UNCTUOUS
16th May 2005, 17:33
Wonder whether this delay is related to the Wall St Journal Article below? Whistleblower claims that his company just quietly slipped in some COTS program to run a critical part of the CPCS (Cabin PPressure Control System) without qualifying it under DO-178(B). Naughty naughty.... particularly as the software had some unresolved bugs that had produced undesired results in its bespoke ground-bound application. All to save a few millions..
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Airbus to postpone deliveries of A380 until second half of 2006, report says
Airlines say Airbus will delay deliveries of its A380 superjumbo jet until the second half of 2006, the Wall Street Journal reports. The
manufacturer previously expected to deliver the planes in the first half of the year. Airbus would not comment on the delays. Engineers say efforts to reduce the weight of the plane and technical issues are stalling the program. They added that the delays do not signal fundamental problems with the plane. [The Wall Street Journal]
Airbus Software Feud Lands in Court
Subcontractors Ex-Staffer Alleges Moves to Mislead On Product in Superjumbo
By DANIEL MICHAELS and MATTHEW KARNITSCHNIG
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
April 28, 2005; Page B4
VIENNA --Armies of engineers write software for all kinds of transportation applications. So why not borrow some of it, make the necessary adjustments and use it on a multibillion dollar jetliner? The question is central to a court battle over software re-engineering and the complicated process of certifying its safety for aerospace use. And the case has implications for Airbus's massive new jet, the 555-seat A380, which took its successful maiden flight yesterday and is awaiting certification to go into service next year.
Aircraft designers make a point of worrying about the safety of software and circuits in jetliners, whose electronic systems have gotten increasingly complex and integrated in the past 20 years. The avionics industry and regulators have responded with strict rules for jetliner software and electronic equipment -- and mountains of paperwork are required to back it up. Thanks to that rigor, computer circuits have never been implicated in a major plane crash. Still, electronic glitches have led to crashes of jetfighters and spacecraft and there have been some close calls with commercial airliners.
On Feb. 8, a Virgin Atlantic Airways flight to London from Hong Kong with 293 passengers and 18 crew on board made an emergency landing in Amsterdam after bugs in the computerized fuel-management system of the Airbus A340-600 starved one engine of fuel and almost shut down a second. British investigators are still analyzing the "serious incident," but Airbus reprogrammed the system at their urging. Now, a former employee of a subcontractor to Airbus on its A380 super-jumbo jet alleges that company managers misled Airbus and authorities about shortcomings in the certification paperwork for a chip and software to be used on the plane. The former employee also claims the software -- which was adapted from earlier off-the-shelf products -- has flaws that could endanger passengers. The subcontractor, closely held TTTech Computertechnik AG of Vienna, denies the allegations of the former employee, Joseph Mangan. TTTech's chief executive, Stefan Poledna, says he fired the engineer in October for poor job performance and contends Mr. Mangan now wants revenge. TTTech has brought both a criminal and a civil suit against him for defamation and has taken legal steps to stop him from making claims about TTTech and its products, which Mr. Poledna said caused TTTech "considerable damage."
Attempts to settle out of court have failed. TTTech's suits against Mr. Mangan, a 40-year-old American, as well his own suit against the company, are playing out in Vienna district court. Mr. Mangan, a freelance aerospace and software specialist who worked for TTTech for six months, contends that certain potential problems in TTTech's products, if they arise, could ripple throughout the cabin-air system and cause passenger injuries or even a crash. Officials at both Airbus and the contractor that hired TTTech say they have studied the system and found no safety issues. They say even if issues arise, the equipment doesn't play a critical enough role in the A380 to endanger the plane. Airbus, which is owned by European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. and Britain's BAE Systems PLC, adds that its suppliers will meet all certification requirements. A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is in the process of certifying the A380, said EASA "is aware of the case and has reacted accordingly."
