Erebus 25 years on

[Graybeard]

OK, guys, I apologize for writing that the plane was ever at 700 feet. I was working from memory, and never had access to the accident report. I don't believe I ever wrote or implied that they hit at anything below 1465 feet, however.

"No change in altitude is recorded as a result of this pitch up although the NSU memory module recorded a plus 10 fps acceleration at impact."

What is an NSU, Brian?

GB

[Desert Dingo]

Graybeard:
Thanks for making that correction. I appreciate your honesty.

Just shows how careful we should all be when making any claim of anything to be a fact in this discussion. (It is not good enough to use the appeal to authority - like "Sir Someone Hyphened-Name and others said.... " that is so prevalent here. I will only be convinced that a correct conclusion has been reached if I can verify that the source data used for the premise is accurate).

Your NSU query;
Looks like Brian had a bit of fat finger trouble there.
The original Chippindale reference (Annex D p6) is to the NCU.
This is defined in the report at 1.18.1 as a Navigation Computer Unit.
Chippindale writes about "new investigation techniques" where the manufacturer was able to extract data not normally available.
Seems to be exactly what you were referring to in your post, although no actual retrieved speeds or altitudes are mentioned.

[ampan]

What did Mahon actually say about Capt. Wilson's evidence? It's at pp55,60 of the Mahon Report:
"The evidence given by Captain Wilson and Captain Johnson as to the verbal content of the RCU briefing was not accepted by the majority of pilots who attended the briefing. Indeed, there was one pilot who said that upon listening to the evidence given before the Commission in relation to the briefing which he attended, he was led to wonder whether he had been at the same briefing."
Mahon’s first sentence, insofar as it refers to the evidence of Capt. Wilson, is not accurate. Capt. Wilson said “… it was made plain that the track was a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.” (MacFarlane p212). None of the three surviving pilots disputed that evidence. Capt. Wilson went to say that he indicated that the nav track was over Erebus (p213). This is the evidence that was disputed

As regards Mahon’s second sentence, who was this pilot, and what did he actually say? The following extract is from the cross-examination of Capt S. (MacFarlane p687):
And you would accept no doubt there are areas where your recollection diverges from that of Captains Johnson and Wilson?
Yes.
Would you accept that they and your’s could be at fault in certain areas of personal recollection?
I make no claim to having an impeccable memory. I heard and saw the briefing once so I have had no other experience of a briefing to confuse my general recollection. There may be some fine points that are a little beyond my personal recollection. But I think, in fairness to Captains Johnson and Wilson, as they have stated in their evidence they have been called upon to demonstrate their aspect of the briefing several times. And it is my opinion only that possibly unconsciously each time they demonstrated they inadvertently improved it somewhat. Captain Wilson’s evidence in general I have no great conflict with. It’s just the extreme fine detail that he appears to have included for the commission that I don’t recall. In Captain Johnson’s case however, the description I heard in this court was so different to my recollection, that I wondered if in fact I had attended the same briefing.
It is obvious that Capt. S. was not referring to Capt. Wilson’s evidence about the briefing. So Mahon’s second sentence, insofar as it refers to the evidence of Capt. Wilson, is, again, not accurate.

The quoted passage from Mahon’s report suggests that he lumped Captains Johnson and Wilson together and treated them as one witness – and that he made a mistake as a result. But if you read on a little further (Mahon Reprt, p60, para 164), Mahon sums up his findings about the briefing, and says this:
“The pictorial representations showed the observers that the flight path was down McMurdo Sound and these displays would, not unnaturally, take precedence over the spoken words indicating a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station and indicating the NDB co-ordinates as the destination waypoint.”
So the judge did not make the mistake of lumping Captains Johnson and Wilson together. It appears that he recognised that no-one disputed Capt. Wilson’s evidence that he told the crew that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station.

Where does this leave us? It leaves us with the Mahon Report containing a clear finding that Captain Collins and F/O Cassin were told at the briefing that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station. It leaves us with Capt. Collins, 18 days later, plotting the nav track and discovering that it did not go to the NDB at McMurdo Station. The issue then is this: Would the average commercial pilot, exercising a reasonable degree of care and attention, have been alerted to a potential issue concerning the final waypoint? In my opinion, the answer to that question is a definite ‘yes’. Therefore, the failure to check the waypoint was an error.

So the captain and the F/O were not insane, or suicidal. They were simply careless. They should have checked, and they didn’t. 999 times out of a 1000, their error would have been of no consequence. In this particular case, however, as result of significantly greater carelessness by other employees of AirNZ, a disaster occurred. But the fact that the crew were killed and that most of the fault lay with AirNZ does not give the crew some sort of immunity from criticism. They were paid, and very well paid, to do a job, and part of that job was to be alert to the very type of situation that led to this accident.

25%.

[Brian Abraham]

Yes, sorry Greybeard, as DD says should be NCU, in my haste (lesson there) wrote NSU in my long hand notes. :{

[prospector]

"No, just interested in why it was OK for some flights to tool about at 1,000 feet AGL."

If indeed there were flights that "tooled around at 1,000ft AGL", they were all in crystal clear CAVOK conditions, after they had been identified and position confirmed by McMurdo radar.

[Brian Abraham]

Folks, I find the attempts to apportion “blame” a fruitless exercise. We all adjudge different nuances as having greater importance than others in leading to the accident. Who is to say which of those nuances has a greater role to play. The crew are not available to explain why they thought any particular action they made on the day seemed like a good idea at the time. The crew were professional aviators in every sense of the word, and as I’ve said previously it was only a matter of time before an incident/accident occurred. To that end, I’d like to put a scenario to you and see who you would adjudge as having erred.

The DC-10 is tracking inbound to McMurdo from Hallett and has descended to the LSALT of FL160 in preparation for a VMC descent to 6,000 feet in accordance with company procedures when overhead McMurdo. On passing overhead Mount Erebus the aircraft is impacted by a lava bomb thrown up by the vulcano. The aircraft is rendered uncontrollable and impacts the southern slopes of Mount Erebus in a vertical dive. This is a non-survivable accident.

Some will say it’s the pilots fault and point to various regulations to back their claims, such as Australian CAR regulation

224 Pilot in command
(1) For each flight the operator shall designate one pilot to act as pilot in command.
Penalty: 5 penalty units.
(1A) An offence against subregulation (1) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(2) A pilot in command of an aircraft is responsible for:
(a) the start, continuation, diversion and end of a flight by the aircraft; and
(b) the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time; and
(c) the safety of persons and cargo carried on the aircraft; and

239 Planning of flight by pilot in command
(1) Before beginning a flight, the pilot in command shall study all available information appropriate to the intended operation, and, in the cases of flights away from the vicinity of an aerodrome and all I.F.R. flights, shall make a careful study of:
(a) current weather reports and forecasts for the route to be followed and at aerodromes to be used;
(b) the airways facilities available on the route to be followed and the condition of those facilities;
(c) the condition of aerodromes to be used and their suitability for the aircraft to be used; and
(d) the air traffic control rules and procedures appertaining to the particular flight; and the pilot shall plan the flight in relation to the information obtained.

Would it have been the pilots “fault”? Or rather a systems failure?

[ampan]

The lava bomb is much the same as a sector whiteout, isn't it? If the crew has no reason to be alerted to the risk of a lava bomb, then it's definitely a systems failure, ie, crew has 0% of the blame. (The word "blame" is not a particularly pleasant one, but it's a word that cannot be avoided, in my opinion.)

But what if the crew, 19 days earlier, had been told of the possible risk of a lava bomb? And what if they disregarded what they had been told? In that situation, why shouldn't the crew get a share of the blame?

[prospector]

Brian Abraham,
" Folks, I find the attempts to apportion “blame” a fruitless exercise."

That is why the official accident report compiled by the Chief Accident Inspector states "Probable Cause".

It is only Mahon who states, in his opinion, who was to blame.

[ampan]

Correct, Prospector. Mahon started it.

[Brian Abraham]

I'm sorry. To me Chippendale's probable cause lays all the "blame" at the feet of the Captain, and that is what caused the dissension (Mahon etc). In his conclusions he covers the ground extremely well as to the systemic failures and I would give him 9.5 out of 10 for his report. In fact, given the comments he makes in his conclusions it is somewhat difficult, I find, to reconcile his probable cause. Perhaps it's just me. All the brouhaha would have been avoided with the modern day method of reporting in which the conclusions chapter lists the latent failures, along with the active failures, and ends with safety recommendations. Nobody is placed in the position of being "blamed" (negligence aside) because the question asked with regard to latent and active failures is always "why", and the necessary recommendations are made to put measures in place to avoid a repeat. The Qantas Bangkok over run report is absolutely outstanding in how the investigators address the latent and active failures, highly recommended reading.

they were all in crystal clear CAVOK conditions

prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions, else you would not be making that statement. You're not to be faulted for that of course. And it's the reason I keep saying that an incident/accident had the writing on the wall while ever ANZ operated the flights in the manner that they were. If it wasn't Captain Collins and crew and passengers, it would have been another unfortunate flight.

[Graybeard]

The NCU received attitude and position data on serial busses from the three LTN-58 ISU, Inertial Sensor Units, which, of course, had very sensitive accelerometers. It was undoubtedly an Arinc 561 word format, but I don't recall the data rate. Eight times per second is reasonable.

Time and distractions confused my memory on the altitude. As Brian wrote, 700 feet radio altitude was the trigger for the GPWS.

GB

[Graybeard]

"prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions, else you would not be making that statement. You're not to be faulted for that of course. And it's the reason I keep saying that an incident/accident had the writing on the wall while ever ANZ operated the flights in the manner that they were. If it wasn't Captain Collins and crew and passengers, it would have been another unfortunate flight."

If this flight had not crashed, the pilots would have surely reported the error in their position vs. where they believed they were. That would have caused a major stir at HQ.

For examples:

If they had continued on course from Hallett a few seconds longer, they would have made radar contact with McMurdo Station, and been told they were just north of Erebus.

If they had turned on their Wx radar upon making their descent below 16,000, they would have seen the position error.
-------

As I pointed out in one of my first posts here, using the word McMurdo without attaching Station or Sound was a deadly confuser.

GB

[prospector]

" prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions"

Not first hand, but I have seen numerous photo's, especially of Erebus,from many miles away, I have heard it stated it can be seen from 100 miles away. This is in CAVOK conditions with the atmosphere gin clear.

If the mountain was never sighted at any time, as on this flight, when even if they were on the track they thought they were on they would have been no more than 20 miles from Ross Island, then surely alarm bells must have sounded.

This also from the crew that had never been to the Antarctic, apart from the Flight Engineer

"He levelled out at that height and a few minutes later, knowing from McMurdo that the weather was well below the minima required for the company approved letdown procedure and so he would have to improvise his own, he saw a break in the clouds which extended to sea level. Collins stated his intention to circle to get below cloud".


Once again go back to the purpose of the flight, sightseeing, what is the purpose of going down to 1500ft when you had been advised that the weather was no good for sightseeing??? in the McMurdo, Ross Island area???

Then come back to the apportioning of blame, that the aircraft impacted Erebus was totally the fault of the Nav Section in Auckland, and the crew were completely blameless, this according to Mahon's findings?? no way will I and many others accept this reasoning of Justice Mahon's.

[ampan]

At #223, #266 and #403 I said that Mahon labelled Captain Wilson as a perjurer. I was completely wrong about that. No such finding was made by Mahon – which explains why Captain Wilson was not involved in the Court of Appeal and Privy Council cases.

I’d like to carry on with this briefing business a bit longer, because I’m convinced that Captain Wilson told the crew that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station. What he didn’t tell the crew, or, more likely, didn’t make clear, was that the nav track was over Erebus.

If you accept that the pilots at the briefing were told that the final waypoint was at the NDB at McMurdo Station, what about the evidence of two of the surviving pilots concerning this rough “eye-balling” exercise they both allegedly carried out, where they estimated, they said, that the final waypoint was somewhere other than at the NBD at McMurdo Station? That could not have happened: If the briefing officer is saying that the waypoint is at X, and you think it might somewhere else, you would definitely say something.

The “eye-balling” evidence never made much sense in any event. It’s not the sort of thing you would expect a pilot to do during the briefing. You might do it home afterwards, while flicking through the briefing documents. Or you might do it on the flightdeck. But during the briefing, you would be listening to the briefing.

But let’s do a cross-check: Assume that the eye-balling occurred. We know that none of the five pilots at the briefing raised an issue concerning the final waypoint. So these two pilots, having formed the impression that the final waypoint was not at the NDB at McMurdo Station, sat there and said nothing. There are only two ways that this could have happened. The first possibility is that Captain Wilson never made any reference to the nav track and completely avoided the subject – which possibility can be discounted. The second possibility is that Captain Wilson did refer to the nav track and indicated that it went somewhere other than the NDB at McMurdo Station, to a position that roughly accorded with the position that was estimated by the two pilots. But if this is what happened, you would expect the two pilots to say so in their evidence. They don’t. Instead, the subject is avoided.

So all five pilots walked out of the briefing room believing that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station – and one of them, Captain Collins, was holding a print-out of the flightplan, which he believed was to the NDB at McMurdo Station.

Capts. S and G. meet on the morning of their flight, collect the flightplan, and manually enter the waypoints, believing that the track they are entering will take them to the NDB at McMurdo Station. On reaching Cape Hallett, they find blue skies, and fly heading select, right of track, closer to Victoria Land. Once at the end of the sound, by the Dry Valleys, they turn left and head for McMurdo Station, which they can see. As they pass the Dailey Islands, Capt. S. notices that they are going left of track. This is unusual, because he didn’t expect to be going left of track until passing McMurdo Station – because he believes that the track goes to McMurdo Station. This concerns him, because there might be a problem with the AINS, which he has to rely on to get back to NZ. So he performs an update once over the TACAN. This is the point in time, I think, when the charts came out and when the eye-balling occurred.

[werbil]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't a "cloud break procedure" a procedure designed to allow a descent through cloud to get visual beneath a layer? After completing the cloud break procedure terrain avoidance would still be visual, and impact at 6,000' in sector whiteout is just as possible, especially if you are not where you think you are. VFR procedures require the pilot to use visual observations to ensure separation from the terrain. Even just one minute after you have made a positive visual fix you are navigating using dead reckoning procedures, and if you're below the lowest safe the only source of positive terrain clearance information is by visual observation.

Prospector, the conditions you describe (sky clear) are far, far greater than CAVOK. It is my understanding that under a solid ceiling at 20,000' even with 100km visibility (also well in excess of CAVOK conditions in this location) "sector whiteout" could still occur with the same results. Unlike reduced visibility or cloud, you can't see sector whiteout coming - you can only recognize it when you are in it AND you are expecting it AND you know what signs (or lack of) that you are looking for.

Whilst the conditions may have been unsuitable for scenic viewing in the McMurdo area, the weather could well have been quite suitable a few miles away. Whilst I don't have any Antarctic nor Arctic experience, I do have a lot of experience in VFR tourism operations, and I would be very surprised if localized weather did not occur in these regions like it does everywhere else that I've flown. To condemn the crew based on the weather in another location (even if it was their eventual destination) is irrelevant.

Ultimately, there are numerous things that if the flight crew had done differently the accident would not have occurred on this particular flight. However, the same can also be said for Air New Zealand, the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority (what ever it was called) and even the US military. Even the open door policy could well have distracted the crew at a critical time.

It is the company's responsibility to ensure that the flight crew are route qualified - and it is the company's performance is this regard that lined up many of the holes (the lack of detailed information on whiteout, the lack of information on the use and limitations of weather radar for ground mapping of surfaces covered by dry snow, the alteration of the waypoints combined with the ambiguity [polite way to put it] of the route in relation to Mt Erebus).

I still have some trouble with the concept that the crew should be completely exonerated for their contributions to the accident. At the end of the day a perfectly serviceable aircraft crashed into the side of a mountain, and if the crew's job is not to prevent that, what is it? However, given what I have read I am not comfortable to condemn the crew to being any of 'reckless', 'careless' or 'negligent' - the outcome proves that some of their decisions were wrong, but given the same training, briefings and company procedures without the benefit of hindsight would other professional pilots have done the same thing? I'm damn sure some would have.

W

[ampan]

I’ve got five categories of pilot conduct. First, there’s Silk Air deliberate. Second, it’s Cali Columbia reckless. Third, which is where we are at, is negligence. This is the “pilot error” zone. The issue is the conduct of the crew, measured against the objective standard of an average crew exercising a reasonable amount of care and attention.

Fourth is “Could have done better”. Fifth is “Couldn’t have done anything”.




If we look at the conduct of the flight from Cape Hallett onwards, there are three matters that can be classified as “Could have done better”. The first is the failure to appreciate the reason for the lack of VHF communications. The second is the failure to identify Beaufort Island. The third, which is connected to the first and the second, is the failure to check the current co-ordinates displayed on the AINS against the chart. But none of those failures, in my opinion, was pilot error. (Whether a finding of pilot error can be based upon an accumulation of “could have done better” factros is is an issue that will have to wait for another day.)

This leaves us with the decision to descend below the height of a known hazard without verifying the position. There would be no argument if the descent was through cloud. But it wasn’t. Prospector and the other aviation experts he cites say that it makes no difference. But I can’t get past the logic of Brian Abraham’s “VMC bubble”. In other words, your own eyes give you a spherical zone of protection against hitting the high ground. As it turned out, the VMC bubble was an illusion. Although the captain, who was obviously an aviation buff, was aware of the phenomena of sector whiteout (“bit hard to tell the difference between the ice and the cloud”), that does not mean he would know it when he saw it. All he had done was read about it. So I can’t call the decision to descend an error.

Then we have the alleged breach of an alleged rule re minimum altitude. But to establish an error based on the alleged breach of a rule, you first have to establish the rule. That can’t be done in this case – see the various Desert Dingo postings.

So I come back to the night before the flight, when the captain plots the nav track, after being told, 18 days beforehand, that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station. He would have noted that a track to the NDB at McMurdo Station would go over Erebus. He would have noted that the copy of the flightplan gave a track going to the Dailey Islands, which would not go over Erebus. He would have noted the conflict between what was said at the briefing and what was recorded in the briefing documents. What occurred, I think, was that he disregarded this potential issue concerning the final waypoint and went to bed that night completely confident that his nav track was well to the left of Erebus. That was an error, in my opinion. It was perpetuated the following morning, when the captain confidently advised F/O Cassin that the track did not go to the NDB at McMurdo Sound. Although the F/O has the most difficult job on the flightdeck, F/O Cassin should have questioned the captain, given that F/O Cassin would have remembered Captain Wilson’s comments re the nav track. Instead, he went along with the skip, so no-one checked.

[prospector]

werbil,

"To condemn the crew based on the weather in another location (even if it was their eventual destination) is irrelevant."

Considering Mt Erebus was hiding amongst this weather your statement of irrelevance is to say the least puzzling.



" It is the company's responsibility to ensure that the flight crew are route qualified"

If you have been following this thread you will no doubt have noticed that it was demanded, requested , or at any rate required from NZALPA that their members all be given a turn on this perk flight to the Antarctic. This in complete disregard of the experience in Antarctic operations demanded by all other operators going down there, RNZAF, USAF, USN, etc. While this may be seen as a fault of the company surely it must also be considered when blame is apportioned for this event.

It was not, as has been described by NZ's most experienced Antarctic operator, a Sunday drive, with up to 11 people believed to be in the cockpit at the critical time.

"limitations of weather radar for ground mapping of surfaces covered by dry snow, the alteration of the waypoints combined with the ambiguity [polite way to put it] of the route in relation to Mt Erebus)."

That is a theory of Mahons, it is not held by everybody, and there was certainly plenty of rock faces to give a good return from Beaufort Island, and as has been said many times Beaufort Island, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side.

By going VMC descent they took responsiblity for their own terrain clearance, they impacted terrain, how can that impact then be seen as anybody elses failing??? They were well aware of their lack of Antarctic experience, surely one would be ultra careful, and not do such things as design own descent procedure in marginal weather in that location.

[ampan]

I can see where you're coming from, Prospector, but that VMC argument is a bit like the "PIC" argument: the captain must be at fault because the aircraft hit the ground. That's like saying that the captain in the O'Hare accident has to cop a share of the blame.

Am wondering if Gary Parate might still be lurking out there. In any event, on 16 February 2008 he said this, at #248:
Quote:
"Incidentally, if ALPA are going to do are proper job on the proposed website, why don't they dig up everything, scan it, and put it on the site so that everyone has all the information? "

As one of the webmasters for the new site, I can confirm that this is exactly what is going to be happening. The site will be short on opinion, and long on information, although ultimately the judges of that will be you. Many of the questions on this thread will be answerable by researching the site. I don't yet have a date for when the site will go live, possibly April/May but I can tell you that this thread is having an influence on its ongoing development because it is serving as a useful barometer as to the necessity of having such a site.

The PC judgment has been scanned and will be available, as well as the Mahon and Chippindale Reports.

Other features will include a media kit, an area that will facilitate research, school projects, and a commemoration section.

It will not be a tool for venting one's spleen, nor should there be cause for anyone to vent at it(!), provided we have done our jobs correctly. Once again, that will be for you to decide.

A panel of experts will be available to answer questions by e-mail. All attempts will be made to ensure the impartiality of answers and I will be personally ensuring that this is the case. Whether I succeed in your estimation is another matter.

I have no opinion on some of the opinions I have read here, preferring to value them as a valid contribution to a robust debate. However I have to say that some of the statements of 'fact' I have read on here are nothing of the kind, and only serve to perpetuate myths that result in a debate that waste's everyone's time. Several claims that generate false thoughts in readers' minds that the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal "overturned" the Mahon Report are good examples.

It is hoped that the site will minimise pointless debate, but that may be wishful thinking. At least debate is better than no debate, and I, for one, have enjoyed reading every contribution on this thread. So keep it up, PPRuNers.

Gary Parata

All well and good, Gary, but I it is sometimes a little difficult to be assured of these things, especially when the following appeared in the President’s Message in the Dec 06 edition of ‘N’Formation’ (p10):
"The Jim Collins Memorial Award was presented to Capt.Paul McCarthy at the 2006 Conference held in Rotorua.While I (President) was away for the Conference, I did have the pleasure of informing Paul of his award. Paul was overcome and felt privileged to be considered worthy of such an award. Part of the process of determining a worthy recipient for this award is working with Maria Collins, Captain Jim Collins’ widow. What a pleasure this is, and what a vibrant lady Maria remains. Maria is passionate about this award initiated in recognition of her husband Jim Collins, Captain of TE901, tragically flying into the slopes of Mt Erebus in1979. Every day Maria still has issues she deals with concerning this tragic time for her family and New Zealand. Maria is determined that her grandchildren and their grandchildren, when researching this flight and Mt Erebus, will read that the Mahon Report is the accepted account of the flight in New Zealand’s records, at ICAO, and anywhere on the Web. We have been working with Maria to help this happen. Work on a comprehensive Erebus page on the NZALPA Website has been underway for sometime. We are going to get it right before we go live. You will see this page available next year and will be advised when it is available."
This is, obviously, a sensitive issue. But the question has to be asked: Are we going to get it right? The fundamental issue is whether Mahon’s exoneration of the crew was correct. Captain Collins, as pilot in command, was a key member of the crew. His conduct, therefore, has to be scrutinised and, if necessary, criticised. This criticism will be extremely distressing to his wife and children, and to his grandchildren. So I think NZALPA should make up its mind, one way or another. Either do it right, or don’t do it at all.

