with a very broad brush. I think the result is an inaccurate picture of what actually goes on here.

Certainly there are cowboy pilots and shoddy operators, but they are not representative of what we do here in this day and age.

For the majority of crew change trips a well equipped, appropriately sized twin is the preferred aircraft. However, for operations within a field (i.e. up to a dozen or more satellite platforms within perhaps a five mile circle) the ideal aircraft from both a utility and safety perspective is a small single-engine, single-pilot ship such as the Bell 206.

Federal aviation regulations require that all aircraft, single or twin, either compute weight and balance or use an approved loading schedule which ensures the aircraft will remain within its limitations. Documentation is required for all flights. Passengers' names and weights are recorded for each leg. Performance calculations are normally simple as they are predicated on OAT (our high power demand operations typically occur within a couple hundred feet of sea level).

There are still many small ships operating in the GoM which are minimally instrumented, but customers are increasingly requiring better capability in the aircraft they contract. My company has required an instrument rating of all newly hired pilots for quite some time. They recently made it a retroactive requirement that all pilots who did not have the rating go out and obtain it.

Additionally, the major helicopter operators have put in place policies requiring base managers to become much more involved in the weather and fuel decisions their pilots make to dispatch or to continue a flight. This has relieved individual pilots of much of the pressure they might have felt in the past.

The bottom line is; yes there are "bottom feeders" whose only interest is in doing the job at minimal cost. Fortunately, where I work we don't see so much of that. In the UK a very conservative civil aviation authority mandates safety. In the US it's quite often liability concerns and lawyers. Eventually, both probably achieve the same end, but which is better ... I guess that's open to debate.

-Stan-

leading edge

9th May 2005, 23:51

SL

I agree that Hippolite has maybe painted the GOM with a broad brush but makes a valid point that contributors to this thread have implied that twin operation are complicated and it has been implied that there is minimal paperwork for SE operations. I am sure that the truth lies in the middle ground somewhere.

Regarding equipment, I believe that the company you work for has many Bell 407s and Bell 206L aircraft which don't have a VSI. Sure, you can mandate a current instrument rating but it is still not enough when the aircraft are not equipped with what most pilots would term basic instrumentation.

It is also acknowledged that now, companies have put into place adverse weather policies and procedures, but it was only after a very bad weather related accident in 2003. It should have happened sooner.

Your statement that a well equipped appropriately sized twin is used for crew change operations is also true, but shouldn't you add that its often flown with one way fuel and at max all up weight with no performance calculations, no reject area at the heliport therefore making its "twin" status questionable at best?

Things are, from what you have said, improving in the GOM, lets hope that they continue to improve...they still have some way to go to match other places where helicopters are operated.

Gomer Pylot

10th May 2005, 01:39

The GOM operators follow the same regulations that the rest of the US follows. VSI indicators are not required in any VFR aircraft in the US. Whether that's good or bad, it is the law. Most helicopters in the GOM are actually better equipped than the average US helicopter. As GLSNightPilot said, US, European, and Oz regulations are different, and always will be. Throwing rocks at the regulatory agencies of other countries is senseless. In the US, it's perfectly legal to fly a single-engine helicopter at night, across cities, with no IFR instrumentation at all. There is no regulatory difference between onshore and offshore, except for the requirement for flotation gear. We have an entirely different philosophy than European countries on this and many other issues. That won't change. If you want changes, then you'll have to come over here and enforce your will, and I predict that will be resisted strongly.

Personally, I support stronger regulation and enforcement, but I'm also realistic about the probability of that happening, and mandating all twin-engine aircraft is not the best way to increase safety. Factors other than engine failure are what are killing us, and our passengers. Having all twins is fine, but better instrumentation, training, maintenance, weather information, and traffic information are all cheaper and more effective. Shorter working hours and more pilots are also likely to increase safety more than more engines. The amount of money that will go into safety is severely limited, and I want it to go toward the most effective fixes. More engines is not it.

212man

10th May 2005, 09:12

"In the US, it's perfectly legal to fly a single-engine helicopter at night, across cities, with no IFR instrumentation at all"

Then the FAA get all shirty when BA decide to fly a 4 engine aircraft on 3, back home; there's consistency!

Going back to the original debate about twins, is it really going to cause any problem for the pilot to operate a 427 rather than a 407/206, or a 355 rather than a 350/120? We've operated 355s on high intensity operations without any problems (they took over from a 206).

The defence of lack of VSIs because it's not a legal requirement is novel. Lots of things may not be legal requirements, but it doesn't mean they are probably more than desirable. I imagine in 'gold fish bowl' conditions it would be highly desirable to have all the instruments you can, even if technically VFR. By not fitting such gear seems to imply that the owners are aiming at the lowest standard they can get away with, rather than the highest standard practical (there obviously comes a point where kit for the sake of kit is not helping anyone.) It seems less than diligent on the part of the FAA too; it (insert particular item) may not be a requirement now, but perhaps it ought to be.

Take AVADs in larger a/c such as the S-76 for example. In the UK in 1986 (I think) an S-61 full of passengers flew into flat calm sea in the cruise whilst VFR, but in heavy haze, resulting in several fatalities. Subsequently the CAA mandated AVAD for aircraft operating over water. A relatively simple, cheap and effective way to prevent a repeat performance. Indeed, it probably saved a 76 a year or so later. Has anything been mandated following the CFIT last year of a 76 at night in the GoM? So not all our regulations are 'anal' and not everything is tied up in how many engines we have; most rules are a result of experience and reacting to events that have taken place. In some cases, even proactively such as HOMP.

Having said that, I think it is also important to realise that unlike some 'oil patches' in the world where there may only be one, two or three operators, in the GoM there are loads of them, several of which most people outside the region won't have heard of, and it is wrong to tar all of them with the same brush.

flyer43

10th May 2005, 12:45

In the US, it's perfectly legal to fly a single-engine helicopter at night, across cities, with no IFR instrumentation at all
We have an entirely different philosophy than European countries on this and many other issues. That won't change. If you want changes, then you'll have to come over here and enforce your will, and I predict that will be resisted strongly.
Gomer, the point has nothing to do with regulations and the law or whatever you want to call it. The whole point is using common sense and giving yourself a fighting chance to deliver your valuable payload and yourself in one piece, without getting them wet. And as for the argument that not many of them drown when a single engine machine ditches ........................
As for speed and efficiency in offshore operations. I spent many years operating with a Bell 212 conducting long shuttles. The paperwork was designed to help streamline the whole operation, plus we had offshore radio stations with recorders that helped to keep the score as well. Extra life jackets were available at all locations so that there was a minimal delay between landing, deplaning and reloading more animated freight. I certainly wouldn't have wanted to be doing the same job in a single of any sort, even if the inter platform payloads warented their use.

212man makes a very valid point regarding the difference between legal and sensible.
Previous comments I and many others this side of the pond have been taken as mud slinging between the FAA and CAA requirements. It's nothing of the sort, this is only about using your common sense and providing a safe and efficient service for your clients..

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

10th May 2005, 12:54

"Which brings another point up- the one thing that is inarguably true is that two pilot crews ARE safer."

Devil 49,

Any statistics to support this ? I'm interested because I always thought the push for two crew was originated by the oil companies.

Cheers,

NEO

Devil 49

10th May 2005, 14:06

The OGP study shows that the multis operated with two-pilot crews have a significant safety advantage over all other equipment. Off the top of my head, that's the only source of stats that comes to mind. There are apples and oranges issues in the numbers, for instance- flight profiles, ie- my impression is that all the two-pilot crews in the study are IFR crews, whereas you can't say that of all the twins. So, perhaps it's the IFR capability that's significant? That makes sense to me, too. I think some reasonable assumption follow:
IFR crews are generally better trained and prepared at each dispatch;
IFR flights face serious magnifiers of hazard;
And two pilot crews address the greatest hazard to any fligth- pilot failure of all sorts.
Pilot error, or just poor pilot performance, is the greatest threat to safety.

I can count on my fingers the number of inflight power failures I've had since '68. Systems failures, on the other hand, would be several dozens of occurences, and pilot mistakes of all types, thousands in my career. Look around, and I'll guess you'll see the same pattern. Twins address the least likely hazard, multiply the second, and geometrically amplify the third in my list.
What does work, apparently and in spite of the frequent clashes of personalities in the cockpit, is having two pilots addressing the challenges of safe flight.

Nigerian Expat Outlaw

10th May 2005, 14:18

Okey Dokey, thanks.

212man

10th May 2005, 14:23

Having a quiet day East of the Calabar river NEO?(':ok:')

SASless

10th May 2005, 15:02

Gomer...

212man and I have done the "Rat Killing" shuttle flying in 212's, hopping from well head to well head, and you can see from his post that we share the belief that such work can be done with a twin as well as a single.

I agree with everything 212man said about this...it really is a philosophical view that requires examination as to whether twins are better than singles. Bob Suggs, et al, reduced helicopter flying to the lowest denominator by adhering to the Bell 47 mindset that PHI started with....just like the way the offshore boats evolved from Shrimp Boats. The GOM is its own worst enemy at times....small decks do not allow for "bigger" helicopters thus singles get forced upon us....answer would have been to have better foresight and build bigger...safer...decks.

Gomer Pylot

11th May 2005, 02:27

Well, we can debate this until the cows come home, and it won't change anything. The regulations clearly allow singles, and thus they will continue to fly. The FAA will not change the requirements on this.

I'm willing to bet that the 'rat-killing shuttle' didn't involve a hundred takeoffs. I've flown fields where 200 per day was the norm. That won't happen in a 212. I'm not saying I enjoyed doing that, but it happens here, and it will continue as long as it's legal, which is likely to be well into the foreseeable future.

It's certainly true that there is a wide disparity of operators in the GOM, and it should also be noted that there are probably more helicopters flying out there every day than even exist in all of Europe. With that number flying, it's no surprise that there will be more incidents.

Hippolite

11th May 2005, 05:38

Gomer SASless, SL etc....

Ignoring deck size restrictions, why can't "deck hopping, rat killing 200 landings or you're a pussy" shuttles be done with a 212, 412, or any twin?

In the 80s, on the Southern North Sea, over 75 landings per day was the norm for an S61 and that included some longer transit legs. All close together platforms and double that would have been possible.

I'm not sure I see the issue here. Silly me!!

HH:cool:

John Eacott

11th May 2005, 05:59

Further to the S61 NS stuff, during the 70's we shuttled the bears to and from work in the Brent Field almost daily with 212's, average hop <2 minutes. Shift changes were 0600 and 1800, anything up to 4 x 212's moving 11-13 pax at a time. Worked well, and all loading was at ground idle.

Not a daytime flight hour logged mid winter, either ;)

flyer43

11th May 2005, 13:14

Gomer,
The regulations clearly allow singles, and thus they will continue to fly. The FAA will not change the requirements on this.
I'm not saying I enjoyed doing that, but it happens here, and it will continue as long as it's legal, which is likely to be well into the foreseeable future.
As previously mentioned by others, legal does not necessarily equate to safe. And neither does speed, or any other measure for that matter. If we want to get into the old "My Dad is bigger than yours" argument, I am sure that many of us out here could give as good as you want, but that would achieve very little.

Ignore your thoughts that this is still a CAA versus FAA rules issue and think a bit deeper on what some people are trying to say in this thread. Unfortunately, I suspect that pride and prejudice will get the better of you......

Proven reliability multi-engine helis, operated correctly, expose you to less risk than single engine helis......

slgrossman

11th May 2005, 17:24

When you're talking about more than 50 landings in a day, especially during the summer, fatigue induced pilot error is much more likely to be the cause of an incident than loss of an engine. The 212 is pretty simple, but going through even that simple checklist 50 or more times a day takes its toll. I don't believe there's a turbine helicopter that can do the field job with less stress on the pilot than a 206.

My currrent job involves crew changes over fairly long distances (80 miles or more) so I wouldn't be happy with anything less than my trusty S-76, but for field work the 206 certainly has its advantages, and not merely cost of operation.

-Stan-

Devil 49

11th May 2005, 17:57

(If you believe multis are the answer to all safety issues, I'd suggest you cover your ears and close your eyes right now.)

Not to mention, Stan, the fact that it's one of the safest, if not THE safest single-engine aircraft in the world, helo or airplane.

One can lead a horse to water...

Gomer Pylot

11th May 2005, 19:10

I understand what people are trying to say in this thread. I understand that it's a matter of safety, not regulation. I also understand that it's a matter of money, which I'm not convinced that the European posters do. As I've said before, I'm for using more twins, fewer takeoffs, and all that. But the oil companies will have to pay for that, and they're simply not willing to do so. Many of them are only interested in the cheapest transportation they can get, in the short term, and don't care about the long term. They save enough in monthly costs to pay for any lawsuits, which will be protracted in any case. Wishing does not make it so, and whining from the east side of the Atlantic will make no difference on what happens here. Even the majors have different operating philosophies, although that seems to be (very grudgingly) changing, albeit very slowly. But you have to remember that there are literally dozens of smaller oil companies operating in the GOM, along with many smaller helicopter operators, and these are all driven by short-term economics. As long as regulations permit using singles (and that will be at least through this century, IMO, and certainly through at least half of it) then singles will be used. If we are going to spend money on increasing safety, then we need to spend what little of it there is on the things which will really save lives, and not on the things outsiders believe, through their one true faith, will save us all. Twin engines are not a panacea, they're a red herring. We need better weather reporting, better flight following (real ATC, with common frequencies used by all operators), and better enforcement of regulations. We need TCAS, EGPWS, and better cockpit instrumentation. We need better regulation of crappy helipads, both offshore and onshore. We need realistic weather minimums. The major operators have conservative minimums, but the smaller ones just use the FAA regs, which only require clear of clouds. In short, there are many things which are killing us, and which could be fixed much more cheaply than junking hundreds of aircraft and buying hundreds of much more expensive aircraft. And requiring all twins would require, literally, the disposition of several hundred helicopters, just for the GOM. Ain't gonna happen.

