China Airlines taxi-way take-off!

[Cyclic Hotline]

From the KINY website.. .Wrong way takeoff made at Anchorage's airport

The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating an incident this morning in which a China Airlines plane took off in the wrong direction and on a taxi-way instead of a runway.

Jim LaBelle, who heads the agency's Alaska office, says the China Airlines Airbus A-343 had about 250 passengers and crewmembers on board when the incident occurred shortly before 3 a-m at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport.

The plane was directed to take off on the north-bound runway. Instead it took off on a west-bound taxiway over.

The plane departed safely, but LaBelle says the landing gear grazed a snow berm at the end of the taxiway as it lifted off.

LaBelle says investigators will listen to tapes of the radio transmissions between the China Airlines cockpit and the control tower to determine what went wrong.

[AtlPax]

They must've been in a hurry . . . <img src="confused.gif" border="0">

[Tool Time Two]

And they've been so good lately. <img src="cool.gif" border="0">

[hobie]

Dear God ..... please tell me this is a joke ..... it's impossible that ATC could allow this to happen?

[Shore Guy]

Jet narrowly escapes disaster. .WRONG WAY: China Airlines passenger jet clips snow berm after misguided takeoff.

. .By Zaz Hollander . .Anchorage Daily News

(Published: January 26, 2002) . .A China Airlines air bus carrying 254 passengers and crew members narrowly avoided catastrophe early Friday when pilots took off in the wrong direction and on a taxiway instead of a runway at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport.

In its takeoff just before 3 a.m., the plane came so close to running out of taxiway that its landing gear clipped a snow berm at the pavement's end before it gained altitude over Cook Inlet and flew on to Taipei, according to federal investigators.

"I think it's safe to say disaster was averted by inches," said Jim LaBelle, Alaska's top official with the National Transportation Safety Board, the federal agency that mounted an investigation Friday.

Controllers instructed the China Airlines pilots to take off from a north-south runway but instead they used an east-west taxiway. Investigators and a China Airlines official say they still don't know why.

China Airlines is mounting an investigation of its own, said Hamilton Liu, the company's station manager at Anchorage. NTSB officials had already visited the company's head offices in Taipei by Friday afternoon.

Liu said it was too early to jump to conclusions.

"We don't know what actually happened yet," he said. "I'm waiting for their report, too."

The federal investigation will center on transcripts of air traffic control tower tapes, flight data recorder information and testimony from pilots. That information was unavailable Friday.

But air traffic controllers and Federal Aviation Administration officials provided enough information Friday for LaBelle to piece together a preliminary sketch of what happened:

At 2:43 a.m., controllers in the Anchorage tower cleared China Airlines flight O11 to taxi toward the airport's north-south runway, Runway 32. The big plane was preparing for China Airlines' daily 11-hour nonstop run from Anchorage to Taipei.

The three-man flight crew turned west onto a taxiway that connects to the runway. Then air traffic controllers cleared the plane for departure on Runway 32.

But instead of turning north onto the runway, the pilots accelerated west down the taxiway toward Cook Inlet.

They had a strip of pavement only about 6,000 feet long in which to gain the speed and lift necessary for takeoff, airport officials said. The taxiway also narrows significantly before it ends, LaBelle said.

The runway gives pilots nearly 11,000 feet of asphalt, officials said.

Taxiways and runways at the airport have different lights, striping and signs to help pilots distinguish between the two. Runways have white edge lights and center line lights, along with painted white edge lines and white dashes down the center. Taxiways have blue edge lights, painted yellow edge lines and green center line lights.

LaBelle said the NTSB investigation will look at the experience and training of the three-man flight crew, condition of airport equipment, the crew's duty time or problems communicating because of a language barrier.

"It would not be unusual if there was a language issue," he said.

English is the international language of aviation. Under an agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization, pilots must demonstrate enough English to communicate with controllers, according to Joette Storm, the FAA's spokeswoman in Anchorage.

Taiwan government officials are responsible for making sure the China Airlines pilots can communicate, Storm said. Any airline approved to fly in the United States must also meet FAA requirements.

Airport officials -- notified of the incident just after it occurred -- said they didn't know of any mechanical problems with the taxiway or runway.

"All lights were working, everything was functioning," said airport manager Corky Caldwell. "Weather conditions were good. It was clear and the runways were clear of ice and snow."

In 1983, a Korean Air Lines cargo jet beginning its takeoff in the wrong direction on the wrong runway smashed into a Kenai-bound commuter plane in heavy fog at Anchorage. No one was killed. Investigators mainly faulted the Korean Airlines pilot for failing to follow procedures.

------------------------

[Shore Guy]

Here is a link for an airport diagram (expandable-right click, "zoom out" in I.E.). . . . . <a href="http://www.anctaxiway.com" target="_blank">http://www.anctaxiway.com</a>

It sounds like they took off westbound on taxiway "K" at the intersection of taxiway "R".

Scary stuff.

[Shore Guy]

Whoops - meant to say "zoom in" in last post

[hobie]

quote

"In 1983, a Korean Air Lines cargo jet beginning its takeoff in the wrong direction on the wrong runway smashed into a Kenai-bound commuter plane in heavy fog at Anchorage. No one was killed. Investigators mainly faulted the Korean Airlines pilot for failing to follow procedures."

.... can this really happen at a major International airport?

[411A]

With my first training on jet aircraft (B707) at PanAmerican, a configuration check was the last item on the before takeoff check list...flaps (correct setting), speedbrake, stab trim....and compass heading (agree with the runway assigned)...maybe those in CI don't bother to look at the HSI. . .An urgent call to the training department should be in order.

[JJflyer]

Hobie...

Yes ATC really has no say in it after Wong Way let his 5 APU´s rip it, unless he deems it suitable to stop at the risk of losing face and admitting a mistake.

Also Yes a ground collision between 2 aircarf can happen at a major International Airport... Remeber PanAm and KLM B747´s in Tenerife in the -70´s.

[Justin Abeaver]

The lessons of Tenerife STILL seem to have not been taken onboard by some cultures, and their trainers. Who trains these guys anyway?