If NZALPA are to proceed, then these are the items that I would like to see on the website:

(1) A complete transcript of the evidence of Capt. Wilson, Capt. Simpson, F/O Gabriel and F/O Irvine.

(2) Any document containing any previous statement made by any of the above witnesses.

(3) The photocopy of the topographical map used at the briefing.

(4) The topographical chart provided in the despatch documents.

(5) The passenger photographs of Beaufort Island.

[prospector]

Ampan,

" I can see where you're coming from, Prospector, but that VMC argument is a bit like the "PIC" argument: the captain must be at fault because the aircraft hit the ground. That's like saying that the captain in the O'Hare accident has to cop a share of the blame."

Who made the decision to descend VMC?? they were in receipt of the local weather conditions.

Cant see any similarity with the O'Hare incident, that captain was faced with a problem of great magnitude and very little time to suss it, also nothing in the manual to cover such an event. How do you relate that to a decision taken with no time stress and in a perfectly functioning aircraft?

[ampan]

They knew the weather conditions, but they didn't know the effect that those conditions would have on their visibility.

If that descent had been made in a tropical or temperate zone, it would have been been a safe manouvre, wouldn't it?

[prospector]

Ampan,

" If that descent had been made in a tropical or temperate zone, it would have been been a safe manouvre, wouldn't it?"

Perhaps, in fact likely, but it would never have been carried out on a scheduled passenger run, I mean if an third level operator carried out a manouver of that nature and ended up with the same result in something like an Aero Commander, without the support of NZALPA do you think Mahons findings would have been the same??? They were well aware they were operating in a hostile environment in which, due to internal politics, they had absolutely no experience, apart from the simulator ride that along with most other things, nobody can agree on what was covered and what was not.

I will try another tack, likely get shot down but hopefully will prove a point.

A leg from Auckland to Wellington, Wellington closed due weather, descend over Kapiti Island because you can see it through a hole in the cloud cover, then try and track around to Wellington via Makara and Sinclair Head, fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you. Impact a hill. Who is at fault??? The pilot did not know that that patch of cloud would be in such a position, but considering the other known weather facts it would always be a possibility.

[ampan]

Descending through a hole in the cloud would be unusual, but would it be unprecedented? And I'm reasonably sure that the captain would be familar with orbiting over a particular area, waiting for his turn to land. Also, looking at the Beaufort Island photos, which show the sunshine on the sea ice, it looks to be a decent-sized hole.

But I'm still at 25%, for different reasons.

[prospector]

Going down through a hole in the cloud is certainly not without precedent.

Read the accident report appertaining to F27 ZK-NFC at Mangere 17th Feb 1979, not exactly the same but similarities.

[Desert Dingo]

Prospector:
When you write
...fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you. You have just demonstrated that you do not have a clue what sector whiteout really is.
There is a very fundamental difference beween flying in cloud and having a sector whiteout. I suggest you do some research before writing such nonsense.

[Brian Abraham]

fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you.

prospector, I didn't know you were given to comedy. You demonstrate that you have absolutely no concept, nor understanding, of the whiteout phenomena. What you talk of is neither sector whiteout or even whiteout.

The pilot did not know that that patch of cloud would be in such a position

This statement is even more telling, since it demonstrates a further complete lack of knowledge as to what flight in VMC is all about. I have detailed the principles in some depth in an early post. It seems that there may be little profit to be had in engaging in further discussion with you.

[prospector]

I am well aware that the example given is not sector whiteout.

The point that I was trying to make is that in such conditions as were in force at the time one should not be suprised at encountering whiteout. It is the fact that one would deliberately proceed into such conditions and then be suprised to encounter whiteout that is suprising.

Encountering whiteout was to be expected, being down at that height in those conditions at all is when the situation turned to custard.

Brian Abraham,
You say "prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions, else you would not be making that statement"

Now tell me what experience of Antarctic flying did this crew have?? before they made the decision to descend into weather that they had been advised was below minima's for the descent planned and approved by both the company and CAA, and which they had carried out training in the simulator for.

"This statement is even more telling, since it demonstrates a further complete lack of knowledge as to what flight in VMC is all about. I have detailed the principles in some depth in an early post. It seems that there may be little profit to be had in engaging in further discussion with you.

Well at least we have found some ground in common, but before I go tell me exactly what assuming responsibility for your own terrain clearance entails??

[ampan]

In Prospector's defence, it should be noted that he prefaced his sector whiteout comment with an indication that he "was likely to be shot down", which he duly was.

Just to finish off my guess at what happened, the crew enter the final waypoint into the AINS, believing that it would take them to the Dailey Islands. They don’t check this. Once at cruising altitude, the captain probably briefed the two flight engineers and F/O Lucas (who didn’t attend the briefing). But there wasn’t that much else to do, was there? There might have been passenger visits to the flightdeck, but there was still plenty of time for Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin to discuss the briefing they had attended 19 days beforehand. The captain would have brought out his atlas/map showing the plotted track with distance segments marked on it, and with the final waypoint at the Dailey Islands. There would have been some further discussion of what Capt. Wilson had said re the final waypoint, if only to the effect that he should be told that the actual waypoint was in a different location. But it still seems strange that no-one bothered checking this final waypoint, given that there was plenty of time available to do so. Perhaps they did check? It should be noted that the crew now had two printouts of a flightplan, the first being that obtained from the briefing, with the second being that obtained on despatch. The crew though they were identical, but they were not. It may be that the check was performed using the earlier flightplan. But they shouldn’t have used either of the printed flightplans. The digits on the printed flightplans did not tell them where they were going. The digits that told them where they were going were those that had been entered into the AINS before take-off, and that’s where they should have looked.

Once at Cape Hallett, the crew would have discussed their options. Given that the NDB wasn’t working, they would have discussed flying under the cloudbase, using the nav track. The captain was aware of the potential visibility problems involved in flying between cloud and snow – but he had his nav track and he had his altimeter. The option of using the nav track to fly under the cloudbase below the height of the high ground should have focused the crew’s attention back onto the final waypoint. Captain Wilson told them that it was at the NDB at McMurdo Station. Whether he told them that the track was over Erebus is immaterial, as the crew would have already known that. (In fact, the captain knew it the night before.) Given the plan, doesn’t the final waypoint become a matter of critical importance? You have the briefing officer saying that the nav track goes over a 13000 foot mountain, you have a flightplan saying it doesn’t – and you propose following the nav track down to 2000 feet. It is very surprising that none of the five members of the crew requested a further check, or insisted on plotting the position before descending from FL180.

They descend through the hole, and level out at 1500 feet. A short time later, the F/E says “I don’t like this” and the captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin recommends doing a 180 degree turn to the right. Note that F/O Cassin is in the right-hand seat, so he has the better view of the right. It was at this point, I believe, that the captain was starting to have doubts as to his position and he was rapidly reassessing things. He would have recalled what Capt. Wilson said and the possibility of Erebus being ahead would have occurred to him for the first time. He would have known that that if Erebus was ahead, Mount Bird would be to the right and behind, so when F/O Cassin recommends a right turn, the captain says “No. Negative.” At this point, the captain has decided to turn left, not as a matter of life & death urgency, but as a precautionary measure, just in case. So he disengages nav mode, which causes an initial roll to right, which he then corrects and as he initiates a left turn using heading select. Impact occurs a couple of seconds later.

If this is what happened, it must be a case of pilot error. If Capt. Wilson told Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, then they should have been alerted to a potential issue concerning the final waypoint, and should have checked.

Did Capt. Wilson tell the crew that the nav track was to the NBD at McMurdo Station? According to Mister Justice Mahon: Yes, he did.

[Brian Abraham]

If those interested in this thread would indulge me, I would like to digress for a moment in which to make one last attempt to show prospector that what may pass as pilot error ain’t necessarily pilot error.

On the night of 13 September 1993 a RAAF F-111C A8-127 callsign Buckshot 18 impacted the ground while making its egress from a practice low level bombing run on a target near the town of Guyra in northern NSW. Both crewmembers, the pilot FLTLT Jeremy McNess and navigator FLTLT Mark Cairns-Cowan lost their lives.

The media, in their usual fashion, shouted PILOT ERROR from the rooftops, much to the distress of the pilot’s family, as you may well imagine.

From page 67 of http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S7494.pdf I don't think I need to bold any particular part, as a considered reading will highlight the lessons to be learnt.

Mrs McNess— Often it seemed to us that too much time was spent trying to find ways to blame the accident on the crew and too little on the systemic problems that led to it, thus affording protection to those within squadron hierarchy and abandonment to those killed. We had no wish to see any one person held responsible, but felt strongly that, unless roles and procedures were closely scrutinised and improved where necessary, similar circumstances would recur in the future and more lives would be lost. Unfortunately, there was another accident 5½ years later, when another F111 crashed, killing two more. Several similarities between the two accidents were immediately obvious. These were the lack of crew currency (my comment – due to defence budgetary constraints) for the exercise and the lack of crew rapport, both readily recognised by civilian airlines and the Air Force as prerequisites for safe flying.

Portion of letter by Air Marshal LB Fisher, AO RAAF

While Jeremy and Mark adequately prepared themselves for the mission, there were a number of latent factors that individually were incidental to the conduct of the flight until tested by the inflight circumstances during the approach to the target near Guyra. Flying supervisors appeared to be focused on regaining night proficiency for the squadron and were less vigilant in regard to the elementary matters of crew and cockpit rapport and the effect that these synergies have on operational efficiency.

Jeremy’s low night currency was tested to extreme by the inflight difficulty which also exposed a link to the pilots’ preference to manually fly the auto-TF approach during day operations. Two critical points stem from this factor. First, during the day pilots were able to maintain safe flight without total reliance on instruments because external visual references were available to them. Second, the ‘pickle-paddle-pull’ sequence at the pull-up point was not practised with every auto-TF flown and therefore did not become instinctive. The effect in Jeremy’s situation was that his familiarity with day time procedures prevailed and the TF was not disengaged at the pull-up point. Although the flight profile was not dangerous at that point, his low night currency may not have automatically directed his attention to critical flight instruments. This may have placed Jeremy under additional pressure and could have affected his recognition of the problem and the immediate actions required to rectify the situation. By allowing the crews more time to adjust to night operations before commencing demanding tasks, such as a night auto-TF, and a more rigid adherence to prescribed flying procedures may have alleviated some of the pressures that were brought to bear when Jeremy experienced the handling difficulty. Also associated with this particular point was that the guidance in flying orders could have been interpreted more stringently. Although flying supervisors expressed their concerns regarding the Squadron’s low night currency and stressed the need for caution, a less demanding mission may have been a more appropriate opening to the night flying program. Alternatively, the auto-TF could have been flown with a longer high-level leg that allowed crews more time to settle into the night environment before descending for the demanding low-level operations.

I also believe that Jeremy’s low night currency was exacerbated by crewing him with a navigator similarly inexperienced in night operations, and one with whom he had not frequently flown. This factor was insignificant during mission preparation on the ground and they adequately briefed the other crews on the conduct of the mission. Their approach to the target was initially uneventful until the critical pull-up point. Jeremy appeared to attempt to resolve the problem himself and the navigator remained fixed on his weapons delivery. The factor of inexperience may have allowed the seriousness of the problem to pass unnoticed because they had not established the rapport and synergy that is critical to cockpit proficiency. The clipped verbal commentary between the two indicated, to some extent, that they had not established the fluency of ‘crew-buddies’. I agree with the Accident Investigation Team’s finding that the pairing of Jeremy and Mark was ill-advised.

Jeremy’s low night currency and his pairing with Mark Cairns-Cowan were the two factors critical to events that occurred on 13 September 1993. Systemic supervisory shortfalls saw a crew, inexperienced in night operations, assigned a difficult but achievable task that later exceeded their individual and collective capabilities when the inflight handling difficulty was encountered. They had not had the opportunity to develop their professional cohesion and as a consequence neither was aware of the potential seriousness of the events that followed the handling problem. Crew rapport, and the inseparable crew confidence, in this case may have turned the course of events and led to a safe recovery. The other factors such as Jeremy’s first flight in A8-127, the maintenance history of the aircraft, weather conditions in the target area and their responsibilities as first crew were initially insignificant because their professional training equips them to fly any aircraft in the fleet through bad weather to a target. However, there remains a possibility that these factors may have also affected Jeremy’s reactions to the handling problem.

Anybody want to put up their hand and say the accident was the result of pilot error? Yes, the pilot flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, that much is both true and a fact. To leave the analysis there is to fail to learn from their sacrifice and understand WHY. The why is well answered by Air Marshal Fisher, and I don’t think requires elaboration. PILOT ERROR? Definitely not (in my book).

Jeremy was a lad who grew up in our small town of Sale, and it was one of the pilots who I worked with who taught him to fly and encouraged him to join the RAAF.

To return to Erebus.

I am well aware that the example given is not sector whiteout

Well, why did you say

fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you

You do contradict yourself.

tell me exactly what assuming responsibility for your own terrain clearance entails

You are quite correct that when flying VMC the pilot is assuming responsibility for his own terrain clearance. The whole problem with the ANZ operation was the basis on which it was formulated. The 6,000 feet limit invoked by the company and the CAD provided absolutely no protection. Some points to remember.

A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet
B Chippendale’s words – “A high potential for the white out phenomena is always likely when overcast conditions exist above a continuous snow covered slope. Those who have not been exposed to white out are often sceptical about the ability of those who have experienced it to estimate distance and to be aware of terrain changes and the separation of sky and earth. The condition may occur in a crystal clear atmosphere (your gin clear day prospector) or under a cloud ceiling.”

Whenever the aircraft was being operated at an altitude below the height of the hard bits (Erebus 12,448 feet) it ran the risk of running into those hard bits, just as Captain Collins did, the fact that he was below the stipulated minimum altitude of 6,000 feet had very little to do with the nature of the accident and its underlying cause. This is why I keep beating the drum that an incident/accident was inevitable at some stage. Had the crews obeyed the airlines and CAD’s instructions to the letter, they still ran the gauntlet and danger of imitating what was to befall Captain Collins flight.

My own personal experience as SLF on a flight to Antarctica – we were flying in VMC conditions at FL200 and immediately below an overcast. The only thing that could be seen, other than a milky whiteness in every direction you looked, whether it be up, down or sideways, was the shadow of an odd isolated puff ball cloud on the snow surface (could not see the cloud making the shadow of course). Visibility at the time? You would have been able to see around the world so to speak.

So what may be the cause of the accident. It is both true and a fact that the crew flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, as did Jeremy. Why? Lack of training and experience partly, but fore most, unrealistic limits placed on operations by the airline and CAD, in that they failed to recognise that white out would always be a problem and a danger to operations when operating below the LSALT. Are the people within the respective organisations to blame? I very much doubt it, as it comes back to “you don’t know what you don’t know”. Although you may have thought they would have picked the brains of DEEP FREEZE personel at Christchurch. I’d be very surprised if in fact the airline did not have pilots with Antarctic experience in their ranks, the RNZAF operated Austers and Beavers starting 1956 and C-130 from 1965. It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having made a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours.

Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector. :ok:

PS O’Hare DC-10 The pilots had a flyable, albeit unserviceable, aircraft on their hands and their training was one thing that brought them undone. Our town and company lost a project engineer on that flight, and a wife and two daughters, aged 3 and 1 years respectively, a husband and father, Dale Whitthoft,. RIP.

[ampan]

Will prvvide a considered reponse in due course, Brian. But why can't you, and, more to the point, NZALPA, leave out the emotive aspect? To put it bluntly, the captain's wife is the last person to ask for an objective response to an accident that killed her husband and the father of her three children.

[Brian Abraham]

leave out the emotive aspect

Oh dear ampan, you are shooting from the hip. Read the Hansard report before drawing weapons.

captain's wife is the last person to ask for an objective response to an accident that killed her husband and the father of her three children

In Jeremy's case it was only because of a diligent mother seeking the truth that answers came to light.

Now pull your head in and read the Hansard.

[ampan]

Will do, Brian.

My 'wife & three kids' remark was directed at TE901 and the proposed NZALPA website.

[Desert Dingo]

ampan #510
Retraction - Captain Wilson

At #223, #266 and #403 I said that Mahon labelled Captain Wilson as a perjurer. I was completely wrong about that. No such finding was made by Mahon – which explains why Captain Wilson was not involved in the Court of Appeal and Privy Council cases.
Thanks, ampan. Good to see some of us can admit a mistake and keep a civilized discussion going.


I’d like to engage you on your position where you state
I’m convinced that Captain Wilson told the crew that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station. What he didn’t tell the crew, or, more likely, didn’t make clear, was that the nav track was over Erebus. Well, I’m not convinced at all.
I don’t think he told them that the track was over Erebus, or that it was to the NDB.

Let’s look at the evidence available.
All of the maps at the briefing showed tracks down McMurdo Sound. Not one showed a track over Mt Erebus or to the NDB.
All the briefing slides appeared to be taken from over McMurdo Sound or flat terrain.
Captain Simpson’s testimony: “I certainly did not get the impression from the audio-visual that our approach would be over Ross Island or Mt Erebus.” (M.p236) and about the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan “I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….” (M.p237)
Captain Gabriel’s testimony: “ …. noting the heading of the aircraft was to the right of the high ground depicted in the slide. I consequently expected the aircraft to approach the McMurdo area on a track which would take the aircraft to the west of Mt Erebus. Nothing that I saw or heard during the audio visual presentation gave me the impression that the aircraft would overfly Mt Erebus during its approach to the McMurdo area.”
F/O Irvine’s testimony: “I am certain that at no stage during the briefing conducted by Captain Wilson was anything said to the effect that our flight plan track would go over Ross Island or Mt Erebus".
Captain Collins and F/O Cassin demonstrated that they did not believe the track was over Erebus when they engaged NAV and flew straight into the side of Mt Erebus. Pretty convincing evidence that was, I think! If you accept that the pilots at the briefing were told that the final waypoint was at the NDB at McMurdo Station, what about the evidence of two of the surviving pilots concerning this rough “eye-balling” exercise they both allegedly carried out, where they estimated, they said, that the final waypoint was somewhere other than at the NBD at McMurdo Station? That could not have happened: If the briefing officer is saying that the waypoint is at X, and you think it might somewhere else, you would definitely say something. Agreed. You would definitely say something.
F/O Irvine’s testimony: “If mention had been made that out track passed over Ross Island or Mt Erebus, I would most certainly have questioned Captain Wilson about it to clarify my own understanding”Nice try, but I think your reasoning here is completely arse-about. That the pilots did not query Captain Wilson is not evidence that he told them the track was over Erebus or to the NDB - but evidence that he did NOT say anything to contradict their estimates of the McMurdo waypoint being in McMurdo Sound.

The “eye-balling” evidence never made much sense in any event. It’s not the sort of thing you would expect a pilot to do during the briefing. You might do it home afterwards, while flicking through the briefing documents. Or you might do it on the flightdeck. But during the briefing, you would be listening to the briefing. I disagree. The testimony of the pilots is that they did it at the briefing while they had access to the flight plan.
Captain Simpson: “When I looked at one of these flight plans …<snip>… (the McMurdo position)… I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….”
Captain Gabriel: “At some stage during the talk through I made a comparison of the TACAN co-ordinates ….<snip> …… and the co-ordinates of the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan…<snip> In making that comparison I realized that the flight plan ‘McMurdo’ waypoint was to the west of the TACAN position.” (M.p233) But let’s do a cross-check: Assume that the eye-balling occurred. We know that none of the five pilots at the briefing raised an issue concerning the final waypoint. So these two pilots, having formed the impression that the final waypoint was not at the NDB at McMurdo Station, sat there and said nothing. There are only two ways that this could have happened. The first possibility is that Captain Wilson never made any reference to the nav track and completely avoided the subject – which possibility can be discounted. Yeah, maybe. It wouldn’t be much of a briefing if he did that.


The second possibility is that Captain Wilson did refer to the nav track and indicated that it went somewhere other than the NDB at McMurdo Station, to a position that roughly accorded with the position that was estimated by the two pilots. But if this is what happened, you would expect the two pilots to say so in their evidence. They don’t. Instead, the subject is avoided. Good point. It is possible that he never said anything along the lines of “the final waypoint is here’ *pointing to map*. However, by passing around copies of the flight plan it is obvious that he gave the information to the pilots and they worked it out for themselves.


So all five pilots walked out of the briefing room believing that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station – and one of them, Captain Collins, was holding a print-out of the flightplan, which he believed was to the NDB at McMurdo Station.I submit that is completely wrong for all the reasons above.


Capts. S and G. meet on the morning of their flight, collect the flightplan, and manually enter the waypoints, believing that the track they are entering will take them to the NDB at McMurdo Station. Even more wrong. You have no evidence that they believed the track went there, and in addition there was no longer an NDB there.
On reaching Cape Hallett, they find blue skies, and fly heading select, right of track, closer to Victoria Land. Once at the end of the sound, by the Dry Valleys, they turn left and head for McMurdo Station, which they can see. As they pass the Dailey Islands, Capt. S. notices that they are going left of track. This is unusual, because he didn’t expect to be going left of track until passing McMurdo Station – because he believes that the track goes to McMurdo Station. No. Captain Simpson expected to track via the head of Mc Murdo Sound. He was only surprised that the offset distance was more than he expected when he got to McMurdo Station. (M.p242)
This concerns him, because there might be a problem with the AINS, which he has to rely on to get back to NZ. So he performs an update once over the TACAN. This is the point in time, I think, when the charts came out and when the eye-balling occurred. No. All the testimony indicates the “eye-balling” was done at the briefing when they had access to the sample flight plan. See above.

We can all agree that it was a pretty crummy briefing. A briefing is supposed to be a run through of what you are about to do in real life in the near future. To not have a single aeronautical map with the actual track shown on it is incompetence. For Captain Wilson to have all the briefing material (maps, slides and flight plan) implying that the track went down McMurdo Sound and then to claim that he briefed that the real track actually went over Erebus defies belief.

The conclusion I make is that Captain Wilson did NOT tell the crews that the track was over Erebus.
Why he said that he did tell them so, in the face of all the contrary evidence, is another argument.

Over to you.

[Gary Parata]

Thank you ampan, your comment is appreciated, if somewhat pre-emptive. Just be advised that discussion of the technical aspects forms only part of the proposed website content. It is also intended as a commemoration, and therefore family input is not only appropriate, but quite possibly, essential. Family input is intended not to be restricted to the flight crews', but also those of the passengers. But that will take some time to appear fully. This is in line with commemorative-type sites relating to other disasters, examples of which are many and varied on the web.

It would be nice if you could at least wait until the website is up, before picking holes in it - and I'm sure there will be many. But if that's not possible, never mind. I'm sure you will get your chance with some alacrity in due course.