TheFlyingSquirrel

11th May 2005, 19:19

Has there ever bee a mid-air low level in the Gom between two helis?

flyer43

11th May 2005, 19:42

Gomer,
When you put it like that I can only agree with you! Unfortunately, the larger oil companies that are willing to spend the necessary cash to improve the safety of their own operations don't necessarily cause their lesser cousins to follow suit. However, some of them do try to improve the situation by lobbying the regulators to apply changes, including the mandating of certain equipment fits to enhance safety etc. (for example: TCAS is only really useful if the rest of the pack have suitable transponders fitted - and switched on!!)
But it is not only the oil companies that can bring about the changes. As long as there are operators willing to operate to lower standards and pilots willing to accept them, there will always be customers who will use them as a means of saving money. Change any one of the components of this equation and things should improve - i.e. pilots could actually improve things by not accepting to fly in a helicopter, single or twin, which does not have suitable equipment fit to optimise the safety of its operation..... but I guess that is hardly likely to happen as some guys are just willing to fly anything for the sake of earning a crust.

If you want some general statistics for helicopter operations wordlwide, you can find stats for 2000-2003 on the publications page of the OGP website - Click Here (http://www.ogp.org.uk/Publications/index.asp) It may be a UK website, but the data is global!!
Enter the word helicopter in the search box and enter - you can download the .pdf reports free of charge
The breakdown of info is by helicopter general type rather than manufacturer type, but may make useful reading for some.

SASless

11th May 2005, 22:14

Gomer hits the nail squarely on the head....if we cannot have the twins...can we have some of the other things....ATC, common frequencies, SAR....etc?

Gomer Pylot

11th May 2005, 22:37

Squirrel, yes, there have been several midair collisions between helicopters in the GOM, all of them fatal. I have personally had many 'near misses', but none since using a TAWS. Transponders are required when flying in the GOM, because we are regularly crossing the ADIZ. It's still possible for a transponder to fail, of course, but every helicopter operating out there has to have one installed and turned on. Otherwise, a pair of F16s will soon be flying in formation with it, or at least trying to.

Flyer43, it's a vicious cycle. Some customers go with the lowest bidder, and some operators bid low by virtue of providing lower safety and maintenance standards, in order to get the business from the cheap customers. They reinforce each other. And there will always be pilots willing to fly for them, just as there are pilots willing to fly for very little money just to build time. If you read this and the other forums, that can't even be iln question. As long as the small operators are not unionized, there is no way to prevent it, and the US labor laws make it very difficult to unionize companies.

PPRUNE FAN#1

11th May 2005, 22:40

TheFlyingSquirrel:Has there ever bee a mid-air low level in the Gom between two helis?My dear boy! For a time we were averaging one mid-air per year in the GOM, a horrible, atrocious rate. A friend of mine who was flying his speed-hobbled 407 got rammed from his 5 o'clock position by a Twinstar whose pilot had his head down, likely fiddling with his...umm, something. Sadly, the Twinstar pilot died. My friend's 407 got mightily chopped up (nose gone- including pedals!, tail boom gone), but miraculously (is there any other word?) he managed to get it down on the water safely.

TCAS (not TCAD for cryin' out loud) is the single most important safety device to ever come down the pike. But PHI "couldn't afford" to equip all its ships with them. Too expensive! (Tell me "safety" isn't about dollars...go ahead, tell me!)

I know one pilot who had given his wife instructions that if he was ever killed in a mid-air between his non-TCAS-equipped ship and another that she should sue and sue and sue until PHI had no money left to buy anything. And you know what, I don't blame him a bit.

In that non-radar environment where there are so many aircraft flying at the same dang altitudes (read: "low"), the value of TCAS is inestimable...incalculable. Yet the operators resist installing it.

Yeah, what does one mid-air cost?

Hippolite

12th May 2005, 03:50

PPrune Fan

I belive that PHI has ALL its aircraft equiped with the BFG Skywatch system or better in the case of the larger twins.

Now....that VSI might be a nice addition in a 407 or 206L3

HH:cool:

SASless

12th May 2005, 16:29

If my alcohol ravaged brain does not defeat me...was there not two mid-airs in one day...seems it was about twenty years ago. I do know PHI lost two Jetrangers to tranny mount failures in one day many many years ago.

The traffic problem could be improved if the GOM adopted a method similar to the North Sea....a single common frequency for distinct areas thus all aircraft operating in that sector are on the same frequency. There would have to be more of them....due to the sheer number of aircraft and it would require two radio's in each aircraft....

The answer to the question...how much does an accident cost vice the cost of TCAS....is simple. One can purchase insurance for the accident....it takes capital investment to purchase TCAS....which is much more costly....and thus harms the bonus pool for the managers. (....or could the cost be passed along to the customer some way?)

Mars

19th May 2005, 14:29

NTSB Identification: DFW05IA119
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Friday, May 13, 2005 in S.Timbalier 265, GM
Aircraft: Eurocopter France EC120B, registration: N588SC
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On May 13, 2005, about 1425 central daylight time, a Eurocopter France EC120B single-engine turbine powered helicopter, N588SC, registered to CFS Air LLC., of Danbury Connecticut, and operated by ERA Helicopters LLC., of Saint Charles, Louisiana, remained undamaged during a forced autorotation landing into open ocean water near offshore platform South Timbelier ST 265, located in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot and passenger were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. The flight originated from ST 265 and was destined for Port Fourchon (9LA) near Fourchon, Louisiana.

According to the pilot, while approximately 14 miles south of Port Fourchon and while 500 feet above the water, he observed the engine low oil pressure light illuminate and shortly thereafter the engine lost power. The pilot elected to turn into the wind, inflate the floats, and perform an autorotation to the water. After a successful autorotation the pilot and passenger disembarked the helicopter without injury and were rescued. At the time of the incident the pilot reported the fuel gauges indicated approximately 24 gallons of fuel.

The pilot further reported that the helicopter remained upright until the recovery at which time the helicopter rolled inverted, but remained afloat.

The helicopter was recovered, and on May 16, 2005 was examined by investigators from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), American Eurocopter, and Turbomeca USA. The engine was removed and transported to Turbomeca USA for further examination.

Hippolite

19th May 2005, 20:36

So, let's see, since this thread has been going, how many have we had? How many have we had in the non GOM?

In this case, everything was fine, both got out with no problem.

In this case, can we demonstrate that a twin (say an EC135) MIGHT have been safer and not lead to a hull loss?

BUT, then again, they are so COMPLICATED to operate and can't do more than a few landings each day so they are no good for the GOM.

SASless

19th May 2005, 20:53

Hippo....

Something that has to be factored into the equation....Air Log had a rash of engine failures a few years back (seems that distinction rotates amongst the GOM outfits) due to contaminated fuel. That would possibly do in a twin as well as a single.

Try as you might....you will not be able to sway the jury I fear. After all, the deck weight of some of these twins is so much greater than a single....along with all that complexity to cope with.

flyer43

20th May 2005, 11:11

What stuns me is that the EC120 ditching in the posting by MARS has been classified as an incident, as are many of the ditchings which occur in the area. Provided that all occupants get out without too much bruising etc. and the aircraft is eventually recovered, this is the norm. If the aircraft is damaged by rolling over after everybody has evacuated, this does not make it an accident as the "flight" was completed as soon as the last person on board evacuated..........

Devil 49

20th May 2005, 14:12

I'm not aware of any stats that support any safety advantage of single pilot twins. On the other hand, there are data that indicate a disadvantage. Perhaps- in spite of common sense interpretation of appearance- the world IS round, and s/p twins aren't safer.

flyer43

20th May 2005, 14:37

Where did comparisons with single-pilot twins come into the equation?

As for data supporting generic types, try the following - as posted earlier .....

If you want some general statistics for helicopter operations wordlwide, you can find stats for 2000-2003 on the publications page of the OGP website - http://www.ogp.org.uk/Publications/index.asp (Here) It may be a UK website, but the data is global!!
Enter the word helicopter in the search box and enter - you can download the .pdf reports free of charge
The breakdown of info is by helicopter general type rather than manufacturer type, but may make useful reading for some.

212man

20th May 2005, 15:02

Maybe, as F43 mentions, IF the various 'incidents' suffered by S/E aircraft that were, in fact, power loss ditchings, were recorded more fully, the statistics might favour twins.

At the end of the day, I don't think anyone is advocating using an S-92 where a 206 currently operates. However, as the accidents/incidents, referred to here, clearly show, had a 427/355 been used in preference to a 206/407/120, then they would probably not have resulted in ditchings. It's not a difficult concept to grasp!

So we've seen the twin vs single debate going on, how about the turbine vs piston? Think how much money all those 407/120 operators could save by using R-44s

TheFlyingSquirrel

20th May 2005, 16:03

Or Filapino crew !!

SASless

21st May 2005, 02:59

Careful now....the argument should be on how to convince our neighbors and fellow rotorheads to assimilate other cultures....and payscales. Bid up....not down...if you like your standard of living at some fraction of the highest wage....imagine how much happier you would be with the entire wage? Seems a lot of folks skip over that when they get the offer.

SASless

30th May 2005, 03:26

Air Dog Bell 206 doing training had an engine failure of some sort....Training Captain made a routine engine off landing to the water. Only difference was the engine was not working whereas it would have been during the practice.

A Bell 407 had an engine problem....found itself being transported by workboat.....some suggestion the tailboom got bent somewhere after takeoff and when it arrived at the dock....maybe someone in the GOM can add more to this.

Except for the circumstances....could have been two more ditchings to add to the list.

Mars

19th Aug 2005, 15:44

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 8/19/2005 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 167H Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 08/18/2005 Time: 1405

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N167H, A BELL 206 ROTORCRAFT, CRASHED ON ATTEMPTED LANDING AT AN OIL
PLATFORM, THE TWO PERSONS ON BOARD WERE FATALLY INJURED, WEST CAMERON
BLOCK 560 OFFSHORE, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 2
# Crew: 2 Fat: 2 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: NOT REPORTED

OTHER DATA

Departed: Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: Flt Plan: Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 08/19/2005

TheFlyingSquirrel

19th Aug 2005, 15:50

For God's sake - it's never good news from this God foresaken place !!

RIP

SASless

19th Aug 2005, 16:18

167H registration comes back to Air Logistics....an OLOG company.

Condolences to the families.:(

Time Out

20th Aug 2005, 14:20

Offshore Logistics, Inc. Confirms Flight Accident

LAFAYETTE, La.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 19, 2005--Offshore Logistics, Inc. (NYSE: OLG) today regretfully reports an accident on August 18, 2005 that claimed the lives of two Air Logistics employees in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. The aircraft, a single engine Bell helicopter, reportedly departed one production platform and was planning to land at a nearby platform when the accident occurred. The families of the employees involved have been notified and the Company is responding to the tragedy. In addition, the Company has notified the appropriate regulatory authorities, including the National Transportation Safety Board.
source (http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20050819005326&newsLang=en)

so very sad - condolences to those concerned

Hippolite

21st Aug 2005, 07:03

Here's another one from the day before although no injuries reported. Looks like a classic tail strike.

N330P, A BELL 206L-3 ROTORCRAFT, ON LANDING REPORTED FLYING DEBRIS FOLLOWED
BY AN UNCONTROLLABLE SPIN, MUSTANG ISLAND BLOCK A111, GULF OF MEXICO,
DERIDDER, LA

Not a good week for Airlog

Captain Pheremone

22nd Aug 2005, 12:59

Reading between the lines it sure seems these last two posts are actually the same prang with different levels of authenticity?????????????

SASless

22nd Aug 2005, 13:26

Different tail numbers....different locations.:(

Mars

1st Sep 2005, 15:10

May I express sympathy with all of those who have lost as a result of hurricane 'Katrina'.

This is a fuller version of the accident that happened on the 18th August and which was posted earlier.

NTSB Identification: DFW05FA217
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, August 18, 2005 in
Aircraft: Bell 206B, registration: N167H
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On August 18, 2005, approximately 1410 central daylight time, a single-engine Bell 206B helicopter, N167H, registered to and operated by Air Logistics LLC of New Iberia, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted water following a collision with an oil platform while landing on an offshore oil platform, West Cameron (WC) 560 located in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot and mechanic received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 positioning flight. The local flight originated from a nearby platform, WC 645 at 13:59.

Two witnesses on the oil platform at the time of the accident reported the helicopter approached the platform from the south. The witnesses then stated that as the helicopter headed for the heliport, it "sounded like it lost power and started dropping rapidly." The witnesses lost sight of the helicopter as it descended below the platform's living quarters. They then heard the helicopter contact the oil platform and fall into the water below. The emergency floats did not deploy and the helicopter quickly sank.

The helicopter was retrieved from approximately 190 feet of water, and transported to a secured maintenance facility located in New Iberia, Louisiana.

Hippolite

1st Aug 2006, 10:37

Another GOM Accident but not too serious.

Standard helideck markings (a circle) would help prevent this....so easy but so hard for the Gomers to do....why?

