AA MD82 Landing Incident?

[320DRIVER]

Any more info on this?


************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 11/22/2004 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 234AA Make/Model: MD82 Description: MD-81/82/83/87/88
Date: 11/21/2004 Time: 1738

Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: DENVER State: CO Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N234AA, AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT
SHORT OF THE RUNWAY NO INJURIES REPORTED AND DAMAGE EXTENT UNKNOWN, DENVER,
CO

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: 1727Z 31010KT 1/16SM R35L/3000VPC00FT FAFG OVC001 MO3/M04 A3014

[411A]

Additional posted on the N. American forum.

[Shore Guy]

:( :( :( and.................


DENVER - Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are concentrating on the glide slope instrumentation and the pilot operations in their investigation of why an American Airlines Flight landed 350 feet short of the runway at Denver International Airport Sunday morning.

It was snowing, icy and instruments-only when American Airlines Flight 1115 from Dallas landed at DIA. The MD80 would have been on glide slope instrumentation to keep it on the right descent for landing. If the plane is too high or too low, an alarm voice should have sounded in the cockpit. The instrumentation depends on instruments on the ground and in the plane. DIA says its system on the ground was tested after the plane landed and DIA's instrumentation was working. Most of the equipment from the plane has been sent to Washington D.C. for analysis.

The MD80 hit approach lights and landed on a lighter-weight concrete short of the runway.

The First Officer, as opposed to the Captain, was flying the plane. That's considered routine.

Debris from the broken lights and the plane was strewn along the runway for 700 feet. That was a potential problem for other planes that landed after AA Flight 1115 landed. Evidently, the pilots didn't know they'd hit the lights because they didn't report it to DIA operations until about 25 minutes after the accident happened.

[catchup]

Evidently, the pilots didn't know they'd hit the lights because they didn't report it to DIA operations until about 25 minutes after the accident happened.


Ooops..... sounds strange.

regards

[hobie]

As the evidence flows in .......

"AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT SHORT OF THE RUNWAY"

or .....

"American Airlines Flight landed 350 feet short of the runway"


is it any wonder we all end up going around in circles with some of these incident reports :(

[411A]

AA, at it....again.
Late reporting to ops?
No doubt taking the time to fill out the NASA form...for both pilots.

[Crótalo]

Not taking sides, but just for a bit of balance ;) there is at least one reasonable explanation for the 25-minute delay, IF they didn't notice anything unusual on landing. From touchdown and rollout, they would have completed their taxi to the gate (slowly, due to the snowy/icy conditions), and shut down. That would have taken several minutes. Then perhaps a marshaller noticed some damage and notified the pilots. Pilots continue shutdown checklist, then go out and check the aircraft. Another several minutes. Then they realize what has happened and start contacting authorities.

[dallas dude]

411A,

You're usually best ignored so with that in mind this is for the benefit of open-minded, non AA ax-grinders....

DIA is a huge airport. Taxy time varies but safe to say, given the reduced visiblity at the time, it could take this crew at least the ten minutes it took me when I was there a week ago, on a VFR day.

At the gate, a shutdown checklist takes a few minutes whilst the passengers begin to deplane. It can take up to ten minutes for them all to get off.

At this point in time, assuming this crew and airplane continue to another destination, the CA leaves the airplane to get the paperwork, check WX etc and the FO "sets up" the flight deck per before starting engine checklist. This may account for another five or six minutes.

Finally the FO then leaves the flightdeck to check the outside of the airplane, known as the "walk around".

I was not there but this timeline is somewhat typical for a through flight.

DD

[Astra driver]

Fresh from the NTSB;


NTSB Identification: DEN05IA027
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of CIT Leasing Corp. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Sunday, November 21, 2004 in Denver, CO
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N234AA
Injuries: 106 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On November 21, 2004, at 1038 mountain standard time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N234AA, operating as American Airlines Flight 1115, sustained minor damage when during landing at the Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado, the airplane struck several approach and runway threshold lights. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121. The captain, first officer, 3 flight attendants, and 101 passengers on board reported no injuries. The flight originated at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, Ft. Worth, Texas, at 1004 central standard time, and was en route to DEN.

The captain reported that the first officer was flying the airplane. Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope. Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around. The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach. The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight. The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach. The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight. The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights). At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded. The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time. The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane. The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal.

At 1046, the weather at DEN was 100 broken, 1/2 mile visibility with freezing fog, temperature was 27 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 28 degrees F, winds 320 degrees at 8 knots, altimeter 30.13 inched, and remarks "surface visibility 1/2 mile, visibility north through east 2 mile, ceiling 100 feet broken varies overcast."

The National Transportation Safety Board arrived on scene at 1300.

An examination of runway 35L showed one approach light, 19 feet from the beginning of the paved overrun, broken forward at its base. Approximately 49 feet from the start of the paved overrun surface, the beginning of 2 pairs of parallel-running tire marks were observed. The left pair of tire marks ran through 3 sets of center approach lights in the overrun, 2 runway threshold lights, a distance of 354 feet, and continued down runway 35L for approximately 700 feet. Light stanchions, broken lens pieces, and bulb debris was observed extending down the runway along the tire marks.