The travelling public deserve better than this nonsense.

[GEENY]

or LIN...

[Airbubba]

&gt;&gt;It sounds like they took off westbound on taxiway "K" at the intersection of taxiway "R".

Yep, the normal takeoff clearance is for "Runway 32 at Kilo", they were very lucky to get it airborne...

[Zeke]

Justin Abeaver,

Initial training is done by British Aerospace.

Most of the young guys learn to drive a jet before they can drive a car, the first machine a lot of them operate is an aircraft.

The language issue is the problem, the experienced captains are being promoted from internal routes onthe the new equipment on the international routes using the english speaking chinese first and second officers.

It requires very good CRM for things to work.

Z

[inverted flatspin]

What about all those blue lights along the side of the "runway", there may have even been green ones along the centerline, were they even looking outside? Scary really.

[PK-KAR]

Now that gives a new meaning to their callsign Dynasty.... DIE NASTY.

PK-KAR

[Freak On A Leash]

Seems as if somebody needs to check their vision... Shouldn`t an experienced flight crew know the difference in airport markings?Or is this a case of an aircrew being in a hurry and losing track of things?

As a former flight instructor flying out of neighboring Merrill Field I can say that there is a major problem with regards to language at PANC.. .Anchorage ATC do deserve some respect because dechifering some of the Asian carriers` radio calls is not that easy.

Let`s just consider it lucky that the crew did not take off eastbound.2 major highways and a lot of houses lie just off the end of runways 6R and 6L.

[wonderbusdriver]

Just a reminder:

Do not EVER (NEVER EVER) say: It couldn´t happen to me!!

Besides that, there´s some explanation in store here, it seems, just to prevent this from happening again to anyone else.. .(And, no, you WILL NOT LOSE YOUR FACE, guys.)

[stoopid]

hmmmmmmmm reminds of a story i once heard about a british island a/c and gatwick <img src="smile.gif" border="0"> who trained them?

[aloneincommand]

It's really a shame. The company has spended a great deal of money in training devices, but not in the Human field. After forty something years of flying they have not found the right way to teach their pilots the basics. With all the automation and screens the first advise from de IPs is "don't look outside" so this has made a Visual Approach the most dangerous maneuver (believe it or not); this, followed by the Company's policy of PUNISHMENT, can, easily, keep the pilots mind "out of the loop". . .It can not be denied that a lot of good changes have been done by the Vice president of operations (not a local guy) and his team, unfortunately his contract is about to expire and, guess what, a bunch of local guys are circling around his chair, like vultures, to take back their power. And run the company with wise advices like "don't look outside".. .So if this happens don't be sorprised to hear of more CAL daredevils.

[HotDog]

"Do not EVER (NEVER EVER) say: It couldn´t happen to me!!"

Truer words were never spoken. Happened before and will happen again. A few that come to mind; DC-8 that came to grief on a taxiway takeoff attempt next to RW18 EDDL, Singapore Airlines attempted T/O on RW05R RCTP, Singapore Airlines that just made it over the fence by taking off on (wrong) RW09 YMLL. A few operators, including Qantas who landed at Changi instead of Paya Lebar in the sixties. So, there by the grace of God.....

[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>

[Shore Guy]

Following is a piece I wrote for our in house publication (safety committee) with references to specific carrier omited. Permision granted for reprint/republication - no copyright.

RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION – THE FAA’S NUMBER ONE SAFETY PRIORITY. . . .15:15:20 TWR Singapore six, Runway zero-five left, wind zero two zero an . .eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff. . .15:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero-five left, Singapore Six.. .15:15:31 CA OK, man… . .15:15:34 FO OK, checks below the line; Cabin Announcement complete. . .15:15:37 FO Packs . .15:15:38 CA OK, norm, eh… . .15:15:39 FO Norm . .15:15:40 FO Strobes on; landing lights all on. . .15:15:44 FO Takeoff clearance. . .15:15:45 CA Obtained, hah… . .15:15:46 FO Obtained, Sir. . .15:15:47 CA OK, thanks. . .15:15:48 FO Before Takeoff checklist completed. . .15:15:50 CAM Sound of click . .15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here. . .15:15:52 CA It going to be very slippery, I am going to slow down a bit, . .turn here. . .15:15:53 FO Turning that… . .15:16:07 FO And the PVD hasn't lined up, ah…. .(Note – The PVD is the “Para Visual Display”, a localizer based low visability takeoff aid that is an option on the 747-400) . .15:16:10 CA Yeah, we gotta line up first. . .15:16:12 OBS We need forty-five degrees. . .15:16:15 FO I see, excellent man… . .15:16:16 CA Yah. . .15:16:23 CA Not yet er, PVD huh, never mind, we can see the runway, . .not so bad. OK, I am going to put it to high first. OK, ready eh, so, zero one zero . .is from the left, lah OK. . .15:16:27 FO OK. . .15:16:30 CAM (Sound of windshield wipers going to HIGH speed) . .15:16:31 FO Ready Sir, zero two zero check OK. . .15:16:33 CA Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh, OK. Cabin . .reported, eh… . .15:16:37 FO Yah, cabin is ready. . .15:16:37 CA OK, thanks. . .15:16:37 FO Yup, thanks. . .15:16:43 FO OK, thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:43 FO Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CA OK, Thrust – Ref, TOGA, TOGA. . .15:16:44 CAM (Sound of engines spooling up) . .15:16:54 OBS Hold. . .15:16:54 FO Hold.. . . .15:17:13 FO V 1. . . .15:17:17 CA Something there. . . .Sounds of impact. . . . . . The 747-400 slammed into barricades and construction equipment at the end of the closed runway 05R in Taipei and burst into flames. Eighty-three of the one hundred seventy nine persons onboard died. As reported previously, our gateway personnel and pilots assisted in the rescue of some injured passengers.. . . . And so ends the most recent fatal example of an air carrier runway incursion, defined by the FAA as “any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object in loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land”. The FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, has stated “Runway incursions are the number one safety problem today”. The largest loss of life accident in aviation history, the collision of two B747’s on the runway at Tenerife, was essentially a runway incursion accident, resulting in the death of 583 crew and passengers. . . . . There has been a dramatic increase in the number of runway incursions in recent years (see chart), with pilot deviations being the majority cause of these incursions. The FAA and NASA have embarked on a number of initiatives, both ground and cockpit based, to combat the rising rate of incursions, but many of these involve new technologies and equipment that will take years to design, certificate, and implement. The most pressing issue is what can we do NOW as crewmembers to prevent a runway incursion. Our operation has some unique characteristics that I believe predisposes us more than many passenger carriers to an incursion incident/accident. Majority night operations, the attending fatigue (pilots and controllers), lower visibilities, poorly lit/marked cargo taxiways and ramps all provide more opportunity for the inadvertent incursion. This article will first review our procedures with relation to avoiding an incursion, and then present some techniques culled from some of our pilots and other operators, which may be of assistance in avoiding an incursion.. . . . First, the procedures. In addition to following the guidelines provided in part 91 of the F.A.R.’s and the Airman’s Information Manual, a recent bulletin, now incorporated into the F.O.M., requires crews to conduct a taxi briefing of the expected route from the ramp to the assigned runway for takeoff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all our crews are not always accomplishing this mandated briefing. If there is an incursion, and there has not been a taxi brief, explaining both the incursion and violation of written company policy would be difficult at best. Both pilots are to display the Jeppesen Airport Plan View. If possible, conduct the takeoff briefing prior to block out to prevent it from being a distraction during taxi. Second Officers should monitor taxi progress and be particularly alert during runway crossings. Approach briefings are now required to include an expected taxi route briefing and, once again, both pilots are required to have in view the airport diagram. Briefing of SMGS lighting and special taxi routes are required for low visibility operation.. . . . Now, some techniques that may help in preventing an incursion. These have been solicited from our pilots and pilots of other carriers. My definition of a technique is using a tool that is not procedurally required (F.A.R., F.O.M., or A.O.M.). Some of these items are procedurally required at other airlines.. . . . For those of us who spend time squinting at the airport diagram trying to determine the difference between taxiway E and F on the chart (sometimes harder than the FAA first class eye exam), a suggestion. Enlarge the 10-9 page on a copier (most gateways have one). 130% enlargement of the 10-9 page just about fills an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper. Easier viewing and because it is a copy of a source document, you can mark it up to show closed/restricted taxiways, notes, etc. Another source for taxiway diagrams is on the web. AOPA, in conjunction with the Flight Safety Foundation, sponsor a public web page (no membership required) with over 400 pages of airport diagrams. They may be found at <a href="http://www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/" target="_blank">www.aopa.org/asf/taxi/</a>. . . . Some carriers now recommend/require the use of certain lights when crossing an active runway. Wing inspection and strobes on while crossing an active runway make an aircraft infinitely more visible. Announcement of and visual clearing of both sides of the aircraft when crossing an active runway is imperative.. . . . The act of taxiing a transport aircraft in many minds is a “captain only” event. (Witness the CVR transcript at the beginning of this piece). In all our aircraft except the B747, there is only a tiller on the left side, reinforcing this perception. This sometimes results in the First Officer being not fully in the loop or situationally aware during the taxi. To combat this mindset, some captains let the first officers taxi the aircraft. When the task is shifted to the First Officer, his/her situational awareness is dramatically increased and it allows the captain to monitor rather than perform a sometimes tedious and consuming task. Obviously, the captain will have to make the “tiller turns” in most of our aircraft but for some, this works to make taxiing a safer event.. . . . Our F.O.M. recommends crosschecking heading information when aligned on the runway for takeoff, but another check is helpful. If the runway has a localizer, use it for runway confirmation before takeoff (In the Singapore 006 accident, procedurally it was used, (PVD), but apparently disregarded by the captain). This is especially important in a low visibility environment. In B757/767 aircraft, make sure the aircraft is showing on the center of the runway on the lowest map range (non GPS/Pegasus aircraft may show a very slight displacement dependant on accuracy of position at alignment and drift rate).. . . . One of the many initiatives of the FAA in regard to runway incursions is a proposed “Runway Hot Spot” list and website. The purpose of this site is to list runways that are particularly susceptible to incursion due to their surrounding environment (poor lighting, signage, proximity to other runways, etc.). The safety committee is actively soliciting your submission of confusing/dangerous taxi routes and procedures from our gateways. These will be reported in the (in house pulication) as well as listed on the *** website.. . . . . . As a final note, I would like to say to all First officers and Second officers – please be assertive in your observations/perceptions during taxi. In preparation and research for this article, I have read tens of accident/incident reports where the F/O or F/E recognized and/or announced an impending incursion, and was not assertive enough to stop the progress of the incursion (see transcript above, as well as the Tenerife accident) F/O’s, you may not have a tiller, but you have brakes – if not comfortable prior to the takeoff roll, use them and discuss it later. Taking control of the aircraft from the captain is one of the toughest calls in the business, but history shows it would have prevented a number of incursion disasters.. . . . Be careful out there.. . . . . . . . . . . .(Referenced chart below). . . . . . . . . .Year OE PD VPD Total. .1988 89 68 30 187. .1989 80 83 60 223. .1990 100 119 62 281. .1991 74 102 66 242. .1992 90 92 37 219. .1993 74 84 28 186. .1994 83 66 51 200. .1995 65 125 50 240. .1996 69 146 60 275. .1997 87 132 73 292. .1998 91 183 51 325. .1999 78 182 61 321. .2000 88 257 84 429. .SOURCE: RUNWAY SAFETY PROGRAM OFFICEKEY: OE = Operational ErrorPD = Pilot DeviationVPD = Vehicle / Pedestrian. . . . . . . .Web references and research sources:. . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety/</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/faa_office/rirp/</a>. . . . <a href="http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm" target="_blank">http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety_products/runwayincursion.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm" target="_blank">http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm</a>. . . . <a href="http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm" target="_blank">http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/index.htm</a>

[allianceair]

Don't forget the TWA MD80 that landed on the taxiway in bright daylight, ahh it must have been chinese american pilots at the control then.