LOCATION
City: PATTERSON State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N15Q, A BELL 206B ROTORCRAFT, DURING HOVER WHILE LANDING, STRUCK A FOUR
FOOT VENTILATION STACK, SHIP SHOAL 79, 40 SOUTHEAST OF PATTERSON, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: METAR KPTN 171355Z 31003KT CLR 28/23 A3006

OTHER DATA

Departed: Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: Flt Plan: Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 07/18/2006

JimL

1st Aug 2006, 14:38

See the discussion on the touchdown/positioning markings (aiming circle) in this thread:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2733657#post2733657

Jim

SASless

1st Aug 2006, 17:06

Even with markings one has to stay within them. GOM decks are usually very small...used by more than one aircraft at a time...and maintenance standards leave a bit to be desired. Throw in the general attitude regarding safety by some of the bottom feeders that own the decks....and accidents will happen.

Gomer Pylot

1st Aug 2006, 20:25

I don't know about this particular deck, but it's not uncommon for the decks to be so small as to make aiming circles useless. 24'x24' is common, and that size deck gives just enough room to get the skids on the platform, with the tail hanging over the edge. Common practice is to put the nose close to the edge, leaving just enough room to walk in front of it. On some of these so-called helidecks, you will still have t/r obstructions on one or more sides, and if you turn the wrong way you're going to hit something, and an aiming circle just puts you closer to the obstacles if you stay in it.

TheFlyingSquirrel

1st Aug 2006, 20:43

Is this about average on the GOM installations Gomer, or do they come much smaller ?

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v650/theflyingsquirrel/SS358TopDeck1.jpg

crop duster

1st Aug 2006, 23:11

They get a lot smaller than that.

barryb

Gomer Pylot

2nd Aug 2006, 14:39

That's about average. At least there aren't many obstacles sticking up, only the flare boom. I've landed on many platforms that had only one leg, the heliport (if you want to call it that) on top, and the only way down was through a hole in the deck, through which the pax crawled to check the well. You have to land rather precisely, so as not to cover up the hole. In a stiff wind with high seas, the pax crawl to and from the hole, because the deck is moving too much to walk. I've also done lots of sling loads to these things, and the only way to see the platform when over it was via a 2.5" convex mirror mounted under the chin bubble. Not long lining, but hovering up there seeing only the moving waves while spotting the load was difficult enough for me.

crop duster

2nd Aug 2006, 22:00

oscar bravo

3rd Aug 2006, 18:37

TFS

Thats funny I've been on that platform (GB142) in a similar looking aircraft :E

The white buildings were not there though.

BTW, Darren wants to know how you got that picture

Jack Mehoff

4th Aug 2006, 23:52

Squirrel. I have a picture of a toad stool. If I emailed to you would you post it on here?
Hope your well, hope to see you here soon!!

Darren :ok:

TheFlyingSquirrel

5th Aug 2006, 01:32

Here are the toad stools, provided by young Jack....I presume there's a gas valve on every one ? Looks like a game of heli hop-scotch !

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v650/theflyingsquirrel/Toadstool3.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v650/theflyingsquirrel/ToadStool.jpg

SASless

5th Aug 2006, 02:55

What we need now is a photo of a 212 on one of the Ubit decks at Eket......

212man

5th Aug 2006, 11:14

Not sure about Ubit decks (they weren't that small, were they?) more like one of the Texaco decks: I got out of a 76 once and 'paced' one, it was 7-8m!

TheFlyingSquirrel

5th Aug 2006, 11:19

when toad-stool hopping, would one make a flat approach, or climb to make a steep approach ?

Also, you've shut down on that precarious looking lump of metal - how long could you expect to be ' marooned ' there for ?

SASless

5th Aug 2006, 15:01

212man,

The total deck was plenty big....before they removed the wooden deck timbers. Afterwards, one had to land between the "railroad tracks"....which made the decks much smaller in reality.

212man

5th Aug 2006, 15:36

Ah yes, now I remember: much of that period had been relegated to a little used memory recess!

Gomer Pylot

5th Aug 2006, 15:59

I've worked fields where there were ~50 of these in one block, 3x3 sm, plus a few larger ones. 100-150 landings/day, every day, ~9000 in ~7 months. I often just hovered from one to the other, but if I could I flew around long enough to get some air moved through the cockpit.

Jack Mehoff

6th Aug 2006, 04:52

If you had a problem on one of these, you would call base who would in this case, have to get a boat out to you!!! god knows how long that would take!! I used to dread being marrooned on one!! always had lots of provisions though!!:ok:

Mars

24th Aug 2007, 12:44

Interesting because of the prior lightning strike.

NTSB Identification: DFW07IA184
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Thursday, August 16, 2007 in Gulf of Mexico, GM
Aircraft: Bell 407, registration: N433PH
Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On August 16, 2007, at 1513 central daylight time, a single-engine Bell 407 helicopter, N433PH, was undamaged during an emergency landing to the water in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot sustained minor injuries and the passenger was not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters Incorporated, of Lafayette, Louisiana. A company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight that departed the East Cameron 109 (EC109) offshore platform at about 1507, and was destined for the West Cameron 98 (WC98) offshore platform. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 flight.

In a written statement, the pilot reported that he departed the EC 109 platform and climbed to an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet and filed his flight plan with the operator's communications center. Approximately five minutes after departure, the engine chip light illuminated and the pilot immediately turned back to the departure platform. While in the turn, the pilot reported hearing a "high pitched grinding noise" and a "pop" before the engine stopped producing power.

The pilot entered an autorotation to the ocean as he made a Mayday call to his company's communications center. Approximately 75 to 100 feet above the water, the pilot initiated a flare to slow the helicopter's descent and attempted to deploy the emergency floats; however, he did not pull the handle hard enough. The pilot made a second attempt, which was successful, and the floats deployed when the helicopter was approximately 10-feet above the water. The pilot "pulled pitch" and the helicopter landed safely on the water with the floats fully inflated. Shortly thereafter, a large wave impacted the helicopter and broke out the right windshield and rolled the helicopter inverted.

The pilot and the passenger were able to exit the helicopter and deploy one of the on-board life rafts. Once both individuals were in the life raft, the pilot activated the EPIRB and another PHI helicopter was able to direct a nearby shrimp boat to the life raft. The pilot and the passenger were taken onto the boat and were later recovered by a United States Coast Guard helicopter.

The operator recovered the helicopter the following day and transported the helicopter to their maintenance facility in Louisiana, where representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), PHI, and Rolls Royce examined the engine. The engine examination revealed signs of an uncontained engine failure near the area of the third stage turbine wheel. The engine was further disassembled and initial investigation confirmed that the third stage turbine wheel had failed, which caused rub on the peashooter, which caused the turbine spline adapter to fail, and subsequent failure of the first stage turbine wheel. The third stage turbine wheel was shipped to Rolls Royce, for further metallurgical examination.

A review of maintenance records revealed that the third stage turbine wheel (part number 6898663, serial number X536938) had accrued a total of 1,904.7-hours and 3, 208-cycles. The turbine had been overhauled 283-hours and 439-cycles prior to its failure, due to a lightning strike. The maintenance records reported that the turbine was zygloyed at that time.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter with a helicopter instrument rating. In addition, he was also a certificated flight instructor for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The pilot held a current second-class FAA medical certificate and reported having accumulated a total of 1,855-hours, of which 139-hours were in the same make and model.

The pilot reported the weather as wind between 180 and 220 degrees at 20, gusting to 25 knots, visibility 10 miles, broken ceiling 2,000 feet, and seas 6 to 10 feet.

tottigol

24th Aug 2007, 13:12

It seems like a job well done by the pilot.:D:D

helirider

25th Aug 2007, 07:06

In the sentence:
"The maintenance records reported that the turbine was zygloyed at that Does anybody know what is the meaning of "zygloyed" ?
thank you by advance...

sox6

13th Oct 2007, 21:19

One, missing from this thread was a PHI Sikorsky S-76A++ N22342
http://www.phihelico.com/News%20Releases/PHI%20Aircraft%20Incident.pdf
NTSB issued a probable cause during the summer that seems to have gone unnoticed here: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20061101X01599&key=1

The helicopter was inadvertently flown into the water while the attention of both crewmembers was diverted to arming the emergency float system and activating the windshield wipers.

Shades of the ERA accident. Again a cheap AVAD could have helped (and yes IF it were an new aircraft and IF it had been shipped with a more expensive EGPWS then that would have helped too but lets not loose sight that this was avoidable with current and mature technology if only people are prepared to learn the lessons from overseas).

The 'rescue' is even more amazing:

The seas were 5 to 6 foot swells when the helicopter sank . Both crew members remained in the vicinity of their impact with the water for another 30 to 40 minutes. The flight crew then elected to swim toward an abandoned platform, which they believed to be approximately 2 miles from their position.

The crewmembers swam for 2.5 hours to reach the abandoned offshore platform. The platform had been abandoned following damage sustained during hurricane Katrina. The crew found water, food, medical supplies and shelter until a helicopter made visual contact and reported their position. Both crewmembers were rescued by a Bell 407 helicopter and taken to a hospital in Houma, Louisiana. The flight crew was reported to be suffering from severe fatigue as a result of the egress from the wreckage and their 2.5 hour swim. The copilot was treated for a puncture wound to his right thigh and remained in the hospital overnight for observation.

Severe fatigue - really?!

Meanwhile another single ditched a week ago off the Texas coast , 3 POB, all recovered. http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/preliminary_data/media/J_1009_N.txt:

http://sjdrimages.com/Mb/UserUploads/q74Xpc0ONi5L48.jpg

Gomer Pylot

13th Oct 2007, 23:34

Ironically enough, that exact ship was flown on the search for the Era S76 on the night it went down. It was fairly well equipped, with dual radar altimeters which provided both aural and visual warnings of descent below the set DH, and digital altitude display at the bottom of the ADI. What you failed to mention was that the PIC hadn't flown in the GOM in several years, the SIC was brand new, both put in that cockpit to fill in for striking pilots, and that they were flying visually in poor weather. With only the two pilots aboard, it wouldn't have been that difficult to fly the trip IFR, but I doubt it was even considered.

Mars

14th Oct 2007, 10:13

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 10/12/2007 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 3899C Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 10/06/2007 Time: 1300
Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: GALVESTON State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
AIRCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, NO INJURIES, 77 MILES SE
GALVESTON, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: UNK
OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 10/09/2007

Thridle Op Des

14th Oct 2007, 17:36

Just for you SAS (See No. 116), a photo not of one of the Ubits but a very old unmodified Oso of the same generation - it'll make you feel right at home again, wood, rails and all!
http://i197.photobucket.com/albums/aa266/thridleopdes/DeckSurvey-OsoOriginal1.jpg

edited due incompetance and spelyng

Mars

18th Oct 2007, 07:03

NTSB Identification: DFW08IA002
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Saturday, October 06, 2007 in Galveston, TX
Aircraft: Bell 206L-1, registration: N3899C
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 6, 2007 at 0801 central daylight time, a single-engine Bell 206L-1 helicopter, N3899C, sustained minor damage during a forced landing to the water approximately 13-miles south east of Galveston, Texas.

The helicopter, registered to and operated by Air Logistics, Inc., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The commercial pilot and two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight for which a company flight plan was filed. The flight departed from the Galveston 190A off-shore platform, in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 13 miles off shore from Galveston, Texas, and was destined for offshore platform HI 138, located approximately 38-miles to the northeast.

The operator reported that the floatation system was deployed and the aircraft remained upright and floating following the water landing. The pilot and two passengers were able to egress onto inflatable life rafts that deployed normally.

The initial investigation was conducted by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector on October 6, 2007. His investigation included interviews with the pilot, passengers, and base personnel at the Galveston, Texas, location. An engine examination was conducted by a FAA inspector on October 11, 2007, with the assistance of representatives from Rolls Royce and Air Logistics maintenance personnel, at the operator's maintenance facilities in New Iberia, Louisiana.

Weather reported at Scholes International Airport (KGLS), near Galveston, Texas, at 0752, was reported as wind calm, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 2200 feet and a broken cloud layer at 2900 feet, temperature 27 degrees Celsius, dew point 24 degrees Celsius, and a barometric pressure setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury.

Out-of-balance

18th Oct 2007, 08:14

Question (hopefully not already covered in thread)…

Do any air operators/oil companies have local P&P's covering emergency landings onto platforms?

Can’t imagine I’d be very excited if I was an employee/s (I’m assuming the bigger rigs) watching a 407 with full-fuel & 5 pax attempting an auto (under the best of conditions) meters from my bedroom.

The math’s would take me to the water every time but others are a little bolder (younger).

Thanks

K48

18th Oct 2007, 11:39

EVERYBODY!!! TIMEOUT!! Helos are tools.. differnt tools for different jobs.. no point arguing over this issue twin/single/platform size etc... one set of you are in balmy 25+ degrees of water surrounded by boats, platforms and friendly traffic - possibly with babes in bikinis cruising by??, the others are in 5 minute survival temperatures miles away from anywhere in freezing fog and rain... (scottish babes in bars in woolly jumpers too far to swim to!!). It is what it is... Ditching in GOM isn't ditching in Norway. Temperature makes a big difference to lifestyle. Annnd .... Relaaaxxx..
Gomer, Just wondering.. When you didnt have time for entering names/weights etc..Whydu not just put board in front of each seat with two columns..name and weight and get your oily Pax to each shout out their weight.. you will know your limits... all done and tick a box on your lap before pulling off? Surely you had to know you c.g / tow for insurance?

