4 die in crash of medical helicopter

[tvpilot]

Associated Press
Jul. 13, 2004 07:10 AM


JALAPA, S.C. - A medical helicopter crashed in a heavily wood area on Tuesday morning, killing all four people on board, a hospital spokeswoman said.

The helicopter crashed in rough terrain after picking up a car crash victim from Interstate 26, Sheriff Lee Foster said. It was reported down at 5:55 a.m. on U.S. Forest Service land.

Killed were the pilot, a flight nurse, paramedic and the patient, said Betsy McMillan, spokeswoman for Spartanburg Regional Healthcare System.

She had no information on the cause of the crash.

Jalapa is 50 miles northwest of Columbia.

CNN
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/South/07/13/copter.crash.ap/index.html

[alouette]

This article is published at interstate.com

Helicopter crash in S.C. kills four


NEWBERRY, S.C., July 13 (UPI) -- A South Carolina hospital helicopter that was transporting a traffic accident victim crashed Tuesday, killing four.

Officials said they do not know why the helicopter, a Bell 407, crashed less than a minute after picking up a woman who had been discovered along Interstate 29 about 50 miles northwest of Columbia, S.C.

The crash was in a heavily wooded area and rescue crews had to use four-wheel vehicles to reach the site. All four people were declared dead at the scene. They included the traffic accident victim, the helicopter pilot, a paramedic and a flight nurse, the Greenville News reported.

The helicopter had been dispatched from Spartanburg Medical Center, about 50 miles north of the accident scene, after a helicopter from Columbia to the south was grounded because of fog. Weather was not an obvious reason for the eventual crash, officials said.

Authorities said the accident victim had chest injuries and a broken leg after either being hit by or thrown from a vehicle. Both incidents are under investigation.

It's sad enough. RIP:{

[rollie rotors]

another report:

By JEFFREY COLLINS
Associated Press Writer

Four people died when a medical helicopter crashed in a heavily wood area of Newberry County on Tuesday morning, a hospital spokeswoman said.

Spartanburg Regional Healthcare System's helicopter crashed about 5:55 a.m. just off Interstate 26, hospital spokeswoman Betsy McMillan said.

A pilot, flight nurse, paramedic and a patient were on the helicopter when it came down, McMillan said.

Newberry County Emergency Medical Services had requested the helicopter for a pedestrian who reported being injured in a minor hit and run accident, Highway Patrol Cpl. Steve Sluder said. The helicopter was dispatched at 5:34 a.m., McMillan said.

Truck driver Johnny Williamson had stopped at the rest area on I-26 to take a nap.

Williamson said he and a state trooper watched as the helicopter took off. "When it got above the trees, we heard a boom and we didn't see it again," he said.

Williamson said he found the helicopter at least a mile from the road in a heavily wooded area.

"There was a little bit of fire. The chopper was totally destroyed," he said. "I've seen a lot of wrecks on the interstate and stuff like that, but I've never seen anything like this. This is one rest area I think I'll bypass from now on."

The helicopter came down on U.S. Forest Service land, Sheriff Lee Foster said. Government bulldozers were used to clear a path to the wreckage.

The site of the crash is heavily wooded, said Chief Deputy Sheriff Jerry Wright. "If you're 50 feet away, you couldn't see it. That's how wooded it is."

A rest area on I-26 was being used as a command post, Foster said.

The crash site was about 50 miles northwest of Columbia.

There was no indication what caused the crash, McMillan said. Weather conditions were fair in the area, according to the National Weather Service's 6 a.m. report.

The National Transportation Safety Board and Federal Aviation Administration were on their way to the scene to investigate, Wright said.

[Time Out]

Kimburly Ahearn lost her husband in the crash. Bob Giard, 41, was at the helicopter's controls when it went down less than a minute after lifting off with a patient aboard from near a rest area on I-26 near Jalapa. "He's just a good person. He like to help everybody," she said.

Giard, with 10 years flying helicopters and an instructor's license, moved to Spartanburg from Memphis last year when the hospital began its helicopter rescue service in May 2003. He was proud of his 21-year-old son Christopher and 20-year-old Marine son Stephen. And he liked hunting and his new, bright yellow Harley-Davidson.

Fellow pilot Miles Dunagan said he was planning to visit Giard soon to see his new Harley.

Giard liked to help people, Dunagan said. "He did it with a smile. All he needed was a bed and a meal."

Source of the extract (http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040714/APN/407140529)

also info on this site (http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/local/9148431.htm)

[SASless]

From the FAA web site (faa.gov)......

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 530MT Make/Model: B407 Description: BELL B407
Date: 07/13/2004 Time: 0130

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
City: JALAPA State: SC Country: US

DESCRIPTION
HELO DEPARTED AN AUTO ACCIDENT SCENE ENROUTE TO SPARTANBURG REGIONAL
HOSPITAL AND CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE ON MEDICAL
EMERGENCY FLIGHT WITH ACCIDENT VICTIM. FOUR FATALITIES AND ACFT IS
DESTROYED. NEWBERRY, SC

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 4
# Crew: 1 Fat: 1 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 3 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: GRD 0856Z CALM 5SM BR CLR 23/21 2994 GRD 0956Z 200/06 4SM BR BKN030 22/22
2995


OTHER DATA
Activity: Air Ambulance Phase: Unknown Operation: General Aviation

Departed: I-26 64 MM Dep Date: 07/13/2004 Dep. Time: 0944
Destination: SPARTANBURG REGIONAL Flt Plan: UNK Wx Briefing: U
Last Radio Cont: NONE
Last Clearance: NONE

FAA FSDO: COLUMBIA, SC (SO13) Entry date: 07/14/2004


Without making any statement beyond readiing the weather information.....perfect situation for fog.