[boofhead]

I've seen this kneejerk action so many times, and it does not work. Before long the crews are talking constantly about what they are doing and seeing and what they are intending to do, to the point that the flying pilot has to tune it all out in order to concentrate on what is important to him at the time. Witness the number of times the reponse of "SET" is made when the flap, gear, hydraulic etc is not in fact set. And the number of times a routine call is made and it is not understood. It may be acknowledged, but that does not mean it is understood.

As a voice in the wilderness, I plead for you all to put away the claptrap and go back to using the manufacturer's procedures, which include callouts. If the non-flying pilot says ANYTHING it should be IMPORTANT and the flying pilot will then know that he must pay attention. During critical procedures (takeoff, approach and landing) the non-flying pilot should maintain silence unless he sees something that is not right, and then he should call out in a loud clear voice.

Calling the FMA, EICAS etc when the messages are routine, is a waste of time and distracting. It concentrates the attentionm on something that is operating normally and might prevent the pilots from seeing something going wrong, in enough time to prevent the accident.

The continuous chatter I have to put up with is annoying, at the least, and those of you who do not notice it are, I suggest, tuning it out. If there was some nugget of good information in there, you would miss it.

Briefing the taxi route is an example of this. In most cases, you are taxiing on your own home airport, which you know very well. Or the point of takeoff can be seen from the parking position, there is only one way to get to the takeoff point, etc. In these cases, nothing need be said (including the utterly stupid instruction to "make standard calls"). If the route is different, or new, or there might be a possibility of confusion, then brief accordingly (see the Boeing TM for details). And how do you know you are going to get the shortest route? You might be sent along some different path, and what happens to your briefing then?

Some runways do not have the number painted on them, or the displaced threshold is too far from the numbers to see them, or they might be covered in light snow. What happpens then to those of you who cannot think without talking, or who need to be told what to think? Gimme a break.

(If the airplane has an ND, then look at the Map to be sure you are in the right general position, and use the airport diagram to make sure it is the right runway. This should be normal procedure and does not require a reminder, or a briefing).

Whenever you open your mouth, make sure you are telling the other guy what he needs to know, and discourage the verbal diahhrea.

You cannot legislate safety. It comes from experience and training, and needs a good application of intelligence. For you managers out there: You have to be able to give your pilots the best training you can, and then leave them to do their job. Stop trying to look over their shoulder all the time. What would you rather have, automatons who cannot think outside the box, or intelligent, well trained pilots who will be able to handle anything that comes at them?

[hobie]

charterguy ..... you are so right ..... take off clearance is granted by ATC from an agreed position on a specified runway ...... if signage at this position cannot confirm to the crew that they are in the agreed position for take off then it should be abandoned (close the Bxxxxxy airport if necessary) ...... after reading the various posts on this subject yesterday I went down to our local airport at lunchtime and watched a whole bunch of 330's and a MD11 take off for the U.S. ...... the thought of any of these guys rolling on the wrong runway and perhaps in the wrong direction just makes me feel ill!!!

[reportfurther]

Taiwan airline grounds three pilots for wrong-way takeoff

TAIPEI, Monday January 28, 6:36 AM

Taiwan's China Airlines (CAL) grounded three pilots today for taking off on a wrong taxiway in Alaska on Friday, a mistake which could have caused serious consequences.

"This is a warning signal. CAL will step up flight safety training for its pilots," flight safety officer Yeh You-ching said.

CAL flight CI-011, an Airbus A-343, took off in the wrong direction and on a taxiway instead of a runway from Anchorage International Airport.

The plane departed safely carrying 226 people.

CAL - Taiwan's largest airline - has had a dozen fatal accidents since 1970.

[411A]

Actually HotDog...it was SQ on runway 27 at Melbourne....was on nightstop at the time...so I know. Get your facts straight....planned for 34 but headed to 27...lucky for them it "drops off" at the end. The tower mentioned they....went out of sight, and then slowly climbed away...weeds were found in the tail on landing in S'pore.. .Lucky boys, indeed. The Captain was sent back to the right seat...for a looooong time.. .My question is...why cannot "common sense" be introduced to the flight deck (for some operators)?. .Many lessons to be learned...from others' mistakes.

[BusyB]

411A, Yet you still want the cheapest pilots you can get! When are you going to grow up and work with the pilots instead of against them?

[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: BusyB ]</p>

[GlueBall]

Shore Guy: Good info. Jeppesen also could improve its airport diagrams. For one thing it would help by colorizing more of its charts and putting the taxiway and intersection identifiers over the pavements rather than beside it. It would provide easier identification, especially with parallel, intersecting taxiways. . .I don't know current conditions at ANC, but I have been on snow covered airports where taxi lights were plowed over and where runway markings were not visible. Nevertheless, it always helps to have the Heading Bug on runway heading before spooling up for takeoff. <img src="frown.gif" border="0">

[HotDog]

You have hit the nail on the head, boofhead. We all started off with the manufacturers Flight Manuals, which al worked fine and refelected the training on the type. Invariably, within six months or a year, there would be several dozen amendments published to "improve" the manufacturers procedures. Then, if a new fleet manager or chief training captain got promoted, a new pile of amendments to the amendments were sure to follow. Glad I'm retired,in a way.

[ 27 January 2002: Message edited by: HotDog ]</p>

[Huck]

Their heading bug was probably on 300 deg. for the departure turn.

I shall go back to putting runway heading on the bug for takeoff. FMS is great, but some of the old ways are still the best....

[allianceair]

Delta is soon going to be code sharing with CAL, or they might have started already. Lets see Delta is code sharing with AeroMexico, Alitalia, Korean Air and CAL....hmmmmm. <img src="eek.gif" border="0">

[RiverCity]

This may, or may not, belong on the current thread, but it's the aftermath of this incident.

Airport ill-prepared for major accident. .Airplane near-disaster focuses attention on problems.