An examination of the airplane showed damage to the left main landing gear tire and brake lines, dents and scraped in the bottom left aft fuselage, chips in the aft bottom radio antennae, and cracks and puncture damage to the bottom of the left engine cowling. There was puncture damage to the inside of the left engine cowling, just forward of the stator vanes to the engine's compressor section. Several of the engine's compressor blades showed dents and scrapes. A ground check of the airplane's avionic system revealed no anomalies.
Index for Nov2004 | Index of months

[Wino]

In CRM class at AA virtually all the incidents discussed were ALWAYS about the "Stupid 80". I suggested we could improve the safety of the airline and shorten the CRM course by simply selling the MD80 fleet.

That was met with a cold stare from the instructor. AA does have 400 or so of them, and they are half of American's fleet, but they are involved in a disproportionate number of incidents.

I have never flown the 80 myself, and those in the 80 program swear by the aircraft. I think its a combination of stockholm syndrome and a cult myself :D :D

No actual comment on the indident here, just an amusing story from the school house.

Cheers
Wino

[Avman]

You will all come down on me like a ton of bricks but under the prevailing weather conditions, as described by the NTSB I'd say this was poor ATC (poor vectoring onto a short final) and poor airmanship (continuing with an unstable approach). Period. Tin hat on!

[411A]

AA, at it again.

STUPID pilots, plain and simple.

Cali, Colombia. (Bang, hit high terrain due to situational awareness)
Little Rock. (A chief pilot, no less, landing in a thunderstorm)
New York (A300-600, big feet on the rudder)
Seattle. (Landing on the taxiway)

And now Denver.

These folks should be audited for the inability of flight crew to actually fly the aeroplane to a successfull landing...on the runway.

You gotta admit, someting stinks in Dallas...and it ain't the cowboys.
Or, maybe it is... cowboys in the cockpit, AA style.
Now one would/could expect this of, say, an African air carrier, but AA has been around for a very long time.

AA, positively no excuse... period.

Quite frankly, AA should be shut down.

Anyone else here want to make excuses for these turkeys?

[WhatsaLizad?]

Initial post on the subject: 23 Nov, 00:05

Reply by 411A: 23 Nov, 00:46



Amazing, any pruner can puruse the archives and find that any subject referencing AA will be met by 411A's venom spitting in less than 2 hours, even before any bodies have been laid to rest (research 411A's glee last year at the deaths of two AA pilots in a private accident, an accident still unresolved by the NTSB). It is plainly obvious that 411A's multiple orgasms at any ill suffered at AA are a result of some deep seated slight from the past, and that have must have involved an AA pilot.

Was his bitter attitude the result of Mrs. 411A seeking comfort from his inadequacies in the arms of an AA pilot who only worked DFW-NRT 9 days a month? Was it an AA pilot with dimished motor skills who ran over a pet Yorkie of his? Was it the perceived wisdom of AA personel who turned down 411A's obvious superior piloting skills when he applied for a job? (This is my favored scenario, I think it was an easy call ;) )

There is one person that can answer this and I doubt we will find out.

If this scum has any redeeming value to the fraternity of aviators, please let me know. I've yet to see anything other than a sad, bitter,vindictive, total POS known as 411A

Sorry about the yahoo chat board imitation, it's just a colonial spat.

[411A]

Sorry to disappoint you, WhatsaLizad, but I never worked for AA, nor did I ever apply to do so.

Ask yourself...what US airline has the highest percentage of incidents/accidents over the last ten years.

The unmistakable answer is...American Airlines.

Who, due to the pilots inability to navigate properly, ran into a hill at Cali...American Airlines.

Who, being unable to resist landing in a thunderstorm, crashed at Little Rock....American Airlines. A chicago based Chief Pilot no less....shame. At least HE should have known better.
The record shows the First Officer certainly did.

Who, due to the inability to actually train their pilots properly in regard to the use of the rudder....American Airlines.


And...who landed short at Denver, due to the pilots' inability to actually land properly....American Airlines.

The record, unfortunately, speaks for itself.

AA simply can't do it right....without bending metal.

Just where will it all end?

Now some may think I am being overly critical.
OK then, why has Northwest...or United...or Continental...or Delta not had these very same mishaps where, it appears it well could have been prevented by proper flying techniques.?

Answers on a postcard...please.

American Airlines...doing it wrong. :uhoh: :uhoh:

[catchup]

After ignoring all that personal stuff in above discussion, the facts give AA indeed a less than glory history....

regards

[A-3TWENTY]

411A,

They have mora planes,they are more exposed to that...

cheers

[Loose rivets]

I rarely make comment about an accident, but in this case the read is so odd that I will remark only on the text per se, assuming that the inquiry will make more sense than this text.

Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope.
This is a bad start to the final landing phase, even in good weather.

'Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around.'
I would say that this was a clue that they were not happy, even if the crew were.

'The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.' Please tell me that by now they were in one slot or the other.

'The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). '
At what rate I wonder. But of course by now nicely settled on the LOC ??

