Menen
8th Apr 2004, 11:43
Interesting that the NTSB can publish such a comprehensive preliminary report in just a few days when our ATSB would take at least six months to publish just a few scant lines. Why is this so?.
Accident occurred Thursday, March 25, 2004 in Pittsfield, MA
Aircraft: Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, registration: N201UV
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 25, 2004, at 0533 eastern standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, N201UV, operated by Royal Air Freight Inc., was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight, which originated at the Hagerstown Regional Airport (HGR), Hagerstown, Maryland. The cargo flight was destined for the Bangor International Airport (BGR), Bangor, Maine, and conducted under 14 CFR Part 135.
The Director of Operations for Royal Air Freight reported that the accident trip originated at the Oakland County International Airport (PTK), Pontiac, Michigan, about 2330, on the evening of March 24th. The pilot flew from PTK to the Greater Rockford Airport (RFD), Rockford, Illinois, picked up cargo, and then flew to Hagerstown. The pilot dropped off a portion of the cargo at Hagerstown, and was en route to Bangor, Maine, when the accident occurred.
According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot received a weather briefing from the Elkins Flight Service Station at 0353 on the day of the accident, for a flight from Hagerstown to Bangor. He also filed an IFR flight plan for the flight.
According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) information, just prior to the accident, the airplane was being handled by the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). All transmissions from the pilot were routine, and he did not report any problems with the airplane. The last communication with the pilot was about 9 minutes prior to the accident, when New York Center instructed the pilot to contact Boston Center, for the continuation of his flight to Bangor. The pilot acknowledged this transmission; however, he never contacted Boston Center, and no further transmissions were received by the pilot.
Preliminary raw radar data indicated the airplane was level at 17,000 feet, flying in a northeast direction. At 0531, the airplane initiated a climb, and gained approximately 300 feet of altitude in about 1 minute. Over the following 50 seconds, the airplane descended from about 17,300 feet until the last radar contact at 05:33:17, at an altitude of about 5,700 feet.
Several witnesses observed the airplane prior to it impacting the ground. One witness reported that the sound of the airplane first drew her attention to it. She described a loud grinding sound coming from the airplane, similar to "a metal I-beam going through a grinder." This sound continued for about 5-7 seconds, stopped briefly, and started again. As the sound continued, she observed the airplane spinning in a nose-high, tail low attitude, almost as if it were "hovering." She stated that the airplane began to "veer to the right," as the metallic noise stopped again. She then heard a "whining" sound coming from the airplane, as it continued to spin. She lost sight of the airplane behind trees, and then heard the impact.
A second witness observed the airplane from his second-floor apartment about 1-1/2 miles from the accident site. He stated that he could hear the airplane before he could see it, due to an overcast cloud layer, at an altitude of about 1,500 feet. The witness described the sound as a loud "howling" sound, similar to a pair of motorcycles. The sound was synchronized and continuous, with no interruption. When the witness observed the airplane "break out of the clouds," it was spinning in a counter-clockwise direction, with about a 10-degree nose-down attitude. As the witness observed the airplane spin, he also heard the sound of the engines get louder and quieter with each rotation. The witness reported that the airplane continued to spin until it impacted the ground.
A third witness observed the airplane pass over his house in a south to north direction, in a "flat spin." According to the witness, as the airplane continued to travel to the north, he heard the sound of the engines "throttling up, then throttling down, as if the pilot were trying to recover."
A fourth witness reported hearing a loud noise overhead, and looked up to see the airplane in a "flat spin." The witness reported that the engines were "very loud," and the airplane continued to spin until it impacted the ground.
The wreckage was examined at the accident site on March 25, 2004, and all major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene. The airplane impacted a marshy field, upright, in a flat attitude, on a heading of 150 degrees. The fuselage section of the airplane was compressed to a height of about 4 feet, and indications of forward velocity on the wings or fuselage section were not observed.