By Zaz Hollander, Anchorage Daily News . .(Published: January 27, 2002)

[quote]A China Airlines airplane that narrowly avoided disaster early Friday in Anchorage handed the latest reality check to rescuers who say they're ill-prepared to save mass victims of a plane crash in Cook Inlet.

Federal and state officials say the incident at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport highlights the need for a large-scale rescue plan for the Inlet to prepare for the time when a pilot isn't so lucky.

"This thing that happened early (Friday) morning just reinforced that, in the most dramatic way short of killing someone," said Lt. Chuck Lamica, the Alaska State Troopers' statewide search-and-rescue coordinator.

Instructed by air traffic controllers to take off on a northbound runway just before 3 a.m., China Airlines pilots instead steered for a westbound takeoff on a taxiway that gave them 6,000 feet of asphalt instead of nearly 11,000. The takeoff was so close that the plane's landing gear left furrows in a snow berm at the taxiway's end.

The flight landed safely in Taipei with about 250 people aboard.

The airport presents some unusual rescue challenges. It sits next to a body of water bounded by mud flats that will drown a victim in glacial silt in summer. In winter, huge slabs of ice piled as high as 6 feet block passage by most rescue vehicles.

Because the China Airlines plane was flying low and slowly over flat terrain, "this could have been a very survivable accident," said Jim LaBelle, Alaska chief for the National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating. "But you're still in harm's way. You . . . need to be rescued in a timely fashion."

Emergency equipment on commercial airliners doesn't always work, LaBelle said. Evacuation slides can become too damaged to double as a life raft; cold water quickly eats away at a passenger's grip on a seat cushion.

Passengers in the water risk death from hypothermia within an hour, officials say.

Had the China Airlines plane crashed Friday, it would have taken some rescuers at least an hour to arrive, Lamica said.

Describing a scenario of post-crash events, he explained why:

Victims would be out of the reach of firetrucks and ambulances first on scene. The troopers' helicopter would arrive in about an hour, because the pilot would have to get to the hangar from home. Several Air National Guard helicopters launched from the Rescue Coordination Center at Fort Richardson could take up to two hours to get airborne.

A new hovercraft at the airport can't travel over ice slabs taller than 3 feet. Lamica said the only craft that could is something like the 100-foot-long hovercraft the Canadian Coast Guard bought for about $6 million.

"This crash . . . would have taxed us to the utmost," he said.

Nearly a dozen rescue agencies and others -- military, the Alaska Air Carriers Association, Anchorage police and fire departments, federal aviation officials and investigators -- met Jan. 18 to talk about Cook Inlet rescue preparedness. They realized they were unprepared for large-scale rescues after October's Era Aviation helicopter crash in Cook Inlet near the airport that killed three and injured two.

The group discussed the need to develop a comprehensive rescue plan that divides duties among agencies and how to get around logistical problems posed by the Inlet's unique conditions, questions that came disturbingly close to a test Friday, Lamica said.

"That is a problem that's going to require the assistance of many, many different groups and agencies. It's going to be a daunting task."<hr></blockquote>

[411A]

Well BusyB, salary does not always get the best guys...but it helps.. .Our guys are selected from prior companies that we know...and their predominate request is for....time off for vacations.. .Recall a few years ago was offered extra pay...or vacation days due...took the days (103) because you can never replace time off, unless you have kids in university...which I don't.. .Also have to agree with those that advocate a silent flight deck...unless something is...WRONG.. .Pro guys do NOT need the constant dialogue that was started by...AirBus.

[Anti Skid On]

Some of the suggestions sound reasonable, but how much would it cost to have a couple of guys employed to 'guide' aircraft at unfamiliar fields to the active runway (especially at off peak times and in cr4p weather) - surely better for an airport to spend $100000 a year on this than the cost of cleaning up the almighty mess and aftermath.

[jonno]

Hi all,. .Who still believes that any China Air or Korean Air, or similar, have a three man crew, it's always what the captain says goes, and the other two have to/will always go along regardless, might as well have rubber blow-up dolls in the other two seats for all the good they are!

Until that 'face saving' stupid approach is gotten around, these sorts of things will continue to occur.

[Shore Guy]

All,. . Check out <a href="http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0102/27/news.shtml" target="_blank">http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0102/27/news.shtml</a>

It has a graphic/picture of cleared vs. actual path.

[newswatcher]

The local English-speaking paper in Taipei, says that the cockpit voice recorder will not be any use, because it has a 2-hour life, and was in continuous use for the remainder of the flight. The Anchorage ATC recordings will be the only source.

[ 29 January 2002: Message edited by: newswatcher ]</p>

[TG910]

From flight intl back in Aug 1999 :. ." Every aircraft in the fleet has a flight operation data analysis system and each flight is automatically downloaded and reviewed. If any irregularity shows up, the pilot is interviewed, and if necessary, grounded for retraining" it goes on ....CAL boss says " There's nothing personal involved- it's all business" - from Liu himself.

[aloneincommand]

The CAL's Flight Safety office took and extraordinary decision, to set up flight safety training for its pilots. I wonder what have they been doing during all these past years? The big problem is Who are they going to start with? If, in the Anchorage A-340 were a DE(Designated Examiner) an Instructor Pilot and the F/O. . .If an airline can not guarantee a safe flight with this kind of team, what can be expected from line pilots? Something must be really wrong behind all this operations.. .Let's see, HotDog mentioned about the manuals being amended to often, right, there are changes to the SOPs every week. This has made the pilots wonder what is right and what is wrong. When they have to take a decision the first thing in their minds is, as Tg910 mentioned, the FODAS. This wonder of tecnology, which is used, in CAL, for punishment, not for airmanship improvement. There have been a lot of pilots fire and bunch more punished, but the same mistakes keep appearing.. .Something deep must be done.. .For Glueball, Jeppesen can make the most colourfull diagrams, but if the DE, CP, IP (which most of the times believes to be god), tells the F/O,don't worry I know this airport, I've been here thousand times, just turn here and here and...., it does't matter what kind of diagram you have, you must use it.. .If somebody have really good sugestions they will be welcome, or maybe new methods of punishment, these guys seem to love it.