As I've said before, this thread may very well have a significant influence into some of the editorial that will be contained within the site, so pardon me if I just continue to lurk in it without much reaction for the time being.

Gary Parata

[ampan]

Brian, I've ploughed through the Senate's hansard, and it's mostly irrelevent - which is typical of politicians. This accident was, clearly, the result of inadequate training in night-flying. If proper training had been provided and checked, I'm quite happy to put up my hand with the frenzied media and label the accident as 100% pilot error. Given the inadequate training, it's still pilot error, but to a diminished extent. This might cause ructions in Sale, but those ructions pale in comparison to the the ructions in NZ concerning TE901.

I don't think anyone can say that Jim Collins had inadequate training. Even 20 years on from the 7 years he spent in the RNZAF, a low run in a light plane at night would not have presented him with any degree of difficulty. So he has to be judged against a much higher standard. Desert Dingo complains about my reference to the money he was being paid, and says that it's irrelevant. I do not agree. Of all the Air NZ staff who made c*ck-ups, he was being paid the most. (Forget the exec pilots: they got hardly anything extra for their admin work, which might tend to explain why the superstar Vette was not amongst them).

[prospector]

Brian Abraham,

" It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having ma!
de a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours"

Capt Wilson did in fact, if my memory serves me right, do a trip to the ice. It was on the trip that diverted due weather at McMurdo, to the alternate advertised sites, South Magnetic pole I think, as has been stated on this thread it weas the unpopularity of this decision to divert to the alternate plan that may have influenced Capt Collins decision to proceed as he did.

"A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet"

And what was the cloud base at McMurdo station that was reported to the crew, well below 7,000ft. And the actual cloud base over Ross Island was even lower, 2,000ft or below, and to the North of Ross Island, or why the requirement to descend to 1500ft?

"Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector."

Fraid not, Still believe that Sir Geoffrey Roberts who said "I say quite flatly the main cause was the fact a pilot failed to locate himself in relation to ground features and flew his aircraft into the side of a mountain".
Or, from Capt Dereck Ellis. "The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the commissioner, has in fact been to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of Air Accidents investigation are infinitely more realistic.

Or the publication of CHN L'Estrange, The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Misscarriage of Justice, were all penned by people with a vastly greater insight and experience then all the hair splitting of who said what where and no they did not that has been going on in this thread.

The job of the crew was to take the aircraft down to the ice for a sightseeing trip, the pax had all been briefed that if the weather was unsuitable than an alternate site to McMurdo would be required. At the end of the day the requirement to get all these punters home safely was far more important than missing out on a bit of sightseeing.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo: We get back to the "trick question", don't we? I think that this question lies at the heart of the whole problem. If I say "your nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station", and if I know that this track goes over Erebus, then I will believe that I am communicating that information to the pilots. But because of the paucity of decent charts, that information is not actually conveyed. So the pilots walk out of the briefing thinking that their track is direct to the NDB at McMurdo Station, not appreciating that this track will take them over Erebus.

This doesn't explain everything, by any means. But then you have to factor in the union and the lawyers.

[ampan]

Prospector #531:

We can quote luminaries till the cows come home, Prospector, but the only way to prevent Mahon's report going down in history as the definitive account of this accident is to establish at least one act/ommission of pilot error that no properly-informed pilot can realistically argue with. Failing that, we are left with adding up various "could have done better" incidents.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo #528:

“Pretty convincing evidence that was, I think.” Not convincing at all, Desert Dingo. The evidence given by the three surviving pilots was all in the negative. Each and every one of them confined their evidence to what they did NOT recall Captain Wilson saying. Not one of them gave any evidence about what they DID recall him saying about the nav track..

So are you suggesting that the briefing officer said nothing on the subject of the nav track?

Or are you blocking your nose to the smell of the hot breath of the union, and the sweaty palms of some overly-eager law clerk?

[prospector]

Ampan,
Granted, but if people will not accept that going VMC in the reported conditions, was not a clever thing to do, and accepting responsibility for your own terrain clearance and then flying into a mountain was not a massive stuff up then what can one do.

To my understanding the only official accident report was the one compiled by Ron Chippendale, Mahons was a Commission of Enquiry, his findings could not be challenged on legal grounds, I do not have to advise who are the people who are forever pushing the Mahon enquiry as the definitive text.

There are many well informed pilots who do not agree with Mahons findings, all the people that I have quoted are not only luminaries they are,or were, very experienced pilots. I have quoted three but there are many more.

One thing that you hair splitters have not discussed yet is that Collins said we are 26 miles North we will have to climb out of this, From whence were they 26 miles North of?? how far to the NDB coordinates when this statement was made? where else could they have have been 26 miles North of? this was a very precise statement, no doubt read straight of the AINS readout. I dont have any charts of a sufficient scale to interpret this statement, but it has not been questioned by anyone who listened to the tape to my knowledge.

[ampan]

Prospector: My guess is that Capt. Collins marked out 10 mile segments on the nav track that he plotted on his atlas/map. But the "26 miles" comment probably came from the his AINS read-out, which gave the distance to go to the next waypoint.

I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports. Logically, Mahon's must be the final version as to the cause of the accident. The "orchestrated litany of lies"/NZ Court of Appeal/Privy Council thing is a red herring. That had nothing to do with the finding as to the cause of the accident. One thing, however, should be noted: Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct. But that does not mean that Mahon's findings as to the cause were supported by either of those courts. The plain fact of the matter is that the cause of the accident wasn't a matter at issue. Why? Because AirNZ could not appeal against Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident - however much they might have wanted to. They were stuck with it. The only things that they could argue about were issues concerning Mahon's stepping outside the brief he had been given by the government. There was never any dispute that the government appointed Mahon to inquire into, and make findings as to, the cause of the accident. What was disputed was whether the government appointed Mahon to conduct a quasi-criminal trial to find various persons guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to commit organised perjury.

[prospector]

Ampan,
"But the "26 miles" comment probably came from the his AINS read-out, which gave the distance to go to the next waypoint."

Yes, that is what I said, an AINS readout, the point being, as i said, from whence were they 26 miles from? the disputed waypoint or the coordinates of the NDB, or perhaps TACAN.


"Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct."

But "Peter Mahon concluded that Exhibit 164 was the track and distance chart supplied to Antarctic crews". Now it is obvious that a lot of the conclusions Justice Mahon came to were based on this belief. Now what did the Appeal Court state about Exhibit 164???

"They demolished his case item by item, including exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation".

This obviously is not only about orchestrated litanies,

And the Privy Council agreed with the findings of the Appeal Court.

That to my way of thinking is not agreeing with the Commissioner's finding wholeheartedly, but could they have been disagreeing with him in a "Polite way"???

From John King publication, "For his part, Morrie Davis is angry that the Mahon report remains unqualified, still the version quoted in law schools, without the rebuttals formed by the subsequent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgements. There has been no movement, he says, to record these officially and correct the Mahon version of the reasons behind the disaster."


And when we get politicians such as Anderton banging his gums together quoting the Mahon report as gospel, history will have a hard time getting the final findings after the Appeal Court and Privy Council findings known to the general public.

And how many of the general public have ever heard of Judge Harold S.Greene's finding in the Distict Court of Washington D,C.

"The operational crew of FLT901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending 'below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirementd for such descent".

Now there are some who disagree with anything concerning this accident except what came out of Mahon's report, but for my money Judge Greene would have had a lot more facts to hand to form his judgement than anyone on this forum.

[ampan]

Prospector:

I'm sure that when he said "26 miles out" he meant 26 miles from the waypoint by the Dailey Islands that he had plotted the night before. But very shortly after he said that, various pennies started to drop. Hence the turn to the left, rather than the right.

As for the Court of Appeal and Privy Council, although the cause of the accident was not part of their brief, they're only human, and they probably got a little bit interested in the case - as most people do. AirNZ, no doubt, would have encouraged this, and would have tried to dress up Mahon's findings about the cause as findings about something else, being a something else they could argue about. So I don't think you can take anything that the Court of Appeal or Privy Council said as being some sort of higher authority re the cause. All you can do is borrow their argument.

The problem is that there is no forum to present any further argument. It's all done and dusted. Crew completely exonerated. So if you get conflicting information at a briefing, take your pick, and assume you're right. So much for flight safety.

[Desert Dingo]

Ampan: I’m having difficulty following your logic.
If I say "your nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station", and if I know that this track goes over Erebus, then I will believe that I am communicating that information to the pilots.

Then why show me the flight plan from the previous flight which has a NAV track that goes somewhere else? You are supposed to be briefing me on a flight I will do in the near future.
But because of the paucity of decent charts, that information is not actually conveyed. So the pilots walk out of the briefing thinking that their track is direct to the NDB at McMurdo Station, not appreciating that this track will take them over Erebus. But the pilots did not walk out of the briefing thinking that the track is to the NDB.
The evidence shows that the pilots did not believe the track went to the NDB. They all worked out from the co-ordinates on the flight plan they were shown that the final waypoint was west of McMurdo Station.
Collins and Cassin demonstrated in the most conclusive way possible that they did not believe the track went over Erebus to a now non-existent NDB.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo: The evidence of the three surviving pilots simply doesn't wash. Two of them, allegedly, are sitting there listening to the briefing and simultaneously engaging in this strange eye-balling exercise, one guessing that the waypoint is 10 miles from McMurdo Station, while the other is guessing that it is 50 miles from McMurdo Station. As this is going on, Captain Wilson is making it quite clear to them where he thinks the final waypoint is, and yet neither gentleman says anything. Wherever the f*ck Capt. Wilson might have said it was, it must have been at a position that was at variance with the position estimated by one or other - and yet there is no comment by either.

Then there is their flight down, and the "10 miles" nonsense, followed by the phone call from Capt S. to advise Capt. J. that he can't use the scale on a map and that other pilots should be advised of what an idiot he is.

[Brian Abraham]

Capt Wilson did in fact, if my memory serves me right, do a trip to the ice. It was on the trip that diverted due weather at McMurdo, to the alternate advertised sites, South Magnetic pole I think

No

Mahon Page 60(e) Captain Wilson, the supervisor of the RCU briefing procedures, had not flown to McMurdo Sound. He had applied to go on such a flight, so as to improve his knowledge of antarctic conditions, but his application had been declined by Flight Operations Division.

The one item that was always going to lead to grief is contained right here, and is what precipitated the whole event.

Chippendale 2.10 There was no explanation of the horizon and surface definition terms in the operators’ route qualification briefing or pre-flight dispatch planning, and only a passing reference to white out conditions.

As you say prospector

but if people will not accept that going VMC in the reported conditions, was not a clever thing to do

but what you miss is that operating VMC below the LSALT (FL160) was not a clever thing to do.

I've ploughed through the Senate's hansard, and it's mostly irrelevent - which is typical of politicians. This accident was, clearly, the result of inadequate training in night-flying

ampan, thanks for taking the time to plough through it. As you say, a result of lack of training. And that is the case with Erebus to some extent as well. The crews received zip training to prepare them for operating VMC in antarctica at any altitude below the LSALT. Descent below FL160 should not have been permitted at any time.

Your reference to "a low run in a light plane at night" has no bearing on the ability to operate in white out conditions. An anolgy I might make is the ability to fly formation. You may be an ace in the day time but you need to step very carefully and ease into it by way of training to do it at night, and we had occasion to do it with no lights.

For background, I spent a goodly part of my 20,000 hour career attempting to maintain VMC, and a lot of times not succeeding, in an area noted for its lousy weather. And had occasion to experience whiteout, brown out, grey out and black out, depending on the surface medium.

[FlexibleResponse]

I quote from Post No 1 by Wirraway:
The pain continued as New Zealanders tried to understand what had happened. On one side of what was to become a bitter national debate, air accident chief inspector Ron Chippindale ruled it was pilot error. He said the pilots were flying too low when they had not established where they were. On the other, Commission of Inquiry head Justice Peter Mahon blamed Air New Zealand for a last-minute change to the flight path that took the plane over towering Mt Erebus. It was a change of which the pilots were unaware. Mahon also leveled the charge of an attempted cover-up by the national airline.

The world aviation community owes so much to the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Peter Mahon.

It is always too easy to blame pilot error for a particularly inconvenient accident. This is especially so, when the crew involved are unable to defend themselves. The punishment for the so identified "perpetrators" of such accidents is of course, their own demise in the accident. It is then ever so easy for the politicians to "clear the decks", and "to move on".

The enquiring mind of Justice Peter Mahon and his strength of character in reporting precisely what he found has re-set the baseline for subsequent and all future aircraft accident investigations forever.

[Graybeard]

I'm not of a suspicious nature, but sometimes I wonder if you take most of the facts of a tragedy and build a crime scene, that it might not be instructional.

How would you build this accident into a crime? Nigel is a field service engineer for the mainframe computer co. that maintains the system used by ANZ dispatch. The passenger in 16A for this flight is banging Nigel's wife, and Nigel is angry.

Nigel, not a pilot, writes a little routine into the computer that changes the lat/long of McMurdo, putting Erebus in its path. It is a routine that then self destructs, leaving no clue.

How plausible is this plot?

Scenario 1: the crew avoids Erebus by discovering the wrong lat/long, or by lack of white-out. The ensuing investigation is chalked up as a computer error. News of it leaks, and Nigel's enemy gets religion and gives up adultery.

Scenario 2: The plane hits Erebus and Nigel is avenged. The AINS-70 data does not survive, so it appears they were just off course. McDonnell-Douglas, Collins Avionics and Litton Industries are sued for more than $2 Billion US.

Any more? Can the facts of this case ever be made into a credible plot?

GB

[Graybeard]

Ampan wrote in #523, "The crew thought they were identical, but they were not. It may be that the check was performed using the earlier flightplan. But they shouldn’t have used either of the printed flightplans. The digits on the printed flightplans did not tell them where they were going. The digits that told them where they were going were those that had been entered (my bold) into the AINS before take-off, and that’s where they should have looked."

That makes it sound as if some anonymous person or device had entered the waypoints into the AINS-70. Remember, there was no company route for Antarctica on the AINS-70 flight data tape. Waypoints had to be entered manually, just as in any INS of the day.

I have never seen or heard of an airline operation where manual waypoints are entered by anybody other than the flight crew. That person would have used the flightplan as source of the waypoints' lats/longs.

When another of the crew verified the correctness of the waypoints, he would have used the same flightplan. If they had used an earlier flightplan, they would have been steered clear of Erebus.

Having a National Geographic map of Antarctica onboard for plotting their course - would have made the difference.

GB

[ampan]

Greybeard: Yes, it was a member of the crew who typed the waypoints into the AINS, using the printout of the flightplan provided at despatch. As the McMurdo waypoint was being entered, it should have been checked against the chart (and they had charts, although not by National Geographic). Why? Because this waypoint had a question-mark next to it, or should have done.

If they didn't check the waypoint against the chart as it was entered, maybe they did it on the way down? If they did it on the way down, why was there an accident? One possible explanation is that they used the other printout of the flightplan - the one retained by Capt. Collins at the end of the briefing 19 days before. If you took the McMurdo waypoint from that flightplan and checked it against the chart, you would simply be repeating the plotting exercise that Capt. Collins did the night before.

[prospector]

Brian Abraham,


"The crews received zip training to prepare them for operating VMC in antarctica at any altitude below the LSALT"

That is of course correct, but to put the blame on the company only for this state of affairs does not tell the whole story. Capt Gemmel explained that he spent time with the Deep Freeze operators to glean as much knowledge as possible before these flights were commenced. He states he was informed that if the flights stayed above 6,000ft, and in weather minima as laid down, there would be no problem with whiteout.

We all know the experience requirements of the other operators who operate down there regularly in as much as experience required before going down in command. No doubt the company would also have like to implement this policy. But who was it that insisted that these "perk" flights be shared amongst its members, thereby diluting any pool of experience amongst the available captains for these flights??.

And a bit more on Exhibit 164. This from Keith Amies from the Nav Section.

" Exhibit 164 had no significance at all in the operations to McMurdo. However, it was the only piece of evidence that could support the Commissioners contention that the DC10 was intentionally flight planned to somewhere other than McMurdo" and a lot more in the same vein.

We have seen what the Appeal Court thought of the amount of credence Justice Mahon put on Exhibit 164.

From Gordon Vette's book Impact Erebus,

"Among a number of maps and documents placed on the table before the pilots at the RCU briefing were four copies of an actual flight plan, one used only two days previously on Captain Wilson's Antarctic flight".

I have another reference somewhere stating that Capt Wilson was on the flight that diverted but cannot find it at this time.

[prospector]

Ampan,


"I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports."

This from John Kings publication, which I am sure was very well researched and had the benefit of hind sight.

"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged."

[Brian Abraham]

FlexibleResponse, an all too objective, factual and sensible post. I think the

bitter national debate

is alive and well and of a nature where no argument of fact will be allowed to influence entrenched positions. I'm taking the advice contained in your post

to "clear the decks", and "to move on".

[Dark Knight]

OK: give it a break.

If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput.

Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring.

If you have a bone to pursue, put your cash where your mouth is.

Time for the thread to be locked?

DK

[prospector]

"The enquiring mind of Justice Peter Mahon and his strength of character in reporting precisely what he found has re-set the baseline for subsequent and all future aircraft accident investigations forever"

"If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput."



"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged.

"Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring."

Does this thread jump onto your computer or do you select the thread???

Does that clear up those statements?? you will note that that Chippendales accident report has never been officially challenged, and it is not possible to legally challenge Mahon's findings.

[ampan]

Dark Knight #549:

Lock the thread?! This thread has managed to chop things right down to the bare bones. Closing it off would be premature, at this stage.

Instead of throwing your hands up and tipping over the chess board, why not do some research and then post it?

[Desert Dingo]

Dark Knight:
If you find this thread boring then go away or otherwise pull your head in.:=

I’m having a great debate with ampan as to whether Captain Willson really told the crews that the track went over Erebus. Some good points are being made on each side, and hopefully when the dust settles we will both agree on what really happened.

Back to the fray:

Captain Wilson briefed crews that the track was over Erebus?
Then cop this: These dates are for the briefings/flights made after the flight plan McMurdo waypoint was “accidentally changed” to be at the head of McMurdo sound. At the same time some briefing material in the Antarctic pack also “accidentally changed” to show a track down McMurdo Sound. Quite a coincidence that.

Date of flight-- Pilot’s Name-- Evidence showed he believed track went to:
07.11.78 -- McWilliams-- McMurdo Sound
14.11.78 -- Calder -- Uncertain
21.11.78 -- Griffiths -- No evidence
28.11.78 -- Ruffell -- Ambiguous McMurdo
07.11.79 -- Dalziel --McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Simpson -- McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Gabriel -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- White -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- Irvine -- McMurdo Sound

So Captain Wilson must have been pretty good at mumbling incoherently to be able to say the track went over Erebus and at the same time let all these pilots convince themselves that the track went down McMurdo Sound /sarc

ampan:
Did Capt. Wilson tell the crew that the nav track was to the NBD at McMurdo Station? According to Mister Justice Mahon: Yes, he did. And what is your evidence to support this?

I have in Mahon’s report (p87 245(b))
“........ I accept without reservation what Captain Simpson had to say in evidence.”
Mahon accepts Simpson’s testimony without qualification
Simpson ‘s testimony says (in part) that Wilson did not say the track went over Erebus
Therefore Mahon cannot be agreeing that Wilson said the track was over Erebus.I’m sticking with Mahon’s famous conclusion that the company tried to tell a few fibs. :E

[ampan]

Desert Dingo:

Given that the only available records are the excerpts contained in MacFarlane's book, and given that MacFarlane is clearly a Mahon supporter, I may well have to go back to the Auckland Public Library and ask the nice lady to wheel up seven big volumes of evidence - which will then have to be photocopied, scanned, edited, and posted.

Happy to do this, but only if it's going to make a difference. So here's the question: If Captain Wilson told the crew, at the briefing, that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, is it pilot error, of the 10-25% order?

[Desert Dingo]

ampan:
If Captain Wilson told the crew, at the briefing, that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, is it pilot error, of the 10-25% order? Nah. If that was the case I would give you more than that. I would be straight over into the Chippindale camp – 100% pilot error.
There are these two scenarios:
If Collins was told and believed that the track was over Erebus then it was a suicidal act of his to point the aircraft at Erebus and engage NAV with less than 10 miles to run
If Collins was told, but did not believe the track was over Erebus because he had plotted a track down Mc Murdo Sound, then he was monumentally irresponsible not to question the difference in tracks.Either way - huge pilot error.

I don’t follow your argument against McFarlane. I agree that much of the records of transcripts and briefs we are working with now come from his book, and it would be great if we could get back to the original transcripts. But your argument seems to be along the lines
We are using data from McFarlane’s book
McFarlane is clearly a Mahon supporter
Therefore we should not trust anything in McFarlane’s book.I don’t agree. McFarlane gives references to all the sources he quotes from. You can be sceptical about the conclusions he reaches, but he is showing you where the original data is from which he makes those conclusions. He can’t fake that.
Maybe he is a Mahon supporter because he has checked all the conclusions Mahon made and can’t find anything wrong with them.

To sustain your proposition that Wilson told Collins that the track was over Erebus you have to find an explanation as to why
All the briefing material implied the track was not over Erebus
Why the final waypoint was in McMurdo Sound for 14 months and Wilson did not notice it.
Why all those pilots said Wilson did not say that to them.
Why did Collins engage NAV and fly a collision course with Erebus
Why did Cassin not object to Collins doing this.I’m sure you have heard of Ockham’s Razor about the simplest explanation being the best.
How about this for a real simple explanation: Wilson did not say that the track was over Erebus.
That would be a good explanation for all the above.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo:

We need to get the hypothesis straight, and also the “to the NDB” / “over Erebus” thing. Here’s the hypothesis:

(1) Capt. Wilson tells the crew that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.

(2) He does not tell the crew that the nav track crosses Erebus.

(3) Capt. Collins, therefore, leaves the briefing believing that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but not knowing that the track goes over Erebus.

(4) Capt. Collins takes one of the copies of the flightplan that were available at the briefing.

(5) 18 days later, Capt. Collins gets out the copy of the flightplan and gets out his charts.

(6) He recalls that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.

(7) He notes, from his charts, that a track from Cape Hallett to the NDB at McMurdo Station crosses Erebus.

(8) He plots the nav track, using the flightplan, and notes that it does not go to the NDB at McMurdo Station. Instead, it goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.

(9) He assumes that the nav track is as shown on the flightplan, and retains this assumption right through until a few seconds before impact. This was an error: he should have checked.

(10)F/O Cassin also left the briefing believing that the nav track went to
the NDB at McMurdo Station.

(11)On the morning of the flight, his captain tells him that it doesn’t. The captain
tells him that the nav track goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.

(12)F/O Cassin accepts what the captain says and adopts the captain’s
assumption. That was an error: he should have questioned the captain.


That’s the hypotheseis, which obvioiusly depends on establishing that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but which does not depend on establishing that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track crossed Erebus.

So the question is this: If it is established that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, would you accept, on the basis of the above, that there was a degree of pilot error? It appears that you answer would be ‘yes’, based on your scenario numbered (2).


