US grounds C130Es due to wing cracks

[Navaleye]

This is slightly worrying, what is being done to check our fleet?

BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4259375.stm)

[MajorMadMax]

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v82/M2_patches/C-130EsGrounded.jpg

[hobie]

Not a problem for the U.K. it seems ......

quote "

US Hercules planes grounded Feb 12 2005

The RAF will not stop its Hercules C-130 planes flying despite America grounding its 30 oldest aircraft because of wing cracks, the Ministry of Defence has said.

Flight restrictions have been imposed by the US on 60 more of its C-130 fleet. The move by the US Air Force comes less than a fortnight after an RAF Hercules crashed into the Iraqi desert, killing 10 servicemen.

An MoD spokesman said there were no plans to ground any of the RAF's fleet, adding that the UK version of the plane, the C-130K, was "very different" to America's C-130E.

"If the US thought there was a problem they would have informed us," he said. "I am not aware of any such approach. If the president of the board of inquiry (into the Iraq crash) thought there was any risk to fleet safety from his initial findings, the UK fleet would have been grounded."

The spokesman added that Britain had been "liaising" with the US over the C-130 since the tragedy. He stressed that until the full report was completed, no definite cause for the crash could be stated.

"The UK C-130 is much younger, both in terms of years and flying hours, than the US fleet. This means the UK fleet has a lower fatigue rate. We use the C-130K primarily for strategic flying, the transportation of equipment and personnel, which puts less strain on the aircraft."

The British model dates from the late 1960s, while the US's fleet was built at the beginning of that decade, he added.

"The construction of the wing section of the UK Hercules is different to that of the grounded American fleet. The wing structure is much more durable and stronger on the K variant. It's a different variant and that's why the RAF has not grounded its fleet."

http://icsouthlondon.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/nationalnews/tm_objectid=15181896&method=full&siteid=50102&headline=us-hercules-planes-grounded-name_page.html

[16 blades]

Correct, US Herk. What we have are E-models with H engines.

And our fatigue consumption has increased dramatically in the last 5 yrs or so due to the Operational tempo. I would hazard that we give our 'frames a much harder time that the USAF do, too. This is worrying news, I fear.

16B

[wessex19]

The Kiwi 'hercs' are 44 years old I believe and are due for a major overhaul!! They will find more cracks than an Indian cricket pitch.:O

[Jackonicko]

Are you sure?

I thought there were several standards of centre section as built.

Original (A/B)
Strengthened (E)
Further strengthened (early H, K, etc.)
Final (developed for later, 'heavy H')

and several mods to those various standards.

Or are all the books wrong? Is the fact that the USAF is imposing limitations on some of its Hs indication that these have the same wing box as the Es, or just that the Es (whose wing boxes were modified back in the 70s) are NOW at the same standard.

Can anyone definitively confirm that (structurally speaking) the K is an E and not an H?

[BEagle]

See 'Metal fatigue theory in RAF crash':

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-1481752,00.html

If this does ultimately prove to have been the cause, one wonders at the wisdom of extending so many of the RAF's large a/c fleets way past their originally intended use-by dates?

[SilsoeSid]

Is this related in any way to the incident in 2002, of the firefighting C-130, when on a water drop run the right wing folded, with the obvious consequences?

Not a nice video. :ugh:

Photo if you choose to see it (http://www.wildlandfire.com/pics/air4/cr_c130t.jpg)

Narrative (http://www.wildlandfire.com/descr/descr_air.htm#air4)

[LunchMonitor]

The 2002 Firefighting crash I seem to remember was partially attributed to the aircraft carrying a high payload and very little (ie. NO wing relieving) fuel.
Although as many say we have abused our aircraft during various ops with aircraft getting airborne over MAX TOW (175000lbs ops necessity in old money) every crew I have ever got airborne at high weights with, has taken the carriage of wing relieving fuel seriously, which has hopefully protected our wing roots to some extent. This does depend however on whether our figures for wing relieving are accurate and we shouldnt forget that all fatigue is cumulative.

[US Herk]

The A-model firefighter that folded up its wings was nothing like an E or K. Those particular birds were retired by the USAF having never had their centre wing boxes upgraded. The forestry service operated them & even some non-government contractors.

Fire fighting is severe duty - max speed dives into moderate/severe turbulence with rapid onset G-forces during pullout.

Metal fatigue is indeed cumulative - it's like bending a paper clip back & forth - eventually it snaps & you never know exactly when.

[Jackonicko]

OK, You got me.

Bleed?
Damien?

[VP959]

The other primary structural issue with a fire fighting aircraft is that the wing loads very rapidly reverse as the water drops. The aircraft goes from heavy to light in a couple of seconds, which then flexes the whole wing in the opposite direction from that in normal loaded flight.

The net result is greater fatigue in the structure, caused by a pretty unique operating regime. Even load dropping from a Herc doesn't get rid of mass quite as rapidly as a water drop, I think.

[hobie]

An MoD spokesman said .......
Now I wonder who the $$$$ he was :confused:

[Flatus Veteranus]

Hobie

The BBC broadcast I heard refrred to "an Army spokesman" in the context of the wing structure of various marks. Now that inspires confidence!

In The Times last week there was a picture of the Hercules at Basra loading the coffins of those who died in the Hercules crash. The caption referred to the "ten soldiers who died". This following an article soon after the crash referring to "No 47 Air Despatch Sqn of the Royal Logistics Corps" or some such crap.

I think the trouble may be that the services have lost their single-service PR staff at MOD, and it is all done now by Purple People, who would not recognise an airman if he booted them up the bum. And the press are notorious for employing defence correspondents who know nothing of military aviation.

[juliet]

"This following an article soon after the crash referring to "No 47 Air Despatch Sqn of the Royal Logistics Corps" or some such crap."

Flatus,
47 AD RLC are intertwined with the herc squadrons in that they are the ones organising and dispatching the stuff that gets thrown out the back. they are a separate unit to 47 Sqn RAF but work very closely with them.

[opso]

Juliet, I think that you'll find that Flatus is only too aware of who 47 AD are and the fact that none of them were on board 179...

[Jackonicko]

Anyone know how many hours and cycles 179 had 'on the clock'?

[lineslime]

I don't, but I know some people who should. Just don't ask me who as I would hate to offend. Don't you just hate it when people like to dig for any info on such a tragic event. I'm sure that if you needed to know you would have been told.

[Jackonicko]

I'm hesitant about asking the question.

Especially as a journo.

But the issue of fatigue is now firmly out there, on TV, radio and in the press, and there are times when 'digging' can be of greater value than watching as something is covered up. Journos and others digging was, on balance, helpful on the Chinook/Mull accident, for example.

And isn't it always better, if a story is going to be told anyway, that that story should at least be 'informed'?

It's easy to ascertain the milestones at which fatigue is regarded as a concern by LM, and we know that the centre wing box is 'of concern' to the IPT. If we know that 179 was a low houred aircraft we can avoid unnecessary and distressing speculation, and if we know it was high houred (in the 'of concern ballpark') then reporting can at least be more calm and level headed.

And why should 179's hours and cycles be a secret?

[Nopax,thanx]

AFAIK, there are NO RAF herks flying with original wings except the new J's. At Marshalls in the seventies and eighties we gave them new centre sections and the outer wings were completely rebuilt (new planks top and bottom). This was specifically to address the fatigue problems associated with the older type wing. (The one with the oblong tank hatches - look at an RAF model now and you'll see the hatches are oval)

There was no selection of aircraft according to usage, the entire fleet was done. So the wings are in fact a fair bit younger than the fuselages.

[Jackonicko]

RAF Rules Out Grounding Hercules Fleet Amid U.S. Alert

By Rachel Williams, PA

The RAF will not stop its Hercules C-130 planes flying after America grounded 30 of its oldest of the cargo aircraft because of wing cracks, the Ministry of Defence said today.

The move by the US Air Force comes less than a fortnight after an RAF Hercules crashed into the Iraqi desert, killing 10 servicemen.

Flight restrictions have been imposed by the US on 60 more of its C-130 fleet.

An MoD spokesman said there were no plans to ground any of the RAF’s fleet, adding that the UK version of the plane, the C-130K was “very different” to America’s C-130E.

“If the US thought there was a problem they would have informed us,” he said.

“I am not aware of any such approach.

“If the president of the board of inquiry (into the Iraq crash) thought there was any risk to fleet safety from his initial findings the UK fleet would have been grounded.”

The spokesman added that Britain had been “liaising” with the US over the C-130 since the tragedy.

He stressed that until the full report was completed, no definite cause for the crash could be stated.

“The UK C-130 is much younger both in terms of years and flying hours than the US fleet and uses it differently to the US, which means the UK fleet has a lower fatigue rate,” the spokesman continued.

“We use the C-130K primarily for strategic flying, the transportation of equipment an personnel, which puts less strain on the aircraft.”

Are we really suggesting that XV179 has been used more gently than ANG C-130Es? Or than USAF HC-130Ns and Ps. Are we suggesting that suddenly No.47 and No.70 Squadrons are tasked with strategic route flying, and that the No.47 (SF) Flight undertakes 'strategic flying'?

The British model dates from the late 1960s while the US’s fleet was built at the beginning of that decade, he added.

“The construction of the wing section of the UK Hercules is different to that of the grounded American fleet.

“The wing structure is much more durable and stronger on the K variant.

We know this to be incorrect.

“It’s a different variant and that’s why the RAF has not grounded its fleet.”

The RAF has a “very robust maintenance” regime across all its aircraft and would take immediate action to deal with any faults detected, the spokesman added.

The US move includes about a dozen C-130s that have been hauling supplies in Iraq, but it is not expected to have a major impact on the war effort.

The aircraft were grounded after inspections showed cracks to a “centre wing box structure” were greater in number than expected.

The inference from this spokesperson is that there were/are no known issues, yet we know that a new OLM analysis programme has been launched "to provide more knowledge of operational effects on the structure and a safe life clearance for the fleet" and that the RAF has: "Concerns over the centre wing structure, that it considers is unmonitored."

[oldfella]

"If we know that 179 was a low houred aircraft we can avoid unnecessary and distressing speculation, and if we know it was high houred (in the 'of concern ballpark') then reporting can at least be more calm and level headed."

To Jackonicko and any other journalists out there. Why should there be any speculation, unnecessary or disturbing, at all? There will be an inquiry, looking into all sorts of areas (I won't even try to list them as this will raise more specualtion) and the results will be open record.

I agree that your later statement is correct and that reporting should be calm and level headed. Why not leave it at that? Wait for the results then report them.

[Jackonicko]

I'd love to, but I have to live in the real world, in which some will write about the incident, and in which I'll be asked to write about it. And I'll do so, but I'll try to do so with sensitivity and without too much sensationalism - explaining and educating (if I can) rather than entertaining or titillating.

[Samuel]

The Kiwi Hercs were purchased, the first three at least, in1965, and the second order in 1969. They were the first 'H' models off the production line, and from memory they have had all the wing modifications, and will shortly have a further 'life of type' upgrade, possibly at Marshalls.

[US Herk]

While it is true that export versions of the C-130E with -15 engines were designated C-130H by Lockheed as early as '64, they were nothing more than "Super Es" having the same exact systems as C-130Es. The C-130H did not really begin production until 1974 with the modified bleed air system, uprated cockpit air conditioner, etc.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

FV

You are quite wrong with your assertion that the services have lost their single-service PR staff at MOD, and it is all done now by Purple People, who would not recognise an airman if he booted them up the bum.

There is still an RAF PR Dept and it has 4 aircrew in it to my knowledge. Trouble is, the papers/tv, probably don't bother reading the press releases or picking up the phone to check facts before they go to print .

HPT

[Arkroyal]

"If we know that 179 was a low houred aircraft we can avoid unnecessary and distressing speculation, and if we know it was high houred (in the 'of concern ballpark') then reporting can at least be more calm and level headed." Don't know how tough its life has been, but there in my 16 year old space cadet's 3822, Passenger Flying Log:

22/4/68 Hercules Mk1 XV179 AEF 2hr 0 min

I wonder, politically, how Hoon will want to play this. I'm sure he'd rather it come out as a shoot down, and cover up any other cause.

[Jackonicko]

HPT,

FV should have said that the direction of PR in Main Building has passed from real servicemen to 'Purple' civilians. At Command Level it's the other way around, and day to day PR has long been in the hands of civil servants - albeit ones who've been in post long enough to know an airman before he bites them.

Culturally, service PR is still guided by a "What can we do to avoid answering the question/how can we justify witholding the facts/how can we minimise the amount of information we give" attitude, rather than a "what can we do to answer/how can we try to provide the information" culture.

The problem with phoning to check facts is that you never know whether the response will be to procrastinate and delay until the aircraft type involved has left service, or whether they'll lay off your story to a friendlier rival, or whether they'll answer another question entirely and push out some tired Blairite spin.

Ensuring that journos are well informed and sympathetic (if not actually on side) is a much more difficult way of shaping press coverage than it is to make it virtually impossible for journalists to do their work properly, and then to insert spin into the resulting vacuum.

[Jambo Jet]

Has the grounding of the K fleet been considered?

What needs to happen in order for a fleet to get grounded?

Who takes the rap if another incident (God forbid) were to happen?

[Dockers]

Seem to remember somethng about rainbow fittings being vulnerable. Any eng care to comment?

[air pig]

As we are not "at war", does the UK Health and Safety at Work act apply in this situation ?? Would it not be prudent to ground the K fleet until the cause of the incidient is determined by the accident board.

Whilst the requirement for the aircraft is obvious, surely the safety of the crew and passengers is paramount.

The cost of damages at litigation could be considarable, if another incident occurs that is not due to external actions, and was determined to be forseeable by a Court of Law.

In civil and military law ignorance is not a defence, espially in the Health and Safety world.

[hyd3failure]

Would it not be prudent to ground the K fleet until the cause of the incidient is determined by the accident board. Thats not the way it happens and nor should it. We are not in this for knee jerk reactions.
Can you imagine the carnage and chaos if we were to ground each type of aircraft following an accident. Mayhem. For Instance. In my particular fleet we lost an aircraft and 2 crew to a flying accident in June 2002 and we are still waiting the report from the AAIB. Can you imagine grounding the entire Herc fleet for 2 years whilst you await a report?

[Jackonicko]

No sane person would support grounding the Ks, or even the Mk 1 Mini Fleet, for an extended period without good reason, but with the USAF having taken some action over fatigue concerns, the responsible action would surely be to temporarily and briefly ground the C1s immediately while a Centre section inspection is undertaken (perhaps the inspection currently scheduled at 6FI increments) and thereafter to impose a more robust and more frequent inspection regime. Sample high FI/high houred C3s and C3As might also undergo similar inspections to see ifany problem is fleet wide. That would entail grounding five aircraft fairly briefly, and would be a proportionate response in the present situation, I'd have thunk.

I know that folk don't like speculation, and want everyone to wait for the BOI, but in the real world that doesn't happen, and there is a political imperative to play down anything that might prove embarrassing - especially in the run up to an election.

MoD spokespeople are already pre-judging the accident, and are already 'news managing', by inferring that the RAF Herc has no fatigue issues. If he knows this to be 'spin', it's surely a journo's job to point out that this seems to be at best simplistic, and at worst disingenuous, isn't it? Once the MoD starts spinning a particular line around the accident, it has effectively been pushed into the press' domain, and our reluctance to speculate or to be insensitive tends to be over-ridden.

In 2002, at the Herc Operator's conference (whose proceedings were exhaustively recorded and then placed on the public record), it was revealed by the Herc IPT that: “Due to operational demands placed upon the CMk1 fleet ….the cleared fatigue life of these aircraft has nearly been reached” and that the RAF had started a wing swap programme on three aircraft (XV179, XV196, and XV295) with K-model outer wing sets using H-model outer wings that were claimed to be “less affected by high FI consumption rates”.

The Fleet Leader was then said to have amassed 29,300 flying hours, when the C-130K Fuselage Fatigue Test Programme (then due to run from Feb 03 to Feb 06) was expected to clear the C-130K fuselage for 10,000 flight cycles, equivalent to 30,000 flying hours (with a further 9,000 flying hour option).

These new outer wings were said to be RAF assets - presumably taken from H-winged C1 and C3 aircraft withdrawn from use when the Js entered service.

Re-winging was felt to offer the best chance of getting the C1 to its (extended) OSD and to bridge the gap til the A400M arrives. It was said, however, that “Unexpected severe damage could ground the fleet”, with centre wing cracks specifically given as an example of such damage.

The IPT described the C-130K aircraft as being “derived from the E model” and expressed particular concerns “over the centre wing structure, that we consider is unmonitored, especially on the Mk.1 mini-fleet.” That's the kind of concern that would lead me to suggest that suggesting a temporary grounding might not be disproportionate.

