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lead zeppelin
20th Oct 2004, 04:26
Reports: 8 Die In Missouri Plane Crash

POSTED: 11:21 pm EDT October 19, 2004
UPDATED: 12:17 am EDT October 20, 2004

CHICAGO -- A small plane crashed in a wooded area of northeastern Missouri Tuesday evening.

Quincy, Ill., television station WGEM reported that eight people were killed in the crash, but the Associated Press said only five were confirmed dead. Three people are missing, and two survivors were found, the station said.

The Federal Aviation Administration in Chicago says the plane was believed to be a Corporate Express flight on a regular route from St. Louis to Kirksville, Missouri, when it crashed just after 7:30 p.m. CST. Corporate Express is an affiliate of American Airlines.

The aircraft, a BAC Jetstream Turbo Prop, left Lambert Airport in St. Louis earlier in the evening.

Twelve people were thought to have been on the plane but it's unclear if that figure includes crew members.

The plane's last communication at 7:33 p.m. indicated it was on a normal approach to Kirksville Regional Airport, and there was no mention of any problems.
Distributed by Internet Broadcasting Systems, Inc. The Associated Press contributed to this report. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

20th Oct 2004, 13:08
American Connection J-31. 6 confirmed dead, 5 missing, 2 survivors.


20th Oct 2004, 15:01
The usual response of the US airline majors that when an incident happens to a commuter aircraft in their livery http://www.airliners.net/open.file/633488/M/ with their flight number AA5966 sold on their website, departing from their terminal, cabin crew in their uniform ... etc. They immediately try to distance themselves from their affiliated commuter carrier.

From the AA website :

"Flight 5966 is operated by Corporate Airlines, an independent airline."

Our thoughts with those on board, pax and crew.

20th Oct 2004, 22:34
One of the survivors, a lady was found wandering around the plane and she had a broken arm. When speaking to the rescuers she stated that the plane broke-up before it hit the ground. Amazing there were any survivors.


20th Oct 2004, 23:01
The five missing passengers have since been found dead:


22nd Oct 2004, 21:00
Looks like the end of a long hard day....It was the crew's 6th flight of the day and their 15th hour flying. Read on below...



22nd Oct 2004, 22:33
For the pilots it was also the second flight into Kirksville airport in one day.

23rd Oct 2004, 01:20
The flight was the sixth of the day for the crew, who had been on duty nearly 15 hours that day, within FAA-approved limits, investigators said.

Would you be happy to be operated on by a surgeon who had been on duty for 15 hours? No? But you are happy to be flown by a crew on an old turbo prop that have!

Another case of a HGV driver has a more restrictive duty day than an airplane pilot! Makes sense don't it?

23rd Oct 2004, 06:16
Well.......as I witnessed my brother during his residency at the trauma center, he was on duty many..many long hours..frightening huh? The FAA regs are way behind the times when it comes to duty limits...I can remember some of those six-sector days in hand-flown turboprops, and lousy weather...wonder how many more people have to die before duty times are based on local report time, and sectors operated....cannot believe fatigue had nothing to do with this accident....sounds a little bit like AA at Little Rock....

23rd Oct 2004, 12:54
The link from newarksmells suggests CFIT; can someone post a copy of the instrument approach chart for the airport or give the relevant details, NPA etc?
In addition, the report refers to a warning system; is the GPWS or EGPWS?

23rd Oct 2004, 15:14
I think it`s disgusting, if in fact to be found true in the investigation , that this crew was operating after a 15 hour duty day.
I hope there will come a day in aviation when we can all look back at those STUPID and UNSAFE duty days for what they were and ARE ; a usual contributor to accidents , totally out of line with common sense , basic human physiology and that there removal ( flt duty times ) was long overdue.
US companies that pay lobbyists for the continuation of these rules have blood on their hands.

23rd Oct 2004, 15:21
wonder how many more people have to die before duty times are based on local report time, and sectors operated Iron, you mean they aren't already:ooh:

Just what are the FAA rules then.

whilst these poor devils were dying, I was doing a six sector day here in the UK. at only a little over 10 hours, I was knackered by the end of it.

23rd Oct 2004, 16:03
I know that thisi s a rumour and news network, but the information contained within the posts so far is exactly what specualtive journo's feed on.
If nothing else, can we have a little decorum out of respect for those who lost their leives and their relatives?