As for McFarlane, although I’ve got no reason to doubt the accuracy of MacFarlane’s extracts, it’s MacFarlane who decides which pieces of the evidence to include. Given that he would appear to be an almost-rabid supporter of Mahon, it is preferable to cut out the middle-man and go straight to the transcript.

So it seems that I have some work to do.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo #552:

Your summary of the previous flights is adapted from the table at p326 of MacFarlane’s book. Your adaptation of MacFarlane’s table is accurate, but Macfarlane’s table isn’t. According to MacFarlane, the table was constructed as follows: “The final column which is headed “Believed Flight Path Evidence” indicates which route, Erebus or McMurdo Sound, the pilot said in evidence he believed, as a result of the RCU briefing, the flightpath followed.” (p325)

We get back, again, to the trick question. What if a pilot’s evidence was “I don’t recall Captain Wilson saying that the track was over Erebus” and what if that pilot said nothing about what they actually recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track? Given that the choice is between “Erebus” and “McMurdo Sound”, that pilot’s evidence, given that he can’t recall being told the track was over Erebus, would receive the alternative tag: “McMurdo Sound”. But this is misleading, because the pilot, in his evidence, has not said “I recall Captain Wilson saying that the nav track went to a position in McMurdo Sound, by the Dailey Islands”. The pilot has said nothing on that subject. So a more accurate tag for the pilot’s evidence is “Not Erebus”.

Of the nine pilots listed in Desert Dingo's adaptation of MacFarlane’s table, eight say nothing about what they recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track – although six say that they cannot recall Capt. Wilson saying that the track went over Erebus (those six being tagged “McMurdo Sound” in the adapted table.)
The only pilot who gets close to giving evidence about their recall of what Capt. Wilson said is Capt McWilliams, as follows: “Following the briefing I received, I had a general understanding that the route south of Cape Hallett would proceed to a position west of McMurdo Base.” (p198) Apart from that one single vague reference by one of the nine pilots, there’s nothing else.

Capt. Ruffell’s evidence is interesting, because MacFarlane gives it an expanded treatment. Desert Dingo has labelled his evidence as “Ambiguous McMurdo”, but if you have a close look at it, it all makes perfect sense. From Capt. Ruffell’s typewritten statement, drafted by the union lawyers:

“The briefing was conducted by Captain J.P. Wilson. We were first shown an audio-visual presentation and briefing notes were distributed. There followed a talk though of the briefing notes page by page. I do not recall Captain Wilson making any statement to the effect that we would be overflying Mt Erebus.

I was not clear, following the briefing, of the relationship of the route south of Hallett to the topography. I had spoken to crew members of earlier flights and had learned that their flights flew up McMurdo Sound to the west of Mt Erebus.

Prior to my flight of 28 November 1978 I studied this NZMS135 chart and noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Sation would overfly Ross Island and Mt Erebus. Prior to studying the map I had been unclear , as I stated above, that this would be the case, and I do not recall Captain Wilson making any clear statement to the effect that we would overfly Mt Erebus.” (pp203,204)
Note how the typewritten statement avoids any reference to where Captain Wilson actually said the nav track went. If you read between the lines, however, doesn’t Capt. Ruffell appear to be saying that Capt. Wilson told him that the nav track went to McMurdo Station? Note that NZMS135 was not available at the briefing. All that was available at the briefing was a photocopy of the inset diagram, which did not show Cape Hallett, so you couldn’t use it to picture the line from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station. . After the briefing, Capt. Ruffell obtains the full chart, and notes that the line from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. He says that prior to studying the chart he “had been unclear … that this would be the case.” So he appears to be saying the Capt. Wilson told him that the nav track was from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station.

Capt. Ruffell is much more clear about the situation when his words are not sifted by the union lawyers. On 13 December 1979, two weeks after the accident, Ron Chippendale interviewed Capt. Ruffell. No notes were taken, but the AirNZ Flight Ops manager asked Capt. Ruffell to write out his own recollections. In those recollections, a copy of which was presumably made available to the union lawyers, Capt. Ruffell makes no bones about it. He recalls a question from Chippendale about the position of Erebus in relation to the track, and he records his answer as “My understanding was that [Mt Erebus] was more or less on the direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.” He is quite clear as to where he understood the nav track to run: from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station – not to a position by the Dailey Islands.

There is no conflict in what Capt. Ruffell says re Erebus. He realised that the nav track went over Erebus after the briefing, not during it. This is confirmed in cross-examination:
If you had not had that map for some time before your flight, do you think you would have appreciated that the aircraft’s path was over Ross Island from the briefing?
No, I think that prior to doing that I was under the impression that the track went north or west over the sea ice.”(p204) (I would question whether “north or west” is an accurate transcription of what Capt. Ruffell said.)

MacFarlane appears to be a little bit unhappy with Capt. Ruffell’s evidence, because he attempts to pick holes in it. One attempt, at p206, is to point to the above answer and say “ … he appears to have believed that the NDB and airfield were west over the sea ice.” In other words, he appears to have believed that the runway was in the sea.

MacFarlane obviously thinks himself to be very clever. I think not. It is obvious what Capt. Ruffell means. He thought the track ran from McMurdo Station to the northwest, over the sea ice, to Cape Hallett.

[ampan]

Desert Dingo #554:

The Simplest Explanation: I don’t think “Wilson didn’t tell them that the track was over Erebus” is the simplest explanation, because you then have to ask what he did tell them. And that’s going to lead into all sorts of complications. Whereas “Wilson told them that the track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station” explains everything, including the captain’s decision to turn left. (On that topic, I accept what Mahon says about the “sudden manual application of left rudder”. But before this, a left turn was initiated using the autopilot, and there is no dispute about that.)

As to the points raised -

“All the briefing material implied that the track was not over Erebus.” Even if that were true, ‘over Erebus’ is not the relevant issue. The correct question to ask is whether all the briefing material implied that the track went to somewhere other than the McMurdo Station.

Wilson did not notice the Dailey Islands waypoint for 14 months – Although it was 14 months, there were only four briefing sessions during that period. When put like that, the failure to notice seems much less strange.

The denials of the surviving pilots – The only denials concerned ‘over Erebus’. None of the three disputed Wilson’s evidence re the nav track going to McMurdo Station.

Why Collins engaged the nav track – He believed it went to the Dailey Islands. His belief was the result of an error.

Why didn’t Cassin object? – Cassin also believed that the nav track went to the Dailey Islands. He adopted the captain’s belief, which was an error.



End of #552:

Mahon’s findings:

In the passage quoted by Desert Dingo, Mahon is not referring to Capt. Simpson’s evidence concerning what Capt. Wilson said about the nav track. Mahon is referring to Capt. Simpson’s evidence about his telephone discussion with Capt. Johnson.

Even if Mahon had said that he accepted Capt. Simpson’s evidence in its entirety (which he didn’t) the plain fact of the matter is that Capt. Simpson never disputed Capt. Wilson’s evidence that the he told the crew that the nav track went to McMurdo Station. Capt. Simpson only disputed Capt. Wilson’s evidence that he told the crew that the track went over Erebus.

This might explain why Mahon’s only finding on the subject appears to support Capt. Wilson’s version – see #499. He hears Capt. Wilson say: (1) "I told them that the nav track was to McMurdo Station”, and (2) “I told them that this track went over Erebus”. He then hears Capt. Simpson and two others say that “Wilson did not tell us that the track went over Erebus”. So what would you conclude from that, assuming that you preferred the evidence of the three surviving pilots where there was a conflict. You would conclude that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the nav track went to McMurdo Station, but that he did not say that this track went over Erebus. And that’s exactly what Mahon concludes – see p60, para 164(b).

[ampan]

taken, poignantly (if that's a word), from the promotional brochure:

http://www.christchurch.archives.govt.nz/v/christchurch/interesting+items+website/Erebus/

[ampan]

http://nz.briefcase.yahoo.com/[email protected]


PDF files of the evidence of the pilots who were briefed by Capt Wilson.

[grummanavenger]

Among the briefing material supplied to crew were two copies of charts, an RNC4 and a McMurdo area chart.
Both these clearly showed a waypoint at “BYRD”, S 77.30 E 165.00, this at least visually would have encouraged the impression the approach to McMurdo was over sea or pack ice.
But whether the Collins crew had a mandate for the descent remains debatable.
While in practice the radio/inertial nav system was accurate, it did have an acceptable drift rate of around 1.7 nm/ hour without radio update so after the transit to the ice there could have been a circle of position around 6 nm diameter. Additionally, instrument approaches using the nav system were not permitted.
The mis-identification of the landmarks visible was an unfortunate map reading error. We should recall that Jim Collins as an airline pilot had not map read for about 22 years since his time in the RNZAF.
To add to the what if, there was certainly one flight where the second F/O transferred the nav position from the display on the overhead panel onto a topo map.
I also ponder what the plan was for the exit from the area assuming there had been a successful lower level sight seeing activity.
An early post mentioned the other F/O, “Brick” Lucas. His body was found within the wreckage in a position suggesting he was seated back within the cabin on impact.
The missing pages of the diary also puzzles observers. I suspect, that as WW2 aircrew who did not return invariably had their personal effects sanitized, that similar may, just may have happened in this case. The latter comment is not an attempt to condone the alleged break-ins of the homes.
Note should also be made that at the Royal Commission witnesses were required to speak at dictation speed or slower. Maybe this in part explains Ian Gemmell’s responses frequently in “monosyllables?” And yes he did spend some years as Ops Manager with Polynesian at Apia.

[ampan]

Could never see any motive for Captain Gemmell destroying evidence while down on the ice. I also read somewhere that it was he who found the black box, after digging for half a day, tied to rope. Not bad for a chap in, I'm guessing, his 50s.

[grummanavenger]

Yes Ian Gemmell would have been 50-51 back in 1979.

[ampan]

I’ve found the reference. It’s from the first book written about the accident, entitled ‘White Out’, by Michael Guy in mid-1980, just after the release of the Chippendale Report (pp119,120):

“The search for the flight and voice recorders began straight away. Ian Gemmell from Air New Zealand had promply made a reconnaissance of the area as soon as he reached the crash site. Roped to a Face Rescue mountaineer he had located a part of the fuselage near where the recorders were racked. The mountaineer was the first to see the bright orange voice recorder, but there seemed to be no sign of the flight recorder. They made another sweep along the strewn wreckage, but there appeared to be no trace of it above ground. They decided to dig around the area where the first recorder had been found. It took some time to dig about 30 yards of snow, and they then decided to take a break for tea. By 11pm they were digging again, and within five minutes they were lucky. Gemmell’s spade struck the box, 15 yards away from where they had found the voice recorder. It was an immense relief. Neither recorder appeared damaged and they would possibly yield clues as to why the plane had crashed.”

[ampan]

Been doing some more research on Ian Gemmell. People might ask why the CP was sent down to the ice, but it looks as if Gemmell had been AirNZ's accident man for years. I note that an AirNZ DC8 crashed on take-off during a training flight in 1966, and that Gemmell was on the investigating team. So I can't see anything sinister in sending down the best man, even if he happens to be the CP.

[punkalouver]

It appears that descents below 16,000 feet were only allowed in a sector to the true south of McMurdo. Why were they descending even if VMC north of McMurdo?

[prospector]

" It appears that descents below 16,000 feet were only allowed in a sector to the true south of McMurdo."

Exactly.

[punkalouver]

Not only that but no descent was allowed if snowshowers were in the area and apparently there was snow reported in the area. Why would this snow restriction/no descent allowed be created in the first place. Potential for whiteout conditions possibly.

[Oakape]

It's called 'normalised deviance'.

It goes along the lines of -

Everyone is doing it
Everyone knows everyone is doing it
No one has got in trouble for doing it
No one in authority has said to stop doing it

So it becomes 'the way we do things around here'

Often it ends in embarrassment, occasionally, in tears

[NS14]

Hi experts,

recently came across Mahon's book in a 2nd hand store.
Interested upon finishing to see other points of view, original details etc and found my way to erebus.co.nz where I read the Chippendale and Mahon reports then found my way here and have read various threads including this one in full.
I now find I want to spend some more effort to tidy some loose ends though I fear this may be the end of the road.

Any help with the following will be greatly appreciated:
1) is there now online transcripts of the royal commission evidence? For example the link http://nz.briefcase.yahoo.com/[email protected] from ampans post re "PDF files of the evidence of the pilots who were briefed by Capt Wilson" doesn't work now.
2) What was SOP for pilots re- navigating and cross-checking INS? Was Collins expected to confirm each leg was heading where he expected / to confirm exactly where it was headed? Was it a SOP to check that if going down? I think I may have read it was but only if landing and note also desert-dingo said "Should have verified waypoint by plotting on a chart. No. The company SOPs are to check waypoint entries against flight plan data". It just seems so obvious, perhaps especially in hindsight, that you should.
3) The issue of Simpson vs Johnson, the 27 miles vs the 2 miles between the NDB and TACAN, is really difficult (and noted by Mahon who said it was very confusing the last part of the waypoint changing saga). Johnson's position seems to be Simpson didn't mention a 27 mile difference - how else could it be explained that he thought it was a 2 mile difference? Simpsons story seems to have been well assessed by ampan when he described Simpson calling up to ask for the other pilots to be informed Simpson couldn't tell the difference between 27 and 10 miles when looking at a map. Seems this was an area the commission should have probed hard at.
4) It was speculated that "McMurdo" was used to disguise that the track was over the volcano as the US would have objected. Question then is what was the situation when it orginally did go over Erebus? Was the US informed then? Did they not object?
5) and just a point of interest that came up. How did INS account for wind in making its assessments? Does it get forecaste conditions input?

Perhaps I should have started another thread but it seems to me having one thread more convenient.

[Welsh Wingman]

NS14,

Re: (3) and (4), don't get too focussed on the waypoints, or you will lose sight of the wood for the trees when it comes to the Erebus mishap.

Williams Field? NDB? TACAN? Western (i.e. Dailey Island)? It was all part of the systemic failure within the AirNZ of the time (and the (lack of) oversight by CAD). There was only one waypoint those flights should have had programmed from the very first flight in February 1977 - the military Byrd reporting point, before military aircraft began their easterly dog leg descent down the chute to McMurdo. That would have always placed the flight upon arrival in the area at MSA and firmly on the USN ATC radar. No communication/radar line of sight issues, and no overflying of an active volcano. The AINS was accurate enough, even if ideally one would want a ground navigation aid as the waypoint.

Once the USN ATC picked up the incoming sightseeing flight on its radar at the Byrd Reporting Point waypoint, the PIC of the DC10 could seek his clearance from USN ATC to descend VFR provided the DC10 never left the USN's radar scope without permission (or at all?).

Mahon produced an excellent ground breaking report, way ahead of its time, and dealing with systemic/organisational failure. In those days, systemic failure not overcome by the pilots was just misleadingly classified as "pilot error". But not what NZ PM Robert Muldoon wanted to hear, as the shareholder of the state national carrier! The AirNZ planning and CAD oversight of the Antarctic flights was poor (waypoints, nav track, whiteout, prior flight experience, route clearance, survival equipment). There was an administrative malaise within the airline, particularly within flight operations and sub-sections such as navigation and the RCU. Communication in particular. The consumer pressure facing the pilots, Ross Island being the star attraction. The flight crew were programmed to fly down McMurdo Sound and the aircraft itself was programmed to overfly Ross Island, never a happy scenario. Even NZALPA joined in, with the flights treated as a Buggins' turn perk for senior captains rather than sensibly training, say, 3 permanent crews for this route. I recall some ICAO official getting into trouble after the Mahon report was published, for saying something like "What's going on down there, it's like a Third World country?"). Reading the planning of those Antarctic flights makes grim reading. The US District Judge Greene later wrote "Were it not for the tragic outcome, the planning phase of Flight 901 could be described as a comedy of errors; some of these errors were perpetrated by Air New Zealand, others by members of the flight crew."

But Mahon made two mistakes.

Firstly, he overstepped the mark in relation to AirNZ with his "orchestrated litany of lies" angle, no doubt clearly unhappy about their post-accident behaviour and (rightly?) exacerbated by their witnesses behaviour towards his Royal Commission but, fatally breaching the rules of natural justice. This judicial finding by the NZ Courts and the Privy Council reduced the focus on their pre-flight behaviour and failings, ironically the very last thing he would have wanted.

Secondly, this probably also contributed towards Mahon feeling sympathy for the pilots and their families, enough to exonerate them and which was going too far for many. This was, after all, a CFIT at FLT 015 into a FLT 130 mountain with a fully functioning DC10. See the later comments of Air Marshal Rochford Hughes, technical adviser to counsel for the Royal Commission. There are aspects of that flight that are troubling, e.g. descent without a permanent fix and without a radar let down, even if the majority of the blame lies elsewhere. The complete exoneration was as controversial as the initial attempt to lay nearly all the blame on the pilots, as this was Antarctica and a "clean flight" configuration at FLT 015 in a wide bodied commercial passenger airliner is not something to enter into lightly in proximity to high terrain.

The failure to divert to the dry valleys? The sudden orbiting descent to get under the cloud cover ahead? Missing Beaufort Island on the wrong side of the INS nav track? Failing to grasp an obvious non-meteorological explanation for the VHF and TACAN issues (intervening high ground)? Failing to plot the nav track entered in the INS during the actual flight, on the run south from Auckland to the Bellany Islands (surely a job for F/O Cassin?)? Failing to check and plot the entered McMurdo waypoint in the INS before descending? Failing to check and plot the current position in the INS, before descending? Obviously the lack of whiteout training, and the presence of sector whiteout, ultimately misled the flight crew although its interesting that Capt Collins elected a left climb in the last seconds of his life (had the penny finally dropped...?).

This incident unfortunately became contentiously black v white in New Zealand, and still is, with no shades of grey. That was unhelpful. The flight crew made mistakes that day, others made far bigger mistakes in the chain of causation.

Trust this helps.

[prospector]

This incident unhelpfully became contentiously black v white in New Zealand, and still is, with no shades of grey. That was unhelpful. The flight crew made mistakes, others made far bigger mistakes in the chain of causation.

That may be your opinion, many think by far the greater mistakes were made by the crew. No matter what mistakes had been made by other people the decision to break all standing orders, such as no descent below 16,000ft unless specific requirements were met, none of which were complied with. As stated by


punkalouver It appears that descents below 16,000 feet were only allowed in a sector to the true south of McMurdo. Why were they descending even if VMC north of McMurdo?

Missing Beaufort Island on the wrong side of the INS nav track?

The Island was, as was shown by pictures recovered from camera's of Pax, was very visible, if attention was being paid by any of the crew to the actual position of the aircraft, rather than "following the magenta line" it should have been obvious that something was not as it should be.

[Welsh Wingman]

Prospector,

The SOPs were a bit of a red herring. I think the judge painstakingly proved the "real" SOP was "give the passengers a good sightseeing time". Retired Capt Wilson (RCU) effectively conceded that, as I recall. Everybody knew what the punters were being given, thanks to AirNZs own publicity machine.

If AirNZ had programmed the INS McMurdo arrival waypoint as the Byrd reporting point, nicely always on USN ATC radars, it's difficult for any pilot action to break the safety of the overall system.

Flight crew mistakes were made, and I forgot to additionally add reliance upon INS track at all at FLT 015.

WW

[prospector]

I think the judge painstakingly proved the "real" SOP was "give the passengers a good sightseeing time".

I do not agree with that at all.
The judge by painstakingly trying to establish the only purpose of the flight was to "give the passengers a good sightseeing time". It was obvious the judge had absolutely no knowledge on how an aircraft cockpit routine should be managed.

All the details have been thrashed out in this thread many times, but the most important object of the exercise was to sightsee if weather conditions allowed, they did not at the nominated position, there was an alternative, Dry Valley area that was clear, this option was not chosen. In the end I am quite certain the passengers would willingly have given up the "sightseeing" if they knew what the consequences of the actions of the crew to give them that sightseeing opportunity meant breaking all the safety requirements that had been built into these flights to ensure what happened would never happen.

The judge would appear to have placed little credence on that fact.

[Welsh Wingman]

Prospector,

I think you take us to exactly the sort of systemically unsafe issues that I have alluded to.

Say 3 Captains were designated in 1977 to be the specialist PIC for all the Antarctic flights PIC (Gemmell? Grundy? Vette?). 28 November 1979 would have been about the 5th individual trip, unless they had commanded the 1 previous diversion to the South Pole and the 1 previous diversion to the dry valleys.

With a plane full of punters wanting to see Mt Erebus, McMurdo and Scott as the highlight of their trip, do you think these PICs would have been more inclined to sooner divert to the dry valleys (if marginal), than any PIC making his only trip (claiming his perk) to the Antarctic...?

Systemic safety, which was singularly missing from these flights. A nav track that approaches out of radar/VHF coverage until overflying an active volcano just before your waypoint for low level sightseeing? Seriously?

Get on the USN ATC radar at the Byrd reporting point, and stay on it until you head back to Christchurch, and what can go wrong? If a PIC strays too close to high terrain, or falls for any optical illusion, USN ATC can warn him.

WW

[prospector]

than any PIC making his only trip (claiming his perk) to the Antarctic...?

And that would be it in a nutshell.

Re the radar, that was one of the requirements, to be positively identified, along with VHF contact with the radar operator, that were mandatory requirements before descent below 16,000ft could be commenced.

As we now know not one of the requirements for descent were met.

[Welsh Wingman]

Prospector,

Then why have an INS nav track that means the DC10 will be practically overhead the radar before it picks up the aircraft and VHF contact is possible...? The Byrd reporting point was the logical waypoint.

The entire Antarctic sightseeing flights were ill thought out. One of my former colleagues nearly lost his 742 over Indonesia, and he had about 30,000 ft clearance to an active volcano.

The descent without radar coverage was ill-considered, in my opinion, if not objected to by USN ATC.

PIC thought he had VMC - did he?

WW

[prospector]

Welsh Wingman,

I know it would take quite a bit of reading, but all these points have been raised in this thread over a number of years now, but every now and then, people like yourself bring up the subject again.

I doubt whether all the toing and froing has changed anybodies mind as to where blame lies.

To my mind the most important task of the crew was to bring the passengers back home safe and sound.

That did not happen, I have my opinion as to why this is so, many agree, many disagree, I strongly disagree with the legal findings, from a judge with no Aviation expertise, and strongly agree with the Aircraft Accident Inspectors report who had been involved in all manner of Aviation endeavours all his working life.

All of value to come out of this event, I hesitate to call it an accident, will have been well and truly assimilated into peoples memory cells, and hopefully such an event will not be repeated.

[Welsh Wingman]

Prospector,

Fair enough.

That was not one of Chippendale's better reports, from altering the CVR transcript outside of accepted protocols to alleging the flight crew were not deceived by the changed nav track of which they were not notified (self-evidently they were, the crash site location conclusively proving it).

Mahon contributed enormously to aviation safely, even if his report was ultimately flawed in relation to airmanship and post-incident events. He should have called more upon Rochford Hughes, for one thing.

