Spatial Disorientation

[Banjo]

Following a chat amongst us today about helicopter crashes and spatial problems I thought I would post this article as a thought provoker to all of us who fly and maybe have not considered the problem enough since our PPL days or who have been flying so long we think we are too experienced to get into trouble.



How long can a pilot who has little or no instrument training expect to live after he flies into bad weather and loses visual contact? Researchers at the University of Illinois did some tests and came up with some very interesting data. Twenty student "guinea pigs" flew into simulated instrument weather, and all went into graveyard spirals or rollercoasters. The outcome differed in only one respect - the time required till control was lost. The interval ranged from 480 seconds to 20 seconds. The average time was 178 seconds -- two seconds short of three minutes.

Here's the fatal scenario. . . . . . .



The sky is overcast and the visibility is poor. That reported five mile visibility looks more like two, and you can't judge the height of the overcast. Your altimeter tells you that you are at 1500 feet but your map tells you that there's local terrain as high as 1200 feet. There might be a tower nearby because you're not sure how far off course you are. But you've flown into worse weather than this, so press on.

You find yourself unconsciously easing back just a bit on the controls to clear those towers. With no warning, you're in the soup. You peer so hard into the milky white mist that your eyes hurt. You fight the feeling in your stomach. You try to swallow, only to find your mouth dry. Now you realize you should have waited for better weather. The appointment was important, but not all that important. Somewhere a voice is saying, "You've had it -- it's all over!"


You now have 178 seconds to live.


Your aircraft feels on even keel but your compass turns slowly. You push a little rudder and add a little pressure on the controls to stop the turn but this feels unnatural and you return the controls to their original position. This feels better but now your compass is turning a little faster and your airspeed is increasing slightly. You scan your instruments for help but what you see looks somewhat unfamiliar. You're sure that this is just a bad spot. You'll break out in a few minutes. (But you don't have a few minutes left. . .)


You now have 100 seconds to live.


You glance at your altimeter and you are shocked to see it unwinding. You're already down to 1200 feet. Instinctively, you pull back on the controls but the altimeter still unwinds. The engine is into the red and the airspeed, nearly so.


You have 45 seconds to live.


Now you're sweating and shaking. There must be something wrong with the controls; pulling back only moves the airspeed indicator further into the red. You can hear the wind tearing at the aircraft.


You are about to meet your Maker; you have 10 seconds to live.


Suddenly you see the ground. The trees rush up at you. You can see the horizon if you turn your head far enough but it's at a weird angle -- you're almost inverted. You open your mouth to scream but. . . . . .


. . . .You just ran out of seconds.


Think about it before you press on into marginal weather



This Test was carried out with a Fixed wing, I have been told that for a rotary the average time is reduced to just THIRTY seconds.

[SASless]

You saw my last IRT ya bugger! Don't spread it around!

[delta3]

Banjo

"a pilot who has little or no instrument training"
survives THIRTY sec in a Heli ....

My guess would be THREE


delta3

[Banjo]

Most of the accident reports/transcripts I have studied of UK heli crashes due to IMC flight tend to support the thirty or second so figure Delta 3. Either way it's not often you get to go home from it!

[BigEndBob]

Perhaps if the average heli pilot flew higher than 300 feet they might have a few more seconds to live!

[Anne Tenner]

A few years ago I went on a visit to the AAIB. There was a slide show covering a number of accidents involving commercial helicopter pilots, fully instument rated, who had crashed due to bad weather.

They had tried to analyse why such accidents had occurred and the conclusion was that even though these pilots were very capable of flying in the bad weather, it was the transition from VMC to IMC which actually caused the problem.

If they were established on instruments they would not have a problem, but when the weather was bad but they were still just able to continue visually, and they then flew in to IMC that was when the trouble started.

As the cloud rushed by them, they instinctively pulled back, not initially realising they were climbing and the airspeed declining, after which it all started to go from bad to worse.

The message from the AAIB was that if you think you stand a chance of flying into IMC the important thing to do is to establish yourself flying solely on the instruments BEFORE it happens.

I seem to recall some figures somewhere that stated that if you flew into IMC you had something like 11 seconds before you adopted an unusual attitude, and 40 seconds before that unusual attitude became unrecoverable. Not long.

Shortly after the AAIB visit I was very close to home and pressing on in bad weather. I had a brush with IMC that could have easily resulted in me being added to the AAIB statistics. The combination of the AAIB visit and my own near disaster, has left me with a much greater respect for the weather.

In the face of other private pilots who wish to press on in dreadful conditions I am happy to say that I have adopted cowardice as means of survival which has stood me in good stead. I fully intend that if it turns out to be helicopters that kill me, it wont be because I was stupid enough to be flying in appalling weather conditions.

[helicopter-redeye]

In the face of other private pilots who wish to press on in dreadful conditions I am happy to say that I have adopted cowardice as means of survival which has stood me in good stead. I fully intend that if it turns out to be helicopters that kill me, it wont be because I was stupid enough to be flying in appalling weather conditions.


Well said AT. There have been far too many accidents because of people flying when they did not need too.

Top tip #1. Dont get into the situation.

But if you did (God forbid) and are established on instruments what are then the best actions to take, discuss.

[Banjo]

Anne T. I would not be so hard on yourself and call it cowardice, more a sensible stand to take and a desire to return home at the end of a day to ones family and I for one applaud it.

As to your numbers another figure to consider would be that it takes a qualified and in practice instrument pilot approx 9 seconds to fully establish on instruments when not expecting to have to.

BigendBob, height sadly does not have much to do with it. 200’ or 2000’ the difference will in all probability not help you to sort out the problem once lost in IMC if untrained. In fact in a number of cases the flight path has become so erratic as to have caused a mid air break-up before the ground has even come into play.

The only way to prevent it, is as redeye has said, is to avoid getting into that position in the first place!!

We are not an aeroplane who would prefer to find a nice runway to land on. We can land almost anywhere safely and as such have no reason to keep pushing on into worsening conditions. Yet every year pilots keep killing themselves and their passengers because of get-there-itis. This will not change until we start to teach Captaincy to new pilots at a serious level as opposed to the lip service it gets in most PPL courses nowadays.

Along with this the more experienced pilots need to help teach the attitude that it is all right to not make a flight as opposed to the “a better pilot would have made it” attitude that sadly still prevails in some corners. Widows and orphans are attending funerals every year and will continue to do so for no other reason than someone could not make the simple decision to cancel or turn back from a trip instead carrying on following an already chosen course of action.

Redeye the question might better be “how can we teach pilots to be more flexible in their decision making process and improve their judgment so as to prevent them from placing themselves in such a position?”

[Smoketoomuch]

Surely a classic example; certainly an expensive afternoon.

http://www.juneaucrondahls.com/ships/cal2002/cal0209.htm
September 10, 1999: A Temsco helicopter crashed on Herbert Glacier stranding five cruise ship passengers overnight in 25 degree temperatures and snow on the glacier. Two additional Temsco helicopters crashed on Herbert Glacier in an attempt to rescue the pilot and passengers on the first helicopter.

[GLSNightPilot]

Some years back the US Army did a test, using experienced instrument instructors and pilots, flying UH1s with a safety pilot. The objective was to slow the airspeed down by 10 knots at a time, and see how slow they could fly and maintain control. Some sort of instrumentation was used to record eye movements and where the eyes were looking. In every case, the scan had to be reduced as airspeed slowed and stability was reduced, and by the time 60 kts was reached the AI was basically all any of the pilots had time to scan, and below 60 knots every pilot went into a graveyard spiral and the aircraft had to be recovered by the safety pilot. If you fly into weather and have to go on the instruments, make sure you get the airspeed up immediately. The exact airspeed may differ by model, but the overall effect is likely to be the same, at least with helicopters without AFCS.

[SASless]

GLS....

Is this the same Army that put out thousands of "Tactical Instrument Rated" pilots during a period of unpleasantness in the Southeastern part of Asia? The same Army that spent countless hours of valuable training time teaching the figure eight tactical instrument approach that was dead certain to cause veritigo and/or disorientation over,around, near, an NDB or Field radion transmitter? The same Army that lost hundreds of helicopters to weather related accidents and killed a swoop of people as a result of those policies invented by MGEN Tolson of 1st Air Cav fame and later a bigwig in the NCARNG?