Circumstantial information....other EMS operators had been called and declined the flight based upon existing weather conditions. I wonder if the crew involved knew of the "turn downs" by the other operators....did the requester go chopper shopping? Should the EMS industry not set up a protocol so that this kind of information be required when requests are made? Can not the EMS operators work together on safety issues and still remain competitors to everyone's gain?

Is this yet another case of the typical US EMS VFR operation being conducted in such manner as to set up a very deadly trap for its crews? Single engine, single pilot, night, inclement weather, legal instrument currency (vice true instrument proficency)?

Condolences to the families and co-workers. EMS loses another crew of very nice people.:(

[Devil 49]

A quibble-one other service launched on this call, and aborted for weather, before Regional One responded. At least two pilots thought it worth a shot.

Let's propose that fog was the true cause... how would two engines correct that problem?

Comment- I've been flying since '68, and it doesn't bother me at all that other operations may have turned down a flight. Alternately, I don't care if everbody else is flying. We are, each and every one of us, required to make our own go-no go decisions based on our own situation.
If another service declines, the info should be shared, and ordinarily it is. It's a flag that something unusual is at hand.

To the meat of the issue- The current run of accidents in US EMS, specifically- a bad run on night flights.

First, night weather minimums in the industry are obviously not realistic numbers. Either the least acceptable condition is being regarded as a mandatory dispatch criterion, or poorly trained pilots are not adequately considering the unique situation that each flight is.

Next, we're poorly equipped for the job we're required to do-
Jim-Bob's cell phone accesses more data than my entire aircraft shipset. Launch into skosh weather, update by phone (if you can) or "weatherwatch"? That's airplane stuff. If you're down in the green and leafy, weather information is critical- Read "citical" in bold, all caps and underlined.
NVG's- if permitted by the FAA- are enroute only, and few and far between, then. The military has emphatically proven the advantage of vision enhancement at night, especially low level. We don't have to reinvent the wheel.
VFR Aircraft expected in marginal weather should have stabilisation equipment. The VFR guy, inadvertent IMC, needs even more help than a regularly IFR, and proficiant IFR pilot. How many autopilot sets could you buy and maintain for the cost of a crash?

Most important- The industry's disregard for circadian rhythms- I do the hardest part of my job when I'm least efficient and most likely to err- the 3 AM call out on my first night, after being on days. Clarify- I work monday through thursday 8 am to 8 pm, then friday 8 pm until saturday 8 AM. Most programs work this way, the first half of the duty cycle on days, then report for nights the following day. That's almost criminal negligence. I couldn't report for work drunk, but I'm expected to work in that exact mental equivalent. Jet lag is cliche everwhere but in this industry.

The need is simple. I don't need a twin engine glass cockpit and fully coupled with auto-approach and hover. What I need is some accomodation to proven human limitations. Spend a few bucks and save millions.

[MightyGem]

Granted, 12 hour nights mess up your bio-rhythms, but there are ways to alleviate the problem. I work 12 hour duties(2 days, 2 nights, 7.30/7.30).

On the afternoon of my first night, I go to bed after lunch, without fail, and usually get 4 hours sleep. This is enough to get me through the night without becoming too tired. After the first night I'm usually in bed by 9am and I stay there until 4.30/5pm, regardless of whether I'm asleep or not. So I'm not doing chores around the house or taking the wife shopping when I should be resting.

Mind you, it's a bit of a bummer when it's a nice sunny summer's day and I have to be in bed, but at least I'm reasonably fit for the coming night.

[tvpilot]

PICTURE @ SCENE

SOURCE
http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/nation/9151881.htm

[SASless]

Devil 49...

Lets do the math here....you are in a twin engine machine being operated within "stay up on one engine" weight....an engine dies...you continue flying to a safe destination and make a single engine landing.

On the other hand, you are in your Bell 206, 207, AStar, or some other single engine helicopter....that same situation....engine failure occurs....

Now lets add to this situation.....you are out in a truely nasty night....IMC....maybe IMC right to the ground in places...or all over the area...and you are going to be required to do an ILS to minimums....200 Feet and 1/4 mile (which in an unstablized machine single pilot can be a bit of a hand full at times....)

Now re-think your question regarding what two engines has to do with IMC flying? If your math skills are that weak...then you are a bit too comfortable with things mechanical for my liking.

The oil patch in the Gulf of Mexico has proven the fact that single engine helicopters flying over hostile terrain kill more people than twin engine helicopters when engines fail.....particularly when you filter the data for "enroute during cruise" engine failures.

In EMS flying...the combination of bad weather and darkness has killed way too many good people. The Industry should be ashamed of itself for its devotion to safety. The Germans do it right....daylight VMC. Otherwise it becomes an IMC/IFR job.

I read the original article noted in the post prior to this one....and felt doing a cut and paste thing to emphazise what happened to this crew is in order for those who have not read the article.

"Fatal medical helicopter crash

Spartanburg, S.C., copter took call after 3 units declined

By LAUREN LEACH and CLIF LeBLANC

The (Columbia, S.C.) State


JALAPA — Three times early Tuesday, calls went out to emergency medical helicopters: A woman with a broken leg needed help along I-26 in Newberry County.

Air rescue units from two Columbia hospitals and another in Greenville said it was too foggy to fly.