The following year, the IPT made it clear that the Mk 1 Mini Fleet were tasked with the SOF Role, including AAR (Receive only), High/Low Level Para, Air Drop/Resupply, OLF (150' day, 250' night NVG) and Rapid Air Land (Tactical Insertion). This doesn't sound like the 'primarily strategic' role described by MoD spokespeople, that puts so much less 'strain on the aircraft'! Joking apart, such a misrepresentation raises the legitimate question as to whether the political centre has sufficient understanding of the Hercs use to be qualified to comment as to fatigue at all, let alone to provide a lead which encourages the belief that everything's fine and dandy.

Of course it's far too early to rule anything in or out, and neither the press nor MoD PR people should be pre-judging the causes of this tragic accident before the BOI reports. It's clear that the accident may have had nothing to do with structural factors at all, and it's vital to avoid 'panic', but to dismiss even the possibility of such a cause (especially in the light of the USAF experience) in the way in which the MOD has done, does seems premature.

Moreover, an intelligent debate about age and fatigue may be less damaging than a whispering campaign swept under the office carpet at Handbrake House.

[scroggs]

The centre wing boxes were replaced several years ago, as Nopax states. I am not aware of exactly what specification the replacement wing boxes were to, but it's fair to assume that they were superior to the type replaced. There was an outer wing replacement programme sometime later, as Jacko has discovered, but, again, I don't have the full facts of that programme.

All the aircraft mentioned, among others, were members of the C1K or C1 PLR2 fleets in the early '80s (and, in the C1K's case, through to 27 Mar 1996 when the last - XV201 - was retired) which were regularly flown at the maximum overload weight, which may have been of more concern than the tactical manouevring that the aircraft were subject to. I believe it was this high gross weight flying, coupled with some discovered corrosion, which prompted the outer wing replacement programme. I should say that I had no direct contact with that process or the decisions behind it other than occasionally delivering aircraft to or from Cambridge.

Anyway, my point is that I believe the MoD is correct when it states that the RAF C1s (C130Ks) are currently a very different aircraft to the USAF C130Es.

[air pig]

To hyd3failure's comment about not grounding the K fleet, I bow to their superior knowledge of past incidents, but this incident is shrouded in mystery and conjecture at present.

In view of the US Forces grounding 30 and restricting 60 aircraft in operations, who are in the same time frame of construction, what is the prudent course of action ??

With the case recently of the Royal Tank Regiment NCO's next of kin being awarded damages against the MoD, for in effect conficating his body armour whist preparing for action in Op Tellic and his subsequent death, what price taking all precautions. A very smart legal mind could, and would, if another incident occurs which is proved to be a non combat, non proveable flying incident, may have a case, where will the MoD stand, in view of not having taken all reasonable safety steps.

[Navaleye]

What would be the implications on our operational committments if we grounded all the Ks? Pretty severe I would think?

[Vage Rot]

I seem to remember in the Early 90's, my Sqn Boss, en-route ISK to Gib in a herc (as pax!) had to div into Portugal or Spain when a large crack appeared in the top fuselage at the wing root.

[air pig]

In reply to Naveleye, it would cost Gordon the Prudent a serious amount of money to replace the aircraft in the short term, if you could get hold of them on the open market. The cost of insurance would be astronomical.

In the long term IF the current K fleet is defective, the cost of total replacement is horrendous, wait for other parts of the budget to be slashed or scrapped.

There is no short term replacement. The cardboard aircraft A400 will not be in service until 2010 at least. The first metal has only just been cut for construction. LMAC will be laughing all the way to the bank. Good job the dollar is so weak at the moment, order early now !!!

:E :E :E :E :E :E :E :E

[moggiee]

I must admit that I thought that (as posted by nopax) the RAF C130Ks had all had new wings fitted some time back because of fatigue/corrosion.

[16 blades]

JackoNicko is correct, we do have a real fatigue problem, particularly on the Mk1 fleet. The last Operator's conference I attended saw the IPT tell us that at current consumption rates, we will have run out of FI on the majority of the fleet by 2008, although this was 2 years ago. ISTR they alsostated there has been, historically, no NDT programme aimed at the centre-wing as all eyes in this dept were on the shoulders and armpits.

The other problem is that the current picture of fatigue consumption may not even be accurate, since the fatigue meter is inhibited during the landing phase (ever seen how much the wings flex during a hard tac landing??).

I am not usually on the side of the prying jounalist, but in this case I think it may be necessary. When my mind was, involuntarily, searching for a possible cause in the immediate aftermath of the crash, wing fatigue was at the forefront of my mind, for a number of reasons. It is my guess that the govt will go to any length to prevent a finding in this direction, since it would be extremely politically damaging (Headline: "Herc crash caused by Govt penny-pinching") especially in the run-up to an election.

So, Jacko, you just keep on prying, mate. I really do not want to see a thread on here entitled "Hercules - Still Hittting Back".

16B

ps I apologise for the speculation, but it already appears that the spin and lies have started to waft out of the Big House.

[Grimweasel]

All I want to know is, after flying an awful lot on all the Mk1's in question are they safe?
I have been on them on various sorties over the last twelve years and as has been mentioned they have been used HEAVILY. The RAF have a good tech./service programme but just how many times can a spar bend and rattle before it weakens escp @OLF with a heavy load?
Surely in the interests of preventing more loss of life would it not be prudent to ground the specific frames in question and give them a good going over?
Having read previous reports and knowing the real story one wonders how much of a cover up we are expected to swallow this time. I concur readily with Jacko and 16 Blades that speculation in not fair or wise but there must come a time when in the interests of the wellbeing of all those connected with the fleet something must be done sooner rather than later.
Not fishing or leaking just worried and concerned. Weasel

[FJ2ME]

Here, here.

As a relatively new and inexperienced aviator, who has always being given the impression that safety is paramount in military flying, it beggars belief that the MOD says it is not even contemplating a temporary grounding pending wing box inspection. Surely, the 'fact' that the wing appears to have separated during flight on 179, coupled with an acknowledged problem of fatigue on the K fleet, surely an inspection is justified?

The consequences of wing-box failure, especially if on troop-carrying sorties, doesn't bear thinking about. Moreover, I am sure that legally the MOD wouldn't have a pot to pi$$ in if it came out after another incident that they failed to instigate even the most superficial of examinations. With an election coming up, and the recent controversy over body armour penny-pinching, can the MOD/ Govt afford another set of deaths from bean counting?

[Arkroyal]

The other problem is that the current picture of fatigue consumption may not even be accurate, since the fatigue meter is inhibited during the landing phase (ever seen how much the wings flex during a hard tac landing??).So all the data is incomplete and misleading? Just watching a herc taxy over the dessert would worry me enough, are they disabled then, too?

[LunchMonitor]

Just watching a herc taxy over the dessert would worry me enough,

I can see where this would be a trifle unnerving.

[ORAC]

Better that than a pancake landing....

[Jackonicko]

That's a trifle flippant, chaps!

You'll be talking about piling the flight flan, next.

[Arkroyal]

Only possible, of course, if they didn't get in the soup earlier!

Must lern too spel proply:=

[hobie]

Is it true that the Herc involved in the Iraq incident is 38 years old?

[oldfella]

[QUOTE]As an aside, whatever happened to the speech by GW Bush (on the day we lost 179) in which he said there had been US fatalities? Mid-air?[/QOUTE]

On the same day as the crash there were American casualities in the theatre, not in the same incident. President Bush said something about the crash of tha Hercules then continued to say something along the lines of sorrow felt about the loss of American and British guys that day. This has been misreported several times now in speculation that Americans were involved in the crash. The post from which the quote comes now raises further speculation about a possible mid-air.

Can we stop trying to second guess.

As to the original basis of this thread, I'm sure that the BOI is looking into all aspects of the loss of 179. If there were serious concerns I'm sure that the guys who fly the beasts would be among the first to raise their concerns about fatigue.

[16 blades]

If there were serious concerns I'm sure that the guys who fly the beasts would be among the first to raise their concerns about fatigue.

There may well be, and we are.

16B

[LunchMonitor]

179 was a 1965 aircraft this lists it and its peers last revised as at 5 feb 05
The numbers 13021/13024 refer to the original Usaf serial numbers

65-13021/13044 Lockheed C-130K Hercules
C/N 4169,4182,4188,4195/4196,4198/4201,4203/4207,4210/4214,4216/4220.
For RAF as Hercules C.1 XV176/XV199
13021 (XV176) returned to Lockheed Mar 4, 2000.
13023 (XV178) returned to Lockheed Nov 26, 2000.
13024 (c/n 4195, XV179) crashed near Al Teji, Iraq Jan 30, 2005. 10 onboard killed.
13025 (XV180) crashed at RAF Fairford Mar 24, 1969 when engine went into
reverse thrust during takeoff.
13026 (XV181) to be sold to Austrian AF
13027 (XV182) returned to Lockheed Nov 12, 2000.
13032 (XV187) returned to Lockheed Jan 28, 2001.
13034 (XV189) returned to Lockheed Dec 10, 2000.
13038 (XV193)crashed Glen Tilt, Scotland May 27, 1993 when stalled after cargo drop
13039 (XV194) ran off runway into ditch while landing at Tromso, Norway Sep 12, 1972,
damaged beyond repair.
13040 (XV195) returned to Lockheed Jan 28, 2001.
13043 (XV198) crashed at RAF Colerne, UK Sep 10, 1973 when engine cut during touch and go.


THis info came from here: http://home.att.net/~jbaugher/1965.html

[US Herk]

Received this from one of my sources:


The understanding gained by the RAF of the structural integrity
of its Hercules fleet over nearly 40 years of service is considerable. In particular, the correlation between types of use of the aircraft and the arising of fatigue damage is well known. The RAF and other leading operators around the world and the aircraft Designer (Lockheed Martin) share such information to ensure that all potential structural problems are identified and that any necessary measures are taken in good time. There is probably no better understanding of Hercules structural integrity than that shared among this group of operators and the aircraft Designer. The information that led the USAF to ground a small portion of its fleet was available to the RAF some time ago and has been clearly shown not to apply to the same degree to the different configurations of wings and different usage patterns of the RAF aircraft. Both the centre wings and outer wings of the RAF Hercules C130K aircraft are carefully monitored for fatigue damage and inspections are directed to known problem areas, especially when any new problem is alerted by other operators or by new RAF findings.

The aircraft involved in the tragic accident of 30 January had been fitted with replacement centre wing and outer wings during the 1970s. These replacement wings are to a higher standard of integrity and durability than those affected by the recent USAF groundings. The level of fatigue damage present in these RAF wings was under careful and proper control and there is currently no reason to believe that fatigue contributed to the accident. Nevertheless, the RAF Board of Inquiry will consider all possible causes when correlating the evidence that it collates. The Board has the power to recommend immediate action in respect of any technical conclusions that it begins to reach but has taken no such action to date.

[hobie]

many thanks for that info LM ..... I wonder what the "returned to Lockheed" a/c are destined for? storage/conversion/scrap?

[meub]

hobie

Any of the above. They were some of the buy-back ac from the J purchase, ie. part ex, one careful lady owner, etc. Believe they've been offered as sweeteners on some potential F-16 buys in recent times but not sure if anyone's taken the bait.

[UncleFester]

Hi Guys,
I was the unit test pilot at Rompers Green in the mid 90's and quite a few of the A/C I tested, particularly the older ones, had new centre box sections and new "H" wings. As regarding the ones sent back to Lockheed, these were the oldest on the fleet, ex-tankers, for refurbishment and re-sale.
I did the first trials of the A/D suite, flare and chaff particularly, at Chino and I can assure anyone that the Mk 1's and III's were all examined carefully for cracks etc before any modification was done. As a C130 tanker Captain I can asssure people that wing relieving was taken very seriously indeed to the extent of restricting some of the tanking sorties we were tasked for.
It was and is a great aircraft and still one of the safest around considering the abuse it received. I did over 10,000 hours on it,("pardon"....yes I've got tinnitus!"), and despite all its ancillary problems, usually avionics (e190 radar in particular), would take one anywhere, any time and often did. Miss the flying and crews like hell but not the niff naff and trivia that was becoming more endemic when I left in 2001.

Ray

[ORAC]

The USA is donating 5 x C130Ks to Poland and giving $66M in miltary assistance to cover the cost of renovation and modernization. Presumably the 5 listed above.

In the meantime Marshalls renovated 3 for delivery to Austria (XV181, 291 and 292).

[TEEEJ]

Orac wrote:

"The USA is donating 5 x C130Ks to Poland and giving $66M in miltary assistance to cover the cost of renovation and modernization. Presumably the 5 listed above.

In the meantime Marshalls renovated 3 for delivery to Austria (XV181, 291 and 292)."

You are probably very well aware. Info for those who might not know. Some of the C-130K fleet also ended up with the air forces of Sri Lanka and Mexico.

[Jackonicko]

While it's vital to avoid panic, we should also avoid complacency. After the Chinook saga, I'd also question undue faith in the likely speed and thoroughness of the normal process. It usually works very well, but needs a caution sticker.

US Herk:

You say: "Typical bureaucratic palaver, however, some things can be gleaned:
-They are concerned about fatigue
-The wings were replaced in the '70s."

I'd add that they are so concerned about fatigue that a Squadron Leader on the IPT (Sqn Ldr David Saunders BEng CEng MIMechE, Hercules IPT, Room V012, Palmer Pavilion, ext 4552) said:

"Due to operational demands placed upon the CMk1 fleet ….the cleared fatigue life of these aircraft has nearly been reached” and that the RAF had started a wing swap programme on three aircraft with K-model outer wing sets using RAF assets. The H-model outer wings are LESS affected by high FI consumption rates."

And that a further OLM effort has been launched because:

"- Required to provide more knowledge of operational effects on the structure and a safe life clearance for the Mk1 mini-fleet
- Concerns over the centre wing structure, that we consider is unmonitored, especially on the Mk1 mini-fleet."

The latter would suggest that Uncle Fester's assertion that: "the Mk 1's and III's were all examined carefully for cracks etc before any modification was done" does not mean that the centre wing boxes are being adequately inspected, and would seem to contradict US Herk's anonymous source's assertion that: "Both the centre wings and outer wings of the RAF Hercules C130K aircraft are carefully monitored for fatigue damage and inspections are directed to known problem areas....."

I don't suggest grounding the K fleet until the BOI has finished its business (or until Lockheed have sorted the problem of what went wrong with the USAF aircraft). I don't even suggest grounding the five remaining C1s (although one little bird told me they haven't flown, except on limited (ferry?) sorties in recent days) but I do suggest making the inspection process more frequent and more robust.

Though I'm not an aero engineer, let alone an aerostructures expert or a metallurgist, it strikes me that even today, fatigue is something of a black art, and that totally unforseen problems can still occur even on much newer aircraft than the C-130K (whose structural design dates back to the early 1950s). Witness the way in which solving a Harrier GR7 fatigue problem aft of the rear nozzles shifted the stresses and loads further aft, causing a new fatigue problem there. I seem to recall reading of an aircraft in which replacing fatigue prone outer wing panels with new, more fatigue-resistant units caused new problems in the roots. One wonders whether re-winging Hercs may not have had a similar impact on the centre wing box.

What scares me rigid is that some people may be working quite hard to deflect attention from even the possibility of fatigue because this might focus attention on inadequate funding or on poor programme management in the past.

If fatigue did claim '179, I'm da.mned sure that the crew would have wanted every effort to be concentrated on saving any of their comrades from suffering the same fate, and that saving Hoon's skin, or the skins of some within the DLO, would be low on their list of priorities.

[SALAD DODGER]

What can we gain from this speculation?

Whilst I can understand everyones concern, the fact is that this speculation is hurting the friends and familly of those involved in the recent crash in Iraq.

I am suprised more people havent spoken out. As I am finding this quite disturbing. We havent even had a chance to have funerals for our friends and rumour and gossip are already tainting the air.

You can speculate all you like, but trying to solicit a link with XV179 and anything else can only be done by the BOI. The comments written here will not help, and we owe it to the crew to look after their famillies in this terrible time. If it was your wife reading this after your death how would she feel, who would she blame?

If you need to gossip, please can you give us a couple of weeks or wait until the BOI sits.

Thanks PPRUNERS

[Jackonicko]

1) While I'm naturally concerned about the crew of '179, their friends and families, I'm even more concerned about making sure none of their colleagues join them. I'm sure that families and friends would understand this concern, and would (like 16B) wish to avoid having PPR dominated by a 'Hercules Still Hitting Back' sticky in three years time.

2) The MoD have made the deliberate choice to mount a sustained PR campaign and have aggressively gone out to dismiss any speculation about fatigue when this is clearly a matter of concern to the IPT and to many current crews. Whose interests are best served by suppressing debate?

[SALAD DODGER]

I can understand the frustration at the lack of information, we all feel it. We all want something or someone to blame and we all want to make sure it never happens to anyone else. Most of all we should want to do the right thing.

I simply wanted to point out that in my opinion, the right thing is to serve the intrests of the familly. You will find it hard to find a single person on 47 or 70 Sqn who thinks that this speculative debate is the best way to do it.