BlenderPilot

18th Oct 2007, 18:27

Mars

23rd Oct 2007, 07:59

Latest recommendation from the NTSB:

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_87_88.pdf (http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_87_88.pdf)

Extract from the paper:

"Accident Statistics for Air Taxi Operations in the Gulf of Mexico

A review of the Safety Board’s accident database for 2000 to 2006 found that Part 135 and Part 91 helicopter operators were involved in 62 incidents and accidents in the Gulf during that time period, resulting in 38 fatalities and 25 serious injuries.According to a safety review conducted by the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC),offshore helicopter operations in the Gulf served approximately 2.8 million passengers annually between 2000 and 2005. A December 2004 study presented by Shell Oil Company to members of the HSAC indicated that 67 percent of offshore oil industry helicopter accidents occur in the Gulf and forecasted that, if the accident rate continues, there could be an equivalent of 250 fatalities from all offshore helicopter operations in the next 10 years."

JimL

23rd Oct 2007, 13:33

It might be more appropriate to post the NTSB Recommendations:Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administratiion:Require that all existing and new turbine-powered helicopters operating in the Gulf of Mexico and certificated with five or more seats be equipped with externally mounted liferafts large enough to accommodate all occupants

Require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with personal flotation devices equipped with a waterproof, global positioning-system-enabled 406 megahertz personal locator beacon, as well as one other signaling device, such as a signaling mirror or a strobe light. (A-07-88).
Jim

Hippolite

23rd Oct 2007, 16:34

Jim L

Some of the larger operators in the GOM equipped their fleets with a centre float mounted liferaft system during 2004 as a safety initiative. After float inflation, the liferaft (contained inside the float bag) inflates and can then be detached from the aircraft. I believe that PHI was the first to install the system made by Apical.

purge98

24th Oct 2007, 20:49

What is the most ditchings one individual Pilot has suffered in the GOM?

Mars

19th Dec 2007, 14:00

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 12/19/2007 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 407AK Make/Model: B407 Description: Bell 407
Date: 12/15/2007 Time: 2104
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: GALVESTON State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N407AK, A BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT, SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AN OFFSHORE
PLATFORM, EXPERIENCED LOST OF ROTOR CONTROL, FLOATS WERE DEPLOYED AND
ROTOCRAFT LANDED IN THE WATER, ALL ON BOARD WERE RESCUED, ROTORCRAFT
PRESUMED TO HAVE SANK, GALVESTON, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: NOT REPORTED
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 12/19/2007

SASless

19th Dec 2007, 18:12

one set of you are in balmy 25+ degrees of water surrounded by boats, platforms and friendly traffic - possibly with babes in bikinis cruising by??,

This might be so near shore during nice balmy days but think about a Mid-January/February late afternoon flight in gusty winds with ten foot seas with breaking tops on the waves and you are heading for the rig and you are now about 150-200 miles offshore where the rigs are a bit scarce.

You are sat there in your plumbers uniform with the flag on the shoulder and a wonderful Swiftlik life jacket with no EPIRB.

The air Temp is 45F and the water temp is 54F....the wind is blowing 25 knots....ten foot seas....and Ms. Allison goes on a sit down strike.

What is the odds the helicopter is going to roll over?

What is the odds of everyone getting into the raft?

What is the odds on you getting picked up in the next 30 minutes?

Any one care to tell how many GOM pilots get rescued by the USCG Helicopter fleet?

Anyone care to describe the fleet capability of the USCG in the GOM?

What if.....as can happen sometimes in these things....you get hurt during the transition from aviator to flotsam?

Mars

1st Jan 2008, 10:23

NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, while the commercial pilot and two other passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The flight originated from offshore platform Chandelier 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.

In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a "sloping cloud deck" as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.

A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.

The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date.

The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.

Gomer Pylot

1st Jan 2008, 16:41

Hmmmm... not quite the same time or conditions as the initial reports and posts indicated. Imagine that.

BlenderPilot

1st Jan 2008, 17:19

the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event

Ahhhh . . . . SWP!

That mysterious phenomenon that seems to happen to guys who fly a helicopter that lacks the power to hover OGE and the TR control authority to keep the nose pointed where it should be a high power setting . . . . . . . downwind.

:rolleyes:

Aser

12th Jun 2009, 13:18

Another one:
Chopper Makes Emergency Landing In Gulf - Dauphin Island Us Coast Guard Helicopter Crash - WKRG.com (http://www.wkrg.com/alabama/article/chopper-makes-emergency-landing-in-gulf/100815/)

Published: Thu, June 11, 2009 - 11:12 pm Last Updated: Thu, June 11, 2009 - 11:19 pm
A crash and rescue Thursday night off the coast of Dauphin Island. The U.S. Coast Guard tells News 5 that a chopper carrying oil rig workers had to make an emergency landing in the gulf around 6:15 p.m. Several boaters helped the four passengers and took them to a platform. A Coast Guard crew finished the rescue. All of the passengers were taken to a New Orleans hospital to get checked out.

Here is the entire release from the U.S. Coast Guard:

The Coast Guard transported four passengers from an oil platform after their helicopter went down in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 57 miles south of Dauphin Island, Ala., Thursday, June 11, 2009.

The Coast Guard received a call from Rotorcraft Inc. at approximately 6:15 p.m., Thursday, reporting that the Bell Helicopter 206L-1 carrying four passengers had to make an emergency landing in the water due to mechanical failures. Several Good Samaritans assisted the four passengers to the Main Pass 265 platform, and the offshore supply vessel Lafayette placed the downed helicopter in tow.

The Coast Guard launched a MH-65C rescue helicopter and crew from Air Station New Orleans to transport the uninjured passengers to West Jefferson Hospital in New Orleans as a precautionary measure.

The National Transportation Safety Board will conduct an investigation.

Regards
Aser

zalt

12th Jun 2009, 21:47

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 518RL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/11/2009 Time: 1800

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
HELICOPTER RPM STARTED TO DECAY, PILOT ADDED POWER BUT COULD NOT STOP
DECAY, INITIATED AN AUTOROTATION AND LANDED IN WATER, GULF OF MEXICO

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: UNKNOWN

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Cruise Operation: Air Carrier

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 06/12/2009

Actually:
Model: 206L-1 Year built: 1978
Construction Number (C/N): 45183

malabo

12th Jun 2009, 22:00

Curious description - how do you "add power" in a 206 to regain RPM? You could "take away" power by lowering the collective, and eventually end up in an autorotation, which he did.

SASless

12th Jun 2009, 22:05

Malabo,

You are talking about the FAA here.....they have been known to make a few mistakes in the wording of these things....and dates...locations...aircraft types....etc.

Mars

31st Jul 2009, 07:07

This is worth a read for offshore pilots/operators - salutary lessons to be learnt.

Look particularly at the highlighted section - this has always provided astonishment in Europe. This is a good example of a chain of events leading to a fatality - it might have been avoided if any of the links had been broken.

NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/15/2009
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

According to an interview with the pilot, while en route to an unmanned offshore platform South Pass 38 in the Gulf of Mexico, the cloud ceilings were about 500 feet and the visibility was about 5 miles. However, as the helicopter neared the destination platform, the flight entered deteriorating weather. The pilot estimated that the cloud ceiling was about 300 feet and that the visibility was about 1 mile when he began circling to land on the platform. Although the weather conditions did not meet Air Logistics’ operating minimums, which required a 500 foot cloud ceiling and 3 miles of visibility, the pilot decided to continue to the destination platform, despite having the option to divert to another station.

About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.

The accident helicopter was equipped with externally mounted floats, which could have been deployed by actuating a trigger mounted on the cyclic. The helicopter was also equipped with two externally mounted liferafts that could have been deployed either by pulling an interior T-handle near the pilot’s left leg or by pulling one of the two externally mounted T-handles on the helicopter’s skid cross bar. According to a supplemental type certificate for the helicopter, a placard was only mounted near the interior T-handle.

According to a pilot interview and a written statement obtained by Air Logistics, the pilot did not attempt to activate the helicopter’s flotation system or liferafts before water impact because he was preoccupied with recovering from the buffet. The accident pilot provided no indication why he did not deploy the external liferafts using the internal T-handle when the helicopter entered the water, even though he had received training on external liferaft deployments. Air Logistics’ training program and operating manual expected company pilots to deploy the floats before water impact but did not address pilot expectations in the event of water impact without floats deployed. Lacking additional guidance, the pilot reverted to his water survival training and immediately exited the helicopter.

All of the occupants survived the impact, exited the helicopter, and inflated their lifejackets. The pilot was unable to reach the external liferaft T-handles on the skids and attempted to direct the passengers to deploy the liferafts. However, because the pilot had not conducted a passenger briefing (including instructions on how to deploy the liferaft system), the passengers did not know that liferafts were available externally and did not understand how to deploy the liferafts using the external T-handles before the helicopter sank. Under 14 CFR 135.117, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to ensure that, before flight, all passengers on flights involving extended overwater operations are orally briefed on ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment; however, the accident flight did not meet the 14 CFR 1.1 definition of an extended overwater operation because it was operating within 50 nautical miles of the shoreline.

Per the Air Logistics flight operations manual (FOM), a passenger briefing was required that would have included the location of emergency equipment, such as seat belts, exits, lifejackets, and fire extinguishers. The FOM did not specify that liferaft locations were to be part of the briefing.[2] Regardless, no passenger safety briefing was provided before departure. Air Logistics passenger briefing cards, which were stowed in a pouch on the cabin sidewall for each passenger seat, provided directions on how to operate different emergency equipment; however, the briefing cards did not provide guidance on which equipment was installed on the helicopter. In addition, at the time of the accident, there were no placards to aid in recognition of the external liferaft activation handles.

The passengers and the pilot attempted to swim to the platform, which was about 100 yards from the impact location, but were separated by high waves and were moved away from the platform by the current. About 1551, an Air Logistics radio operator mistakenly recorded the helicopter as “landed” in the company’s flight-following database. Because the helicopter was placed in the “landed” status, the flight-tracking program did not trigger any overdue notifications. About 34 minutes later (1 hour after the crash), the error was discovered by the Air Logistics base manager in Venice, Louisiana, because the pilot had not reported his status before sunset. As a result, the company diverted a field boat toward the offshore platform to search for the helicopter; however, the field boat was too far away to aid the survivors.

The weather conditions precluded the launch of another helicopter to assist in the search. About 1 hour 15 minutes after the crash, the crewmembers of a shrimp trawler contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to report that they had retrieved two survivors and a deceased passenger from the water. The water temperature near the accident location was about 49 degrees Fahrenheit, and the passenger died of hypothermia secondary to asphyxia from drowning. A Coast Guard ship rescued the severely hypothermic pilot more than 4 hours after the estimated time of the crash.

The pilot did not report engine power loss or control malfunction. The passengers did not report seeing any warning lights or hearing any aural warnings before the accident. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded safe flight or the production of engine power.

On October 20, 2008, the NTSB issued two recommendations pertaining to this accident. Safety Recommendation A-08-83 asked for the installation of a placard for each external T handle on turbine-powered helicopters with externally mounted liferafts that clearly identifies the location of and provides activation instructions for the handle. Safety Recommendation A 08-84 recommended that all operators of turbine-powered helicopters be required to include information about the location and activation of internal or external liferafts in pilot preflight safety briefings to passengers before each takeoff. Both recommendations are classified “Open—Response Received.”

Safety Recommendation A-07-88, which the NTSB issued on October 19, 2007, also applies to this accident. In the recommendation, the NTSB asked the FAA to require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with beacon-equipped personal flotation devices; Safety Recommendation A-07-88 is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” based on the FAA’s plan to consult with operators on the best ways to increase the chance of survival in a ditching and the issuance of an information for operators that describes recommendations to mitigate the risks and hazards for helicopters that may have to ditch in the Gulf. As a result of the accident, Air Logistics has initiated a program requiring that each pilot be provided a lifejacket equipped with a 406-megahertz emergency position indicating radio beacon that has full two-way voice capability and that is waterproof to 10 meters. This program requirement is consistent with the intent of the recommendation even without the FAA requiring it.

Additionally, personal locator beacons (without two-way voice capability) have been installed in Air Logistics liferafts. Air Logistics also has started installing water-activated switches on the flotation system and liferafts for its Bell 407 helicopters; the switches are being installed during each helicopter’s next maintenance or inspection visit. Placards have also been placed on the underside of aircraft showing the mechanism for manual deployment of liferafts when the aircraft is upside down in the water. To standardize the briefing information given to passengers, the preflight briefing checklist, passenger briefing cards, and passenger briefing tapes have been revised to include information on the location and operation of liferafts.
In addition, the company produced an initial and recurrent training video to include more detailed information on how to deploy the flotation system and liferafts installed on its helicopters, including footage of an actual deployment, and has revamped its aircraft type-specific briefing videos for passengers. The training and briefing videos are shown to all first-time passengers before they depart their shore base. Air Logistics also has a separate video specifically on raft and float deployment, which includes manual deployment from outside the aircraft; according to the company, this video usually runs continually in the waiting rooms at the shore base. Thus far, Air Logistics pilots and passengers have given positive feedback on the training and briefing videos.