A fourth call went to Spartanburg, where Regional One pilot Bob Giard checked the radar, decided the weather looked clear and took off with two crew members."

The crew never reported problems with the weather en route to the site. But minutes after picking up the patient, their helicopter crashed in woods near the Palmetto Trail, about 1,000 yards from an I-26 rest area, authorities said

Now folks....a "Fourth Call" ! That in EMS parlance is known as "Chopper Shopping" and should be a Felony Offense comparable to homicide in my book. Unless, the Shopper clearly explains to each crew the details of who declined previously and why...and provides the telephone number for verification when soliciting a flight from any other crew.

Now, I do not know about you...but if three other pilots turn down a flight for weather....and I know of that....just what response do you think I am inclined to give? Simple...at 5AM in the morning....either bark a "No!" roll over and go back to sleep or get up and make the coffee for the rest of the crew,but there ain't gonna be no flying knowing three other pilots said "No".

[Devil 49]

Sasless....

"Let's propose that fog was the true cause (of the SC EMS helo crash)... how would two engines correct that problem?"

1,2,3,4- or more engines-CFIT, etc., happens.

[donut king]

If fog was/ forecast present, I would file IFR to the closest a/p( approach facility).

If one was unavailable.........DECLINE !

I don't know your experience Devil 49 so no disrespect intended here....

Twin engine op's doesn't just mean two engines on board. Totally different discipline than single engine stuff. Decision making, profiles, handling..... all different. Not necessarily better, but different.

Now, twin engine utility work like logging...that's another story. I'm referring to IFR/Night two pilot stuff.

Any responses welcome!

D.K

[SASless]

49...

As the man says...single engine IMC flying is really like rolling the dice at the Craps table...that is why even the FAA had grave reservations (poor choice of words there) with it until they finally caved in to commercial pressure with the modern singles like the Caravan and other single turbine aircraft that produced a very impressive reliability record.

That being said....on a very pretty night, full moon, in a Caravan, headed from north of Spokane to the Olympia area of Washington....on top of a sea of white....only the rugged peaks of the Alps like mountains north of Snoqualamie sticking up....absolutely smashing night to be flying...smooth....clear above....then realized I was pretty much bore sighting the only engine on the airplane.....and actually thought of what I would do if that only engine decided to quit running....that realization of just how fragile the Good Lord's affection for you is....brings home my point.

The number of engines has nothing to do with CFIT...I have no idea what caused this particular crash nor will I speculate. The accident in question....by occurring in the weather conditions it did....provoked my comments. The chopper shopping that lead up to the takeoff of the flight in question and the US EMS industry acceptance of that is what causes me to voice my concerns over that practice. If you defend the use of VFR, single engine, unstabilized helicopters for night EMS flights in marginal weather....then you and I shall forever be on opposites sides of this argument. All I have to do is read the casualty lists to know that entirely too many good people have died. I flew at both VFR and single pilot IFR operations and know too well the sham that is being made of maintaining Instrument Proficency training. When the very FAR's allow you to maintain currency by passing a single check ride...that should tell you something. Currency and profiecency are too different things.

I know of some programs that not only talk the talk..but walk the walk too....there are some but they are very few...and almost invariably are not vendor programs but are Hospital owned programs where money is put forth for training to include Sim training at third party vendors. They train for the job...spend the money on first class equipment...and prepare for the IFR flights they do.

The VFR programs that put you out on a marginal night with scarce weather reporting, aircraft that are not equipped for single pilot instrument flight to include autopilots and stability systems....are really setting you up for a terminal velocity departure....especially if you get to do some unusual attitude testing and maybe even a Radar surveillence approach on your annual 135 checkride...sorry...but this topic gave me a reason to rant a bit.

[[email protected]]

A most unfortunate and probably avoidable incident - Devil is right about circadian rhythms, those early morning jobs are much more difficult whether or not you have adjusted to night shift working, it is daylight that controls them and if it's dark and 3am your body wants to be asleep.
It seems unlikely that engine failure was the cause here - CFIT due to inadvertant IMC seems more likely especially since in marginal mist/fog conditions, hill fog tends to form on wooded areas first.
The woman's injuries seem to have been less than critical and you might question the decision to air tansport her in the first place.
Weather radar won't show fog and mist so he was kidding himself if this was his go/no go criterion.
I'm with Devil on this, decent avionics, NVG and IFR trained pilots for jobs such as night EMS.
RIP.

[tecpilot]

The Germans do it right....daylight VMC. Otherwise it becomes an IMC/IFR job.

Sorry SASless,

isn't true. You can find in germany the same problems. Indicated by some catastrophic accidents in the last years. Night flying, especially EMS or others with specific needs is very sophisticated. I think all the experienced night drivers know the wonderful shining nights with the good ol' moon is smiling above. But we all are knowing, the pitch-black nights, pouring rain, snow showers, witching hour, surprisingly coming position lights/strobes in front of you... becoming vertigo, sweat is dropping... Jesus, where the hell is the strobe switch... looking back from the overhead switch panel i count 50° bank...

Nearly every week, i have to try to tell some people these situations. Pushed by JAR-OPS3 a PIC needs not more than 300h hours at all and 10 hours on night conditions to fly VFR night without IR. Some times i could shake the head and ask myself, why we have so much pilots and bosses don't believing how hard such nights flights could be. It needs also not only the instruments, it needs the brain. To have a second plan if the first fails, the ability to interprete the weather, local area, next landing site...
As a HEMS PIC you need 50 night hours and no IR. You can fly such missions single pilot, only with a HCM. Okay there are some rules about the a/c. Single engine at night isn't possible. But what needs the fully equipped a/c if the pilot couldn't read the instruments and isn't able to fly the ship through the clouds out by instruments?
The other side is, that we have seen heavy accidents, reinduced by very experienced IR pilots, with space ships, carrying all possible stuff, including impressive hubris and arrogance, trying to make self constructed instrument approaches in fog or going with no fuel on the cruise...