Both wings remained attached to the fuselage with the right wing tilted slightly aft. Both fuel tip tanks were ruptured; however, a substantial amount of fuel was observed on the ground, in the area of both tip tanks. The outboard and inboard fuel tanks on each wing remained intact, and approximately 60 gallons of jet fuel were drained from the tanks. Both engines remained attached to their respective wings, and two out of three propeller blades on each engine were visible. All four of the visible blades displayed chordwise scratching and S-bending. One propeller blade on each engine was buried in the ground.
Flight control continuity was confirmed from the severely compressed floorboard area, to all flight control surfaces. The flap selector in the cockpit indicated that the flaps were set to 5 degrees; however, a measurement of the flap actuator revealed the flaps were in the retracted position. The elevator trim indicator in the cockpit displayed a trim setting of 5 degrees nose down, and a measurement of the elevator trim actuator indicated a setting of 18 degrees nose up. The rudder trim indicator in the cockpit displayed a setting of 2 degrees nose left, and a measurement of the rudder trim actuator indicated a setting of 13 degrees nose right.
The empennage section was partially separated at the vertical stabilizer attachment point. The empennage skin displayed a tear, which encircled the empennage, and the vertical stabilizer was angled about 45-degrees to the right.
Examination of the cockpit revealed the right power lever was in the 'flight idle' detent and the left power lever was approximately half an inch forward of the 'flight idle' detent. Both right and left condition levers were positioned half-way between the 'takeoff' and 'taxi' detents. The left torque gauge indicated 112 percent torque, and the right torque gauge indicated 100 percent torque. Additionally, the cabin pressurization was set to 15,500 feet.
Examination of the cockpit overhead switch panel indicated the right pitot/static heat was 'on' and the stall heat was 'on.' The remainder of the overhead switches, which included: propeller de-ice, engine intake heat, windshield anti-ice, and wing de-ice were all in the 'off' position.
As the airplane was recovered from the accident site, the underside of the fuselage was examined, and the landing gear was observed in the retracted position. Additionally, one propeller blade on each engine, which had been buried in the ground, was visible. These propeller blades contained slight chordwise scratching.
Examination of both engines revealed their compressor blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation, and the third stage turbine blades displayed evidence of metal splatter.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate, and was type-rated in a Learjet. He was also a certified flight instructor. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on January 24, 2003.
According to the Director of Operations at Royal Air Freight, the pilot was hired in April 1998, and began flying the MU-2 in May 1998. Since that time, he had accumulated more than 2,000 hours in the MU-2. He received his type rating in the Learjet on January 23, 2001, and at the time of the accident was routinely flying both the Lear and the MU-2. In the 90 days prior to the accident, the pilot had accumulated 142 hours in the MU-2. In the week prior to the accident, the pilot logged about 4.4 hours in the MU-2, and 10.1 hours in the Learjet.
According to the Director of Operations, the airplane departed PTK with full fuel (approximately 366 gallons). Interviews with fixed base operator (FBO) personnel at RFD and HGR indicated the airplane was refueled at both airports. The pilot purchased 111 gallons of jet A fuel at RFD at 0011, and also purchased 184 gallons of jet A fuel at HGR, about 0400.
A Safety Board meteorologist conducted a preliminary review of weather conditions at the time of the accident. Weather charts and recorded data indicated that a dissipating warm front was present in the vicinity of the accident site, and another defined warm front was moving across Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland, into New England. A large area of overrunning clouds and precipitation was present with the front, with cloud tops near 15,700 feet. A freezing level was indicated at 6,500 feet, with support for icing conditions between the freezing level and approximately 14,000 feet. Two AIRMETs were issued for occasional moderate rime to mixed icing conditions. One of the AIRMETs was valid between the freezing level and 18,000 feet, and the other was for the southern section of the area, from the freezing level to 22,000 feet. A PREP was also issued indicating icing and low altitude turbulence.
Surface conditions reported at the Pittsfield Municipal Airport, about 4 miles to the west, at 0554, included wind variable at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, overcast clouds at 5,000 feet, temperature 05 degrees Celsius, dew point 01 degrees Celsius, and barometric pressure of 30.48 inches Hg.