To address the problem of misreporting helicopter status, a senior company pilot now assists the radio operator with oversight of helicopters, and helicopter pilots are required to provide position reports every 30 minutes, regardless of whether their helicopter is airborne or has landed. The radio operator and the senior pilot monitor any pilot who requests a longer delay to eat lunch or take a restroom break, for example. Also, to eliminate inadvertent changes in helicopter status, an additional keystroke has been added to confirm that a helicopter has landed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot’s decision to continue to the destination landing platform in weather conditions below the company’s weather minimums and his failure to maintain aircraft control during the approach. Contributing to the passenger fatality and the severity of the occupant injuries were the lack of a passenger briefing on how to deploy the liferaft, which was required by the company but not by the Federal Aviation Administration because this flight was not an extended overwater operation; the pilot’s failure to deploy the liferafts; and the company radio operator’s misreporting of the helicopter’s “landed” status, which delayed the rescue response.

Gomer Pylot

31st Jul 2009, 19:17

More than 50 miles from the shoreline is only half of it. It's also more than 50 miles from any offshore platform. In the GOM, that covers almost the entire offshore area, out to well beyond 100 NM. That said, I know of no operator or oil company that allows any offshore flights without wearing lifejackets and having rafts onboard, and requiring passenger briefings. This is usually included in the operations manual, which is regulatory, and/or in the ops specs. CFR 14 is written to cover broad areas, and is as unrestrictive as possible, in accordance with the historic US philosophy. Just because it allows something, that doesn't necessarily mean that all operations are that permissive. Many restrictions are covered under ops specs, not just the general regulations.

Mel Effluent

2nd Nov 2009, 20:18

2 hurt in chopper crash in Gulf off Galveston | AP Texas News | Chron.com - Houston Chronicle (http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6698472.html)

GALVESTON, Texas — A helicopter crash on takeoff from a platform in the Gulf of Mexico left two men injured and the aircraft in the water.

A spokesman for Broussard, La.,-based Rotorcraft Leasing Co., which serves the oil and gas industry, said Monday the cause of the crash is sought.

Operations director Gerry Golden told The Associated Press that the accident site is about 75 miles southeast of Galveston.

Golden says the helicopter was bound for another platform and people nearby witnessed the crash Sunday morning. He says the chopper's floats deployed and a boat helped rescue the pilot and the passenger.

A Coast Guard helicopter was dispatched to transport the pair to the University of Texas Medical Branch for treatment of back injuries.

Golden says both men sustained non-life threatening injuries and remained hospitalized for observation.

gwelo shamwari

3rd Nov 2009, 00:37

Rotorcraft leasing put in the water just after taking fuel. Apparently they did not get far from the platform as shown in the pictures... which i only wish i new how to post.

BlenderPilot

3rd Nov 2009, 01:37

Here is a pic of that last one . . . .

I heard that Airlog had just sold it to RLC and it was one of the first flights with RLC. Maybe next time Airlog will at least put it in the contract that the color scheme needs to be changed before the new owners fly it!!!

http://homepage.mac.com/helipilot/PPRuNe/DitchingRLC.jpg

Mars

6th Nov 2009, 13:02

NTSB Identification: CEN10LA036
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, November 01, 2009 in High Island A-442A, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206, registration: N272M
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On November 1, 2009, approximately 1040 central standard time, a Bell 206L-1, N272M, registered to and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company LLC, was substantially damaged when it impacted water following a loss of engine power shortly after lifting off from an oil drilling platform. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The non-scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger received minor injuries. The flight had just originated from platform High Island A442A, and was en route to platform High Island A515, both in the Gulf of Mexico.

According to the company, the helicopter had landed on the platform and was refueled. It then took off with one passenger. Shortly after lifting off, the engine lost power and the pilot made a forced landing in the water. Just before touching down, the pilot inflated the pontoons. The helicopter settled in the water and rolled inverted.

The helicopter was later recovered and taken to the operator's base in Broussard, Louisiana, for examination. Preliminary information indicates the Pc line was loose.

ATPMBA

6th Nov 2009, 13:24

Once a heliciopter gets flooded with salt water as in the picture in the above post is it a total write off or can it be flushed out with fresh water and placed back into service?

Gomer Pylot

6th Nov 2009, 14:40

They're refurbished all the time. If properly treated beforehand with CorrosionX or similar, there will be minimal corrosion. Without treatment, I've seen aircraft that just had blown spray on them corrode very quickly. IME, most helicopters that go into the water are recovered and refurbished. As the old saying goes, as long as you have a data plate, you have a viable aircraft.

Dysfunctional

6th Nov 2009, 18:18

About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.

Hm. Not sure I like summarizing transverse flow effect in this manner. We're talking about a longitudinal change in the flow pattern, coupled with a 90 degree delay in response. Causing a rolling motion similar to a cross wind. Agreed? We all deal with it on every take-off, and don't even think about it. Now, when we're slowing down, the reverse. Okay, got that.
Must admit though I never would have thought of that aspect of this accident pilot slowing down into that airspeed area leading to buffeting. Buffeting makes me think of "settling with power". But perhaps it is a combination of more than just settling with power. So slowing down into a state of transverse flow, the opposite of take-off, also contributed to the buffeting this poor pilot experienced?
Rightly or wrongly, I see transverse flow as a gradual, smooth phenomenon. I don't think I'd put buffeting on top of the list of observable symptoms.
Dammit, I do all this stuff and I've quit thinking about it. My brain hurts already.
;)

SayItIsntSo

4th Dec 2009, 06:00

The cause of the crash on 1 Nov of the Rotorcraft Leasing Bell 206 LongRanger appears to be confirmed as the 'PC line' on the engine being loose. See the excerpt from AIN below.

NTSB Data Show Loose Line a Common Crash Cause

On November 1, a Bell LongRanger operated by Rotorcraft Leasing was taking off from oil-drilling platform High Island A442A in the Gulf of Mexico en route to another platform when the engine lost power and the pilot inflated the pontoons and landed in the water. The helicopter rolled inverted after touchdown, according to the NTSB. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger suffered minor injuries. The occupants were rescued by a nearby offshore supply vessel, then a U.S. Coast Guard MH-65C Dolphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Houston transported them to the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Texas. According to the NTSB preliminary report, after investigators recovered the LongRanger and moved it to Rotorcraft Leasing’s base in Broussard, La., the Rolls-Royce 250 engine’s “Pc line was found loose.” In a search of the NTSB accident database, AIN found five helicopter accidents since 2000 involving loose Pc (compressor discharge pressure) lines. A Rolls-Royce Alert Service Letter revised in 2007 notes that “Rolls-Royce continues to be involved in investigations of aircraft accidents and incidents which are attributed to improper alignment, clamping and torquing of engine tubing during installation.As it is such a well documented cause of failure and it is fairly well covered in the maintenance requirement I hope someone is going to get 'their bottom smacked'. We cannot have pilots and passengers repeatedly hurt by inadequate engineering standards and continue to talk about a 'just culture'.

Does anyone know if the maintenance organisation has taken any disciplinary action as a direct result of this accident? What about the insurers are they really going to pay the claim? And dare I be so naive as to ask what the FAA will do about it?

thepross

4th Dec 2009, 06:53

Do you honestly believe anybody cares what you Think......

Gomer Pylot

4th Dec 2009, 22:08

The rumor is that the A&P who did the work was fired, and his A&P license suspended by the FAA.

Mars

18th Jun 2010, 16:08

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 6/18/2010 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 108PH Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/10/2010 Time: 1634

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial

LOCATION
City: PORT O'CONNER State: TX Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N108PH, BELL 206L-3 ROTORCRAFT, DITCHED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO, NEAR PORT
O'CONNER, TX

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: CLEAR

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER

FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 06/18/2010

TomBola

23rd Oct 2010, 16:29

When will they learn that this sort of accident is inevitable with singles?

So I suppose in your book twin rotor helicopters are inherently safer than single rotor helicopters? :ugh:

Shell Management

23rd Oct 2010, 16:57

Obviously not because there are no twin rotor helicopters that can continue to operate with one failed. However twin helocopters operated PC1 or PC2e mean an engine failure is rarely the cause of an accident.

HeliTester

25th Oct 2010, 01:34

Shell Management,

However twin helocopters operated PC1 or PC2e mean an engine failure is rarely the cause of an accident.

So does this mean that all Shell offshore air operations are conducted exclusively by twin engine helicopters operating in either PC1 or PC2e?

HT

Variable Load

25th Oct 2010, 05:26

Now that is a VERY interesting question. C'mon SM, which of your contracts are operating to PC2e offshore. More to the point, which are not - and why??

AnFI

25th Oct 2010, 12:20

singles never crash due to combiner gearbox failures.........

js0987

25th Oct 2010, 13:25

For the record, it wasn't an accident. An L4 was just climbing out when there was a compressor stall due to ingesting a tree frog. The pilot put the aircraft down about 100 yards from the end of the runway under partial power.

tistisnot

25th Oct 2010, 14:51

You mean .... the engine croaked?!

js0987

25th Oct 2010, 15:11

Croaked - A deep raspy sound or implying death - In this case it was more of a "ribit."

Shell Management

25th Oct 2010, 18:12

Assorted answers

HeliTester Obviously yes. PC1/PC2e is an essential part of 7/7=1 which Shell launched nearly 6 years ago. Obviously it took time for the OEMs to put procedures in place and to get higher performance machines in place.

Combiner gearboxes simply do what MRGBs do and what I said about rotors applies to them. However they fail less then engines.

Frogs are a well know hazard in the GOM and managening them should feature in any competent safety case. Failing to miss FOD in an intake, even if its green and croaks (and added alerting feature:)) speakes volumes about pre-flight inspections.

js0987

25th Oct 2010, 21:28

For those that don't yet have the Herpetology addition to the RFM - a couple of pointers. The little green tree frogs (hyla cinerea) are extrodinairily fast little buggers. They can jump 6-8 feet in a flash. Nothing like having just removed the inlet pillow and spotting one the little creatures and trying to shoe it one way only to have it leap towards the inlet. They are also pretty quiet, no croaking or ribiting when you're near.

Unfortunately replacing the pillows until your ready to start hasn't always worked. There are still a number of minutes to get strapped in and the check list done before the start not to mention the loading of passengers.

Like avoiding a bird strike, avoiding our little amphibian friends (they eat lots of mosquitos) is constant and never ending.

Lonewolf_50

26th Oct 2010, 16:31

Frogs are a well know hazard in the GOM
Actually, they haven't been since Maximilian was stood against a wall with a cigarette and a blindfold ... :}

(I know he was Austrian, but the Frogs put him there ... )

sox6

26th Oct 2010, 18:49

js0987

So the frogs (as in Freedom Frogs not Cheese Eating Surrender Frogs) can approach the aircraft unseen and unheard and jump 6-8 feet straight down an intake in the short time after removing the intake blanks and inspecting, then cling on, to release themselves into the compressor at 100ft?

avoiding our little amphibian friends is constant and never ending.

Out of interest what is actually done to avoid them?

FH1100 Pilot

26th Oct 2010, 19:28

Out of interest what is actually done to avoid them?

You put the inlet pillows in every night. But remember, most GOM heliports are in the swamp. Not *near* the swamp, IN it. And until you've seen how many little green frogs can hang on to the side of various structures, you cannot imagine how hard it is to ensure that one won't find his/her undetected way into your intake. GOM pilots preflight and untie in the darkness, to be ready for a sunrise takeoff.

In reality, they do little damage, other than causing a startling *POP!* and surge from the engine. Some pilots shrug and keep going on their way; others react harshly and put the thing down "off-airport" so to speak.

squib66

26th Oct 2010, 20:01

GOM pilots preflight and untie in the darkness, to be ready for a sunrise takeoff.

But not so dark as to make a proper pre-flight impossible right?;)

Some pilots shrug and keep going on their way; others react harshly like this one
FTW97LA016 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001208X06881&key=1)
FTW97LA016 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20001208X06881&ntsbno=FTW97LA016&akey=1)

NTSB Identification: FTW97LA016 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division (http://www.ntsb.gov/info/sources.htm#pib)
Nonscheduled 14 CFR
Accident occurred Monday, October 14, 1996 in VENICE, LA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/23/1997
Aircraft: Bell 206L-3, registration: N21497
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
On October 14, 1996, at 0720 central daylight time, a Bell 206L-3 helicopter, N21497, owned and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., was substantially damaged during a precautionary landing near Venice, Louisiana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 CFR Part 135 air taxi flight. The commercial pilot and three passengers were not injured. A company flight plan was filed. The flight was originating from the Shell Heliport at the time of the accident.

According to the pilot, the helicopter was approximately 50 feet AGL during takeoff when he heard a "big pop and the helicopter was shaky and noisy." He initiated a "deceleration to land "due to the wires in front of the helicopter. During the landing, a 2-foot section of the tailboom which included the vertical fin and tail rotor gearbox, separated from the tailboom. Throughout the forced landing he had tail rotor pedal control.

The passengers reported that on takeoff they heard a noise like a "backfire," and then the helicopter began to shake.

According to the operator, the damage to the helicopter resulted when "a main rotor blade flexed down and severed the tailboom." An examination of the engine by the operator revealed that frogs had been ingested.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:a loss of engine power due to frogs being ingested into the engine as a result of the pilots failure to perform a thorough preflight, and the pilot's improper touchdown technique.

js0987

26th Oct 2010, 20:41

Sox 6. Actually yes. They don't make noise and are small enough to easily miss. To expound on what FH 1100 wrote; preflights are done in the dark with a flashlight. Examining the inlet area is fine, but our little friends can stick to anything, so finding them on the side of the fuselage or even the bottom of a rotor blade has happened. More than likely, its the frog that ended up on the doghouse or the top of the cabin that ends up getting sucked in once the airflow breaks him loose. Using your flashlight, you try to look everything over but, like the bird strike, it's possible to not see it.