Those Antarctic flights were systemically an accident waiting to happen for AirNZ, hence the hull loss on the 14th trip down there.

Nice chatting. Be well.

WW

[ampan]

Whose side are you on, Welsh Wingman? He who sits on the fence as regards Erebus eventually ends up with a wooden post up their arse.


Mahon's report was garbage and it contributed very little to aviation safety. His finding that the crew were blameless was demonstrably wrong (and it appears that you would agree).


The so-called "alteration" of the CVR transcript had nothing to do with anything, despite the attention given to the subject by Mahon.


As to the alteration of the waypoint, Chippendale's finding appears to be very strange but it's explainable if you go into the background and into the initial statements made to him by other pilots. That said, it's obvious, in the absence of evidence of a murder/suicide, that the crew thought that Erebus was out to their left, not dead ahead. Was that assumption justified? Definitely not. Where was the waypoint, in fact? McMurdo Station. Where were they told, at the briefing, where the waypoint was? McMurdo Station. Where does a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station go? Over the summit of Erebus.


Anyone who thinks that some old flight plan that might have been floating around at the briefing exonerates the crew is living in cloud cuckoo land.

[Fantome]

. . . .in the absence of evidence of a murder/suicide . . . There's a late in the piece strange aside. All who have made a close study of the disaster know what happened. . . know how it happened . . . and maybe out of forensic interest, are happy to debate the minutia ad nauseam with any other interested party who has read widely enough.
That said, in the absence of a thorough expert impartial analysis and publication to the contrary, the books written by Justice Peter Mahon and Captain Gordon Vette will ever receive the credence they deserve.

[prospector]

The carping of an obsessive minority should not even be rated a distraction.


All who have made a close study of the disaster know what happened


Are you saying that the people who disagree with Mahons findings have not made a close study??

. That is the sort of pointless statement that will likely start the whole process over again.

That said, in the absence of a thorough expert impartial analysis and publication to the contrary,

Try reading New Zealand Tragedies Aviation, compiled by John King. It has a very good section covering Erebus. And from someone who had no personal axe to grind, deserves far more credence then the publications you appear to subscribe to.

[Fantome]

Not in any way knocking John King for the quality of his research and his written output covering New Zealand aviation extensively . . .. but to suggest that his grasp of the subject (Impact Erebus) is superior to that demonstrated by the aforementioned gentleman is surprising, to put it mildly.

[prospector]

The two publications you quote, Impact Erebus. by Gordon Vette, and Verdict on Erebus by Peter Mahon could hardly be called impartial accounts of such an event.
The Foreword to Vette's book is by Peter Mahon, and of course Mahons book is to try and justify his opinions.

You will note that I suggested John King's publication as an unbiased resume from many different sources, including opinion of American judge who differed completely from those published in the books you give as unbiased accounts of the event.

[Fantome]

Many horrific accidents after investigation were found to be caused by an irrefutable failure in the first instance to foresee the potentially fatal error, where you have a single cut and dried causative factor. The crash at Mount Erebus has never lent itself to that kind of simplistic verdict. There will always be contention. MH370 will be debated and discussed seemingly forever. In smaller forums, TE 901 likewise.

[ampan]

Erebus is probably one of the best accidents that "lends itself to that kind of simplistic verdict":


** Descended below MSA without radar confirmation of position. Had that not happened, the co-ordinates would not have mattered.


** Descended below MSA using AINS to confirm position, which was not permitted. Had that not happened, the co-ordinates would not have mattered.


** Captain pretended to be VMC when he knew he wasn't. Had that not happened, the co-ordinates would not have mattered.


** Captain received contradictory information about the position of the final waypoint and did nothing to resolve the contradiction. Had that not happened, the co-ordinates would not have mattered.


** Captain levelled out at 2000 feet and saw no horizon ahead. Instead of immediately climbing out he descended a further 500 feet and continued on for nearly two minutes. (ie, Chippendale's stated cause of the accident.) Had that not occurred, the co-ordinates would not have mattered.

[prospector]

ampan,

I would think that it would be impossible to refute any of those arguments, But we now have this

https://www.nzalpa.org.nz/About-Us/About-NZALPA#53412-the-jim-collins-memorial-award

[Fantome]

Not helpful to denigrate or suggest invidious comparisons as to relative degrees of acumen, impartiality or profoundly imbued integrity. . . . or moreover to imply that these two are not worthy of the respectful recognition they have been accorded.


https://www.nzalpa.org.nz/Portals/0/images/JCMA/Mahon.jpg 2009 - Hon. Justice Peter T. Mahon (Posthumously)

Justice Peter Thomas Mahon QC received the 2009 Jim Collins Award for his exceptional contribution to aviation safety. Justice Mahon’s controversial 1981 Royal Commission of Inquiry report into the 1979 Erebus air accident in Antarctica, cited organisational failure, ‘administration errors made by the Navigation Division’, as the primary factor of the accident, and exonerated the pilots from the blame that was apportioned to them in the 1980 Chippindale Report.


https://www.nzalpa.org.nz/Portals/0/images/JCMA/Vette_JC.jpg 1991 - Captain Alwyn Gordon Vette

Nominations drew attention to Captain Vette’s coordination and command of a rescue mission in the Pacific which earned him the Johnston memorial Award from the Guild of Air Pilots and the President’s Award from the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, his independent research into the causes of the Erebus accident, his publication and production of a book and video on the Erebus disaster (Impact Erebus) – proceeds from which go to the Captain A G Vette Flight Safety Research Fund, his assistance to students working on aviation safety matters, his continuing contribution to areas of ergonomics and human factors in flight safety and his active membership of the New Zealand Psychological Society – specialising in aviation psychology. Gordon was the recipient of a Presidential Citation from the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations at their annual conference in Auckland, March 2009.


Captain Vette is also now deceased - RIP - http://www.nzedge.com/news/hero-skies-gordon-vette-dies/

[prospector]

Not impugning anybody, or their integrity, many believe that this man had the cause of the Erebus disaster identified correctly, and his pedigree gives him far more credibility.


In 1992, when a Chief Executive was appointed, Chippindale became the Chief Inspector of Accidents with the TAIC, an appointment he retained until his retirement on 31 October 1998.

During this time period, he was the Investigator-in-Charge of 48 aircraft and rail accidents and incidents, and had overall responsibility for the investigation of approximately 400 accidents and incidents. He was involved in several major aircraft accident investigation such as being the chief investigator of the Mount Erebus Disaster, the DC-10 accident in Antarctica in which 257 lives were lost.

He was a member of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) teams, which investigated the Mozambican Tupolev Tu-134 air disaster in South Africa in which the President of Mozambique lost his life, and the shooting down of three civil aircraft: Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over Russia and two United Nations (UN) L-130 aircraft in Angola.

Chippindale has represented New Zealand at Accident Investigation Group meetings of ICAO and drafted the ICAO circular on the provision of "Family Assistance" after an aircraft accident. He was also the New Zealand Councillor to the International Society of Air Accident Investigators and a transport accident investigation consultant.

In 2004, Chippindale was awarded the 'Jerome F Lederer' award for outstanding lifetime contributions in the field of aircraft accident investigation and prevention and achievement of the International society of Air Safety Investigators' Objectives and technical excellence. In March 2007, Chippindale was one of 22 people who received a New Zealand Special Service Medal (Erebus) at a ceremony in Wellington. The medal was awarded for the work in what became known as "Operation Overdue".


.

[ampan]

And several of those others do not know what they are talking about. A good example is the link to the article about Gordon Vette's death, which contains a piece by someone called Christine Negroni:


"Alwyn Gordon Vette, a New Zealand pilot whose independentanalysis of the 1972 Air New Zealand airplane crash in Antarctica helped toidentify an important hazard in Arctic flying, has died in Auckland. He was 82.Captain Vette ... was ... the recipient of numerous honours for heroicscarried out while flying DC-10s for Air New Zealand. ...
Photos developed from the passengers’ cameras found in thewreckage showed that the weather over Antarctica had been clear moments beforethe crash, launching Vette on a search to find out why none of the men on theflight deck saw or tried to avoid the mountain as the plane approached itdescending through 2500ft. Vette discovered that in certain conditions, thepowerful effect of “whiteout” eliminated visual borders, and that pilots mightnot see obstacles as big as mountains directly in front of them.




The accident did not occur in 1972.
Vette was not "the recipient of numerous honours for heroics carried out while flying DC10s for Air New Zealand"
The passengers photos did not show that the weather over Antarctica had been clear moments before the crash.
Vette did not discover sector whiteout. It had been know about for decades.

[ampan]

The first part of my original post has been edited by this website to the point that it makes no sense. It appears that that the operators of this so-called forum are yet another bunch of 'believers'.


No doubt this post will disappear very shortly.




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Tail Wheel

[Fantome]

Post Number 40 on this thread from 'Uncommon Sense' is worth a revisit, since it serves as a gentle reminder that by contrast, the bittterness and pettiness of many disputatious posters on PPRuNe down all the years, is as nothing compared with the deep inexpressible sadness residing in the hearts of the most affected.


The debate about Chippendale / Mahon / The Privvy Council Appeal / Morris has been going on for 25 years - you will not resolve it on this thread. Nobody is probably going to definitively decide it.

Anyway wasn't the point of this thread to just agree that whatever happened, and whoever was responsible and with whatever proportion, the event was an absolute tragedy - especially to a country of it's size, and one that was very close knit?

Family and friends of mine are often surprised at how, like other avaition people, I can dispassionately look at accident reports and photographs and seek information out of them about what went wrong and why. But when I see the photos of Erebus, I still get a shiver up my spine - it is the difference of association I guess, remember what an absolute tragedy it was for NZ and the effect on the psyche of the whole country at the time. It sounds melodramatic, but anyone who lived there at the time I am sure will attest to the enormity of it at the time.

My father worked for the company in flight ops and was working at Mangere that night - we watched the newsreader on NZTV (Dougal Stevenson was it?) reading the fateful newsflash. Living in the western hills of Auckland overlooking the Manakau we were surrounded by ANZ families and it was a tough couple of months leading up to Christmas - as they say everybody in NZ knew someone connected to Erebus - but around our neck of the woods everybody seemed to know a few.

My fathers first story of the night after getting home was the embarassment of seeing the MD Davis stumbling down the escalators at the airport clearly drunk whilst relatives of the families looked on - it was not ANZ's finest hour with respect to PR. As I recall they had just started up their 'Nobody does it Better' advertising campaign, which was quickly ditched. The PR campaign got worse when the homes of the operating crew were broken in to and documents removed.

The only comfort I take from the whole tragedy is that for the occupants of ZK-NZP the end looked mercifully swift.

The pain of the families , including around where I lived, was unneccessarily drawn out, and continues to be today, by stupid politics.

It is said that NZ grew up that day - more is the pity. It was to grow up further in the following couple of years witnessing the mire of political manipulation.

[Ollie Onion]

Of my god, just give it up. The direct cause of the event was the aircraft was operated below MSA when not in VMC conditions against published policy. If that hadn't have happened then no amount of 'wrong coordinates, bad training etc 'would have mattered.

Now, that is not to say the crew is to blame, although the CAA aproval clearly stated that flight below MSA was not permitted, the reality is that the crews who operated these flights were told that a VMC descent was acceptable and expected as the flights were openly sold to the travelling public showing images that were taken on aircraft doing just that.

The CP, more than likely, thought he was in VMC. Biggest lesson out of this debacle is..... Never trust any procedure were you are told to do something that is against manual procedures! And when you get the gut feeling that something ain't right, like this crew did, get the hell out of there.

And of course sadly, these things happen from time to time, we just hope that we learn some lessons from it.

[ampan]

"The CP, more than likely, thought he was VMC"? Demonstrably not true. He had already summarised sector whiteout; "Very difficult to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice." He knew that from flying sorties for the RNZAF out of Wigram in the 1950s. He knew full well that he would not be VMC below the cloud layer. The reason for has expressly declaring that he was VMC was because he was actually relying on the AINS to confirm his position, contrary to rules that he also knew full well. Mahon placed great significance on his locking the aircraft back onto the nav track at 1500 feet. So do I, but to the opposite effect. Wasn't he supposed to be VMC? (I apologise for not concluding this post with some feigned politeness and another ******** comment about flight safety.)

[PapaHotel6]

I have not posted on this forum before, but have been an avid scholar of this disaster the early 1980’s. Until I came here I believed that no-one could have studied this event in more depth than myself; however having read many of the insightful contributions here I’m now not so sure.

I have no conflict of interest to declare except for the fact I had chance meetings with both Mahon and Chippindale in the 1980s when I was a student.

I was an avid proponent of Mahon until I became a private pilot myself, studied more about the differences between high and low altitude navigation, IFR flying and more about Aviation in general and I now believe that the factors leading directly to this disaster were the fault of Capt. Collins. Other factors which have been well described were all secondary.

Why is this still important in 2016? Because many people are still living with a direct personal connection to the disaster. The Collins family have been militant in trying to clear Jim Collins’s name. In doing so, they sully the reputations of Chippindale, Gemmell and many others. But their loved ones too, carry the pain. The Collins family would serve their man far better by maintaining some quiet dignity.

A few points in no particular order.

- There should have been no need to arm the INS during VFR flight. The fact that Collins did so strongly suggests, as many others have done, that he was not truly VFR and was using the INS as some sort of “backup”.

- The INS is designed for navigating an aircraft at high altitude from one waypoint to the next. Nothing else. End of story. Think about it. If it was that crucial a navigation device – to the extent that a single wrong digit could crash an aircraft – do you think the crew would have been permitted to enter the data manually?

- Whether Jim Collins was a meticulous pilot, whether he used to put life jackets on his kids, whether he was in general a good person is all utterly irrelevant to whether he made errors on the day.

- Mahon suggests that Flight Engineer Brooks (himself a pilot) only became alarmed at the precise moment he said “I don’t like this”. I believe this to be fanciful in the extreme, and contrary to evidence.

- At 2000’ and not in VFR Collins should have climbed away immediately, not descended further to 1500’

[prospector]

PapaHotel6,

That is a very good first post, and brings up a good point that has not been mentioned previously, or if so only fleetingly.

The families of the other people involved.

[PapaHotel6]

Cheers!

Yes, the families of all those maligned by Mahon et al. would certainly have had a cross to bear. To their credit, they have maintained a level of dignity not exhibited by the Collins family - themselves served badly by the likes of Mahon, Holmes, Dunne etc. - all of whom I believe were utterly sincere but - wrong.

Mahon put his premise in believable terms and the mob at large with little or no aviation knowledge like Mahon himself, bought it ("big evil corporation shafting the little guy/flight plan/changed to fly the plane into a mountain/optical illusion called whiteout/aircraft are flown by computers now don'tchya know, a concept Chippindale was too boneheaded to understand" etc. etc). On the other hand, Chippindale saw no need to "sell" his conclusions, which to the public at large seemed like clutching at straws or mere semantics "16000 ft MSA?!/IFR vs VFR? C'mon, give me a break!!" etc.

A shining example of a how a little knowledge can be dangerous.

[PLovett]

Oh boy......sit back........snack at hand and drink ready and watch the fireworks.

[3 Holer]

Fireworks over what?

Moderators don't take long to sort out who the trolls are :sad:

[PapaHotel6]

Moderators don't take long to sort out who the trolls are

Nor should they. But if that comment is directed at myself, I resent it.

To exonerate Collins from responsibility, as Mahon did, it is necessary to believe:

- that his descent from high altitude through a hole in the cloud in a region known to contain a 13,000' mountain, using only the (assumed) high altitude flight plan to verify his position was justifiable;

- that he was truly in VMC conditions all the way down to and including 1500';

- that the requirement not to descend below 16000' MSA until south of Erebus was in fact not real;

- that he was psychologically tricked by whiteout and "saw" a clear, normal horizon stretching out in front of him all the time up until impact;

- that he maintained appropriate situational awareness in the last stages of flight, in spite of failing to establish VHF comms and several comments from other crew members about High ground/Erebus/don't like this etc.;

- that it was appropriate to descend from 2000' to 1500' when good conditions were not apparent at 2000'.

I personally reject every one of the above points.

[zkdli]

Hmm, situational awareness is such a mine field. Perhaps it is time for a human factors specialist to provide a definition... one that all human factors specialists can agree with :)

[PapaHotel6]

I think most of us would agree that "situational awareness" refers to the ability to assimilate the wider factors of a situation that might not be individually related, and act accordingly.

Quantifying situational awareness and agreeing whether it was present is of course always going to be a matter of opinion. However in the case of Collins:

- he'd commenced a descent that was unorthodox relying only on the supposed integrity of the flight plan;

- conditions during the descent were marginal VFR at best;

- He had been unable to establish VHF comms;

- Others on the flight deck had expressed concern;

- Finding himself at 2000' (and subsequently 1500') in a DC-10 loaded with 257 people, in a region known to contain a 13,000' mountain he still found poor visual conditons.

I would feel confident in saying that most of the professional body of airline pilots would argue that Jim Collins did not display the situational awareness expected of a captain.

[ampan]

It was a simple case of pilot error. The reason for the continued argument is that Mahon was duped by the union and botched things up, and the union then sought to enshrine its victory.

[zkdli]

now we have human error and situational awareness. PH6 your thoughts on the pilot's situational awareness are based on hindsight, unfortunately we will never know what the factors involved in Capt Collins situational awareness were, we will only know the results of his decisions not his awareness of the environment that he was operating in.
As for "pilot" or Human error, again that is a construct of Hindsight. We also know that several times in past flights, pilots were doing similar actions as Capt Collins. I know that every flight was different however, they were doing similar things and it would be interesting to discuss what they based their environmental awareness on. By the thought process on pilot error, they must also have been committing pilot error but did not come to grief.

[PapaHotel6]

The fact that other pilots may have broken the rules also and got away with it neither exonerates Collins nor invalidates the rules. The comparisons are also invalid, as Collins's descent was in a league all of its own. No other Antarctic pilot descended through a hole in the cloud in marginal (at best!) VFR conditions down to 2000' then 1500' all the while neglecting to identify the known high ground in the region.

[framer]

I normally like to see some of the responsibility of the crash go to the PinC when discussing Erebus for all the oft discussed reasons, but to completely exclude the operating culture of the time is as bad as to try to completely exonerate the Captain of his responsibility. There will never be agreement on where the responsibility lies because people naturally like to lump it all in one place ( like you are doing PH6) when that is not how life works. There were serious decision making errors yes, but he wasn't operating in a vacuum, he was operating inan era and as a part of a particular culture when those errors were made. Peoples views will change with time as well. As a young turbo prop Captain I put the blame 90/10 on Collins. Now as a more experienced and older jet Captain I put it at about 70/30 on Collins......when I retire will it be 50/50? I doubt it but I wouldn't rule it out.

[ampan]

It’s a bit difficult to discern whose side you’re on.Various silly w*nkers will say that there are no “sides” – but there are. Mahongot this completely wrong, probably because he had a brain tumour.
Read the CVR transcript: Bad weather at McMurdo Station - probablyhave to go somewhere else. Fine.
Radar let –down to McMurdo offered. Fine.
Can’t get VHF communications for radar let-down. Go downanyway? So obviously not fine that it beggars belief that this is still a topicfor any argument.
Can any of you stupid twits out there justify that?

[PapaHotel6]

I normally like to see some of the responsibility of the crash go to the PinC when discussing Erebus for all the oft discussed reasons, but to completely exclude the operating culture of the time is as bad as to try to completely exonerate the Captain of his responsibility. There will never be agreement on where the responsibility lies because people naturally like to lump it all in one place ( like you are doing PH6) when that is not how life works. There were serious decision making errors yes, but he wasn't operating in a vacuum, he was operating inan era and as a part of a particular culture when those errors were made. Peoples views will change with time as well. As a young turbo prop Captain I put the blame 90/10 on Collins. Now as a more experienced and older jet Captain I put it at about 70/30 on Collins......when I retire will it be 50/50? I doubt it but I wouldn't rule it out.

Thanks framer. Yes, the company and culture were far from perfect either. But where people become confused is in failing to differentiate between direct causal errors and those that were only significant in the presence of a unique set of circumstances.

Here's what I mean. Air New Zealand
- probably should not have gone into the sightseeing business in the first place
- should have trained and briefed their pilots properly, and unambiguously
- should not have made a series of errors with the high altitude flight plan
- should not have removed the requirement for one person on the flight deck to have flown in Antarctica before.

But here's the thing. While these things may have contributed, not one of these factors on their own would you expect to cause an accident. But flying an aircraft in marginal visual conditions at 1500' in an unfamiliar mountainous area? Absolutely!

[prospector]

- should have trained and briefed their pilots properly, and unambiguously

should not have removed the requirement for one person on the flight deck to have flown in Antarctica before.

Was it not the ALPA people who insisted that their senior captains all have a "turn" at this perk flight? Here CAA should have been more insistent that the Company use the experience of the people who had been going down there for many years, and no Captain should have gone down there as PIC until a familiarisation flight had been undertaken, as was a mandatory requirement for all the service aircrew carrying out operations down to the ice.

[Anotherday]

Thought the USAF (who'd been operating down there for decades and had lost airframes and crew as a result) at the time wanted nothing to do with AirNZs trips to Erebus as they felt the company was grossly inexperienced in operating to Antartica.

I still don't see the connection between doing AKL-LAX and taking a DC10 way south for some VFR.

[PapaHotel6]

I still don't see the connection between doing AKL-LAX and taking a DC10 way south for some VFR.

There isn't one. Which is why that although the direct cause of this accident was pilot error; not all the blame can go to Collins and some sympathy must be directed his way.

He, like all Air New Zealand pilots was trained for commercial transport ops. Extrapolating this to commercial sightseeing ops in Antarctica with only an afternoon's training defies belief. As does the perception that these flights were so routine, that the requirement for previous Antarctic experience could be done away with.

Simply put, the airline placed their crews in a situation where errors were more likely to occur. They simply weren't trained for what they were being asked to do.

[prospector]

Simply put, the airline placed their crews in a situation where errors were more likely to occur. They simply weren't trained for what they were being asked to do

That statement, whilst correct, is not the whole story.

Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals, who knew it all and did not therefor need to ask advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF < USAF< USN or the division, wrote Bob Thomson in his History of New Zealand Antarctic research programme 1965-88

Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by members of their aircrews who flew earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a "special perk" for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members,

Therefor aircrews, including aircraft captains, usually had not any previous experience on these flights, an experience which would have avoided the Erebus disaster from ever happening..


Bob Thomson was not a pilot, but probably had done more flights to the Antarctic than anybody, usually in the cockpit, and at times was the commentator for Air New Zealand scenic flights to the ice.

[PapaHotel6]

That statement, whilst correct, is not the whole story.

I think we are probably in agreement here when I say the 'whole story' in relation to the Erebus incident was:

1. Pilot error.
2. Systems failures which by themselves should not have been causative.

Getting point 2 into context is where so many - including Mahon, who should have known better - have come unstuck.

Here's an analogy which I thought of. Aircraft A has some substandard work on an engine done. This causes a reduction in power, and Aircraft A has to fly slower than it otherwise would. An ATC error causes Aircraft A to collide with aircraft B. This would not have occurred had Aircraft A been flying at the normal speed.