After a preliminary hearing in December, the next hearing in the case is due in coming weeks. Mr. Mangan, who seeks compensation for wrongful dismissal, faces a hefty fine and up to six months in jail if he can't prove his charges. He concedes it will be hard. But so is proving the products are safe, he argues, due to the complexity of software certification. TTTech is supplying a microchip and software that handle data communication within the system that controls the air pressure inside the two-deck A380. TTTech was hired in July 2002 by Nord-Micro AG in Frankfurt, a subsidiary of U.S. conglomerate United Technologies Corp.'s Hamilton Sundstrand division, which is developing the A380's cabin-pressure control system. A pivotal issue in the case is that TTTech's system was developed using commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, systems that were designed for other purposes, rather than custom aviation software developed from scratch. TTTech developed its COTS equipment in the 1990s mainly for cars and trains, and more recently adapted it for aviation.
While such COTS systems are rare in aerospace, they aren't unheard of. TTTech's system is now also being used in a military aviation application, which doesn't face the same rigors of certification as civil aviation. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has conducted several studies of safety and certification issues raised by COTS software in recent years. A group of specialists from the U.S., Europe and Canada in 2003 also studied the issues. Basically, they say that COTS systems should be subjected to the same testing and standards as other systems. The fact that some system may be in use doesn't mean it should be exempted from the same extensive proving as other aviation systems, except in some very rare circumstances. As a result, getting the necessary certification paperwork for COTS software usually requires some reverse-engineering. Such reverse-engineering -- which involves going through the software code line by line and justifying each part -- can be so complicated and time-consuming that adapting COTS electronics ends up costing as much as creating aviation systems from scratch.
Mr. Mangan alleges that TTTech managers knew last spring that their paperwork would be insufficient for the A380, but avoided alerting Airbus or regulators. He says that he revealed the problem to Airbus and EASA in late September and TTTech fired him after that. TTTech disputes Mr. Mangan's account. European regulators and other people familiar with the certification of TTTech's equipment supported some of Mr. Mangan's claims about documentation shortcomings. These people said TTTech and Nord-Micro initially took the position that some equipment required a low level of certification documentation because of its use in other transport applications. Regulators said documentation was insufficient and have asked the companies to meet higher certification standards. The companies are now preparing the documentation. Mr. Mangan says that doesn't address software flaws that he alleges exist. Mr. Poledna, TTTech's CEO, says the company identified and fixed a glitch, as happens during software development and review. Mr. Poledna says that TTTech's equipment is safe and that the company is on track to meet all certification requirements.
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Airbus to postpone deliveries of A380 until second half of 2006, report says
Airlines say Airbus will delay deliveries of its A380 superjumbo jet until the second half of 2006, the Wall Street Journal reports. The
manufacturer previously expected to deliver the planes in the first half of the year. Airbus would not comment on the delays. Engineers say efforts to reduce the weight of the plane and technical issues are stalling the program. They added that the delays do not signal fundamental problems with the plane. [The Wall Street Journal]
Airbus Software Feud Lands in Court
Subcontractors Ex-Staffer Alleges Moves to Mislead On Product in Superjumbo
By DANIEL MICHAELS and MATTHEW KARNITSCHNIG
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
April 28, 2005; Page B4
VIENNA --Armies of engineers write software for all kinds of transportation applications. So why not borrow some of it, make the necessary adjustments and use it on a multibillion dollar jetliner? The question is central to a court battle over software re-engineering and the complicated process of certifying its safety for aerospace use. And the case has implications for Airbus's massive new jet, the 555-seat A380, which took its successful maiden flight yesterday and is awaiting certification to go into service next year.
Aircraft designers make a point of worrying about the safety of software and circuits in jetliners, whose electronic systems have gotten increasingly complex and integrated in the past 20 years. The avionics industry and regulators have responded with strict rules for jetliner software and electronic equipment -- and mountains of paperwork are required to back it up. Thanks to that rigor, computer circuits have never been implicated in a major plane crash. Still, electronic glitches have led to crashes of jetfighters and spacecraft and there have been some close calls with commercial airliners.
