Up and Forward for Take Off

[Milt]

All cockpit/flight deck switches and controls, wherever possible, to be up or forward for take off.

In the 50s/60s there was a concerted move to standardise on the alignment of aircraft switches and controls. Prior to this the alignments were at the whims of a multitude of individuals and we aircrew often ended up with a dog's breakfast.

Presumably this requirement was eventually written into design specification requirements on a world wide basis.

Flight test establishments proceeded to insist on conformity and we began to find great benefits arising, substantially speeding up flight deck scanning prior to undertaking the first critical phase of a flight. Soon the item aligned the wrong way became a significant vital attention getter.

Now it seems appropriate to review the present flight decks/cockpits to determine the extent of conformity and to highlight non conformity which may be of continuing concern to many of you, the professional pilots.

Oddly this all started way back when a British electrician was asked to install the first electrical switch in an aircraft for the control of a magneto. The switch was installed with the toggle in the British sence - down for ON.

Result was UP for the magneto to be ON. This alignment translated to succeeding switches which then needed to be UP for ON to be consistent with the magneto switches. Strange beginnings !

So how are we doing with flight deck standardisation?

[Tarnished]

If I can read "flight deck" to include "cockpit" and bring in two of the latest fighters into the discussion then I think we are doing pretty well.

When I last looked at the Typhoon checklist it had a very few specific switches to be checked (trigger, master arm, landing gear, etc) but the catch all was "all other switches = fwd, auto, neutral or guarded" which covered everything apart from one rouge switch (nav lights) which we had a bit of disagreement over. The Autocue would (should) catch the rest.

F-35 has even fewer "real" switches in the cockpit but thereby brings with it a new potential snag. To a certain degree the same issue exists in Typhoon that being initialisation settings for the myriad of computers that control the sub-systems.

In the fighter world - which has traditionally led the technological way, the swing towards a switchless cockpit is on its way. Touch screens and softkeys with Phase of Flight automatic defaults and warning is the way of the future.

The pilot should not have to play a game of "spot the odd one out" to avert a disaster. Computers are far more vigilant than even the best of pilots. We should be allowing them to look after the basics while the pilot does the job of fighting the fight or getting from A-B. An intellegent monitoring and warning system should allow the fighter pilot to worry about the ROE and the Airline Captain to worry about the pregnant mum in 12B.

T

[Shawn Coyle]

Doing well everywhere except for Russia.
The Russian philosophy is up is on, except that in the overhead, where their logic is back is on - based on a sweep of the hand from the vertical panel in the front continuing back would have on being aft.
Caused some interesting changes to be made - Transport Canada insisted that the overhead switches on the KA-32 be changed to be forward is on. When a Russian company bought a Challenger, the Russians insisted the overhead switches be changed so back is on.
But for the most part these switches are easy to re-orient.
Also part of the philosophy should be - all the switches are up, all the lights are off, let's go.

[ICT_SLB]

Shawn,
Don't think the Russians are (were?) alone on this. If memory serves (and it's along time since I worked on one) but the same was true for BAC 1-11s. The CAA Overhead Panel was Back = ON but the FAA Overhead was reversed - Forward = ON.

When the JAA certified the CRJ-200 (with a CAA Project Pilot no less), they did not insist on switch reversal on the Overhead so the standardisation with Transport Canada/FAA/JAA should be Forward = ON. Have to agree with your "dark cockpit" philosophy and add "No superfluous EICAS (ECAM) messages".

[411A]

Sadly, the proliferation of various switches, and their on/off positions varied between airlines, and within some airlines, between aircraft types.
Take the B707 and the Lockheed TriStar for example.

Trans World Airlines insisted that both of these types share common on/off switch positions, when they accepted new aircraft for delivery....ie: up (aft) = ON, down (forward) = OFF.

This was contrary to the 'standard' Boeing/Lockheed fit.
Not a problem, as all TWA aircraft were like this.

THEN, when these aircraft were sold, they joined other airlines fleets, where the switch positions were the 'standard' Boeing/Lockheed variety.

So, depending on which 707 or L1011 you were to operate on that particular day, the switch positions varied from the previous days ops.

This was not particularly a problem for experienced Captains/First Officers, but was a big problem for the brand new co-pilots under line training.

Clearly not a good situation, but they carried on regardless, sometimes in total confusion.