Fortunately alligators are too big to fit in the inlets so we're safe there.

squib66

26th Oct 2010, 20:46

The alligators do fit on the BBQ though!

js0987

26th Oct 2010, 22:38

Don't forget comfortable boots.

Gomer Pylot

26th Oct 2010, 22:51

Tree frogs can easily cling to glass or any other smooth surface, even if it's overhead. It's simply not possible to inspect the intake of an engine and detect any possible tree frog. You can't see every nook in there, no matter how hard you look, and no matter how much you pretzel yourself around to try. You just do the best you can and hope for the best. Most operators start using the baffles at the start of frog season (early spring) and keep using them until late autumn, but it's never a certain proposition. I've also had problems with birds. Mockingbirds can be very persistent, and I've had them start replacing nests in the intake area within minutes of removing the previous one. They like to use sticks and bits of safety wire in building their nests, and they're a real danger. I once fought a pair for days, finally keeping the intake plugs in during the day, and thought I had won, but the pilot of the BO105 on the pad next to me found a huge nest inside his aircraft the next day. If it ain't one thing, it's another. Preflighting in the dark, with a flashlight, isn't the best solution, but I've been royally chewed out by Shell dispatchers for not being on the pad at their dock when the top arc of the sun started appearing above the horizon. Shell talks a good safety program, but it's just talk. They, like the other companies, care only about short-term profits, and safety is important only when it's convenient.

Shell Management

27th Oct 2010, 19:45

If you have any problems with Shell dispatchers not complying with the Shell Code of Conduct you must contact Shell Aircraft immediately - thats actually a contract requirement.

SAI are at
(713) 241 7700
17231 JFK Blvd, Houston, TX, 77042

Or use the confidential helpline if you prefer:
Shell Global Helpline - About Shell (http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/who_we_are/our_values/compliance_helpline/)

You can read more on the code of conduct at:
Shell Code of Conduct - About Shell (http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/who_we_are/our_values/code_of_conduct/)

Gomer Pylot

27th Oct 2010, 21:34

Yeah, right. And the tooth fairy will leave money under my pillow, too.

zalt

27th Oct 2010, 21:35

So much for ADS-B as a big success in the GOM as the FAA's ability to technically oversee the programme is called into doubt.

U.S. DOT IG Chastises FAA on ADS-B: AINonline (http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/us-dot-ig-chastises-faa-on-ads-b-27021/)

The U.S. DOT Inspector General (IG), the FAA’s fiscal watchdog, recently issued a report titled “FAA faces significant risks in implementing the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast program and realizing benefits.” The IG examined key risks to the FAA’s ADS-B implementation and assessed strengths and weaknesses of its contracting approach.

But the IG questioned the FAA’s resulting in-house technical oversight capabilities due to “knowing very little about a system that is expected to be the foundation of NextGen.”

Mars

25th Mar 2011, 14:20

Just seen this on the wire.

PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LA (WAFB) - A helicopter leaving a rig in the Gulf of Mexico flipped into the water when an engine went out Thursday afternoon.

According to a witness, a "chopper in the water" alert went out over a loud speaker on the oil platform just before 5 p.m. He said it was so random everyone was on edge.

The Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI) chopper went into the water in an area known as Main Pass, which is just off the coast of Boothville.

A PHI worker who was on the oil platform pulled out his cell phone and recorded the aftermath. Petty Officer First Class Kelsey Thomason with the U.S. Coast Guard reported three men were on board.

"They were getting ready to take off and there was some kind of malfunction and it flipped over on its side," Thomason said.

According to Thomason, the chopper was floating on the water on a pontoon, but the guys could have been seriously hurt.

"It is dangerous. We did have a helicopter up doing a pollution flight, so we quickly diverted it to the rig and quickly recovered it," he explained.

A PHI worker said within 10 minutes a vessel pulled alongside the helicopter to rescue the three men. Thomason added they were taken back to the platform and treated by PHI medics.

The helicopter was tied to the platform to keep it from floating away.

Copyright 2011 WAFB. All rights reserved.

Ian Corrigible

25th Mar 2011, 14:33

Aircraft in question being a LongRanger.

http://wafb.images.worldnow.com/images/14317849_BG4.jpg

I/C

Shell Management

9th Apr 2011, 14:37

Last year was the first year since 1984 (records were not kept before then!) when there were no accidents in the GOM.:D:)

That is no doubt due to the IHST's promotion of SMS.:ok::D

However the dirty little secret remains, namely there were 3 ditchings, one due to a tail rotor failure and two due to engine failures. :\:(

The NTSB, who seem busy scrambling go teams for every TCAS RA thesedays, don't treat those as accidents and ignore them.:ugh::=

Gomer Pylot

9th Apr 2011, 19:44

The definition of an accident is well established on this side of the pond. The NTSB cannot call it an accident if it doesn't meet the definition.

Accident
As defined by the NTSB, this is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft where as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any person (either inside or outside the aircraft) receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial damage. The occurrence is also not caused by the deliberate action of one or more persons and that leads to damage or injury. The NTSB definition, which is also used by the FAA, divides accidents into four categories:

Major - an accident in which a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was destroyed, there were multiple fatalities, or there was one fatality and a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was substantially damaged.
Serious - an accident in which there was either one fatality without substantial damage to a 14 CFR 121 aircraft, or there was at least one serious injury and a 14 CFR121 aircraft was substantially damaged.
Injury - a nonfatal accident with at least one serious injury and without substantial damage to a 14 CFR 121 aircraft.
Damage - an accident in which no person was killed or seriously injured, but in which any aircraft was substantially damaged.

Serious Injury
Injuries that result in one or more of the following conditions:

Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the date the injury was received,
Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose),
Involves lacerations that cause severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage.
Involves injury to any internal organ, or
Involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than five percent of the body surface.

Substantial Damage
Damage or structural failure that negatively affects an aircraft's structural strength, performance, or flying characteristics, and which would require significant repair or replacement of the affected component or system. Substantial damage excludes damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, and flaps. It also excludes bent aerodynamic fairings, dents in the aircraft skin, small punctures in the aircraft skin, ground damage to propeller blades, or damage to only a single engine.

Gomer Pylot

10th Apr 2011, 21:15

That was just a quote, and the same applies to Part 135. There has to be a serious injury or substantial damage to the aircraft before it can be called an accident, no matter what FAR covers the operation. No serious injury, no substantial damage, no accident. There is no wiggle room on that.

500e

10th Apr 2011, 21:45

Would have thought a dip in the Gulf was substantial damage, going to be big bill if not total loss.

Gordy

10th Apr 2011, 21:59

Actually the definition is HERE (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get-cfr.cgi?TITLE=49&PART=830&SECTION=2&TYPE=TEXT)

Here are some relevant excerpts...emphasis added by me:

Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation
of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the
aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or
in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.

Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component.

One would think the "flight characteristics" of the aircraft in the picture were "adversely affected".

Just for clarification however:

Engine failure..................not considered substantial damage'' for the purpose of this part.

FH1100 Pilot

10th Apr 2011, 23:18

Boys...if the helicopter landed successfully on the water and then rolled over after everyone got out, then voila!...not an accident. That would be my story and I'd stick to it.

birrddog

11th Apr 2011, 01:03

FH1100, I have a LongRanger I'd like to sell you. Just had a compressor wash, detail and has 2000 accident free hours :E

Gomer Pylot

11th Apr 2011, 02:21

There have been lots of those flying around the GOM for decades. Some fare better than others. I remember one 206 which had a decel on takeoff, the pilot put it in the water on the floats and everyone got out and onto a boat, and then the boat tried to tow it back to the platform. By the time it was attached to the crane for lifting up, both rotor blades were broken off, the tailboom was broken off, the skids were pulled off, and the windows were broken out, among other things. There was certainly substantial damage, but I still wouldn't call it an accident, because the damage was all caused after the aircraft was landed and the engine was shut down, and there was no further intent to fly. It's not an accident if a tornado destroys an aircraft in a hangar, is it?

Corrosion-X is an excellent product, and has helped lots of helicopters continue flying after immersion in salt water.

Mars

18th May 2011, 08:26

Any further information on this?

Mars

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 5/17/2011 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 266P Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 05/13/2011 Time: 1600

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial

LOCATION
City: MOBILE State: AL Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N266P BELL 206-L4 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES OFF SHORE
NEAR MOBILE, AL

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: 1553Z 17010KT 10SM SCT024 28/22 A2990

OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER

FAA FSDO: BIRMINGHAM, AL (SO09) Entry date: 05/17/2011

Mars

26th May 2011, 06:52

NTSB Identification: ERA11LA297
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, May 13, 2011 in Mobile Block 114CC, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206-L4, registration: N266P
Injuries: 2 Serious,1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On May 13, 2011, about 1120 central daylight time, a Bell 206L-4, N229P, landed hard in the Gulf of Mexico near the Mobile Block 114CC helideck following an in-flight loss of directional control. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI, Inc. under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a passenger flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed. The two pilots sustained serious injuries and the passenger was not injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

According to the operator, the pilot positioned the helicopter for a west-southwest departure due to prevailing wind conditions. After clearing the edge of the production platform helideck, the helicopter started a slow yaw to the right. The pilot added full left pedal; however, this did not stop the rotation. After 360 degrees of rotation, the rotation quickened, the pilot stated that he "didn't have a tail rotor," and lowered the collective and rolled the throttle to idle. The pilot deployed the emergency floats, and the helicopter impacted the water slightly nose low and in a right drift. The helicopter rolled over immediately to the right and stayed afloat. The pilot egressed the helicopter through the broken windscreen area, the left seat pilot egressed through the pilot's open door, and the passenger egressed through the left passenger door.

The wreckage was recovered to the operator's facilities in Lafayette, Louisiana where an examination of the wreckage was performed on May 18, 2011. An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration provided oversight for the examination, assisted by the operator and an investigator from Bell Textron. The examination of the engine, tail rotor gearbox, tail rotor drive shaft, main gear box, and main rotor system did not reveal evidence of a pre-existing mechanical malfunction or anomaly.

SASless

26th May 2011, 12:14

Lazurus Twins?

Gomer Pylot

30th May 2011, 02:34

But... But... But... That costs more money! The poor oil companies are almost bankrupt, aren't they?

Mars

25th Nov 2011, 07:04

Here is the summary of an interesting paper produced by 'Hopkins Center':

A new study by researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy finds that helicopters that service the drilling platforms and vessels in the Gulf of Mexico crash on average more than six times per year resulting in an average of 5 deaths per year. From 1983 to 2009, 178 crashes resulted in 139 deaths, including 41 pilots and 3 co-pilots. Mechanical failure was the most common cause, leading to 68 crashes (38 percent of the total), followed by bad weather (16 percent of the total). While the challenges such as bad weather and long travel distances associated with helicopter flights in the Gulf related to oil and gas operations are recognized, this study is noteworthy for examining the circumstances of the crashes. The article is published in the September issue of Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine.

Researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy, part of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, examined fatal and nonfatal crash records of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from 1983 to 2009. Analyses determined that the most common result of mechanical failure in both fatal and nonfatal crashes was loss of engine power, which occurred in almost one-third of fatal crashes. The majority of forced landings following mechanical failure occurred in water, with 20 percent resulting in the sinking of the helicopter despite the fact that most helicopters are being equipped with pilot-activated flotation devices.

Bad weather was the second most common precipitating factor for fatal and nonfatal crashes and was responsible for the largest number of deaths. In fact, bad weather was the only factor that significantly increased the risk of pilot death when a crash occurred. Pilot error was a major contributor to 83 crashes (47 percent), with poor decision-making the most prevalent error. For example, the NTSB conclusion for many of the bad-weather crashes was that the pilot should not proceeded in given the forecast or observed bad weather.

“This study raises concern about the safety of helicopter flights related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly during bad weather,” said Susan P. Baker, MPH, professor with the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy and the paper’s lead author. “Our findings suggest that efforts to reduce crashes and deaths must address mechanical failure, non-activation of flotation devices, and pilot error.” Baker is a licensed private pilot and received the Aerospace Medical Association’s Harry G. Moseley Award in 2010 for her work applying the public health model to aviation safety.

The researchers also examined crash trends over the study time period and found an increase in the most recent time period, 8.2 annually during 2000 to 2009 versus 5.6 during 1983 to 1999. Following 2007, however, the researchers measured a decrease in crashes.

“While the apparent deterioration in safety over time is alarming, I am encouraged by the most recent data,” said Baker. “Only time will tell whether this is a temporary statistical blip or the beginning of a positive trend.”

Additional authors of “Helicopter Crashes Related to Oil and Gas Operations in the Gulf of Mexico” are Dennis F. Shanahan (associate faculty at the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy), Wren Haaland (consultant to the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy), Joanne Brady (Columbia University) and Guohua Li (Columbia University).

The research was funded by the National Institutes of Health and by grant funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy.

squib66

26th Nov 2011, 07:25

Mechanical failure was the most common cause

This is completely at odds with the IHST findings for helicopter accidents in the US.

Could this be because John Hopkins University included all ditchings?

Shell Management

28th Nov 2011, 17:56

Very possibly.

There is a strong US lobby (certain GOM operators, their trade bodies, Bell and the less progressive oil companies) that are happy that cheap, low power, single engine helicopters (mostly 206s) fly two thirds of GOM flight hours and sectors. They will always use the weak US definitions of accidents to make their rates look better.

See hear the fuss when the NTSB wanted to make blades strikes accidents!
http://www.rotor.com/membership/rotor/rotorpdf/spring2005/18.pdf

BestoftheWest

28th Nov 2011, 18:18

Are there any stats that show what actually makes up the GOM fleet and how many. ie:

206 x ??
412 x ??