[JimL]

tecpilot:

Could it be that you are confusing two issues:Pushed by JAR-OPS3 a PIC needs not more than 300h hours at all and 10 hours on night conditions to fly VFR night without IR..JAR-OPS 3 HEMS Appendix requires for a HEMS Commander (simplistically):(a) Total - a minimum of 1,000 hrs;

(b) For Night operations - 20 hours Night VFR;

(c) Recency (in addition to that required by Subpart N - see below*) - all pilots conducting HEMS operations shall have completed a minimum of 30 minutes flight by sole reference to instruments...in the last six months. *This is in addition to night recency required for all pilots flying night VMC:(d) without a valid instrument rating - three take-offs, three circuits and three landings at night in the preceding 90 days;

(e) with a valid instrument rating - the recency required for instrument flying.In addition to these basic qualifications, the operator has a requirement to provide a training program and conduct proficiency checking - approved by the Authority.

Your quotation correctly states the minimum experience to conduct Night VMC flying. This subject was the result of extensive soul searching and was set at this level because:(f) Twin-engine operations only were considered (entry level experience would probably never be accepted by operators);

(g) Basic competence of the pilot is a matter for the pilot conducting the licence proficiency check;

(h) Operational competence of the pilot is a matter for the operator in accordance with the training/checking program - approved by the Authority.Most importantly; the working group was aware that to set the bar too high would prevent pilots - who have demonstrated competence under such conditions - access to our industry for simple Night VFR tasks (which would, of course, exclude specialist operations). The working group producing this text consisted of experienced operational pilots (some of whom were HEMS professionals and most had Instrument Ratings) who, when considering the appropriate level of qualification, drew on their own experience from training in the military, or at civilian training establishments.

There was addional discussion on whether an instrument rating should be required for night VFR. In consideration of this the group were mindful of the fact that to obtain and maintain an instrument rating when only Night VFR was conducted would result in unjustified costs - i.e. there would be no actual instrument flying for which credit could be taken; and instrument recency would have to be provided in synthetic devices (or under the hood).

It was also accepted that to have a qualification that was tested only on periodic checks and would be used only under emergency conditions (inadvertent entry into IMC) might tempt the pilot into launching a mission under less than ideal conditions and would not therefore improve safety. This would not have been the case if IFR planning and execution were being considered.

The UK CAA concluded similarly but also introduced instrument training.

[Devil 49]

Donut King-
I'm a helicopter ATP, more than 8200 hours over 36 years and approximately 4200 and 10 years in twins. Last 3 years in helo EMS in a neighboring program to the accident aircraft, and this is my home region. I have flown over that area.

I don't know the cause of this event. First, I'll say I probably would not have responded had I been dispatched- WX- but I wasn't on duty and I don't know what the incident pilot's plan was. The fact that another program responded, but aborted, seeems to indicate that the flight was a reasonable call re weather. At least one other professional departed with a plan to deal with the reported weather. It's not clear to me yet that his abort was passed on to the pilot. That information is even more cirtical than a decline.

IF WX, particularly vis, was the cause- then how does equipment make this accident preventable? My position is that if that assumptions is true, then: poor situational awareness; poor planning; and finally, poor execution of an unknown plan are the true and unchanged cause, and would have been fatal in the most basic or advanced equipment- if it was a pilot failure, if fog was the final link in the accident chain.
Would two engines have made a difference? I don't think so, unless he had an engine failure on departure, and there's no evidence yet of that.
Would IFR capability have made a difference? Moot, but arguable. Perhaps IFR competency (and, yes I agree that semi annual checks aren't IFR competency no matter what the FAA position is) and the time required to plan for IFR completion would have improved situational awareness and presented options that might have changed the outcome- he apparently flew into the ground accelerating away from the top of the hover, for unknown reasons.

But: if imminent death isn't motivation enough to decline to continue as the vis deteriorates; or get on the gauges and assure a positive rate of climb when you see the vis is bad; or if you're unable to make the transition to IFR quickly enough when an appreciation of your situation becomes obvious- the die was cast and outcome determined at takeoff. All the engines in the world, all the gauges, all the rules are no good if pilot capability isn't adequate for the situation.

I agree with you in that multi-engines are an advantage if you have a realistic appraisal of their operation. The stats show it. They also show that multis are even MORE dangerous than singles if you operate them like singles. In the area Regional One and I operate in, twins have proven to be an unaccepable cost.

Sasless and I share one basic prejudice- I'm not enthusiastic when it comes to single-engine, and for me, especially single pilot- IFR ops. I can't defend that scientifically, but I've done single engine IFR and the aircraft flew fine both as a single- the UH-1, and as a twin- 212/412, at all times being capable of better flight than I executed.
I vehemently disagree with him that anybody else ever makes my dispatch decision for me- call every other servcie in the universe- but pass that info to me- and I'll still decide for myself based on what I see and believe is in my capability. CAll all the services in the world first, or none at all- I'm the PIC.

If it was an equipment failure, then clearly an equipment change would have prevented this accident. If it was a pilot failure, especially a poor plan to deal with fog, then equipment wouldn't have made any difference unless it flew the departure for him. The decision that kind of capability was required would still have to be made before departure.