'The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight.' From what angle I wonder.

'The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach.'
So, from circa 80' in cr*p conditions and probably poor positioning, he had plenty of time to transfer to visual then?

'The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight.' If that is an exact quote, is this new planespeak? If so, sufficient for what?

'The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights).'
So there wasn't quite sufficient ‘runway environment' in sight for both pilots then?

'At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded.'
Go back a few steps to "The first officer was chasing the glide slope" and the imagery becomes vivid at this point.

'The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time.'
So, they both sit there with the little airplanes way into the blue and don't open the taps. Well, this would explain the damage to the ventral regions perhaps

'The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane.'
Other than it refused to fly with no power. At least the plane made a sensible decision.

Damage to the left this, left that, left the other.... So the wings were not quite level then?

'The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal. ' = Still squirting out. But as luck would have it, the brakes still worked.


If what we read here is true, this type of flying, sometimes acceptable on a bright clear day, is absolutely not acceptable with this reported weather.

This text may be written in a way that makes everything look bleak for the crew, but I just get a bad feeling about this pre-report. I am routinely flying AA now as SLF, and I want to feel confident that my intrepid colleagues will not be sculling about in poor weather conditions, chasing the ILS while below 1,000'.

[Few Cloudy]

The Captain´s report, if it is truely reported, says it all. Now we should learn from the incident.

After all the CRM, SIm training, Line checks, Memos, Quality meetings and discussions, still we get crews pressing on with unstabilised approaches.

Here they got away with it thank God. These guys should now make a tour of operators, explaining to other pilots first hand what thoughts go on in these situations - what makes us press on, even when warning signs are there, loud and clear.

Human psychology seemingly stays constant - unconvinced by rule makers, advisers and instructors. What goes on inside us? Is it the same instinct which makes us try to get to the motorway gas station after this one, rather than doing the guarranteed safe thing?

Let us not hammer these guys - let us learn from them. Let us not, on the other hand label it conveniently CFIT and publish yet more memos.

Let us also agree, that no one airline has a monopoly on press-on-itis.

Each and all need to understand these inner feelings and the individual will have to develop a strategy for dealing with them.

[Shore Guy]

After a particularly ugly approach incident, our airline went to the mandatory 1000’ stable approach criteria, with added emphsis on the "No fault go-around". Other carriers, some voluntary, some not, have done the same. FOQA data show a dramatic reduction in unstabilised approaches. My guess is that we will see AAL go to this standard - perhaps voluntary, perhaps not.

[Shaman]

With this sort of weather, should they not have been doing a Monitored Approach with the Capt taking over at MDA or at the very least an autocoupled approach?

[davek]

at my carrier, in conditions of reduced RVR or ceilings below CAT I it is manditory to be configured @ the marker with a monitored appr technique in use.

I don't know if AA uses monitored appr, but really, a ceiling of 100' and a g/s intercept @ 500'-600'?

WTF were they thinking!

[flying_elvis]

Don't know if these 80's have glass cockpits. But the thing I like most about glass and the moving map display is that you can see a crap vector the instant you turn the heading bug.

A hard turn, excessive speed or held high at the marker shows itself in no uncertain turns. I don't think I could go back and fly those steam gage dinosaurs with any confidence.

I love my 737-800, the only way to fly!

[dallas dude]

Shaman,

AA does not use the monitored type approach. Used to but that changed with the introduction of the B737 because the HUD is only available on the CA's side and so procedures across the fleets were changed in order to standardise this.

Cat 2 and 3 are now wholly flown from the left seat.

411A clearly forgets we've ALL been learning form the Wright Brother's and others experiences.I guess he/she was born a perfect pilot. Lucky him/her.

Statistically, the world's largest airline will likely incur the greatest number of incidents, everything else being equal.

Remember, Concorde was the safest airplane in the world until....

Also note, the NTSB statement has a disclaimer regarding the preliminary report's accuracy.

I re-viewed the DFDR data on Monday.

We will continue to learn from other's experiences (unless of course we feel we already know it all).

DD

[Astra driver]

I think Few Cloudy has it right.

While it is clear these guys screwed the pooch, we should all not be so fast to critique and say, "I would never do that" remember, the time that elapses between a routine flight and a crash is typically only a few seconds. We should all take notice of this incident and remember it the next time we find ourselves in a situation that is deteriorating.

Nobody wakes up in the morning and thinks to themselves, "I'm going to crash a plane today".

I'm just glad no one got hurt.

[Larry in TN]

I think some people are forgetting a few things...

1. From May 25, 1979 until December 20th, 1995 American Airlines operated over 15,000,000 flights without a single passenger fataility. On December 19th, 1995 AAL had operated more fataility free flights than any airline in the history of the industry. At the time, SWA had completely just over half that number of flights in their entire existance. (Does anyone know if they've passed the 15,000,000 mark by now?)

2. From September 20, 1989 until September 8, 1994, a period of just under five years, US Air had five crashes (LGA, LAX, LGA, CLT, PIT) with passenger fatailities--one per year--yet have managed to fly the past decade without a single passenger fatality.

