Nas - Regulatory Impact Statement

[Voices of Reason]

NAS - REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT


The following information was found on the web-site of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia:


The Commonwealth Government REQUIRES all Commonwealth Departments and agencies to prepare a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) to accompany regulation that impacts on business. This ensures that all Commonwealth departments and agencies adopt best practice processes for developing and amending legislation. The RIS is an analytical tool designed to improve the formulation, review and reform of CASA regulatory policy.

IT PROVIDES VALUABLE INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY REGULATORY MEASURES.

A RIS is a statement that explains the regulatory impact of a policy proposal. When a government department, agency or statutory authority develops a regulatory proposal that may/will impact on business and the agency, it must prepare a RIS. A RIS does not examine policy options in themselves—it examines impacts associated with the various implementation options that CASA can use to achieve its policy decision.

A RIS ENABLES CASA TO FULLY CONSIDER COMPLIANCE AND OTHER COST ISSUES WHEN FORMULATING ITS POLICY.

It also ensures that the proposers of new regulations document/record all relevant information, and that THE DECISION MAKING PROCESSES ARE EXPLICIT AND TRANSPARENT.

The analytical framework underpinning a RIS should be used throughout the policy development process. The preparation of a RIS NORMALLY COMMENCES AT THE INITIATION OF THE PROJECT……..




The same document states, in relation to Consultation:

….Consider:
- Who are the main affected parties?
- What are the views of those parties?
- Where consultation was limited or not undertaken, WHY WAS FULL CONSULTATION INAPPROPRIATE?

Consultation with affected parties is a KEY REQUIREMENT of the entire RIS process. This section should contain a consultation statement which identifies those consulted and outline the main views expressed. Areas and extent of agreement as well as areas of difference should be noted……



(We assume that this applies equally to Airservices Australia).



It would appear then, from their reference as presumably still current standards in CASA documentation, that the proposed NAS changes to the following “standards” (also found on their web-site) should have been subjected to that very same Regulatory Impact Statement process.



(Current) Manual of Operational Standards
Part 1. Airspace Design and Separation Standards
1. Airspace Design Standards

…..
…..
1.6 CASA Minimum Airspace Criteria

1.6.1 The following minimum safety criteria are derived from the five policy (non negotiable) and 14 negotiable criteria provided to the Industry as Phase One of the airspace review.

1. A Control Tower and associated controlled airspace (Class D minimum) is to be provided in accordance with the cost benefit methodology currently used by the CASA for establishing and/or discontinuing control towers.

2. At any aerodrome with an approach radar control service, aircraft operating under the IFR are to be provided with a minimum of Class C service.

3. Controlled airspace is to be constructed according to the specifications of the CASA’s Airspace Design Standards, as reviewed from time to time.

4. A minimum of Class B airspace is to be provided above FL200 (FL245 Oceanic) — Class A preferred.

5. A minimum of en-route Class E airspace is to be provided above 10 000 ft within radar coverage (lower if justified on the basis of traffic density, aircraft type and/or risk analysis).

6. The provision of en-route Class E or higher airspace outside of radar coverage shall be determined on the basis of traffic density, aircraft type and/or risk analysis.

7. For all high capacity, high performance RPT operations (and, subject to CASA risk analysis, other RPT and IFR operations) an IFR/VFR alerted see and avoid operating environment is required in the terminal areas, provided by any of the following means, selected subject to traffic density, complexity and/or risk analysis:

- A class of airspace providing separation services (Classes A, B, C or D)
- Pilot broadcast procedures (for example, MBZ)
- Electronic means.

Note: For the purposes of this requirement, the nominal terminal area is assumed to be the volume of airspace contained in an area not less than 15 nm radius from the aerodrome up to and including 5000 ft AMSL.

8. For RPT and IFR operations, a minimum of an IFR/IFR, ATS provided, en-route and terminal traffic information service is required (this requires mandatory flight notification for each such operation).



We assume this was, in fact, carried out, and is available in the public domain - or at least in an open domain for aviation professionals - for examination, along with the safety case(s).

[Voices of Reason]

The following indicates the folly of aviation management – including airspace managers - believing that compromises and short-cuts over safety will not hurt them directly.

Extract from today’s New York Times:
12 March 2004

GENEVA, March 11 - André Dosé, who resigned this week as chief executive of Swiss International Airlines, may revisit an earlier part of his career if Swiss prosecutors broaden their investigation into an air accident that occurred at a company he once ran.

When Mr. Dosé, 46, started Swiss International two years ago, few people - least of all the energetic young manager - thought his past would come back to haunt him. Mr. Dosé was chief executive of Crossair when its Jumbolino passenger jet from Berlin crashed near Zurich on Nov. 24, 2001, killing 24 of the 33 people on board.

