No Radio Dick: The Next Instalment

[Capn Bloggs]

"Well,
On with the show. A couple of near-hits ain't gunna stop me!"
The CASA NPRM for changes to operations at non-controlled aerodromes has been posted here (http://rrp.casa.gov.au/download/04_nprm.asp).

Safeskies, I note you made it into Flight International: well done. We need a similar petition for this MBZ nonsense!

[89 steps to heaven]

I might be having a bit of a slow start to the week, but after briefly reading the NPRM, I am not sure how or if part time CTAF's will work.

At an aerodrome where there is a part -time tower, non 24 hour op, outside of tower hours, does the CTAF become a non towered aerodrome and aircraft without radios are then permitted, or does it still remain by definition a towered areodrome.

If it is the 1st case, then I can see it raises problems with resuming tower operations as there may be aircraft in the airspace, not in comms. Also, there has to be an additional risk should the tower have to either open early or close later than published hours (normally to accomodate an RPT or an emergency).

As this change is not to comply with an ICAO procedure, I am also interested in what safety case the NASIG has, or will produce.

[Dick Smith]

Captain Bloggs, you state

“Well, on with the show. A couple of near-hits ain’t gunna stop me!” You imply that I do not have a concern for aviation safety. I can assure you that the opposite is the truth.

Following is a list of just some of the serious unalerted see and avoid and RA incidents which took place before 27 November 2003. Please note that all of these have simply been filed in respective databases and no proper "system safety" action has been taken.

The plan of the NAS is to reduce the number of these serious incidents. You will no doubt note that most of these serious incidents take place close to the aerodrome area where the risk of collision is highest. The new airspace system, following international practice, will concentrate resources close to the aerodrome to reduce this type of serious incident.

Captain Bloggs, can you advise why you have never campaigned against the very high number of incidents (as shown on the list) that take place close to the aerodrome area in the airspace before 27 November 2003?

I look forward to your advice.

Incidents before 27 November 2003 – no emotive media releases, no Category 3s

1. BOEING 747 POTENTIAL MID-AIR COLLISION – 400 LIVES!
Brisbane. Occurrence number 9601917. Incident category 4.
An air traffic controller made an error where an air transport Boeing 747 could have collided into the rear of an air transport BAe146 jet. The report states, “Had the aircraft not been fitted with ACAS, or had the crew not queried the controller, there was the possibility of a collision. Without an ACAS the crew may have observed the BAe146 through the aircraft’s windscreen, however this would have been subject to the crew’s cockpit workload.”

2. NEAR MISS, UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID, “FILLED THE SCREEN”
Taree. Occurrence number 9701187. Incident category 4.
A Piper Chieftain was enroute from Williamtown to Kempsey at 9,000 ft, and an air transport Dash 8 was flying from Taree to Sydney. The Chieftain had the Dash 8 fly across and directly in front of them. The crew of the Chieftain said the aircraft “filled the screen”. The Dash 8 crew knew nothing of the incident until they landed. Neither aircraft was given traffic on the other.

3. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 AND AIR TRANSPORT BEECH 1900 NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION 400 FEET APART
23 February 2000 – Port Macquarie
Occurrence number 200000637. Incident category 4.
An air transport Dash 8 aircraft was inbound for Port Macquarie and broadcast that they would be conducting a straight in approach for runway 03. An air transport Beech 1900, replied that they were taxiing for reciprocal runway 21 for departure to Kempsey. The pilot of the Dash 8 then observed the Beech aircraft about 400’ directly ahead of them and climbing through their level. They immediately received a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system alert with a full red arc above level flight resolution advisory.

4. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION – 200 FEET AWAY!
18 November 2000 – Orange.
Occurrence number 200005598. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Saab was conducting a GPS arrival from the west. The crew of a Piper Archer were intending to climb in the circuit to depart to the southeast from overhead, and the Saab crew requested that the Archer remain north of the field to avoid conflict. However at 3 DME, the Saab flight crew received a TCAS TA with the Archer turned to track south overhead the airfield. The TCAS alert was followed shortly afterwards by a TCAS RA to descend. During the descent, the Saab crew became visual and sighted the Piper approximately 200 ft away.

5. TCAS RESOLUTION ADVISORY MAY HAVE PREVENTED MID-AIR COLLISION UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
14 June 2001 – Alice Springs
Occurrence number 200102845. Incident category 5.
During the departure climb to intercept track and approaching 5,000 ft, the air transport Fokker 100 jet aircraft’s TCAS activated a TA followed by an RA. The crew took immediate action and the warning ceased.

6. AIR TRANSPORT BOEING 717 JET NEAR MISS – UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID – BUT CATEGORY 5!
23 September 2003 – Hamilton Island
Occurrence number 200304044. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Boeing 717 were making a visual approach via right base to runway 14 when they received a TCAS TA. They saw a general aviation aircraft pass approximately 600 – 700 ft below their aircraft. During their descent after turning onto base, they received a TCAS RA.

7. AIR TRANSPORT JET FORCED TO GO AROUND TO PREVENT POSSIBLE COLLISION
17 July 2000 – Alice Springs
Occurrence number 200003093. Incident category 4.
An air transport BAe146 jet was inbound from the north east and was instructed to make visual approach to runway 12 on a left circuit. When the BAe146 was on final approach, the crew sighted an Arrow approximately 1 nm ahead and descending through their level. They commenced a go-around and manoeuvred to the right to pass behind the Arrow. The pilot of the Arrow had misinterpreted the controller’s instructions and had tracked for a circuit because he was not set up for a straight-in approach.

8. TCAS MAY HAVE PREVENTED MID-AIR COLLISION
5 December 2000 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200005957. Incident category 5.
An air transport Dash 8 was on descent to 3,500 ft for arrival at Tamworth. At approximately 4,000 ft the airline crew received a TCAS TA alert on a CT4 aircraft that was climbing to 2,500 ft on a training flight. Shortly after, the crew of the Dash 8 received an RA and maintained 4,000 ft. The TCAS indicated that the CT4 was approximately 900 ft below the Dash 8.

9. AIR TRANSPORT BOEING 717 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
6 January 2002 – Maroochydore
Occurrence number 200200146. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Boeing 717 reported that on commencing descent from 1,000 ft they received a TCAS TA followed immediately by an RA to climb. A go-around was made followed by a visual right circuit for runway 36. The alert was activated as a result of a rescue helicopter operating at 200 ft. There was no advice from the air traffic control tower staff of the helicopter.

10. LEAR JET NEAR MISS – 500 METRES APART
18 May 2003 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200302447. Incident category 5.
A light aircraft was observed by the ATC to have entered CTA without a clearance and conflict with a Lear Jet inbound and on descent for base for runway 12. ATC estimated the aircraft proximity as 500 ft vertically and 500 metres horizontally.

11. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 MISSED APPROACH TO AVOID COLLISION UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
25 November 2000 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200005642. Incident category 5.
The flight crew of an air transport Dash 8 aircraft inbound to Williamtown had noticed an aircraft on their TCAS. The pilot of the Dash 8 had turned right to avoid the other aircraft and had made numerous broadcasts without response from the other aircraft’s pilot. As the Dash 8 was joining crosswind for the circuit for runway 12 the other aircraft, a Piper Cherokee, passed within approximately 500 ft. The crew of the Dash 8 then carried out a missed approach when they observed the Cherokee on final for runway 30.

12. AIR TRANSPORT FOKKER 27 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID TCAS USED TO PREVENT MID-AIR COLLISION
12 January 2001 – Geraldton
Occurrence number 200100220. Incident category 5.
During the descent, the air transport Fokker 27 aircraft’s TCAS RA activated. Conditions at the time were overcast. Attempts to contact the crew of the other aircraft, a Mooney, were unsuccessful. Subsequently, contact was established on the area frequency and the position of the Mooney aircraft was confirmed. The airline crew reported that avoidance action was required to prevent a collision.

13. AIRLINE CREW TOOK EVASIVE ACTION TO PREVENT COLLISION UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
29 March 2001 – Bundaberg
Occurrence number 200101479. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Jetstream aircraft had made all necessary radio calls for departure, but no response was heard. The aircraft was on runway heading after take-off, when the co-pilot sighted a light aircraft on a conflicting track ahead and above. The crew took evasive action and endeavoured to identify the other aircraft without success. No transponder response had been obtained from the other aircraft.

14. AIRLINE DASH 8 “EVASIVE MANOEUVRE” SAVES MID-AIR COLLISION
12 April 2001 – Dubbo
Occurrence number 200101714. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Dash 8 reported that when they taxied for departure, and in reply to their transmission, the crew of a Cessna 152 responded that they were operating in the circuit area. The airline crew requested that the Cessna crew advise when turning onto final, then lined up the Dash 8 on runway 23. The airline crew had not heard a call from the Cessna and commenced their take off run. As they were committed to take off and about to become airborne, the Cessna 152 was sighted ahead and above at low altitude. An evasive manoeuvre was carried out by the Dash 8 crew.

15. AIRLINE DASH 8 UNALAERTED SEE AND AVOID – NEAR MISS
24 April 2001 – Dubbo
Occurrence number 200101900. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Dash 8 reported that while they were on descent for landing, the aircraft’s TCAS activated an RA on opposite direction VFR traffic climbing towards them. All the appropriate radio broadcasts had been made with no response from the other aircraft. They responded to the TCAS advice by climbing their aircraft which caused tem to re-enter IMC. When the other aircraft had passed they descended again for an uneventful landing.