I am concerned at the statistics regarding nights and late day accidents in EMS. I firmly believe human factors need greater attention by the industry and pilots.

[SASless]

49

We agree actually....I make the call as the PIC...but I make my decision based upon all the information I can get to include my experience. I also know that if several other pilots confronted with the same information...or more...either declined to take off or decided to abort once having taken off...then again...the majority rules. I also operate on the one dissenting vote rule when it comes to weather/safety decisions....and the vote for safety wins.

I would suggest a two pilot crew in a fully kitted out twin aircraft....should be the standard for night EMS in marginal weather. Shared decision making, shared cockpit workload....that relaxed hand patting you on the should saying everthing is cool....makes for a much safer operation.

When you get out there in the dark, the weather is marginal, your suface lights disappear because they just aren't out there...as is the case in lots of South Carolina and other places....and we ignore the requirement to maintain that light reference....we set ourselves up for failure.

EMS is headed towards another crisis with the growth of single engine, non-IFR programs. We had one when the operators removed all the instrumentation so "the pilots would not be tempted to push weather" to giving the gear back but not providing meaningful training....and then for some of the vendors putting out IFR machines and pilots without providing real training....when are people going to be more important than sheer costs?

[donut king]

Devil and Sasless,

Very good points from both of you!!

I cannot and will not comment on this accident itself. I was only responding to Devil 49's scenario.

Basically, for me, twin engine IFR/night puts me in a regimented, procedural( protected maybe!) environment that excludes a night scene response where I have to possibly flog around quasi VFR/IFR....whatever!

That was my main point....not to comment on this accident.

D.K

[GLSNightPilot]

IMO 2 pilots are more important than 2 engines. I fly with both, but I consider the second pilot to be the most immediate thing likely to save my butt. Also the most immediate thing likely to kill me, but everything is a compromise, right? :D

A departure on a dark night or in poor weather is where the second pilot really becomes important. In my cockpit, the PNF is doing nothing except watching the PF, and calling out airspeed, altitude, ROC, etc. Until we're above 500' AGL, neither of us does *anything* else. No radio calls, no nothing. Same thing for landing - below 500', we concentrate on flying and watching the other guy, nothing else. We worry about everything else later. And this is important. Down there, you can kill yourself before you even suspect you're in trouble. I've had cojos try to fly me into the water on downwind while I was tuning the radio, and had to take the controls below 200' with a heart-stopping rate of descent going on, and the guy didn't even suspect he was descending, because he was looking outside at blackness. I could easily do the same. With two of us watching each other, it becomes a little less likely. Flying night EMS to scenes single-pilot is damned dangerous, no matter who is doing it. If I were a flight nurse, I wouldn't ride in the helicopter. If I were the pilot, I wouldn't crank it. Give me some help or I walk.

[helmet fire]

Not commenting about this accident (not enough facts yet), but I am commenting on the discussion.

Twin V Single. IFR V VFR for night. One pilot V two pilots. These arguements continue to rage unabated. It always ends in both sides slinging statistics (damn statistics and bloody lies!) at each other, but I think it is all about the mighty dollar. We always justify the means by the end, ie: "we have succesfully done single engine, single pilot, VFR equipped HEMS before, and it's heaps cheaper, so therefore we SHOULD do it that way". That is always the way that side of the arguement comes down to it. The other side is the value of human life, etc.

I believe one solution may be to create different WX minima for different ops(assuming commercial ops here). Something like actual OR forecast:
1. For SP NVFR Ops: min cloud level LSALT (1000 ft above highest obstacle within 7nm GPS, or 10nm no GPS) PLUS 1000ft. Min Viz is 8km. Min illumination 40 millilux or fully visible horizon.

2. For 2 pilot NVFR Ops: viz may be reduced to 5km. Cloud may be reduced to LSALT PLUS 500ft. illum may be reduced to not less than 30 millilux or fully visible horizon.

3. Pilots of NVFR aircraft must demonstrate the ability to take off with sole reference to the instruments, and inadvertant IMC recovery with sole reference to the instruments annually.

4. IFR qulaified and current SP may operate to NVFR 2 pilot minima.

5. IFR capable operation with respect to crewing and aircraft, may operate to NVFR to cloud BKN at LSALT, Viz not less than 3km, and no illumination/visible horizon requirements. To use these minima, a suitable navaid alternate must be available.

6. NVG equipped and trained crews may reduce applicable LSALT to 500 ft for VFR crews, and 300 ft for IFR capable crew/aircraft.

7. IFR rules/minima stay the same.

In relation to the majority of these sort of accidents, I think GLSNight hit the nail on the head:

I've had cojos try to fly me into the water on downwind while I was tuning the radio, and had to take the controls below 200' with a heart-stopping rate of descent going on, and the guy didn't even suspect he was descending, because he was looking outside at blackness

That smacks of very poor training. NVFR is missed named. You should fly NVFR with primary reference to your instruments, and confirm correct settings with a glance out the window. Make ALL attitude changes on instruments, not by looking outside.

Or wear NVG and lets see if we can avoid hitting the ground because we can see it!!

[tecpilot]

JimL

As i wrote a PIC on JAR-OPS (and it means generally) needs not more than 300h and 10h at night to act as a professional PIC in night ops.

The HEMS Situation is a subpart (3.005 d). The situation at night is the same, but it could be excpected that HEMS could see more situations like the described. The 20h night hours, (i believe actual now 50h) are really calming!