Index for Mar2004 | Index of months
Accident occurred Thursday, March 25, 2004 in Pittsfield, MA
Aircraft: Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, registration: N201UV
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 25, 2004, at 0533 eastern standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-36, N201UV, operated by Royal Air Freight Inc., was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight, which originated at the Hagerstown Regional Airport (HGR), Hagerstown, Maryland. The cargo flight was destined for the Bangor International Airport (BGR), Bangor, Maine, and conducted under 14 CFR Part 135.
The Director of Operations for Royal Air Freight reported that the accident trip originated at the Oakland County International Airport (PTK), Pontiac, Michigan, about 2330, on the evening of March 24th. The pilot flew from PTK to the Greater Rockford Airport (RFD), Rockford, Illinois, picked up cargo, and then flew to Hagerstown. The pilot dropped off a portion of the cargo at Hagerstown, and was en route to Bangor, Maine, when the accident occurred.
According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot received a weather briefing from the Elkins Flight Service Station at 0353 on the day of the accident, for a flight from Hagerstown to Bangor. He also filed an IFR flight plan for the flight.
According to FAA air traffic control (ATC) information, just prior to the accident, the airplane was being handled by the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). All transmissions from the pilot were routine, and he did not report any problems with the airplane. The last communication with the pilot was about 9 minutes prior to the accident, when New York Center instructed the pilot to contact Boston Center, for the continuation of his flight to Bangor. The pilot acknowledged this transmission; however, he never contacted Boston Center, and no further transmissions were received by the pilot.
Preliminary raw radar data indicated the airplane was level at 17,000 feet, flying in a northeast direction. At 0531, the airplane initiated a climb, and gained approximately 300 feet of altitude in about 1 minute. Over the following 50 seconds, the airplane descended from about 17,300 feet until the last radar contact at 05:33:17, at an altitude of about 5,700 feet.
Several witnesses observed the airplane prior to it impacting the ground. One witness reported that the sound of the airplane first drew her attention to it. She described a loud grinding sound coming from the airplane, similar to "a metal I-beam going through a grinder." This sound continued for about 5-7 seconds, stopped briefly, and started again. As the sound continued, she observed the airplane spinning in a nose-high, tail low attitude, almost as if it were "hovering." She stated that the airplane began to "veer to the right," as the metallic noise stopped again. She then heard a "whining" sound coming from the airplane, as it continued to spin. She lost sight of the airplane behind trees, and then heard the impact.
A second witness observed the airplane from his second-floor apartment about 1-1/2 miles from the accident site. He stated that he could hear the airplane before he could see it, due to an overcast cloud layer, at an altitude of about 1,500 feet. The witness described the sound as a loud "howling" sound, similar to a pair of motorcycles. The sound was synchronized and continuous, with no interruption. When the witness observed the airplane "break out of the clouds," it was spinning in a counter-clockwise direction, with about a 10-degree nose-down attitude. As the witness observed the airplane spin, he also heard the sound of the engines get louder and quieter with each rotation. The witness reported that the airplane continued to spin until it impacted the ground.
A third witness observed the airplane pass over his house in a south to north direction, in a "flat spin." According to the witness, as the airplane continued to travel to the north, he heard the sound of the engines "throttling up, then throttling down, as if the pilot were trying to recover."
A fourth witness reported hearing a loud noise overhead, and looked up to see the airplane in a "flat spin." The witness reported that the engines were "very loud," and the airplane continued to spin until it impacted the ground.
The wreckage was examined at the accident site on March 25, 2004, and all major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene. The airplane impacted a marshy field, upright, in a flat attitude, on a heading of 150 degrees. The fuselage section of the airplane was compressed to a height of about 4 feet, and indications of forward velocity on the wings or fuselage section were not observed.