On Feb. 8, a Virgin Atlantic Airways flight to London from Hong Kong with 293 passengers and 18 crew on board made an emergency landing in Amsterdam after bugs in the computerized fuel-management system of the Airbus A340-600 starved one engine of fuel and almost shut down a second. British investigators are still analyzing the "serious incident," but Airbus reprogrammed the system at their urging. Now, a former employee of a subcontractor to Airbus on its A380 super-jumbo jet alleges that company managers misled Airbus and authorities about shortcomings in the certification paperwork for a chip and software to be used on the plane. The former employee also claims the software -- which was adapted from earlier off-the-shelf products -- has flaws that could endanger passengers. The subcontractor, closely held TTTech Computertechnik AG of Vienna, denies the allegations of the former employee, Joseph Mangan. TTTech's chief executive, Stefan Poledna, says he fired the engineer in October for poor job performance and contends Mr. Mangan now wants revenge. TTTech has brought both a criminal and a civil suit against him for defamation and has taken legal steps to stop him from making claims about TTTech and its products, which Mr. Poledna said caused TTTech "considerable damage."
Attempts to settle out of court have failed. TTTech's suits against Mr. Mangan, a 40-year-old American, as well his own suit against the company, are playing out in Vienna district court. Mr. Mangan, a freelance aerospace and software specialist who worked for TTTech for six months, contends that certain potential problems in TTTech's products, if they arise, could ripple throughout the cabin-air system and cause passenger injuries or even a crash. Officials at both Airbus and the contractor that hired TTTech say they have studied the system and found no safety issues. They say even if issues arise, the equipment doesn't play a critical enough role in the A380 to endanger the plane. Airbus, which is owned by European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. and Britain's BAE Systems PLC, adds that its suppliers will meet all certification requirements. A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is in the process of certifying the A380, said EASA "is aware of the case and has reacted accordingly."
After a preliminary hearing in December, the next hearing in the case is due in coming weeks. Mr. Mangan, who seeks compensation for wrongful dismissal, faces a hefty fine and up to six months in jail if he can't prove his charges. He concedes it will be hard. But so is proving the products are safe, he argues, due to the complexity of software certification. TTTech is supplying a microchip and software that handle data communication within the system that controls the air pressure inside the two-deck A380. TTTech was hired in July 2002 by Nord-Micro AG in Frankfurt, a subsidiary of U.S. conglomerate United Technologies Corp.'s Hamilton Sundstrand division, which is developing the A380's cabin-pressure control system. A pivotal issue in the case is that TTTech's system was developed using commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, systems that were designed for other purposes, rather than custom aviation software developed from scratch. TTTech developed its COTS equipment in the 1990s mainly for cars and trains, and more recently adapted it for aviation.
While such COTS systems are rare in aerospace, they aren't unheard of. TTTech's system is now also being used in a military aviation application, which doesn't face the same rigors of certification as civil aviation. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has conducted several studies of safety and certification issues raised by COTS software in recent years. A group of specialists from the U.S., Europe and Canada in 2003 also studied the issues. Basically, they say that COTS systems should be subjected to the same testing and standards as other systems. The fact that some system may be in use doesn't mean it should be exempted from the same extensive proving as other aviation systems, except in some very rare circumstances. As a result, getting the necessary certification paperwork for COTS software usually requires some reverse-engineering. Such reverse-engineering -- which involves going through the software code line by line and justifying each part -- can be so complicated and time-consuming that adapting COTS electronics ends up costing as much as creating aviation systems from scratch.
Mr. Mangan alleges that TTTech managers knew last spring that their paperwork would be insufficient for the A380, but avoided alerting Airbus or regulators. He says that he revealed the problem to Airbus and EASA in late September and TTTech fired him after that. TTTech disputes Mr. Mangan's account. European regulators and other people familiar with the certification of TTTech's equipment supported some of Mr. Mangan's claims about documentation shortcomings. These people said TTTech and Nord-Micro initially took the position that some equipment required a low level of certification documentation because of its use in other transport applications. Regulators said documentation was insufficient and have asked the companies to meet higher certification standards. The companies are now preparing the documentation. Mr. Mangan says that doesn't address software flaws that he alleges exist. Mr. Poledna, TTTech's CEO, says the company identified and fixed a glitch, as happens during software development and review. Mr. Poledna says that TTTech's equipment is safe and that the company is on track to meet all certification requirements.