In the german spoken countries most of the HEMS pilots are not IFR rated. In austria and switzerland don't exist own helicopter IFR ratings by law. Only the mil is flying such procedures.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

GLSNightPilot cites some pretty strict procedures that his company uses, while at the same time acknowledging that they are not foolproof. What he does relate is the "backstory"...the reason these procedures are in place.

His company had a particularly bad accident some time ago. Two IFR-qualified pilots taking off from an airport, at night, in very low IFR conditions. This airport was in elevated terrain. The weather was "simply" fog- a relatively thin layer of it. Everyone around was reporting clear above. All the crew needed to do was climb a couple of hundred feet up and they would have been okay. But it didn't work out that way.

The initial part of the takeoff went well, but as the S-76 accellerated down the runway it stopped climbing. There is talk that maybe one of the ADI's was not working properly and that this might have caused some confusion for the pilots. Whatever the cause...they floundered around, changing track so radically that they actually ended up pointing back at their departure airport, at a lower altitude than that from which they took off. At which point they hit a hill and everyone died.

Preventable? Sure! If just one of the pilots had been watching either the VSI or the altimeter, he would have noticed that the aircraft was not climbing. Correcting that, no matter which or how many other instruments had failed, if they had simply maintained a rate of climb they would quickly have popped up into a starry, starry night.

Pilots are human and humans sometimes fail. We get so that we're talking in circles. How many engines do we need? How many instruments? How many pilots do we need to prevent an accident? The airlines have consistently shown us over the years that even *three* pilots in the cockpit will not prevent an incredibly dumb, human-error type accident. Should we push for four?

The point of all of this? Flying is risky. We try to minimize the risks as best we can, but sometimes we make the wrong judgement with fatal results. Will that ever change? Call me a pessimist, but I don't think so. Not as long as humans are in charge.

[RDRickster]

GLSNightPilot,

In the Washington, D.C. area, two of the EMS operators fly SPIFR! Of course, the beltway around D.C. is pretty hard to miss when close to the ground and there are several ATC locations to provide flight following. It isn't like some of the rural areas in the mid-west and west coast.

PPRUNE FAN#1,

Good points, but you assume there wasn't a failure of the pitot-static system or other problem that gave the pilots incorrect readings. I guess we'll never know on that score, but your points are well taken.

[SASless]

Ok fellers...

Accidents are going to happen....true statement...but I maintain they can be reduced greatly by proper equipment, personnel, procedures, and training.

The PHI 76 Crash....read the transcript of the CVR....it chills your soul....someone should have taken command...as to a failing ADI...last time I checked there are three of the things ....poll the jury....positive rate of climb...airspeed increasing....check power setting....two of the three ADI's should have been agreeing...and with the right power set...and a constant heading...and airspeed where it should be or attitude set correctly...then starry starry night appears.

One engine or two....there is no answer but two at a minimum...if for no other reason than psychological...and redundancy of systems...two generators...two inverters....third attitude indicator...

IFR equipped machine....ignore the FAA allowing two pilot flight without an autopilot.....equip the aircraft with at least a three axis autopilot.....and a second pilot.

One pilot or two....only a MORON....and think of the Air Methods Chief Pilot comment...."I would much rather have an autopilot than a second pilot any time." attitude. Two pilots are always better than one...if properly trained and disciplined to follow good CRM.

The airline standards require all of this and yet they land at fully instrumented lighted airfields with radar coverage, weather reporting, and simulator training.....why are we as an industry...the helicopter industry...willing to put ourselves into a situation where we land in the dark ...off airport....with nothing to really help us....and insist on doing so in poorly equipped aircraft....single pilot....and do so knowing how many of us get killed each and every year doing so. This includes Offshore as well as EMS...why do the operators in the Gulf of Mexico still get away with flying single engine aircraft over all that water with out being IFR equipped and trained....with no ATC, Weather, or air traffic communications in place. How can the FAA get away with ignoring the safety issues in the GOM? The industry acknowledges helicopters are the biggest killers in the GOM....but yet it goes on from year to year.....

Someone explain this mind set to me please! Why do the EMS pilots accept the paltry wages they get, the often evil treatment they get at the hospitals they serve, by the medical crews they serve.....and take the horrid risks they do....I just do not understand the mindset.

Am I alone in questioning the industry attitudes towards safety...what I see as putting financial issues before human issues? Or, am I all wet and just do not see the situation accurately?

[Fatigue]

SASless,

Could not agree more with eveything you said, we as pilots are to blame for excepting these conditions, if we all banded together and said NO! things would have to change.

It's disgraceful how many fatalities there are, when there is absolutely no reason for it to happen.
Fatigue

[Devil 49]

In a nutshell- we are a business that performs a public service.
Yes 2 pilot IFR capable (and all weather, esp. ice protection), NVG equipped, multi-engine is ideal... And every ambulance should have an emergency medicine physician!
The ideals are probably unattainable and certainly impractical.
Shall we throw up our hands and do without both because we can't field the state of the art? Or should we do the best we can in the present reimbursement environment?
There is service to be done, and money to be made with what is practical, available and supportable. It requires respect for limitations, however, and that's inescapable with any equipment configuration. Even with super helo postulated as the ideal, judgement and skill would be the final determiner of safety, service, and profit. Profit enables the whole thing to continue. The profit equation is there even with government programs- it's just harder to determine. In the end, it's a question of what's possible without undue risk, no matter what you're operating. The responsibility sits right where it always will- in the PIC's lap.