Both wings remained attached to the fuselage with the right wing tilted slightly aft. Both fuel tip tanks were ruptured; however, a substantial amount of fuel was observed on the ground, in the area of both tip tanks. The outboard and inboard fuel tanks on each wing remained intact, and approximately 60 gallons of jet fuel were drained from the tanks. Both engines remained attached to their respective wings, and two out of three propeller blades on each engine were visible. All four of the visible blades displayed chordwise scratching and S-bending. One propeller blade on each engine was buried in the ground.
Flight control continuity was confirmed from the severely compressed floorboard area, to all flight control surfaces. The flap selector in the cockpit indicated that the flaps were set to 5 degrees; however, a measurement of the flap actuator revealed the flaps were in the retracted position. The elevator trim indicator in the cockpit displayed a trim setting of 5 degrees nose down, and a measurement of the elevator trim actuator indicated a setting of 18 degrees nose up. The rudder trim indicator in the cockpit displayed a setting of 2 degrees nose left, and a measurement of the rudder trim actuator indicated a setting of 13 degrees nose right.
The empennage section was partially separated at the vertical stabilizer attachment point. The empennage skin displayed a tear, which encircled the empennage, and the vertical stabilizer was angled about 45-degrees to the right.
Examination of the cockpit revealed the right power lever was in the 'flight idle' detent and the left power lever was approximately half an inch forward of the 'flight idle' detent. Both right and left condition levers were positioned half-way between the 'takeoff' and 'taxi' detents. The left torque gauge indicated 112 percent torque, and the right torque gauge indicated 100 percent torque. Additionally, the cabin pressurization was set to 15,500 feet.
Examination of the cockpit overhead switch panel indicated the right pitot/static heat was 'on' and the stall heat was 'on.' The remainder of the overhead switches, which included: propeller de-ice, engine intake heat, windshield anti-ice, and wing de-ice were all in the 'off' position.
As the airplane was recovered from the accident site, the underside of the fuselage was examined, and the landing gear was observed in the retracted position. Additionally, one propeller blade on each engine, which had been buried in the ground, was visible. These propeller blades contained slight chordwise scratching.
Examination of both engines revealed their compressor blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation, and the third stage turbine blades displayed evidence of metal splatter.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate, and was type-rated in a Learjet. He was also a certified flight instructor. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on January 24, 2003.
According to the Director of Operations at Royal Air Freight, the pilot was hired in April 1998, and began flying the MU-2 in May 1998. Since that time, he had accumulated more than 2,000 hours in the MU-2. He received his type rating in the Learjet on January 23, 2001, and at the time of the accident was routinely flying both the Lear and the MU-2. In the 90 days prior to the accident, the pilot had accumulated 142 hours in the MU-2. In the week prior to the accident, the pilot logged about 4.4 hours in the MU-2, and 10.1 hours in the Learjet.
According to the Director of Operations, the airplane departed PTK with full fuel (approximately 366 gallons). Interviews with fixed base operator (FBO) personnel at RFD and HGR indicated the airplane was refueled at both airports. The pilot purchased 111 gallons of jet A fuel at RFD at 0011, and also purchased 184 gallons of jet A fuel at HGR, about 0400.
A Safety Board meteorologist conducted a preliminary review of weather conditions at the time of the accident. Weather charts and recorded data indicated that a dissipating warm front was present in the vicinity of the accident site, and another defined warm front was moving across Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland, into New England. A large area of overrunning clouds and precipitation was present with the front, with cloud tops near 15,700 feet. A freezing level was indicated at 6,500 feet, with support for icing conditions between the freezing level and approximately 14,000 feet. Two AIRMETs were issued for occasional moderate rime to mixed icing conditions. One of the AIRMETs was valid between the freezing level and 18,000 feet, and the other was for the southern section of the area, from the freezing level to 22,000 feet. A PREP was also issued indicating icing and low altitude turbulence.
Surface conditions reported at the Pittsfield Municipal Airport, about 4 miles to the west, at 0554, included wind variable at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, overcast clouds at 5,000 feet, temperature 05 degrees Celsius, dew point 01 degrees Celsius, and barometric pressure of 30.48 inches Hg.
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