Who got to ride home in the center seat of a pickup truck one afternoon because a young Army warrant officer would not violate regulations and fly a UH-1 from Charlotte to Raleigh IFR.....that same Army? (Was a proud holder of one of those wonderful TAC tickets.....and could not miss the opporunity to make a point....a Standard ticket would have prevented that problem....) We started getting Instrument school slots immediately after that as I recall.

There is something to the study...but I dare say 60 knots is a tad high.....also different aircraft will handle better if configured with stability augmentation than the old Huey...god bless her!

[GLSNightPilot]

Same Army, just a later version. Maybe 60 kts is high, but below that no pilot was able to maintain control, IIRC. I can't find the study now, but another Army study on spatial disorientation is here (http://www.usaarl.army.mil/TechReports/95-25.PDF) . This is much more recent, and not the same type study, but it does show the risk of night flight, even with NVGs.

[SASless]

I ran across this site a few nights ago...very well done accounting of US Army helicopter losses by type of aircraft. As you read through the UH-1 Huey portion of the site....during the Vietnam period....accident after accident shows up due to night and IIMC events. One thing to remember...lots of times the aircraft instrumentation was not operative, there was very little nav or radar available....and it was a very dark place with mountains in most parts.


www.armyaircrews.com

[Lu Zuckerman]

Many years ago a group of H-34s were flying one after the other in a long line. The lead pilot flew into a canyon and was suddenly enveloped in a cloudbank. The lead pilot redioed to the following pilots to come to a hover do a 180 and fly out of the canyon. Since the loss of visibility was progressive the other pilots still had some spatial reference. All got out of the situation except the lead pilot. He reduced airspeed to zero and came to what he felt was a stationary hover. The H-34 in a hover would hang down 3-degrees by the tail and seven degrees wheel down to the left. His instruments told him he was in climbing bank but his barometric instruments told him he was stationary. It didn’t take long for vertigo to start and shortly thereafter he crashed.

He did not have an ASE,which would have corrected for the hover attitude.


:E :E

[victor two]

This is fairly timely for me becase I found myself in this exact situation for real about two weeks ago. As a cautious pilot with a couple thousand hours I was flying a fixed wing aircraft under marginal daytime VFR, totally smooth air in light rain under a cloud base of only 1500 feet, terrain was up to about 300 feet in spots, the rain gradually got heavier until forward visibility was zero, could still see the ground OK, one minute later the ground was gone too and it was solid dark grey IMC murk and then it got bumpy. It seems I had flown into a patch of cloud cumulus off the edge of a biggish storm that went right onto the trees. I pushed on for about another minute hoping to pop out and it started to feel a bit weird and then decided it was all just too scary and turned around to get back out, had partial leans, almost instantly felt sick, nothing on the panel seemed to be matching up with what I felt in my guts. Felt like I was turning but wasn't, tried to get "level" in my guts, that made the AI turn me the other way. It is a disgusting feeling. Through luck I only spent a few minutes feeling totally out of control but finally came back out of the gloom and saw some ground and all the sicknesss vanished. Without any pride I can tell you I nearly messed myself during that few minutes. My encounter was honestly unintentional but guys and girls, just don't ever do it on purpose because it is an experience that you will really not enjoy. I was very lucky and learned my lesson. One thing that freaked me out is how engine noise seems to double due (to reduced optical sensation ?) and that just adds to the confusion. Looking at a clear AI image of a plane turning and honestly believing that you are straight and level is just horrible.

stay safe.

Vic

[wishtobflying]

Simulator time, simulator time, simulator time, simulator time.

Simulate the leans in a non-motion sim by getting the instructor to replace one of forward views with one of the side front views with a downwards offset angle. Nothing out the front window makes any sense to your brain and the instruments become your best friend in the world.

No, I haven't tried this in real life, but after many hours of practice I have completed several hour-long IMC cross-country flights in the simulator with map reading, nav radio operation, etc, both in daytime and full black night settings, with wind buffeting, lightning and rain.

Note that I am not saying I would presume to be better than an ab initio pilot with no experience at all if I was flying a real aircraft, the point is this: it took me a good 10-12 hours of practice in instrument flying to be able to do that in the simulator (on top of the hundred or so hours of VFR sim time), and I pity any non-instrument-rated pilot who finds themselves inadvertently in IMC.

Even an EMS pilot I've spoken to lamented the lack of preparedness for black night bad weather operations, as have several Army pilots.

[Banjo]

Victor Two I am glad that you are still with us.

It was fortunate that you flew a fixed wing that day a slightly more stable platform than a helicopter. Thank you for letting others know how easy it is to fall into such a situation. It is those pilots such as you who now have the ability to spread your story to others you meet in flying clubs and other places where pilots get together (bars, I believe they call them) and try to raise the awareness of ending up having to rely on instruments without the training. I am sure that you will not push the weather envelope again and risk a repeat flight.

Because you have the strength of character to tell your story as opposed to keeping it quiet for years you also can help other less experienced pilots gain the strength required to NOT make a flight.

For some reason pilots keep finding the decision to go an easier route to take than the decision to not go on a trip. Maybe someone here could point us in the way of any research into this decision making process.

[rotorspeed]

In a rotary there is simply no reason to ever go inadvertently IMC, assuming VFR pilot and machine. Just go lower and slower, and when you get too low turn round and go back, or land. But what ever you do, never, ever, lose visual contact with the ground. And if you need to turn, do so to your side, (ie to the right in most helos) so you can keep the ground in your door window as you turn. End of story.

Victor two: you could have descended and slowed, and then turned back in VMC if it was deteriorating too much. No doubt because of their aircraft's inherent stability, and the fact they tend to fly higher, fixed wing PPLs tend to go IMC more often, but such an approach in a rotary is a recipe for disaster.

I believe too much emphasis is placed on the importance of some IMC training. You are either VFR in a VFR machine, or instrument rated in a IFR machine. A little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.

Just think, you don't take the "go lower and slower" rule far enough, and you get into IMC, what height are you going to be at? Less than 500 ft? Almost certainly - you'd be an even bigger idiot to end up in IMC higher than this. So, you're now IMC with the ground less (probably much less) than 500ft away. Assuming you can even do a big turn on instruments, the chances of losing 500ft in the process are pretty high. You may get lucky and control the airspeed and vertical speed well, but you've got every chance of boring a hole in the ground, even assuming you emerge a hundred or so feet above the misty ground.

Given the same initial situation, ie getting into IMC low level, (assuming ice is not an issue) our IFR pilot/machine would climb straight ahead at max IMC rate, get to MSA, and then decide where to go to get down again. Assuming he did this, our VFR pilot has no approach plates to refer to, no experience of making an IMC approach, probably limited fuel and a massive amount of anxiety. A pretty lethal mix.

Night poses greater risks of going inadvertent IMC, but then you've got to be much more cautious. Only follow routes with reasonable ground lighting, keep high, and always be wary of your visibility decreasing. If you could see a town 7 kms away and then it disappears, a big chunk of cloud has just got in the way. Descend until it returns in sight, then think sensibly what to do. Intermittent use of landing light to check for moisture is very valuable.

[Vfrpilotpb]

Pressonitiss seems to be some type of strange thing that make's normally sound thinkers into blinkered half wits,

Where I live we are surrounded by reasonable smooth yet hard rolling hills , part of the mid Pennines in the UK, many helicopters fly directly over my office/house in many different types of weather, you would be supprised at the amount of really good helicopters that fly low to keep in touch with mother earth, but then "just to get over the hill top" go IMC, with the Pylons and radio masts that also abound, many times have I held my breath waiting for that awful crump, and then silence!

These comparativly low hills, have captured many aircraft, and helicopters, flown by Pilots who should have known better, but yet took a chance!

Peter R-B

[Banjo]

Peter R-B couldn't agree more.

That is exactly why I believe the importance should not be on a small amount of instrument "appreciation" during the new JAA PPL (asking for trouble when mixed with the wrong personality) but in fact a sensible CRM/Captaincy type course to prevent flying into those conditions in the first place.

We have it in the commercial world when will(or how many have to die before) the CAA decide that PPl's should also attend such courses as part of gaining their licence.