Etc.

BOTW

Shell Management

30th Nov 2011, 17:39

2010 data

SINGLE ENGINE 314 (mostly 206s and 407s with a few AS350s and A119s)
LIGHT TWIN 43 (Bo105s, EC135s, B427/9)
MEDIUM TWIN 103 (mostly S76s, AW139s and some B412s)
HEAVY TWIN 23 (S-92s, 225s, 214STs)
TOTAL FLEET 483

Variable Load

1st Dec 2011, 01:33

SM

There is a strong US lobby

The annual OGP stats were/are also biased to show GOM ops with singles to be as safe as twin ops around the globe, so I would include all OGP members as party to this conspiracy.

About a decade ago a N Sea S76 suffered a lightning strike that was quoted in the OGP stats as an accident, yet numerous fatal accidents in the GOM were not counted. The basis for inclusion of the S76 was the cost of the repair. The natural conclusion from this is that the OGP place no $ value on the life of a pilot! Shameful.

SASless

1st Dec 2011, 11:06

Actually it was two accidents for the one Lightning Strike wasn't it?

There was the one where the aircraft got hit by lightning and then the one where the improperly repaired/inspected blade failed on a second aircraft resulting in the loss of all aboard.

The Oil Companies are all for aviation safety....right up to the point it costs them money....at which point they all begin to sharpen their pencils and begin calculating cost/benefit ratio's.

js0987

1st Dec 2011, 13:03

The story I heard was that the blade that was struck by lightning had a manufacturing defect that was not known until the accident. The leading edge scarf joint was out of allignment just enough that when the lightning stuck the blade it caused an arc from the scarf joint to the spar. The arc put a weak spot in the spar that subsequently caused its failure. Since that kind of defect in manufacturing would be difficult to determine in the field, the decision was made to withdraw any blades that had been stuck by lightning.

SASless

1st Dec 2011, 13:29

The blade in question had been sent back to Sikorsky for inspection....and despite that....the defect was not found. Thus, as you point out....very hard to find not only in the field but also at the builder's facility as well.

The fact almost every other dynamic component had been binned from the aircraft with the lightning strike should have been considered much more strongly than it was when it was decided to re-use the fatal blade. But...that is another story as they say.

Variable Load

1st Dec 2011, 14:07

The S76 lightning strike I was referring to was not the BHL S76 fatal accident, this occurred later. The "accident" in the OGP stats was a straightforward lightning strike, after which the aircraft continued it's flight back to base. During the subsequent maintenance inspection the 'current path' resulted in most of the drivetrain being removed for inspection/repair at major cost.

SASless

1st Dec 2011, 14:23

VL,

There was the one where the aircraft got hit by lightning and then the one where the improperly repaired/inspected blade failed on a second aircraft resulting in the loss of all aboard.

We are talking the same two events.

Your contention is the first one (the lightning strike itself) should not have been classified as an "accident" the way I read your post.

Do you base your comment upon the definition of an "accident" under the CAA/JAR/EASA rules and definition they contain for what an "accident" is?

An aviation accident is defined in the Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 13 as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, in which a person is fatally or seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure or the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

From the CAA Mandatory Reporting Scheme....CAP 382 of March this year

Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes
place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person suffers a fatal or serious injury as a result of:
i) being in or upon the aircraft;

ii) direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft; or

iii) direct exposure to jet blast;
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:

i) adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft; and

ii) would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component; except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or

c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible

Shell Management

1st Dec 2011, 17:41

The OGP stats are clearly marked as defining accidents based on the state of occurrences definition of accidents, so the inherent slackness in the US is accepted and that suits some oil companies.

In practice what also happens is that many nations either don't acknowledge accidents when they occur or even issue reports. Thats why the better oil companies are quick to stage investigations themselves for the greater good.

SASless

1st Dec 2011, 19:02

Seems the industry itself likes the "slackness".

I don't see much difference in the US method of defining an accident except the NTSB does break accidents into four categories.

http://www.rotor.com/membership/rotor/rotorpdf/spring2005/18.pdf

Shell Management

1st Dec 2011, 19:12

As I wrote, just a few days when I posted that exact link:

There is a strong US lobby (certain GOM operators, their trade bodies, Bell and the less progressive oil companies) that are happy that cheap, low power, single engine helicopters (mostly 206s) fly two thirds of GOM flight hours and sectors. They will always use the weak US definitions of accidents to make their rates look better.

The big difference is that aircraft that ditch in the GOM are not counted as having had an accident as though sinking is a normal part of a flight!

Variable Load

1st Dec 2011, 21:19

SASless you said Actually it was two accidents for the one Lightning Strike wasn't it?

No. The S76 lightning strike I was referring to had no connection to the S76 blade that failed i.e. different aircraft, different blades.

The point I was making was that accidents that are clearly accidents in the GOM are not captured in the OGP statistics. This is mainly because these particular accidents occur when the aircraft isn't carrying passengers, even though the oil company has chartered the aircraft and pays for the positioning which under "normal" rules is still CAT. They use the fact that the positioning occurs under a different FAR regulation so discount it as a recordable event, even when the pilot perishes.

Shell and other OGP members seem happy to play this game.

SASless

1st Dec 2011, 21:38

Are either of these two aircraft and the related incidents connected to the event you are referring to by chance?

July 16 crash of a Bristow Sikorsky S-76A+ (G-BJVX)

The rotor blade was manufactured in March 1981. In 1999, while fitted to another S-76A (G-BHBF), it was damaged in a lightning strike.

S-76 rotor blades put under scrutiny | Aviation International News (http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2008-05-05/s-76-rotor-blades-put-under-scrutiny)

Mars

2nd Dec 2011, 15:06

************************************************************ ********************
** Notice created 12/2/2011 Notice 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 435PH Make/Model: B407 Description: Bell 407
Date: 12/01/2011 Time: 1800

Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION

N435PH BELL407 ROTORCRAFT AUTO-ROTATED INTO THE WATER AND ROLLED OVER, GULF OF MEXICO, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk: 1
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

OTHER DATA

Activity: Business Phase: Landing Operation: OTHER

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 12/02/2011

Variable Load

2nd Dec 2011, 17:11

Are either of these two aircraft and the related incidents connected to the event you are referring to by chance?

No, I will try and find the actual event if I can ;)

Mars

17th Dec 2011, 06:46

NTSB Identification: CEN12IA096
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Thursday, December 01, 2011 in Gulf Of Mexico, GM
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON CANADA 407, registration: N435PH
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 1, 2011, about 1005 central standard time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N435PH, was successfully autorotated to the water following a loss of engine power while in cruise flight over the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter was not damaged during the on water landing. The commercial pilot, and sole passenger, were not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a non-scheduled air-taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from platform EC278-C, and was en route to platform EC261, both in the Gulf Of Mexico.

According to the pilot, while en route to EC261 the engine chip light illuminated. The flight was abeam platform EC278-B at the time, and the pilot elected to divert for a precautionary landing. While on the base leg to EC278-B, the pilot heard a loud whining noise followed by a loud popping noise and the helicopter began to yaw. The pilot entered an autorotation, called mayday, inflated the floats, and performed a successful water landing. The pilot and passenger were able to exit the helicopter unassisted into a life raft and were picked up within 10 minutes. The helicopter remained upright for approximately 20 minutes before overturning.

EN48

22nd Dec 2011, 16:12

NTSB Identification: CEN12IA096
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Thursday, December 01, 2011 in Gulf Of Mexico, GM
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON CANADA 407, registration: N435PH
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

Any info or opinions as to whether this engine failure is related to the no. 2 compressor bearing failures discussed in an earlier B407 thread?

AnFI

23rd Dec 2011, 00:02

another reason not to bother having a pointless spare engine

the consequences need to be much worse than this to justify the unreliability of two engines.... mathematically speaking

Shell Management

24th Dec 2011, 13:29

AnFI you epitomise the poor and cavalier safety culture that permeates the GOM.

SASless

24th Dec 2011, 15:25

SM....you living in a glass house and chucking rocks again! Shame on you!

industry insider

25th Dec 2011, 09:02

I am not often with SM but I am this time. This ditching was luckily uneventful but it could have been different.

How the GOM claims to want to improve safety but continues to tolerate ditchings from simple engine problems is baffling.

SASless

25th Dec 2011, 12:36

Beaudreaux done it this way since the very first days using Bell 47's....and Boudreaux don't like change especially if it costs him money. As long as the customers want to do it cheap, and the operators will do it cheap, then cheap is the way it shall be done.

Why just think how much the price of gasoline would go up if all the helicopters in the GOM were twin engined and able to fly around on just one engine?

On the other hand....it is awfully green to fly singles....far smaller carbon footprint and that should make any Greener happy! After all....humans are of a lesser importance than the enviornment.

The way to change this single engine mentality in the GOM is to have the EPA raise the Penalties for polluting the water with all that Jet Fuel and Oils the helicopters put into the water when they ditch, roll over, and sink.

js0987

26th Dec 2011, 13:17

Speaking of twin engines, statistics and safety, the helicopter community has been kicking this around for decades. We are now informed that twin engine commercial airlines can soon take the north pole route. As much as five hours away from a safe landing field on one engine. Was is Disraeli or Mark Twain that said there are lies, damn lies and statistics? Welcome Aboard!

Thridle Op Des

26th Dec 2011, 13:29

....except the 'papers' forgot we have been running the NP route for decades, I was a very young SLF in 1977 flying from CPH to ANC with SAS and the NP was one of the waypoints. What they meant to say was South (same, same, but different as they say here) Pole. 330 minutes on one engine at MCT, I'm glad it's the cripple seven which was approved and not the scare bus.

TOD

(I'm too old to get into the helicopter with one or two engine argument - I just know which I prefer!)

JimL

26th Dec 2011, 13:47

js0798,

...and that is because the probability of one failure followed by a second from an unconnected cause ('a' followed by 'b') is 1 x 10**-10.

The issue, conveniently forgotten by AnFI, is not the probability of an engine failure – which remains constant at about 1 x 10**-5/hour - but the consequence of a failure if it occurs over a hostile environment (a hostile environment is where safe-forced-landing cannot be carried out – i.e. resulting in a catastrophic event).

What in fact is being advocated by js0798 is not flying a twin over the NP, but a single.

The statistics have not changed;they are just conveniently ignored whenever it suits for the purpose of recycling the argument.

... mathematically speaking!

Jim

SASless

26th Dec 2011, 14:37

Now to refresh and old story about the FAA, Three Engined 727's, over-water flight, and life rafts/life jackets and statistics.

The FAA nodded to Eastern's solicitation to do away with overwater flight required flotation gear for flights between NYC and MIA as the over water portion was a short time and not all that far offshore. With permission granted....Eastern removed all the extra weight of the floation gear.

Less than two weeks later....a FE managed to starve all three engines of fuel...caused all three engines to fail nearly simultaneously...smack dab in the middle of the overwater portion of the flight.

The Crew was able to sort out the situation...restarted the engines...and only got a close look at the Oggin.

The over water gear went back into the aircraft....and I would suppose the FE got the ass kicking of his life shortly after landing!

Statistics are just that statistics....the probability of a second engine failure immediately following the failure of the other engine is only a guess and not a guarantee. They are independent events. There is no guarantee an engine will last more than 30 seconds after installation or that it will go to TBO. Five hours is a very long time to be hanging on one Donk in something like an Air Bus or Boeing with hundreds of folks wondering about how they have lived their lives and wondering about the final tally!

When the first Donk dies.....you are now rolling the dice big time....each second that goes by is another roll of the dice. I like to hedge my bets so I don't lose everything.

There is no such thing as too much power...too many engines....too much fuel.

js0987

26th Dec 2011, 15:22

And then there was the Canadian Airbus that ran out of fuel and did a dead stick landing in the Azores.

Actually, while we are on the subject of safety and statistics, I would like to mention survival gear and the GOM. I'm aware that in the North Sea and Canada, amoung other northern enviroments, survuval suits are required for passengers and crew. In the GOM you may have only a handful of days where the temperatures are below freezing, so there you are - statistically speaking - its not worth the cost or effort to equip everyone with a survival suit.

Back in the 70's flying 206's and looking at the white caps and the cold temperatures, I remembered an article I read in an offshore publication about a hypotheria study done by the University of Vancouver. As a result of that study, they developed a cold water jacket for just such occasions. After some effort, I bought a Thermal Float Jacket from Mustang Sportswear and either wore it or carried it with me for years when it was cold- until I, sort of, outgrew it.

Like SAS says statistics are a crap shoot.

SASless

26th Dec 2011, 16:53

JS,

It is not so much the air temperature but the water temp that creates the real hazard...as water is a much better remover of body heat than air.

Add in the wind to arrive at a chill factor and air temp can be an issue as well.

Now that the rigs are much further out in the GOM...and flying shuts down just a half hour before dark for single engined helicopters....one might be a very long way from help and thus be confronted with a survival situation that includes darkness, a bit of sea state, cold air and cold water....and if not in a raft...it could be a very cold night.

I will bet there are far more periods of time an exposure suit is needed than currently thought, if an honest review of the situation was done.

But then I love the comment...."statistically it is not worth equipping Pilots/Pax with suits!"

Geoffersincornwall

26th Dec 2011, 21:30

There are some very simple answers to that question:-

If 'Time-to-Rescue' is longer than worst case 'Survival-Time' = Yes

(just ask those that maintain that the reverse is the case to prove it with a realistic exercise or two).

