Preliminary report VH TNP

[muddergoose]

www.atsb.gov.au

[I Fly]

Does any of you ATCers know whether the Radar track of 250 degrees is True or Magnetic? 250M would put them way NORTH of BLA.

[karrank]

My handy-dandy pocket thingy says YJBY-YBLA 235M & 248T, so the figure quoted is a bit of a mystery. Unusual for anybody to put such slap-dash stuff in a report, however preliminary. If this is what was replayed off the 'radar tapes' it would be worth noting the enroute consoles are all oriented to true north rather than magnetic.

[topdrop]

Rhumb Line is 250 True from JBY to YBLA.

[compressor stall]

From abeam Ulladulla (not a JBY) it was cleared to BLAED.....

[I Fly]

Thank you I thought that might have been the case. It just had me wondering because they do give us magnetic headings to steer. Do they have to convert T to M in their heads?

[muddergoose]

Does anyone know of a parallel track can be set up on an IFR approach?

[NAMPS]

Does anyone know of a parallel track can be set up on an IFR approach?

Not the one TNP was conducting.

[Bevan666]

Does anyone know of a parallel track can be set up on an IFR approach?

I do not know what equipment was fitted to the aircraft in question, but all IFR (TSO C129) GPS's I am familliar with (Garmin and King) do not have the capability to fly offset tracks, and I would seriously doubt whether any with that capability would allow that when flying an approach.

When flying a random track like that being flown there would be no need to offset a track anyway.

The only GPS's I know of which have the offset track feature are handleld VFR gps units, such as my garmin 196.

Bevan..

[barleyhi]

Most of the newer GPS units do not allow an offset to be selected.

In this instance ASTB has stated that the aircraft was 3.83 degrees offtrack all the way from Jervis Bay.

Offset tracking on older GPS units only allows parallel tracking ie selecting a distance of track eg 2nm and this is held constant until the offset is cancelled.

If the waypoint BLAEG was inadvertantly selected rather than BLAED this would put the aircraft about 2 degrees left off track, but not 3.83.

Tracks/ Distances:
YJBY- YBLA 235M 244nm
YJBY- BLAED 235M 230nm
YJBY- BLAEE 234M 229nm
YJBY- BLAEG 233M 234nm

3.83 degrees off track over 230nm by 1:60 would be 14.69nm south of track. Would be interested to know exactly where it crashed. I believe it was last seen on radar 10nm east of BLAEE at 5000'.

This would put it right on the edge of the 25MSA limit which is 5000'.


Whilst safe it would be unusual for an experienced pilot to be at this level so early as the approach starts at 5000'.

Appreciate any comments

BH

[waav8r]

Also, an interesting (apparent) contradiction in the preliminary ATSB report in that in the second paragraph states that "..From a position abeam Ulladulla, the flight was cleared direct to the global positioning system (GPS) initial approach point BLEAD (ED)...", and in the last paragraph it states that :"...radar data indicated that the aircraft had tracked 250 degrees from Jervis Bay to a point where it disappeared from radar."

Flying from Bankstown to Jervis Bay - a position "abeam Ulladulla" is actually 9 Nautical Miles PAST Jervis Bay, so - are we to believe that the pilot made a turn towards BLEAD about 3 minutes PRIOR to receiving a clearance to make such a turn??

It is also puzzling why a controller would issue a clearance from Ulladulla (or Jervis Bay) to BLAED, as this routing would necessitate two BIG doglegs during the approach - first a left turn of some 45 degrees from 238 degrees (magnetic) to 193 degrees to get to the IF (BLAEI), followed by another 70 degree turn to the right to intercept the inbound track of 263 degrees magnetic, when in fact a routing from Jervis Bay to waypoint BLAEE (which also has the only holding pattern depicted for the approach) would only involve a very minor course correction of some 25 degrees to the right after the Initial Approach Fix (BLAEE) to get established on the inbound track of 263 degrees magnetic.

I have never seen ATSB (or any other similar agency for that matter) release explicit details of this nature at such an early point in the investigation and would be very interested in the motivation for them doing so on this occasion.

[Bevan666]

It is also puzzling why a controller would issue a
clearance from Ulladulla (or Jervis Bay) to BLAED

This was probably done on request from the PIC, and looking at my charts it was the waypoint closest to the direct track from jervis bay to benalla.