[helicopter-redeye]

Banjo

the question might better be “how can we teach pilots to be more flexible in their decision making process and improve their judgment so as to prevent them from placing themselves in such a position?”

Quite agree. IMHO realistically it is about effective supervision of low time pilots after PPL so that people are flying alone in increasingly more challenging situations, within their competency range.

The challenge is where supervision is not welcome because a low time pilot has purchased a helicopter and operate outside of the flying club/ hire/ experienced group boundary.

At the same time, most (all?) of fatal UK R44 accidents since '94 have involved higher hour pilots (usually IMC + Night conditions), hence the first question about "what to do, what if".

IMHO again, it is on the boundary of day VFR that the biggest 'did'nt see it coming' risk occurs because of early morning fog not cleared or rising fog just after CET.

VFRP (PRB) you know there are 60+ aircraft wreaks in the Dark Peak, all of whom 'missed' missing the top by about 30 feet. But not one helicopter (and lets keep it that way).

h-r

[rotorspeed]

It doesn't need the CAA to do anything. It needs more instructors to bang in to heads of their pupils the kind of thing I've said above and to give them some practical experience and training of the hazards of poor weather and how to handle it.

This is a practical issue; use of the mark one eyeball, anticipation, judgement, co-ordination. Just what helo pilots are supposed to be good at.

[eagle 86]

Many years ago whilst flying with the famous "Speechless One" doing an A2 upgrade, I had a Seaking back to 20 KIAS, SAS out, single engine, actual off Portsmouth to recover the "ball" from the trail - I was very current!! You must be current big time and half-arsed instrument ratings only delay the inevitable.
PS Sim time is great but there is nothing like 100% real aircraft time to sort the men from the boys!!
GAGS
E86

[Banjo]

I have to say that I would prefer pilots learning not to place themselves in a position of inadvertent IMC rather than being able to just avoid it/escape it if they get in to it.

With certain peoples make up (and owner pilots can be some of the worst) a little experience will make them think they are able to fly in such conditions and one day they and their passengers luck will run out.

Any experienced IFR pilot will tell you that if you do not stay in regular practice you quickly lose your skills. A PPL with little initial training and no recurring training will never have the skills needed to save themselves when lost in IMC. (Don't forget also that a clear night with no ground lighting as can be found in parts of the UK also constitute a dangerous situation where instrument skills may/will be required. (More than one aircraft has flown in to the ground on a clear night due to lack of references flown by both commercial and private pilots).Taught the decision making process that leads them not to launch in the first place in to such conditions will leave them in a much safer place.

This weekend may well be a sad example.

The 206 lost this weekend crashed close to my home. At the time I was contemplating a short motorway trip to visit a friend. As the weather conditions were very bad and I could not see the end of my garden (rain/mist/low cloud and wind) I spent a few minutes deciding if the trip was worth it or not knowing as I do that the motorway would be full of tailgaters driving way to fast for the conditions. This process of weighing up the pro's and cons was for a simple car trip let alone a flight.

The pilot of the Jet Ranger put down in a field after finding the conditions too bad. Sensible choice. It would then appear that after being on the ground for a while for whatever reason he decided to leave the safety of the field and take off again with the result that all on board perished. Why was this decision made? We will never know suckers gap, lack of information, feeling better once on the ground or group decision making process, not always a good idea. A tragedy that flying skills alone could maybe not save but the ability to decide not to fly again in such conditions would mean all would surely have gone home to their families.

I don’t completely disagree with you Rotorspeed but sadly not all instructors teach such behaviour or even have the right attitude themselves. Also once qualified PPL’s need never see the instructor again but a 3 yearly course to attend would at least help to keep the people thinking about the issues. This would have to be something mandated by the CAA as in the commercial world. Also instructors should have more emphasis on teaching such captaincy skills to students.

For those interested I decided not to make the drive as conditions really were awful and the trip was not that important.

Banjo.

P.S. I do not mean to tar all PPL’s or owner pilots with the same brush I am merely generalising based on my experiences there will always be exceptions to any rule. And yes I realise there are ATPL/CPL holders out there just as bad but no system is perfect. Nor do I know for a fact that it was pilot error in the accident and admit to pre-judging the outcome based on the conditions at the time. That is why I said this weekend …..may well….be a sad example. If I turn out to be wrong then I offer my full and unconditional apologies.

[vaqueroaero]

Very interesting reading.
I shall now share an experience that I had a few weeks ago, that upon reflection was very close to life ending, but has been life changing.
I work for a gentleman who owns his own 206, is a rated pilot with maybe 200 hours flight time. He owns a ranch and the helipad is just shy of 4000 feet msl.
We had been up at the ranch all day and the clouds had what I would define as a very distinct base. You either had cloud or you didn't. We could also see the ocean some 25 miles away, so visibility was not a problem at all. Also the cloud layer ended maybe 5 miles from us and from then on the sky was clear.

We finished doing what we were doing and it was getting late, but I was not bothered about the return journey as we have done it many many times and there was sufficient light to get us out of the hills and over very well lit ground.
The helipad is situated on the top of a hill. We fired up and in my mind the ceiling was maybe 200 feet above us, so once again no problem. We would pick up and go off the pad and drop straight down in to the valley, which I knew was clear because we had just driven up it, and away, as I have done so before. By this time the main consideration was failing light rather than clouds.
Anyway to my surprise (I'm left seat, my boss right seat flying) we pick up and go straight. This takes us toward high ground, the top of which looked as though it was clear. As we climbed up, maybe 100 feet agl , to my surprise we started getting the tell tale 'whispy bits' of cloud coming past the bubble. I immediatley said "Stop climbing" thinking he would get the collective down and start a right turn to take us away down the valley. No response from the right seat.

By this time we were in it. Now I'm not talking low/poor visibility here. I'm talking full on IMC. To compound the problem the landing light was on, which fills the cockpit with an eerie white light. Now straight away we start a left turn. I tell him "We're turning! we're turning!" " Which way?!" he replies. The initial turn I felt 'seat of my pants' and confirmed it by looking over at the artificial horizon. Now as if the situation wasn't bad enough already the bulb on the artificial horizon was burned out. We were, I estimate, in a 45 degree left turn. Experience tells me that to the left there is a rather large hill. Luckily there was sufficient light that I could just make out the instrument. Maybe it was a good thing the landing light was on.
At this point I grab the aircraft from him, yelling " Get off, Get off!" as he had somewhat frozen up.

I pulled us back around to the right and remember looking at the artificial horizon and seeing that we were now in a gentle right turn. I have no idea what any of the other instruments were doing.
Through sheer good fortune, luck, God's good grace, whatever you might want to call it, we popped out in to a sucker hole after what seemed like an eternity. Straight away I bottomed the collective and descended. I remember seeing the ground as black in front of me and saying "Oh S**t" as my depth perception was messed up and by now the light was very bad. Luckily I saw a lake beneath me which indicated I was a good 750 agl. The more we dropped the better visibility became and I levelled off and we flew home.

So lessons learned from that? I don't even know where to start. Primarily I shouldn't have let the situation get as out of hand as it did. I have about 3200 hours all in helicopters and am instrument and commercially rated and also have an instructor ticket. In my opinion I was very slow in my reaction time. As soon as I saw the clouds coming past the bubble, rather than saying something, I should have done something i.e. get on the controls straight away. I also in the failing light underestimated the cloud base, thinking it was higher than it was. The entry in to the clouds was immediate. There was no gradual loss of visibility. It happened in a couple of seconds.

We are fitting a new artificial horizon. We have set ourselves an absolute latest time of departure. ( I live on the ranch, so was in no hurry to be going anywhere)

I remember thinking as we were fully in the clouds what a stupid way to kill myself and that frankly I knew better. I was honestly resigned to the fact that we were screwed and can promise you that the feeling that you get as you wait to slam into the ground is very, very unpleasant, particularly as you can't see anything.

Luckily a few days before I had done an instrument refresher course. Whether that helped or not I don't know. The thing is that it all happened so damn fast. From lift off to popping out into the sucker hole was maybe 2 minutes. As someone wrote earlier it is the transition from outside to inside that messes you up. When you are training you are ready for it to happen, so there is no surprise. When it happens for real and is unexpected you frankly crap yourself.