Swiss International was formed in March 2002 out of Crossair, a unit of the collapsed national carrier, Swissair. Mr. Dosé had worked his way up from pilot to chief pilot to eventually become the right-hand man of Crossair's founder and chief, Moritz Suter.

Mr. Dosé, who for many years was responsible for training pilots, helped shape Crossair's safety guidelines. But in an increasingly tough business environment and with the emergence of discount airlines like EasyJet and Ryanair, Mr. Suter treated the airline like "a family business," cutting corners to save money, said an aviation analyst who insisted on anonymity.

"Mr. Suter ran the business with low costs and compromised on safety," said Werner Vontobel, the chief economic editor of the Swiss newspaper Sonntagsblick, echoing a widely held view in Switzerland.

"The safety culture was not given enough attention at Crossair." In a report released last month, Swiss investigators pinpointed pilot error and safety lapses that contributed to the accident.
The report said that the 57-year-old pilot of Crossair Flight LX 3579 had been working for more than 13 hours at the time of the accident and was too tired to concentrate. It also found that he had worked beyond the maximum hours allowed in the two days before the accident.

The report cited a lack of safety controls and poor pilot training at Crossair, and accused senior managers at the airline of failing to recognize that the pilot - who it said was flying too low on his approach to land in Zurich - was not in a fit state to fly.

It was not the airline's only accident. Investigators cited poorly trained pilots and safety problems in a report on another Crossair crash, on Jan. 10, 2000, near the Zurich airport. All 10 people on board were killed.

Swiss federal prosecutors have been conducting a criminal investigation of the later accident, and said this week that they might broaden their investigation to include individuals. That broader inquiry could result in criminal negligence charges being brought against Mr. Suter and Mr. Dosé. ……..

[WALLEY2]

VoR

By tuesday we should be in the position to place a link to our Design Aeronautical Study on Broome Int. Airport and the letter to CASA. If our lawyers allow I will also post some of the FOI docs on charateistic 29 MBZ to CTAF and other 2b and2c documents and letters.

We have determined there has not been the appropriate RIS to some changes dispite as you point out CASA requirement for one to be done. We have questioned why this practise is continuing with workshops on 2c scheduled and no RIS.

It also reveals CASA former CEO was of the opinion the a DAS may be required for 2b as he was concerned that implimenting NAS by changes would mean that at certain times the risk to airspace users would increase!!

We will also reveal that Mr Dick Smith wanted the AA ARM that showed CTAF was less safe than MBZ to be redone with certain changes to the imput assumptions. We have copies of the team minutes showing this is now occurring and there is a strong preposed position being determined with regards the process.

At this moment all I can say it makes interesting and preturbing reading.

[Voices of Reason]

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

The Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima (Doc 9689) was developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel (ICAO RGCSP), which later became the Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (ICAO SASP). This panel is pre-eminent in areas relating to airspace safety, with experts attending from all of the most developed aviation countries.

Following our initial posts to this website, we were sent a copy of a report from a meeting held by the Separation and Airspace Safety Panel in October 2002.

We were not provided with the actual paper which was discussed. We have provided below an extract from the report which deals with the use of the reference system argument.
It clearly indicates that the experts who created the original concept do not support the use of the reference system argument for the airspace reform program in Australia.

Both Airservices Australia and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority were represented at this meeting (as indicated in the attendance list). We can only assume that the opinion of this meeting was passed to senior management of both organisations through normal processes.


IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW A DECISION TO PROCEED WITH ANY STAGES OF NAS COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH THIS INFORMATION READILY AVAILABLE TO DECISION MAKERS IN THE RESPONSIBLE SAFETY CRITICAL ORGANISATIONS.


This is the relevant extract from the report material. We have covered the name of the presenter and WP number as it is not directly relevant to the discussion. This is not the person or organisation that provided us with the information.

………………………………..



xxxxxxxxxxx presented WP/xx which detailed an application by one State of the reference system comparative analysis methodology detailed in the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima (Doc 9689). The meeting was advised that Australia was currently undertaking reform of its airspace and procedures specific to that airspace, and has identified the comparative analysis methodology as the basis of a safety case for implementation of specific characteristics of the airspace and procedures used in another State.


xxxxxxxx reminded the meeting that previously RGCSP and SASP had determined that the comparative analysis using a reference system methodology was valid for determining separation minima and the validity of the systems that support the airspace in which they are to be applied. However, a question remains as to whether the same methodology can be used by a State to implement the airspace model used by another State, including features other than the separation minima. Specifically, xxxxxxxxxxxxx asked the meeting to confirm if such use of the methodology as developed by this panel was valid, and to what depth any safety analysis should be undertaken to assess the system as safe.