No one wants to put lives at risk by flying the K if it is unsafe. I have faith that the RAF would not continue to let us fly if this was the case. Personally I would rather fly in one of our Hercs than any other aircraft in the airforce.

This forum will not prevent anything. If there is a problem, then we will only be able to achieve anything after the BOI.

[Captain Kirk]

Jacko,

One cannot help but detect the air of pursuing a 'scoop'. Despite the misgivings we may air within this forum, we have faith in the competence of our colleagues - the sort of professional individuals that now constitute the BOI. We are also, collectively, unbowed by politics and even less likely to respond to intimidation. I think that you are off the mark, not to say premature, to start a conspiracy theory.

If you really want to do the research, fine, but, a word to the wise, take it outside of PPRuNe if you want to preserve the generally good standing that you currently enjoy.

[Jackonicko]

If I were after a scoop, I'd hardly be asking questions here, where rival journos can so easily read what is posted. Moreover, I suspect that '179's crash has passed its sell by date as a hot news story for the Dailies, though it's of obvious interest from a flight safety point of view, and will continue to be of interest because of the USAF grounding, and in view of the concern expressed by informed folk like the IPT Squadron Leader and by several current aircrew (some from 47/70) who have got in touch. Unless you want to explain how such concerns are groundless, or are already being robustly addressed.

I'm not looking for a conspiracy, but after other incidents I'm cynical enough to believe that the politicians can manipulate events to their own advantage, whether or not they are doing so in this case.

When this subject is written about, surely it's better that those writing about it are as well informed as possible?

[MechGov]

Surely the whole point of this forum is rumour and speculation.
I must confess that I am not overly confident that a BOI would be able, considering the limited ADR capabilities of the C130K, to explain the cause of this tragic accident. It may well have nothing to do with fatique, but it wouldn't hurt to look.

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

Salad Chap is spot on here guys, all this speculation at this time can only enhance the grief of the family and friends who have yet to lay their loved ones to rest.

The time for those in charge to be asked, and pressured into 'fessing up will come.......but now is not the time:(

[Stretchwell]

Anyone who thinks that the BOI won't consider fatigue as a cause or contributing factor must be pretty poorly informed. However, at this stage the BOI obviously has no evidence to ground the K fleet otherwise it would have done so. Of course there is speculation about the very sad demise of XV179 and, more importantly, the loss of the crew and colleagues. If there was any evidence that fatigue was the cause then the Ks would have been grounded immediately.

The BOI will release information as and when they can. In the meantime I'll be taking any rumours with a large bucket of salt. The rumours help no-one, especially not the relatives of those lost.

[US Herk]

Let me first apologise for my part in dragging this discussion toward 179's demise.

I do believe, however, this thread evolved somewhat normally & not unexpectedly in that direction...

One thing is clear - there is much confusion on the state of the wings of the K-fleet in general. Lots of contradictions from all sides - Marshall's, Lockheed, & Folks who were there.

I'm sure the BOI will investigate any/all possibilities & make the correct recommendations. IF fatigue was a factor, they will, in all probability, be able to tell from the wreckage. In fact, it is quite amazing the things they can determine from wreckage.

I'm equally interested in the K-fleet as the E/H-fleet...I hope to see these great birds flying (safely) for years to come!

Having had the great honour to know & fly with a couple of the lads on 179, I'm also very sensitive to the needs of the families. I apologise if I've added to the terrible hurt.:(

Steering this thread back towards the original topic - latest news from Lockheed:

C-130/L-100 WING FATIGUE CRACKING AND SERVICE LIFE CONCERNS
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
86 South Cobb Drive Marietta, GA 30063

14 February 2005

Many C-130 operators are aware the United States Air Force issued a Press Release on Friday, February 11, 2005, regarding C-130 aircraft groundings and flight restrictions due to center wing fatigue cracking concerns. Over the past two years, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics has been providing analytical support and technical expertise to the USAF to assist them in evaluating the center wing service life. Lockheed Martin will continue to provide support to the USAF, and other operators, as requested in the months ahead.

In parallel with the USAF support activities, Lockheed Martin has also been assessingC-130/L-100 service life issues, related to both the center wing and outer wing, for International and Commercial operators. Wing fatigue cracking, wing service life, and aircraft operational usage have been specifically addressed during the 2002, 2003, and 2004 Hercules Operators Conferences (HOCs).

Lockheed Martin intends to issue a Service Bulletin (SB) addressing wing fatigue cracking and service life in the near future. This SB will affect International Military and Commercial C-130/L-100 operators. All analysis efforts regarding wing service life will be evaluated in terms of Equivalent Baseline Hours (EBH). EBH is not the same as aircraft flight hours. Both the actual wing flight hours, which may be different than the aircraft flight hours if the center wing has previously been replaced, and the past aircraft mission usage severity must be considered in order to determine EBH.

The SB will necessarily take a phased approach, where the first phase is determining the EBH of an individual operators C-130 fleet. The need for an operator usage evaluation was emphasized in Lockheed Martin presentations made during the 2003 and 2004 HOCs. Once an operator’s usage is evaluated, their EBH will be used to determine if further actions are required. Lockheed Martin can assist operators in evaluating their aircraft usage and in determining the EBH for their fleet.

The second phase of the SB will define structural inspection requirements beyond the normal inspection program, and the urgency of these inspections, tailored to varying EBH limits. Some aircraft with high EBH levels could require flight restrictions or aircraft grounding until structural inspections can be implemented to determine what remedial action is appropriate.

Lockheed Martin is committed to supporting all of our C-130/L-100 customers in assessing the wing service life issue and recommending prudent and necessary remedial actions to ensure continued safe operations of C-130/L-100 aircraft while minimizing the potential impact on the operator’s fleet. Lockheed Martin looks forward to working together with operators and their Service Centers as usage evaluations are conducted and structural inspection requirements are implemented.

Any questions concerning this letter should be addressed to; [email protected]

[haltonapp]

I do remember being a crew member on the damaged runway trial at Greenham Common in July 1980 (using XV210 my log book tells me). The a/c was fitted with strain gauges on the wings, accelerometers on the external tanks and an extra fatigue meter operative on the ground and some transducers on the LG. It was an opinion of the boffins then that taxying was very stressful on the old girl.
As an aside, the OLM configured VC10 tanker we had on 101 came to the same conclusion, especially the 13-15 knot bounce, a condition we still get on the scarebus I fly in!

[hobie]

Is it policy to use the most modern(youngest?) hardware in todays War situations or does availabilty simply not allow this approach?

[Jackonicko]

Hobie,

Your question is, in essence, two questions.

1) Why are they still using them at the sharp end?

Because there is nothing else!

The six (now five) short bodied C-130K Hercules C1s, augmented by six converted long bodied C-130K Hercules C3As are the only aircraft in the fleet equipped for Special Forces work. The IPT goes as far as to describe this as encompassing:

"AAR Receive only, High/Low Level Para, Air Drop/Resupply, OLF 150' day, 250' night NVG, Rapid Air Land (Tactical Insertion)"

For this the two variants are equipped with:

"Enhanced DAS, RWR/Chaff, DIRCM/Flares, JTIDS, FLIR/LLTV, NVG Compatible, Armoured Cockpit."

(Before anyone gets too upset, the above is quoted directly from the IPT's presentation, available easily on the net).

It is my understanding that the long bodied Hercules is not suitable for short/rough field operation of the type that is routine in Iraq and Afghanistan though I have no idea how different the two versions' take off and landing performance is, nor why. Clarification from an operator would be most welcome. Whatever the reason, this would obviously place an increased burden on the C1s because the C3As are unsuitable for some SOF ops.

2) Why not use the newer Js for tactical work?

In the very earliest days of the C-130J programme I seem to remember that 'the plan' was for the J to replace the Ks in the tactical role, and that replacing the SOF C1s was the reason that five short bodied C-130J Hercules C5s were included in the RAF's order. The Ks would have been retained by 24 and 30 for route flying.

Exactly when or why this plan changed is uncertain.

Was it because the J's two man flight deck was judged less useful for tactical ops?
Was it because the composite props were more vulnerable to damage during rough strip operations (and could not have minor dings blended out)?
Was it because the J's DAS was late, and would not have been available in time?
Was it because role related problems were slow to be solved?
Was it because unrelated problems were slow to be solved, and the decision was taken that the J could only be introduced into the 'route' squadrons in anything approaching a normal timescale?
Was it because the J's initially cleared fatigue life (6,000 ef/h) would have been used up too quickly in the tactical role?
Was it because the short-bodied Js had particular issues that made its use generally problematic, or problematic in the SOF role?
Were these difficulties associated with CofG?
Was it some of the above, all of the above, or none of the above? Again, clarification of these historic issues would be welcome. PMs are always welcome!

But this 'J Unsuitability' may be changing. Some open, PUBLISHED sources suggest that the OEU is, in essence, a SOF C-130J cadre, and that one J (ZH888) is already configured (to some greater or lesser extent) for the SOF/tactical role.

[Navaleye]

There is an article (in the standard I think) quoting a Sqn Ldr Saunders as saying the the older Hercs are at the end of their lives and need to be replaced urgently. That's not a direct quote but the jist of what he was saying. Who is he BTW?

[BEagle]

That'll be this article:

Warning over Hercules aircraft in 2002
By Andrew Gilligan, Evening Standard
14 February 2005

A senior RAF officer warned more than two years ago that Hercules aircraft like the one which crashed in Iraq last month - killing 10 - were at risk of "unexpected severe damage" from "centre wing cracks".

Squadron Leader David Saunders said that the planes' fatigue life had "nearly been reached," according to official RAF documents posted on the manufacturer's website-Sqn Ldr Saunders, involved in engineering support for Britain's Hercules fleet, spoke of his " concerns" about the "unmonitored" wing cracking problem as long ago as October 2002, the documents reveal. He said the cracks "could ground the fleet".

The revelations come as metal fatigue emerges as a possible cause of the Hercules crash north-west of Baghdad two weeks ago.

Investigators say the aircraft's right wing appears to have snapped off. Nine airmen and a soldier died in Britain's single worst loss of life in Iraq.

The US Air Force last week grounded 30 of its oldest C130-E Hercules aircraft because of centre wing cracks, and put 60 more C130-H planes under flight restrictions.

But the MoD insisted on Saturday that there was no danger with any British Hercules, which could continue to fly as normal - a claim which Sqn Ldr Saunders's presentation appears to question.

His comments come from two presentations he gave to the annual Hercules Operators' Conferences in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2002 and 2003. The slides from the presentations are posted on the Lockheed Martin Hercules website, lmsupport.com.

The aircraft that crashed last month, XV179, was one of Britain's six "Mark 1" Hercules, the oldest in RAF service. It first entered RAF service in 1967. In his 2002 presentation, Sqn Ldr Saunders expressed concern about these six Mark 1 aircraft "due to the operational demands placed on the Mark 1 fleet".

Even though they are nearly 40 years old, the Mark 1s have been heavily used for tactical battlefield operations in every British campaign since the Falklands. They are used for dropping troops and work closely with the SAS.

Sqn Ldr Saunders also revealed that XV179 was one of three aircraft which was given new outer wings in 2002 because of its age. The centre wing section, where there was a potential risk of cracks, was not replaced, however.

An MoD spokesman insisted at the weekend that Britain's Hercules were "much younger" and "very different" from the American aircraft which have been grounded or restricted. "We use the C130-K primarily for strategic f lying, the transportation of equipment and personnel, which puts less strain on the aircraft," the spokesman said.

But air experts disputed this. "I've been surprised that MoD spokesmen have been giving the impression that the Hercules has no fatigue issues," said Jon Lake, a specialist aviation writer.

"Britain's Mark 1 Hercules entered service only five years after the US aircraft and they are essentially the same as the 60 US aircraft which have been put on restricted duties. The only difference is that the US ones are called C130-H and ours are called C130-K."

[Navaleye]

I sure hope Mr Gilligan has "sexed up" this story, because if it's true it should set some alarm bells ringing.

[BEagle]

The presentation slides in question can be found at: https://www.lmsupport.com/ams/news/HOCFiles/pps15.pdf

Due to the graphics, it's quite a long download as it's a 2.85 Mb .pdf .

And yes, he does say: "Due to operational demands placed
upon the CMk1 fleet (6 ac)…the cleared fatigue life of these
aircraft has nearly been reached."

[hobie]

Many thanks for that info "J" and "B" .......

I find it disturbing that guys are sent out to fight a War (or Fight Fires) in craft that are 40 to 50 years old ......

[LunchMonitor]

40 years isnt old, the B52 is going to be 80 years old before it retires from service. 40 years means you've just about ironed out all the teething problems and started to reinvent some new ones! ;)

[hobie]

40 years isn't old, the B52 is going to be 80 years old before it retires from service. 40 years means you've just about ironed out all the teething problems and started to reinvent some new ones!
Can't argue with you "LM" on the B52 ..... it does seem to go on for ever ..... but I do feel the "Herc" can be subjected to far more "Agressive" flying, dictated by Use/location, largely because it needs to operate in hostile territories (with all the associated stresses and strains) ..... the 52's depart, .... a long but leasurely cruise .... off-load and then go home for supper, to a nice friendly Base, far from conflict.

:ok:

[Arkroyal]

From Gilligan's article, this leaps out:An MoD spokesman insisted at the weekend that .......... "We use the C130-K primarily for strategic flying, the transportation of equipment and personnel, which puts less strain on the aircraft," the spokesman said. This bare-faced fib needs to be investigated and its reasons examined. I wonder who the spokesman was?

[phutbang]

Probably a purple civie…I wonder what Sqn Ldr Saunders take on this is?

[BEagle]

"We use the C130-K primarily for strategic flying....."

Why is a tactical transport a/c 'primarily' used for strategic flying? Is it because the Rental Air Force doesn't have sufficient 'strategic' aircraft to support Trust-me-Tone's adventurism? Or because the Hercs are so worn out that they can only be used for strategic purposes?

Was that spokesman just spouting spin and bull$hit?

Or was it a combination of all of the above?

I smell something fishy. It wouldn't have taken long to find evidence of hostile fire or an IED in the recent tragedy if there had been any to find, surely?

[US Herk]

Is it because the Rental Air Force doesn't have sufficient 'strategic' aircraft to support

Speaking of that, what will be 99 SQN's fate? The lease on their planes is up in the next 18mo or so, is it not?

If they've optioned to purchase already, I've not heard, but don't follow the strat scene at all...

But back when the deal was originally struck & 99 SQN proved the value of the C17 during Saif Sarhia '00, I stated then that the RAF would buy them at the end of their lease...

...any updates?

[skaterboi]

"We use the C130-K primarily for strategic flying....."

That is the biggest crock of sh*te I've ever heard.

As a serving K aircrew I am disgusted with this lie. We average 2-3 routes a month at best but the tac program is full almost every day, both day and night. Granted we're not in many theatres right now but the quote could not be further from the truth :mad:

[scroggs]

Speaking of that, what will be 99 SQN's fate? The lease on their planes is up in the next 18mo or so, is it not? If they've optioned to purchase already, I've not heard, but don't follow the strat scene at all...

I believe it was in the papers the other day that the MoD had elected to buy the four leased aircraft, plus one other, and were negotiating options on some more. I'm sure others will have more detail.

[brain fade]

I met a chap at the location where the ex RAF Herks are stored by Lockheed Martin. Plainly these will be the most tired of all since they have been selected for retirement before their fellows (off to Poland next I think). There were also ex Aussie Herks there. The chap said they RAAF ones were in terrific nick and they were pleased to have them. By contrast the words he chose to describe the ex RAF ones would be censored here. These a/c have been USED!

[The Gorilla]

The TAC prog was always full in my short time on hercs. I know that they were thrashed to bits then and I can't see it being any different now, in fact I should think more so.

I do remember the J is coming attitude in the early 90's where by very little was done to the aging fleet.

I have flown them with pulled rivets, fractured longerons and Captains who lied about how much G they pulled!

You can keep them going providing you spend the money, of course, we don't have the money to spend!!

:ok:

[Arkroyal]

we don't have the money to spend!!We damned well do, but Tone would rather waste it on other things :yuk:

[FJJP]

I would be interested to read the BoI 24 hour signal...

[BEagle]

Still nothing more?

Interesting to note the following from http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/33349.html

"The Herald understands that civilian air accident inspectors drafted in to help with the RAF investigation are working on the theory that metal fatigue may have been responsible for a wing snapping off in flight on the aircraft lost near Baghdad."

[Navaleye]

OK, back to a question I asked earlier; what happens IF (a) Metal fatigue is proven and (b) the older Hercs are suddenly grounded. It takes 2 years to build one and losing half the fleet will have a big impact on just about everything we do. I'm not sure there is a plan B.

[Jackonicko]

It depends whether such a grounding was a blanket grounding affecting all 25 surviving 'Heritage Herks' or if it just grounded the C1 Mini Fleet.

If it were all C-130Ks, we'd be in shtuck, because finding 26 low-houred Classic C-130s second hand would be a challenge.