23rd Oct 2004, 23:54
Just use your brains folks....6 sectors...14+ duty hours...hand flying...convective weather....non-precision approach....formula for disaster...but hey...fault the company...one cannot because it's legal!!!! The FAA regs are stone-age...and hence the FAA's nickname...the "tombstone agency" because people have to die before they enact changes....and unfortunately not enough people have died for them to piss off the airlines by enacting regulations that give regional pilots reasonable rest/duty regulations...lived it, survived it, 20 yrs younger ago.....wouldn't try it now.....rather flip burgers and live in a fridge box in an alley...:mad: :mad: :mad:

lead zeppelin
25th Oct 2004, 02:10
From the NTSB


NTSB Identification: DCA05MA004
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of CORPORATE AIRLINES
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 19, 2004 in Kirksville, MO
Aircraft: British Aerospace Jetstream 32, registration:
Injuries: 13 Fatal, 2 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 19, 2004, about 7:45 p.m. central daylight time, a British Aerospace Jetstream 32 twin-engine turboprop airplane, operating as American Connection Flight 5966 (a feeder commuter for American Airlines), crashed during an instrument approach to the Kirksville Regional Airport in Kirksville, Missouri. The airplane carried 2 crewmembers and 13 passengers. The flight was being operated as a scheduled Part 121 airline flight. It departed from St. Louis, Missouri, about 6:45 pm and was destined for Kirksville.

According to preliminary information, the flight was being vectored by the Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) for the Localizer Distance Measuring Equipment (LOC-DME) approach to runway 36 at Kirksville. The airplane was cleared to descend from 15,000 feet. The airplane reportedly crashed about 4 miles from the runway during the approach.

American Connection is owned and operated by Corporate Airlines, a small commuter airline based in Smyrna, Tennessee.

25th Oct 2004, 16:07


25th Oct 2004, 22:01
Thanks av8boy. Whilst I do not know if the crew were using this particular chart, it does illustrate many of the typical CFIT traps when flying NPAs.
This is not to speculate on the cause of the accident or give any reflection on the crew’s performance, but accidents as sad as this often enable improvements in safety through open discussion.

The airfield appears to be uncontrolled, ATC from Kansas center, but using local QNH?
MSA is 3100 ft but there is no chart shading indicating high ground.
The DME is remote from the airfield.
Two DMEs are used in the straight-in procedure; an opportunity for error, forgetting to change over from MCM thus descending at the incorrect range. Anyone done that before?
How far is MCM from IRK?
An open descent, only one check height at 2500 ft does not facilitate a stable constant angle approach.
No table of range against altitude.
Non std approach angle 3.41 deg, not coincident with VGSI. (why, procedure design?)
Minima 1320 ¾ nm; ie MDA 1320 (400 ¾) or (356 ft above threshold alt). At MDA the aircraft is just over 1 nm from the runway, or 1 nm from the beginning of the approach lights. Thus in limiting visibility the crew would not see the lights or the runway when at MDA.
Where is the MAP, at IRK 1.1 DME, i.e. at the runway threshold? Why not at 1 nm from the threshold for S-36 approaches?

Please bear with this one observation. The IAF/descent point is at IRK 10.2, which appears to be MCM 16.9. Thus if in error, the descent was commenced at MCM 10.2 (using the wrong DME) the aircraft would be approx 2100 ft below the procedure approach path. The aircraft would be at MDA just before the FAF, 4-5 nm from the field.

lead zeppelin
26th Oct 2004, 01:35

Excellent post - don't you think that there are too many approaches even worse than this that become so convoluted that even two crew need to be retuning/switching freq/changing course bugs etc. that they create a great opportunity for error?

Methinks an overhaul of these approaches should be conducted soon.......

Ignition Override
26th Oct 2004, 04:41
Are these NOS charts still the primary or only available type of charts for US military and Coast Guard aircraft? Years ago, a USAF C-130 crashed during departure from Jackson Hole, WY. I saw the small paragraph for the SID, which was filled with tiny print and some numbers. Why can't the NOS people depict the departure routes with some black lines and arrows so there is a graphic display?

I wonder if Jeppesen charts would have been easier to use. Isn't there a Jepp LOC/DME 36 chart for Kirksville and is it printed in a more logical format?

26th Oct 2004, 07:03
Apparently the transition from overhead the locator would require much less flightdeck workload...

Stu Bigzorst
26th Oct 2004, 07:04
I have to agree, what a shocking chart. The obvious mistake to make is leaving IRK on your DME, not IIRK, but this would make you 600' (or so) high. Leaving MCM on when being vectored from the south and descending at 10.2 MCM is, as has been pointed out, miles worse.