I consider myself to be very fortunate to have got out of it alive, primarily because we were so close to the ground having just lifted off.

I have also heard the last words of a student pilot caught under a cloud layer in an R22. The last words that he said were" I'm going to try and get on top." It took three weeks to find him in the ocean.

The most important lesson of all though is: DON'T GET IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE!

[Thomas coupling]

vaqueroaero, thanks for sharing that with us!
Did your boss ever thank you for saving his life?

Mind boggling.............................

[Homer_Jay]

A very though provoking thread. I can only echo the sentiments of those out there advising against unplanned IMC in that avoiding it is the best cure for it. Land if you have to and wait for an improvement in the weather.

There seem to be some on here that consider that going unplanned IMC while not trained to instrument fly will solve the danger posed by the weather. All you have done is traded one simple problem for a much tougher one. If you manage to control the aircraft and keep it under control, eventually you will have to land before the fuel runs out. That means an instrument approach, if the weather is good enough. If not you could end up right back where you started.

I am a reasonably experienced rotary wing instrument pilot. In a former life I was an Instrument Rating Examiner for the organisation I worked for. IMHO, the toughest instrument flying you will ever do, even if you are fully trained and current, is fly into IMC unplanned and get your butt safely back on the ground. This is especially so if you are single pilot without any AFCS.

Do not be afraid to turn back or land in the face of bad weather.

Press on itis occurs because people get away with it. Just because you got through the bad weather once does not make it safe. You can expect that whatever angels were sitting on your shoulder at that particular time will desert you if you fail to learn the lessons of pressing when you should turn back.

[chopperchav]

I am a low time private pilot (100 hours) and own a R44 and am hence not restricted by the self hire 2500' cloud base, 2 kt winds etc constraints. I guess that puts me in a dangerous group of accidents waiting to happen.
Having read umpteen accident reports, 'fatal traps', done the robinson safety course etc, I know that clouds=death. However, I have flown with two separate instructors in marginal conditions and have gone momentarily imc both times. Knowing clouds=death I s**t myself both times and questioned wether these instructors were wrong to expose me to these conditions hence encouraging me to fly on my own in similar weather.
As a novice pilot I am ever hungry for experience and am glad to have experienced those conditions with an instructor and not on my own and feel I am better pilot as a result of it.
I feel the 5 hours learning instrument flying would be better spent flying in marginal conditions with an experienced instructor learning how to maintain vmc (ie. go lower and slower etc.).
However, having witnessed a guy jump out of an R44 yesterday with wife and two small boys and 'dog' and rotors still winding down, boys running under tail boom (I kid you not), I guess some people will kill themselves no matter what you try and teach them. No wonder us owner pilots get a bad reputation.

[SASless]

I set a rule for myself a long time ago....for VMC flight at night, in bad weather, and over mountainous terrain.....any one is okay but no more than one at a time. When corporate flying in the mountains east of Seattle....and returning to home at night...my rule was cast in stone....off the pad...through the pass and in the well lit flatter ground by official night time. No debate...no argument...no discussion. If the execs wante to palavver past the deadline...we went to a local motel and flew home the next morning.

After scaring the bejesus out of all us when in a weak moment I let them convince me to fly in some windy and bumpy weather...we came to an unspoken plan that when the pilot said not today....they took their cars and not the helicopter.

All it takes is one moment of in-attention or loss of situational awareness for any reason and you can be in serious trouble quicker than a taxi driver will accept a tip.

[IntheTin]

Having just read all the replies on this subject I would like to say thank you lads. The experience you are passing on is invaluble and I'm glad you are all here to share it.

I am only a 100 hour student doing my stage 2 instrument. I have never doubted the value of learning to fly by instruments alone, but I have since learned by just being in the FTD that if I ever have the missfortune of flying into the fluffy stuff then I at least know how to get my arse back down to the ground, cos thats where I want to be!

Thanks again. I look forward to reading more! :ok:

[rotorspeed]

Frankly it is ludicrous to say one suddenly ended up in IMC "with no warning". Nothing is up there but open sky! This is not like the road, where you can come round a corner and suddenly there is an obstruction! Evidence of the visibility ahead is constantly in front of you - provided you look hard enough!

The lack of visibility we are talking about will be simply down to water; either as precipitation (rain) or vapour (cloud). Cloud just not materialise instantly out of nowhere, it builds up. OK, sometimes quite quickly, but not in seconds!

Apart from freak conditions - and we're not talking about that here - imminent IMC entry is always predictable, provided you don't just sit there, fat, dumb and happy, steaming on in decreasing vis, too fast, without being fully aware of what's building up.

Keep a sensible minimium vis, depending on your experience, say 2000m, and whenever this decreases, especially rapidly, do a 180 and take stock of the situation. And get that speed down - you'll spot the problem earlier and you'll be able to do a tighter 180 to avoid it sooner.

[Rotorbee]

rotorspeed:
You do not need freak conditions and you can have 10 miles of visibility to get into a situation where all outside reference is lost. Flying in the winter in Alaska, in the mountains or over water with an overcast is an eyeopener . There was one accident where a company lost 3 ships on the same glacier on the same day. Fortunately nobody was killed, but those three pilots where neither inexperienced nor stupid.
And reducing your speed isn't always a solution, because at lower speeds a helicopter is less stable.

I can tell you from my own experience, that sometimes it just takes a second to get into very dangerous situations just because you look in the wrong direction. I admit, that I should have turned around way earlier, but 30 seconds before that, the situation wasn't all that bad and I could still see for miles.

Never ever follow a more experienced pilot because you trust him. Take your own decisions.

[vaqueroaero]

Rotorspeed - it is very easy to end up IMC with no warning, particularly at night. You simply do not see clouds.
In my situation you're correct, it was ludicrous what happened because we had fantastic visibility. The main problem was that in failing light I underestimated the ceiling height from our point of take off and within 5 or 10 seconds from take off was full IMC. Poor light plays tricks. Trust me, lesson learned.

Although some training is good to get an appreciation of flying under instruments until you have actually flown IMC you have no idea what it is like. I remember that once I had completed my instrument training as far as I was concerned I could have flown through a hurricane. It was not until I actually flew with an experienced pilot IMC that I realised that it is totally different. At that point I reralised a huge lesson: DON'T GET YOURSELF IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE.

To all those taking instrument lessons good luck, but trust me on this one: be under no illusion that you are skilled enough to be able to fly IMC.

You'll only get out of it alive if you're lucky.

[Three Blades]

I have been reading this forum for some time but this thread has spurred me to register and reply.

I am feeling quite sick inside and rather happy to still be here judging from the stories above and some of the statistics.

Not long after gaining my licence I took off for a local flight in overcast conditions with a low cloudbase. Suffice it to say that the cloudbase was not well defined and I ended up in IMC. By the time I had looked down at the instruments, I had gained 300' and was in a left turn. Possibly because I had only recently finished the 5hrs of instrument appreciation, I managed to regain control, 180 and get back to VMC. I went straight back home, enough seen for the day. I was happy to just be alive and, having read this thread, I now appreciate just how lucky I was. Not only could I have been responsible for my own death but also my passenger and those on the ground that I could have hit. I have not flow anywhere near clouds or bad vis areas since. Lesson learned.

Whilst the 5hrs of instrument appreciation may have saved me on that occasion, the little bit of knowledge also probably allowed me to go on in conditions that I would otherwise not have. Those 5hrs are now some years away and I expect now useless. I must agree with all the suggestions above that more emphasis should be aimed at teaching the PPL to go nowhere near IMC, it is truly a deathtrap to the non-IFR pilot.

I have learned a lot from this forum. Thank you to you all for sharing your experiance and knowledge, it has great value.

[Banjo]

Thank you three blades for your reply. I am sure that there are lots of people reading the posts who never reply to them we can see that from the counters. It is nice however when you get someone like yourself post and let us know that our ramblings are having an effect on some out there and maybe will help a few of the silent readers in their future flying. I have to agree with you that your distant 5 hours training are probably of next to no use to you by now. As you say the only answer is to avoid in the first place completely any instrument conditions flight.