Bevan..

[waav8r]

Bevan - yes, you are probably right, seeing that ED is closer to the direct track. I understand that the regular flight from Bankstown to Benella tracked out from Bankstown through Katoomba-way, so ED was probably the IAF most frequently used for the approach. Did not attempt to speculate, - was just thinking loud as I was looking through the flight and the waypoints indicated in the ATSB report.

[muddergoose]

WA AV8R,

As you think aloud some more, why do you find it strange the ATSB released information so early?:confused:

[compressor stall]

Perhaps they have a possible cause, and now making the evidence fit, and drip feeding it to the masses, both educated (pilots) and non educated (media).

Most detective work goes the other way, but ah well.

Sounds like the methodology employed about 4 years ago :yuk:

[waav8r]

Muddergoose,
I do not wish to speculate, but with all due respect to the many competent professionals at ATSB, expediency is probably not the one characteristic that springs to mind when describing the organisations main attributes.

Hence, my surprise at the release of these early findings was caused by the timing as well as the fact that they are at the same time very explicit (3.83 degrees off an alleged cleared track) and apparently contracticory (were they at Jervis Bay or Ulladulla when clearance to track direct to BLAED was issued?) The conjecture that i read into the preliminary ATSB findings published, is that the pilot had set off tracking towards somewhere else than where ATC had given him clearance to go, and I just would like to see the ATSB being specific about where he was when the implied navigation error originated.

[Deaf]

Speculating a bit, taking Bindooks 14.7 nm south.

If we look at:

Spherical geometry
Data storage
Software functions

The usual method of handling angles as in lat is from the N pole in radians and a convenient way of storing it would be 3 bytes in microradians

For BLAED at ~ S36:29 this would be 126.48 deg or &H21AF3E uradian, the A would be 1010 in binary. Flip one bit to 1011 to get B and we have &H21BF3E which translates to ~ S36:43.

Without knowing exactly how the GPS storage and calculation all works internally it is difficult to say but this change could occur either in the card or in intermeadiate (RAM, EEPROM or Flash) storage for the leg. As to what could flip the bit the current size/charge of bit storage these days means cosmic rays or radioactive decay on an atom within the chip/packaging can do it.

An interesting exercise for ASTB.

[Bevan666]

For King GPS's the internal calculations inside the actual GPS reciever use 4 byte (32 bit) floating point numbers to represent lat and long, and all velocity values. Dont ask my why I know.

I am not sure of the data storage in the flash in the front end of these units, but surely they have some form of checksumming on the aviation data to protect against these sort of errors.

Bevan..

[Sunfish]

I was told something about one angle the direction of the investigation this evening by a reliable source.

It has nothing to do with the pilot, its a technical matter and it is yet to be proven, but I hesitate about posting anything about it at present. Unless I can confirm it is not going to drive everyone into a paroxysm of rage.

[compressor stall]

Sunfish,

I too have heard this rumour. What is disturbing (as people have been saying above) is that the type of data released to date is implying that this is the direction being taken.

CS

[muddergoose]

If you guys hear a rumour but won't post or prv msg why say anything at all?:*

[AviationSafety]

Any more news on this at this stage. Maybe the ATC Controllers care to respond too.

[AviationSafety]

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,10777200%255E23349,00.html
No alert as plane flew off course
Steve Creedy, Aviation writer
September 16, 2004
AIR traffic controllers received two alarm signals indicating a plane that crashed killing six people earlier this year was off course, but did not tell the pilot, The Australian has learned.

The twin-engine Piper Cheyenne Aircraft spent a substantial part of its journey from Sydney off course and arrived near Benalla, 200km northeast of Melbourne, 34km southeast of the airfield at which it was attempting to land in stormy weather,

Sydney chip-board company executive Robert Henderson, his daughter Jacqueline, RAAF helicopter pilot Alan Stark, Belinda Andrews, Qantas pilot Geoff Brockie, and the Cheyenne's pilot, Kerry Endicott, died when the plane hit a mountain. The role played by air traffic control is understood to be one of several issues of "possible safety significance" being probed by an Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation.

Airservices Australia is also conducting an internal investigation that includes the monitoring procedures used by the air traffic controllers.

An Airservices spokesman would not comment on the issue other than to say the accident was still being investigated. But sources confirmed air traffic controllers received warnings from a route monitor, an in-built alarm that goes off when an aircraft is not following the correct flight path.