I only did 600 hours in the JS32, but I saw this mistake (wrong DME selected on a 2 DME NPA) at least twice. But on our charts for this UK regional airport, we had a height table. And the two DME's had very different names. And we'd always put a NPA into the GPS, as a "backup".

After a very long 6 sector day, the kind of mistakes that I make are the "failing to remember to push one button on the nav equipment" type.

I really hope that if the "cause" of this accident is found to be the incorrect selection of navaids, then the outcry is not "pilot error", but "fatigue" or "15 hour days" or "6 sectors".

I am the master of making mistakes. I am at my most masterful after 6 sectors of practice.

What a tragedy.

26th Oct 2004, 07:53
Do the regional airlines in the states use NOS charts or do they pay for Jeps?

I am sure the presentation on a jep will be better but copyright issues my prevent putting them on line.

26th Oct 2004, 08:06
Poor chart + bad weather + fatigue (human factors) = accident
Pure James Reason, and additionally the authorities are the mice.

If we can deduce high risk (threats to a safe operation) by chart analysis then why can’t the authority put defences in place? It would be appalling to blame a crew or operator for falling into a trap set by the safety regulator.

The NTSB recommended that all charts include a range/altitude table, but the FAA rejected the proposal and is not taking any action. (A-00-015, 27 Jan 2000, from Air Safety Week 11 Oct 04). The FAA believes that an additional chart would add clutter to the chart !!!! More like cluttered thinking.

Stu Bigzorst I read the chart as requiring DME IRK (114.6) to be used for the distances during the descent. Have I misread this (long time since I flew in the US), or have I misunderstood your post that indicates the use of I-IRK (111.5) for distance ?

Stu Bigzorst
26th Oct 2004, 08:31

QED! In so much as we are getting confused and we are not even flying...

I read the chart (and it is a while too since I flew in the US) as use the IRK initially for the arc and then the IIRK for distance when on the LOC. For a straight in, then yes it's straight to the IIRK. But if you were planning your descent from afar, I guess you may not be able to get the IIRK, so the IRK would give you a good TOD. Please feel free to correct me - I am regularly wrong! Much more likely to be the MCM/IIRK error though.

Good, safe, naming convention, don't you think?

Also, we must remember that 100 other things could cause this accident.

Astra driver
27th Oct 2004, 21:19
To answer boxmover's question, the vast majority of civilian pilots in the US use Jepps.
I checked out the Kirksville plate yesterday and found it far easier to read than the NOS plate shown here.
One possibility is that considering that the pilot reported the field in sight shortly before impact and the MDA is 356 ft and can be reached quite easily 2 to 3 miles out from the threshold using a non precision descent rate, is that the pilot had visual and then commenced a visual descent at 300 ft/nm in "Black hole" conditions which would have impacted the ground 1 or 2 miles short of the threshold.

25th Jan 2006, 13:04
"Pilot errors caused the deadly crash of a commuter airliner in northeast Missouri in 2004, and the crew's nonstop joking and expletive-laden banter in the cockpit didn't help, federal investigators said Tuesday. The two-man crew and 11 of 13 passengers were killed when Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 crashed on Oct. 19, 2004. It was the country's deadliest civilian air crash that year."


25th Jan 2006, 15:35
Sounds like someone at the commuter airline didn't learn a lesson from history.

Even the FAA's tombstone policy will generate some recognition about history on occaision.

26th Jan 2006, 04:57
The article was very interesting. Here is the summary of the final NTSB report. Full version should be out soon.


One of the reccomendations to the FAA is a bit disconcerting though:

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to incorporate fatigue-related information similar to that being developed by the Department of Transportation Operator Fatigue Management Program into their initial and recurrent pilot training programs; such training should address the detrimental effects of fatigue and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects. (A-06-XX)

I have not yet read the DoT fatigue information mentioned above, so I cannot yet comment on it. But to suggest that providing training to pilots will somehow abate the effects of this kind of fatigue seems ludicrous. Makes more sense to suggest stimulants in place of rest! What NTSB should suggest is sensible duty rules that consider the findings of objective scientific research. New rules have been discussed with industry groups and the FAA in commitee for at least two years now. Individuals in the FAA are quietly saying not to expect the new rules to be settled upon and adopted anytime soon. There's a suprise! Maybe they want to get these new rules just right. $$ Meanwhile, at least the coffee is free. Think I'll have another cup.