If the hazards associated with heat-stress (for the pilots) are greater than the risk of a ditching scenario = No.

The remedy that seems appropriate is that in normal summer conditions during daylight hours (flight completed in daylight) then a survival suit may not be worn. During winter and/or stormy conditions or when any portion of he flight is at night then a suit is to be recommended.

In Europe where the concept of 'Duty of Care' exists the employer would have to demonstrate that to supply additional safety equipment would involve the employer in 'unreasonable additional costs'. It is difficult for any multi-million dollar company to cry 'foul' at a $1000 investment per employee.

G.

grumpytroll

26th Dec 2011, 22:11

Azores Deadstick Landing Report REleased - Air Transat (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/azoresdeadstick.html)

Gimli Glider - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider)

British Airways Flight 9 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_9)

Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics (http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877)

The article from popular mechanics is disturbing but very accurate

Cheers

industry insider

26th Dec 2011, 23:48

Of course there are some causes which would cause a multiple engine out condition, poor fuel, volcanic ash etc.

However, statistically any engine is likely to suffer a malfunction induced failure before a multi engine out condition is caused by an environmental factor or an incident like the one that happened to Air Transat.

The fact remains that a single engine failure leading to an autorotation and water landing in the GOM is not actually that uncommon. Add some wind, no survival suits, winter, close to the end of daylight etc and you have several "escalation" factors, all of which could be mitigated by the use of twin engined helicopters.

JimL

27th Dec 2011, 07:33

In my earlier post I had pointed out (now emphasized) that the discussion was about engine failures due to unconnected causes – all the cases that have been referenced since were failures due to connected causes.

As Geoff has pointed out, hostility exists when the rescue time exceeds the survival time under the prevailing conditions. Here is a case in point:

On February 16, 2003, approximately 1225 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, landed offshore (FAA speak for ditched) in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of engine power.

The helicopter was owned and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, by Houston Helicopters, Inc., at Pearland, Texas. The pilot and one passenger received fatal injuries, and three passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter has not been recovered and is presumed destroyed.

Note: these injuries were, in fact, the onset of hypothermia due to exposure.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight.

Approximately 1210, the helicopter departed Harbor Island (Tesoro Heliport) at Ingleside, Texas, for the 26.1 nautical mile flight to the Ensco Rig 84 (Matagorda 700 block offshore).

The operator and the dispatcher reported that the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, engine failure, and that he was going to land the helicopter on the water. The Coast Guard at Aransas Pass, Texas, and Corpus Christi, Texas, were notified. Search and rescue was initiated by the operator, Coast Guard, water vessels, and other helicopter operators.

Two of the passengers reported that the helicopter rolled inverted within a few seconds after the landing. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter, inflated their life vest, and awaited their rescue. Approximately 1425, the pilot and passengers were recovered by the Coast Guard.

The operator, the dispatcher, Coast Guard helicopter pilots, pilots of other search helicopters, and two of the passengers reported the winds were from the north at 25-40 mph with 5 to 9-foot seas (Sea State 5).

Where transient hostile conditions obtain, the operator (or oil company) has a duty of care to ensure that the Risk is Managed using ‘adverse weather policy’ - all the precursors were there.

There was a ‘reasonably probable’ expectation (R=1 x 10xx-5 per flight hour) that this engine would fail.

Jim

SASless

27th Dec 2011, 11:53

you have several "escalation" factors, all of which could be mitigated by the use of twin engined helicopters.

Assuming they are loaded to a weight that allows for continued flight following failure of one of the engines.

The BO-105's of an Operator sometimes did not meet that commonsense idea....and at least one of their aircraft DITCHED following an engine failure in the cruise portion of the flight returning ashore.

Remember this is the helicopter industry segment that at one time went ten years without granting a "Cost of Living" pay raise to its Pilots.

Cheap is a God down there.....and is worshipped religiously!

Gomer Pylot

27th Dec 2011, 13:55

Better and cheaper than using a twin would be just not making the flight. There are boats available, and it's not that long a trip, but most of the passengers I've ever carried would prefer the helicopter over the boat, regardless of the risks.

Shell Management

27th Dec 2011, 15:43

The BO-105's of an Operator sometimes did not meet that commonsense idea....and at least one of their aircraft DITCHED following an engine failure in the cruise portion of the flight returning ashore.

That was a PHI Bo105 on contract to Shell Oil.:ugh:

After that a series of Brits were seconded into Shell Oil to get a grip.

MamaPut

27th Dec 2011, 18:34

After that a series of Brits were seconded into Shell Oil to get a grip.

Presumably you were one of the high and mighty, hypocritical, know-it-alls who were amongst them? You really do nothing for Brits if that's the case and just make them hated the world over, which is why all Americans so loved the oil spill of another 'Brit' company recently. Now, preach to us all about oil spills, Nigeria, pollution of the environment, lack of any credible maintenance and safety culture until indigenous people's environment was polluted for 30+ years, corporate complicity in political murder and then let's talk about Shell's wonderful safety culture :mad:

industry insider

27th Dec 2011, 23:03

Sure SAS, the weight and balance issue goes without saying. But I refer really to the newer generation of twins that actually do have some OEI capability. I would not call a BO 105 or a 355F a twin for example because neither really have any credible twin performance.

AnFI

28th Dec 2011, 06:45

The issue, conveniently forgotten by AnFI - not at all.

Because ... mathematically speaking!It is not correct or relevant to use the probability of one failure followed by a second from an unconnected cause ('a' followed by 'b') is 1 x 10**-10.Lookup Sir Roy Meadows and what the Royal Statistical Society thought of the use of the same statistic.

Jim - what figure would you put on 'a' following 'b'?
is it in the order of 1in10?
rather than 1 in 100,000?

Would you also agree with me that it's not the risk of forced landing through the 'engine failure' cause but any cause which needs to be factored in?

So:

The other risks from having 2 engines should also be factored in. ie:
the risk of running a complex gearbox (Rgb)
the risk from running all the critical components to a higher load than would be
the risk of major destructive Eng failure etc.

The accidents we see, demonstrate that 1x10^-10 is not relevant.

Also the 'fatalness' of the hostile environment needs attention. You are using the consequence of failure in a hostile area as P=1 , all I was pointing out is that
the consequences need to be much worse than this to justify the unreliability of two engines.... mathematically speaking Risk of death in ditching in GOM? 0.1? 0.01?
it is mathematically speaking much easier to do something about that sized number than a number already this small - 0.0000001

People are generally not good at estimating risk.
Do you carry a knife when you carry a dingy in the cockpit?

212man

28th Dec 2011, 08:06

Anfi, Jim quite clearly stated that the risk of an unconnected second engine failure (he even underlined it himself) used the square rule, whereas in the Meadows case the second death could not be considered unconnected as both babies were genetically and environmentally linked. One could say that this is analagous to a twin engine installation, however the whole purpose of the Cat A certification standards is to try and remove that 'environmental link' so far as is possible though isolation and protection features.

Would you also agree with me that it's not the risk of forced landing through the 'engine failure' cause but any cause which needs to be factored in?

Most twin engined helicopters today have EFIS, Autopilots, EGPWS, TCAS and FADECs, are certified for IFR and are operated two crew. Within that list, there is plenty to reduce the risk of an accident from causes more common than engine failure, and most of those items are not present in a single!

One must also remember that there are other reasons to end up on one engine in a twin, beside a straight forward failure - such as chip lights, fire warnings etc - and in fact you may have one engine at idle rather than shutdown. Better to carry out a precautionary shutdown (or retard a throttle) and head home, rather than ditch - surely!

JimL

28th Dec 2011, 08:13

AnFI,

Let's deal with the engine failure first: it has been established (empirically) that the failure rate of helicopter (turbine) engines is about 1:100,000/flight hour. When two engines are fitted, and certificated, the rules require that each engine is protected (to the extent possible) from failure of the other.

If we exclude failure from (common) external factors such as salt water ingestion, ash ingestions, fuel starvation, FOD ingestion etc., we can assume the failure of each engine is an independent event. The probability of an engine failure is 1:100,000 (or 1 x 10^-5) therefore the failure of one engine followed by the failure of the other is 1 x 10^-5 and (times) 1 x 10^-5 or 1 x 10^-10.

Hence the probability of failure of 'a' followed by 'b' is 1 x 10^-10.

The result of an engine failure for a single is a forced landing; the result of an engine failure for a CAT A twin operating in Performance Class 1 is continued flight on the other engine.

However, the important issue is the consequence of the failure; if we assume superior skill in the pilot performing an auto-rotation and landing, what remains is the characteristic of the (forced) landing site. If the landing can be performed without harm to the occupants of the helicopter it is said to be a safe-forced-landing. Where the landing cannot be performed without harm to the occupants of the helicopter, it is said to be hostile.

Hostility is ICAO is defined as:

Hostile environment. An environment in which:

a) a safe forced landing cannot be accomplished because the surface and surrounding environment are inadequate; or

b) the helicopter occupants cannot be adequately protected from the elements; or

c) search and rescue response/capability is not provided consistent with anticipated exposure; or

d) there is an unacceptable risk of endangering persons or property on the ground.

Clearly: b) above can be mitigated with the use of life-vests (with splash hoods), life-rafts and survival suits; c) is dependent upon b) and the efficacy of search and rescue.

Where hostility of the environment is transient - i.e. at sea - but occurs frequently or can happen very quickly, some States take the precaution of defining it as hostile.

Where hostility of the environment is transient but occurs infrequently and with warning, the operator is left with the Risk Assessment and provision of appropriate 'adverse weather' policy/procedures.

As you have said, there are other reliability issues that have to be addressed; these are dealt with in certification and build standards, and component lifing; or, with redundancy. Some States also take the additional precaution of permitting flight over a hostile environment only in Performance Class 1 (certification in Category A being a more quantitative process).

All of this has been considered in detail for a number of decades; States and operators (and oil companies) have used the above tools to Risk Assess their operations and make appropriate provisions in their regulations/procedures.

It all comes down to the old adage, horses for courses.

This is not a single v twin but a risk assessment discussion. Mathematics /statistics /probability just provides us with the tools with which to make the best (and informed) decisions.

Jim

AnFI

28th Dec 2011, 19:18

Sure its a risk/consequence calculation where correct use of statistics are a tool - but you know what they say about statistics !

You say If we exclude failure from (common) external factors - That is TRUE - BUT we can't - we can pretend/reduce/try/hope etc but we cannot render POWER delivery independent - Especially if they share a common drive chain - where the risk of combiner gearbox etc etc must be factored in.

We expect the engine to deliver a POWER LEVEL (OEI30secs or OEI 2:30) which it has not regularly been tested to - it is being expected to do that because one engine has failed. An engine that it has probably shared a history with (same manufacturing batch, same unaccounted for running on rocket fuel in Bongo-Bongoland? etc..)

Pilot's close down the wrong engine - extinguish the good one etc - many factors which come in at significantly greater than a compounded 1x10^-5,

If it really were 1x10^-10 then we would never see the examples we do - so we can see it is not correct 'by inspection'.

We might want to but we cannot fairly just compound 1x10^-5 and use that figure - other than very hypothetically.

Also the INCREASED risks you refer to: As you have said, there are other reliability issues that have to be addressed; these are dealt with in certification and build standards, and component lifing; or, with redundancyWell it's really not fair to hide them out of the equation - they are the price paid for the (hypothetical) 1x10^-10
And many of those standards (dual hydraulics) - chickens in tail rotors(?) etc are equally applicable to singles....

The negating of Hostility by mitigation looks like it has merit especially wrt ditching survivability - any controlled arrival into any water state should/could be rendered survivable - surely? (is that true?)

If the probability of arriving in the water were truly only 1x10^-10 (which it is not) then that is SO small that carriage of floatation equipment would not be required/safer, the risk could possibly be higher....

It is surely flawed to make risk from one specific cause (engine) better without including the increased risk from other causes - (like the tail boom falling off etc etc ...)

Nick Lappos has/had a really excellent arguement about 'over-engined twins' wasting payload on an almost irrelevant slice of 'exposure' during the Take-Off/Landing Phase - he wrote an excellent article on it - (somewhere?)

I am not against TWINs - and agree with Jim that it:
It all comes down to the old adage, horses for courses.So it's perfectly fair and reasonable that manufacturers should be free to supply the free market with whatever hair brained scheme their engineering ingenuity comes up with to deliver the safety outcome the market demands - even if it means fitting two engines - or floating saftey cell cabins - to make the safest product ... dubious maths should not be enshrined in law to dictate particular engineering solutions.

Although I suppose it helps push the manufactures along....

Customers / oil companies / police forces should be free to demonstrate their commitment to safety by procuring helicopters which their consultants believe are safer...
it's a very strong driver.

Do you really want to be up an Alp in an EC145 in preference to a B3(e?) ?

Power / capability / reliability / margin or accountability .... ?
One saves pilots/people the other saves ..... accountable managers.

Patrick Goudou (EASA) doesn't have time to consider this topic:
"However, within the timeframe available, stakeholders and the Agency were not able to gather the appropriate data and establish a safety case that would show the need to reconsider the basic underlying principle of JAR-OPS 3, which was to transition fleets to multi-engined helicopters, given subsequent technological advances and increased reliability of single-engined helicopters." Opinion04-2011

Jim has done a great job of forcing some rational considerations up the flag pole and into law - but isn't it time we 'upped the game' and lent a bit of support in the same way to other solutions... are there any aircraft designers out there who can clarify the mathematics?