3. The day that Valujet crashed into the everglades, valuejet's accident rate would have proceduced a major crash every third or fourth day if applied to AAL, DAL or UAL's number of daily flights.

Random events due to space themselves out nice and even. They occur in bunches followed by long periods where they appear rarely or not at all.

[SLF3]

Some rather subjective statements in this thread. If data from airdisaster.com is to be believed:

- MD80 is 'safer' than the 737 (.45 versus .62 per million cycles)
- Continental is 'not as safe' as AA (0.63 versus 0.59, not a statistically significant difference)

So why are people being rude about AA and the MD80?

[Few Cloudy]

Just see who was being "rude" SLF 3.

Then check out some other threads and...

[Wino]

411a has an ax to grind with AA for whatever reason.

Furthermore, as was just pointed out above, he has not demonstated an ability to balance incidents with total numbers of flights (the largest airline in the world SHOULD have the most incidents in total if everyone was the same) to actually develope a meaningfull comment on the safety of one airline vs. another.

Cheers
Wino

[Loose rivets]

We all know the famous quote about statistics, but this thread seems to be moving towards the acceptance of a statistically safe flight.

I would suggest that such a flight is a worthy long term goal, but each item of SLF has the right to expect that, on his or her flight, that they would not be relying on statistics, but the accumulated knowledge gained from this data being applied on their day. One of the more important lessons learnt, time and time again, has been the importance of a stabilized approach.

[411A]

Sorry to disappoint you Wino, old boy, but I have no axe to grind with AA except their very poor ability (as a company) to remember the incidents/accidents from the past, and actually learn from them.

Good 'ole Larry in TN pointed out that AA was accident-free from 25 May '79 til 1995.
Lets concur for the moment that this is correct.

But look at the more recent record.

In Cali, the AA 757 rushed into a straight in approach, descended rapidly toward the hills (due to an improper FMS input) and when the GPWS alerted the crew that their actions were inappropriate, they tried to climb away...with the spoilers extended.

Ask yourself, does this sound like a reasonable and safe flight conduct?
The unmistakable answer is NO.

Then, in Little Rock, the Captain (a Chief Pilot no less) insists on conducting an unstabilized approach, with a thunderstorm overhead the airfield, and runs off the end.
This doesn't look to me like SAFE flight operations either.

The A300-600 accident is another.
It has been positively known for many years that the aggresive use of the rudder in swept-wing jet transport aircraft is very bad news, yet we find the First Officer pedaling the rudder like a bicycle.

Totally inappropriate, yet this is what he apparently has been taught by American Airlines.

And now Denver, with the crew conducting a totally unstabilized approach, and the result is landing short, with damage to the aircraft and ground equipment.

In all of these accidents, it was totally inappropriate pilot actions that caused the difficulty.
NO aircraft systems were found to be performing sub-standard.

There seems to me to be a common thread with all these, and that is American Airlines cannot, or will not, learn from the past, and apply safety of flight actions now.

AA does not deserve an air operators certificate, until they can demonstrate more prudent operations.

[AA717driver]

The argument that "we have more airplanes, so we'll have more crashes" doesn't wash and is probably slowing the pace of reform at AA.

AA has had more accidents recently than anyone else. What are you going to do about it? Sweeping it under the rug by chanting the mantra that "we are the biggest and the best" will only ensure a continuation of the trend.

One of the clues to AA's problems is what dallas dude said about the elimination of monitored approaches. They were sacrificed on the alter of "standardization". AA is not the first to experience this mistaken desire to have proceedures on every airplane in the fleet be nearly identical.

Problem is, it doesn't work. Eliminating monitored approaches because one, relatively small fleet type won't work with them is absurd. Have an overall theme and standardize where possible but don't compromise safety to accomplish it.

Another problem at AA is that Flight Ops. is on the same bureaucratic level as all other departments. Bull$!t! The company is an airline. The major aspect of the business revolves around operating aircraft. Flight Ops. should be at or near the top of the pyramid.

At AA, marketing is the tail wagging the dog.

This accident was a cluster. But look at it for what it was--a failure of the Captain to COMMAND and CONTROL the flight. I always hated taking the approach and landing when it was the FO's leg if the weather was too bad. But I was much more afraid of bending metal than I was of hurting the FO's feelings. Plus, I always paid them back either with beer or extra legs.;)

AA earned the title of "Sky nazis" because of their attitude. It's time for them to take stock of what has happened over the past 10 years(accidents, incidents and violations, too), lose the superiority complex and figure out what they have to do to get back on track--just like every other airline did when they experienced a "bad streak".

Don't just keep brushing it under the rug...TC

[kap'n krunch]

Not to cast stones, but I've wondered about AA training. In addition to incidents mentioned previously, AA 1572 touchdown way short of runway at KBDL (Hartford, CT) in 1995. Similar conditions to Little Rock and Denver.

Link to above accident report.

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/AAR9605.pdf

[SLF3]

If a common thread of pilot error runs through AAs accident record, then that is a weakness they need to address. But in the real world any airline will have weaknesses it needs to address. And overall, AA doesn't seem to have a better (or worse) accident rate than its peers.