It is understood controllers acknowledged the route-monitor alarms according to procedures, but did not believe it necessary to contact the aircraft.

Sources suggested the deviation may have been within the air traffic control system's tolerance or that the controllers believed it was happening because the aircraft was headed for a southerly global positioning system approach point rather than a northern point, for which it was originally cleared. Mr Endicott was a highly experienced pilot but that day followed a different route from Sydney's Bankstown Airport to the one he normally took.

Instead of flying directly to Benalla, he followed the coast to Jervis Bay, south of Sydney, and then asked air traffic controllers for a track to Benalla using the GPS for navigation. According to a preliminary ATSB report, the aircraft was consistently 3.83 degrees left of the direct track from Jervis Bay. The route did not pass over ground-based navigation aids and Mr Endicott relied on the GPS for his approach to Benalla.

Investigators found the pilot told air traffic control at 10.45am he was starting a GPS approach and the alarm was raised 18 minutes later when he failed to report he had landed. The aircraft hit trees on a hillside with its wings level and landing gear and flaps extended, suggesting the pilot believed he was landing at Benalla.

The ATSB expects to issue an interim factual report by February and the accident will also be subject to a coronial inquest.

[No Further Requirements]

Aviation Safety:

If there is an investigation still going on this issue, do you really think it would be wise for any of the ATCs involved to comment?

NFR.

[muddergoose]

If the aircraft was being navigated by GPS, as the primary means of navigation, they should have known they were off course.

Why did the GPS lead them astray? This is a line that has received no mention.

[swh]

muddergoose,

Bit of a leap to say the GPS took them off course....mode awareness has caught many people out, nav source selection (GPS/NAV/OBS), autopilot mode etc (HDG/NAV), far too many factors to speculate on...another sad loss.

I await to see with interest what the professional investigations come up with.

:sad:

[poison_dwarf]

Folks,

If we had had the US NAS system in place, this accident would not have happened.

If it wasn’t for all the resistance to the US system, it would have been it in place.

It would have been called Airspace 2000, or perhaps (the original) LLAMP, (not the final LLAMP abortion that was mercifully interred).

Even if we had had flight following in place, which is part of the US NAS, and intended for the Australian NAS, and can be done now, this accident would have been extremely, and I mean extremely, unlikely.

TAATS has all the capabilities needed to provide these services, right now.

Many controllers are doing the right thing, and using their noggins, in fact maybe sticking their professional necks out, and providing services that are beyond the “average”, or those services required to be provided.

This to aircraft visible to controllers, that would obviously benefit from proffered advice and/or assistance, regardless of the class of airspace.

We all thank those controllers who go the extra mile, but that is all dependent on rather fluffy “workload permitting” rules interpretations, a moveable feast.

The NAS would have/ will provide E airspace protection right down to the approach ( 1200/700 AGL) at places like Benalla, and in the Center, should provide automatic terrain alarms, off cleared track alarms (as seems to have been activated, but not acted upon, in this dreadful accident) as well as human monitoring.

This accident is a wakeup call, it’s a real shame that it seems to take an aviation disaster to get progress, but look at history, that’s the Australian way.

The disaster has happened, let’s get on with it.

The Dwarf

[muddergoose]

swh,

I will be amazed if the investigators come up with anything given the amount of destruction and post impact fire.

[poison_dwarf]

muddergoose,

The answer to what happened, and more to the point, what didn't happen, lies in the TAATS/radar records of the last 30 minutes of flight.

The Dwarf

[NAMPS]

Little plane lost - six deaths, no reason
By Robert Wainwright
September 17, 2004

Two Melbourne air traffic controllers have been stood down after preliminary investigations into the death of six people aboard a plane which crashed on a flight from Bankstown to the Victorian town of Benalla two months ago.

The fallout from the tragedy is set to reignite a verbal war over aviation safety as the Federal Government prepares to overhaul the way air space is managed.

Inquiries by the Herald have revealed that Airservices Australia board members discussed the crash a month ago, including detail that the pilot, Kerry Endicott, was not warned on three occasions that he had drifted dangerously off course on the Ulladulla-Benalla leg of the journey.

By the time the plane reached the crash site an hour later, it was 12 kilometres south of the check- point Mr Endicott thought he was heading towards.