[89 steps to heaven]

Dick

Don't bother posting reams of incidents just to prove you care.

It would be more constructive if you could give some guidance on my question please.

[Next Generation]

Dick Smith

It all started to go bad way back when someone decided to introduce the concept of "Affordable Safety"

Dick, you are determined to see your pet project through, and just like an over-protective parent, whose child can do no wrong, you fail to see the shortcomings of the NAS and continue to ignore the majority of the aviation community concerns.

Press on, ignore those of us in the industry at your own peril.

You only see things from a Private Pilot perspective, but I am sure that the Australian public are more concerned about the effects on Airlines.

In response to your big list of close calls prior to 27 November, you have failed to explain how the skies are NOW safer.

I can't see the improvement.

Please enlighten us all.

NG

[Dick Smith]

Incidents before 27 November 2003 - no emotive media releases, no Category 3s (Part 2)
16. AIRLINE TAKES EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID COLLISION – NO ATSB PRESS RELEASE
26 April 2001 – Bundaberg
Occurrence number 200102041. Incident category 5.
While taxiing for take-off, the crew of an air transport Jetstream made the necessary radio calls and had no responses from any aircraft. During the initial climb at 900 ft, the crew of the Jetstream observed a Rans S-7 aircraft joining the circuit on the downwind leg at 1,000 ft. Evasive action was taken by the crew of the airline aircraft to avoid a collision.

17. FOKKER F50 – ON COLLISION COURSE AND TOOK EVASIVE ACTION
27 April 2001 – Geraldton
Occurrence number 200102038. Incident category 5.
While taxiing for take-off on runway 03, the crew of an air transport Fokker F50 made the necessary radio calls and had no response from any aircraft. During the initial climb the crew was alerted by the pilot of a Cessna 172 who advised that they were “closing in on a C172”. The crew then observed the Cessna on a collision course and took evasive action. The pilot of the Cessna did not have the transponder turned on and the airline aircraft’s TCAS did not activate.

18. “CLIMB, CLIMB” UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
5 May 2001 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 2001021008. Incident category 5.
During the descending approach, the air transport Dash 8’s TCAS RA activated with a “monitor vertical speed” and then a “climb, climb” command. The crew complied with the climb command and the RA ceased but they did not receive a “clear of conflict” message. The crew continued the approach when they felt it was safe to do so.

19. FOKKER 28 JET – UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
15 June 2001 – Gove
Occurrence number 200102854. Incident category 5.
While joining the circuit crosswind for runway 13 at 1,500 ft AGL, the air transport Fokker 28 aircraft’s TCAS TA activated on an aircraft in close proximity. The crew’s attempt to contact the other aircraft were unsuccessful. The other aircraft appeared on the TCAS system to track from NE to SW and overflew the aerodrome at 1,500 ft AGL. The crew did not sight the other aircraft.

20. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
21 June 2001 – Port Macquarie
Occurrence number 200103741. Incident category 5.
Approaching 1,000 ft during entry to the circuit the air transport Dash 8 aircraft’s TCAS activated a TA. The crew immediately confirmed visual acquisition with the traffic, a Mooney, but the Dash 8’s TCAS then activated an RA to climb. The crew resolved the confliction and later stated that the pilot of the Mooney had not responded broadcasts until after it was visually acquired.

21. AIR TRANSPORT BEECH 1900 ON COLLISION COURSE UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
18 October 2001 – Roma
Occurrence number 200105064. Incident category 5.
An air transport Beech 1900 was on descent into Roma and was monitoring the airport frequency. A charter Shrike Commander departed Roma, made all appropriate calls, and climbed to 9,500 ft. At 1654, the crew of the Beech 1900 observed the Shrike Commander on a collision course and turned right to avoid the aircraft. Neither crew had heard the radio broadcasts of the other.

22. AIRLINE CARRIES OUT AVOIDANCE MANOEUVRE UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
25 November 2001 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200105652. Incident category 5.
Numerous radio calls made by two inbound aircraft failed to elicit a response from a departing VFR Cessna 172. The Cessna commenced its take-off roll as an inbound air transport Beech 1900 aircraft was joining crosswind. The pilot of the airline aircraft carried out an avoidance manoeuvre to join mid crosswind. Another regional airline aircraft was on final when the departing Cessna passed behind an approximately 600 ft above.

23. BAe146 JET IN CONFLICT – UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
21 December 2001 – Port Hedland
Occurrence number 200106120. Incident category 5.
Shortly after take-off, the crew of the air transport BAe146 jet observed an inbound target on the TCAS, which would have placed both aircraft in conflict had the crew maintained their initial departure profile. All mandatory departure calls were made, with the inbound aircraft not responding. A visual manoeuvre was made to avoid any potential conflict with a Piper Cherokee.

24. AIR TRANSPORT BEECH 1900 MAKES EVASIVE TURN TO AVOID COLLISION UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
26 February 2002 – Devonport
Occurrence number 200200916. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb, the crew of an air transport Beech 1900 observed a Hughes helicopter close in their 1230 o’clock position forcing the pilot to undertake an evasive turn of 30 degrees to the left. The helicopter pilot had not responded to earlier calls and the airline crew was not aware of its presence.

25. AIR TRANSPORT METRO IN NEAR COLLISION OVER THE NOSE UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
14 March 2002 – Tennant Creek
Occurrence number 200201383. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Metro reported that they had made all the required calls during approach. AT about 300 ft on final for runway 07, the crew suddenly saw a Cessna 182 “go sailing past” over the Metro’s nose and land on runway 11. The crew of the Metro had no choice but to continue the approach to land as a go-around was not possible. Attempts to contact the Cessna pilot were unsuccessful.

26. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 REQUIRES “EVASIVE ACTION” TO AVOID COLLISION
16 November 2002 – Longreach
Occurrence number 200205747. Incident category 5.
While the crew of an air transport Dash 8 was backtracking on runway 04, a Cessna 172 on short final for runway 04 continued the approach to within 70 ft and 200 metres from the Dash 8. The airline crew took evasive action to vacate the runway onto taxiway Bravo.

27. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB NEAR COLLISION ON RUNWAY UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
9 April 2003 – Bathurst
Occurrence number 200301757. Incident category 5.
During the landing roll, the crew of an air transport Saab sighted a Cessna 150 aircraft approximately 150 metres ahead on the runway. Maximum braking and reverse thrust was applied and the aircraft stopped approximately 50 metres from the Cessna. The Cessna had no anti-collision or strobe lights on, and later reported lighting and radio difficulties.

28. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB PREVENTS COLLISION BY UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
14 November 1999 – Mount Isa
Occurrence number 199905586. Incident category 5.
Upon arrival in the circuit, the air transport Saab aircraft had to turn to avoid a Cessna 182 from which no radio communications has been received. A collision was avoided through the use of unalerted see and avoid.

29. AIR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT REJECTS TAKE OFF, PREVENTS COLLISION, UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
14 December 1999 – Mount Isa
Occurrence number 199906187. Incident category 5.
An air transport Metro aircraft was back-tracking on runway 16 when the crew saw a Beech Baron aircraft commence its take-off roll. The airline crew unsuccessfully attempted to contact the pilot of the Baron. The Metro crew turned their aircraft around and vacated the runway as the Baron pilot transmitted and rejected the take off.

30. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 NEAR MISS/UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
11 October 1999 – Taree
Occurrence number 199904884. Incident category 5.
The air transport Dash 8 aircraft was manoeuvring to intercept an outbound track when a TCAS TA showed conflicting traffic. The warning changed to an RA after the crew had sighted the traffic and it was behind their aircraft.

31. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION 500 METRES APART
21 February 2000 – Casino
Occurrence number 200000679. Incident category 4.
The crew of an air transport Saab aircraft made the standard radio calls when departing Casino for Sydney. Passing 4,200 ft in climb they heard the pilot of a Mooney aircraft report south of Casino at 4,800 ft. The crew of the airline aircraft maintained 4,300 ft and sighted the Mooney in their left front at about 500 metres distance.

32. AIR TRANSPORT F27 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
2 November 1999 – Geraldton
Occurrence number 199905399. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Fokker F27 initiated a go-around due to a Cessna 172 observed ahead on final. Despite several attempts by the airline crew, communications were never established with the Cessna.

33. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
29 November 1999 – Mildura
Occurrence number 199905740. Incident category 5.
The air transport Dash 8 aircraft was about to enter and backtrack on a runway when an air transport Fairchild Metro aircraft was sighted on a three mile final. No radio calls had been heard from the airline Metro on final despite the appropriate calls from the taxiing Dash 8 airline aircraft.

34. AIR TRANSPORT, NO RADIO CALLS, UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
18 December 1999 – Ayers Rock
Occurrence number 199906001. Incident category 5.
Two air transport aircraft were scheduled to depart. The crew of an airline Boeing 737 entered the runway and did not make any radio calls until just prior to line up.

35. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
17 March 2000 – Wagga Wagga
Occurrence number 200000952. Incident category 5.
During descent, the TCAS of an air transport Saab aircraft activated an RA. The airline crew responded to the alert and later sighted another aircraft which had not responded to transmissions.

36. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
23 April 2000 – Mildura
Occurrence number 200001882. Incident category 5.
Shortly after departure, the crew of an air transport Dash 8 received a TCAS/TA alert. No traffic was sighted.