If it were just the C1 Mini Fleet, then that would remove half of the SOF configured RAF Hercs (there are six long-bodied C3As with: "Enhanced DAS, RWR/Chaff, DIRCM/Flares, JTIDS, FLIR/LLTV, NVG Compatible, Armoured Cockpit.")

But this might still have a major impact on capability because it is my understanding that the long bodied Hercules is not suitable for short/rough field operation (of the type that is routine in Iraq and Afghanistan).

I have no idea how different the two versions' take off and landing performance is, nor why. Clarification would be most welcome.

I'm not sure as to why they can't use the newer Js for tactical work, especially since one J (ZH888) is reportedly already configured (to some greater or lesser extent) for the SOF/tactical role. If Js could replace the Ks in the tactical role, recent budgetary events in the US might suggest that Lockheed will be eager to price the J especially competitively, if it is to keep the line open.

In the very earliest days of the C-130J programme I seem to remember that 'the plan' was for the J to replace the Ks in the tactical role, and that replacing the SOF C1s was the reason that five short bodied C-130J Hercules C5s were included in the RAF's order. The Ks were to have been retained by 24 and 30 for route flying.

Exactly when or why this plan changed is uncertain.

Was it because the J's two man flight deck was judged less useful for tactical ops?
Was it because the composite props were more vulnerable to damage during rough strip operations (and could not have minor dings blended out)?
Was it because the J's DAS was late, and would not have been available in time?
Was it because role related problems were slow to be solved?
Was it because unrelated problems were slow to be solved, and the decision was taken that the J could only be introduced into the 'route' squadrons in anything approaching a normal timescale?
Was it because the J's initially cleared fatigue life (6,000 ef/h) would have been used up too quickly in the tactical role?
Was it because the short-bodied Js had particular issues that made its use generally problematic, or problematic in the SOF role?
Were these difficulties associated with CofG?
Was it some of the above, all of the above, or none of the above?

Clarification of these historic issues would be MOST welcome.

[pr00ne]

Jackonicko,

"five short bodied C-130J Hercules C5s were included in the RAF's order. The Ks were to have been retained by 24 and 30 for route flying."

The order was for 15 long and 10 short, not 5 C5's. Initially they were to be cleared for route flying with 24 and 30.

I think QinetiQ have a lot to do with the answers to the many questions you pose.........................

[Jackonicko]

Air Safety Week, he say:

Hercules Crash In Baghdad Points To Metal Fatigue In C130's Wing Center

"Whirl-Mode" Phenomenon May Also Be At Play

When a Royal Air Force (RAF) Hercules crashed about 19 miles northwest of Baghdad on Jan. 30, the natural assumption was that it had been brought down by enemy action. The brass weren't so sure because it had spun down from an altitude that should have been above the range of a shoulder-fired missile. An opportunistic insurgent group released via al Jazeera a hastily cobbled-together video of flaming wreckage and a non-MANPADS (man-portable air defense system) missile being fired.

But that fraud quickly fizzled and the mystery deepened. Had a sapper or insurgent managed to place a device aboard? It seemed unlikely given where the aircraft had been and the security there. The inflight "explosion" had torn the right wing off near the root at medium altitude in the cruise, the right wing being found some considerable distance from the main wreckage. A senior RAF spokesman said, "sabotage is a distinct possibility but even though metal fatigue is another option, it's considered much less likely."

Less than two weeks later, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) announced that it was grounding 30 of its C130Es and placing another 60 C130Hs on restricted flight status. Some of the grounded aircraft were operating in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. The USAF's Air Mobility Command (AMC) had been monitoring cracks in the planes' wing box structure since 2001, but evidently the grounding decision hadn't been premeditated -- but was comparatively sudden. Inspections of the aircraft in the past four years have revealed that cracks "were greater in number and severity than originally expected," the AMC spokesman at Robins Air Force Base, Lt. Dustin Hart, said. Replacing the older planes with new J models is "one of the options," Hart said. Accordingly, on Feb. 10, Gen. John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, told U.S. senators the service was rethinking its plan to end purchases of C130Js, and he dismissed criticism of their performance, according to Reuters news service. The Pentagon has admitted that two other C130 crashes had been attributed to metal fatigue.

Stuff Of Legends Cracking

Air forces the world over would find it hard to do without the workhorse C130. Its presence in war zones and on humanitarian relief missions is stuff of legends. But the immediate reflexive response from the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) was that RAF C130s would not be grounded, as they are similar "but not identical" models. The RAF C130K is indeed very similar to the E model, yet the distinctions have more to do with perceptions of fatigue as related to age than reality, according to some ex-RAF pilots. The RAF's C130K, they say, is nothing more than a 1968-70 E model but with Dash 15 engines (as fitted to the later H model). Supposedly, the center wing-boxes are fabricated from the same type and strength of aluminum (as the C130E). The "K" model only designated UK specified avionics, i.e., it wasn't a bona fide Lockheed model designation.

Unlike the C130E, the UK's K model had no explosion suppressant foam in its tanks (which helps limit internal wing flexing to some extent). Most of the older RAF C130s were given new center-sections in the mid 70s to mid 80s at Marshalls of Cambridge, and the outer wings were rebuilt with new planks top and bottom. This was done specifically to address the fatigue problems with the older type wing. However, it has been the fatigue spectrum accumulated since the mid 80s that has aged the RAF fleet inordinately, particularly over the last five years. Over that same period, USAF Depot Level Maintenance revisit time was extended from a three-year cycle to a five-year cycle. Each airframe would take four to six months to refurbish. It was mostly at these teardowns that the picture of cumulative fatigue damage was realized.

Refocusing On The Metal

UK investigators are now focusing on metal fatigue because no evidence has been found of enemy action. An MoD source said: "It's hard to believe that there might be a structural failure after all the close monitoring we do, but there is a history of surprises about metal fatigue." British investigators are now examining evidence from a U.S. crash in 2002 in which metal fatigue caused a wing to break off in mid-air. The UK MoD has now taken the highly unusual step of calling in the civilian Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) to help find the cause of the crash of its 1965-built C130, number XV179, one of the six oldest in RAF service. In a Feb. 12 release, the RAF emphasized that the C130 "has an excellent safety record" and that its Hercules Fleet is "routinely and continuously monitored for metal fatigue." An MoD spokesman said that the investigation had reached no conclusions and that "if the president of the board of inquiry had had any concerns, he would have already grounded the fleet. ... If the U.S. thought there was a problem, they would have informed us."

That last statement may have creased a few brows. Nevertheless, if the wing collapse was to be verified, at least 25 older RAF C130s would have to be grounded. That would leave the RAF with very little by way of strategic airlift assets, apart from a few unreliable C130Js and their four leased C-17 Globemasters. It is no wonder that UK MoD is in denial. Putting all your eggs in one basket is a phrase that comes to mind. The A400M next generation transport is still many years off.

Fatigue Should Have Come as No Surprise

No one should be surprised by the specter of metal fatigue when it comes to the C130. Recall that the Canadians grounded their C130s two years ago for cracks in spars joining the wings to the fuselage. The Australian Aircraft Research Laboratory (ARL) had to develop boron fiber patches to fix fatigue in stringers and stress corrosion in risers in the Royal Australian Air Force's (RAAF) C130E models (many of those now being operated by the Pakistani Airforce after being traded in on the J model).

The RAF has been using its C130s in a number of different fatigue profiles. The RAF's Special Forces infiltration birds do the NVG (night vision goggles) ground-hugging profiles -- and that's more than a little different fatigue-wise to Strategic Logistic route flying or tactical troop transport roles. In 2002, the C130 International Project Team (IPT) said that: "Due to operational demands placed upon the RAF's CMk1 fleet ... the cleared fatigue life of these aircraft has nearly been reached," and revealed that the RAF had started a wing swap program on three aircraft (XV179 -- the accident aircraft herein discussed -- as well as XV196, and XV295) with K-model outer wing sets using H-model outer wings that were claimed to be "less affected by high FI (fatigue index) consumption rates."

The fleet leader was then said to have amassed 29,300 flying hours, when the C-130K Fuselage Fatigue Test Programme (that was due to run from Feb. 3 to Feb. 6) was expected to clear the C-130K fuselage for 10,000 flight cycles, equivalent to 30,000 flying hours (with a further 9,000 hour option). Those "new" outer wings are assumed to be RAF assets -- presumably taken from H-winged C1 and C3 aircraft withdrawn from use when the Js entered service (but may well have been E-model). They were looking to bridge the gap to the A400M transport's introduction in 2010 by squeezing more service from the C1 batch. They conceded at that time that any unforeseen arisings, "such as centre wing cracks," could ground the fleet. The MoD representative (Squadron Leader Saunders) admitted that the C130K was derived from the E model and that the main concern was the unmonitored nature of their center wing structure, particularly in the Special Forces support fleet (the Mk 1 mini-fleet). All attention had hitherto been on "the wing's shoulders and armpits." The RAF's IPT presentation slides are on the Lockheed Martin Web site at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/4157.pdf and .../4156.pdf

Monitoring and predicting is a form of passive observation. It's neither reactive nor pro-active unless you have a contingency plan and a plan for activating that plan. It now looks like the UK MoD planners are center-stage -- and need some cue-prompting on their lines.

Academically A Dark Black Art

In a Portsmouth University Paper (Report number: A405493, October 2000) entitled, "The Effects of LCF Loadings on HCF Crack Growth," the authors write:

"... the increased use of aging aircraft has highlighted the limitations in the current technical and fundamental understanding of the fatigue integrity of engineering components. There is at present insufficient guidance to enable an engineer to account for the reduced high cycle fatigue (HCF) life consequent upon various forms and amounts of damage, such as low cycle fatigue (LCF)."

It also stated that:

"... the US Secretary for Defence has declared: 'HCF is the number one readiness issue in the USAF.' It is known for example that galling and fretting can reduce the HCF strength of titanium alloys by 80 and 60% respectively. The two major concerns however are FOD (foreign object damage) and the complexity of the interactions between LCF and HCF." And, "The second technical challenge is to incorporate non-destructive evaluation as an element of fatigue management. The concern here will always be to characterize the largest defect that is not detected in large structures and complex systems where inspectability may be difficult." (Emphasis added)

This is the academic admission that fatigue management (and crack growth propagation) is an inexact science -- and that significant defects may remain hidden. It is indeed a dark black art, and more akin to necromancy than sorcery. You get to pick over the debris of your mistaken assumptions. Even though aircraft carry fatigue meters, and the positive and negative g spectrums ticking into those counting accelerometers can be interpreted by engineers to construct an FI (fatigue index), there are many intangibles. For instance, the fatigue meter is inhibited out of the picture on touchdown, so wing flexures in tactical hard landings just aren't factored in. The pilots just record the number of cycles (landings and takeoffs) and their fuel loads, and they're assumed to all be average "arrivals." But obviously, many are not.

The most significant factor is the amount of fuel being carried in outer wing tanks at any particular time because of stress relief upon the wing root. The fatigue meter has no way of recording that (or fuel taken onboard inflight), nor will a pilot or flight engineer always manage his fuel feed in the same way. This was a significant consideration for aerial fire-fighting C130s. They'd have little fuel in their wings and instantaneous water-load drops, plus rapid onset high-g pull-ups in thermal currents and turbulence, would all place large bending moments on wing-roots. Little wonder that a wing eventually fell off, even though it was an early A model Herc. Some C130s carry 130-gallon under-wing pylon tanks -- but only some of the time, another intangible.

MORE....

It is known that the RAF\'s Hercules frequently carried operational war overloads. Operations over and above the 175,000-lb. design weight, whether necessary or not, carry a non-linear penalty. Another intangible is the extent of hidden corrosion and cracking. That is the reference above to "inspectability." In the 1998 salvage of "King 56," a C130 downed off the U.S. West Coast by a four-engine flameout due to fuel mismanagement, the investigating board was surprised at some revelations:

"...fleet-wide evidence suggests fuselage tanks are not being regularly drained of water, potentially leading to tank corrosion. The discovery of a coating of Corrosion Preventative Compound (CPC) in one tank is evidence of a nonstandard procedure resulting from unanticipated corrosion."

The bottom line is that workhorses do get thrashed in the field. Despite engineers\' best efforts, the actual condition of an airplane deployed into a remote theatre of operations may not be known until its next major overhaul. At that stage, any significant structural damage can be repaired, but who\'s to know just when it happened? Aircraft might fly in an unrecognizably unairworthy state for months at a time. Cracks don\'t propagate linearly in time or dimension. Military workhorses aren\'t subject to the same strict scrutiny as airliners (hopefully) are. Inspections in the field cannot hope to be as thorough as they might be at home-plate, notwithstanding that all the fluids are checked and topped off, and visually the beast appears serviceable -- and runs like a clock. No amount of optimistic monitoring can get things right when the first wing falls off ("Uh oh, we got that wrong"). Is this what we might hear when the actual fate of airframe XV179 is revealed?

Monitoring versus Action

No one\'s saying that the RAF is unconcerned. There is an OLM (Operational Loads Measurement) exercise under way and there were inspections scheduled at 6FI increments. It is recognized that an air force cannot ground an aircraft type each time there is an accident. However, a wing falling off, plus the history, plus the USAF action has raised more than a red flag -- it is now a veritable bunting of crimson pennants. Perhaps the RAF C130 fatigue spectrum has changed significantly. Center-section and rainbow fittings (wing joint attachment) may need more regular and robust checking. Perhaps variable-rate strain- gages, parameter transducers and data acquisition units should be fitted. Anti-corrosion aerosols (such as ACF-50) may need to be applied more liberally. The technology is available.

The inexact science of tracking, monitoring and detecting an incipient failure-mode can be fatiguing, particularly in the last quarter of an airframe\'s life. That\'s why eventually the MMH/FH (maintenance man-hours per flight hour) can eventually dictate an aircraft\'s use-by date. Fatigue life consumption needs to be managed. Early trends may indicate positive hardware fixes and operating niceties that will extend fatigue life and make an airplane safer ("a gusset here and a gusset there" approach, as well as carbon/epoxy prepreg reinforcement). Deterministic fatigue life prediction methods and software tools are available.

The Whirling Dervish

But apart from undetected wing component cracking, what else might cause wing separation? Did re-winging the outer wings with stronger units shift the stresses and strains farther inboard to the center wing box? Did it change the natural bending harmonic of the wings? To explain, each wing has a natural frequency at which it will resonate. If you damage a glass-fiber sail-plane\'s main spar, the glass-fiber man can tell that just by excitating the wing-tip and noting whether it still resonates span-wise at its natural harmonic. But why is the harmonic important? Ever heard of the "whirl-mode" phenomenon that destroyed two early L-188 Electras (N9705C and N121US) before Lockheed wised up to it? Whirl mode is a divergent oscillation of an engine and its mount about an axis parallel with the powerplant\'s static thrustline. It occurs because of the positive feedback loop generated when a large, sudden gyroscopic moment is applied to an engine-mount structure that is insufficiently stiff.

The feedback loop occurs because a gyroscopic moment (produced by a pitch or yaw velocity) is applied in a plane that is 90 degrees to the excitation angular velocity. If the excitation mode couples with a pliant engine-mount or wing resonant frequency, the prop-end of the powerplant can begin to whirl around the static prop centerline, describing a cone of ever-increasing base diameter. The result, if the mode is not checked, is a wildly wobbling gyroscope that eventually begins to transmit its violent motion to a natural outlet: the wing. Think of what happens if you push a spinning top -- it will wobble erratically.

For example, suppose that an aircraft has an engine mounting structure with insufficient STIFFNESS (as differentiated from strength). Suppose that aircraft encounters a violent gust that causes it to pitch-up rapidly. If the prop rotation is clockwise, the prop gyro-moment would try to bend the engine mount structure to the right. If the mount was sufficiently flexible, it would deflect (yaw) rapidly to the right, which would generate an upward gyroscopic moment on the engine mount. The flexible mount deflects upward, causing a yaw-left moment. The 90 degrees-out-of-phase excitation continues, and if these excitations and deflections occur at the natural frequency (or harmonic) of the engine/mount system, the deflections can develop into a whirling deflection of the engine structure of increasing amplitude -- until something breaks.

When you consider the engine mount in the C130 context, you are also including the wing (and possibly one with changed frequency response characteristics because of concealed cracking and outer panel beef-ups). That was the Electra problem -- its wing was "flutter" reacting with the outboard engines. What the investigators found, after the second crash, was that the engine mounts weren\'t strong enough to dampen the whirl mode that originated in the outboard engine nacelles. The oscillation transmitted to the wings caused severe up-and-down vibration, which matched the wing\'s harmonic and so the wing-flutter grew in amplitude until a wing tore off. Lockheed had to beef up that wing and the engine mounts (with diagonal braces). The C130 engines and the Allisons of the Electra are almost identical. Whirl-mode can be hard to detect. According to Don Keller of NASA Langley: "Some flutter modes are elusive. You can\'t predict them until they happen."