There was considerable discussion amongst members regarding the issues raised in WP/xx. One member stated that his understanding was that the methodology in Doc 9689 was specifically only to be used for the determination of applicable separation minima and therefore would only be used by a State to make small changes to an existing system such as implementing a new radar system. HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT ENCOMPASSED WIDER APPLICATION RELATED TO IMPORTING AN AIRSPACE SYSTEM INTO A STATE.

Another member said that he also understood that it was to be used for the safe implementation of separation minima. However, he cautioned that if it was to be used in the manner detailed in WP/xx then there may be other elements in the two airspace structures which may be altered as a result of proposed changes to other parts of the airspace. THERE WOULD THEREFORE NEED TO BE DETAILED ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY THE TOTAL IMPACT OF ANY CHANGES PROPOSED USING THIS METHOD.

One member agreed that in his opinion the comparative assessment methodology was only intended by the panel to be used for determining the safety of implementing separation minima however, that does not necessarily exclude its use for other purposes. The same member stated that USE OF THIS METHODOLOGY FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN IMPLEMENTING SEPARATION MINIMA MAY NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINE THAT THE REFERENCE SYSTEM MEETS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IMPLEMENTING STATE.

Another member stated that in his view, the use of the comparative methodology was not detailed enough or scientific in its application as described in Doc 9689.

A MEMBER COMMENTED THAT IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR A STATE USING THIS METHODOLOGY FOR THE PURPOSES DESCRIBED TO PROVE THAT THE PROCEDURES WERE SAFE UNLESS THE WHOLE AIRSPACE SYSTEM OF THE REFERENCE SYSTEM WAS IMPLEMENTED.

Another member agreed with this point of view stating that in his opinion a holistic system approach was needed. THE PROPOSED USE OF THE METHODOLOGY WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO SATISFY A SAFETY REGULATOR IN HIS OPINION.

The rapporteur of the Mathematicians’ Sub group commented that he thought that A STATE COULD USE THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY BUT NOT SIMPLY ON THE CRITERIA DETAILED IN DOC 9689 AS THIS WAS SPECIFIC TO IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATION MINIMA. HE STATED THAT FROM A CONCEPTUAL POINT OF VIEW, IF A STATE WANTED TO USE THIS METHODOLOGY THEN IT MUST GO TO CONSIDERABLE DEPTH OF ANALYSIS OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE REFERENCE SYSTEM.

The Secretary commented that he agreed that the methodology in Doc 9689 was only intended for implementation of separation minima. He drew the meeting’s attention to the fact that IN THE FOREWORD OF THE DOCUMENT, IT STATED THAT THE METHODOLOGIES PRESENTED PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR “…DETERMINING SAFE SEPARATION MINIMA FOR EN-ROUTE OPERATIONS.” HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS DETAILED AT CHAPTER 6, PARAGRAPH 6.4, WERE AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATION MINIMA. EXAMINING JUST THESE FOUR CRITERIA WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE SAFETY WHERE CHANGES TO FEATURES OTHER THAN THE SEPARATION MINIMA WERE INVOLVED.

The Secretary suggested that it may be possible to develop a comparative assessment methodology encompassing broader issues than just separation minima. The development of a suitable approach would require more information on the extent of the changes proposed, however it would seem that the process would require, as a starting point, a comprehensive hazard identification process, to identify the possible sources of risk in the system. This would allow a comparison of the factors in the two different environments which could affect the risk associated with these hazards.

THE CONSENSUS VIEW OF THE MEETING WAS THAT THE COMPARISON WITH A REFERENCE SYSTEM METHODOLOGY AS SPECIFIED IN DOC 9689 WAS SPECIFICALLY INTENDED BY THE PANEL AS ONLY APPLYING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATION MINIMA. HOWEVER, IF A STATE DECIDED TO USE AN ANALOGOUS METHODOLOGY FOR OTHER PURPOSES SUCH AS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES USED IN ANOTHER STATES AIRSPACE, THEN A MUCH MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS WOULD NEED TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO IDENTIFY AND ASSESSES THE CRITICAL RISKS IN BOTH SYSTEMS AND ENSURE THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE REFERENCE SYSTEM THAT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY SUPPORT THE PROPOSED PROCEDURES ARE EVALUATED.

One participant commented that, as there appeared to be a possibility of confusion regarding this, it may be advisable to add some additional words to emphasize that the minimum requirements specified in 6.4 referred only to the application of the methodology to determination of separation minima. The meeting requested the Secretary to investigate the possibility of such an amendment.