[Pontius Pilot]

Hobie,. ."Dear God ..... please tell me this is a joke ..... it's impossible that ATC could allow this to happen?"

Its not just their fault, they would have a part to play in this, however what sort of moron would take off on a taxiway????? Almost excusable for a student pilot, but not the crew of a heavy, surely???

[hobie]

pontius pilot ..... I understand what you are saying and having now seen the runway diagram in shore guys post above I wonder if the Tower allowed CAL to take a rolling take off rather than "line up and wait" ...... (and with that the 340 bombed off down the taxi way before anyone could spot what he was doing and try and stop him) .....

[Raas767]

God knows there has been alot of runway incursions in aviation, but this is the first time that I have ever heard of a crew taking off on a lighted taxiway at night with good visibility, and on the wrong cardinal heading. I can see how maybe one pilot could briefly mistake a taxi way for a runway but then reorient, or at least the other pilot would interject. The fact that the aircraft was staffed with 3 pilots and none of them caught the error is an example of either extreme incompetence or, more likely, a complete breakdown in CRM. It has been well documented in the past about autocratic leadership in Chinese cockpits and this may be yet another example.. .Will we ever learn?

[B2N2]

Sounds familiar..... .Little story from my own storybook:. .In 1991 I boarded an Tupolev 154M(Balkan-Air) to get from Nairobi to Sofia.. .Got the last seat on the right side of the A/C.. .Next to an emergency exit an with a good view of the engine.. .Clearly on the taxi-way (blue lights,just started my PPl training)the engines spooled up and we started to accellerate.. .I guess we where close to lift-off speed when the engines where put in thrust reverse and heavy braking followed.We made another turn and this time the lights where white.Relief....NOT.. .This time the engines only spooled up to a certain rpm,but not as high as previously on the taxiway.The sound was just all different.. .After quite a while of lights...lights...lights...lights..lights I expected them to abort T/O.Told my neighbour:something's wrong and I'm the 1st one outta here...as I reached for the handles on the exit.The plane rotated....hardly climbed...got a close-up look of the Nairobi citylights..... .Atfer a couple of minutes (still low rpm) we turned what felt like 180 deg.I prayed we where returning to the airport.Suddenly the engine accelerated to what sounded normal and we turned again,climbed out and headed to Sofia in the darkness of the night.I was so scared I went to sleep and didn't wake up till touch-down.Were supposed to take the same plane on to Brussels after refuelling.. .We were told the plane was found to be "broken" as they put it.Had to wait for a replacement which turned out to be a 737.. .Anyway...it happens...

[PaperTiger]

The tower tapes should reveal whether there was any communications misunderstanding, given possible language difficulties. ("Cleared takeoff from Kilo" ?!). . .Which prompts the question - how and why did this become public knowledge ? I doubt a reporter from KINY just happened to be hanging around ANC at 0300. Seems unprofessional for the tower crew to have notified the press. Flight crew and pax didn't know anything was amiss. So whodunnit ?

[Shore Guy]

A previous post on this topic referrred to the CVR being not usable because of the duration of the flight (report from newspaper - yes,I know how inacurate the general press is on aviation matters). Does anyone know:

(1) whether this 340 had a digital CVR, and what are it's characteristics

(2) I have heard of enhancements of tape loops to retrieve previous data (back 5-6-7 loops as I recall). Anyone have info on this capability?

[I Follow Ridges]

Imagine this coming out of the fog at you!!!!

NTSB Identification: DCA84AA013A. The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 23846.

Scheduled 14 CFRPart 129 operation of Foreign KOREAN AIR LINES. .Accident occurred Friday, December 23, 1983 at ANCHORAGE, AK. .Aircraft:MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS DC-10-30CF, registration: H7339. .Injuries: 3 Serious, 3 Minor, 6 Uninjured.

A PIPER PA-31, N35206, (SOUTH CENTRAL AIR FLT 59) WAS CLEARED TO TAXI TO RWY 6L. THE WX AT THAT TIME WAS FOGGY WITH ABOUT 1/8 MI VISIBILITY, BUT THE RVR WAS IMPROVING & THE ARPT WAS EXPECTED SOON TO BE ACCEPTABLE FOR TAKEOFFS. THE PA-31 CREW TAXIED & WAITED IN THE HOLDING AREA FOR THE VISIBILITY TO IMPROVE. A DOUGLAS DC-10, H7339, KOREAN AIR LINES FLT 084, WAS CLEARED TO RWY 32. HOWEVER, WHILE TAXIING IN THE FOG, THE DC-10 CREW INADVERTENTLY TAXIED TO RWY 6L/24R. TOWER PSNL WERE UNABLE TO SEE THE ACFT IN THE FOG & WERE UNAWARE OF THE DC-10'S POSITION. THE DC-10 WAS CLEARED TO TAKE-OFF ON RWY 32 & THE PA-31 WAS CLEARED TO HOLD ON RWY 6L. THE DC-10 CREW TAXIED ON RWY 24R & BEGAN TAKING OFF TOWARD THE PA-31 WITH 2400 FT OF RWY REMAINING. ITS ESTIMATED TAKEOFF DISTANCE WAS 8150 FT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE DC-10 COLLIDED WITH THE PA-31, CONTINUED OFF THE RWY & HIT STANCHION LIGHTS, SMALL TREES & ROUGH TERRAIN. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE DC-10 PLT DID NOT CONFIRM HIS POSITION BY USING HIS COMPASS & THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF LEGIBLE TWY & RWY SIGNS.

. .The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows.

VISUAL/AURAL PERCEPTION..PILOT IN COMMAND. .WRONG RUNWAY..INADVERTENT USE..PILOT IN COMMAND

Contributing Factors

OBJECT..APPROACH LIGHT/NAVAID. .TERRAIN CONDITION..HIGH VEGETATION. .WEATHER CONDITION..FOG. .BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED..INADVERTENT..PILOT IN COMMAND. .TERRAIN CONDITION..ROUGH/UNEVEN. .AIRPORT FACILITIES,TAXIWAY MARKING..INADEQUATE. .AIRPORT FACILITIES,RUNWAY MARKING..INADEQUATE. .OBJECT..AIRCRAFT PARKED/STANDING

[newswatcher]

Shore Guy,

I believe that the NTSB are in the middle of a program requiring certain aircraft to be fitted with a solid state CVR which has a capability of 2 hours recording, by 2005. This was increased from the 30 minutes required for tape.