In Another Whirl

In 1999, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) submitted a petition to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to have the cause of a Dec. 28, 1991, crash of a Beech 1900C reclassified as a whirl-mode breakup. N811BE of Business Express crashed off Rhode Island (NTSB NYC92FA053) and the NTSB had called it a loss of control/disorientation accident -- despite one wing being found far from the main wreckage. Professor R.O. Stearman of the University of Texas later carried out a signal analysis of the CVR (cockpit voice recorder) and identified the structural acoustic signals of whirl-mode and the ensuing aircraft breakup. Evaluation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) SDR (Service Difficulty Report) data revealed that six engine truss designs had been implemented in response to truss cracking over the 10-year history of the aircraft.

One commuter airline documented over 70 cases of cracked trusses, some detailing complete separation of truss tubes. The accident airline had 16 of these aircraft, all three years old or less. Even though airlines were encouraged to inspect the critical areas as frequently as every 100 hours, in two cases up to eight cracks were discovered in a single truss between inspections. The FAA Principal Aviation Safety Inspector for Airworthiness expressed his concerns about this matter in a November 1989 memorandum. Prior to the accident, a vehicle had struck N811BE (and the engine damaged) in 1987 (NYC87LA117). For Stearman\'s Report see http://www.acoustics.org/press/133rd/2psa1.html

A Postulate Worth Positing?

So, could this C130 outer wing panel re-work program and/or center-section cracking have induced an aeroelastic instability of the whirl-mode variety? Lockheed engineers can check. But nevertheless, it is worth asking the question as a prompt. Flutter of any kind is an alarming oscillatory phenomenon that feeds upon itself and usually, like American Airlines [AMR] Flight 587 (A300-600 pilot induced oscillation), quickly ends in self-destruction (ASW, Jan. 31). First time around on both the Braniff Electra crash and the Beech 1900C\'s, the investigators overlooked the whirl-mode phenomenon. As Theodore Karman, the famous aerodynamicist said: "Some fear flutter because they do not understand it. And some fear it -- because they do."

An authoritative source, found at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-130.htm, says: "A wing modification to correct fatigue and corrosion on USAF\'s force of C-130Es has extended the life of the aircraft well into the next century."

That would now appear to be an "inoperative" statement.


Some-one\'s been PPRuNing....?

[Navaleye]

Good post Jacko. What's the betting the MoD will read this the wrong way and take the wrong course of action or no action.

[LunchMonitor]

a few unreliable C130Js

Is this your view Jacko? or is it quoted?

If it is yours what do you base it on?

[500days2do]

The silence is deafening....tonights sorties will be a bundle of laughs...

500days2many...

[Jackonicko]

LM,

Sorry if it wasn't clear. That whole post is what I was sent by a mate, direct from Air Safety Week, so the quote: 'a few unreliable C130Js' is theirs, not mine.

A 'few' is clearly inaccurate, but 'unreliable C-130Js' doesn't seem too far from reality, whatever the causes of the type's poor availability.

[Lockstock]

Jacko,

Unreliability and unavailability are 2 different matters. An aircraft can be unavailable due to a poor spares system, lack of maintainers, heavy tasking on ops, or a variety of reasons. It does not mean it is unreliable.

Do you have facts and figures to back up your statement?

[StopStart]

Sorry Jacko, at the risk of taking this thread down a well worn Pprune path again but I have to agree with LockStock. I'd suggest you're knocking an aircraft you know little about. I'd be thrilled to know exactly how these aircraft are "unreliable"? We're short of them, certainly, but that's mainly because the bullk of the fleet is detached on Ops.

:mad:

[Paul Wilson]

Jackonicko wrote:

That whole post is what I was sent by a mate, direct from Air Safety Week, so the quote: 'a few unreliable C130Js' is theirs, not mine.

Don't shoot the messenger, he didn't write it.

[The Gorilla]

No airframe type has a 100 % reliability; therefore there must be some unreliability in all of them. Just how unreliable a certain type becomes is subjective! Since I was at LYN when the J models were being forced upon the RAF nothing less than 100 % would be acceptable to me, but others might consider 80% to be good.

Having stated the obvious, not even the luvvly-jubbly J's will be able to cope with K model tasking and J model tasking together. But I have no doubt some people on here will say they can!!! Jacko was merely reposting somebody else’s work!

Those who know me are aware of my intense dislike for the MOD, both civil and military. In terms of corruption and ineptitude it is second only to the CSA! I suspect they already know the truth in Whitehall. But I also have no doubt that they would willingly sacrifice lives whilst in denial. A trail of blame can never be allowed to go towards the MOD. It's a part of the military machine I am afraid, ask the redcap and Chinook families, because they know all about it.

[Grimweasel]

Thourgh post there Jacko. Very intersting too. Some worrying thoughts too esp. for those still flying on them.
I must say that the J is an excellent aircraft that performs much better operationally then the K for many reasons that we can't go into here. Most of the bad press is attributed to 'sour' Navs and Eng's who are no longer required on that a/c type! Unless you have operated on/with the J for any length of time then I feel people have no right in commenting on its capabilities!

After all this I would choose to fly J than K on every occasion!

[propulike]

Meanwhile, back on topic, I sincerely hope that metal fatigue is not a factor in the crash. If it is then I REALLY hope that the Board will find as such. Asking CAA metallurgists for specialist help doesn't look to me as though anyone is attempting to cover something up and the usual silence until the FACTS are known is just that - usual.

If you don't trust the engineers to have checked the remaining aircraft the answer is simple. Either don't get on or invite them to come with you!

[BEagle]

And take Buff Hoon along for the ride as well.......

Jacko, your quote included the sentence"....UK investigators are now focusing on metal fatigue because no evidence has been found of enemy action."

Has that been officially stated somewhere?

[Jackonicko]

BEagle,

No. As far as I'm aware there has been absolutely no public comment on causal factors whatsoever.

Stoppers and Lockers,

I admit it. I did say:

"..... but 'unreliable C-130Js' doesn't seem too far from reality, whatever the causes of the type's poor availability."

I'm sorry. I mean unavailable, I guess, not unreliable, though it's a bit of an academic point, isn't it? The shortage of serviceable aircraft may not be indicative of unreliability, though it was my understanding that both engines and some LRUs had proved to have a much higher failure rate than had been predicted, partly accounting for the inadequate spares buy. Doesn't a high failure rate indicate unreliability?

I'm quite prepared to believe that the J is (now) the dog's doodads (Stoppers and Grimweasel's enthusiasm for the aircraft is clearly genuine and compelling). But if the J is 'all that', why can't they just replace these knackered old C1s with C5s upgraded to SOF standards?

Why can't you use the newer Js for tactical work, especially since one J (ZH888) is reportedly already configured (to some greater or lesser extent) for the SOF/tactical role.

In the early days of the C-130J programme wasn't the J going to replace the Ks in the tactical role? Wasn't that the whole reason that the short bodied C-130J Hercules C5s was included in the RAF's order at all?

Js should be available pretty cheaply, since recent budgetary events in the US would seem to suggest that Lockheed will probably need to replace USAF 'slots', if it is to keep the line open.

So why not?

Is the J's two man flight deck less useful (or even totally unsuitable) for tactical ops and especially for SOF?
The USMC always said that the composite props were more vulnerable to damage during rough strip operations (and that they could not have minor dings blended out)? Is this affecting RAF use of the type, too?
Is the J's DAS still not up to it?
Are there some role related problems that haven't been discussed?
Is it because the short-bodied Js have CofG or other issues that make its use generally problematic, or problematic in the SOF role?
Is it because the J could only be introduced into the 'route' squadrons in anything approaching a normal timescale?
Is it because the J's initially cleared fatigue life (6,000 ef/h) would have been used up too quickly in the tactical role?

Clarification of these issues would be MOST welcome.

[phutbang]

Jacko
Military workhorses aren't subject to the same strict scrutiny as airliners (hopefully) are
Can you (or your mate) quantify this statement this at all?

[Good Mickey]

Jackoffnickov,

I'm fairly sure that the answers to all your questions have already been posted on the numerous K vs J threads. The general theme being that the J is more than up to the job, however, to supplement the fleet with a mini fleet of Js would be ridiculously expensive. If I were a betting man, I would put money on a mixed fleet (LRDIC comprising of Ks, Js, C17s) until the A400M comes online - don't hold yer breath!!

GM

[Jackonicko]

Phutbang,

I can't quantify the statement, or justify it, and nor can the person who sent it to me. That has to be down to Air Safety Week, I guess.

It's not a statement I'd be prepared to defend, since I personally believe that the commercial constraints facing civil operators, higher utilisation, and engineering practises may make some civil aeroplanes less subject to scrutiny, and less safe than RAF ones, rather than more safe, and better scrutinised.

[BEagle]

Please don't turn this thread into yet another K vs. J internecine bitch fight....

Notwithstanding the actual utilisation and availability rates of the C-130, the questions to which answers need to be given are:

1. What caused the recent accident.
2. Will the cause have fleetwide implications?
3. If the answer to 2 is yes, what will be the solution?

[Good Mickey]

Hey Beegs,

yer must have been up all night thinking of those questions!! Inspired.

GM

[hobie]

internecine

( P ) Pronunciation Key (ntr-nsn, -n, -nsn)
adj.
Of or relating to struggle within a nation, organization, or group.
Mutually destructive; ruinous or fatal to both sides.
Characterized by bloodshed or carnage.

There is no doubt about it ..... the choice of words is becoming more and more challenging

http://www.yorkshirekoi.co.uk/g/clapping.gif

[oldfella]

This started as USAF aircraft grounding then went on to possibilities of crash cause and has now gone the way of most Herc threads - K/J - mine is bigger, better, faster etc etc than yours.

As to CAA specialists being called in, perhaps the BOI is just being thorough. If the cause is not immediately apparent thay have to rule out possible causes. That means calling on the expertise of the butcher, baker, candlestick maker ir required. It doesn't mean that they think those areas caused the crash. Only speculation, by us and the Press, ends up with things then being mentioned as fact.

[Deaf]

Comment re fatigue is that the nice graphs you see are about as relevant as those in gobal warning. A real loading/cycles to failure graph looks like a shotgun pattern and it's worse for a expensive complex structure like an airframe beause you can't test cycle a statistically significant number of airframes

Thus life limits from cycling a test airframe are hrs/5.

Not so good if the a/c can't readily be replaced and there is a war where ground supply lines are not secure.

[FJJP]

It's not unusual to bring in outside experts. I did a Canberra BoI some years ago and called in a Farnborough engineer/investigator. He listened to the pilot's story and pinpointed the duff component within an hour. Saved us much brain bashing, that did...

[US Herk]

Is the J's two man flight deck less useful (or even totally unsuitable) for tactical ops and especially for SOF?
The USMC always said that the composite props were more vulnerable to damage during rough strip operations (and that they could not have minor dings blended out)? Is this affecting RAF use of the type, too?
Is the J's DAS still not up to it?
Are there some role related problems that haven't been discussed?
Is it because the short-bodied Js have CofG or other issues that make its use generally problematic, or problematic in the SOF role?
Is it because the J could only be introduced into the 'route' squadrons in anything approaching a normal timescale?
Is it because the J's initially cleared fatigue life (6,000 ef/h) would have been used up too quickly in the tactical role?


While I've had a go around the circuit once or twice, I'm not a J-model operator. I don't think it's a question of the two-man flight deck being less useful/suitable for tac ops/SOF as it is developing proper tactics, techniques, procedures to capitalise on technology/capability. However, I will caveat that with the USAF's experience with two-man tac/at has not been promising - C-27A gave up entirely on Tac ops prior to being decomissioned in late '90s & C-17 utilises a third pilot for Tac Ops. I would argue that Lockheed did not take a truly large enough leap in technology/cockpit integration to effectively/efficiently utilise the two-man flight deck for low-level, tac ops...but that's just one man's opinion - nothing more.

RAF would have had to purchase DAS for the J-model for it to be suitable/unsuitable. Witness early goings in early 02 timeframe into Afghanistan - I believe RAF initially borrowed DAS kit from the Italians, ran quick trials at Boscombe, & began operating with it. This is the DAS that Lockheed fitted to the J from the factory - all the wiring was in place, but it wasn't purchased w/the acft. Much like the cargo floor - RAF wanted the Beverly floor like the K instead of the all-singing/all-dancing rapid-reconfigure J-model floor - Lockheed balked & compromised with the -4 floor as fitted to USAF E/H models...typical bean-counter acquisitions...I do not know what DAS is currently fitted to the J-model.

I have heard the natural strips problems with the composite props is overstated, but do know there are at least two aftermarket props (made of ally) out there...

Introduction into route role was much easier due to software development - still nearly 5 years from delivery to operational...

[MechGov]

Oh dear. I fear we are going to get all the usual posts about how great the J is. Still if you haven't flown it I don't think they let you comment on this thread.

[propulike]

Yes it is great.

However that doesn't help discover if older Herc's have a hitherto unknown metal fatigue problem. Are there any engineers from Lyneham in here that know of NDT conducted to resolve this, either past testing or current?

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

"Still if you haven't flown it I don't think they let you comment on this thread."

We do..........but without any credibility how can you:p

Mechgov...............now where did I last here that:E

all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced

[Pass-A-Frozo]

Well I won't go into the J vs K arguement in too much detail. Except:

1> Two man cockpit - what's the problem , I suppose you think A-10's , UH-1's, Apache's , F-111's, F-15's etc. etc. shouldn't operate in a tac environment as they lack the crew
2> Dirt strip problem - bollocks. Again, think outside the box. Do you think other countries might be regularly operating them into dirt strips? Do you think other countries would if it were a problem?

The main point:
If you think the J should be shelved you can say goodbye to the C-130. Lockheed will not reproduce earlier models. The US will not buy European aircraft as there main Tac transporter , so what's the option. People say "re-wing the K's etc." . Well, you can put new tires on your 1960's car, but it's still a 1960's car. The J is here to stay.

I really think if you went to put a nav on a J (which I think is most navs I mean peoples problem is) they would have nothing to do! They have no instruments to look at back there.

I really think you will see the J take over all the roles (progressively). Why not just get them taking over the K role now? Simple, you have years left on an airframe, there isn't an immediate need to do so.

What you're really saying is "That aircraft that is more powerful, more fuel efficient, and performs better on 2/3 engines / in a hot environment is crap. :yuk:

I guess I'll see you guys in 40 years talking about "how good the old days were on K's, and these 'new fangled aircraft aren't' as good as the old models".

Anyway, go back to your abacus :ok:

[Beeza]

Guys,
I'd like to add something to the discussion about the RAF C130K accident and the C130 structure. Firstly, like most other people I would rather wait until all the facts are in to comment on what caused the crash of the aircraft in Iraq.
As for C130 wings, LM-Aero do not have a great track record for building wings. My understanding is that the RAF, RNZAF and RAAF (C130E) were all delivered with the C130B/E centre section. This centre section was distinguished by the shape of the Aux tank access panel described earlier and has proven to be inadequate for the increased 155.0 AUW (175.0 ferry). The later E/H centre section was listed as a durability modification (there is nothing wrong with it, but if you want the better one you can pay!) and was taken up by the RAF, RAAF, RNZAF, RCAF and USAF. The last of all these aircraft was modified about 1992/3. This centre section had considerable design changes to the C130A/B (early E) centre section and utilised a lot of 2025 aluminium. This early centre section was designed for a reduced AUW (135.0 for the C130B)and suffered severely in the C130E & K. All RAAF C130E had the new centre section replaced at about 5000 AFhrs. (A97-189 Lockheed 4189 was replaced at almost 8000 AF hrs for some reason). The Kiwi's did theirs as well and also the outer wings.

The RAAF retired the C130A with approx 10,000 AFhrs, any although probably a premature decision, it was proven correct by the failure of the centre section of the C130A fire bomber a few years ago.
As far as LM-Aero wings go (forgetting the C130A) the C130E, C130K and CC130 wings were all the same. The main problem was the 7075-T6 alloy in the upper and lower planks which was prone to stress corrosion. LM-Aero changed the wing design in fiscal year 73/74 which was fitted to most C130H's. This wing was heavier and had the planks manufactured from 7075-T73 (much more resilient to stress corrosion) and other improvements. In Fy 83/84 there was again a new outer wing and it was considerably beefed up to comply with the FAA lighting strike protection criteria. This is the wing fitted to late C130H's and the C130J.
There have been two outer wing failures of the ealier wing. They occured within (I think) three weeks of each other in 1981. One was an American fire bomber and the other was a USAF Tac bird (Lockheed Sn 4161). (RAAF had sister aircraft 4159 and 4160 in it's C130E fleet). Both wings failed at WS400 (OW220) which is behind the outboard engine. Both were the earlier wings and certainly the USAF bird had suffered stress corrosion fatique and had repairs outside the LM-Aero limits. (It had 5 channel repairs within the same cord line.) These failures are the reason the C130 fuel distribution is managed the way it is. (To alleviate the stresses around WS400 by keeping the fuel C of G close to the C of P. (Most other aircraft keep as much fuel outboard for as long as possible to allieviate wing up bending.)
The Canadians came up with a repair (an outer wing lower doubler) to reduce fatique in this area. (A big band aid under the highly stressed area if you like). The RAAF improved on this with Mod 300. It certainly appeared to have worked. The RAF never used this repair. They reworked their outer wings with new (original 7075-T6 I think?) planks, replaced the rainbow fittings, webs and kingpins and basically zero lifed their wings to original specifications. The USAF and RNZAF replaced their centre sections as discussed earlier and replaced their outer wings with I suspect LM-Aero 73/74 7075-T73 wings.
Overall, I don't think much of the wings on the C130K's, especially given their hard life, however if well monitored they should stay together. l look forward to more information on Herc wings since my life depends on it!