Side note- If you want a really exciting time, get in, deep, flying whatever passes as a super helo. The last IFR line position I flew, one of the instructors tells the story about being caught in a hundred yards vis situation and insufficient fuel to get to better weather (And no Cougar helicopters heads up equipment to facilitate it). After the successful ILS "arrival," and his cojoe losing it (probably for story enhancement?), he had to get a truck to guide him off the active- and they got lost. I'll take chickening out when the WX drops below 1000 and 3 against that, any day.

Helo EMS safety can be improved. AS the guy in the seat, I still see my earlier list as the most economic and efficient changes possible-
Never, ever question a pilot's decision to decline for weather, and remove any compensatory link to flight hours.
A scientific schedule that respects circadian rhythms.
Improved data delivery.
NVG's, takeoff to landing.
Stability augmentation in night VFR aircraft.

[RDRickster]

One of the afore Washington, D.C. SPIFR EMS operators uses a Risk Management matrix as a guide for GO / NO GO operations. In fact, I attended a Risk Management seminar sponsored by the FAA, and it was taught by this EMS operator. Not surprisingly, it followed (almost exactly) how the Defense Department manages risk. Risk Management for both training and operational missions has been incorporated into the military for decades. I'm surprised the civilian sector hasn't caught on as much.

A Risk Management matrix identifies the risks, including all conditions in which you may fly. It also identifies mitigating factors, including training and safety equipment, that you can use to reduce the overal risk. Nevertheless, there is a comprehensive flow chart that is easy for all to follow and it is very flexible... but still provides a GO / NO GO decision methodology. In summary, it is much more comprehensive than a simple "if this than that decision" based on weather alone. (The full version of this course is WEEKS).

I could be wrong, but it seems to me that pilots are taking on too much responsiblity for something that should be driven from the top down. SASless is right... period. Devil 49 brings the practical aspects to this commentary; nevertheless, BOTH can be served by a comprehensive Risk Management matrix (designed and approved by both pilots and management).

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

Oh SASless! You ask such impudent, unanswerable questions, laddy!

Of course all of the things you cite are required by the airlines. Airline pilots would not even think of questioning the need or desire for them. They might all be super-pilots, but you'll never hear a 767 airline pilot suggesting that he really didn't need that copilot...or that fancy-schmancy autopilot...or that second engine. We don't send passengers across the Atlantic in single-engine airliners, and their engines are far more reliable than ours.

Helicopter pilots, on the other hand, are so supremely pompous, arrogant and egotistic that we willingly give up "safety" equipment and features which I agree with you should be mandatory. It is quite astounding to me that pilots will gleefully accept single-pilot/single-engine EMS aircraft for day/night/scene work or even SPIFR jobs. And they do it with this haughty, who-needs-all-those-bells-and-whistles? attitude. It's a level of over-confidence that is hard for this pilot to fathom.

Me? Gimme two motors. I don't care that "most" accidents are pilot-related. Gimme a rated and qualified copilot! Gimme an autopilot too! I want everything that I can get. Do I worry and fret that I might price helicopters right out of reach? Nope. That is not my problem. I might not get all I want, but that does not stop me from wanting it. When I saw the trend in EMS beginning away from twins and to the mighty EC-350 super helicopter, I knew that EMS was not for me. I'm no hero. I'll leave that sort of stuff to others...to those who are not merely willing to accept a compromise, but are quick to suggest it in the first place.

[Mars]

FAN#1:

I too am astounded by the attitude encapsulated in your second paragraph (which can be seen to the fore in areas where improvement is long overdue).

I'm with you and SASless - I don't understand it either!

[donut king]

PPFAN and all!

Agree with you totally!

Here in Canada, some of us call it the lumberjack mentality. The grass roots helicopter industry here is bush flying. One pilot, one machine, to do everything. Get the job done at any cost.

The self thinking is good, yet we end up with blinders on and fail to realize there are tons of other aspects to aviating......twin engine/ IFR/ two pilot....etc.

We are our own worst enemy!!!!!

D.K

[Buitenzorg]

Gentlemen,

While I do agree with all arguments put forward by the above authors, I feel another factor bears looking at. Devil 49 asked the rethorical question:

"Shall we throw up our hands and do without both because we can't field the state of the art? Or should we do the best we can in the present reimbursement environment?"

The accident area appears to be served by at least four EMS helicopters. That seems to be three more than necessary (witness they were all on the ground, ready to respond). But I’m willing to bet they’re all in the same class as the accident aircraft, basically fair-weather machines.

For the cost of four single-engine, single pilot VFR programs, it MUST be possible to field one IFR- and NVG-capable machine, and have enough dosh left over for regular training so the crews will be ready to use all this capability when called for. So I’m forced to conclude we CAN afford to field state of the art equipment, but the laws of economics instead mean that the money is squandered on more, less capable programs, that aren’t even needed.

So the question I feel should be raised is this: since “healthy competition” is more or less directly to blame for the dismal safety record of the EMS industry over the last few years, should the government step in and regulate the industry? Normally, I abhor most forms of government interference, but in this case I’m not so sure.

Feel free to flame me…

[Devil 49]

If there are 4 helicopters serving the area, it's because they're needed. My main service area has 9, and I've seen days when they're all out. So, if the swap was made, 4 VFR for a super helo, then the area would be under-served most of the time. It's VFR here 90%-or better- of the time.