He had been flying in cloud cover and rain that made it impossible to realise his error. When he banked left to prepare to land, the Piper Cheyennecrashed into mountainous countryside, killing all on board instantly.

The families of the victims spoke yesterday for the first time since the July 28 tragedy. They are concerned about time it will take authorities to finish their investigations and potential safety problems for others in the meantime.

David Henderson is mourning his brother, businessman Robert Henderson, and niece, Jacqui Stark. They died along with Jacqui's husband, Alan, his friend Geoff Brockie, Belinda Andrews and Mr Endicott.

Mr Henderson said the preliminary report from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau made it clear the plane crashed because it was off course and that Mr Endicott, an experienced pilot, punched the wrong co-ordinates into GPS equipment.

However, they do not know why the plane was allowed to veer almost four degrees from its designated flight path, through controlled air space for hundreds of kilometres between Ulladulla and the Albury border before it disappeared from radar.

They cannot understand why authorities have not told the flying community about the dangers, particular as it will take at least another year before the bureau makes its final report.

Many within the aviation community believe the reason for the silence is concern that the tragedy will be blamed on the controversial air space category known as G-airspace, where authorities say it is too expensive to control air travel.

"The public needs some action now, not in 12 months' time when they finish their report," Mr Henderson said yesterday.

"I'm not after blaming someone, but I am concerned that air traffic procedures do not appear to be as robust as we are told. Why else would a highly qualified, professional pilot flying a well-maintained and equipped plane have this type of accident.

"I have asked both the ATSB and Civil Aviation Safety Authority to put out some statement, some warning, but it all seems too hard.

"If there is another accident in the meantime, then I believe they should be held accountable."

Barry and Lex Stark, parents of Alan, who was a Black Hawk helicopter pilot, have been even more frustrated since the accident; ignored by aviation authorities who have not even telephoned their Queensland home to inform them of the impending report.

"I did not appreciate being left out of the loop, particularly when there are so many unanswered questions about why they were so far off track. It seems ridiculous that authorities are sitting there with millions of dollars of equipment, simply noting that an aircraft in bad weather is off track and doing nothing about it.

"People should be made aware of the problems."

Like the other family members, Geoff Brockie's aunt, Joy Fletcher, has visited the crash site and is shocked the pilot could have been so far off course. Mr Brockie had joined what was a joy flight for the afternoon and was due to pilot an international Qantas flight out of Melbourne the same night.

"We haven't been told anything beyond what has been said publicly, and that is not enough to answer our questions. It seems amazing that they could fly so far, through several control zones without a warning. It makes you wonder about other flights."

Airservices Australia remained silent yesterday. It is understood that initial internal inquiries told the board of three occasions before the plane flew into uncontrolled air space that the pilot could have been warned about his flight path.

Mr Henderson has met the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and asked for changes to air space management. But a spokesman for the authority said yesterday its hands were tied until the bureau finished its report.

The Minister for Transport, John Anderson, has announced that Airservices Australia will be stripped of its air space regulatory functions if the Government is re-elected. The power would be transferred to a separate body - the Airspace Directorate.

Source: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/16/1095320900824.html (http://)

[muddergoose]

I would have thought the GPS will give accurate information based on input co ordinates as its data source regardless of what method the a/c was being controlled by. You might like to elaborate smh :E

[Biggles_in_Oz]

muddergoose.

A lot depends on what type of GPS was been used.

If it had a moving-map display, then yes, it is easy to see when one is off track.

If it wasn't a certified-for-IFR-use unit with a current database, then it's upto the user to insert the required waypoints, which raises the problem of accuracy.

GPS can only give an estimated position (due to timing errors, ionospheric propagation delays, multipath reflections, constellation geometry, spoofing, ...), but most of the time it's acceptable for aviation.
The data-processor in the GPS has to massage and filter that stream of position fixes into usefull information such as ground-speed, track, and you are here on this GPS approach.

[Sunfish]

I don't know how accurate GPS is in aircraft, but my old eight channel GPS and laptop moving chart software in my yacht give me an error of about twenty feet maximum - of course my maximum speed is about eight knots, not 180 kts!

[Binoculars]

It would appear ATSB can cancel their investigation. Poison Dwarf not only knows the reason for this tragedy but bravely states that it wouldn't have happened if only the professionals in the industry had listened to the private pilots lobby group.