37. AIR TRANSPORT SHORTS 360 – RA MAY HAVE AVOIDED COLLISION WITH NAVAJO
30 April 2000 – Maryborough
Occurrence number 200001573. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Shorts 360 aircraft were inbound for a GPS approach and contacted the pilot of a charter Navajo aircraft, which was inbound for an NDB approach. The Navajo pilot agreed to hold at 4,000 ft while the airline aircraft conducted the GPS approach. The Navajo pilot was holding at 4,000 ft when he thought he heard the crew of the Shorts broadcast that they were visual. The Navajo descended to lowest safe altitude of 1,700 ft to commence the NDB approach. The Saab crew then reported that the runway was not visual and broadcast that they had commenced a missed approach. The Navajo pilot heard this broadcast, checked the instrument approach plates and realised the two aircraft would conflict. He advised the Shorts crew of his altitude and location. A short time later, the pilot of the Shorts aircraft reported that they received an ACAS RA. The airline crew increased the rate of climb until the ACAS indicated that the aircraft was clear of the conflicting traffic.

38. SHORTS 360 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
11 May 2000 – Hervey Bay
Occurrence number 200002102. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport Shorts 360 aircraft was joining crosswind when the TCAS activated a TA. The other aircraft replied with a departure call after a query from the airline crew. The Shorts crew had been monitoring the frequency for at least 6 minutes and had heard no previous radio transmissions.

39. AIR TRANSPORT BAe146 JET NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION, UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
21 May 2000 – Karratha
Occurrence number 200001919. Incident category 5.
An air transport BAe146 was on descent in the MBZ when conflicting traffic was observed by the crew on the TCAS, approximately 6 nm ahead, 400 ft below their current level and climbing. No radio broadcasts had been heard. The airline crew altered their heading by 90 degrees to the right, and the pilot of the other aircraft, a Beech Baron, responded to the broadcast. The aircraft passed with a separation of 700 ft vertically and 2 nm laterally.

40. AIR TRANSPORT BAe146 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
1 July 2000 – Kununurra
Occurrence number 200002983. Incident category 5.
The crew of an air transport BAe146 aircraft were on climb at 3,500 ft when they observed an aircraft on their TCAS at the same altitude as they passed 1 nm to the east. The other aircraft, a Partenavia, did not appear to be maintaining a listening watch as required in published procedures.

41. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB USES TCAS TO SAVE UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID SITUATION
6 July 2000 – Mildura
Occurrence number 200003409. Incident category 5.
Passing 2,000 ft during climb to cruise, the TCAS of an air transport Saab activated a TA. The traffic was indicated at 8 nm and 1,200 ft above. Despite attempts as establishing contact, no response was received. When the aircraft were 2 nm apart, the flight crew of the airline aircraft were required to commence a descending left turn to avoid the traffic, a Beech Bonanza, which passed overhead.

42. 25 July 2000 – Hervey Bay
Occurrence number 200003338. Incident category 5.
While taxiing for departure from runway 29, the crew of an air transport Jetstream aircraft heard a radio transmission from the pilot of a Cessna Caravan reporting inbound. After some communication difficulties, it was agreed between the crews that the Caravan would remain north of the runway centreline. When the Jetstream became airborne, its TCAS activated an RA. The crew responded appropriately and formed the opinion that the Caravan had been positioned for a straight in approach to reciprocal runway 11.

43. AIR TRANSPORT BRASILIA NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION, UNLAERTED SEE AND AVOID
29 July 2000 – Mount Isa
Occurrence number 200003494. Incident category 5.
While descending through 4,000 ft, the pilot of the air transport Brasilia sighted opposite direction traffic 300 – 400 metres to the left and at the same level. The pilot of the other aircraft, a Cessna 210, had not acknowledged any broadcasts.

44. AIR TRANSPORT BAe146 JET UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID INCIDENT
7 August 2000 – Kununurra
Occurrence number 200003524. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb the flight crew of an air transport BAe146 received a TCAS/RA alert on two aircraft. The pilot of one of those aircraft, a Cessna 210, had earlier agreed to remain south of the runway centre line to assist deconfliction. The pilot of the second aircraft had not acknowledged any of the radio calls made by the flight crew of the departing aircraft.

45. AIR TRANSPORT SHORTS 360 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
8 August 2000 – Hervey Bay
Occurrence number 200003512. Incident category 5.
During the take-off roll the pilot of an air transport Shorts 360 became aware of conflicting traffic and rejected the take-off. The pilot of the conflicting Cessna 172 had not responded to radio broadcasts. The pilot of the Cessna later advised he had selected the incorrect frequency.

46. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
30 August 2000 – Cloncurry
Occurrence number 200003980. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb out of Cloncurry, the flight crew of an air transport Saab aircraft noticed the landing lights of a Beech Baron heading across their track. The flight crew had made taxiing calls and received no response. The Baron passed behind within 1,000 ft vertically and 1 nm.

47. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
20 September 2000 – Wagga Wagga
Occurrence number 200004294. Incident category 5.
While an air transport Saab aircraft was on a 2 nm final approach for runway 23, a Beech Baron taxied onto the runway and commenced a take-off run. No radio calls had been heard from the pilot of the departing aircraft.

48. AIR TRANPORT JETSTREAM UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
21 September 2000 – Mount Isa
Occurrence number 200004405. Incident category 5.
While on descent, and having made all required radio calls without response, the crew of an air transport Jetstream noticed the aircraft’s TCAS activate an RA. Appropriate separation measures with a Cessna 404 were taken and the flight landed without further incident. In later discussion with the pilot of the Cessna, it was discovered that the Cessna had been experiencing radio problems.

49. AIR TRANSPORT METRO UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
18 November 2000 – Mount Gambier
Occurrence number 200006477. Incident category 5.
Ground staff reported that while the air transport Metro aircraft was overshooting from a runway 18 NDB approach, an agricultural aircraft took off from the reciprocal runway 36. As the agricultural aircraft reached 200 ft AGL, the Metro passed over at 550 ft. The Metro was in fog (IMC conditions) and the crew did not see the agricultural aircraft. The pilot of the agricultural aircraft did not make any radio calls.

50. 31 January 2001 – Armidale
Occurrence number 200100172. Incident category 5.
During the approach, the TCAS of an air transport Dash 8 activated an RA. The flight crew immediately climbed the aircraft and the warning ceased. Other traffic in the vicinity was a Cessna 172 carrying out NDB Airwork, had the Dash 8 visual and was in radio contact.

51. AIR TRANSPORT BAe146 JET POTENTIAL COLLISION ON RUNWAY AVERTED
7 February 2001 – Mackay
Occurrence number 200100653. Incident category 5.
As the air transport BAe146 jet crew broadcast lining up on runway 14 from taxiway B, the pilot of a Piper Cherokee broadcast commencing the take-off run on runway 14. Both aircraft rejected the take off. The crew of the airline aircraft reported that radio traffic on 135.5 was very busy and approximately 6 aircraft were operating on the frequency at the time.

52. 12 February 2001 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200100706. Incident category 5.
As the air transport Dash 8 approached the MBZ from the south, a Piper Navajo Chieftain departed the MBZ to the south and advised having the airline aircraft in sight. The Dash 8’s TCAS activated an RA for approximately 5 seconds.

53. 15 February 2001 – Laverton
Occurrence number 200100794. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb passing 300 ft AGL the air transport Fokker 27 aircraft’s TCAS activated a TA, followed shortly after by an RA. The crew made all appropriate calls and carried out the necessary action, however no other traffic was noticed.

54. AIR TRANSPORT JETSTREAM TCAS PREVENTS POTENTIAL COLLISION
9 March 2001 – Hervey Bay
Occurrence number 200101179. Incident category 5.
While approaching the airport, the pilot of an air transport Jetstream made all the appropriate calls. At 6 miles, the crew heard and unreadable radio transmission. While established on a 3 nm final for runway 29 the crew noticed a proximate traffic symbol on the TCAS indicating an aircraft at 6 nm on the other side of the aerodrome. When the airline aircraft was on final at 400 ft the crew noticed the other traffic, a Cessna 182, at approximately 200 ft on final for reciprocal runway 11. The crew of the airline aircraft commenced a go-around. The pilot of the Cessna stated he was having radio trouble.

55. AIR TRANSPORT FOKKER 27 RELYING ON UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID TO PREVENT COLLISION
9 March 2001 – Geraldton
Occurrence number 20010106. Incident category 5.
After the air transport Fokker 27 departed on climb to cruise passing FL110, the crew heard the pilot of a Cessna 172 give a 10 nm inbound call that consisted only of a circuit estimate. The crew of the airline aircraft had climbed through the level of the Cessna and were unaware of the aircraft’s position. No TCAS indication was received.

56. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 FORCED TO TAKE RA ACTION TO PREVENT POTENTIAL COLLISION
16 March 2001 – Taree
Occurrence number 200101196. Incident category 5.
An air transport Dash 8 was approaching the CTAF on descent to 3,000 ft. A Beech Duchess was opposite direction traffic departing on climb to 2,000 ft. The crew of both aircraft had previously agreed to maintain 1,000 ft separation until passing. The crew of the Dash 8 observed the Duchess on TCAS climb through 2,000 ft and an RA activated as the Duchess passed 2,600 ft on climb. The flight crew of the Dash 8 took appropriate action.

57. AIRLINE SHORTS 360 – UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
2 August 2001 – Bundaberg
Occurrence number 200104020. Incident category 5.
A report was received that the flight crew of an air transport Shorts 360 aircraft selected the incorrect radio frequency for operations at Bundaberg. When their aircraft entered runway 14 for departure, they observed a light aircraft in the circuit area an upon checking their radios, realised the error.