The engineer who worked on Aircraft A made an error. Had this error not occurred, the accident would not have occurred. But did this error cause the accident, and should the engineer be responsible for it? In no way, shape or form.

And the same goes for the briefing/NAV track change/"whiteout" etc. in relation to the Erebus incident.

[slice]

PapaHotel, I have to disagree with your example in that in your scenario the failures are completely unrelated to each other (ATC and Engineering), whereas with this disaster the failures (both systemic and human) are related and cumulative. As such the organisation responsible must bear their share of the blame. Air New Zealnd's actions post accident are indicative of an organisation desperate to avoid such blame.

[PapaHotel6]

PapaHotel, I have to disagree with your example in that in your scenario the failures are completely unrelated to each other (ATC and Engineering), whereas with this disaster the failures (both systemic and human) are related and cumulative.

Yes and no. A NAV track change is unrelated (or at least, should be unrelated) to a descent from MSA and subsequent low altitude VFR flight. These errors were not related or cumulative. But persuading the general public (or Mahon, Holmes et al.) who can't see past the emotive "the aircraft was programmed to fly into a mountain" logic, is well nigh impossible.

This is where I have a problem with the oft-quoted "swiss cheese" analogy of accident analysis. It implies that all the factors, and errors (ie. holes in the cheese) are of equal causation and interrelated relevance. Whereas usually nothing could be further from the truth.

[3 Holer]

You are correct slice. Anyone who thinks differently, is either a private pilot with very little experience or has never attended Crew Resource Management/ Human Factors training.

[747-419]

You are correct slice. Anyone who thinks differently, is either a private pilot with very little experience or has never attended Crew Resource Management/ Human Factors training.
Agree with you 3 Holer. This accident happened nearly 40 years ago but now we have some instant experts who profess to know exactly what the cause was. Be interesting to know what aviation experience they have that they can make these profound statements.

[prospector]

This accident happened nearly 40 years ago but now we have some instant experts who profess to know exactly what the cause was.


40 years ago, so what, many of us were actively aviating at that time. And the "causes" have not changed at all.



Was it not the ALPA people who insisted that their senior captains all have a "turn" at this perk flight?

It was a simple case of pilot error. The reason for the continued argument is that Mahon was duped by the union and botched things up, and the union then sought to enshrine its victory.


Simply put, the airline placed their crews in a situation where errors were more likely to occur. They simply weren't trained for what they were being asked to do.
Be interesting to know what aviation experience they have that they can make these profound statements.
.


Nothing profound about any of those statements, simply the facts seen a different way then the Mahon report. .

[Fantome]

ahhh . . dead right PLovett . .. . . we do not want to get immersed in tortuous debate yet again. .. . my opinion is as worth a crumpet as yours in the broad scheme of air accident investigation. If you have read and tried to grasp everything you can lay your hands on about TE901 are you then an authority on the subject? Maybe. Maybe not.

There are still many in the airline industry, and retired from it, who ever will respect and admire the late Gordon Vette for his fearless pursuit of the truth, as he saw it.
This from The Auckland Herald last August -

A seeker of justice they couldn't silence

Captain Alwyn Gordon Vette, 82, whose death the other day was largely overlooked by the news media, played a vital role in obtaining justice in New Zealand's most controversial air disaster - the 1979 Erebus crash.

As Air New Zealand and its spin machine worked overtime to blame the crew for Flight TE901 crashing into Mt Erebus in the Antarctic, killing all 257 people on board, Captain Vette quickly began to consider the crew was not to blame.

He did not accept the cause of the crash was pilot error, and at Justice Peter Mahon's subsequent Royal Commission of Inquiry into the crash, he presented his investigative efforts to Justice Mahon - and they were accepted.

Effectively written off by Air New Zealand, Captain Vette's investigative efforts - which cost him his career - were part of the public debate and demand that precipitated the Mahon Inquiry - six months after the release of the official accident report.

Justice Mahon presented his extensive findings, which supported Captain Vette's provocative and original theories about the tragedy of TE901.

Justice Mahon described a single cause of the Erebus disaster: "In my opinion therefore, the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. That mistake is directly attributable, not so much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible."

For me IMPACT EREBUS did a lot in helping to understand something of the front of house crew in a wide body. I think Gordon Vette should be accorded better respect by those who rejected his book and bagged him almost belligerently. Read it before daring to venture an opinion -

[Pakehaboy]

Quote....For me IMPACT EREBUS did a lot in helping to understand something of the front of house crew in a wide body. I think Gordon Vette should be accorded better respect by those who rejected his book and bagged him almost belligerently. Read it before daring to venture an opinion -

Ditto!!!

[prospector]

As such the organisation responsible must bear their share of the blame

Obviously, the point of all these debates is that Mahon completely exonerated the crew from all blame.

That is patently wrong, and the reasons why that decision is wrong have been clearly established by many facts that have been presented in this forum.

[Fantome]

. . . .. so now it is also clearly established that we must cede to the invincible arguments of those with insights superior to misguided souls such as the late Captain Gordon Vette.

[Pakehaboy]

. . . .. so now it is also clearly established that we must cede to the invincible arguments of those with insights superior to misguided souls such as the late Captain Gordon Vette.
Not really,that's why everybody has an opinion,some I find more palatable than others.Ive always held the view that the crew was/is/should be held accountable,as prospector notes.Vette at least pursued the issue by not allowing AirNZ to camouflage important information.
Am I slightly biased that I met the man?maybe,he saved a good friend of mines life,Jay Prochnow,you may remember that??

[prospector]

.. so now it is also clearly established that we must cede to the invincible arguments of those with insights superior to misguided souls such as the late Captain Gordon Vette.

Gordon Vette was trying to establish why they flew into a mountain that everybody knew was there, and why they did not see it.

It is not a question of insights. There were many rules and regulations governing these flights to the ice. This crew (Captain) broke all of them, CAA regs, company requirements for any descent below MSA, the mandatory descent requirements as to area approved for any descent, any descent at all below MSA when the reported weather conditions at McMurdo were below those required for the approved descent procedure, he was even told by the people at McMurdo that the weather was no good for sightseeing and it would be better to go to the dry valley.

He disregarded all of these, flew a perfectly serviceable aeroplane into a mountain that everybody knew was there, and according to some, including Mahon, was Blameless???

[PapaHotel6]

You are correct slice. Anyone who thinks differently, is either a private pilot with very little experience or has never attended Crew Resource Management/ Human Factors training.

Agree with you 3 Holer. This accident happened nearly 40 years ago but now we have some instant experts who profess to know exactly what the cause was. Be interesting to know what aviation experience they have that they can make these profound statements.

. . . .. so now it is also clearly established that we must cede to the invincible arguments of those with insights superior to misguided souls such as the late Captain Gordon Vette.


All the above are examples of emotive, vaguely irrelevant passive-aggressive utterings that do nothing to take the argument forwards that are sadly all too predictable from those who hold the views of Mahon/Vette to be sacrosanct.

I think Gordon Vette should be accorded better respect by those who rejected his book and bagged him almost belligerently. Read it before daring to venture an opinion -


I've read it - from cover to cover at least twice, and flicked through it many times in between. What is actually almost laughable about Vette's treatise, is that he passes his theories off as "science" and his investigations "scientific". Nothing could be further from the truth - his assertions regarding mindset, whiteout, optical illusions are simply his theory - nothing more, nothing less. There is no credible science in there at all. That's not to say he is necessarily wrong - but there is nowhere near enough evidence to assert with confidence that he is right. Yet he put forward his theories as though they were gospel - and were accepted by Mahon as such.

Also, Vette's own interpretation of the CVR, full of his own surmising, is nothing but fantasy - but again, presented as reality.

we do not want to get immersed in tortuous debate yet again
Unfortunately - we are doomed to carry this discussion on forever, thanks to Peter Mahon. Because as long as there are newcomers to this pursuit, there will always be those that have to go through the mental process and information gathering that many of us have done here.

[3 Holer]

Talking of profound statements ...................." an orchestrated litany of lies"
is one of the best! :ok:

[rog747]

the crash and aftermath was a terribly sad state of affairs, which still here cause blood pressure to overload!

a unique tragic crash and such a sad impact for New Zealanders as many knew someone who was lost on this sightseeing fight which back then was ANZ's show case day trip and they all sold out -

Qantas still do these flights every season from Oz airports with a 747-400ER BTW - i would like to do one - would you??
see here
http://www.antarcticaflights.com.au/

i recall the 1979 crash well at the time of the DC-10 ''bad news stories'' happening with regularity so not just the unique accident location and type of joy flight but yet another DC-10 (but which here this a/c type had no contribution to the crash but of course impacted the news story)

so many blindingly obvious what ifs' and the crash would never have happened - one of which had the tour narrator doing the cockpit commentary been on the flight deck at that moment the chances are he would have known that they were in the wrong place - edit I maybe wrong here

the accident now should be used as a major learning tool for all budding crews and operations staff and air safety boards - its is a fantastic piece of very sad history and the events pre, during, and post the crash used as a benchmark of learning.
and also airline companies and aircrews and operational bodies should note that to cover up blame & mistakes for whatever reason will always come back to haunt them as will their arrogance.

the crash is fascinating and happened at a time of major innovations of air travel - big wide body jets - day trips to the south pole - cheap mass air travel - this was all NEW and spectacular must haves and must do's for both companies and public alike.

time to maybe stop letting your blood pressures rise almost 40 years later and accept that things happened that day in that cockpit and prior to take off which are inexplicable to us now so we must study and learn from it -

I was recently at a lecture by explorer Sir Ranulph Fiennes about Shackleton and remote polar explorations held in London at the Royal geographical society and we chatted about the Erebus crash as he was there at the time and helped in the recovery

as an aside was it Capt Vette who was the PIC on the DC-10 flight from HNL to AKL that searched over the Pacific for many hours and found the lost PPL flyer and escorted him to land in NZ on fumes

[prospector]

so many blindingly obvious what ifs' and the crash would never have happened - one of which had the tour narrator doing the cockpit commentary been on the flight deck at that moment the chances are he would have known that they were in the wrong place

Not so, Mulgrew was the narrator.

although Mulgrew told the passengers, less than four minutes before impact, "I still can't see very much at the moment, keep you informed soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are"

[rog747]

thank you for correcting that Prospector - i was somehow under the impression he was not in the cockpit at the time of the crash

[Pakehaboy]

Quote.."I've read it - from cover to cover at least twice, and flicked through it many times in between. What is actually almost laughable about Vette's treatise, is that he passes his theories off as "science" and his investigations "scientific". Nothing could be further from the truth - his assertions regarding mindset, whiteout, optical illusions are simply his theory - nothing more, nothing less. There is no credible science in there at all. That's not to say he is necessarily wrong - but there is nowhere near enough evidence to assert with confidence that he is right. Yet he put forward his theories as though they were gospel - and were accepted by Mahon as such.

Also, Vette's own interpretation of the CVR, full of his own surmising, is nothing but fantasy - but again, presented as reality."


Needed to delete that comment as I think it has come across in a negative value.The saying...Opinions are like aholes,everyone has one etc etc comes to mind etc etc......read the book several times myself,amazing how differences of interpretation arise!!!

[Fantome]

a unique tragic crash and such a sad impact for New Zealanders as many knew someone who was lost on this sightseeing flight

God has spoken,end of subject !!!!!!

For those who lost family it will needless to say be with them till the end of their days. For the family of Captain Jim Collins I suspect that their grief is in some sense compounded, with them every day until the final curtain. No one. . . absolutely no one but a mindless idiot could imagine otherwise.

Does it help to put the minds at ease of those whose loss was greatest to be told repeatedly that Captain Collins' decisions were wrong on every count?
Regardless of whether it is your father or your husband or someone remote from your own personal circle who is postulated to bear the burden of guilt for multiple manslaughter, that line of thought is akin to arguing parallels with the depressive first officer on the GermanWings flight, which is an absurd proposition.

[PapaHotel6]

Does it help to put the minds at ease of those whose loss was greatest to be told repeatedly that Captain Collins' decisions were wrong on every count?

No, but putting minds at ease is not the purpose of this discussion.

To have to process the knowledge that your loved father/husband made a clanger that resulted in the deaths of 257 people must be nothing short of agony. To this end, the Collins family have actually been badly served by the likes of Mahon/Holmes/Dunne etc. who have fueled their thirst and quest to "clear his name", which is just not appropriate. And also, I believe, somewhat disrespectful towards the families of the 256 other people who were killed on this flight.

[framer]

I agree with PapaH on the last point.
Captaining an airliner is serious business. The consequences of a chain of poor decisions is massive as is evidenced by the fact that folk are still debating an event nearly forty years later. We would do well not to forget this. The Captains of our current fleet of airliners should always have it tucked away in the back of their mind that many peoples loved ones are in their care and that any risk ( there is always some) is to be accepted judiciously.
Next time you see your passengers boarding remember how much faith all their loved ones are placing in the workings of your mind.
To brush over Collins's mistakes is to downplay this responsibility. I have often thought he sounded like a good man and wouldn't want us to do that anyway.

[3 Holer]

We are debating 40 years on because, there were indeed a "chain of poor decisions" but as Mahon discovered, not all were Captain Collins. As Air New Zealand et al were trying to force issue with the public on.

I can understand Air New Zealand and the New Zealand government's surprise and horror at the findings in Mahon's final report but to carry on like a couple of petulant children after the fact is actually disturbing to any professional airline pilot.

To refresh our memories:

“The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”

Disgusting!

[framer]

Yes true.
But, as always with this subject the actions/ behaviours of one party often affect how we judge the actions/ behaviours of another.
That AirNZ and the government behaved poorly does not change the fact that Collins was in command of an aircraft, flying in a clean configuration, at 1500ft, below MSA, not in the vicinity of an airport, with crew members saying things like " I'm just wondering where Erebus is" .
The fact that one party behaved poorly does not mean that another party was making good decisions.

[Chris2303]

What about the second first officer who was relegated to the cabin so that the commentator could be on the flight deck?

Knowing that man well I wonder what the outcome would have been if he had been there....

[prospector]

The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”


[QUOTE]In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioner's appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive, had ever existed.[/QUOTe

That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.

[3 Holer]

That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.

Yes, all pro Air New Zealand and NZ government and their petty,futile attempts to lay the blame on Captain Collins. What would you expect?

Pathetic.

[prospector]

Yes, all pro Air New Zealand and NZ government and their petty,futile attempts to lay the blame on Captain Collins. What would you expect?

Pathetic.

Really? The Appeal Court of New Zealand, and the Privy Council of England finding of Mahons failings were just all to lay the blame on Capt Collins?

I do not think any more needs to be said.

[3 Holer]

I do not think any more needs to be said.

Amen. :ok:

[ampan]

chris2303 asks what the other first officer seated with the passengers would have that thought. The answer is in the CVR transcript. The captain announced to the passengers that the would be making a radar-assisted descent to McMurdo Station - so when the aircraft descended through the hole in the cloud, First Officer Lucas would have assumed that the aircraft's position had been confirmed by the radar controller and would not have been concerned.

[PapaHotel6]

Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue? Surely any union, ALPA included, should have no place in an accident investigation and Mahon was clearly manipulated by them. Victory for the union perhaps, but the casualty was truth.

[prospector]

Perhaps the union became involved because they pushed for the flights to be shared amongst their senior captains. This was against all the accumulated wisdom of all the operators who have been operating down to the ice for many years. The experience requirements for operating in Antarctic regions was completely disregarded.
This from 'A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand" by Maurice McGreal.

The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight

This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"

[3 Holer]

the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"
Not if there are external issues contributing to the safe flight operation. (basic Human Factors) As Mahon,Vette, et al found out, by discovering the "incompetent administrative airline procedures", only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.

I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised. His relentless energy and enthusiasm to seek factual evidence of the causal factor(s) of this accident was testament to his ethos of respect and common decency to all parties touched by this tragedy. Unlike Air NZ management and the NZ government, Mahon never pointed the finger at any one person who caused the accident. He stated it was “......the incompetent, administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.” Mahon and Vette were well ahead of their time when it came to the correct protocol and understanding of Human Factors in this accident.

Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality. The findings were well respected and unbiased. However, they were never going to sit well with Morrie Davis and Robert Muldoon, so they set out to discredit them and Peter Mahon. The Erebus Inquiry had to absolve Air New Zealand and the NZ Government of any blame in the accident no matter what it took.

Enter the Privy Council of the U.K. – the self appointed custodian of Royal Commissions in the colonies. The appeal to have Mahon’s finding overturned was farcical but predictable. It wasn’t sufficient just to declare the findings, not politically correct and overturn them within, they had to try and discredit Justice Mahon as well. Those who don’t believe that, may also believe, that one can pick up a piece of sh!t by the clean end.

There was a huge backlash and it took 21 years, but, in 2004, appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in NZ. Now the only avenue for appealing decisions/findings for Commission Inquiries is the Supreme Court of NZ.

[framer]

You have just beautifully demonstrated what I said in an earlier post.

But, as always with this subject the actions/ behaviours of one party often affect how we judge the actions/ behaviours of another.
That AirNZ and the government behaved poorly does not change the fact that Collins was in command of an aircraft, flying in a clean configuration, at 1500ft, below MSA, not in the vicinity of an airport, with crew members saying things like " I'm just wondering where Erebus is" .
The fact that one party behaved poorly does not mean that another party was making good decisions.
I wouldn't disagree with you when you say Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality. if you added "and completely devoid of any understanding of the purpose,role, and responsibilities of an Airline Captain."
only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.
Are you suggesting that if any of the other Air NZ Captains had been called out to operate that duty the crash would still have occurred?
If so I believe you are wrong.

[PapaHotel6]

The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight
This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
Quote:
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"

Actually, such statements really irritate me. They reek of pompous sanctimony and imply that once in the air, a competent captain should gain some sort of overriding omnipresence that protects the flight from all outside influence. Which of course is glaringly untrue and in this case, irrelevant anyway - it was the misuse of the INS combined with failure to observe MSA which caused the accident here; not the vagueness of the destination waypoint.

It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.

I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised.
I agree. Mahon was utterly sincere but - utterly wrong. He allowed personality politics to cloud his judgment. It's clear he was irritated by the fact Gemmell wasn't intimidated by him, for example. He placed far too much credence on his own superficial and very quickly acquired knowledge of aviation procedures. Some of his logic is grossly assumptive and laughably facile "pilots had found from experience that the INS was very accurate, therefore it was okay for Collins to be wholly reliant on it" is one such example. I could go on and on.

[prospector]

PapaHotel6,


To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight

I fail to see how your comment .

ctually, such statements really irritate me. They reek of pompous sanctimony and imply that once in the air, a competent captain should gain some sort of overriding omnipresence that protects the flight from all outside influence

Can be reconciled with the written comment of Maurice McGreal. To my mind that statement covers the Erebus situation very well.


It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.

How do you come to that conclusion??

[PapaHotel6]

How do you come to that conclusion??
Because nebulous statements like "the Captain must have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight" implying therefore, that this was pilot error, are facile in the extreme. Now, the Erebus crash *was* due to pilot error, but for very specific reasons - not because the Captain failed in some ill-defined ultimate responsibility.

Mahon - with a level of arrogance that beggars belief - thought his own level of insight was superior to that of Chippindale, who he wrote off as an uneducated, concrete thinking militaristic individual with no insight into the intricacies and infrastructure of "computerised" navigation. Nothing could have been further from the truth. But making generalised statements like "the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.

Am I making any sense??

[prospector]

Am I making any sense??

Well, to me, sort of. A very fine line you have drawn with

Because nebulous statements like "the Captain must have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight" implying therefore, that this was pilot error, are facile in the extreme

Followed by

Now, the Erebus crash *was* due to pilot error, but for very specific reasons - not because the Captain failed in some ill-defined ultimate responsibility.

Your second paragraph I would agree with until

"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.

I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.

[PapaHotel6]

Quote:
"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.

Simply that the logic "the Captain is solely responsible for the safety of his passengers, these patients did not arrive safely therefore it was by definition the Captain's fault" is childish, and makes us look shallow.

It's not a big deal in the overall context of the discussion. Cheers.

[onetrack]

Doesn't this following article explain the Erebus disaster fairly precisely? - and lay the blame where it is rightfully due? The article is written by a professional pilot.

Is it not a commercial pilots responsibility to know where he is at all times, in relation to that nasty cloud type, "cumulus granitus? I always thought it was - am I wrong in this belief?

Derek Ellis: Erebus - why the pilot was at fault - National - NZ Herald News (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10791580)

[Dick Smith]

I initiated the Antarctic flights and went on the 9 Qantas ones I chartered.

I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.

One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.

It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.

[27/09]

Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue?
Yep I'd say naive. Have a look at history and you will find many instances of the crew being blamed, partly because they're no longer around to defend themselves. This is the reason many pilot bodies like ALPA have become involved.

I am not passing comment on the rights or wrongs of the crew in this accident, just highlighting reasons why the likes of ALPA become involved, to ensure the crew get a fair hearing.

[3 Holer]

In the early hours of 28 November a navigational coordinate in the flight plan presented at the briefing was changed. The airline’s navigation section believed it was making a minor adjustment to the flight’s longstanding destination point, but a typing error some 14 months earlier meant it had actually shifted this point some 27 nautical miles to the east. Instead of the IFR route taking Flight TE901 over flat sea ice, as Collins and Cassin had been briefed, it would take them directly over Mt Erebus, a 3794-metre-high active volcano. The flight crew were not alerted to the change. On the morning of 28 November they received the adjusted 'correct' flight plan and entered these coordinates into the on board computer.

Good point Dick,in retrospect, it would have been a good idea to have plotted the course on a visual chart. In retrospect, there were many things that could have been done differently and may have prevented this tragic accident. Many were raised and considered in Justice Mahon's inquiry. Unfortunately, these findings were not in the best interest of Air NZ and Robert Muldoon's government at the time.

[gulfairs]

I was nearly on stand by as a lowley First Officer for that particular flight.
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
I am like most aviators, I suffer from 20-20 hind sight.
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit. Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.” ― Omar Khayyám.
It had a very sad ending.


GLGR

[Dick Smith]

Yes. Agree the waypoint was moved without the crew being informed.

That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.

[prospector]

That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.

How far back in the thread have you gone?. There were many check systems in place, including the mandatory requirements to be met before any descent below MSA, these have all been raised many times. The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.

1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

You will note that this is the ONLY let down procedure approved by the Company and the CAA. The crew was aware of this requirement as a copy of the memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.

[PapaHotel6]

Yes. Agree the waypoint was moved without the crew being informed.
Waypoints are *always* being moved without crews being informed. They're there to get you at high altitude from "resume own navigation" to a point where a let down procedure might occur. They are not - and never have been (RNP aside) - designed to *be* the let down procedure.

[kaikohe76]

I have absolutely no connection at all with this very sad event, save having being a fellow aviator.

However my question would be,

If any particular loaded way point had been moved or changed, without the operating Crew being advised at the time, would this change not have been noticed, picked up & subsequently dealt with by the Crew, had they done a complete flight plan V INS check prior to departure?