[WestWind1950]

Sometimes it's the pilots, or companies, that make advances difficult. The JAR-OPS lay down some pretty strict restrictions, especially about HEMS flying. I know of one heli company trying to insist on continueing to use his single-engine heli's for HEMS flights, even taking the subject to court, argueing that he doesn't always fly over "hostile environment" and should therefore be able to continue using his singles. But with HEMS you don't always know in advance what type of environment you'll get into! And he ALWAYS fly single-pilot , day or night (at night with the twin)!! Of course he's fighting to keep his business going and needs all the revenue he can get... but at what risk?

So many claim single-engine is safe enough, claiming that there have been so few accidents in the past to prove otherwise... this thread presents a much different picture.......it seems to me theirs are all lame arguments. :ugh:

JAR-OPS, as I see it, is in some points almost too restrictive... but if these restrictions are really valid, then so be it....

Westy

[Mars]

Hi Westy:

I'm sure we were all quite surprised by your post - unless the operator is not in Germany (our understanding on this thread is the HEMS is a day time activity in Germany); or France where two pilots are, we understand, always carried at night.

JAR-OPS 3 does not preclude HEMS operations in Performance Class 3; it is merely in compliance with ICAO Annex 6 which requires a safe-forced-landing at all times - i.e. no flight over a hostile environment. As you so rightly point out, the nature of HEMS is that flight over a hostile environment is almost inevitable on most flights.

Quite surprised also at your contention that the operator always flies single pilot at night (perhaps you were not specifically pointing to HEMS in this example) as the HEMS Appendix requires it. (Although there is alleviation available it is within the gift of the Authority and is laced with mitigating clauses - and still requires a HEMS Crew Member to assist the pilot.)

If there is an answer to the operator's contention that he doesn't always fly over a hostile environment it is that the engine doesn't always fail; but, when it does, best to be in a position where the circumstances are under your control.

I am also mindful of our last discussion which centred on the problems with the number of HEMS hospital heliports in Germany that were in a hostile environment (built up areas).

PS Liked the web site and now I can understand the basis some of your dilemmas.

[tecpilot]

Sometimes it's the pilots, or companies, that make advances difficult.

Shure, but most of the pilots trying to help their companies and to safe their jobs.
The problem with JAR-OPS is the restrictivity. That's the point to bring new frontiers into the business. The bigger operators have no problems to fulfill JAR-OPS. The smaller operators have to fight hard to stay into. The bigger ops trying to get their points out of the situation. But, be honestly, where is the final "Red line"?


@Mars
HEMS is a 24h activity in Germany. Sometimes with two pilots, sometimes with single pilot and HCM. They don't need a IR. Some operators making outside landings without NVG's only with the normal helicopter landing lights or/and lights by the local fire guards. I have no doubts it's the business pressure.

[Gomer Pylot]

I don't think anyone would claim that a second pilot, or a second engine, or an autopilot or any combination of the above would prevent all accidents. But I know personally of more than one that the second pilot has prevented. There are no statistics to show any guesstimate of the total number that have been prevented, but I'm sure it's high. If the PNF just sits there and lets the PF fly into a hill, well, it would certainly have happened if there had been only one pilot. Single-pilot is NEVER, NEVER safer than dual pilot. I've had the 'opportunity' to fly SPIFR jobs, but declined with fervor. I ain't no hero, and any thought that because we're providing a service we should accept lower saftey standards is totally misguided. There are always ground ambulances, and killing 4 to try to save 1 is poor math, especially when death wasn't imminent for the 1 in the first place.

But pilots of all persuasions keep doing more for less pay. Remember the guy cleaning the crappers at the airport, when offered a better job, said "What, and give up my job in aviation?" People will always accept low-paying jobs just to fly. The people making money by paying less than minimum wage count on it, and safety won't improve until that stops.

To quote a common US saying, "Money talks and B******t walks." It always comes down to money for everyone except the guys with stars in their eyes who are willing to fly for little or nothing, or fly substandard equipment and push weather because they're flying EMS. They make the big profits possible, for the other guy.

[helmet fire]

I am not sure I made the point of my previous post very clear - sorry!
What I was saying was that we should have different rules for different capabilities/equipment levels. This achieves many things because it dictates that unless you have spent the money, you will be restricted in your operations - not prevented, but just restricted. Then it is up to the operator to decide what level of restriction they are prepared to accept, ie what level of spending they need to achieve in order to field the desired level of operational response. In other words, the rules provide a layer of risk management for the operators. If you want to go out in REALLY crappy weather, to a non prepared landing site at night in hilly country then you must have twin, IFR, NVG, CRM, all singing and all dancing, etc, etc. If you want to land on lit areas in low terrain when the weather and illumination is good, then a VFR, single pilot no bells and whistles will do.

And we, as pilots, can influence this through associations and lobbying groups.

PS a quick comment on the "chopper shopping" allegations: I have little problem with the concept of this, but problems with the immaturity with which it is often implemented. For example, lets say there are four operators within range of an accident and there is a forecast for cloud on the mountains and scattrerd patches of fog. Two of those operators are fogged in. One has to cross the mountains and is a SE VFR machine. The fourth is the furthest, but has the range, is not fogged in, and has no mountains to cross. Do you simply stop asking when you get knocked back by the first two operators?

But here is where it becomes immature: the knock backs, and the reasons for it should be relayed to each subsequent operator, so the last one tried may get told that WHY the others knocked it back and even have an opportunity to talk it through with the pilot. What if the pilot of the first one is the local operator and confirmed that the accident site was foggy? Unfortunately, it is more likely that the only info given is that operator X, Y and Z knocked it back and "you" are the last hope.