58. AIR TRANSPORT SAAB UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
5 August 2001 – Port Lincoln
Occurrence number 200103919. Incident category 5.
During the approach, the crew of an air transport Saab reported observing on TCAS an aircraft departing. The crew heard no radio calls from the aircraft.

59. VOLUME TURNED DOWN – UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
25 September 2001 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200104797. Incident category 5.
On descent, the air transport Beech 1900 made necessary calls and was advised traffic. The Beech and King Air established communication and the Beech would be number one for runway 12. When the Beech was downwind for runway 12, the Army aircraft transmitted downwind for runway 30. The Beech TCAS showed the Army aircraft to be 1 nm at 400 ft beneath on opposite direction. The Beech climbed to 2,000’. The crew of the Army aircraft reported that the aircraft’s radio volume had been inadvertently turned down due to turbulence inbound.

60. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 FORECED TO RELY ON UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID AND TCAS
9 November 2001 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200105404. Incident category 5.
During the approach, the air transport Dash 8 aircraft’s TCAS RA activated. When inbound, traffic appeared on TCAS, 1 o’clock position at 12 nm flying level at 2,000 ft. The Dash 8 remained at 2,500 ft and tried to contact the aircraft on Brisbane Centre ATC frequency and the MBZ but no contact was made. The TCAS was then brought to a 6 nm range, and as this happened a TCAS RA occurred as the unidentified aircraft passed the Dash 8’s 2 o’clock position at 2 nm.

61. BEECH 1900 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
18 March 2002 – Port Macquarie
Occurrence number 200201380. Incident category 5.
An air transport Beech 1900 aircraft was on descent in visual conditions and the crew had made all required broadcasts. No acknowledgements were received. At about 5 nm north of Port Macquarie passing 1,500 ft, the crew of the Beech observed a Cessna 152 flying in the opposite direction and pass about half a mile to the left and 500 ft above them. Attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful.

62. 8 July 2002 – Hamilton Island
Occurrence number 200203297. Incident category 5.
During the early stages of the take-off roll of an air transport Dash 8, the crew rejected the take off due to a Squirrel helicopter becoming airborne in close proximity. The helicopter pilot said that the Dash 8’s rolling call was difficult to read. The airline aircraft backtracked and departed with no further incident.

63. DASH 8 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
28 July 2002 – Dubbo
Occurrence number 20203860. Incident category 5.
While taxiing for take-off, the crew of an air transport Dash 8 broadcast intentions and received a reply. During initial climb, the Dash 8’s TCAS activated an RA. The crew identified the aircraft on TCAS 300 ft above and the crew adjusted the climb accordingly.

64. UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
30 November 2002 – Williamtown
Occurrence number 200206058. Incident category 5.
While at 4,000 ft in the MBZ and tracking to join a 5 nm final, the pilot of a King Air observed a helicopter less than one mile away, heading in the opposite direction at the same altitude. No communication had been heard from the helicopter.

65. UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
25 January 2003 – Weipa
Occurrence number 200302520. Incident category 5.
While conducting circuits on runway 12, the crew of a military Super King Air observed a Cessna 172 lined up for departure on runway 30. The Cessna pilot taxied off the threshold after sighting the King Air on final, however the Cessna remained on the runway strip as the King Air landed. Discussions between the pilots revealed that the Cessna pilot had tried to communicate with the King Air pilot but had inadvertently depressed the map light button on the control column instead of the radio transmit button.

66. 9 February 2003 – Amberley
Occurrence number 200300860. Incident category 5.
While a Mooney was transiting, a Cessna 206 flew through the Mooney’s intended flight path, approximately 300 metres ahead. No communication was heard from the Cessna pilot.

67. DASH 8 UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID
10 March 2003 – Devonport.
Occurrence number 200301341. Incident category 5.
An air transport Dash 8 crew heard an inbound call from a Jabiru. Despite taxi and departure calls from the Dash 8, no further calls were heard from the Jabiru. During initial climb, the Dash 8 crew noticed the Jabiru straight ahead and in close proximity. The crew levelled the Dash 8 and the Jabiru passed directly overhead.

68. 16 November 2002 – Mackay
Occurrence number 2002006582. Incident category 4.
The crew of an air transport Boeing 717 was cleared to make a visual approach and was instructed to continue downwind. The 717 turned base and became in conflict with an air transport Dash 8 that was on final approach.

69. 10 March 2000 – Maroochydore
Occurrence number 200000928. Incident category 5.
A Cessna 210 aircraft was observed to taxi and take off from the MBZ without making any radio calls. An air transport Shorts 360, and another RPT aircraft, were both using the airfield at the time.

70. 3 January 2001 – Coffs Harbour
Occurrence number 200100040. Incident category 5.
During final approach to runway 03, the air transport Dash 8 aircraft’s TCAS activated an RA to climb. Visual separation standards were being applied by ATC and the flight crew had the other aircraft, a Cessna 172, in sight. The crew of the Dash 8 initiated a climb but then elected to continue approach and landing.

71. 9 May 2001 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200102204. Incident category 5.
During the descent, an air transport Dash 8 aircraft’s TCAS activated with an RA to climb. The crew immediately complied and the warning ceased. Traffic in the vicinity was opposite direction on climb approximately 800 ft below.

72. 12 May 2001 – Alice Springs
Occurrence number 200102237. Incident category 5
An air transport BAe146 jet was departing via the 219 radial with instructions to maintain 4,000 ft. The pilot of a Cessna 210 inbound at 5,000 ft had the jet in sight and was tracking to pass behind. As ATC was attempting to pass traffic information to the airline crew, the pilot of the BAe146 reported receiving a TCAS RA.

73. 17 June 2001 – Mackay
Occurrence number 200102879. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb, the air transport Bae146 aircraft’s TCAS RA activated with a “descend” command, which the crew carried out. Two seconds later the “clear of conflict” message activated.

74. 12 March 2002 – Albury
Occurrence number 200201253. Incident category 5.
During the initial climb, the air transport Saab aircraft’s TCAS RA activated. The Saab crew reported sighting and passing within 1.5 nm of an air transport Dash 8 aircraft. ATC advised the crew of the Saab that visual separation standards were being applied and complied with at the time of the incident.

75. AIR TRANSPORT DASH 8 – BREAKDOWN OF SEPARATION STANDARDS
13 April 2002 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200201741. Incident category 5.
The pilot of a Mooney aircraft contacted ATC inbound and requested an airways clearance when the aircraft was already in CTA. This resulted in an infringement of separation standards between the Mooney and an air transport Dash 8 aircraft. A traffic alert was issued as the vertical separation between the aircraft reduced to 800 ft. Vertical separation of 1,000 ft was then established and an airways clearance issued.

76. 29 June 2002 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200002925. Incident category 5.
A departing Citation jet aircraft failed to maintain 4,000 ft visual as instructed and conflicted with an inbound Cessna 310 aircraft. A breakdown of separation occurred with an aircraft on the reciprocal track. No evasive action was required.

77. 10 October 2002 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200205096. Incident category 5.
While on climb, the air transport Dash 8 aircraft’s TCAS activated an RA due to a Piper Chieftain operating in the vicinity. The ADC had advised both pilots of traffic. The pilot of the Dash 8 reported sighting the Chieftain and agreed to maintain their own separation.

78. 22 November 2003 – Tamworth
Occurrence number 200205830. Incident category 5.
While inbound and assigned 5,000 ft visual, the pilot of a Piper Cherokee aircraft descended to 4,300 ft without approval, resulting in a breakdown of separation with a Dassault Falcon 200 outbound on a practice NDB approach at 4,000 ft.

79. 15 May 2003 – Coffs Harbour (Note: ATSB says not a serious incident – no press release!)
Occurrence number 200302172. Incident category 4.
During a GOS approach to runway 21 in reduced visibility, a Beech King Air aircraft’s left main wheel stuck a breakwater in the harbour north of the aerodrome. The wheels on the left main gear detached from the aircraft. The pilot initiated a go around and operated visually east of the coastline to enable rescue and emergency services to position on the aerodrome. The aircraft landed safely a short time after.

[Shitsu-Tonka]

Dick Smith:

I am a little confused at the exact point you are trying to make with your post.

Is it a case of "here I can prove we have lots of near-misses and TCAS saving the day before so on that basis we can now officially rely on unalerted see and avoid?". Is that really a case for removing the radio?

There is no mention of course of how many times pilots (on the right frequency) actually sorted out a satisfactory separation arrangement - or just simply were aware of other traffic in the circuit. Is that because it happens every day?

'unemotive examples'?? (who wrote the bylines like BOEING 747 POTENTIAL MID-AIR COLLISION – 400 LIVES! , NEAR MISS, UNALERTED SEE AND AVOID, “FILLED THE SCREEN” - the ATSB?!)

You say the NAS follows international practice - is this moving away from a strictly US system - the one that John Anderson says we will now have?

[tobzalp]

79. 15 May 2003 – Coffs Harbour (Note: ATSB says not a serious incident – no press release!)
Occurrence number 200302172. Incident category 4.
During a GOS approach to runway 21 in reduced visibility, a Beech King Air aircraft’s left main wheel stuck a breakwater in the harbour north of the aerodrome. The wheels on the left main gear detached from the aircraft. The pilot initiated a go around and operated visually east of the coastline to enable rescue and emergency services to position on the aerodrome. The aircraft landed safely a short time after.

wtf? NAS? I think you have truely lost it now dicky boy.

[Howard Hughes]

Dick, Dick, Dick, (shakes head)

Having briefly read the incidents that you have so painstakingly put up in defence of NAS I would like to say this.

From my observations the majority of these incidents seem to take place OCTA, or there is a blatant cockpit breakdown (ie: non adherence to an ATC clearance!!).

The incidents post NAS have occured with high capacity RPT jets on descent into controlled aerodromes, where everybody involved was conforming to their clearances or proceeding as class E airspace allows.

Now my question is this, can you not see the difference between the pre and post NAS scenarios?

Secondly how can removing frequencies from charts whilst still expecting people to be on an "appropriate frequency" enhance safety OCTA? You yourself have already quoted a myriad of incidents pre NAS, that have in the large part been caused by miscommunications and/or aircraft with incorrect frequncies selected.


Cheers, HH. :ok:

PS: safe flying all.

[Next Generation]

Dick Smith

Your entire post is disjointed and makes no sense at all.

You have not answered any of our questions.

79. 15 May 2003 – Coffs Harbour (Note: ATSB says not a serious incident – no press release!)
.....The wheels on the left main gear detached from the aircraft. The pilot initiated a go around and operated visually east of the coastline to enable rescue and emergency services to position on the aerodrome......

What the HELL has this got to do with NAS ???

Or did you just go off half-cocked without reading what you were actually cutting & pasting.

As this is a serious issue, (at least it is amongst professional pilot's), please have the courtesy to read whatever it is you are copying.

[Dick Smith]

Next Generation, I did not introduce the concept of affordable safety. I've never heard of anything so ridiculous in all my life. Safety has always been limited to what society can afford. That's why you have to be very astute and allocate the finite resources so they save the most lives.

The additional safety from 27 November changes comes from the fact that air traffic controllers and pilots will be more able to concentrate their resources where the collision risk is higher - that is closer to the airport. This will be reflected in a reduction in the number of serious safety incidents. The reason Class C airspace above places like Launceston has been changed to Class E is so that air traffic control resources can be moved to where the collision risk is highest and where the most serious incidents have been occurring.

Next Generation, you state:

I can't see the improvement Of course, if you just look at incidents which take place in Class E airspace and not also look at incidents which take place in airspace closer to the aerodrome you will not be able to see a change, however, if you objectively look at the situation you will find that by concentrating air traffic control resources to where the collision risk is highest, that safety will improve.

To save answering a further question, the reason that unalerted see and avoid incidents will be reduced in MBZ airports is because VFR aircraft flying enroute will no longer be monitoring hundreds of calls which are irrelevant. The new system is simpler and will result in higher compliance rates in the airport area and there will be less "defusion of responsibility" because most calls received by a pilot in Class G airspace will be relevant traffic information. The USA appears to have a lower number of unalerted see and avoid incidents reported in the circuit area of aerodromes. This is primarily because there is no enroute ATC frequency for VFR pilots to monitor, and there is a simple and straight forward CTAF system that is common at every non-tower airport.

The reason the Coffs Harbour incident is mentioned is due to the fact that the ATSB did not send out a press release about it, whereas they did in relation to the Launceston incident.

[89 steps to heaven]

Dick

Still no answers.

Can't or wont?

Again

[DirectAnywhere]

Dick, I'll post additonal comments relating to 2c on here when I have more time. I've just downloaded the NPRM and am frankly quite disturbed by what I've seen on a brief read through.

I've just got a couple of quick questions at this stage.
That's why you have to be very astute and allocate the finite resources so they save the most lives.
At this stage, what cost saving is there to the tax payer in amending MBZ/CTAF procedures to this extent? Surely it doesn't cost the taxpayer a cent to leave these procedures as they are. No resources will be saved, in fact taxpayer dollars will be wasted as a result of these unnecessary changes. Scarce dollars that could be better spent, perhaps, in educating pilots better on our current procedures?

the reason that unalerted see and avoid incidents will be reduced in MBZ airports is because VFR aircraft flying enroute will no longer be monitoring hundreds of calls which are irrelevant Any aircraft flying in an MBZ should only be hearing the calls that are made from within that MBZ and as such are directly relevant to the operation. This point simply doesn't hold water!!

where the collision risk is higher - that is closer to the airport You accept this fact - in essence it is the raison d'etre for ALL NAS amendments. However, 2c seems to directly contradict this through the removal of MBZs. If this NPRM is accepted you will have High Capacity RPT aircraft that will be sharing airspace with aircraft that may or may not have radios. This can only lead to an increase in serious unalerted see and avoid incidents.

The new recommended procedures, and a requirement for pilots totake all reasonable steps to ensure that his/her aircraft does not cause a danger to other aircraft are too general and, at the end of the day, are only recommended procedures.

I can assure you that I'll be responding to this NPRM through the appropriate channels also and resisting these changes.

As I said, I'll add some further comments later but I would urge you to reconsider this.

[Shitsu-Tonka]

OK! Now I get it.

The whole point of your post is that you have an axe to grind with the ATSB.

You obviously are not happy with the fact that LT was delcared an airprox? How close do you want them to get before it qualifies? If it makes you happier I would say that a fair swag of the examples you quoted OCTA prob qualify for airprox too.

This is really a case of playing the man not the ball - the problem isn't that ATSB or whoever don't like you Dick - it's that they don't like your system. Along with the majority of airspace users, air traffic controllers, CASA FOI's etc.

Do you think maybe that many people might actually have a point?

Let me tell you about your theory of putting air traffic controllers concentration closer to the airport - since NAS I can tell you (as a fact) that some air traffic controllers attention is now diverted away from the airport because aircraft need RAS on 1200 VFR on descent where airspae transitions from E to C. Instead of concentrating on the sequence and separating dep with arr with the appropriate level of attention, they are providing suggested headings to inbound aircraft who don't like what their TCAS is telling them - or providing vectors off standard routes to provide desc and climb clear of E airspace all together. Any idea what all this does for enhancing safety?

ATSB don't give you the answer you want: solution - discredit the ATSB.

Do that somewhere else - we are not that stupid.

[Dick Smith]

Howard Hughes, you asked

“how can removing frequencies from charts whilst still expecting people to be on an “appropriate frequency” enhance safety OCTA?” Safety is enhanced because the system is simpler. Now when flying enroute, if a pilot is in the approach and departure airspace of an aerodrome, they monitor the aerodrome frequency. Where are airline aircraft likely to conflict with VFR aircraft? Yes, in the approach and departure airspace of an aerodrome.

I agree that many of the incidents quoted pre-NAS have aircraft with the wrong frequency selected. Proven overseas systems have shown that if you simplify the system and say to pilots that when in the approach and departure airspace of an aerodrome, monitor the aerodrome frequency, it is such a simple request that it is more often complied with.

I feel sure that you believe that VFR pilots flying enroute in the old system were religiously monitoring ATC frequencies and changing frequency when crossing a radio frequency boundary. You believe this happened, when IFR pilots (who are far more skilled) are told when to change frequency all the time and still make errors.

The old system may have given us a good feeling inside, but compliance was difficult and required pilots to be constantly looking down at charts rather than remaining vigilant.

As over 80% of airports are on frequency 126.7, a pilot can now fly enroute in much of the airspace monitoring 126.7, and be assured of receiving traffic information on aircraft approaching and departing those airports.

People on this forum constantly put down so-called “private pilots”, however incident reports show that all pilots make errors, and the simpler the system, the fewer errors are likely to be made.

I’m sure many will agree.

89 steps to heaven, I'm not sure after 10,000 words of posting what questions I haven't answered. Give me a call on 02 9450 0600 or 0408 640 221 to discuss this. Don't be timid! Bite the bullet and give me a call.

[Dick Smith]

DirectAnywhere, it is extraordinary that you don’t seem to understand my statement:

The reason that unalerted see and avoid incidents will be reduced in MBZ airports is because VFR aircraft flying enroute will no longer be monitoring hundreds of calls which are irrelevant. This is a statement of fact. In the system before 27 November 2003, VFR pilots were taught to monitor ATC frequencies when enroute – that is why so many people want to keep the ATC frequency boundaries on the charts – and then were taught to change to the MBZ frequency when in the MBZ.

Unfortunately, the evidence appears to show that many pilots got to the MBZ and were then not on the correct frequency. This appears to be a greater problem in Australia (even though the requirement is “mandatory”) than in the US CTAF system, where the problem basically does not exist. They do not have a major problem of unalerted see and avoid at their non-tower airports.

There are two major differences. In the USA there is no requirement for VFR aircraft to monitor a radio when enroute. This means that the US VFR pilot can concentrate on monitoring the airport frequency. Also in the USA, rather than have some airports CTAFs and other airports MBZs, every non-tower airport is treated the same way. There are more self-announcements (seven, in fact) than in our MBZs, and the system results in a very high level of compliance and safety.

The reason we are moving to the NAS system for non-tower airports is not to save money. As you have rightly pointed out, there is no saving. It is to improve safety by reducing unalerted see and avoid incidents. In our system of “radio arranged separation” when VMC exists, the MBZ quickly overloads, and pilots cannot get an announcement in. With the NAS system, because there are more announcements and less dialogue, believe it or not, it can cope with more aircraft in the airport vicinity.

You appear to believe that by moving to NAS style CTAFs that there will be fewer pilots using radio. I do not agree, and if I thought this was the situation I would not support the introduction of NAS. I believe there will be no measurable difference in the number of aircraft using radios when existing MBZs are changed to CTAFs. However there will be less “diffusion of responsibility”, because pilots will be more vigilant.

You do not appear to understand the very great problems we have in existing MBZs. In December 2003, the ATSB completed a report (Airspace-Related Occurrences Involving Regular Public Transport and Charter Aircraft within Mandatory Broadcast Zones) where they made the following recommendation:

Some steps have already been taken in an attempt to increase the safety of aircraft operating within some MBZs. However, airspace-related occurrences within MBZs particularly those relating to radio usage, continue to be of safety concern. ****zu-Tonka, no I do not have an axe to grind with the ATSB. I’m happy that they declared the LT incident an airprox, however I believe it is important that they give the same amount of publicity to other airproxes which are just as serious or even more serious. If they don’t do this, there could be a false understanding that serious safety incidents have actually increased with the new airspace system, when they may have decreased.

The ATSB should be totally objective in their reports. I find it extraordinary that I have listed just some of the many incidents that have taken place over the last few years close to the airport, yet no system safety study has been done by the ATSB which mentions that we have a significant safety problem close to our airports.

[DirectAnywhere]

OK Dick. Sorry, I see your point now but I still don't agree with it. The issue you identify is not one of people monitoring the radio while in enroute airspace but FAILING to monitor the correct frequency when within an MBZ. These are two seperate issues. Incidentally, I agree the majority of calls monitored enroute are irrelevant. However, some aren't; but back to the issue. The second issue - the one you've identified as the problem - should be corrected by better training - not simply by removing the requirement to listen to the radio - either enroute or within a CTAF/ former MBZ under 2c.

Secondly, I do not believe there will be less pilots using the radio but there will be more aircraft, those not equipped with radios, now able to share the same airspace as High Cap. RPT aircraft. Even if an RPT aircraft does sight an aircraft within a 2c CTAF if that aircraft is not radio equipped it becomes a guessing game, based upon "recommended" - not mandatory - procedures as to what that aircraft is going to do.

This opens up a can of worms as a pilot can essentially do what they like - within the bounds of the remaining CARs - and whilst "taking all reasonable steps to ensure that his/her aircraft does not cause a danger to other aircraft". Of course, you need to know the other aircraft is there to do that!!

However, airspace-related occurrences within MBZs particularly those relating to radio usage, continue to be of safety concern. And sorry, I have to say that again surely this is a training issue. The procedures work fine, so long as people follow them. And whilst I understand your desire to make things simpler, simpler isn't necessarily safer.

One of the major issues I have with Class E as it stands now has already been identified in this thread. Although, the airspace is simpler, and people are making less "errors", as the incident at Launceston has shown, everybody can do everything right and still have an airprox. At least in Class C, someone has to make a mistake for that to happen. I believe the same is true of this proposal.

[DirtyPierre]

Without getting too personal just some points,

1. The incident investigations of all those incidents would have determined a number of causal factors that contributed to the incident occurring. Many of these factors are system based, and some would be based on actual deliberate or accidental non-compliance by aircrew or ATC. Without that reporting by the investigating team, merely listing the incidents has no useful purpose and neither supports nor contradicts your position.

2. You keep mentioning the KISS principle, yet NAS moves Oz airspace to a more complicated airspace design with a greater number of differing procedures (eg. VFR on top, VFR climb/descent, IFR pick-up).

3. I can substantiate S-Tonka's assertion about NAS actually taking the ATC's attention away from his primary tasks of separation. The ATC now has to continually monitor the flight paths of RPT traffic in E airspace even though the ATC has separated the acft from all known traffic. VFR pop-ups on radar occur at anytime, on occasions without height readout. Assessing and passing traffic involves more radio transmissions than separation, consequently taking up valuable ATC thinking time. Radar coverage, even under the J curve, is a patchy thing, thats why ADS-B is being developed.

4. Dick, can you provide any evidence of suitable accredited qualifications and experience in relation to airspace and procedures design, incident investigation, aviation quality assurance, or air traffic management? Being Chairman of a Board might give you management experience, but it doesn't give you specific experience in the core services of that organisation.

5. Did you read the thread started by the Voices of Reason? I noticed you didn't respond. Why?

Dick, like I said before, your heart is in the right place, but leave the professionals to do the job. Well meaning amatuers will never do as good a job as any half decent professional.

Hasta la vista.

[Next Generation]

Dick Smith

People on this forum constantly put down so-called “private pilots”, however incident reports show that all pilots make errors, and the simpler the system, the fewer errors are likely to be made.

Firstly, this is a PROFESSIONAL pilot's forum.

Secondly, we are not putting down private pilot's. We just feel that a private pilot's opinion should not be the deciding factor in determining what is the safest Airspace System for Australia.

[missy]

Dick,

You say "I did not introduce the concept of affordable safety". Whilst that statement in itself may be correct the first time I heard it was from your mouth.

Your tedious posting of 79 Air Safety occurrences prove only one point and that is a human system within which we operate, humans make mistakes. From what I can see NAS does not improve safety.

[SM4 Pirate]

“Firstly, thank you for your NAS statement which I received on Monday morning. I appreciate your forthrightness and value your input.

The Government has decided to adopt the US FAA airspace model as the model for airspace reform. In Airservices, our responsibility is to ensure the safe implementation of these changes. The NAS model does result in a change of classification of some volumes of airspace and inherent with re-classification is a change of level of air traffic service provided. The re-classification and the resultant level have been deemed appropriate by the Aviation Reform Group. The NAS model has undergone an examination utilising the safety assessment process required for any change to the national airways system. It has been subject to two Safety Cases, one for implementation and one for design, and both have been endorsed as safe by Airservices’ own Directorate of Safety and Environmental Assurance (DSEA), and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) as the aviation regulatory body in Australia.

Airservices Australia has examined the implementation of the change utilising its own safety management system. The Board and Management are satisfied that the 27 November changes are safe and should proceed.

The argument that the expansion of “E” airspace is less safe than the current system of “C” is somewhat inconsistent given that Class E is an ICAO airspace category and is widely used around the world. Services have been provided in Class E airspace between Canberra and Ballina for approximately 5 years. Nevertheless, this issue was carefully considered by management, the Board Safety and Environment Committee and the Board itself.

The Head Air Traffic Controller and Managers of the Centres have examined risks in the context of the ALARP model and have been signatories to both safety cases.

Training has been provided to ensure controllers can competently provide the services expected of them in Class E airspace. The professionalism of the ATC workforce in the successful completion of this training is well recognised by Melbourne Centre Management and by the Office of HATC.

In summary, I acknowledge that the nature of this airspace change is causing a degree of concern within the professional ATC workforce, however NAS 2B has undergone the mandated safety assessment process, which has been endorsed by the regulator.”

Yes Minister, eat your heart out...

Bottle of Rum

[89 steps to heaven]

Dick

89 steps to heaven, I'm not sure after 10,000 words of posting what questions I haven't answered. Give me a call on 02 9450 0600 or 0408 640 221 to discuss this. Don't be timid! Bite the bullet and give me a call.

If you check the second posting in this very thread, you will find the questions that I posted. Not critical, not abusive, not trivial, but questions that need to be answered.

[5miles]

Mr. Smith

You state:
"Safety has always been limited to what society can afford. That's why you have to be very astute and allocate the finite resources so they save the most lives."

Save the most lives?? Yet you have degraded the safety afforded to those that carry the most lives.

Then:
"The reason Class C airspace above places like Launceston has been changed to Class E is so that air traffic control resources can be moved to where the collision risk is highest and where the most serious incidents have been occurring."

To an enroute radar controller, Class E demands more resources than Class C.
We still have to separate IFR/IFR and now have to provide reactive separation with VFR's rather than planned tactical separation.


By the way, caught your input on the "Ugg Boot" issue. Good to see you're not pro-U.S. on everything. Maybe there is hope yet.

[Shitsu-Tonka]

Putting aside the radio requirements and broadcast requirements for one minute.....

Why do we 'need' to change the circuit entry and pattern for non-controlled aerodromes - just because it is the US system? Why confuse everyone even further? Dick - you did premise this whole NAS 'adventure' with the requirement to stimulate GA in Australia right? This would just scare me off!


(As an aside .... I am sick to death of being suffocated with the US v.v:- television / fast-food / rap music / australian kids trying to look like gangsters / john howard and his sycophantic ass-licking / soldiers in my army fighting a war that nobody believes in / one sided trade deals ...... and an airspace system that the US themselves admit is flawed and resulted from band-aid measures... - I say ENOUGH!!! Does anyone else feel like we are losing our identity here? ....goddamn! ------ returns to Gin and Tonic (hichttp://www.puresoul3.btinternet.co.uk/drunk.gif))

[RTB RFN]

Dick - I think common sense and clarity of thought is escaping you.

The list you provided would probably have still occurred and more.

The only difference is that they would have occurred in a quieter environment. Other's would have been added due to the required alert factor of right frequency and required reporting.

NAS would only have increased the numerical value of incidents however they will now remain invisible due to NAS rule definitions changing the reporting rate. (you cunning devil you).

Your argument regarding concetration on the area of concern is fallacious. By reducing CTR size you are shifting the hazard to CLOSER to the aerodrome and CONCENTRATING the hazard closer to the aerodrome. By changing reporting requirements and causing confusion with what is the appropriate frequency there will be less voice alerts. ATC workload has increased due to illogical C airspace steps and higher levels of alerting in E and higher levels of intra-system coordination by ATC's. NAS 3 will icrease this with the unalerted free-for -all at MBZ's and multi-runway GAAP's out of hours.

Have you any idea what workload you have caused so many people trying to find workarounds to make this monster safer?

I have campaigned long and hard on VCA's, discovering the reasons 'why' and designing and promoting strategies for reductions in VCA incidence. NAS does not reduce the VCA problem - it exacerbates it. It concetrates it and multiplies it and most importantly reduces our awareness of the problem and prevents corrective action.

I'd like to say watch me prove it but no honest assessment can be made. The statistics cannot be collected.

Where is the Post Implemention Review on all of this.

I note you are now doing some self-image marketing (SAFETY - now that is sacriligious) - or is this merely some preparatory work in anticipation of appearing before someone especially impressive.

[ferris]

The thing that struck me reading thru all those incident reports, was that most of them were caused by lightie pilots not using the radio correctly. To me, this suggests that if all those places had control towers, there would have been a lot less risk. Alternately, if you reduce radio use, there will be MORE risk. Or, raise the bar re; testing and licensing of said pilots, and reduce risk.

Dick, you might want to consider more carefully the posts you make in trying to support your argument. The MAJOR THING your post says, is how NAS WOULDN'T HAVE HELPED ONE IOTA, and in fact would promote more of these types of incidents.

Now that you have had air traffic controllers point out that NAS doesn't "concentrate resources closer to the airports", will you give it up? BTW, removing pre-existing services that existed away from the airports, isn't "concentrating resources closer to the airports". In the same way that "forcing pilots to listen to enroute reports from hundreds of miles away" was a product of making ATS "more efficient". Safety and efficiency are often competing interests. If you don't like the bad press associated with the reduction in safety, stop wearing the shoe that fits.

[Shitsu-Tonka]

Next Generation, I did not introduce the concept of affordable safety. I've never heard of anything so ridiculous in all my life.

Dick,

I hear you.

Perhaps Next Generation and other associate affordable safety with you because you talk about it a lot.

Like on your website. Here for example (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/Content.php?ContentID=260).

[TIMMEEEE]

Dick,

Looking at these postings and the way you conduct yourself here a number of points become evident.

Firstly you are a businessman - and a successful one at that.
Nobody has a gripe with that and good on you.
You are used to 'running the show' your own way so to speak.

As a consequence of the above you talk at people, you dont talk to them .
In other words you dont really listen to what others have to say, especially if it is in direct conflict to your beliefs.

Someone here mentioned your appearance to protect the NAS like a protective parent.

You may be passionate about this new NAS reform but the fact is that I have not met one transport/charter category pilot (ie: Professional Pilot) I know of that has applauded your baby here Dick.

Listen to the professional pilots, their associations as well as the Air Traffic Controllers that all think this isn't a good idea and has some serious flaws.
Listen to their inputs as to how this reform can be improved for the better and not just cast aside their opinions and recommendations.

Remember the Pope and Cardinals of the Catholic church a few hundred years ago jailing a great scientist for daring to suggest that the Earth actually rotated around the sun and that the Earth was not actually the centre of the universe?

Just who sounds like the Catholic church here Dick?

As soon as someone comes out in opposition to the NSA you seem to treat their comments with contempt, as though its heresy and like my nephews and nieces put there hands over their ears going "lah lah lah lah lah" so they dont hear the facts of reality.

Listen to people Dick, especially those pilots and controllers at the coal face that have to put up with a system which in my opinion and theirs, is a fundamentally flawed model.

It may work in the USA (even thats doubtful) where I can fly from Edwards AFB to Andrews AFB at 500' agl and get vectors the whole way under Primary radar coverage, but improving the risks of having passenger RPT jets/turboprops in direct conflict with light aircraft is a sad state of affairs.

Lets see what the crystal ball provides here Dick.
Your comments??

[griffinblack]

Dick,

Quite frankly, your whole argument is simply one of beliefs with little or no fact. The ‘you believe’, ‘I believe’ tit for tat has become boring.

You have not answered many of the questions posed to you. And those you have answered have been very selective. I am sure you have put down over 10 000 words in this and other threads. But you speculate and use conjecture for the basis of your argument. It does you little credit and has reached its use by date.

You have provided no modelling, no meaningful statistics and no safety case. For the life of me (possibly literally), I cannot understand how this (AusNAS) got up on the specious conjecture you espouse.

“Affordable safety” has no bearing on the merits or otherwise of NAS. However your assertion that you found “affordable safety” ridiculous and yet you were using the term in 1990 (with apparent glee) questions your integrity.

Dick, unless you bring something new to the table, your arguments are becoming irrelevant as more people understand your lack of depth and insight.

Lastly, I would like to see you respond to Voices of Reason. They have challenged the basis of many your ‘beliefs’ and spurious arguments. However, I won’t hold my breath.

Griffinblack

[Water ballast]

Sitzu-Tonka,
Sorry to spoil your rant but in Australia we spell "ass" as ARSE!

[Binoculars]

1. The incident investigations of all those incidents would have determined a number of causal factors that contributed to the incident occurring. Many of these factors are system based, and some would be based on actual deliberate or accidental non-compliance by aircrew or ATC. Without that reporting by the investigating team, merely listing the incidents has no useful purpose and neither supports nor contradicts your position.

An excellent post from Dirty Pierre, and I'm sure one that resonated with many reading the ludicrous posting of irrelevant incident reports. I believe however that it runs the risk of being lost in the hot air pervading this topic, so I took the time to analyse those reports a little deeper. Of the 79 incidents investigated and quoted for whatever reason, a reasonable summation can be made thus:

.....In Class C or D controlled airspace, total incidents caused by error by either pilot or controller: 6.

1 (ATC), 7 (Pilot), 8 (Pilot), 10 (Pilot), 68 (ATC), 76 (Pilot).

.....Impossible to tell from the data given: 9.

2, 5, 6, 8, 36, 51, 53, 62, 73

Instances where other measures had been taken to assure separation, giving an unrealistic RA: 7

9, 50, 52, 70, 72, 74, 77

Total Non-sequiturs: 1

79

Instances occurring OCTA due to poor airmanship, faulty procedures, incorrect or non-use of transponders, and overwhelmingly, incorrect frequency selection: 56

3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 75, 78.

In only one of these (57) was the air transport pilot apparently the offending party.

Instances where the replacement of Class C airspace with Class E would have made the slightest bit of difference: ZERO

If the purpose of quoting these incidents were to show what an effective and indispensable last-resort tool TCAS is, it would have been a remarkably successful strategy. In fact the post is a piece of meaningless folderol designed to divert attention from the real issue, and it demonstrates clearly why nobody bothers taking up Dick’s offer of phoning him. It has nothing, diddly squat, zilch, nada, to do with the Class E argument, which is the one most controllers want resolved.

Dick, your constantly repeated refrain of diverting controller attention to where it is most needed has been addressed already by those whose job it is to survey Class E airspace, and shown to be invalid. Additionally, in the history of your posts, the closest I can come to your addressing the LT incident is that it could have happened under Class C because after all people make mistakes and the VFR pilot may not have called for a clearance. This is irrelevant, dangerous and malicious nonsense. If you can’t address the subject at hand, stay out of it.

Your simplistic and repetitive arguments fly in the face of almost everybody on this forum except a few private pilots. If we get to the stage where such vested interests determine aviation policy in this country, it will be an extremely sad day.

The Class E changes are self-evidently less safe, and provide no benefit. Please refute that with facts or be exposed as an ego-driven ideologue.

[Shitsu-Tonka]

Water Ballast:

Thank you. I was attempting, in what now seems an apparently unneccessary move (considering 'your' arse is officially uncensored) , to trick the naughty-word checker, whilst simultaneously demonstrating that I too have succumbed to the dreaded culture which I vociferously berated whilst tired and emotional. Perhaps the tonic:gin ratio was extreme , but of course.... I was very very drunk at the time.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/comedy/fastshow/characters/images/rowley_birkin2.jpg

****su-Tonka ;)

[Towering Q]

Binos,

1. I can't believe you read all 79 of those incidents and

2. You are spot on.:ok:

[Next Generation]

I don't think we were supposed to read them!

We were just supposed to look on in awe at all the words that Dick posted, and be satisfied that he must be right.

However, it is also abundantly clear (see item 79), that Dick didn't bother to read them all either!

NG

[poteroo]

NAS Stage 2c is Fundamentally Flawed

I have very, very carefully read the whole of NPRM 0401 AS, and it is fatally flawed.

Section 4 refers: all pilots of aircraft to take all reasonable steps to ensure that they do not cause a danger to other aircraft being operated in the vicinity of the aerodrome

Whilst this 'due care and regard' statement reads well - it fails, because a pilot simply cannot comply with it when all traffic is not meeting the same standards for communication.

Without radio use, pilots cannot be fully situationally aware , as recommended in 4.4.1 of the NPRM.

The optionality of radio use must increase the risk to all users CTAF/MBZ airspace. Who is going to conduct a straight in approach to a main runway, in marginal VFR conditions, when there is even the remotest chance of non-radio traffic? Only the suicidal is my suggestion!

My experience with traffic conflicts in MBZ's and CTAF's has been that it's mostly radio related all right - because the average private pilot doesn't carry out a sufficient cross check on matters radio...including, volume up, audio switched correctly,headset plugs in, and lastly the correct frequency.

But it's not just the denigrated PPL who has finger trouble. I was confronted with a B200 landing straight in on the main runway here,(an MBZ),a year or two back, while we were doing circuits on the cross runway. He subsequently apologised at the flight school, because he'd been on area frequency up until he shutdown!

Now if we have had difficulties in the past, there is no way that an optional system is going to improve things. And please, don't anyone mention the word training to me. We currently hammer pilots with lookout, and radio use in MBZ's - I don't beleive you can just write on a 24 page NPRM that

4.5.1 Note: The recommended broadcast procedures require significant pilot training and education

and it will automatically translate into safety. The issue is that we already train pilots as well as the system allows in terms of 'see and avoid', and 'situational awareness'.

Once you remove their confidence that not all aircraft will be on radio, and others might be - but choose to not talk, I forsee a great decline in pilot's confidence in the 'system'.

It just defies logic and common sense, (not a bureaucratic term, or even understood in Canberra), to not require radio. They are cheap, and if you can afford even a bug-smasher Mk3, then you can sure afford a hand held VHF.

Are hand signals still used by cars - of course not - lights replaced them years ago, and you cannot register a vehicle without them. I see a fair comparison with radios and aircraft. Forget what type of aircraft - if it flies, then it should communicate. Lets remember it's the 21st century, and the standards need to lift, not revert to the steam age!

This NPRM fails to bring aviation into the 21st century, and will further erode safety in terminal area airspace.

I do not support it in several areas, and will be holding a pilot/aircraft owner meeting in Albany WA to encourage pilot responses to this NPRM.

happy days

[Col. Walter E. Kurtz]

Free for all in CTAF's. No radio. No requirement for circuits.

Just like driving a car on a Sunday eh Dick? Do we REALLY want all those unnecessary requirements, rules, procedures and airspace to take the pleasure out of it??:(

This whole thing, the next stages, the condascension is completely laughable, if it wasn't so serious.

And the only thing to prove the point is the death of a few scores or tens of gentiles.

I'm starting to choke from all the unadulterated bull$hit.:yuk:

[Kaptin M]

Reading the postings of the two main "players" on this thread, and that initiated by Voices of Reason (http://pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=117373) is akin to comparing chalk and cheese.
Whilst one attempts to bombard readers with reems (10,000) of words and references to incidents that seemingly NEGATE his argument, the other provides a professional, logical, and reasoned debate built upon a solid foundation.

One really does wonder precisely what you have in mind as your "Final Solution", Dick Smith. From your posts to date, you indicate that many private pilots (PPL's) are bewildered/confused by the number of VHF frequencies which they SHOULD be utilising, as they transit from one airspace to another.
But because they either (a)don't have the necessary charts from which to gleen this info, and/or (b)are unable to understand these charts, and/or (c)are incapable/not confident of making/understanding R/T transmissions, and/or (c)don't have a radio capable of receiving/transmitting on those frequencies - YOUR solution is to opt for the lowest common denominator by insinuating that as long as an aircraft is equipped with 126.7, then that is ALL that is really required.
The majority of the 79 incidents you have elected to publish on page 1 were, IN FACT, apparently caused by light, non-revenue pax transporting aircraft, being where they should not have been, and in conflict with RPT aircraft.
Yet your plan is to INCREASE the access of this airspace to even more "lighties" who will converge, unannounced, to join a melee of other aircraft, and pray the SOMEONE has a functional TCAS to prevent what appears to be the inevitable.

An Australian airspace version of Russian Roulette!

As has been the opinion voiced by many other professional aviation employees, I concur with them in condemning these latest changes as far LESS safe than the system they replace.

[WALLEY2]

Dick,

you know who I am, for others, I am the Chairman of Broome International Airport and an admirer of Dicks achievements in business,aviation and adventure


I have a number of observations that are at the core of the MBZ debate.

1. The only sudy on MBZ radio compliance vs CTAF(AUS) showed non compliance at CTAF airports was 500% higher.

2. NASIG has yet to find, since being asked 8 months ago an airport in the USA that is similar to our major regional airport with 20,000+ a/c movement Class G airspace, no radar and 737 RPT ops.

3 On reading the a/p example given by NASIG to the Senate I rang the airport to check and corrected the advise goiven to them by NASIG. THIS USA SKY RESORT AIPORT HAD MANDATORY CALLS 10 MINS OUT ON APPR. OR BEFORE TAXI. I also needed to advise the Senate that contary to NASIG advise there was radar down to 4000 ft AGL and when IFR conditions pervailed they used a one in one out procedure with Denver center placing IFR a/c into a holding pattern until the first a/c had cleared the runway then allowing the nexy a/c to descend below the radar floor which is high due to the surrounding mountains.

4. The USA has FSS sited at airports giving DTI via a ASS Airport Service Station, these can use radar as well as comms monitoring to check on known traffic.

5. In response to our FOI on the department we have been advised there is no risk or safety analysis done for adopting CTAF(USA) at our major regional airports!

6. When I asked John King (who did the NASIG road show) privately, was there to his knowledge airports like Broome (giving him a rundown on a/c type and movements) on CTAF in the USA? after discussing with Martha he said NO. I note about one week later Dick you issued a press statement that Broome was to have a tower neither CASA, AA, or ourselves had been informed of this nor had NASIG! Since then the matter has not been raised.

7. Since 1994 unlike the USA CTAF airports we have had no midair collisions at our MBZ airports.

So todate we have, no number of comparable airports in the USA, no radio useage data or study, no risk analysis of our terminal airspaces that will be effected by this change.

Broomes independent design risk analysis which has taken 5 months to comly to ICAO and Australian standards and cost $40,000 involving four Doctorates in Stats, Engineering and Risk analysis will be complete at the end of this month.(including your imput)

Any proper risk analysis of terminal airspace must be site specific as traffic volumes, traffic direction, trafic peaks, terrain, aircraft type and mix,weather, airport characteristics, availabilty of radar and many other factors influence the outcomes

The USA in the FAA carry out such studies to determine risk at there major regional airports. Infact at the a/p mentioned above they had just complete a study to see if a D class tower was required.The answer was no, but the a/p is asking for a gov funded radar at their ehanced dedicated Unicom "tower" its presence and the FSS service plus radar coverage would have been parameters in the FAA study.

You can look at the USA airports and see many of their gov funded D class towered airports are at "smaller" a/ps than our major uncontrolled regional airports.Though as also stated above the traffic volume is only one parameter in determining risk. It does indicate that at least a FSS providing ASS at the airport as a step prior to a D class tower maybe overdue.

But NASIG are not analysing this or any other option for terminal airspace at our important busy regional airports even though they exist in the USA airspace NAS that we are adopting.

Instead without even examining and analysis any major regional airport terminal airspace we propose to change from a system with no accident since 1994 to a unproven new airspace procedure. Note: unproven as unlike enroute procedures terminal procedures are site specific. Just as you don't have one type A chart for all regional a/ps, you can't have a one size suits all approach to terminal airspace.

This proposed change from MBZ to CTAF(USA) is not an aviation methodology based on learned analysis of data and risk.

We have here an idiological approach to terminal airspace design that if successful will increase risks and may ultimately cost lives.

Dick, you need to answer the above concerns not with "I believe"," it works there" etc but with data, analysis and study addressing all the parameters of a terminal airspace change.

Please draw breath and think again before pushing this agenda.

cheers and regards Mike

[Lodown]

I'm surprised NAS has lasted this long, but it looks like a very quick retreat is on the cards now. I feel sorry for all the public servants who have spent 3 years in a holding pattern. It's longer than that if you include 11/11 and G trial, etc. It must be difficult trying to fill out a resume with your achievements when nothing has been achieved other than a huge waste of money.

Next...

[triadic]

One should feel sorry for the industry and the tax payer as this sorry story has cost around $M50 over the past decade.

And as I have said elsewhere... what have we achieved ?

Nothing!

Who is going to be held accountable for that? The answers are there, and we can do it, but only if the self interest, ego and politics is kept OUT of the process.

[Lodown]

Triadic, I like your comments, but...

but only if the self interest, ego and politics is kept OUT of the process

When pigs fly! The aviation industry is so full of self interest, huge egos, politics and dreamers that there seems to be little room for anything else at times.

I think I know what you meant though. When consideration is given to the self interest, ego and politics of other stakeholders and balanced decisions made accordingly to benefit all without overly constraining any one particular group, will airspace change be effective.

I might be giving the minister too much credit, but I like to think that he had a strong inkling a certain person would hang himself (or at least lose the last vestiges of his credibility) if given enough rope, and the minister gave out plenty.

I imagine there are not a few people diving for cover and working hard to disassociate themselves from NAS at present. But first we have to get through this transition away from NAS. This is where the real talent gets to shine.

Like you, I look forward to the industry moving ahead in a steady and calculated manner after this last decade in the halls of doom.

[Edited because on second read the post seemed blunt and almost rude and this wasn't intended.]

[Water ballast]

The web sites you quote clearly quote Copyright.

Copyright 1998-2004
All rights reserved

Your posting their contents here clearly breaches copyright laws.

And contributes nothing of relevance to the thread.

Woomera

[QSK?]

Wanted:

Accomplished writer to assist Dick Smith with his latest autobiography:

"10 Years in the Dick Smith Aviation Hall of Doom"

(Someone's gotta help him gloss it up - otherwise its going to be bloody awful reading for the rest of us!)

[Blip]

I think Dick Smith has left the building!:)

[Woomera]

I think this thread has run its course. click!

I'll leave it here for the moment, but let's keep it altogether shall we.

W