Similarly the MD80 seems to have a similar accident rate to the B737, which is about the same as the (admittedly newer) A319/A320/A321.

If some some of the practioners feel this thread is being hijacked by statistics perhaps that is because they would rather rely on blind prejudice than facts.

Ducks under the seat, confident the bullet proof door that now divides us works both ways!

[411A]

Quite valid points, SLF3, but then again, for how many years has it been positively known by jet transport operators worldwide, that un-stabilized approaches can quite easily lead to accidents?

I personally learned this first hand at PanAmerican B707 training in 1973....over thirty years ago.

Yet, at AA, they have demonstrated a unique ability of conducting these very same approaches...time after time.

One wonders just how many times some of their pilots have gotten away with these, without incident.

Time for a detailed safety audit...pronto, me thinks.

[akerosid]

Didn't they also have a 727 which landed short at ORD a few years back (late 90s, I think); it was written off and because of AA's strapline at the time, it was nicknamed "something special in the mud".

[Semaphore Sam]

Dear AA717driver (& other AA Commanders):

Possibly there's a management questioning when a go-around is made? Nobody has the macho "Me-Big-Balls Me-Can-Land" idea anymore, but marketing people, plus other bean-counters, can pressure Flight Ops people into questioning pilot decisions concerning things like....extra fuel requests, go-arounds, wx delays, wx diversions....is there an ambiance at AA, due to fiscal restraints, or whatever, to 2nd-guess pilots, and 'influence' them to make the 'extra effort for the sake of the team', that results in 99 questionable 'successful' arrivals, and the hundreth 'failure'?
These influences, rather than training deficiencies, seem indicated by the most recent attempts to salvage marginally safe approaches. Am I right? Off base?

Sad Sam

[dallas dude]

Sad Sam,

While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.

AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.

It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.

I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.

dd

[411A]

All very well, dallas dude, but American Airlines' pilots (and indeed the company) seem completely unable to learn from past errors.

A bad combination.

[Wino]

411A

i am trying to figure out how to scan something in to this website,

but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.

So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)

Someone else did hit the nail on the head about standarization. American has been bowing before that false god for a VERY long time. While it is important to be standard within a fleet it is neither desireable nor smart to standarize procedures across disimilar fleets, and that is something American tries to do.

Standardizing disimiliar aircraft leads to bringing VERY bad habits and assumptions from one aircraft to another where they are not appropriate.

AA is not the first airline to do that, nor the last, several European carriers that I worked for exhibited similar problems.

Cheers
Wino

[Astra driver]

And for those who doubt, the following shows American crews can do it right;

NTSB Identification: CHI04IA260
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
Incident occurred Thursday, September 16, 2004 in Chicago, IL
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N253AA
Injuries: 112 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On September 16, 2004, at 1415 central daylight time, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-82, N253AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1374, encountered a flock of birds after takeoff from runway 4L at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. Damage resulted in a left engine fire which was successfully extinguished by the flight crew. The captain declared an emergency and the flight returned to ORD, landing on runway 32L at 1419. Chicago Fire Department personnel reported that the engine fire had been extinguished when they first observed the aircraft on landing rollout. The domestic air carrier flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. No injuries were reported by the 5 crew members and 107 passengers. The flight departed ORD with an intended destination of Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


Just goes to show that we only remember the bad stuff.

[EDDNHopper]

Few Cloudy has hit a vital point:
These guys should now make a tour of operators, explaining to other pilots first hand what thoughts go on in these situations - what makes us press on, even when warning signs are there, loud and clear.

A number of recent incidents and accidents come to mind where "target fixation" played a major role. I have two in mind,
the Hapag Lloyd A310 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=129100&highlight=hapag+target) and maybe the Crossair CFIT (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=117709&highlight=Zurich+crossair+Lutz) in 2001.

No doubt, an attitude of "We are a l m o s t there, surely we can make it" is something we all know from everyday non-aviation activities, too. "Pressing on" is a state of mind where other potential solutions are faded out (masked). It often involves a perception that it is "too late now to change a course of action once taken" - something which might be reflected in this case by, quote, "The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time" and of course "The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.".

As "target fixation" is an inherent element of the human mind, its dangers must be addressed in training.

(I´m not blaming anyone here, just trying to add some points to a discussion which is too much focussed on "AA the good and the ugly".)

[Semaphore Sam]

Dallas Dude, in response

>While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.

Fair Enough..I was asking, not presuming.

>AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.

Well, the US says it follows the Geneva Conventions in Iraq, too, whilst managers (Rummy, etc) encourage flouting of same. Black-and-White directives mean little when "wink wink" management rules (still not presuming, just asking).

>It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.

>I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.

My call is to ask questions, not answer them. I don't know enough.

[swh]

Wino,

but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.

So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)

Taken from the NTSB accident report (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.htm), this is the public perception, I understand it is not the view of the AA pilots.

Point 16 below is interesting, as even "COORDINATED rudder" as you put it can lead to structural failure. What you have demostrated with your view of the training procedures hinting that "COORDINATED rudder" is okay all the time, no it is not. The NTSB have recognised this widespread fable that is in industry and has asked that the FAA look at changing the regulations to do with certification.