When I operated long range flights, we (all on the flight deck) always checked, the coordinates, lat & long, track & distance, from the INS against the flight plan provided at briefing. Thus if anything had been changed & was unexpected, it would be immediately noticed, during the check.

No axe to grind at all people, but since this very sad incident & after all the various arguments, who was right / wrong etc, I still can't quite understand, why, if the Crew had done a INS V flight plan check prior to departure & compared the loaded INS waypoints against their flight plan, the anomaly was not picked up.

[27/09]

No axe to grind at all people, but since this very sad incident & after all the various arguments, who was right / wrong etc, I still can't quite understand, why, if the Crew had done a INS V flight plan check prior to departure & compared the loaded INS waypoints against their flight plan, the anomaly was not picked up.

There would have been no discrepancy, the flight plan would have had the latest waypoints and these no doubt matched the INS.

There was a briefing a few days prior to the flight where the crew were told the flight path was along a route well to one side of Mt Erebus. It was from this briefing that Jim Collins plotted the course he expected to take on the fateful flight. The waypoint coordinates were changed only the night before the flight.

[Dick Smith]

So the full professionally trained crew did not comply with the company set requirements .

That's why I had a simple check system in place.

Whenever I see the details of an accident I always think " when am I going to do that". Not " I could never be that incompetent"

In Australia for over a decade I have been attempting to get the approach multilateration system in Tasmania to be used properly to reduce the chance of a CFIT.

Many airline pilots tell me that procedural approach is good enough because it would only be an incompetent crew that would let down prematurely and hit Mt Barrow.

I have not heard if one airline pilot requesting the Tasmanian system be fixed . They must think they would not make a Mt Erebus type error. I hope their self confidence is not misplaced .

[PapaHotel6]

I have not heard if one airline pilot requesting the Tasmanian system be fixed . They must think they would not make a Mt Erebus type error. I hope their self confidence is not misplaced

Very insightful Dick Smith. If someone had said to Jim Collins, in the taxi on the way to the airport that day, that he was going to drop below MSA in extremely marginal VMC and crash into a mountain, he probably would've laughed out loud.

[reubee]

I initiated the Antarctic flights and went on the 9 Qantas ones I chartered.

I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.

One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.

It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.

Just on that last point, it was speculated that the crew were confirming their current position using a map (the atlas) with a line drawn on it and the distance to go.

"Where's Erebus in relation to us at the moment"
"Left about (twenty) or (twenty) five miles"
"Left do you reckon"
...
"I think it'll be left yes"
"Yes I reckon about here"

You'd use "here" if pointing at a map, "there" if pointing out the window

The problem being that a) the line would have been drawn using the briefing co-ordinates, not the co-ordinates given to the crew that day, and b) unfortunately for them the geography of the bay they were entering being a good match for the bay they thought they were entering so they weren't getting a visual clue to contradict the picture in their minds.

[Fantome]

Prospector who is .. and I say this in all sincerity . .. deeply studied on this subject . . .believes that -

The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.

- which is a strange statement to make considering primary causal factors.

On another tack , what gulfairs has to say with first hand knowledge about the personalities at the sharp end whom he knew and had flown with is telling. Incidentally, how anyone can say no more to be said . . . "amen" and so to all that . . . when such footnote revelations add a mite to any research into a comprehensive picture . It is a new contribution. To wish to gag any further debate is rather presumptuous. . . arrogant even .

The debate goes on forever . .. ('and the party never ends') . . . whether it remains a matter of interest or not to the individual is immaterial.

[PapaHotel6]

Prospector who is .. and I say this in all sincerity . .. deeply studied on this subject . . .believes that -

Quote:
The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.
- which is a strange statement to make considering primary causal factors.

Prospector is right.

Yes, you could certainly argue the confusion and administration factors surrounding the waypoint shift was an error. Furthermore, if this error hadn't occurred, the accident wouldn't have occurred. But - and I have made this point before - this error occurred in a system that was never designed to prevent an aircraft from crashing into terrain. Whereas the MSA, and VFR rules are very very much systems which are designed for terrain avoidance. And it was these systems that Collins violated.

[Dick Smith]

Reubee. In the 747 the Lat and lon coordinates were constantly shown on the INS when selected.

That's what I used to mark on the ONC. Just basic airmanship and navigation when at low levels in a remote place.

Did the DC10 have similar read outs available? And was there an ONC chart onboard?

Surely they were not using just an atlas ?

[PapaHotel6]

I was nearly on stand by as a lowley First Officer for that particular flight.
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!

Excellent post Gulfairs.

So if I read you right, you are suggesting that Jim Collins might not have been the sort of person whose demeanour would have encouraged open feedback from other crew members? I myself heard that recently prior to this flight, a F/O had filed an incident report against him over a hot & high approach into NAN.

Ultimately though, whether these things are true or whether he really was an aviation demigod as suggested by Mahon et al is irrelevant. Every single one of us, regardless of history, is capable of making dumb mistakes.

[megan]

You will note that this is the ONLY let down procedure approved by the Company and the CAASeeing as you emphasise the "ONLY", the company approved let down had in fact never been used. You've used the excuse prior that that was because the weather was severe VFR. By what company directive were they enabled to descend to the company advertised "see Antarctica from 2,000 feet". The advertised 2,000 rather puts the contention that 6,000 was the limit in some doubt.

[prospector]

I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.

Another thing that could have had a bearing, but should not have had, was that Collins was ex Air Force, and Cassin was Aero Club trained.

By what company directive were they enabled to descend to the company advertised "see Antarctica from 2,000 feet". The advertised 2,000 rather puts the contention that 6,000 was the limit in some doubt.

That was a requirement by CAA, not below 6,000ft. It of course had been broken a number of times, but all after being identified by McMurdo radar, and in real .VMC conditions.
Nevertheless, it was a requirement as laid down by CAA before these flights were commenced. As has been said on this thread a number of times, CAA denied having any knowledge of these indiscretions. As there were no repercussions from CAA the practice continued.

I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence

That statement, made of some of those people at the time, might explain why the rules were disregarded.

If you want to break, or disregard the rules, and have the end result this crew had, and then we get the findings of Mahon that the crew were blameless, this discussion will go on forever.

[megan]

and in real VFR conditionsAnd what are the VFR limits? My regulators limits are 5K vis, 1.5K horizontal & 1,000 feet vertical from cloud. For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?

[prospector]

My regulators limits are 5K vis, 1.5K horizontal & 1,000 feet vertical from cloud

The weather at McMurdo was below the minimums specified for the approved cloud break procedure, and as advised by the observers at McMurdo no good at all for any sightseeing in the area.

Do you really think that a vis of 5K would be of any use at 260kts?

.

[3 Holer]

Welcome aboard megan. This debate has been going on since the 29th November 1979 and will remain ongoing because there is no middle ground to which the two warring parties can agree.

1. The crew did not survive the accident, therefore it is only speculation on what was briefed at the planning stages (before the aircraft got airborne), during the cruise and prior to descent. (MSA, discussion about the route down Mc Murdo Sound, the actual weather at the time (NOT forecast) etc,.)

2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”

3. The New Zealand government and Air NZ were furious and had the findings overturned. Not a popular decision with most of the victim's families. In 2004, appeals to the U.K. Privy Council were abolished in NZ. In 2009, Air NZ's Chief Executive stated, "Air New Zealand inevitably made mistakes and undoubtedly let down people directly affected by the tragedy." That would include families of the crew.

So, there are three sides to this debate. Mahons, Air NZ & NZ government supporters (for brevity referred to as "Others") and the TRUTH. As can be seen by all contributions in this thread, the TRUTH will never be established so it will remain Mahon vs "Others" until infinity.

Amen:ok:

[prospector]

3 Holer,

[QUOTE]In their judgement, delivered on 20 Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioner's appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice. They demolished his case item by item, including Exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation", and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive, had ever existed.[/QUOTe

That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.

2. Mahon found during his inquiry; “The palpably false sections of evidence which I heard could not have been the result of mistake, or faulty recollection. They originated, I am compelled to say, in a pre-determined plan of deception. They were very clearly part of an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous administrative blunders and so… I am forced reluctantly to say that I had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies.”

As long as you and others keep on quoting the views of Mahon, that have been completely disagreed with by his peers and superiors in the law world, and have been printed in this forum many times, then one is left wondering as to the point of trying to establish fact. You may disagree with the Appeal Court of New Zealand, and disagree with the finding of the Privy Council, but you can go to no higher court to challenge them.

[megan]

Do you really think that a vis of 5K would be of any use at 260kts?No I don't, and that is why I asked you the question which you failed to answer.For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?

[prospector]

.For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?


I do not believe there is an answer to that question, they were never VFR, the captain requested a VMC descent, which in effect made him responsible for his own terrain and traffic separation.
.
.





.

[megan]

I do not believe there is an answer to that questionI hate to belabor the point that you are doing your best to avoid answering, on one hand you are saying some flights were in VMC, but now you are saying there is no answer to what constituted VMC conditions.

[Anotherday]

There were from memory 5 or 6 criteria required to descend below MSA on that flight. Didn't matter that the waypoints were changed, there was still a f*cking big mountain in the area whichever of the routes were being flown and the MSA was high for both routes accordingly.

They had 2 of the 5 or 6 criteria required, just 2.

I get that Vette did a lot to show that they didn't have the visual picture they thought they had and I thank him for that. And I get that other flights busted SOP and descended when they shouldn't have. So someone else was doing it so that made it ok? That's the kind of argument I have with my 4 year old.

And I get that previous flights that didn't descend had a bunch of unhappy pax who saw nothing but cloud tops for hours so the viability of the flight itself was in question.

But it doesn't alter the question as to what were they doing down there, that low, in the first place. The person in the LHS is the skipper, he operates the aircraft to the SOPs which is what the AOC is based on. The aircraft was, let's not forget, perfectly serviceable. If the crew had all got gastro half way to Antartica and ended up in the bathroom the aircraft would have happily flown all the way down to Antartica and all the way back to NZ without so much as a scratch.

To apportion none of the blame to the crew is ludicrous.

[compressor stall]

And was there an ONC chart onboard?

Surely they were not using just an atlas ?

IIRC the captain took pages from his own atlas with the original (not updated) INS coords plotted on it.

I don't recall anything about any other ONC style charts being used or even carried.

[prospector]

megan,

For the Antarctic flights at what point did it become non VFR?



I hate to belabor the point that you are doing your best to avoid answering, on one hand you are saying some flights were in VMC, but

You are talking about two different things. VMC is visual meteorological conditions, VFR is Visual Flight Rules. The flights were, to the best of my knowledge, always operated under IFR, Instrument Flight Rules.

Are you referring to my post 672 in which I mistakenly used VFR rather than VMC? that was a mistake and has been rectified.

Dick Smith,
I don't recall anything about any other ONC style charts being used or even carried.

From the Bolt/Kennedy Report into the performance of NZCAA
Regarding these matters, the Bolt/Kennedy report notes that the airliners captain (J.Collins) had in fact been issued with a map on the day of the flight but commented that while it may have been better that this map had been made available at the general crew briefing a day or so earlier, it considered this matter to be the responsibility of the airline rather than of the C.A.D

[3 Holer]

prospector states: As long as you and others keep on quoting the views of Mahon, that have been completely disagreed with by his peers and superiors in the law world, and have been printed in this forum many times, then one is left wondering as to the point of trying to establish fact. You may disagree with the Appeal Court of New Zealand, and disagree with the finding of the Privy Council, but you can go to no higher court to challenge them.

How about this then from the Minister of Transport in 1999.

On 18 August 1999 the Minister of Transport, Maurice Williamson, who worked at Air New Zealand as a corporate planner at the time of the crash, tabled the Mahon report in Parliament. Present for the occasion were Maria Collins and Anne Cassin, the widows of two of the pilots on the flight, and Margarita Mahon, Justice Peter Mahon's widow.

Williamson argued that the time for apportioning blame was over and that he was tabling the report because 'of the lessons it taught'. He commented that:
The International Civil Aviation Organisation says the report was 10 years ahead of its time; that subsequent high-technology systems catastrophes such as those at Chenobyl and Bhopal need not have happened if the international safety community had grasped the message from Erebus and adopted its prevention lessons.


Justice Peter Mahon, take a bow. From ICAO, the report you methodically put together through obtaining facts and impartial investigation was 10 years ahead of it's time.

prospector, do you really think that findings of the Privy Council and NZ Appeal Court are more relevant, in this case, than those by ICAO?

[PapaHotel6]

Justice Peter Mahon, take a bow. From ICAO, the report you methodically put together through obtaining facts and impartial investigation was 10 years ahead of it's time.

Sheesh. Where to start.....

Firstly, there is no "ahead of its time". The facts of this accident have been clear since 1980. Secondly, "facts and impartial investigation" could not be a less apt description of the Mahon report. It is full of theory, false assumption and conjecture with incorrect conclusions presented as fact. While I'm sure Mahon believed himself to be impartial, in fact he was heavily manipulated by ALPA.

How about this then from the Minister of Transport in 1999.

A politician with predictable mob-insight who is no more qualified to declare on this accident than are the crew members' families.

From ICAO, the report you methodically put together through obtaining facts and impartial investigation was 10 years ahead of it's time.

The official report of ICAO remains the Chippindale report.

[prospector]

prospector, do you really think that findings of the Privy Council and NZ Appeal Court are more relevant, in this case, than those by ICAO

Certainly, there is no doubt of that.and the following is one of the reasons why.

Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account- and has never been officially challenged.

[megan]

You are talking about two different things. VMC is visual meteorological conditions, VFR is Visual Flight Rules. The flights were, to the best of my knowledge, always operated under IFR, Instrument Flight Rules.
My mistake saying VFR rather than VMC. The flights had a VMC segment, that was the scenic part of the flight. How are the pax going to view the scenery, the entire purpose of the flight, if the aircraft is not in VMC conditions. So using the correct terminology, what conditions were considered to be VMC?

In your,1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.you forgot to mention that the descent from 16,000 to the minimum of 6,000 had to be in VMC. So what were the stipulated VMC limits? There is nothing in the report that I can find, though the regs in force at the time state 8Km vis, 1 mile horizontally & 1,000 feet vertically.

Since the NDB was out presumably they had to identify McMurdo by a combination of DME read out and INS.

For those asking about maps.

Topographical maps were not issued for use on the flight. With the exception of a Photostat copy of a small insert enlargement of a map of Ross Island (1:1,000,000), these were not issued to the crew until the day of the flight, and were of a relatively small scale i.e. 1:5,000,000 and 1:3,000,000.

More importantly, the strip map of the route from Christchurch to McMurdo issued on the day of the flight also had two tracks printed on it both depicting a passage to the west of Ross Island. Positive reinforcement of the track the Captain had taken the trouble of plotting in his atlas.

[Hempy]

megan,

The McMurdo NBD was still transmitting despite being listed as out of service. There was no DME, but there was a TACAN. However the crew never received a signal from that NAVAID. They could also only communicate via HF radio and were never radar identified.

Why?

NDBs, TACANs, VHF radio and radar are all 'line of sight'. Unfortunately there was a 12,500" mountain between them (which none of the crew twigged to).

[megan]

Well aware Hempy of the NDB state, but they were not permitted to use same. I said DME because that's the only function of TACAN they could access, not the bearing info. Any aircraft with DME can access that part of TACAN, a TACAN channel number has a corresponding VHF frequency. ie 84X=113.7

[Hempy]

I'm well aware of the UHF (DME) abilities of TACAN.

I'm also aware that 901 never interrogated the McMurdo TACAN. There was a whopping great mountain in the way...

(p.s you are aware that the reason civil aircraft can't interrogate bearing information off a TACAN is because TACAN is UHF, and NDBs and VORs operate on VHF, aren't you? The reason civil aircraft can get range information off a TACAN is because DME is UHF, as is TACAN..)

[megan]

Did 9 years flying TACAN, think I have the gist, but I sure didn't know NDB was VHF.

[Hempy]

Correct. The (non existent..) NDB operates between MF and VHF. And about TACAN/DME having a corresponding VHF frequency?

Which is all irrelevant to the facts. There was a mountain in the way. When you can't get NDB, TACAN, VHF radio or expected radar coverage, SURELY someone might think 'hmmm what is there around here that might possibly be blocking a signal from the ground based equipment? Surely not a huge fkn mountain..' :ugh:

[megan]

NDB operates between MF and VHFNope, ADF operates on LF and MF, 200 to 1699 kHz in my GA aircraft, and 100 to 1750 in my old mil. You have HF (3 to 30 mHz) between MF and VHF (30 to 300 mHz), then UHF (300 MHz to 3 GHz).And about TACAN/DME having a corresponding VHF frequency?I'm afraid outside of the military I've never seen a cockpit whereby you can tune UHF, either com or nav. I said,a TACAN channel number has a corresponding VHF frequency. ie 84X=113.7 I did not say, nor I think, imply, that the DME or TACAN OPERATED on VHF. You tune a VHF frequency in the box, which then talks to the ground station per this table, and receives a reply on a different frequency, both being UHF.

Instrument Landing System (ILS) Frequencies - The RadioReference Wiki (http://wiki.radioreference.com/index.php/Instrument_Landing_System_%28ILS%29_Frequencies)

[Hempy]

ILS??

Since the NDB was out presumably they had to identify McMurdo by a combination of DME read out and INS.

Presumably you haven't read the investigation report. They never interrogated the TACAN.

I did not say, nor I think, imply, that the DME or TACAN OPERATED on VHF.

I said DME because that's the only function of TACAN they could access, not the bearing info. Any aircraft with DME can access that part of TACAN, a TACAN channel number has a corresponding VHF frequency. ie 84X=113.7

Nor imply? Same as VMC/VFR?

Since, by your own admission, you have zero experience in civil ops, what's your beef?

[PapaHotel6]

Which is all irrelevant to the facts. There was a mountain in the way. When you can't get NDB, TACAN, VHF radio or expected radar coverage, SURELY someone might think 'hmmm what is there around here that might possibly be blocking a signal from the ground based equipment? Surely not a huge fkn mountain..'

Not to mention the fact you've just said yourself "very hard to tell the difference between cloud and ice"; and your F/E has already asked "where's Erebus" and later "I don't like this".

The lack of situational awareness here was massive. And that, of course, followed the initial doozy decision to descend below MSA without radar guidance in marginal VMC.

[megan]

ILS??You didn't look at the link did you. :=you haven't read the investigation report. They never interrogated the TACAN.Only a hundred times or so, and they did interrogate the TACAN. Read the report. :=Since, by your own admission, you have zero experience in civil opsWhere did I say that? 33 years civil actually. :ok:what's your beef?Sirloin, or Porterhouse at a pinch.

[3 Holer]

..................and the ONLY reason a mountain was in the way was because some one changed the final co-ordinates of the route without telling the crew! :=

[megan]

You forgot to add 3 Holer that immediately prior to the flight the crew were given the preflight planning folder contained the strip map with the track going down the route Captain Collins expected. Oh, and the nav department didn't give the required Ops Flash (I think it was called, can't be bothered looking it up right now) signifying that a change had been made to the flight plan.

[prospector]

you forgot to mention that the descent from 16,000 to the minimum of 6,000 had to be in VMC. So what were the stipulated VMC limits? There is nothing in the report that I can find, though the regs in force at the time state 8Km vis, 1 mile horizontally & 1,000 feet vertically.

I have not found any specially laid down VMC requirements for that portion of the approved descent. However, as it was a requirement to be under radar monitoring and in the laid down area that was well clear of Mt Erebus I would think in unlikely that anyone ever got round to producing special VMC requirements just for that portion, 16,000ft to 6,000ft.

The question is not really relevant though, the weather at McMurdo was well below that required for the only approved descent below MSA.

3 Holer,
..................and the ONLY reason a mountain was in the way was because some one changed the final co-ordinates of the route without telling the crew
Have you any idea what requesting and getting a VMC descent entails? You take on responsibility for your own terrain and traffic avoidance. As has been shown in this thread many times, changing the waypoint was sloppy operating but was not the cause of the disaster.

[Cazalet33]

Rather few characters came out well from the ghastly aftermath. Two who showed immense fortitude of character and great dignity were the widows of the two pilots.

Another two, both of whom were unusually gifted technocrats in their own fields, were Vette and Mahon.

I commend this video to the forum:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyWvOI_MD-Q



I also commend an accurately scripted docudrama which may embarrass some of the more mendacious members of the three government agencies which quite clearly had something to hide, as well as embarrassing one or two of those of whom did not make much effort to hide their involvement in what was a limited coverup:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ivz6lAJwJ8

[prospector]

I commend this video to the forum:


I would suggest you go back over the many posts in this forum, the docu/drama that you commend has very little credibility to many who have a good knowledge of what in fact caused this disaster. I must admit they do have some credence,as they were meant to, to the general public who have no intimate knowledge of the workings of the Aviation world.

[3 Holer]

That's why Justice Peter Mahon maintains his good name and reputation to this day and the "Others" can only keep banging on about visual approaches, MSA's and their total ignorance about Human Factors.

[prospector]

Perhaps if you could answer a simple aviation related question, as posed to you a few posts back, rather than "banging on" about the human factors??? .

Have you any idea what requesting and getting a VMC descent entails? You take on responsibility for your own terrain and traffic avoidance. As has been shown in this thread many times, changing the waypoint was sloppy operating but was not the cause of the disaster.

[PapaHotel6]

..................and the ONLY reason a mountain was in the way was because some one changed the final co-ordinates of the route without telling the crew!

You forgot to add 3 Holer that immediately prior to the flight the crew were given the preflight planning folder contained the strip map with the track going down the route Captain Collins expected. Oh, and the nav department didn't give the required Ops Flash (I think it was called, can't be bothered looking it up right now) signifying that a change had been made to the flight plan.

For the love of Heaven. Even if the Chief of the navigation section himself had walked out to NZP that morning, looked Jim Collins in the eye and told him "I've programmed your aircraft to fly down McMurdo Sound", Collins still would not have been justified in descending in the manner he did in the conditions he had.

I would suggest you go back over the many posts in this forum, the docu/drama that you commend has very little credibility to many who have a good knowledge of what in fact caused this disaster.

I would second that. The Mahon/Vette premise is extremely believable to those with little or no aviation knowledge - and I don't mean that to be nearly as patronising as it sounds. I myself believed it for many years until I a) became a pilot b) studied things deeper and c) took emotion out of the equation.

Two who showed immense fortitude of character and great dignity were the widows of the two pilots
Ann Cassin certainly, but I don't think the same can be said of Maria Collins unfortunately. Her presence in the media, denouncing of Chippindale etc. and relentless drive to "clear her husband's name" while understandable hasn't been particularly dignified, and as I said earlier, is somewhat disrespectful to the families of the other 256.

That's why Justice Peter Mahon maintains his good name and reputation to this day
How can you say this with a straight face? The NZ Court of Appeal and the Privy Council unequivocally denounced him. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, himself no slouch in the legal field, said Mahon "did many great things in his career, but the Erebus report was not one of them".