Your posts are usually so pathetic as to be unworthy of a response, Dwarf, but perhaps you would like to enlighten everybody as to how you have used your thorough investigation to suit your political ends. :yuk:

[poison_dwarf]

Binoculars
When the truth stares at you in the face you can turn away but it will still be there when you turn back, wake up and stop living a dream. It does not take five seconds to reveal that this accident could have been prevented sham on you. I have no political ends just see **** from shineola do you get it? When is Aus going to wake we have the most bastardised airspace system in the world and we still think Aus is unique interesting to note we are the only country in the world arguing about airspace and have one of the worst records the rest of them are just getting on with it. You should start looking at the big picture.

PD

[Binoculars]

Not one single fact there, dwarf. Just your opinions.

[compressor stall]

Just to clarify the GPS bits...

For a GPS NPA you cannot enter your own waypoints. They are in the database card from Jeppesen etc. Reference AIP GEN something.

And to quote the ATSB report...The operation of the approved GPS carried for this flight, using the installed software, does not require manual input of waypoint position coordinates.



Yep...it was only a matter of time until this was politicised.
:yuk:

[muddergoose]

Sounds to me like poison dwarf and binoculars have an axe to grind!

Focus your energy and create a successful outcome to anomolies within the system. If there is an issue with IFR GPS then lets make it public and resolve the issue. Ultimate outcome is to save lives. Unfortunately, too late for the six involved. If you have family, think about it!!!!!:mad:

My experince with IFR GPS is with Trimble TNL2000 and recently an Apollo GX-60. It offers parallel tracking and is approved for IFR, allbeit older than current models.

I read a report on PPRUNE the Pilot had 20,000 hours 1,500 on type and someone posted "Endicott checked him out in \'76 on particular type.

The Leg from Ulladulla to BLAED was approximately 230 nm according to a post. What was the pilot doing, having a snooze?

Compressor stall says you can\'t alter waypoints for IFR approach.

Ultimately. regardless of ATC, something has lead them astray. I\'m thinking the GPS.

If you can\'t place your faith in a GPS NPA approach, why use it at all?

We do believe GPS is the way but there are RF (Radio Frequency) issues or charge issues that could alter Binary storage, therefor these have to be addressed!

[Sunfish]

With respect, the only conclusion that can be drawn at this stage is that the pilot was not where he thought he was.

We don't know why. I'm sure the folk at ATSB will get to the bottom of it one way or another, probably re enacting the flight if necessary.

I have one question at the moment - the aircraft was apparently a constant 3.83 degrees off track. Is there another navaid or waypoint that the machinery could have been heading to instead of Benalla, such as Strathbogie?

[Sonny Hammond]

Muddergoose,

After you ream others for their posts you then go on to criticise the pilot. Nice one.

And BTW 230nm in a high performance turbo prop is not far, a time interval of probably under an hour. Nothing for a professional pilot, and given the wheels and flaps were down I doubt he was asleep.

He did have lots of experience and had an experienced pilot next to him in the form of a QANTAS pilot with a military background. So I reckon, just a hunch, that there were eye's on what was happening and the fact it ended like this should be a reminder to all to be vigilant..

All you people here having a vent etc, shut your traps and go back to studying BAK.
We'll see what BASI have to say about this one.

[AviationSafety]

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/17/1095320936474.html?oneclick=true

Controllers stood down over deadly plane crash

September 17, 2004 - 10:20AM


The remains of the aircraft at Benalla after the accident. Photo Michael Clayton-Jones


Two air traffic controllers have been stood down following a light plane crash in uncontrolled airspace which killed six people, the federal government said today.

The twin-engine Piper Cheyenne aircraft was off course when it crashed into a mountain while experienced pilot Kerry Endicott was approaching Benalla airfield in north-east Victoria on July 28.

Mr Endicott, Sydney chip-board executive Robert Henderson, his daughter Jacqueline, her husband RAAF helicopter pilot Alan Stark, Belinda Andrews and Qantas pilot Geoff Brockie all died in the crash.

Federal Transport Minister John Anderson said the crash was being investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

Mr Anderson said there was nothing untoward about the two air traffic controllers being stood down.

"It's not unusual for air traffic controllers to be stood aside during an investigation of this sort," he told Sydney radio 2UE.