Modify 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 standards to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope, including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity. (A-04-XX)

Require the manufacturers and operators of transport-category airplanes to establish and implement pilot training programs that: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections. The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after takeoff or during strong or gusty crosswind takeoffs or landings. (A-02-01)

Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots of transport-category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure that flight crews are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters. (A-02-02)

NTSB CONCLUSIONS

[list=1]
The captain and the first officer (the flying pilot) were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical conditions that may have adversely affected the flight crew’s performance during the flight. Flight crew fatigue was not a factor in this accident.

The accident airplane was properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with Federal regulations.

The air traffic controllers who handled American Airlines flight 587 were properly trained and qualified. The local controller complied with Federal Aviation Administration wake turbulence spacing requirements when handling flight 587 and Japan Air Lines flight 47, which departed immediately before flight 587.

The witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

Flight 587’s cyclic rudder motions after the second wake turbulence encounter were the result of the first officer’s rudder pedal inputs.

Flight 587’s vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.

The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.

The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.

The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence, erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques, and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.

Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplane’s rudder travel limiter system operates.

The A300-600 rudder control system couples a rudder travel limiter system that increases in sensitivity with airspeed, which is characteristic of variable stop designs, with the lightest pedal forces of all the transport-category aircraft evaluated by the National Transportation Safety Board during this investigation.

The first officer’s initial control wheel input in response to the second wake turbulence encounter was too aggressive, and his initial rudder pedal input response was unnecessary to control the airplane.

Certification standards are needed to ensure that future airplane designs minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling susceptibility and to better protect against high loads in the event of large rudder inputs.

Because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds.

To minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling events, transport-category pilots would benefit from training about the role that alternating full control inputs can play in such events and training that emphasizes that alternating full rudder inputs are not necessary to control a transport-category airplane.

There is a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about the degree of structural protection that exists when full or abrupt flight control inputs are made at airspeeds below the maneuvering speed.

Federal Aviation Administration standards for unusual attitude training programs that take into account industry best practices and are designed to avoid inaccurate or negative training would lead to improvement and standardization of industry training programs.

The use of lower levels of automation, such as simulators without motion or simple computer screen displays, may be more appropriate to provide the necessary awareness training with less danger of introducing incorrect information.
[/list=1]

I am not trying to bring the name of the airline or pilots in disrepute, just share some information in memory of those who lost their lives.

:uhoh:

[Wino]

Sten didn't really put in "Coordinated" rudder, because at 250 knots its just not an option on the aircraft.

I have read the report (as have you, obviously)

And the points that are necesary here is


10. I have a copy of the FCOM on CDROM(official factory manual from the aircraft) from which AA procedures were developed (because of the flight attendant accident in Miami that also called AA manuals into question) The Rudder load limiter described is actually the one from the b4 not the 600r. That was corrected in a revision later. The B4 Rudder load Limiter was a ratio changer system, like the rest of the industry, not the fixed ratio system in place on 587. Very poor manuals to say the least.

12 Under no circumstance do I believe that Sten INTENDED to get full rudder on the first (or an after) throw of the rudder. As to the controll wheel responses being to agressive, easy thing to say when the aircraft is rolling away from you and this particular aircraft has Tiny Tiny aillerons (inboard only) and some spoilers and can be down right ponderous on response in certain regimes (especially compared to 767 and 777 aircraft, which are similar or larger in size)

13. BINGO

14 BINGO

I have always been aware of the risk of a doublet. However, the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder.

The problem here is that the aircraft has a tendancy towards a POI and that needs to be corrected and can be corrected fairly easily. It is the same reason that we set AFT CG LIMITS on aircraft. The farther aft the CG goes on an aircraft the more efficient the aircraft gets (But less stable). There is a point at which stability becomes beyond the acceptable level. This aircraft has a stability problem in CERTAIN rarely seen regimes of flight.

It can easily be fixed one of two ways. One is to change the rudder load limiter back to a ratio changer system rather than a fixed ratio changer (somewhat expensive) The other is to further limit rudder travel at speeds of higher than say 180 knots so that the amount of rudder travel allowed would permit a full doublet. The second change would have no effect on performance and would simply be a software change in the FAC.

But as Airbus has never made a mistake, I don't expect to see it.


Cheers
Wino

[411A]

"I have always been aware of the risk of a doublet. However, the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder."

Ah, well actually Wino, this ain't true, at all.

Since the very early days of 707 certification flying, pilots
then had a proper well founded knowledge that large and particularly rapid rudder inputs at higher speeds can lead to severe problems....and this knowledge was passed down to respective carriers who ordered the aircraft, including American Airlines.

Now, one could ask, how come this knowledge is somehow forgotten now?
Plain and simply, the older guys have now retired, and young turks are in charge in the training department, so these folks have NO prior knowledge about the problems that can occur, and further, have NO inclanation to find out, either.

I suspect it is the AA idea of..."we know best, so shut up and do it this way."