Rotorspeed, I call it instrument conditions flight above because cloud and rain are not the only things to cause you to require flight by sole reference to instruments. As mentioned by Rotorbee there are white out conditions and lack of visible horizon due to haze or lighting and surface conditions. I have flown in Arizona at night and trust me when I say it is very easy to start to wonder which side is up when surrounded by hundreds of square miles of nothing with no ground light at all. You also have smog and industrial effects as well as many other traps which only time and a good instructor can go through for you. To say that it is ludicrous to end up inadvertent instrument flight is sadly not true. Yes some people get there because they had a set of blinkers on but others can arrive at that point who are conscientious pilots and simply got caught out by changing conditions quicker than their pilot/captaincy skills could cope with.

When it comes to accidents of any sort I have one golden rule I teach all my students,


“If you believe it could never happen to you then one day it probably will!!!”


This is for the simple reason that it shows an attitude that belittles the problem and blames such incidents on the pilot concerned and takes the though process no further as to how the various factors (and there are always many) combined to end in a smoking hole in the ground.

As I go through your posts on this subject I find myself wondering if one day we shan’t all be reading about you in a report. I say this not to start an argument but to promote honest inward exploring and thought. I do not know you and may well be wrong about your attitude and if so please accept my fullest apologies. However I am sure that I am not alone amongst the experienced pilots here and that if they are honest several of them have probably also thought the same reading your posts. As an aside, the go slower lower principle is only so useful. The obvious final point of a go slower and lower approach is to end up in a hover from one field to another a “relatively” safe but silly situation to be in. Long before this though on the way down you will have a good chance of hitting wires etc. or whilst going slower you will reduce speed to the point where any stability you may have had has gone and the results are predictable. Never go slower than 40 knots this speed can be faster in different types of A/C.


Anne Tenner I could not agree more. The hardest decision to make is to not fly when others are. The situation you describe of several helicopters departing from one location puts immense pressure on a nervous pilot who would rather not fly to say yes and follow them. (Remember fear is the feeling in your stomach you get when your brain says no and your mouth says yes). We must help to teach pilots to have the knowledge and strength of character to make such decisions.
It is for that reason that I started this thread to encourage the more experienced pilots to air their views in front of the less experienced so that they can see it is more than fine to say no to a flight and stay on the ground no matter what others are doing. It is in fact exactly what you should be doing and there is no shame in it.

[GLSNightPilot]

Rotorspeed, I wish you good luck, but I think you're wrong. It can happen with no warning at all, especially at night. If you believe it can't then I suggest you continue to stay on the ground.

[SASless]

GLS is spot on...can happen in day time but at least you can see up until the last instant. At night....it can happen before you can blink.

Trotting along...aircraft all trimmed up...attitude hold working....setting up the telephone for the med crew in the back...looked up....and Hello! Nada...nothing...just a very puzzled looking mirror image of a handsome debonair helicopter pilot that looked amazingly like me. Fortunately, had a Flight Director and Autopilot....woke George up....got him all sorted out....rotated the heading bug around to whence I had come....few minutes later back out into the inky blackness but some lights on the ground....called approach and got a clearance....and on home we went. If it had been an unstabilized VMC machine.....well now...that would have been a much different story.

[Gaseous]

The sheer number of 'it happened to me' stories here make me think it is very common. It has certainly happened to me, a couple of times, and despite spouting here about it before, it happened again a couple of weeks ago - and no, I didn't see it coming, and I was 400 feet lower than the expected cloud base. I did a 180 and went home. I wont bore you with the details but I am realistic to know that flying in Northern Britain there is a strong possiblity it will happen again unless one only flies in clear blue skies.

[UwantME2landWHERE!]

Like many others, I have followed this thread with interest. And no doubt I am not the only one who has had that unmistakable feeling in the pit of your stomach remembering my own brush with I-IMC while reading others accounts.
However, in some posts, I sense an almost naive understanding of the situations. Not about the subject of I-IMC, but that all flights are unimportant (in retrospect almost all lack importance in the event of an accident) or that staying on the deck or landing in a field miles from nowhere is an easy decision to make.
Commercial pressures are easy to blame after the fact, but very little of my flying is to places I want to go, with pax I want to fly, at times and conditions I want to fly in.
I once heard a commercial instructor say 'There are limits that both you and your aircraft are subject too and under no circumstances must these be exceeded, however you must be able to fly up to these limits.'
We have all flown in marginal conditions, knowing when you have exceeded those minimums is the key, and that's normally only after you've just given yourself a scare..!

Safe flying all. :ok:

[407 too]

Quote:
"I set a rule for myself a long time ago....for VMC flight at night, in bad weather, and over mountainous terrain.....any one is okay but no more than one at a time."

good plan to LIVE by !!

more should adopt this outlook


it always helps to have a poor flyer (passenger) on board, they will usually want to abort before you do:ok:

[Ascend Charlie]

Don't forget smoke...

While working on bushfires in the Blue Mountains (west of Sydney) a few years back, I was required to report for bucketing duty at a spot a few miles away, around the rim of a large curved bowl. The only way to get there with certainty was to follow the 400'-high sandstone cliffs (at 3500' elevation) through the fires and smoke.

So, I puttered along at about 40kt, with the cliffs out to my right about 100' away, and all around me was white smoke. Except for the Navy Sea King that suddenly appeared in front of me, coming the other way, using the cliffs for a reference. And he was marginally closer to the cliff than me.

Only option was a snappy left turn away from the collision, and there I was, suspended in smoky space, with an unknown distance to the cliffs at the other side. First thought was to gently turn back towards the cliff and feel my way back to its visual reference, but after about 45 degrees of turn, I realised that it would appear just as suddenly as the Sea King had, and if I was coming at it at 90 degrees, I couldn't stop. So, turn back away from the cliff, lock onto the clocks, and pull the collective to fly away.

I didn't pop out until I was at 7000', well clear of the ground, as I had been climbing inside the massive smoke column. But at least my instrument training and experience from the military years before gave me the ability to still be here. :uhoh:

[SASless]

407 too,

I have another rule I live by..."The one dissenting vote rule." During my brief to the med crew or fire crew or working passengers such as biologists, etc....I raise the issue of "getting un-comfy with the situation....all it takes is one "No" vote and it is home we go or whatever it takes to get comfy again."

The biggest fright I ever gave myself without a doubt was on a ferry flight from Alaska to Lafayette, Louisana at the end of a summer season in Alaska haulling around cored drills with a Hughes 500D.

Those being the real cowboy days.....I was flying a machine that had a few defects....one of them being the airspeed indicator did not work. Having flown the machine all summer....I had gotten used to the airspeed/power combinations so I wasn't really fussed. (Statute of limitations having run out I can talk now). The machine also had no gyro instruments in it...just a mag compass and a single VHF comm.

It was a very hazy day as I approached the Grand Canyon at warp speed low level in the Go Fast......and vis being really poor....I began to look for the canyon....and look and look and look. Finally, I picked up the map...did the "lets unfold this thing...without flying into the ground routine". Got the map unfolded....refolded....then tried to figure out where I was. Being about brain dead....I was spending way too much time peering at the map....and merely glancing at the outside long enough only to make sure I was staying high enough to clear the sage brush.

About the time I was going to give up on the map....I developed a rather strange feeling...of being in a brown colored ping pong ball....I had flown off the North Rim of the Grand Canyon at 130 knots in a helicopter with zero instruments....not even a trim string...with horizontal and vertical vis of about a thousand feet. Might I remind you that at that point.....my vertical vis was about three thousand feet short of enough and the rim of the canyon was very rapidly disappearing behind me and I could only just barely make it out through the dust haze.

By the time I got back to the North Rim....I felt the need to land and walk around a bit.....but could not because I could not get my knees to quit shaking for what seemd like an hour. Except for not having enough fuel to go around the Canyon....I would certainly have done so....but one can fly down the side of the thing...find the bottom...scoot across to the other side and up the South Rim and off you go.

The current concept is "Situational Awareness". I did not have it that day.

Another thought....if the other pilot asks you what you think about the weather....that is a sign he doesn't like it...I always say...looks bad to me....what do you think. If the other guy needs reassurance he just might be seeing something you are not. Refer to the one dissenting vote rule in this situation.