[Jackonicko]

"Why not just get them taking over the K role now? Simple, you have years left on an airframe, there isn't an immediate need to do so."

You simply don't have 'years left' on the K. Even if there is no fatigue problem now, the IPT acknowledge that several of the current fleet can not make it to the originally planned OSD, let alone the actual, extended OSD.

Comments here would seem to suggest that the tactical role may be imposing harder use and more rapid FI usage than was originally envisaged.

It looks as though there is at least a strong possibility that the entire existing C1 mini fleet cannot last until the A400M comes on stream.

This leaves five options:

a) Take the hit and lose half of the C-130 SOF capable fleet (the most useful half since the short Hercs seem to be the only rough/short field capable versions).
b) Refurbish/re-wing the C1s or acquire low-houred second hand Hs to replace them.
c) Replace the C1s with further C3As.
d) Replace the C1s with C5s.
e) Do nothing and bury our heads in the sand until one breaks up in the air.

[Cougar]

Take it or leave it, the J is here to stay. Pass-A-Frozo has hit the nail on the head.

Look outside the box. Other countries apart from the UK are operating the J model, and successfully operating in the tac role with a two pilot crew. Simple as that. No problems, no issues, and no member in the third seat. Not required.

Prop problems on dirt?? Not an issue - a rumour spread by those not wanting the J to succeed. Aircraft are operating on dirt frequently by other users than the UK.

Rumours, rumours, rumours. None substantiated.

I am not bashing older models. They still have their place for the years to come. But as PAF said, 30 years down the track they will simply not be around.

Summary: 2 pilot crew works and is working for the J. Those who argue this are naive and misinformed (and most probably have never flown a J).

[Belgique]

South African Air Force Grounds Most of its C130 Fleet for Wing Cracks (and faulty repairs to wings)

LINK (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/RiskManagement/SAAFC130-cracked.html)

[hobie]

"The SAAF, as a professional military operator acting in the exigencies of aviation safety, has issued a stop-flying instruction for the fleet with effect from February 15... Therefore the fleet was not grounded."

:confused: :confused: :confused:

[US Herk]

Two man cockpit - what's the problem , I suppose you think A-10's , UH-1's, Apache's , F-111's, F-15's etc. etc. shouldn't operate in a tac environment as they lack the crew

Point well made. However, one of the biggest challenges is each of these aircraft were originally designed as 1/2-man aircraft & missions are developed, planned, & executed with that in mind. Many of these aircraft fly black-line missions & simply do not react (in many cases) to mission changes in the manner the Hercules does.

My contention is not that a 2-man crew is inusfficient for low-level/Tac, rather, that Lockheed did not take a big enough leap forward to aid the elimination of the "excess" crew. Couple that with 50 years of culture, inertia, and paradigms & it makes it a challenge to even think a little outside the box for designers, leadership, and even crews.

I had the opportunity to fly a series of classified simulators for a study with (then) McDonnel-Douglas (just prior to the Boeing take-over) & flew some advanced-design cockpits that eliminated the need for additional crewmembers such as navs & EWOs. It was their proposed cockpit for the JSF (at the time - this was '97-'98 timeframe) as applied to SF Hercules with TFR. That cockpit technology fused on-board/off-board mission sensors & was significantly more advanced than "scanned in digi-maps" with real-time information in the cockpit (RTIC), threat fusion (like available in front-line fighters) & even threat avoidance guidance varied by "presented RCS"

Lots of gee-whiz stuff to be sure, but much more than digi-maps & a HUD are required to truly execute the mission efficiently. I am not knocking the J, in fact, I'm an ardent supporter of it, however, Lockheed didn't learn any lessons from USAF C-27 & C-17.

It truly is a mind-set issue & not an aircraft model issue. Case in point, USAF fleet-wide modernisation plan, AMP, is using as its baseline software, Boeings 737 mission management suite. So they're starting with something less than a route queen baseline & going to manipulate it into something it was never intended - low-level/TAC. This is exactly the problem the J faces - the software, not the cockpit, was designed by folks who thought in terms of "traditional" Hercules roles....

I still think it's a great plane & will continue on the Hercules legacy in an exceptional manner....

[16 blades]

"The J is a good aircraft"

Define "good" aircraft.

If you define it in terms of bells, whistles, flashing lights and toys, then it is, indeed, the class leader.

If you define it in terms of power and performance, then again, it's at the top of the class.

If you define it in terms of how useful it is to the armed forces, when held up against the role it should fulfil, then we see a different story.

THINGS THE J CAN DO:
Strategic AT
Drop Harness Packs
Drop Para + Wedge (with limitations)

THINGS THE K CAN DO:
Strategic AT
Drop Harness Packs
Drop Para + Wedge (in all configurations)
Drop 1 ton ME (all configurations)
Drop 1 ton AE (all configurations)
Drop MSPs (single + double)
Drop Boats (large and small)
Free Drop (inc heavy)
Drop HSP (if you dare!!)
ULLA (likewise!!)

The J is a capable and mesmerising pilot's toy. The K is a useful aircraft. Whether the J ever becomes so is yet to be seen. It has a long way to go before it can assume the Ks role in toto, which is a pity - it is all of us that suffer when capability gaps like this are allowed to develop through lack of funding (which seems to be the Js main impediment, IMHO).

I am not bashing older models. They still have their place for the years to come

Indeed!

16B

[BEagle]

Look, you lot, we've asked you to take your facile bitch fights to another thread. So stop this silly willy-waving just for once, will you?

The focus of this thread is "Why did the Herc crash in Iraq?" - so please don't muddy the waters with your interminable intra-fleet bickering, if you would be so kind....

[Good Mickey]

Bleagle,

I think this is one of the better threads at the moment which has stimulated some healthy and interesting debate and attracted the usual strong veiwpoints from all corners. The K vs J debate is a natural course for this thread to run as we're discussing fatigue and the fact that aeroplanes don't last forever and need replacing with newer models.

16B

well said, I agree with your last post, its all about money, nothing else. Under the heading 'Things the J can do' add CDS (a very capable and versatile airdrop system} and combat offloads. The big benefit of these two disciplines is that we now become completely compatible and interoperable with every other 130 user.

GM

[Jackonicko]

"THINGS THE K CAN DO:
Strategic AT
Drop Harness Packs
Drop Para + Wedge (in all configurations)
Drop 1 ton ME (all configurations)
Drop 1 ton AE (all configurations)
Drop MSPs (single + double)
Drop Boats (large and small)
Free Drop (inc heavy)
Drop HSP (if you dare!!)
ULLA (likewise!!)"

Nice jargon! In English?

[16 blades]

Jacko,

Tried to PM you with a glossary, but your inbox is full.

16B

[Jambo Jet]

16 Props

The K may be able to do all those things over the J but the major capability that it has just now is the ability to lose a wing mid flight and that worries the hell out of me.

[16 blades]

Indeed. I share that concern deeply, but we will ultimately have to wait for the next report from the BOI before any action is taken, if it is deemed necessary.

The J is poorly placed to assume the Ks tasking should the need arise, and we would lose almost our entire TacAT capability.

16B

[OBNO]

16B,

C130J may not be certified for all the Heavy Equipt drops you list - yet. But there is no reason why it should not be. Given the "requirement", it should not be a long process to conduct these trials. Given the climate it may be prudent to hurry the remaining role certifications along.

Back to the topic.

Has anything official been released on preliminary findings yet?

If not why not?

[glum]

Until we can afford the ridiculous prices LH are asking for software integration, the J will never become an SF aircraft.

They have us over a barrel, and since they seem to have a 2:1 lawyer:engineer ratio, this will not change.

When pricing up DAS upgrades, and the new aircraft will cost you 10 times more than the old to modify, where would you spend your money? 1 new frame or ten old ones?

The problem with the J and it's 2 man crew is that any avionic mods fitted to the aircraft need to be controlled from the mission computers, and output their information to the MFD's. On the K, you can pretty much slap an indicator and a controller anywhere you like and someone will be able to operate it.

This means we need to pay LH to integrate the new system, and that's the rub. There is no competitive market we can go to for this operation - they have taken a leaf from Microsoft's book and will continue to rape us for years to come.

The RAF has flown more J hours than the rest of the operators put together, and it IS the future. But it's going to be a long time before the J will be as able as the SF K because we cannot afford to modify it.

And that's a damn shame...

[BEagle]

Which is why it would be very unwise indeed for the RAF's model of the A400M to be dumbed-down by the beancounters. Unless it is acquired with the DASS, Data Link and all relevant gucci kit included, retrospective modification and re-certification will be prohibitively expensive. It must be acquired with 'future-proof' architecture and through-life upgradeability included fro the outset.

The 'J' experience of software integration costs is a lesson that the MoD must heed!

Back to the thread - why have there still been no preliminary findings released?

[Navaleye]

we would lose almost our entire TacAT capability

Surely we will lose it anyway once the Ks reach their OSD assuming they make it that far. Why not implement a replacement programme now?

[OKOC]

APPARENTLY, the 48 hr signal HAS been released recently to a VERY tight audience, and quote "furthermore, the initial findings are due to be released imminently".... (to a broader audience ie us-what spin will that have I wonder).

Why the f***ing secrecy, bloody lives are at stake here NOT just f***ing money.

[US Herk]

Why the f***ing secrecy, bloody lives are at stake here NOT just f***ing money.

Not sure I see the relevance of money.

It is because of operational security. Any SF unit gets an extra layer of security around it and information is released only reluctantly after several rounds through the staff to ensure they are releasing only the minimum and only when they have to.

I'm sure it went to its initial target audience in a relatively timely manner.


The 'J' experience of software integration costs is a lesson that the MoD must heed!

Yes - the trend in the past 25+ years of aviation development is proprietary knowledge - customer be damned. While I can't speak for the CAA or JAA, I know the FAA originally intended this for flight safety - only the developer of the aircraft could produce replacement parts. This after a few aircraft mishaps resulting in fatalities to the flying public when it was found components such as main landing gear assemblies were just fabricated in the local engineering shop. The laws developed, however, left it open for the aircraft developers to view proprietary knowledge the same as componentry. So the Microsoft analogy is very appropriate given the computerisation of systems on modern aircraft.

The really annoying bit is the aircraft developers pitch the aircraft as "easy to upgrade, requiring only a software change for new capabilities" - b*ll*cks!

The military acquisition folks (which the RAF has finally seen the light & admitted they need blue suiters in there in recent years) are learning hard lessons over the past 10-20 years. Unforutnately, that means many of the aircraft procured during this time will be slow to upgrade due money issues. The next generations will be purchased with more intelligent contracts to figure these things out.

And yes, LM has more lawyers than engineers who get paid loads better the government lawyers, so they're quite competent at what they do...

[FJJP]

There used to be a scheme in the 60s and 70s where selected Engineering Officers were trained to fly, do one or two operational tours and then return to the Eng Branch. They were invaluable, since they knew what was what when dealing with ac matters at HQ level.

Maybe it's time to re-introduce the scheme - then we may get some informed input into some of the eng/procurement issues at the right stage, preventing some of the c*ck-ups we have seen regularly in the past 20 years...

[Jackonicko]

The way in which the concept of Design Authority is used to give the OEM an effective monopolistic position for upgrades and mods does not serve the interests of the customer.

It strikes me that nothing has been learned from comparing the VFM aspects of the Jaguar and Tornado GR4 upgrades - and that the argument is becoming increasingly irrelevant after the sell-off of DERA/QinetiQ and DARO, which once gave the RAF some in-house capability.

The way in which aircraft now serve for much longer and in smaller numbers lead to gaps between production programmes for companies like BAE, and they naturally want to fill those gaps with support and upgrade work. If they can retain a monopoly position they can charge what they like for doing so.

Smart procurement? I think not.

FJJP,

In the days that you're talking about, there were also significant numbers of senior engineering officers who wore 'E' brevets earned during the war and early 1950s, giving them even more of an understanding of operational aircrew than the officers who were simply taught to fly to wings standard before returning to branch.

[BEagle]

The Navy had some fine traditions as well - it seems that any engine change carried out at sea in the days when we had real carriers would be followed by the Engineering Officer who'd signed it off going along for the first launch.... Sounds like an excellent idea to me!

A Bucc had a double engine change and was duly positioned on the catapult. Just before it was due to be shot off, allegedly a little voice from the back said "I thought it was a leg pull - I'm not strapped in!". Not sure what happened next....

Still nothing more in the meeja about the Iraqi Herc accident - apart from the speculation about metal fatigue a couple of weeks ago......

[Jackonicko]

16B,

How about that glossary then?

Ciaio!

[FJJP]

Jacko, the eng officers in question during the scheme were not merely trained to fly, get wings and return to eng duties. They were posted to sqns and flew operational for 1 or 2 tours before reverting to engineers.

[Jackonicko]

Really? The only engineers with Wings I knew had returned to branch after Wings - the prime example being Taff Holden.

Perhaps the scheme developed later, and they did the same as the flying doctors?

[Pindi]

There were two young engineer pilots on my first squadron - both above good aviators and very popular. The scheme allowed for only one squadron tour. One of our chaps asked to remain in the GD branch at the end of his tour and received a very short answer from his own lot.

[Jackonicko]

When was that, Pindi?

I suppose that cost would rule it out today.

I remember Engineer University Cadets being given no more than an hour or two on our UAS, and always thought that taking them to BHT would have been useful enough to justify the cost. Then on a vacation attachment I ran across a medic Squadron Leader flying a tour on Canberras - which seemed like an extraordinary use of resources - though said Doc was a top bloke!

[Pindi]

Jacko

Mid-1950's. The JMO at CFS was also an aviator when I did the course and must have undergone flying training at a rather more advanced age than the rest of us as he was an un-winged MO at Cranwell when I was a cadet. I believe he finished up as quite a senior wheel in the medical branch and had done a spell at IAM on the way.

[oldfella]

There was a course with an Eng O and a Doc at Basic jet School on JPs early 70s. Deal was to get wings then return to normal duties. Doc was subsequently killed in Meteor crash I think. Eng argued the case to be allowed one tour and won. Went on to helis - SAR, winning an AFC.

[FJJP]

I did a course in the mid 70s with a Herc pilot who was an eng in a flying tour.

Farnborough, IIRC, had an established post for a flying Doc. Used to fly Hunters. The one I met had one helluva reputation and was quite unhinged in the best possible way. I believe they started and flew airsickness desensitising courses.

My personal knowledge quite sketchy, but believe the above to be fact...

[MadsDad]

Friend of mine was an engineer who did a tour on Canberras, late 50s/early 60s I think.

I posted hime a link to the Canberra thread, showing the pic of the Canberras coming low over the beach on Cyprus. His reply was "I think I was flying the second one, actually".

[Jackonicko]

News 24 say:

"
Pretoria - Seven of the air force's nine C130 Hercules transport aircraft have been grounded.

Sources and the SAAF said on Thursday the grounding related to a wing life-span problem.

Air force spokesperson Captain Ronald Maseko said: "Information gathered at the Hercules Operators Conference during October 2004 and follow-up information... indicated a possible impact on the predicted life-span of the wings of the Hercules C130 fleet of the SAAF."

He said the information was issued by Lockheed Martin, the original equipment manufacturer, during December 2004.

"The SAAF, as a professional military operator acting in the exigencies of aviation safety, issued a stop-flying instruction for the fleet with effect from February 15... Therefore the fleet was not grounded."

A former pilot said the terms amounted to the same thing.

Three independent sources have said the grounding relates to apparently incorrect modifications or maintenance procedures being carried out on the main wingspar - a rod connecting the two wings.

The SAAF acquired seven of the aircraft in the late 1960s, but the United States shortly afterwards cut off military aid.

This included assistance on the safe operation of the C130s.

Aid was restored only in 1990s after the settlement of a lawsuit related to illegal activities in the US by arms agency Armscor.

The US donated a further five airframes a few years ago, of which two were restored to flying status.

All nine were sent in turn to arms company Denel for a comprehensive upgrade in co-operation with Marshall's, a British aircraft re-manufacturer.

There has been persistent talk in aviation circles that the upgrade programme has not been as successful as expected.

Maseko said two of the nine SAAF C130s were fitted with different wing sections from the seven grounded and the safety instruction did not apply to them.

"These two aircraft are serviceable and being operated by the SAAF."

The latest issue of the African Armed Forces Journal reported that Lockheed Martin appeared keen to establish a continental maintenance depot in South Africa in co-operation with Denel."

[UNCTUOUS]

Jackonicko

That INFO about the SAAF Hercs was posted on page 9 many days ago by Belgique

UNC

[Jackonicko]

I didn't recall having seen the phrase:

"Three independent sources have said the grounding relates to apparently incorrect modifications or maintenance procedures being carried out on the main wingspar"

Though in retrospect his link would have told me so.

Colour me stupid!

[hobie]

quote ....

"The SAAF, as a professional military operator acting in the exigencies of aviation safety, issued a stop-flying instruction for the fleet with effect from February 15... Therefore the fleet was not grounded."

I'm still trying to work out where I went wrong in learning the English language :(

[Grimweasel]

Latest here...

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/wiltshire/4325775.stm




Mod site..

The RAF Board of Inquiry (BOI) has produced its interim report into the crash of the C130 Hercules in Iraq on 30 January 2005 with the tragic loss of all ten personnel on board.

"I should emphasise that the BOI is not yet in a position to establish the cause of the crash. There is a great deal of detailed evidence that has yet to be analysed and a number of lines of enquiry that need further investigation.

"Based on the evidence currently available, the BOI has ruled out a number of possibilities. These are bird strike, lightning strike, mid-air collision, controlled flight into the ground, wire/obstacle strike, restriction in the aircraft’s flying controls, cargo explosion, engine fire, sabotage (including the use of an improvised explosive device) and aircraft fatigue. These interim findings are supported by the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB).

"There remain a number of other possible causes that require further investigation. The BOI is continuing its work, assisted by the AAIB which is also working independently from the BOI to ensure every possible avenue is explored. We will not be commenting or speculating further on the possible causes of the crash until the BOI has concluded.

"The families of those killed in the crash are being informed personally of the BOI interim findings

[Jackonicko]

Scottish news direct from Scotland Monday, 7th March 2005_

The Scotsman

Sabotage Ruled Out in Hercules Crash

"PA"

British military officials today ruled out sabotage as the cause of the crash of an RAF Hercules transport aircraft in Iraq in January, in which 10 people died.
An interim report by the RAF board of inquiry did not rule out the possibility that the plane was shot down by hostile fire.

But it excluded a range of possible explanations including lightning, bird strike, engine fire or collision with another aircraft.

[propulike]

It rules out aircraft fatigue as a possible cause, which will come as a relief to a number of people I'm sure.

[SALAD DODGER]

Probably wont come as a relief to those that insisted on speculating and making 2+2=5.

Most important is the fact that the crew were doing everything right, and no blame can be placed with them. Its hard to find any positives in such tragic circumstances, but I am glad that we can lay the guys to rest without the mud-slinging in the background.

[Ice-a-Cream]

SD:
Curious to see now that the recognised experts in the field have spoken, how many of the other type will be 'fessing up to being speculative pr@ts?

Families of the lost past, present and future:
The BOI will present the findings - not anyone you read on PPrune.

[Jackonicko]

"It rules out aircraft fatigue as a possible cause, which will come as a relief to a number of people I'm sure."

I was going to ask you to elaborate? That was the first I've heard of fatigue being ruled out.

I see though, that a statement is now on the MoD website.

It says:

"Hercules crash Board of Inquiry releases Interim Report

Published Monday 7th March 2005

Royal Air Force

On 7 March 2005, the Secretary of State for Defence announced to Parliament the interim findings of the RAF Board of Inquiry investigating the loss of a Hercules C130 in Iraq.
_
In a Written Ministerial Statement, the Secretary of State said:_

"The RAF Board of Inquiry (BOI) has produced its interim report into the crash of the C130 Hercules in Iraq on 30 January 2005 with the tragic loss of all ten personnel on board.

"I should emphasise that the BOI is not yet in a position to establish the cause of the crash._ There is a great deal of detailed evidence that has yet to be analysed and a number of lines of enquiry that need further investigation.

"Based on the evidence currently available, the BOI has ruled out a number of possibilities._ These are bird strike, lightning strike, mid-air collision, controlled flight into the ground, wire/obstacle strike, restriction in the aircraft’s flying controls, cargo explosion, engine fire, sabotage (including the use of an improvised explosive device) and aircraft fatigue._ These interim findings are supported by the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB).

"There remain a number of other possible causes that require further investigation._ The BOI is continuing its work, assisted by the AAIB which is also working independently from the BOI to ensure every possible avenue is explored._ We will not be commenting or speculating further on the possible causes of the crash until the BOI has concluded.

"The families of those killed in the crash are being informed personally of the BOI interim findings."



What other credible explanations are there of the starboard wing separating from the aircraft in those circumstances?



Re 'speculative tw@ts' and '2+2=5', it strikes me that asking questions about fatigue as a possible cause was entirely legitimate, especially when no-one 'speculating' was insisting that fatigue WAS the cause, only asking whether it could have been.

And before anyone starts gloating, whether or not this accident was caused by a fatigue failure, it has highlighted that there is a real concern over C-130K fatigue, and no-one should be too complacent (nor too relieved, perhaps) about the C-130K's structure.

Certainly there are no grounds for assuming that all is well with the C-130K wing box, nor that this BOI finding 'proves' that there is no problem in this area.

And then there's the thorny question as to what extent we can trust BOI findings, especially after the Chinook.....

[rivetjoint]

While the BoI are suggesting that fatigue didn't cause this crash it doesn't answer the questions raised about the SF fleet's fatigue life following the data in that presentation about the RAF C-130s. It still also doesn't answer the question about whether or not the the problems with the C-130Es affect RAF C-130s.

And yes...how else can a C-130 fall out of the sky in so many pieces?

[BEagle]

And from what height did it do so?

[OKOC]

"What other credible explanations are there of the starboard wing separating from the aircraft in those circumstances?"

How about a ground-to-air missile/hittile?

[16 blades]

I'd be interested in exactly what evidence they used to 'rule out' fatigue. Trying to avoid ministerial embarrasment in the face of an election, perhaps? Sorry chaps, but some things don't add up here.

16B

[BEagle]

Sit on your hands, guys.....

If the actual cause is known, we should now refrain from further comment until the news has been communicated to the families first.

[Jackonicko]

The cause isn't known yet, BEags, so won't be en route to the families. This is an interim report, and the final report is weeks or months away. Some time after 5 May, no doubt.

You are a load of cynics. Just because enemy action is a no-blame cause for our glorious Government (Tony can't get worse stick over the War, and this was an aircraft that could not have been more generously provided with defensive kit), and just because a fatigue failure might be interpreted as the result of inadequate funding and/or management, which might be taken as evidence in a failure to exercise the appropriate 'duty of care'....... or might generate unhelpful press coverage before the election.

I listened to the PM programme this evening and heard more descriptions of the 'widely scattered wreckage' which supposedly obviously indicated a major explosion at height. It still doesn't ring true with the film we saw of the crash scene, with at least one engine, the cockpit floor, the rear ramp and the ladder all within spitting distance of each other. If anything, the wreckage seemed remarkably confined, though it is understood that the starboard wing was found a very long way from the rest of the debris, perhaps suggesting that it did separate at altitude.

Every Herc operator I've spoken to has expressed the belief that fatigue is a more likely cause of this accident than enemy action, in their minds. The wing could have detached as a result of a SAM hit, of course, but wouldn't that be as obvious (and leave as many traces of shrapnel, residue, etc.) as a cargo explosion or sabotage?

[rudekid]

16B

Don't be stupid!

The very experienced subject matter experts clearly just guessed and decided on the spur of the moment to let everyone know it hadn't crashed due to fatigue, based on a feeling in their water.

Or did they use some sort of alien code,written on a buried artifact in the sand in Iraq to communicate the secret reason it crashed....

Stop looking for conspiracy.

The people doing the investigation know their onions and all will be revealed at the correct time, I'm sure.

If the 28 day report isn't juicy enough for you, make up your own story or listen to some of the rumours circulating at other stations whose personnel should know better.

Luckily, those with an ounce of intelligence know better: a brave and professional crew lost their lives doing their duty.

[16 blades]

Rudekid,

Just to put you in the picture, I am a current Herc K operator. I knew some of the crew personally. I find your insinuation that I am fishing for stories highly offensive.

I am not looking for a conspiracy, I am looking for truth. Perhaps I have been too vocal expressing my doubts, but they are informed doubts, not random speculation.

16B

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

rudekid.............what a very apt handle:rolleyes:

16 Blades has established his "credentials" in these forums on numerous occasions and he is not the only one here in Wilts with some concerns:(

all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced

[The Gorilla]

Rudekid

Tis you who may be a tadge stupid or perhaps naive. Do not think for one moment that people would not lie about this issue, trust me they would.
Embarrassment must be avoided at all costs. I have strong doubts about today’s interim report.

I suggest you take time to read the Chinook thread.

:(

[Jackonicko]

There have been some posts on the other 'condolence' thread.

I suspect they may be removed by the moderators.

They run:

OKOC
posted 5th March 2005 17:51 ___ _ _ __ _
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Totalwar,

In answer to your question "What Happened"-let's just wait and see; clearly if it was a structural failure (NB it wasn't a USA E model nor was it a South African Herc variant): our Engineers must have stringently checked our fleet and must be absolutely 100% certain that ours are still safe to operate; otherwise they would have grounded our K's weeks ago.

My money is still on a ground-to-air projectile of some sort hitting a soft spot resulting in this dreadful accident-my thoughts are with the families and loved ones at this awful time.




Navaleye
posted 7th March 2005 14:24 ___ _ _ __ _
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Latest news from the Beeb. Not good news I have to say. Here




totalwar
posted 7th March 2005 14:48 ___ _ _ __ _
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is bad news indeed. If it wasn't bird strike, lightning strike, mid-air collision, controlled flight into the ground, wire/obstacle strike, restriction in the aircraft’s flying controls, cargo explosion, engine fire, sabotage (including the use of an improvised explosive device) or aircraft fatigue then what other possibilities does it leave?

At least there is no blame being placed on the crew, that is good news.


SmilingKnifed
posted 7th March 2005 21:56 ___ _ _ __ _
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jamino, that type of speculation serves no purpose, especially on the open source.

Please be mindul of the fact that a lot of good lads died on that aircraft. Maybe speculation would be better placed on a separate thread.

[rudekid]

16B

As you are a current herc operator, I wonder where you are getting your information from, as it is obviously much more accurate than the stuff being investigated by the board of inquiry. Obviously your quest for truth is being ignored by the BoI.

I quote:

'I am not looking for a conspiracy, I am looking for truth. Perhaps I have been too vocal expressing my doubts, but they are informed doubts, not random speculation.'

You appear to be getting two issues confused, wing fatigue which is obviously a major concern to all operators and the board of inquiry into the XV179 accident. I would argue that you are indeed looking to push some conspiracy theory by casting doubt on the 28 day report from the board of inquiry. These are not glib statements broadcast for political edification. This is as good and as accurate an interpretation as time and situation allow. It HAS not been tampered with for political expediency.

Now, to put you in the picture, I am also a current K operator and knew all of the crew very well, save the siggy and the SE fitt.

Your moral high ground for conspiracy theory is non-existent. Highly offensive or not, you're plain wrong.

ABIW

I share your concerns about fatigue, but feel we're confusing issues on this and XV179.

Gorilla

I agree, The Mull incident stinks but BoI rules have changed significantly since then. The 28 day report is produced by the RAF only, so any cover up is being done by us. Knowing the individuals on the BoI team, none of them would stand for a change of emphasis in contnet or tone from the original report

[mystic_meg]

...welcome to the latest instalment of the Lyneham Piss*ng Contest.....

[16 blades]

Rudekid,

I don't want to propagate a pissing contest here; ultimately it would serve no purpose.

I am not saying that I know better than the BoI - I don't, and couldn't. Nor am I saying that I know what happened, because I don't. Merely that I have sincerely held doubts, based on my own knowedge and experience. I am hoping that the full report will, in due course allay those doubts. I want to be proven wrong.

16B

[UNCTUOUS]

http://www.canit.se/~griffon/aviation/img/div/nk/tp84-flares_1.jpg

Please correct me if I'm way off base on the internal carriage and loading of replenishment flares etc . Later research would seem to indicate that the standard Mk46 and pyrophoric flares are loaded externally and cannot be replenished in a AN/ALE-47 TACDS system (as put together by BAe). But I guess that a lucky ground shot by small arms fire might be able to trigger a flare. If a pyrophoric flare cooked off in its tube, it would be very incendiary. Supposedly all types are HERO PROOF (Hazards of Emitted Radiation to Ordnance)

I've only ever fired flares and 200 million candle-power photo-flash from P2's and P-3's, so I'm not sure just how the C130 self-defence IR flares are set-up and loaded. If they'd just departed Baghdad and had used some flares on departure, it might make sense that they were reloading the tubes at height from internal stocks when one was dropped (due turbulence perhaps?)

Having seen the photos of flares exiting C130's I'd sure hate one to go off inside any airplane that I was inside of. The aircraft would instantly fill full of smoke - and leave little or no time for a mayday, getting depressurized, getting the rear ramp down etc. Loss of external visibility and loss of control might then cause a break-up (as well as cooking off a whole load of other flares). I'd guess that the flares generate a lot of heat as well as smoke - and that some cargo carried would have been munitions or flammables.

I'd imagine that the C130 guys world-wide carry their flares stocks internally and that they are reloaded from inside the aircraft.... for arrivals (after being fired serially as a deterrent upon departure). It would be hard to discriminate a pre-crash flare fire from a post-crash fire (just like wiring fires). The stocks of flares would have been consumed in either case. Post-mortem toxicity levels would possibly find it hard to discriminate whether there was a flare-fire onboard before break-up.

link to the Flares themselves (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/enviro/DTI_EA/13_Appendix_B.pdf)

[BEagle]

Has it yet been confirmed at what height the a/c was flying when, for whatever reason yet to be stated, the wing detached?

[US Herk]

Even a small explosion from something the size of a manpad may be enough to snap a wing if the acft was attempting evasion & the wings were under stress...

I believe that is the accepted theory for the AC-130 loss during the gulf war.

So the shoot-down theory is not easily dismissed.

I'd imagine that the C130 guys world-wide carry their flares stocks internally and that they are reloaded from inside the aircraft
To my limited knowledge, only one C-130 variant has the ability to re-load defensive flares inflight. This variant is not in service with the RAF. Many variants can jettison illumination flares that are stored onboard - this is not one of those variants (unless a recent mod, which I doubt).


I've been quick to jump on the fatigue issue as well, as I know some of the history of these birds & flew with a few of the crew. I'm also cynical insofar as I know how a BoI could dismiss fatigue simply because the outer wings were replaced in the recent past. However, it must be assumed that the centre wing boxes were at least inspected during this service - do you think Marshalls would pass up an opportunity to make more ££?! In this case, MoD spokesmen making silly comments like 'the K is a completely different airplane with superior wings to the E' only fueled this fatigue cover-up/conspiracy speculation....however, spokesmen, as we all know, are not selected for their technical knowledge.

Unfortunately, to make this cynical assumption is to question the professionalism of the BoI members. Something I'm not proud of on retrospect, :ugh: so I'm content to wait & see what the final report says.

Having recently concluded an accident investigation where I was a primary board member, I can tell you that many of the assumptions made initially were completely at odds with the facts. Things often are not as simple as they first appear.

[Jackonicko]

"It must be assumed that the centre wing boxes were at least inspected during this service - do you think Marshalls would pass up an opportunity to make more ££?!"

Must it? Marshall will not inspect centre wing boxes without payment, and who is to say that the Exchequer would have funded such fripperies? At the time that these aircraft were re-winged, there was no real understanding of the fatigue mechanisms at work, nor of the extent of fatigue accrued on the ground, just when the meters are inhibited. That is why our friend on the IPT,
Squadron Leader David Saunders (BEng CEng MIMechE, Hercules IPT, Room V012, Palmer Pavilion, ext 4552) thought that more OLM effort was

"- Required to provide more knowledge of operational effects on the structure and a safe life clearance for the Mk1 mini-fleet"

and which is why he expressed:

"- Concerns over the centre wing structure, that we consider is unmonitored, especially on the Mk1 mini-fleet."

A conclusion that enemy action was responsible for XV179's demise will be a get out of jail free card for those politicians who have failed to fund adequate remedial action, fatigue use and monitoring, and a replacement for these ancient airframes, but will have exactly the same advantage to anyone in the chain of command who had a duty of care to '179's crew. I'm not saying that I think that there is or has been a cover-up about fatigue, only that I'm cautious about stating unequivocally that no such thing could have happened.

On the other hand, I cannot believe that any RAF officer would allow themselves to be remotely associated with any such cover up, unless there are some real grounds for delaying an announcement of a fatigue related cause in the national interest.

[mystic_meg]

I'd imagine that the C130 guys world-wide carry their flares stocks internally and that they are reloaded from inside the aircraft....

...Jesus...keep imagining pal, and while you're at it, pass the waccy baccy 'round too....

what utter, uninformed, widely speculative drivel! :mad: :mad:

[lineslime]

The only flares i've seen stored internally on albert normally belong to one of the crew, and they are not the sort that make pretty lights in the sky.

[16 blades]

UNCTIOUS,

Absolutely nothing in your post is fact.

16B

[US Herk]

Must it? Marshall will not inspect centre wing boxes without payment, and who is to say that the Exchequer would have funded such fripperies? At the time that these aircraft were re-winged, there was no real understanding of the fatigue mechanisms at work, nor of the extent of fatigue accrued on the ground, just when the meters are inhibited.

I have dealt with Marshalls, so know full well their penchant for sticking to the contract as written - nothing more. However, the wing box issues in question may be as obvious as cracks or fatigue induced corrosion (some alloys).

Even as cynical as I am about contractors, if there was a chance for them to make more money, you can bet your ar*e they'd have exploited it using every tactic imaginable.

Also, Marshalls knows full well the history of the K-models as they are the UK Hercules design authority & wouldn't undertake a job such as this w/o a full overview of structure(s) involved. AND these tails were selected for wing replacement in recent years (2002) BECAUSE of their high usage rates.

Furthermore, the presumption that there is no real understanding of the fatigue accrued (on ground or in flight) is a bit simplistic & overstates the case. If we did not understand this, the wings wouldn't have been replaced in the 70s/80s, no? It really is as simple as service life cycles. With or without the fatigue (G) meter inhibited.

While I certainly do not know if Marshalls did any centre wing inspections during their re-wing of XV179 (or any others). My assumption is that at worst, they would be aware of the issue and at best, inspected it to some degree.

Perhaps I'm being generous, but as the design authority, they have to approve all modifications/upgrades, so they would be in the best position to be aware. We also do not know if it was an option given to the RAF/MoD & not elected based on the expected life cycle of the aircraft.

Either way, the BoI will tell us. Speculation doesn't help & I'm as guilty (even within this post) as any.

Taxi!

[Belgique]

I think I'd rather go with the UNCTUOUS theory about a flare cooking off in the tube than this bunch of codswallop.In fact, compared with this fanciful politically inspired nonsense, it would make much more sense:

Insurgents' High Altitude missile likely cause of Hercules crash
09 Mar 05
LONDON - A missile fired by insurgents from the ground probably destroyed an RAF Hercules C-130 cargo plane in Iraq with the loss of 10 British special operations servicemen, an interim report reveals.

The Ministry of Defence accident investigators' findings were outlined to MPs yesterday by Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon.

The findings raised fears within the ministry that the insurgents could possess a new missile capable of hitting aircraft flying at more than 4570m (15,000ft).

The board of inquiry ruled out the possibility that the Hercules, which was supplying a special operations base north of Baghdad, was blown up by a bomb on board or an explosion on board caused by an accident with bombs or ammunition.

The inquiry team will now have to determine whether the plane was brought down by a heat-seeking missile designed to reach aircraft at high altitude or was a lucky strike by insurgents using a SAM (surface-to-air) missile which normally has a range of less than 3000m.

Hoon said the inquiry team had ruled out a number of possibilities.

"These are bird strike, lightning strike, mid-air collision, controlled flight into the ground, wire-obstacle strike, restriction in the aircraft's flying controls, cargo explosion, engine fire, sabotage and aircraft fatigue."

The transport with nine RAF personnel and a soldier was half-way through its flight from Baghdad to a United States special operations base at Balad when it crashed, strewing blazing wreckage across a wide area.

It is [i]believed to have been flying at an altitude above 4570m to avoid hostile fire.

The insurgents are known to have SAMs but it would be unprecedented for one to bring down a plane flying at a height previously thought to be safe.

The inquiry team will produce a report on the "lessons to be learned" from the accident, which could include the need for more evasive action in future.

Hercules planes routinely dive steeply and throw out chaff to deflect incoming missiles when they are coming in to land, but a missile capable of reaching alliance aircraft could mean they will have to fly higher in future.

[16 blades]

Agree.

Utter, complete, uninformed sh!te!

If the reporter who wrote that would have bothered doing ANY research (even using open source material like Jane's All The Worlds Dangerous Sh!t, etc) he would have realised he was spouting complete b0ll0cks. I despair.

16B

[US Herk]

Not to continue with the assumptions game, but more to poke these spokesmen/journalists in the eye again.

Any Hercules operator worth his salt can identify several inconsistencies in these statements...:hmm:

[Jackonicko]

I concur, and hope that no-one thinks that I'm that kind of journo.

[BEagle]

The comments were outrageous - and as for the suggestion that they were 'stooging around' or 'conducting illegal low flying' in one tawdry chip-wrapper, words fail me.

Jacko - a thought. All this talk about fatigue and stress cracks could prove to be convenient maskirovka for the MoD. I suggest that you focus your attention on other possible causes...

I do NOT know what actually happened - but I would have though that even a cursory examination of the wreckage would have shown up any evidence of hostile action fairly obviously?

[airsound]

No one seems to have mentioned 'friendly fire' recently. Any thoughts, anyone?

To save people the trouble of looking me up, yes, I'm a journo. But I hope a responsible one. And I am a proud and sad ex-truckie. 24 & 53.

[StopStart]

Friendly fire??? Are you for real?? There's enough ill-informed, conspiratorial crap on here with out this angle. In what possible way could this be friendly fire?? You may be an ex-truckie but just take 2 seconds to think about it - in what way could any coalition forces in Iraq feel threatened enough to attack an aircraft??

Sorry gents but the more I read on here the angrier I get. Flares cooking off, friendly fire, wings falling off, cover up by the MoD - what next? I dread to think. Lets face the harsh realities here. A low flying Herc could be bought down by a wire guided or beam riding AT weapon. Likewise heavy AAA. Medium level we face many and various SAM threats. Is it not beyond the bounds of possibility that a hostile force using freely available weapons and technology took down one of our aircraft?

Or was it the MoD on the grassy knoll.......?

[airsound]

Thanks for your considered response, StopStart.

In answer to your first para - you might well have asked (perhaps you did) why the USS Vincennes should have shot down a civil Airbus full of pax on a planned approach into a civil airport. These things are not unknown - and many serious and/or inexplicable incidents eventually turn out to have been caused by an event or series of events right out at the end of the probability (and believability) graph. I wasn’t suggesting ‘conspiracy’ - friendly fire is, almost by definition, not intentional.

Second, I agree that it’s "not beyond the bounds of possibility that a hostile force using freely available weapons and technology took down one of our aircraft." But it seems to me that most of the current questions arise from the rather strange way the BOI chose to release its interim findings. It went to a lot of trouble to say, exhaustively, what didn’t happen - including, as I read it, "wings falling off". But, if it were a simple ‘shoot down’, why would the BOI, with so much information already to hand, not be able to say so?

Finally, do you know the Herc was "low flying"?

[lineslime]

Stopstart

Well put. As a fixer of Ks I would also like all the speculation and fishing to stop, but unfortunatly it won't. The findings of the BOI will come out eventually, we will all just have to sit and wait.

[airsound]

Thanks for all that, StopStart. No apologies necessary.

I’m deeply sorry for the loss of your friend. I didn’t know any of them, but I do feel very saddened about all of them, and I have expressed that to OC 47. I’ve also been heartened, not just by the extraordinary outpourings of grief in the other thread, but also by the happy and often funny remembrances of all ten of them. That attitude reminds me, once again, of the admirable response of Air Force people in times of adversity.

However, all of that said, I don’t believe that the mourning, in which we are all taking part, should prevent us from discussing and considering the causes of this worrying event. I don’t accept that ‘speculation’, which most people on these threads so decry, is automatically taboo. Clearly, anything that might reflect adversely on the dead is not appropriate, but speculation about almost anything else does little harm, and may well add to the sum of knowledge. Presumably most people writing to this forum agree that it provides a useful service, otherwise why take part?

You accuse me of fishing. That’s not what I’m doing. I’m asking straight, unspun questions - and I’ve announced where I’m coming from. No one has to answer me if they don’t want to. You have kindly chosen to give me your views. With your position and experience, they are clearly worth hearing, and I thank you for them.

And here’s a final question. Next time I’m invited onto a tv station to comment on this incident (that’s some of what I do), which would you rather I did - responded along the lines of some of the ‘chip-wrapper’ reporting mentioned above, or made use of some of the expert knowledge revealed in these threads, combined with my own background knowledge of the subject?

You don’t have to answer that question if you don’t want to:)

[BEagle]

"Perhaps they're trying to find out what weapon it was?"

A most interesting comment - was there a weapon? I haven't read anything in the meeja from MoD spokespersons stating that...

[Ice-a-Cream]

my quote "I knew a guy who talked to somebody whose sister knew someone who had seen this with their own eyes."

your quote "expert knowledge revealed in these threads, combined with my own background knowledge of the subject"

I don't see the difference between these two statements as they apply to this thread, or how they justify the spread with the word "expert" behind it of specualtion. I know it wll help you stand out above the other "experts" if you can scoop them with some hard-bitten, close to the scene of the crash, smell of charred flesh and jet fuel sensationalism, but you're not increasing the public's sum of knowledge.

You don't mention the third answer available to you -
"I don't know." It will hurt you in your current account, but the pride you can feel in putting out factual, proven and correct information should more than make up for it.

?expert knowledge?

[StopStart]

airsound

I wouldn't suggest for a moment that any mourning should prevent any discussion on the subject and nor have I. I was merely trying to establish where "I was coming from" as it were.

Speculation in matters such as these is all well and good depending on how and where it is done. A forum like this is used by the media as an easy source of "research" and it is amazing how quickly something goes from being idle musings on the internet to hard "facts" in the news. As for your next TV interview I'm afraid I can't help you. Where you get your info from is up to you. I'd suggest though that an anonymous forum like this probably isn't up there with the Encyclopedia Britannica as a recognised source of reliable info......
As Ice-a-Cream says you could just say that you don't know.....just as none of us know....


BEags

An interesting comment maybe. Perhaps that was a poor choice of word. Maybe might be more apposite. I have no more facts to hand than you I'm afraid. I was merely trying to suggest reasons for why the BOI has done what its done.

[C130 Techie]

Totally agree.

All this ill informed speculative crap is helping no-one.

[airsound]

Ice-a-Cream - I’m sorry you can’t see the difference between “my quote” and “your quote”. For me, it’s about using a lifetime’s experience of aviation to help me decide which posts in a forum like this are worth taking note of and which aren’t. I’m sure you would agree that someone of StopStart’s background has plenty to offer that is worthwhile. But perhaps not all of the posts in this thread are so helpful. I believe I can mostly tell the difference.

I not going to dignify your suggestion that I might practice “close to the scene of the crash, smell of charred flesh and jet fuel sensationalism” with a reply, other than to say that I don’t do sensationalism of any sort.

As to saying “I don’t know” - I have said exactly that, and I will continue to say that, whenever a media outlet asks me about something that I don’t know about. After all, if I’m being paid to be an expert, then I had better be able to display some appropriate expertise, or I’m taking money on false pretences. In this particular case, my services for the tv companies concerned were to comment on the interim findings of the BOI and put them into some professional aviation context. I was not there to sensationalise anything.

StopStart - I wasn’t asking you for help with my next interview, honest! I was merely trying to indicate that, as with anything controversial in the British media, there is a huge spread of comment available, ranging from the totally irresponsible to the serious professional comment. I try very hard to keep to the latter end of the scale. And as for sources, I’m not sure Britannica’s much use, but there is much professional literature both on- and offline that is very useful - and, taken with the occasional pinch of salt, PPRuNers are often helpful. Especially ones who come from the Central Gliding School at EGDL.

[oldfella]

Where does each line of speculation end?

We started with crash questions about the possibility of fatigue, rolled through specialists being called therefore possibly fatigue, more possibilities of fatigue and assumptions, into a report - fatigue not a factor, now rolling into - it might still be fatigue but maybe they are not telling us everything. Give it a rest.

The original thread was about USAF fatigue problems and whether the problem read across to our Hercs. I admit that the Govt answer was poor and the question should still properly answered. For those who are on the fleet surely you can ask those in your Eng empire rather than trying to find an answer here.

[juliet]

how about all journos on here just f**k off! secondly, why dont those who should know better just keep their big traps shut. until the BOI releases its FINAL report all thoughts are purely speculation. of course someone will come up with "but this is a rumour network so we can spout on all we like". congratulations to you if you do, you are just making it harder for those coming to grips with losing their family/friends/collegues while making it easier for more rubbish to make it into the media. there are a lot of people still out there doing the job who like everyone else have no clue as to what happened. they do get wound up when info is reported that can have a direct impact on they way they operate.

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times

British plane was shot down
Christina Lamb

"THE RAF Hercules transport plane that crashed in Iraq on January 30, killing 10 British servicemen, was shot down by insurgents, military sources have confirmed.
“We know it was a projectile but we do not yet know which kind,” a senior military officer said.

It is believed something as crude as a shoulder-launched rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) may have been used. The Hercules was equipped with detection devices to guard against guided missiles but these would not have picked up an RPG.

Whatever the weapon, the RAF is expected to have to review its defensive tactics urgently. The Hercules was probably flying at low altitude to make it more difficult for rebels to track its course, but this could also have brought it within range of an RPG.

The investigation into the crash, the worst single loss of British lives since the Iraq war began two years ago, has been hampered by the fact that more than half the wreckage was looted from the crash site within a few hours.

The admission that the plane was shot down will be regarded as a significant victory by militants fighting coalition forces. Nine RAF personnel and an SAS soldier died.

Insurgents quickly claimed responsibility for bringing down the plane and released a video, broadcast on Al-Jazeera television, which showed a missile being launched followed by film of wreckage strewn across the ground. At the time, the Ministry of Defence dismissed the video as a fake."

RIP

[lineslime]

How is it the press seem to get told this before those actually working on the aircraft, guess we aren't important enough to be privvy to this information and have to find out second hand (if true at all). I for one am going to wait for the BOI findings to be published before I believe anything written in the press, and would suggest others do so as well. Who was this senior military officer anyway?

[mbga9pgf]

half of a herc looted in hours? sounds like @rse to me. can journalists please check their facts before publishing complete
sh!t please :mad:

[propulike]

Actually, if you read correctly, it was more than half a Herc. Obviously. And it wasn't insurgents, it was the engineers trying to find spares and I know 'cos my mothers sisters boyfriends cousin had a mate who was on the 'phone to someone who knew someone who saw something on the telly right so its true absolutely gospel.

At times I can't believe I actually waste the pixels adding to this nonsense. RIP boys.

[Dagger Dirk]

ZU23 multi-barrel cannon http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/zu-23.htm

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/zu-23-dfst8409748_jpg-s.jpghttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/23mm-aaa-iran-s.jpg

Sounds very inconclusive and non-peremptory. Would've thought API-T, HEI-T 23mm rounds would have left very distinctive "fingerprints". May be a MinDef "red herring"

Last Update: Tuesday, May 17, 2005. 11:28am (AEST)
Anti-aircraft fire blamed for Iraq plane downing: report

Insurgents armed with basic anti-aircraft weapons likely shot down a British military plane in Iraq earlier this year, killing all 10 servicemen on board, a British newspaper has reported.
An interim report into the cause of Britain's biggest single-day loss of life in the Iraq campaign had ruled out almost everything apart from enemy fire and it was suggested that a missile or rocket propelled grenade could have brought the Royal Air Force (RAF) craft down.
A military official, however, told the Daily Telegraph that the report concluded that the C-130 Hercules had been shot down by anti-aircraft rounds, as it flew at a low altitude, possibly 46 metres.
"It was shredded by a multi-barrelled 20mm canon. They have worked out that's what caused the crash," the anonymous official was quoted as saying in the newspaper.
If the report is accurate, it could force US-led coalition planes to fly out of range of all anti-aircraft fire, according to the daily.
It said the gun is believed to have been a 1960s twin-barrel Zu-23, made in China or the Soviet Union, left over from the toppled regime of Saddam Hussein.
It has an effective range of 1.8 kilometres and can be mounted on a truck or set on wheels.
The Daily Telegraph added that it was still unknown why the Hercules, which was equipped with sophisticated defensive measures, was flying at low altitude for a short journey from Baghdad airport to another military air base on January 30, when the majority of flights climb much higher.
Australian airman Paul Pardoel died when the Hercules transport plane crashed.
The 35-year-old flight lieutenant and father of three, a former RAAF navigator joined the British Air Force three years ago, and was recorded as the first Australian serviceman killed in Iraq.
- AFP

[C130 Techie]

More cr@p from anonymous sources and wild press speculation!!!

This sort of journalistic rubbish helps no one!!

The OFFICAL report will be published when it is good and ready.

With the memorial service this Friday can't this be left to rest at least until after that. Leave the families and friends to grieve in peace.

[BEagle]

The problem is that, because the known truth hasn't been made generally available, press speculation will be inevitable.

I've been told one or two things, which I refuse point blank to discuss. So journos, don't bother asking.