Additionally, large jet transport aeroplanes can NOT be thrown around with wild abandon, as some light highly maneuverable aircraft can, at maneuvering speeds, without overstressing the structure.

Positively KNOWN a very long time ago, and American Airlines, and specifically their ill-informed training department, are sadly unable to grasp the facts.
AA mindset, demonstrated at its worst.

[swh]

Wino,

I dont want to stir the pot, or cheapen the loss of life in that terrible accident.

I have posted some information on page 20 of the American Airlines flight 587 thread that deals with the the FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.

Some of the recommendations from the NTSB was for the FAA to change to the FARs.

Your comment "the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder" is common amongst the professional pilots, however it is not correct.

As many people have suggested, seasoned pilots get used to their equipment, the A300 may have more sensitive rudders than other types, however this would only be noticible if someone is changing fleets, not for experienced A300 operators, it would be just the way the aircraft handles. This was not a factor in this accident from my recollection.

I am sure you have flown aircraft with lighter rudders again than the A300 at some stage in your career, transferring the "feel" from one to the other is not something people do, they are essentially carbon based autopilot controllers, when hand flying you have a known outcome/flight path in mind and adjust the controls/attitude to meet the outcome/flight path. Similar to an electronic autopilot you dont go around using the control forces for an A300 in a small piper or vice versa. While its agreed its sensitive, its also agreed that these were seasoned operators, and as you said the sensitivity of the rudders are well known to all at AA.


:suspect:

[EDDNHopper]

Er, am I missing something? This is the MD80 thread, not the A300... :confused: ;)

[ironbutt57]

Just gettin' ready to ask the same thing.......:confused: :confused: :confused:

[RRAAMJET]

Me too, as apparently those "old turks" or turkeys such as 411a have no inclination to learn the correct spelling of 'inclination'. Apparently some people never learn, blah blah blah.....

Oh, by the way, PanAm's history with rudder overcontrol and pylon failure isn't too grand either....

We're not all young turks here, mate, and my offer to challenge you to a flight test of any kind, independently examined, still stands.....

Cheers,
Back to blocking out 411a in PPRUNE, ahhhh, bliss.....:zzz:

Back to topic, these guys were bloody lucky, and so were the folks landing behind them not to trample wreckage. For those unfamiliar, the right seat of the older 80's has particularly poor positional info if you are cross-referencing the GPS cross-track error, etc. This still doesn't explain why a CATIIIa was not briefed and flown in these conditions, but I'm sure 'all in good time'....

Bottom line: unstable - throw it away

[Wino]

ABRUPT inputs are NOT what I am talking about SWH and 411a, and certification REQUIRES demontration or calculation that max angle rudder can be achieved including the steady state yaw that would be achieved without harming the aircaft. You SHOULD be able to smoothly apply the ENTIRE amount of Yaw that the Rudder load limiter allows to you.

411a, has chosen again not to read what I posted and chose instead just to go for teh gratuious slam of AA. Oh lord it must be hard to be humble when you are perfect in every way :rolleyes:

You should be able to use the full input if required. (Roll is not protected exactly, but crossover speed and a few other aerodynamic details will keep you somewhat safe,)

Again I am not advocating hammering away at the controlls. And I don't think it was sten's INTENTION to do that either, and therein lies the problem with the A300.

Cheers
Wino

[West Coast]

"Oh lord it must be hard to be humble when you are perfect in every way"

Wino, consider this is the same pilot who said in all is years of flying he never made mistake that a FO caught, he's that good I guess.

[411A]

But OTOH, I would much prefer 296 spelling mistakes, than 296 very dead bodies, such was the outcome of the AA A300-600 totally preventable accident.
An accident, by the way, that can be directly laid at the front door of American Airlines, for their complete failure to properly train and supervise their A300-600 line pilots.

[dallas dude]

411a

You can't have it both ways.

Either the JFK crew DID fly as they were trained with the resulting outcome or the DIA crew DIDN'T fly as trained with the resulting outcome.

A previous post of yours talked about "old hands". These were the same (now retired) "old hands" who initiated many of the training procedures in place at AA you now criticize.

Per your claimed training at Pan Am, did you learn anything from the guys in a PA B747, who ran into the departure end lights on takeoff at SFO (a result of a runway switch without recourse to the appropriate performance data with a different TO flap setting) and the subsequent evacuation cluster? I know I did!

Did you learn anything from the Tenerife accident? I know I did!

dd
still learning and still far from knowing it all.

[poydras]

you all,
mistake happen. AA has so many planes out there, now we all play the monday morning QB.
I just wish to see their attitude (AA pilots) adjusted a little more Lord I hate to jump seat with those SKYNAZI!!!!!!!!!

[cactusbusdrvr]

The GPWS should not have given a glideslope warning inside of 100' agl , should it?

We had an incident years ago in DFW where one of our 737s clipped the approach lights at 4am after breaking out on the ILS with 2 miles and fog. The crew were tired after flying multiple legs and the F/O dipped below the G/S going visual. I think the VASIs were out as well. The Captain called for a go-around inside of 50'. We changed our procedures to reemphasize a FAF gate and a 500' gate (in VMC). I would like to know if this crew had been on duty for a long time and if this was the first day of their pairing and if they had flown together before. Those are the key factors in an accident. By the way, our crew diverted to HOU after their go-around. The plane flew fine with a few scrapes.