An accompanying article suggested that it was no longer possible to get a "tape"-based CVR, I don't know if that is true.

I believe the European standard follows that of EUROCAE ED-56A , which has the same 2 hour recording requirement.

I guess it would not be too difficult to "dump" selective sections from the "live" area, for later retrieval in the event of an incident like this.

[Feather #3]

Can anyone tell us what the w/x conditions were when they took off? There should be some mitigating circumstance, surely?? <img src="confused.gif" border="0">

G'day

[AEROVISION]

Paper Tiger

I don't think that the tower contacted the press.. .I think they contacted the FAA.. .I also think that the crew new what happened once airborne.. .Follow this scenario with me.:. .Tower, CAL1011 ready for departure. Roger,CAL 1011, cleared for take off runway 32, wind calm, contact departure 118.6 when airborne, good night. Cleared take off 32 departure when airborne, CAL 1011.. .Then 1011 thunders down heading 240.. .Now, the SID for 32 says,fly rwy heading till 400 ft then turn LEFT heading 300.. .At 400ft pnf says 400 turn left 300, PF, left??. .300 is right turn, pnf SID says left, few seconds of confusion. PF, call departure.. .Departure, CAL 1011 passing 900 ft.. .Roger CAL 1011 identified, and uh uh your heading. .shows 240 ? Yes, we are turning now 300.. .Ok, uhh CAL 1011, you departed rwy 32??? as we picked you up heading 240.. .Yes, eh uh Affirm CAL1011. Roger then, further cleared as filed FL 200 expect higher in 10 minutes. FL 200 CAL1011.. .Ringg, phone rings in tower. Yellooh, hi departure here, did you send that CAL off on 24 i thought we had 32. Yes 32 it is why.?. .Well, we picked him up heading 240 and when we questioned him there was a bit of confusion seems to me. So we think he took 24. You better send ground ops down there at that intersection to check if lights and other stuff all ok.. .Yep, do that. Ringgg, phone rings at ground ops. Yellohh, hi, tower here, we have some confusion on that CAL that just left which rwy he took, so go to intersection K and roam around , see if you can get some clues, lights or signs or so. Ok, on our way.. .5 minutes later, tower, ground ops charlie 1 here, charlie one, go ahead, ok, we looked around and nothing wrong at the intersection so we drove twy 24 a while and then we saw that snow bank at the end had shaved its top of by big wheels or so, you think that was your CAL??. .Um eh not sure charlie one, you can come back now. Ringg, phone at departure rings, yellowh,. .hi tower here, we think your right, it seems he took off twy 24 and just made it, now what we do, are you still talking to him? No, I just handed him off, but maybe you call FAA, you know, yeah you right. So, tower calls FAA and NOT the press. By this time around 50 people at the airport knew what happened, so take your pick. And at the flight deck, there either was a stunning silence or a hefty debate, but sure they new.

What you think ?

Best regards. .A.V.

[Shore Guy]

Newswatcher - thanks for the info. Here is the latest from the Anchorage Daily News.

Controllers didn't try to stop jet. .WRONG WAY Airbus going too fast to stop, tower crew thought.

. .By Zaz Hollander . .Anchorage Daily News

(Published: January 30, 2002) . .A sudden hush fell over the Anchorage air traffic control tower early last Friday morning when controllers realized a rapidly accelerating China Airlines jetliner was about to take off the wrong way and from a taxiway instead of a runway.

The Airbus 340, carrying about 250 people, had pulled away from the international terminal, according to Joette Storm, spokeswoman for the Federal Aviation Administration in Anchorage. It was around 2:45 a.m. Two FAA controllers -- with a third person, who was on break -- were working the tower.

The tower had just given the pilot his takeoff directions. Once the tower realized the Airbus was on a takeoff roll down a relatively short taxiway, controllers decided not to intervene, investigators said Tuesday.

The controllers' silence as they realized they were too late to stop the errant plane was revealed this week to investigators who reviewed a recording of communications between the tower and the pilot.

"Once they brought the power up and were rolling and the controller noticed it, they did not call for an abort," said Scott Erickson, the National Transportation Safety Board's chief investigator on the incident. "I think they were a bit concerned about whether they were going to get airborne."

The controller communicating with the China Airlines pilot cleared the aircraft for takeoff on the airport's 11,000-foot-long north-south runway. The pilot read back the instructions in English, the universal language for air-traffic control.

The controller turned away for a instant, Storm said. "When he turned to look outside again, the plane was on its way down the taxiway."

Given the plane's considerable speed on the 6,000-foot-long taxiway, controllers determined "it would be better to allow them to proceed," she said.

The jet got off the ground but came "inches from disaster," as one investigator put it. Its landing gear cut divots in a snow berm at the end of the taxiway.

The flight landed safely in Taipei later Friday. China Airlines over the weekend grounded the three-person Taiwanese crew until further notice, according to Hamilton Liu, China Air's station manager at Anchorage.

China Airlines officials told The Taipei Times that the suspension of their flight duties is company policy and does not imply guilt.

The Airbus 340 is a new aircraft for the company, Liu said. But he added the pilots are experienced flying other types of aircraft.

China Air is cooperating with the NTSB, FAA and with investigators from the Taiwanese equivalent of the NTSB, he said.

The NTSB investigation will probably take several months, Erickson said. Investigators will analyze the pilots' training and experience and the possibility that language barriers led to communication problems, among other factors.

A parallel FAA effort will investigate the quality of communications, pilot certification and the working condition of airport navigational aids. Taiwan's flight safety officials have reviewed the plane's black box and are communicating with the NTSB by e-mail.

Many questions linger, baffled aviators say.