[3 Holer]

Captain Collins did take responsibility for his own terrain clearance. The problem was Erebus was not supposed to be there (BUT it was there compliments of the Navigation section who changed the route and NEVER TOLD the crew). The reason it wasn't seen was because of a visual illusion known as whiteout!

This has been done to death Mate, get with the program, please.

[Anotherday]

You need to understand MSA. Collins didn't, if he had half a clue about operating an aircraft to the SOPs he wouldn't have descended. Air NZ were smart enough to know you couldn't just throw an aircraft into a cloud break.
He didn't even have Nav info off mcmurdo.
He should have flown the aircraft as he was paid to do and on the day in those conditions not descended.

You need to read the report.

The Nav section didn't plot a course below area MSA, there was nothing unsafe about the route they gave him on the day.

So the Nav section should have said "if you decide to throw airmanship and common sense out the window and dispense with the requirements of the SOP and laugh at the US military who have lost plenty of aircraft in the area while operating down there for the last 50 years because on the basis of your experience flying a hundred flights to and from LA you know best then....."

[PapaHotel6]

And I say again............ the INS is not designed for terrain avoidance.... if it were; it'd be possible to fly from AKL right onto short final at ZQN with one push of a button.

The Nav section didn't plot a course below area MSA, there was nothing unsafe about the route they gave him on the day.
People need to read this over and over until it sinks in.

[prospector]

Captain Collins did take responsibility for his own terrain clearance. The problem was Erebus was not supposed to be there

You cannot be serious!!! Erebus has been in exactly the same position for a very long time.

[Cazalet33]

Erebus has been in exactly the same position for a very long time.

So has McMurdo Sound.

That is/was the problem.

He thought he had been briefed to fly down the Sound, not into the Bay.

So had the other crew at the same briefing.

That's why they (the surviving crew of the same briefing) were surprised to see the 26 mile cross-track 'error' on the INS when they found where they were in a less malign form of 'VMC', on a similarly briefed flight.

Look at the videos, please.

[PapaHotel6]

That's why they (the surviving crew of the same briefing) were surprised to see the 26 mile cross-track 'error' on the INS when they found where they were in a less malign form of 'VMC', on a similarly briefed flight

And yet this didn't cause an outcry. Barely a murmur. But if the safety of the flight depended on the INS track, don't you think it should have?

[Cazalet33]

I would suggest you go back over the many posts in this forum

I have done so. Just as I have read every word of the Chippindale and Mahon reports.

That's why I commended both of the lengthy videos to the forum.

That's why I give links to both videos here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=xyWvOI_MD-Q

and
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=2ivz6lAJwJ8

They are both worth watching, both to to those who care about the truth of what actually happened and to those who don't.

[Cazalet33]

And yet this didn't cause an outcry. Barely a murmur. But if the safety of the flight depended on the INS track, don't you think it should have?

Yes, I do.

I think the safety culture of the airline on those gigs was structurally phuqed up. There was a complacency which almost inevitably would lead to a high risk of disaster.

[Anotherday]

Still amazed someone could fly for 4 hrs on an early era IRS with no GPS or DME updating, make up an uncertified approach and fly down to well below MSA. Drift on those old IRS must have been in the order of 3-6 nm an hour. So doing the homemade IRS letdown may have put him 12-24 miles off apparent track anyway with the IRS still within tolerances. And without DME updating who knew where they actually were.
Another reason why AirNZ attached so many preconditions to descending below MSA which the crew ignored.
I'm impressed so many on here would have happily done the same.

[Cazalet33]

The crew did not do what previous crews had not done with the same, or similar, briefings. Other than getting suckered in to the sector whiteout thing, that is.

Descending to low level was quite common on those gigs.

[prospector]

both to to those who care about the truth of what actually happened

Are you still trying to convince anyone that this captain could fly a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the side of a mountain that everybody knew was there, by carrying out a descent procedure that had plucked out of the air, by a captain who had never been to the Antarctic before, and after being advised that the weather conditions were below those required for the approved cloud break procedure, in fact he was advised that the weather conditions were no good for sight seeing at all, and after all this is still blameless??

Descending to low level was quite common on those gigs.

Yes it was, but that does not make it legal, and as CAA testified after, they had no knowledge of these breaches of altitude restrictions. The altitude restrictions were there because the Airline was given approval to use crews who had no previous experience down to the ice, which went against the requirements of all the other operators USAF, USN,RNZAF who had much experience operating down there.

Cazalet33, I suggest you read Gordon Vette's Impact Erebus. Have a look at the diagrams on page 46 and 47. If this crew was on the ball, and they thought they were going down McMurdo Sound, why was it not noticed they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island? Met conditions at that point were certainly VMC, there are passenger photo's retrieved from the wreck clearly showing Beaufort Island.

[27/09]

Collins still would not have been justified in descending in the manner he did in the conditions he had.

PapaHotel6; What conditions did Captain Collins have when he descended? More to the point what conditions did he think he had.

[27/09]

Still amazed someone could fly for 4 hrs on an early era IRS with no GPS or DME updating, make up an uncertified approach and fly down to well below MSA. Drift on those old IRS must have been in the order of 3-6 nm an hour. So doing the homemade IRS letdown may have put him 12-24 miles off apparent track anyway with the IRS still within tolerances. And without DME updating who knew where they actually were.

Anotherday; I have no experience with INS/IRS systems on the DC10 but I do recall hearing they were very accurate, with crews expecting to be very close to track after a trans Pacific flight, certainly much much more accurate than you have supposed.

It's been a while since I read anything about this accident but IIRC the crew had identified their track visually, all be it incorrectly by mistakenly identifying similar looking landmarks. They were in their mind where they expected to be.

A letdown as you describe it infers descent to get below cloud. My recollection of the transcripts is the crew thought they were in VMC.

[prospector]

megan,

So what were the stipulated VMC limits? ''

Found the reference, 20km was the required vis for any VMC flight during these operations. Just how one established that one had 20km vis I do not know.

[Dick Smith]

Prospector. You are correct re being on the wrong side of Beaufort Island. Photos recovered showed the island was clearly indentifiable.

What is doubly strange is that Antarctic veteran and close friend of Ed Hillary , Peter Mulgrew was on the flight deck and did not mention that they were clearly on the east of the island not the west .

Re accuracy of the INS. On the Qantas flights I checked the accuracy when we overflew at low altitude indentifiable places like Mawsons Hut or Cape Adare. The INS was within a mile at these locations.

[3 Holer]

Peter Mulgrew was on the flight deck and did not mention that they were clearly on the east of the island not the west .
How do you know he didn't Dick?

[compressor stall]

[quote]. Just how one established that one had 20km vis I do not know.[\quote]

Looking out the right windows they could see the dry valleys. Much more than 20km.

[Cazalet33]

after all this [the captain] is still blameless??


I haven't said that the crew were 100% blameless. I think they were complacent, just like everyone else in the causal chain.

We'll never know whether they hand plotted the INS co-ords onto a topo chart. Most of the navigational notes were made to disappear in the coverup by the Company. I suspect that during the flight the only INS data they monitored was DTG and Xtrk. In their minds the datum line to which those parameters referred was straight down the middle of the Sound.


The altitude restrictions were there because the Airline was given approval to use crews who had no previous experience down to the ice, which went against the requirements of all the other operators USAF, USN,RNZAF who had much experience operating down there.

It was widely known, at all levels of management, that those flights regularly flew well below the nominal floor of 6,000'. As for sending captains down there with zero experience of Antarctica: it was diabolically dangerous. All three members of the crew had never been there before. For the CAA to have allowed such a reckless policy was unforgivable.

If this crew was on the ball, and they thought they were going down McMurdo Sound, why was it not noticed they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island?

They quite certainly thought they were going down the Sound and they quite certainly thought the INS trackline was guiding them there. That much is certain. As for the reason why they did not recognise Beaufort island, I think it comes back to a lack of local knowledge and complacency. They saw only what they expected to see and did not see what they did not expected. A well known phenomenon in Human Factors (nowadays).

As for why the local guide, Mulgrew did not recognise the island: he wasn't on the flight deck at the time. He was making his way through the crowded pax cabin at the time, no doubt chatting to people along the way and probably wasn't looking out of the Stbd windows. He was about as agile on 'his' feet as Douglas Bader was, and for the same reason.

[timboeing707]

Hi All,

not sure if anyone has posted these links to these excellent videos on Youtube about the Erebus Disaster, well worth a watch.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yP36X0BsMQ0

and

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ivz6lAJwJ8

Cheers

[megan]

However, as it was a requirement to be under radar monitoring and in the laid down area that was well clear of Mt ErebusNot correct, it was not required to be radar monitored, it was to be co-ordinated with radar control as they may have had other traffic in the area. Monitored and co-ordinated are two vastly different things.

In any event, the controller saidWe were not aware at the time of the sector within which the Air New Zealand DC1O flights were said to be required to fly. This required sector as now identified to me by representatives of the Royal Commission would in my opinion have been absurd. Any radar controls contemplated by those planning such flights for purposes of assisting in descent manoeuvres would have been virtually impossible since Ice Tower radar does not function above 30 degrees and since without vertical aiming radar or an Azimuth Beam on the TACAN, there could be no adequate ground based control should it have been required. I re-emphasize that to the best of my knowledge, Operation DEEP FREEZE was unaware of any officially approved Civil Aviation Division (CAD) or Air New Zealand flight plan or descent approach. However, had such a flight plan or descent approach been provided for DEEP FREEZE consideration and had DEEP FREEZE agreed to provide radar let—down· assistance, I would have regarded such a plan as extremely ill-advised for the reasons stated.

[Cazalet33]

[quote]. Just how one established that one had 20km vis I do not know.[\quote]

Looking out the right windows they could see the dry valleys. Much more than 20km.

Furthermore, the US military controller at McMurdo had declared the visibility to be 40 miles and that it was even clearer to the North West.

[Dick Smith]

3 holer, a presumption because they flew into the mountain.

I am amazed if he was not in the cockpit- he was the one with the local knowledge of the area they were going to.

[Cazalet33]

He was there as a commentator for the pax, not as a flight navigator.

PIC was a qualified navigator, though not current.

Perhaps if Mulgrew had been present on the flight deck when Beaufort slid by on the Stbd side he might have asked wtf, but he wasn't part of the flight crew and hadn't been a party to the nav briefing, so perhaps not.

[megan]

You need to understand MSA......The Nav section didn't plot a course below area MSA, there was nothing unsafe about the route they gave him on the day.The route they gave him was over the top of Erebus, an active volcano prone to persistent Strombolian eruptions. Chippendale in his recommendations said,No commercial passenger carrying flight be planned to fly over or close to an active volcanoSomebody finally realised the danger presented by the ash cloud, and bombs ejected from the crater. ie It wasn't smart nor effing safe. There was a reason the RNC track went down the sound, keep away from Erebus, and that's the route Chippendale recommended.

Eruptions occur on average six times per day, and have been known to throw ten metre diameter bombs up to one kilometer above the crater rim. Mountain 12,450 feet plus one kilometer = 15,731 feet. Now, what did you say the MSA was?

Again, it's a demonstration of the lackadaisical approach taken to the entire operation, people not knowing what they didn't know, and not enquiring enough to find out. Bit of a "We invented aviation" mind set?

[Cazalet33]

I'd like to develop a thought I expressed in my recent post #721.

Pilotage is largely a matter of feature recognition. Conventional IFR nav is very different. These scenic flights were a highly unusual mix of conventional IFR nav and highly unusual low level mountain flying in a wide-bodied air transport aircraft. They subscended the transition from conventional instrument-borne nav to purely visual pilotage under IFR to an extraordinary degree.

Marine (maritime, not the grunting variety) pilots, from whom we take our name in aviation, are pilots who have a highly detailed knowledge of both the waters and the land-forms within their area of expertise. They have a highly developed and well tested ability to recognise position from even momentary and fragmented glimpses of a landform in crappy vis. That's why they earn the big bucks (and the bagfulls of free booze & baccie).

What was required of the pilots of these scenic flights, once they descended below the formal MSA, was the navigational skill which we call pilotage. Pilotage in such a locale as McMurdo requires local knowledge, a knowledge of which the five flight crew members were entirely bereft.

On their briefing day, a little under three weeks before the crash, the two crews were given a sim session, specific to their planned flight(s). The purpose of the sim session was to refresh their awareness of the technicalities of Polar Grid Nav, with specific reference to the very substantial differences between Grid bearings/headings and those of True or Magnetic North and a detailed refresher on the operation and interpretation of the INS in that regime.

In those days the visuals on even the most sophisticated sims, such the the one for the Diesel10 in the 1970s, did not model hypsographic data and could not possibly be used for showing the 3D visual appearances of remote islands in any weather.

There were/are two islands proximal to the programmed track towards Ross Island. One to the left, then one to the right.

Mulgrew would have recognised the landform of either or both of those islands. He'd seen both before, just like a marine pilot of his own competence.

I muse that if he had been present on the flight deck, doing his commentary thing on the PA, when Scott Island passed by the left wing, and then when Beaufort island passed by on the other side, which he was not, his commentary might have jangled with the SA model in the minds of the two pilots. In that scenario, which sadly was not the case, then perhaps Captain Collins might have saved the day.

Just a thought. Albeit one which may be coloured by more modern concepts of CRM than were widespread outside United Airlines in the 1970s.

[Cazalet33]

Bit of a "We invented aviation" mind set?

My reading of Chippindale, and I've read all of his Report, is that he was a bit of a puppy to his governmental masters and payers.

Mahon was the opposite. Too much so, perhaps, but most informatively and most insightfully so.

[PapaHotel6]

What was required of the pilots of these scenic flights, once they descended below the formal MSA, was the navigational skill which we call pilotage. Pilotage in such a locale as McMurdo requires local knowledge, a knowledge of which the five flight crew members were entirely bereft.

A very intriguing point Cazalet33.

Jim Collins asked Mulgrew if he could "get them out over the Wright Valley" to which Mulgrew replied "no problem". So clearly Collins was thinking along the lines of potentially using Mulgrew in the "maritime pilot" role you describe. It never came to that, but.... at the very least represents yet another example of complacency inappropriate to commercial jet transport.

It was widely known, at all levels of management, that those flights regularly flew well below the nominal floor of 6,000'. As for sending captains down there with zero experience of Antarctica: it was diabolically dangerous. All three members of the crew had never been there before. For the CAA to have allowed such a reckless policy was unforgivable.
Agreed. As it was for Air NZ to request such a reckless policy.

[prospector]

Quote:

It was widely known, at all levels of management, that those flights regularly flew well below the nominal floor of 6,000'. As for sending captains down there with zero experience of Antarctica: it was diabolically dangerous. All three members of the crew had never been there before. For the CAA to have allowed such a reckless policy was unforgivable.
Agreed. As it was for Air NZ to request such a reckless policy.


It would have been less problematic for Air New Zealand to have used only one crew for these flights, and then been in line with the experience requirements of the other operators to the ice. USAF for example required 20 hours experience down at the ice prior to going down in command.

It was NZALPA who insisted that these were "perk": flights and were to be shared amongst their senior members.

From Bob Thomson in his "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88

Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefor need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF, USAF, USN or the division.

The experience of Bob Thomson in Antarctic operations has been printed in this forum.

[PapaHotel6]

It was NZALPA who insisted that these were "perk": flights and were to be shared amongst their senior members

You've made this point before. I don't disagree (but I hadn't come across this previously, what's your source?) However - this doesn't make anything NZALPA's "fault". It's up to the airline and CAA to say "request acknowledged ALPA, but get f**ked".

[Cazalet33]

It was NZALPA who insisted that these were "perk": flights and were to be shared amongst their senior members

I don't doubt a word of that, Prospector.

It reinforces my impression that there was a dangerously disdended degree of complacency, top-to-bottom, that these gigs were a walk in the park.

Low level flying on a Class 7 AOC (or whatever it's called in Nya Zillun) in a mountainous area such as Greenland or Antarctica is a highly specialised form of aviation, not a perq to be awarded on the basis of Buggins Turn.

The CAA, or CAD, or whatever its called nowadays on the two interesting islands of Australasia, bear an extremely heavy responsibility for the TE901 crackup. Massively more so than than the eager victims who thought they'd won a watch until the fatal bang.

[prospector]

From Bob Thomson in his "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88

.And the this taken from John King "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation".

But Thomson had more experience on the area then almost anybody else. During his 75 trips to Antarctica in the course of his long career with the DSIR Antarctic Division, at least 50 had been on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North, observing the ice edge and conditions. He was commentator on Air New Zealands inaugural flight back in February 1977, with Captain Ian Gemmel in command, and also on the last completed trip before the Flight 901 on 28 November.
In fact, he was originally scheduled to fly on the fatal flight, but had to change his plans because of an expected visit to Scott Base by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon in early December 1979. Instead mountaineer Peter Mulgrew took his place- and was on the flight deck at the moment of impact.

Has Bob Thomson felt uneasy that, but for a twist of fate, he might have died that day? "Not at all". I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17,000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like, and where any clouds were.

On each of Thomson's flights the captain turned to him for advice on the best sightseeing route around the area. Interpreting that as sharing responsibility for the flight, he found the idea of having to make quick decisions on behalf of 250 people too much, so his last flight would have been his final trip, even if Air New Zealand had kept them going.

"There's traditionally bad weather in Lewis Bay, where they crashed," says Thomson.

The captain didn't give attention to problems he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he had gone in by sea, and all his travels from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anyone ever went into Lewis Bay.

Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the cloud. If a pilot is unsure he always goes up, never down.The copilot on flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longitude readout. But the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it.


That was his take on the fatal flight.
As to the 6,000ft minimum, some captains never went below this. It apparently started when a flight was invited down by the local ATC to do a low level pass. Since when does an invite by an Air Traffic controller override CAA and company requirements?

Cazalet33, You say Most of the navigational notes were made to disappear in the coverup by the Company.

That was well after the event, if they had of been taking the Lat/Long readouts and plotting them then surely the disaster would not have happened,

PapaHotel6 You say It's up to the airline and CAA to say "request acknowledged ALPA, but get f**ked". Of course, in this day and age that would likely occur, but at the time all this took place the demeanour of some of the people involved would have made it difficult.


I had heard that there was supposed to be an airline inspector from CAA onboard the flight, but due to family commitments he had to cancel, would this flight have been carried out the way it was if it was known an Airline Inspector was onboard?

[3 Holer]

Thank you Dick. There have been a number of "presumptions" on this thread and that highlights the point I made earlier. No one will ever know what went on during the descent/approach because the crew did not survive the crash.

[Cazalet33]

Most of the navigational notes were made to disappear in the coverup by the Company.
That was well after the event, if they had of been taking the Lat/Long readouts and plotting them then surely the disaster would not have happened,

The coverup started immediately after the accident. And continued for weeks, not months.

It was the suspicious burglary which occurred much later. Months, not weeks.

[Cazalet33]

As to the 6,000ft minimum, some captains never went below this.

You sound like you are using the teenager defence of malfeasance, Mr P.

[prospector]

The coverup started immediately after the accident. And continued for weeks, not months.

You missed the point, if they had of been plotting the position on a chart, taken from the Lat/Long readouts, then they would have known where they were, rather thinking they knew where they were.

[Cazalet33]

if they had of been plotting the position on a chart, taken from the Lat/Long readouts, then they would have known where they were, rather thinking they knew where they were.

Agreed.

Perhaps that's why the FEs, abaft the front row seats in the cinema, expressed such concern that something was wrong.

[prospector]

expressed such concern that something was wrong.

If they had been plotting any of the lat long readouts at the critical times, from the time the home grown descent procedure, against all mandatory descent requirements, was commenced, I would have thought they would have known Mt Erebus was directly ahead. I would have thought in that case there would have been much more expressed then "that something was wrong"

[Cazalet33]

I would have thought in that case there would have been much more expressed then "that something was wrong"

What do you think would have been the words and actions in the CRM culture of the 1970s? Reaching forward and shoving the thrust levers to the max and hauling the yoke back to rattle?

[FAR CU]

CAZ . . .. you have a familiar ring . .. . (oops ) . . . it smacks of the
ex? hot-shot driving Sabres Mirages F111s or later fast jets rather than lead sleds. (What that has to do with the serious vein of the the never ending story F-Nose.)

[Cazalet33]

Self-evidently, they did not share your belief.

That's why they died.

[PapaHotel6]

3 Holer says

There have been a number of "presumptions" on this thread and that highlights the point I made earlier. No one will ever know what went on during the descent/approach because the crew did not survive the crash.

.......which also applies to the "whiteout" theory. Often presented as fact, Vette's theory about mindset/false horizon causing the pilots to 'see' a flat vista of ice stretching out into the distance is nothing more than an idea - and a rather fanciful one at that I would suggest. Given the conditions at the time, and the comments made in the cockpit, I'm sure they saw a "sea" of white, but something akin to flying inside a ping pong ball. Something like this (minus the penguins and starlifter)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/C-141_Starlifter_with_penguins.jpg

[prospector]

No one will ever know what went on during the descent/approach because the crew did not survive the crash.


Really??, what about the information contained in the CVR, and DFDR.

[3 Holer]

Whiteout is not a theory, it is a factual optical illusion. Of course it would never
have been considered, along with all the postulation about this accident, if the changed co-ordinates of the flight planned route had been disseminated to the crew that morning.

[prospector]

Cazalet33,
You say, after posting the findings of Mahon via the video's you commended

I haven't said that the crew were 100% blameless. I think they were complacent, just like everyone else in the causal chain.

And that is why this thread has been going for so long, Mahon took it upon himself to say the crew was blameless. As has been made evident, by many posters, many disagree with that opinion, and that is all it is, Mahon's opinion that is in dispute.

[megan]

You missed the point, if they had of been plotting the position on a chart, taken from the Lat/Long readouts, then they would have known where they were, rather thinking they knew where they were.So why wasn't that part of the SOP? Once again proof positive of the lackadaisical approach to the entire operation by both the airline itself, and the CAA. Everyone in the country, had they known the SOP, would have known they were not being followed, because it was featured in all the media. For the CAA to say they didn't know SOP wasn't being complied with is just disingenuous at best, and an outright lie at its worse. Same with the airlines management. A classic case of the "Normalisation of Deviance" concept.

[prospector]

Once again proof positive of the lackadaisical approach to the entire operation by both the airline itself, and the CAA

If you added and by this crew, then I would have to agree. I say again, it is only Mahon's opinion that the crew were blameless that is in dispute.

[PapaHotel6]

it is only Mahon's opinion that the crew were blameless that is in dispute.
And that's the opinion that is making its way into school curriculums, popular media and history books. Aside from the injustice, it also sets a dangerous precedent to aviation culture.

3 Holer said:

Whiteout is not a theory, it is a factual optical illusion.

Oxymoronic term "factual optical illusion" aside, any speculation about what the crew actually perceived visually at 1500' feet is just that - speculation.

No-one however has asserted that the crew were duped by some optical illusion all the way from 13,000' down to 1500' however - yet still, they never saw the mountain. That's because to the south of the aircraft from high altitude down it was pretty much a wall of cloud. Which they were happy to descend under, almost to ground level without radar guidance.