"But no-one should draw any conclusions or jump to any judgments at this stage."

Mr Anderson said he understood the angst of the family and friends of those who died in the crash.

"I know first hand, not from personal experience, but from meeting with the family of the people who've died in the aircraft accident, just how traumatic it is waiting to get a handle on what has happened and why and where justice is needed ...," he said.
AAP

[I Fly]

This tragic accident produced 6 victims already; please don't 'create' any more victims. I am certain NAS 2b or c has nothing to do with this accident.
As compressor stall pointed out you can't manually load the GPSNPA waypoints and in fact their location is not published. One thing bothers me with these 3.83 degrees off track. The GPS does not work in degrees; it works in distance off track. In other words parallelling track. If indeed they were 3.83 degrees off, that suggests to me that they were navigating by conventional navaids. I am only speculating and I hope it's not so. Perhaps if the HSI was selected to a VOR instead of the GPS????
When I first had my Garmin 155 it had a feature that when you selected an ILS on Nav 1 the HSI would automatically select the Nav mode. After a while an AD came out and this automatic selection had to be disabled. I got caught flying 1 ILS thinking the HSI displayed ILS information when in fact I had forgotten to switch it from GPS to ILS. The same thing could happen in reverse. There is also a problem with their distances. They crashed south of the southern initial approach fix. The minimum altitude there is 5000'. They crashed at 1500'. They could have had some problem that distracted them and resulted in being 3500' too low. Or they could have thought they were much closer to Benalla than they really were.
I hope the ATSB finds the real causes so that all of us can learn.

[muddergoose]

Sonny Hammond,

I didn't intend to bag the pilot when I said was he having a snooze. It was a flippant response to a previous poster.

My point was he was very experienced and would have been receptive to his environment.

At no stage do i mean to bag anyone, if it has come across that way.

:ok:

[muddergoose]

[URL=http://www.atsb.gov.au/atsb/media/mrel072.cfm[/URL]

Some Pics as well.

[tobzalp]

remember the tolerances that ATC applies for GPS and other navaids. Things go beep all the time solely due to aircraft equipment error. The route monitoring systems in TAAATS are different to these figures. I say blame dick, TAAATS was his idea.

[muddergoose]

Can anyone tell me the maximum height above ground a R/ALT will read?

At a 5° approach TPN would have been approx 1489' above the impact site at a point 2.8 nm away. The first hill must have been 3 to 4° inclined from the impact point, or 892' / 1190' at the 2.8 nm mark. Would the R/ALT have worked this high above that first hill?

[muddergoose]

Can anyone answer my question on the Radar Altimeter above?:8

[Uncommon Sense]

MudderGoose: From my dim distant dark memories of the ATPL days it is around 2500 AGL for the R/ALT.

Those current on type may be better informed.

[Woomera]

Typically 2,500 ft for GA equipment I belive there are models that will go to 5,000 but seem to be mostly military.

The GPWS is/was an extension of the original concept.

You would have to know the particular model installed to get the "correct" answer. But I would bet on 2,500 as the original spec, whether it was still operating to it I cannot tell.

They also only operate vertically or at least normal to the aircraft plane of flight. They would not normally "see" steep terrain until perhaps it was too late.

Bit like the depth sounder on your boat telling you that you have just hit a reef abouyt the same time as the crunch sound, when a forwarding looking sonar would have given you prior warning.

[muddergoose]

Thanks guys!

I wonder whether there is an audible warning with R/ALT or you just rely on your observation?

I don't know if you saw the photos posted on the www.atsb.gov.au (http://) but you would think some indication would have been given?

I couldn't help but feel how close they must have come to hitting that first hill.

:confused:

[Woomera]

The Rad Alt on GA aircraft tends not to be in the "normal scan" and down the bottom of the pilots side panel, sometimes on the other side, which is in any event usually pretty crowded due to its small relative size.
If there is an audible alert it tends to be an integral part of the instrument and piezo type not especially audible amongst all of the normal snap crackles and pop going on, especially if you are not "looking or listening" for it.

I.E. if you are not looking for, expecting nor anticipating it's activation in that part of the approach sequence there is a high probability you will not "hear/see" its activation or coming off the stops.
Whether it was connected to the Annunciator Panel or Master Caution I do not know, but it is probably unlikely and in any event in steep country the time beteeen its activation and impact is likely to be very short.

