Wirraway
14th Mar 2004, 17:32
Mon "The Australian"
No defence of a misused F-word
ROBERT GOTTLIEBSEN
March 15, 2004
THERE is a rule in business that when you are under extreme pressure to make a quick big decision you often get it wrong.
Defence analysts are beginning to fear that the haste in making our biggest and most important purchasing decision may have led to error.
In 2002, the Government was under extreme pressure to make a quick decision to join the US in the development of the F-35 aircraft to replace our F-111s and F/A-18s. We didn't make a firm commitment to buy the F-35 but we set ourselves on a path that meant it would be very difficult to pull back from a $12 billion-plus purchase.
For the past three or four decades, Australia has been the pre-eminent air power in the region because we had the F-111. But now many countries in Asia are substantially upgrading their air power and in particular are buying the Russian Sukhoi Su. These aircraft are vastly superior to our F/A-18 and F-111 fleet in its current state.
Defence is like business – when the competition becomes more intense you must devise a way to retain leadership.
If the decision to back the F-35 enabled us to retain leadership, it was a good one, although there are obvious inherent risks in any new aircraft development. (Because we have not formally committed ourselves, we can exit the deal should the F-35 development not reach the expected specifications.)
But last month the Australian Strategic Policy Institute produced a 90-page report on the decision which not only graphically showed the dangers of hinging our long-term security to a development project but also warned that even if the F-35 met its expected performance levels, it had significant limitations. It is a short-range aircraft that will not deliver Australia the long-range capability the F-111 gave us.
Australia therefore plans to put all its air security into one aircraft that might be quite unsuitable for certain types of warfare and in some circumstances could be vulnerable to the sophisticated weaponry now in the hands of our northern neighbours. Future conflicts had better be as we expect them to be.
For the Americans, the specialised F-35 will be perfect for their needs because they plan to work it with the already developed F-22, which is emerging as the best all-round military aircraft in the world.
US defence chiefs are so ecstatic with the F-22 that they plan to take its development further and the increased production will reduce its unit cost.
Why didn't we buy the F-22? It seems the Defence Department in 2002 simply thought that it was too expensive for Australia.
When Robert Menzies ordered the F-111, he ensured that Australia had the pre-eminent aircraft in the region. This time we may be caught with the wrong aircraft type depending on what surprises lie ahead in coming decades.
In my view, Australia simply cannot afford to be relegated to a second-best power. How could we get ourselves into a position where we could afford an F-22 fleet?
Here we are helped by a paper by one of Australia's pre-eminent air strategists, Carlo Kopp from the Defence Studies Centre at the University of NSW plus Monash University.
Kopp sets out a series of lower cost options, which would free up the funds necessary to take the F-22 option. One is to upgrade the F-111 systems and purchase mothballed F-111s to maintain the fleet.
He says an upgraded F-111 would still be a very powerful and low-cost aircraft and points out that the US has made a similar choice with the B52 bombers.
You might then not need to buy as many F-22s. Australia is short of aerial refuelling capacity, and Kopp suggests we buy 747 passenger planes that are idle around the world and can be converted to fuel carriers at relatively low cost.
And he has a series of other suggestions along the same lines. He claims that these options, if anything, would enhance Australia's air defence capacity.
But even if he was wrong and they were not as good as the best options being proposed by the Defence Department, it would be worth it if they gave us the cash to help us retain air superiority in the region.
These options also have the side-effect of promoting Australia's defence support industries, and I should say that it is these industries that have alerted me to the aircraft problem. However, it is also true that the F-35 project is a big plus for the aeronautical service industry.
In recent years many people have warned that the defence cutbacks have included the loss of substantial strategic talent. We have seen in companies such as AMP and Southcorp the devastating effect of retiring the wrong people.
My fear is that those defence talent warnings may be chillingly accurate.
[email protected]
============================================
No defence of a misused F-word
ROBERT GOTTLIEBSEN
March 15, 2004
THERE is a rule in business that when you are under extreme pressure to make a quick big decision you often get it wrong.
Defence analysts are beginning to fear that the haste in making our biggest and most important purchasing decision may have led to error.
In 2002, the Government was under extreme pressure to make a quick decision to join the US in the development of the F-35 aircraft to replace our F-111s and F/A-18s. We didn't make a firm commitment to buy the F-35 but we set ourselves on a path that meant it would be very difficult to pull back from a $12 billion-plus purchase.
For the past three or four decades, Australia has been the pre-eminent air power in the region because we had the F-111. But now many countries in Asia are substantially upgrading their air power and in particular are buying the Russian Sukhoi Su. These aircraft are vastly superior to our F/A-18 and F-111 fleet in its current state.
Defence is like business – when the competition becomes more intense you must devise a way to retain leadership.
If the decision to back the F-35 enabled us to retain leadership, it was a good one, although there are obvious inherent risks in any new aircraft development. (Because we have not formally committed ourselves, we can exit the deal should the F-35 development not reach the expected specifications.)
But last month the Australian Strategic Policy Institute produced a 90-page report on the decision which not only graphically showed the dangers of hinging our long-term security to a development project but also warned that even if the F-35 met its expected performance levels, it had significant limitations. It is a short-range aircraft that will not deliver Australia the long-range capability the F-111 gave us.
Australia therefore plans to put all its air security into one aircraft that might be quite unsuitable for certain types of warfare and in some circumstances could be vulnerable to the sophisticated weaponry now in the hands of our northern neighbours. Future conflicts had better be as we expect them to be.
For the Americans, the specialised F-35 will be perfect for their needs because they plan to work it with the already developed F-22, which is emerging as the best all-round military aircraft in the world.
US defence chiefs are so ecstatic with the F-22 that they plan to take its development further and the increased production will reduce its unit cost.
Why didn't we buy the F-22? It seems the Defence Department in 2002 simply thought that it was too expensive for Australia.
When Robert Menzies ordered the F-111, he ensured that Australia had the pre-eminent aircraft in the region. This time we may be caught with the wrong aircraft type depending on what surprises lie ahead in coming decades.
In my view, Australia simply cannot afford to be relegated to a second-best power. How could we get ourselves into a position where we could afford an F-22 fleet?
Here we are helped by a paper by one of Australia's pre-eminent air strategists, Carlo Kopp from the Defence Studies Centre at the University of NSW plus Monash University.
Kopp sets out a series of lower cost options, which would free up the funds necessary to take the F-22 option. One is to upgrade the F-111 systems and purchase mothballed F-111s to maintain the fleet.
He says an upgraded F-111 would still be a very powerful and low-cost aircraft and points out that the US has made a similar choice with the B52 bombers.
You might then not need to buy as many F-22s. Australia is short of aerial refuelling capacity, and Kopp suggests we buy 747 passenger planes that are idle around the world and can be converted to fuel carriers at relatively low cost.
And he has a series of other suggestions along the same lines. He claims that these options, if anything, would enhance Australia's air defence capacity.
But even if he was wrong and they were not as good as the best options being proposed by the Defence Department, it would be worth it if they gave us the cash to help us retain air superiority in the region.
These options also have the side-effect of promoting Australia's defence support industries, and I should say that it is these industries that have alerted me to the aircraft problem. However, it is also true that the F-35 project is a big plus for the aeronautical service industry.
In recent years many people have warned that the defence cutbacks have included the loss of substantial strategic talent. We have seen in companies such as AMP and Southcorp the devastating effect of retiring the wrong people.
My fear is that those defence talent warnings may be chillingly accurate.
[email protected]
============================================