[Ignition Override]

There seems to be a debate between the older generation(s) of retired pilots and the younger people, maybe never quite hidden on Pprune forums ('fora' for "martinets" and those well-versed in "living Latin"). Even though CRM was begun due to some hard-headed "solo pilot" decisions made years ago by some 'Superior Generation' Captains in 'flightdecks' (i.e. the United DC-8 crash in Portland and Western DC-10 at Mexico City) and other specific accidents many years ago (excluding those involving the then-unknown concept of microbursts), no pilot generation can justify being so smug that it can claim superiority in terms of flight safety.

Another aspect of flight safety is the political environment which, combined with deregulation since '78, has permanently changed everything. One of the books by attorney and C-141/B-727 pilot John Nance was able to prove to a degree how much US deregulation helped contribute to numerous accidents. The rubber-stamp approval of almost any flight manual and operating certificate during rapid airline growth in the 80s, by our over-worked (GOP-appointed) friends at the FAA was planned in order to meet the expectations of their bosses in the GOP-controlled Executive Branch. Don't get me all wrong, the GOP has some good points, I suppose. We know that the FAA, DOT, never mind the signals to the business community during the reckless ATC controller strike, were to support the laissez-faire (screw the employees all you want, declare Chapter 11 if needed..."Upstream [steal]" most of the operating cash while implying that LABOR is always the main problem....

As we all know and cannot pretend to ignore, airline (and much military aviation) training is now different, not just simulator realism, along with the progress in aircraft technology, procedures which requires less flight crew staffing (often 2 instead of 3 in the 'front office') and other changes which have taken place involving the hub and spoke networks. Lessons and procedures/policies are incorporated from previous and recent accidents-this helps explain why they keep changing. :ouch:

Airlines still allegedly alter/misplace aircraft maintenance logbook pages to avoid severe problems with insurance and liability. Much better to cost the Captain his/her career than for all of the evidence to come out.:suspect:

[West Coast]

"Lord I hate to jump seat with those SKYNAZI!!!!!!!!!"

Funny, I've JS'ed on them before and found them to be nothing less than professional and personable. From checking to see if I have a place for my bags, to checking on a leather seat and finished up friendly smile on the way out. Never heard of anyone who has had problems with AA. I'm a commuter and have a circle of friends who are also, we shop talk and I never get any negative feedback on AA/AE. A lot of the way a negative JS experience is the way one approaches the crew. If you think its your God given right to be there, yup your gonna have problems. If you approach it as a privilege you might have better luck. There is some canned etiquette. Introduce yourself, and ask for the privilege of the JS, shake hands and for gods sake, acknowledge the FO's existence by saying hi to him/her as well. Have your license/medical/company ID ready to go without having to be asked. Use these tried and true steps and see if your experience improves. If not, do a little soul searching.

[Few Cloudy]

Cactus bus driver,

GPWS below 100ft.

It´s been a while but I think it´s 1.3 dots below GP at that height.

Current guys please correct this.

FC.

[RRAAMJET]

West Coast: a particularly well written observation, which I'm sure applies equally to all flightdecks worldwide, and not just when commuting.

You'd be welcome anytime.

[West Coast]

Thanks RRAAMJET. As I said, I've never had anything less than a positive experience with y'awl. When Baseball season rolls around, I'll be taking you up on that offer.

[poydras]

West Coast,
sounds like you are a little green on this topic by stating the OBVIOUS ( docs ready and big smile for the Fo). No dude there is always a problem with those folks.
You see USUALLY in a working envirorment 85 % of people are courteous and occasionally 15 % are not so cooperative. Well I think AA employees are trying to revert that formula.
But I don' t fault them, just look at their management then you' ll understand.
If you jumpseat on UAL or SWA pay close attention and you' ll see the difference.
Is the CALIBER my friend.Is the caliber.

damn i miss those TWA folks..

[West Coast]

Green is a reletive term.
However the way a jumpseater approaches for a free ride shouldn't be any different if he's a crusty Captain who started off the panel of an Electra or a "green" new hire in the right seat of a Beech 1900. Some forget that and see it as a right and not a privledge. As I was a helo bubba and exiting the military at the wrong time I spent a number of years at a regionals. Doing the LAX to SBP milk run. A UA 747 skipper on his way home stuck his head up front and said "I got the actual, I'll be back" He sat his ass down, we didn't say a word to him. Who generated that atmosphere?


"But I don' t fault them, just look at their management then you' ll understand.
If you jumpseat on UAL or SWA pay close attention and you' ll see the difference"

I suspect I have a helluva a better insight in to SWA than most.


"No dude there is always a problem with those folks"

Every single one of them huh? Even if I was "green", at the percentage rates you quote I should have run in to some of these Nazi's by now.

I have never had a problem with AA, nor has any of my friends who use them, some exclusively.

Is there even just a teeny weenie little part of you asking "could it be me?"