A study of the contours along the final track plotted against the aircrafts ground speed may give some indications of the rate of change of altitude. Then it is possible to calculate what the rate of change or climb rate of the terrain was in relation to the available climb rate of the aircraft in that configuration.

The question that must be asked is was the Rad Alt operational or was the pilot relying solely on the GPS for position and relative height and did the GPS have a TAWS or terrain warning function.

Wangarrata is only 20 or so NM away ??, with an NDB?? was this being monitored as a routine cross check against what other aids viz VOR/DME were available to do likewise. ?

The manufactured hysteria surrounding the routine "stand down" of the ATC guys and accusation that it was their fault, does not IMHO stand up to rational scrutiny.
The pilot was not under their direct control, nor was he being vectored, he was not conducting a precision approach, he was, as I understand it and as we are all, responsible for his own navigation under these circumstances.

[muddergoose]

As stated in the ATSB interim report:

Given the heightened interest, the ATSB has released an interim report on progress with its investigation into the tragic Benalla fatal accident

If everyone has a say regardless of credibility of statements, maybe, we will be informed more quickly by the relevant authorities.:sad:

[muddergoose]

go here (http://au.pg.photos.yahoo.com/ph/mcocktail/album?.dir=f31e)

[Jamair]

I've got a few Cheyenne hours and (on those that I flew) the Rad Alt is max 2500'. It was set at each stage of a stepped approach to the rounded up MDH AGL for that step and worked in concert with the altitude alerter and GPS Alt Alert. They also have both aural and visual warning (light and dinger) as well as the actual readout on the instrument and a digital readout on a display at the bottom of the VG. I found it hard to miss those cues, but at typical Cheyenne approach speeds those cues change pretty bludy fast when the're reading directly below you instead of forward of your path.:uhoh:

[Jenna Talia]

The manufactured hysteria surrounding the routine "stand down" of the ATC guys and accusation that it was their fault, does not IMHO stand up to rational scrutiny. The pilot was not under their direct control, nor was he being vectored, he was not conducting a precision approach, he was, as I understand it and as we are all, responsible for his own navigation under these circumstances.

That was very well said and I agree wholeheartedly.

[ATCguy]

Has anyone done any study in to Human Factors and reason models here? Basically only one thing is for sure, accidents are a culmination of many little events that catastrophically lead to one end.

As pilots, we would have all experienced a situation where you have been able to convince yourself that a situation you have been in makes sence, when all the evidence is to the contrary.


It hurts me to read, people squarely blaming ATC ie DICK SMITH. We are ultimately responsible for our own actions, whatever role we may or may not have played in this tragic incident. Whether the wrong coordinates were entered into the GPS, alarms on the ATC console were misinterrpereted or whatever, any system, NAS or other, is fallable when human factors are taken into consideration.

Condolences to the people affected by this accident. ATC's included.:ugh:

[muddergoose]

I note, with interest, in the latest Flight Saftey Australia, dated Sep - Oct 2004, page 10, ACA acts to prohibit GNSS jammers.

The ACA has decided to institute the ban because of widespread use of the GPS and its vulnerability to interference.

While it is not my intention to infer someone local was conducting one's self in an untoward manner, it does prove the device is succeptible to error. I don't believe interference would discriminate between WAAS, DGPS or GNSS or other means when it comes to satellite data.



Any thoughts People?

[Deaf]

Unlikely,

Jamming/interference would be local, not a rock solid deviation for 100+ nm

[Biggles_in_Oz]

Jamming/interference would be local, not a rock solid deviation for 100+ nm
True, except for when the US-DOD fiddle with it. (after all, it is their system) :hmm:

Localised GPS jamming is very possible with low-power transmitters. (do a Google search)

Jammers can effectively disable normal GPS operation over quite a wide radius.
(>200km depending on power).

To create false position information would require creating fake signals
for at least 4 GPS satellites to fool the receiver, which, whilst technically
feasible, is not likely to be done unless someone is *very* evil.

GPS will either work, (if there are enough satellites in view),
or not (if there are not enough satellites, or if the US-DOD is fiddling with it in your area.)