"That was so close to a real disaster," said Felix Maguire, president of the Alaska Airmen's Association. "It's just incredible how they got away with it."

Why didn't other members of the flight crew question the pilot, given the abundant lights and markings that distinguish the taxiway from the runway? Didn't the plane's instruments tell the flight crew they were not on the 320-degree heading of their assigned runway but a 240-degree heading?

"Which is 80 degrees off," said Maguire, a former commercial pilot who flies a corporate jet. "Any pilot with basic training should know that."

Reporter Zaz Hollander can be reached at [email protected]

[ 31 January 2002: Message edited by: Sick Squid ]</p>

[Feather #3]

I guess that news article answers the visibility question! Astounding.

G'day <img src="rolleyes.gif" border="0">

[hobie]

from now on ........

"line up and WAIT"

[411A]

Hello, PARC Aviation? China Airlines calling....ah, we NEED experienced Captains, right away, First Officers too. Pay NO object.

Shame...will never happen <img src="rolleyes.gif" border="0">

[polzin]

I have forgotten the exact year but 3 or 4 years ago some of the expats refused to deadhead on CAL, the airline that employed them. Am I correct ? 4 years ,.. lost..4 ..747"s

[ 01 February 2002: Message edited by: polzin ]</p>

[Toilet Porpoise]

As if we don't have enough to worry about in this day and time, flying for a living...

Now I gotta watch out for "rogue" airliners, terrorizing the taxiways...

Good grief...

Glad no one was hurt.

[Roadtrip]

"Why didn't other members of the flight crew question the pilot, given the abundant lights and markings that distinguish the taxiway from the runway?"

Good Crew Resource Management has never been a strong force among far easterners, to put it politely.

[ 01 February 2002: Message edited by: Roadtrip ]</p>

[aloneincommand]

Roadtrip, the FO was pilot flying, the IP on the left side and, apparently, his first time in Anchorage, and the DE in the jump seat. And all of them ex-air force.. . Could it be that the DE, within all his experience, wisdom and majesty was guiding the FO instead of following the airport diagram? After all, he might have been there a thousand times and knew the airport perfectly by day and night. Now go and tell him that he is wrong.UUUhhhh, I don't think so.. .As you said in these eastern airlines the CRM is not very well practiced.

[Smudger]

B2N2, Why on earth did you board a Tupolev 154 in the first place? I wouldn't, even if it were the last plane home on Christmas Eve. Your tale is just another reason I never will!

[floigl]

Smudger,

Tupolevs at least don't disintegrate in midair like . .Airbuses ( flight fivehundredsomething few month ago). .or Boeings (737 cabrio of Hawai years ago or Lauda 767).One has to fly them into something hard to kill. .them.And as Malev crew proved in Tessaloniki year or two ago even that may not be suficient. 154 touched. .down with gear retracted,took-off,extended the gear. .and landed with no injures on board.Try it with some. .of the Western aircraft.

[ORAC]

Hun, really?

<a href="http://www.crashdatabase.com/cgi-bin2/webdata_crashdatabase.cgi?cgifunction=Search&Aircraft=Tupolev" target="_blank">http://www.crashdatabase.com/cgi-bin2/webdata_crashdatabase.cgi?cgifunction=Search&Aircraft=Tupolev</a>

Date: 06/06/1994. .Location: Xi'an, China. .Airline: China Northwest Airlines. .Aircraft: Tupolev TU-154M. .Registration: B-2610. .Fatalities/No. Aboard: 160:160. .Details: The plane broke-up in flight 10 minutes after taking off. Auto-pilot induced oscillations caused the aircraft to shake violently. The autopilot yaw-channel was accidentally connected to the bank control and the bank-channel to the yaw controls.

[ 02 February 2002: Message edited by: ORAC ]</p>

[TowerDog]

Think I'll stay away from them Tupolevs.. .After reading all the accident reports on this page, and reflecting on the former Aeroflot's bad accident record:

If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going.

[polzin]

Ive been told by people who flew the 154B that the generators could not be paralleled and Gen 1 supplied power to fuel pumps on left wing and Gen 3 powered pumps in right wing. If you lost a Gen you lost the fuel in that wing.

The other thing that impressed me was that the passengers did not have oxygen. Im not too sure this a bad idea. A lot of people have died because that system was on an airplane........... Discussion, Ladies and Gentlemen ?????

[hobie]

polzin ... whats the Oxygen thing all about? ...... cheers ...hobie

[Willit Run]

Hobie,

I think Polzin is making a cry for help!, you see, he lives in some very rarefied air out west and doesn't always think straight due to lack of oxygen. So, being the nice guy you are, be gentle with the old guy!

[ATC Watcher]

Individual oxygens masks are not mandatory ( or were not at the time the Tu154 was certified ) The SE210 ( Caravelle to the youngsters) also did not have individual O2 masks. The procedure in case decompression was to dive like a madman to 14.000 Ft. A couple of bottles with ONE mask each were avail to the FAs to give to the weak pax.... .I guess the same goes for the Tu 154 and probably a lot of other oldies...

[Check 6]

NTSB final report (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20020204X00182&key=1)

[Anti Skid On]

Which is at the bottom of the link above

The aircraft operating manual for the Airbus did not contain a checklist requirement for the crew to verbalize and verify the runway in use before takeoff.

The aircraft operating manual for China Airlines Boeing 747-200 airplane fleet, under Normal Procedures, Taxi and Takeoff, has a section that reviews taxi routes, and the runway for departure. The procedure states, in part: "1. Before enter the runway: …To corroborate the following required visual reference is established: …the designation of the takeoff runway. 2. After enter the runway: …Make sure active runway marking are being checked as follows: threshold marking; runway designation marking by calling out the runway number; verify runway in use by localizer bearing or GPS coordinates; runway centerline marking; runway touchdown zone markings and fixed distance markings; runway lighting systems are as illuminated as expected.

Without wishing to spark the usual Airbus-v-Boeing fisticuffs, why the hell would the NTSB wish to labour the point above. Are they saying 'Good old Boeing, bad boy Airbus'?