[rotorspeed]

So, some of you seem to disagree with my view that good piloting skills should ensure you never end up in IMC with no warning.

OK, let's put to one side the issue of darkness, just for a minute. My comments have been centred on the big accident killer - certainly in Europe, and that is losing orientation and crashing in daylight, in poor weather; low cloud, drizzle rain etc.

Now I still maintain that, assuming you are a VFR pilot in a VFR machine, you should never get into IMC in these conditions, essentially by using the principles I have said earlier. And Banjo, if you read carefully what I said, that is to go lower and slower "and when you get too low turn round and go back, or land." Now if your view of when that point would be is a high hover over a field, that is a big worry. In Europe we have the 500ft rule if relevant and common sense judgement.

I think everyone here agrees that for a VFR pilot disorientation with lack of ground reference, is a very high risk situation. Exactly what happens in the final seconds before the accidents in such conditions.

But now I am puzzled. There are those of you who think such IMC situations cannot be avoided because they can be sudden, and who also accept that entry into such situations is highly dangerous. So what is it, just luck that determines when you have an IMC LOC accident? Perhaps we have found a clue as to why there are so many such accidents, because too many believe such situations cannot be avoided? I certainly would only want to travel with a pilot who believed our safety was firmly in his hands, catastrophic mechanical failure etc apart.

So please tell me, what actions/technique should pilots be employing to ensure they don't end up having these accidents? And it's no good just saying well they shouldn't go, because we all know weather conditions change en route, apart from anything else. What pilots here need is some good, practical advice as to how to handle such poor weather situations when they find them developing, and that's what I have tried to do.

Another tip, by the way, for the novices. When raining, always try and avoid bringing wet clothes into the cabin. A full complement of pax with wet coats will often provide moisture beyond the capability of the demister, leaving you in a virtual IMC condition. And get the screen fully demisted before you lift off.

Night flying? Well I have made comments earlier:

"Night poses greater risks of going inadvertent IMC, but then you've got to be much more cautious. Only follow routes with reasonable ground lighting, keep high, and always be wary of your visibility decreasing. If you could see a town 7 kms away and then it disappears, a big chunk of cloud has just got in the way. Descend until it returns in sight, then think sensibly what to do. Intermittent use of landing light to check for moisture is very valuable."

If you are not absolutely confident a flight can be safely carried out with sufficiently good reference to ground or ambient lighting to avoid IMC entry, you shouldn't be there as a VFR pilot in a VFR machine. The flight must be carried out by an IR pilot in an IFR machine.

[Vfrpilotpb]

One of my very good friends, once took me in his twin Squirrel cloud base at the time was about 1000 but was clear on top at 5000, his craft had all the bells and whistles that anyone could use, and so orft we went, as we climbed into the white stuff I sort of went all quiet and whilst I trusted him implicitly found that I could not agree with what the art/horizon was telling me, I had a full throated feeling that I was leaning to the left.

As planned we burst through at a tad under 5k to find vision all the way to Hellios, but I never want to feel like that again, very unnerving, and a situation that did not cure its self till vision was resumed, Day light and nearcloudless skies are my bag.

My acorn aint that big, in fact that cloud type flying almost makes me a Ladyman!!


PeterR-B

[Banjo]

Rotorspeed, I certainly do not think that a high hover is the time to give up in fact I think it is plain from my post that I said this was a “silly position to be in” and I was using polite words to describe that. Please feel free to insert a stronger phrase of your choice.

You mention the 500’ rule, I assume that you do not advocate this as a suitable limit to descend to before giving up. I would suggest that by the time you have come within 500’ of the ground as an inexperienced PPL (we are obviously not discussing current IFR pilots in suitable machines in this thread) then you are already way to close to meeting your maker.

I can not recall the exact date and am sure someone here will point me to it but I remember an accident back in 2003 involving a Hughes 369HS (OH-6) near Sevenoaks which was sadly fatal. The aircraft was at 500’ when it entered a descent of around 1500 FPM and impacted the ground at cruise speed of around 80kts and with a nose down attitude of approx 35-40 degrees if memory serves me right.

From 500’ to impact took just over ten seconds!

When you consider that it takes approximately 9 seconds for an experienced and current pilot to fully establish on instruments from an unexpected I-IMC event 500’ is just too close for comfort. The pilot had no idea until the last instant that he was in a turn or a descent. He had not shown any signs of being aware of the aircrafts flight path. Accident investigators suggested that this could have been due to the descending and turning movements masking each other from his sensory systems.

What makes this accident different were the weather conditions. What were they?
In excess of 10K visibility and a few clouds in excess of 3000 (yes thousand) feet. The pilot was apparently changing the radio frequency and looking inside at the time.

This accident though not an IMC incident does involve spatial orientation problems and also a large amount of captaincy failure. I mention it in response to Rotorspeeds question

So please tell me, what actions/technique should pilots be employing to ensure they don't end up having these accidents?

More Captaincy /CRM type skills need to be taught. As this accident shows and others here have mentioned you can become unaware of your attitudes in more situations than just rain and clouds. We need to train pilots to be able to manage the aircraft and make informed decisions and act on them.

This means everything from teaching decision making processes and stressing the relevant parts of human factors to Met so that forecasts can be understood and conditions en route can be analysed if in fact they are not as predicted.
(as an aside how many PPL’s when taking their written tests at the flying club had a little “help” from others around or during the debrief from the tester to make sure they passed. I know I have seen it happen and talked to others who have experienced it and it is totally outrageous but I am sure it still happens in some of the less reputable clubs today and needs to be stamped out).
By teaching such skills we are not only helping to prevent I-IMC accidents we are also helping to prevent people flying when too tired or when their mind is on the business meeting they have just left. Taking off in an aircraft and running out of fuel because they where paying too much attention to the navigation due to poor pre flight planning or other distractions happens far far too often.

At the private pilot level in the rotary world I do not think we should be teaching instrument appreciation. There is no compulsory re-training so once you have your shiny new licence you need never practice such skills again. 5 hours flown several years ago will not help you when the soft brown stuff hits the large spinning thing. Good CRM/Captaincy skills that you use every time you fly though will stay with you and improve and help you to avoid such positions before they occur.

SASless you “handsome debonair helicopter pilot” you crack me up. Completely agree though I-IMC at night can easily happen with no warning but I do not see how we can teach PPL’s and keep them current to recover from such a situation without demanding a lot more training and recurring training at that. Stay away from it is my advice to them as I am sure you feel also.

[Homer_Jay]

SASless,

I almost fell off my chair with the leans just reading that. Please warn people before you tell that story.

Uwantme2landwhere,

There are such things as personal limits which we all should not fly beyond. The legal limit is exactly that and it should not be busted.

Chopperchav,

'Clear of cloud' means exactly that. Not 'in it for a second and then we're out'. Those instructors were failing as teachers. To quote a text on flying instruction...'the instructor shall demonstrate the highest standards of airmanship at all times'

[The Nr Fairy]

Banjo:

The accident report you refer to is available from the AAIB website (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/january_2005/hughes_369hs__g_cspj.cfm) as a PDF document.

From the report, The Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) for Biggin Hill for the period between 0700 hrs and 1600 hrs on 19 July 2003 gave a surface wind of 190°/10 kt with visibility in excess of 10 km and scattered cloud at 3,000 feet agl. At 0820 hrs an actual weather observation at Biggin Hill Airport recorded a surface wind of 160°/08 kt, varying in direction between 130° and 210°, with visibility in excess of 10 km and no cloud below 5,000 feet agl. The temperature was 22°C and the dew point was 16°C. In general the weather was fine, typical of a good summer's day, and it remained so for the duration of G-CSPJ's flight.

so I'm not convinced inadvertent IMC is relevant here, but you do make a good point about high rates of descent achievable under certain conditions.

[Banjo]

Thanks for that NR. I knew someone would have the report about. I did mention in the post that this was not an IMC but does show how impossible it is to tell what an aircraft is doing by "seat of pants" as well as captaincy skills.

If you want to see a high rate of descent then look no further than an auto in a scout, talk about a brick. Great fun though!

[coorong]

Some good comments about avoiding inadvertant IMC. I think a major part of the problem is the lack of relevant practical training on how to assess the weather [with implications if worse than forecast], the importance of having an escape route if it all turns into a can of worms and the actual flying techniques required to achieve a safe recovery to a safe location.

I believe that this part of training has been neglected for several reasons. Firstly, it is not specifically required in any flight test for professional/private flying [as far as I am aware]. You can be the finest poler on Earth, but without being tested in poor weather scenario no one would aware of your shortcomings in poor wx [including YOU].

Training-wise, it can be awkward to teach and there is no set method for instructors to follow. It is not normally a set part of most training syllabi and gets glossed over, despite the flight-safety implications. When I used to instruct or ran training programs, I ensured that it was taught correctly with ground and air scenarios using practical techniques. With basic rotary training on poor [not marginal!] weather days, I would get airborne with students to both convince them that it was a serious business and give them practical airmanship instruction in how to safely deal with deteriorating weather [day or night].

If you have plenty of experience like some of the contributors here, then you probably do not require extra training. If you do lack experience, I suggest you find a very experienced instructor, invest some dosh for a days training and learn!!

I think part of the reason why poor wx accidents recur with such regularity is that there is little realistic flying training in this area. Part of this could be that it is very common to have instructors teaching PPLs with just a few hundred flying hours. They therefore lack experience flying in poor conditions. This will obviously cause a problem in both terms of credibility and capability as an instructor. What compounds it that these instructors were sometimes taught to fly by people of similar ability!.

When you combine the above factors, it should not be in the least surpising that poor wx. flying should cause anxiety at best and burning wreckage at worst.:E

[helicopter-redeye]

I think part of the reason why poor wx accidents recur with such regularity is that there is little realistic flying training in this area. Part of this could be that it is very common to have instructors teaching PPLs with just a few hundred flying hours.


The other aspect of this is, of course, poor "supervision" (as in my first post) especially amongst the owner population and even more so amongst the off-site-owner population (no Joe in the Tower to pass comment as the voice of last resort).

Supervision, as a part of captaincy, does not have to involve a regular FI check ride, or more regaulation by the appropriate authority.

It can, as a part of captaincy, rightly include effective self briefing on wx/ sites/ en route weather/ hazards; consultation with other pilots, including the FI and personal limits.

If there is no risk, then nobody ever leaves the circuit. Too much and they die. The line between the two is difficult to assess without experience, hence the importance of some form of ongoing supervision and training over time, to keep practices sharp (& the LPC does not do that).

[SASless]

Pray tell what is "Captaincy"?

Is that another example of class consciousness or some term created by a British Gentleman to describe a pilot who happens to be the P-I-C of an aircraft....which includes single pilot aircraft...from student pilots right the way up to the guy in charge of a multi-pilot, multi-crew long distance international flight.

[Homer_Jay]

SASless,

I think you are reading too much into it. Captaincy is the quality of being the captain, pilot in command, boss, head cheese, numero uno honcho, she who must be obeyed....sorry that's the wife. Any way the person on the spot in charge making the decisions. Reading some element of class into it is drawing a very long bow.

[helicopter-redeye]

Pray tell what is "Captaincy"?

Seeing as you asked...

It was the first thing that my flying instructor described to me and said was a key element of learning to fly, all those years ago.

[SASless]

Oh, spare me!

Easy things can be so complicated with effort. Which seat is the Captain's seat in an aircraft?

Since we have "captaincy" concerns from lesson one....ah, cmon' now.....pull the other one.....the one leg is getting a bit sore!

This is some British dry humour at play here....right?

[rotorspeed]

Banjo

From the report it looked pretty clear that Hughes accident had absolutely nothing to do with spatial disorientation. Bit of a mystery I would say but best guess was that the pilot was simply not looking out of the aircraft (or at his AI/HSI) as he was preoccupied trying to change a radio frequency having probably moved his left hand to the cyclic in the LHD helo. IF that was the cause, it comes back to what I have been banging on about, and that is keep looking at what's keeping you upright - ie the ground, or if you are IMC, the instruments.

With regard to any 500 ft "decision height" for want of a better term, what on earth is the relevance of how long it takes to get orientated on instruments? The whole point is that you should never need to try!

And as for your advice on technique to avoid getting into inadvertent IMC, well sorry, but what a load of old waffle! That's not going to help anyone as they find themselves getting anxious about worsening weather.

Coorong

Agree wholeheartedly. Address that and some good progress might be made!

[verticalhold]

All the above points are valid, however Rotorspeed flight into IMC with no warning does happen. I've seen it in the UK on 3 occasions. One minute VFR, the next fog all around and me sitting in a shrinking hole in the middle of it. The other area no-one has mentioned is the instrument failure situation. A while ago flying an IFR approach into a major airport at night I experienced a screen failure which took out my HSI but left the picture in place. I was very confused for a while just as I was intercepting the localiser. Fortunately I squeaked for help from the ground and the approach controller effectively gave me an SRA until I was happy with my scan taking in the LH seat instruments. I was working hard and I dread to think what would have happened had it been a flight director failure or multiple failures and I was left with the standbys.

My eternal thanks and respect go to that controller at EGGW!

[helicopter-redeye]

This is some British dry humour at play here....right?

Drizzabone Cobber!

:ok:

[[email protected]]

Rotorspeed - the problem with your advice is that it is too simple - if we just said to people before they went flying 'don't crash' it would have about the same effect as your 'don't go below 500' ie none.

In the harsh reality of the GA heli world people get airborne to do something (fly to see friends, have lunch, sightsee etc) and have had to make time in their busy lives to do it. Therefore many of them are unlikely to be put off at the first hurdle (crap weather forecast) as the met man is often wrong and it has got be worth 'giving it a go'.

Then, once airborne the pressure to complete the task and avoid disappointing others or themselves leads pilots into compromising their training.

Even if they started with a 'not below 500' philosophy' they will kid themselves that 'just this once' they can go to 400' just to get round the last bit of bad weather after which it is bound to get better.

Now it's really crap and having compromised their principles once, convince themselves that it is better to push on than turn back - completely ignoring the obvious evidence of lowering cloudbase and worsening vis.

Many pilots have done this and got away with it because the met man was wrong and it really was the last bit of cloud before the wx improved.

But if your luck is out and you keep pushing then inadvertant IMC is almost inevitable, made worse because you are unsure of your position and therfore that of high ground, masts etc and have no idea what your safety altitude is even if you could fly on instruments to get there.

This is how crashes happen.

If you don't believe people get airborne unprepared then why did I have to show an R44 pilot where his intended landing site was yesterday by flying over it and talking him on, because he hadn't checked either the contact frequency or the grid reference before he got airborne.

Unless the CAA mandates instrument training for PPLs, no-one will bother because a. they don't think IIMC will ever happen to them and b. it costs money and the CAA have already taken enough of that from them.

[Vfrpilotpb]

Pilots often seem to ignore advice because of the Macho logic of the male thinking, I know of one skilled Fi who made that mistake and three people died, one through stupidity the other two cos they were pax, and had no control over the Fi who ignored CPL advice of DON,T FLY, he did, they all died, within 16 miles of the take off point

Sadly the Fi had, wanted, needed, but didnt want to stay the night and fly the next day. the lessons are there read AAI GTLME

Vfr

[Gomer Pylot]

It's all well and good to say that one should never get into IMC unexpectedly, but it seems Rotorspeed hasn't had that much experience. Sooner or later it will happen. I was once flying a 206 loaded with tired roughnecks down the beach under a 700' ceiling, with 10 miles or so of visibility, no worries, when the sky just fell on me. The clouds simply opened up and with no warning visibility was near zero in heavy rain and high winds. I immediately made a turn, trying to keep the ground in sight, but the turn didn't help, and I ended up doing a 360 back into the wind and landed on the beach. Half an hour later we continued on. More times than I want to think about I've had the skies dump on me, visibility go to nil, and there I was, saying "Just let me get out of this alive and I'll never never do it again!" Good pilots keep having it happen, and many of them don't survive it, so it's obviously possible. Sticking your head in the sand and saying it's entirely preventable is just silly, IMO. It happens, and one has to be prepared to get out alive. Certainly caution is one of the main ways to live, but more is needed.

[Shawn Coyle]

I recently had the pleasure of flying an R-44 equipped with an AFCS that was designed specficially to keep people out of trouble. (you can find the article in an old edition of Helicopter World).
Basically the reason for the system was to prevent accidents caused by loss of the sight of the visual horizon - a significant percentage of helicopter accidents, by the way.
With the system on, you can trim the helicopter for pitch attitudes between 5 degrees nose up and 5 nose down and 10 degrees of bank (or something similar) If you want to roll to 30 degrees of bank - you have to hold the stick into the turn to maintain the angle of bank. If you let go, it will roll to wings level (or up to 10 degrees angle of bank if that's what you had trimmed it for).
Wonderful system - easy to use, transformed flying the R-44 into a piece of cake - in one 20 minute leg in light turbulence I had to use the trim release 5 times from hover to hover. The system made the same input I would have made, but about one-half to one second before I would have.
I'm waiting for it to get certified...

[Banjo]

Shawn I too have spoken to pilots who have seen the system and I have used simillar with the SAS on the wonderful SA341/2. The trouble again is that the system will only help if used correctly.

Sadly one of the pilots I chatted to (and it was out of three people so not good odds) was already mentioning how it would help him get over the cloud on the high ground to the clear stuff on the other side. Simply climb above the hills set it up and let it take him through the cloud. On the other side he could carry on normally.

I agree a good bit of kit when in the s**t. Sadly though we all know idiots that will use it to kill themselves and while we can not prevent all such people from doing so we can try to cut the numbers down with good teaching of pilot captaincy skills and a better awarness of the dangers of flying. (thats waffle to some I know, sorry).

[raven2]

With all these wise words of wisdom is it possible for ppruner’s to put together a set of immediate actions that a pilot should take at an early stage in the flight if the pilot suspects poor weather conditions ahead?

I was thinking something along the lines of,

1. Identify the problem: Low Cloud, Poor Vis etc.

2. Identify the hazard: High ground to the west

3. Identify escape routes: Is it a 360 degree poor vis or a 180 degree poor vis
4. Identify low-level safe routes: Locate Railway line or road.

5. Take appropriate action depending on the answers to 1-4 above, such as low and slow over a railway line, put down near a town / village now rather than a filed in the middle of no where.


So rather than panicking at the onset of poor conditions the pilot would have a mental formula that could assist in the decision making process in the absence of 1000’s of hours experience.

Raven

[rotorspeed]

Crab

First point is that I didn't simply say use a 500ft minimum height. I said: "we have the 500ft rule if relevant and common sense judgement", so refer to two things, (a) the law and (b) sensible judgement. That might mean 800ft; it might be 300ft, as you know.

I generally agree with your points and whilst I can understand that you feel my advice is too simple, I was trying to reduce the endless detail of advice we could all write, much of it generalised, to the one key thing that could save someone's life if disaster approaches, and that is, whatever you do, keep sight of the ground. Now I agree entirely that it would be much safer if people turned around when the conditions deteriorated below, say, 1000ft base and 5k vis. So of course in theory everyone should decide the appropriate limits, check the weather and not go if not confident they can be maintained.

Except of course, in the real world, advice limited to this will not prevent all accidents. Pilots will sometimes push on if conditions deteriorate, so what advice are we going to give now? Pilots flying VFR are (thankfully) not controlled by ATC so individual judgement will always be crucial. It will always be a grey area and hence the importance of the critical advice in the ultimate situation. I have never said specifically how low you should go, or how slow; I have just said that following that advice to whatever limits are sensible considering pilot experience, law, terrain, etc, can pretty much guarantee you can continue to see the ground and avoid going IMC.

Gomer

You presume I have not got much experience. Depends on how you define that I guess, but I have around 5000 hrs. Not as much as many I admit, but enough to have a valid view.


My position stands, but if consensus really is that inadvertent IMC entry is a hazard that cannot be avoided our various authorities better start the process of implementing minimum training standards and aircraft minimum equipment levels to enable pilots and their passengers to survive such encounters.

So what does anyone thing these standards should be then?

[[email protected]]

Rotor speed - the problem is that you expect every pilot out there to be a good pilot - as you say 'good piloting skills will prevent inadvertant IMC'.

The differing levels of experience and currency mean that those with a tenth of your flying experience will make different decisions to you and me.

There will also always be good instructors who have frightened themselves in the past and will proffer advice and guidance to their students to prevent it happening to them. But, and it is a big BUT - it is not mandated training and many low time pilots are out there instructing with not much more than a PPL themselves.

I believe there should be mandatory 'post graduate' training for all PPLs as much of the skill-base in aviation is perishable and needs constant practise - IF being of particular note.

[rotorspeed]

Crab

I guess you're probably right, and that the level of skills of low time PPLs is variable, to say the least. Don't have any contact with that area but as you say some instructors may have had limited weather appraisal experience too.

Totally agree that better - and recurrent up till say 500 hrs - poor weather training ought to be introduced and carried out by experienced instructors to make some pilots more aware of just how careful you need to be in poor weather, monitoring it continually and making decisive decisions when appropriate. Agreed with Coorong's focus on this too, earlier on this thread. Of course though when you want it a bit ropey it will be CAVOK!

There are just far too many bad weather accidents and they are avoidable. Apart from the tragic loss of life, it doesn't do the image of helicopter travel or insurance premiums any good at all. Wonder if this thread will make any difference? Hope so!

[wishtobflying]

I just wanted to thank everyone who's had input on this thread. This thread, more than any other I can recall reading on PPRuNe, has raised my awareness of instrument flight to a whole new level.

Stay safe out there, and respect the soft fluffy stuff. To bastardise an old quote: "There's rocks in them thar clouds".

Maybe this should be a Sticky for a while ... ?

[GLSNightPilot]

Rotorspeed, if you have flown 5000 hours in a helicopter and never been in inadvertent IMC, or at least very close to it, you are a very lucky man, or else it has taken you a long time, flying only in excellent weather for short periods. I remember very well my last flight in the US Army, coming up the Rhine valley with a brand-new aviator fresh from West Point and Ft Rucker, with the weather as good as it ever got there and forecast to continue. Around Heidelberg we suddenly had to come to a hover over very high powerlines because of a fogbank that appeared in front of us, turned around, and had a fogbank behind us. It wasn't forecast, and just suddenly appeared. We flew a GCA to minimums, and barely got down. It happens to everyone, sooner or later. If we're lucky, we have time to land or go IFR, but if not then we become a statistic. Even instrument-rated pilots sometimes become statistics. The weather changes, and sometimes it does so very suddenly, and the guessers often get it wrong. Certainly landing before the weather deteriorates is the best option, but sometimes there just isn't enough time, because the weather can go to nothing before you can react. If you keep flying, eventually you'll see it, and I hope you don't become another statistic.

[rotorspeed]

GLS

No, never been inadvertent IMC in 5000 hours; yes have been close to it, and have certainly flown in a lot of ****ty weather.

Maybe you're right and I have just been lucky over those hours. However what I do know is that I have been absolutely obsessed with never losing sight of the ground when I have not been able to go IMC, either prior to being instrument rated or since, but when going IMC has not been a viable option.

I've turned back many times and I've landed in fields waiting for weather to improve quite a few times. Maybe I'm more cautious than others, who knows.

No question this is out there to bite any of us any time, so don't anyone think I am over-confident or complacent that it couldn't happen to me. This is probably the biggest killer and continually needs the greatest efforts to avoid.

[chopperchav]

Heard an old proverb yesterday which immediately made me think of this thread. 'A smooth sea never a master mariner made'. I guess this can be applied to helicopter pilots also.
You experienced guys talk about ****ty weather. Define ****ty in terms of cloud base and viz and what your limit would be. Obviously terrain would be a factor also.

It would be nice if ****ty weather was defined for the ppl and a minimum number of hours were flown in these conditions going through the drills of finding a suitable field and making approach etc. This would do a lot to quell anxiety which must be a big factor in inadvertant imc, especially for low timers and maybe reduce pressonitis.

[Gaseous]

****ty weather = cloud base lower than you and highest obstacle higher than you.:yuk:

Seriously though, the sort of sky that I have found most difficult to judge is when it is an even grey colour from horizon to vertical.

We specialise in them in Lancashire.