[swh]

muddergoose,

Further to that Woomeras comments on Rad Alt, they normally have a lineal scale from 0-500 ft, and logarithmic 500-2500 ft. They have an accuracy of ±5 ft or 5 % above 500 ft, and ± 2ft or 2% below 500 ft. They generally do not work with bank angles in excess of 40º or pitch attitudes in excess of 30º.

The scan footprint is elliptical, 20º for and aft of the lateral axis, and 40º either side of the longitudinal axis. It employs a frequency modulated continuous wave transmission in the SHF band, about 1W output. The one Woomera mentioned up to 5000’ is not the current generation of RAD ALT, it is a pulse modulated device, which is not as accurate close to the ground, but does have a larger power output.

Depending on the avionics installed, on the bottom of the AH can have a DH set on the LHS on the bottom of the AH, with RAD ALT on the RHS or a separate display with 2500 ft at the 12 o'clock position, 500 ft at the 6 o'clock position, and 0 ft at the 3 o’clock position, the needle moving anticlockwise as you descend.

Unless you have GPWS/EGPWS installed the only general alert given to crew the in illumination of the DH annunciator, or DH light on the stand alone display.

The Rad Alt is normally not associated with altitude alerter which is a pure barometric device.

The altitude alerter normally shares the same static source as the altimeter, the GPS may have its barometric input from an altimeter, encoder, or separate input. Altitude alerter is normally coupled to the autopilot allowing the pilot to descend the aircraft to the level selected on the altitude alerter. 1000' above or below this preselected height, a single gong is generated a light illuminates, 300' from the target altitude the light generally turns off. Once at the target altitude any deviation or a magnitude of 200-300 ft will cause a single gong is generated a light illuminate.

Depending on the autopilot installed, failure of the pilot to arm either the altitude alerter (some have a altitude arm button on them) and/or the altitude select on the autopilot will allow the aircraft/autopilot not capture the selected altitude and may result in a CFIT, depending on the altitude alerter installed, if the altitude is not armed the pilot will receive no warnings when approaching or departing from the selected altitude.

Biggles_in_Oz et al,

Shooting a GPS/NPA requires the pilot to conduct a RAIM prediction prior to conducting the approach and have GPS notams, this checks to see satellites will be in view at the time of arrival and the US DOD has made them available for civil use. The current fleet of satellites allows for the US DOD to selectively control the time bias for position deteration as experienced during gulf war 1. This would now only be applicable in targeted war zones.

Prior to arming the approach the barometric altitude (QNH) must be inputted into the GPS for RAIM.

Local jamming as you suggest has been experienced in Italy due to interference from pay TV transmissions, however this would result in a RAIM failure, with a MSG flashing on the GPS annunciator panel and on the GPS, the approach will fail to arm, and will not scale down to finals sensitivity.

:ok:

[muddergoose]

http://www.atsb.gov.au/atsb/media/index.cfm:(

[Capt Snooze]

swh and muddergoose,

In the 'for what its worth' department, most of our fleet have 1500' at the maximum end of the scale. We do have some with 2500'.


Snooze :cool:

[muddergoose]

If the data card has been sent to France can anyone determine the brand of GPS?

[QSK?]

muddergoose: If the data card has been sent to France can anyone determine the brand of GPS? It could be, muddergoose, that the ATSB simply doesn't trust the US NTSB to be completely impartial and open in its findings should an NTSB investigation conclude that it was a US based navigation product or system that was at fault.

My reading of this statement by the ATSB is that by sending the card to France, the ATSB would be more confident of receiving a completely independent and honest assessment of the integrity of the card.

[swh]

QSK?,

France would not be the place I would send anything for an independant report on equipment that has been made in the U.K. or U.S., would have thought Germany or Netherlands would have been a better choice for independance.

My guess is the France have offered expert analysis that was not available within the ATSB, and the ATSB has taken up the offer. The ATSB does offer its expertise to overseas states, normally accidents/incidents are few and far between and investigators assist overseas to gain experience, enhance investigation skills, and network.

The last few months have been a worry, the frequency of crashes seems to be increasing.

:suspect:

[muddergoose]

The last few months have been a worry, the frequency of crashes seems to be increasing.

Interesting thoughts QSK and SWH.

SWH, can you elaborate on the above quote?:ok:

[swh]

muddergoose,

Think 2004 is the safeest in terms of number of people killed, just recently it seems every day on average an incident occours, 30+ in november.

Check your PM's

:ok: