RTB RFN
24th Jan 2004, 12:38
It is interesting to note that the FAA tried to fix US NAS way back in 1979 realising then, the danger of uncontrolled VFR traffic at levels up to FL180 and at certain busy terminal areas.
So, have we really attempted to install an already flawed system and increased those flaws due to integration with the Australian paradigm? I recommend this book to all budding transport Ministers. It can also help provide an insight as to the difference in human physiology between driving on a road with a white line down the middle compared to missing something coming at you at unexperienced closure rates - head on ....ER LEFT, NO RIGHT uh LEFT - HECK THAT WAS CLOSE!
Make your own mind up but admit that this shows a different tale to the propaganda offerred by Pro AUSNAS proponents.
Selective quotes from Mid-air Collisions: The Accidents. The Systems and the Realpolitik. E,L. Wiener, PILOT ERROR –THE HUMAN FACTORS, 2nd edition, EDITED BY Ronald and Leslie Hurst.
Following the San Diego collision in September 1978 involving an air-carrier Boeing 727 and a Cessna 172 light aircraft there was a public demand for action and among the many proposed solutions were higher control of visual flight rules aircraft and expansion of positive control airspace. This began a political battle involving general aviation, the FAA and the US Congress.
…these accidents are seen to result from an air traffic control system which emphasises airspace allocation and political compromise, rather than dealing directly with the variety of problems facing pilots and controllers operating within the National Airspace System.
By December (1978) the FAA had proposed a number of restrictions on the NAS including dropping the floor of positive controlled airspace from 18,000 to 12, 500…..and 10,000. VFR aircraft would fly under controlled visual flight rules requiring clearances similar to those issued to IFR. NPRM 78-19 which specified the new NAS plans …..increased TCA’s from 21 to 65….and TRSA’s from 67 to 147 …
The AOPA made their position clear “If there is a proliferation of TCA’s we will violently oppose them.” A letter writing campaign to Congress was begun. The political impact of an organisation with 230,000 members was not to be lost to their elected representatives.
By the end of summer 1979 the counter-vailing pressures of 78-19 were building and Congress was threatening to block its implementation. …. amendment denying FAA and funds for implementation. FAA began to vacillate …In September 1979 canceled the proposals.
Conclusion – Where does collision avoidance stand today? There are two answers. First, it stands confused. The current system could be said to be excellent by most standards of accident prevention; but by the harsh and absolute standards of aviation, tolerant of nothing short of perfection, it is beginning to show signs of trouble for the third time since WW2.
So, have we really attempted to install an already flawed system and increased those flaws due to integration with the Australian paradigm? I recommend this book to all budding transport Ministers. It can also help provide an insight as to the difference in human physiology between driving on a road with a white line down the middle compared to missing something coming at you at unexperienced closure rates - head on ....ER LEFT, NO RIGHT uh LEFT - HECK THAT WAS CLOSE!
Make your own mind up but admit that this shows a different tale to the propaganda offerred by Pro AUSNAS proponents.
Selective quotes from Mid-air Collisions: The Accidents. The Systems and the Realpolitik. E,L. Wiener, PILOT ERROR –THE HUMAN FACTORS, 2nd edition, EDITED BY Ronald and Leslie Hurst.
Following the San Diego collision in September 1978 involving an air-carrier Boeing 727 and a Cessna 172 light aircraft there was a public demand for action and among the many proposed solutions were higher control of visual flight rules aircraft and expansion of positive control airspace. This began a political battle involving general aviation, the FAA and the US Congress.
…these accidents are seen to result from an air traffic control system which emphasises airspace allocation and political compromise, rather than dealing directly with the variety of problems facing pilots and controllers operating within the National Airspace System.
By December (1978) the FAA had proposed a number of restrictions on the NAS including dropping the floor of positive controlled airspace from 18,000 to 12, 500…..and 10,000. VFR aircraft would fly under controlled visual flight rules requiring clearances similar to those issued to IFR. NPRM 78-19 which specified the new NAS plans …..increased TCA’s from 21 to 65….and TRSA’s from 67 to 147 …
The AOPA made their position clear “If there is a proliferation of TCA’s we will violently oppose them.” A letter writing campaign to Congress was begun. The political impact of an organisation with 230,000 members was not to be lost to their elected representatives.
By the end of summer 1979 the counter-vailing pressures of 78-19 were building and Congress was threatening to block its implementation. …. amendment denying FAA and funds for implementation. FAA began to vacillate …In September 1979 canceled the proposals.
Conclusion – Where does collision avoidance stand today? There are two answers. First, it stands confused. The current system could be said to be excellent by most standards of accident prevention; but by the harsh and absolute standards of aviation, tolerant of nothing short of perfection, it is beginning to show signs of trouble for the third time since WW2.