Hapag-Llloyd Airbus pilot charged... [Archive]

cessna l plate

23rd Jan 2004, 00:46

As a mere learner in this great world that we call aviation, I am probably in no position to judge this captain, he must have had good reasons for doing what he did, and I am sure that this will clear itself up in court. The mere fact that he didn't accept a "plea-bargain" shows that there is a tale to tell. I will reserve an opinion until after the case has been heard..... unlike 411A, but who am I, a bottom of the rung circuit basher to critisise 411A, an airline captain no less (according to his profile anyway).

However, as a human being I feel that I am in a good position to critisise this individual. Whenever an issue exists on this forum, there always seems to be a self-opinionated, stir the smelly-stuff up, etc attitude posted under the heading 411A. Does this person have any sense of natural justice? Let those with the right to do so carve this captain up, if that is what he deserves, I just hope that you never serve on a jury for an aviation related case, but if you do, please don't forget to bring your own piece of rope to court, it saves the authorities the time and money for going to buy one for the poor sod you want to hang.

Question: If memory serves me correct, wasn't there a thread recently for the removal of 411A from this forum?? If so, where do I sign. And finally, after 2500+ posts, don't you think it high time, 411A, that you bought a personal title, and give something back to Danny after he has given you somewhere to print your worthless opinions?
I do aplogise if this post offends anyone ( excpet 411A of course) but I thought that we all stuck together in this industry, to fight the beancounters amongst others.

412A

23rd Jan 2004, 01:31

....hmm,....a bit quiet 411A.....unusual for you...! I think the phrase is 'hung by ones own petard'.... the comment regarding the personal title was apt I might add.

694c

23rd Jan 2004, 01:34

The accident report will surely make fascinating reading, when it is eventually published.
As the aircraft crashed in Vienna, the Austrians are responsible for the investigation. I looked for information but nothing has yet been released by them on the www.bmvit.gv.at website. The Huns have published some details but only in kraut on www.bfu-web.de click 'Bulletin' and look further under 'Juli 2000' .pdf files.
If I can help with translating any of this report I'll gladly do so.

mutt

23rd Jan 2004, 02:02

Talk about thread creep..... forget about 411A.........

Now can anyone offer a legitimate reason why a commercial airliner landed at an enroute airport without fuel?

Mutt.

StressFree

23rd Jan 2004, 02:11

Thank-you Mutt for re-directing the thread towards the real questions. I also would like to know why a commercial airliner with pax on board landed with no fuel in a part of the World with many decent airports. It surely cannot be just that the captain was bullied into SUCH a dangerous situation by his company, there must be more as I'm sure no-one could be that stupid.....

:confused:

Semaphore Sam

23rd Jan 2004, 02:19

I've seen most of 411A's posts, and, whether I agree or not, they seem well reasoned on the whole; more dangerous than overzealous criticism is oversealous protectionism, which results in lowering of standards. Landing with empty tanks DEMANDS an explanation...whether there is blame to the Captain or not, the situation must be resolved.

Tartan Giant

23rd Jan 2004, 02:36

There certainly seems to be a prima facie case for being unhappy with the Commander's decision to "continue" with a rapidly depleting fuel supply.

One cannot imagine carrying enough fuel to be able to make the early judgement to "continue" with the gear down, flying slower, and at a lower cruise level, all the way to the original destination; given the assumption that sort of snag was never in your fuel planning in the first place.

Quote
Shortly after the aircraft departed Chania, Greece bound for Hanover, Germany, the flight crew realized that the landing gear could not be retracted.
The decision was made to continue the flight to Hanover at a lower altitude and airspeed with the landing gear extended.

As the aircraft neared the mid-point of its journey, the crew realized that the remaining fuel would be insufficient to continue the flight to Hanover, so a landing was planning at Vienna, Austria.
As the aircraft descended through 10,000 feet, the left engine failed due to fuel exhaustion.
By utilizing crossfeed fuel pumps, the crew was able to keep the right engine running, but was unable to restart the left.

As the aircraft turned a six mile final, the right engine also failed due to fuel exhaustion.

The plane touched down 600 feet short of runway 34, collapsing the main landing gear, and seriously damaging the left wing and engine.
Unquote

So near, and yet so far.

TG

NigelOnDraft

23rd Jan 2004, 03:54

I know little of the "facts" in the VIE landing - maybe an advantage...

The 'A' for Airmanship is being driven out of aviation by company's, Training Capts etc. toeing the Co. line.

Say the FMGC, the thing we are increasingly driven to "believe" "follow" and "use to manage" did not allow for the extra fuel burn with the U/C down... and so predicted VIE with suitable fuel... and only as they got nearer did things not "add up"??

Very few accidents are caused by a "single event"... and unlikely any Captain, or indeed more correctly crew, would make such a crass mistake as to "decide" to run out of fuel, as they are being hung for here... Suspect 5+ factors led to this - and let's remember, the only casualty was an A310, no serious injuries (I believe)!

Edit: The above post overlapped with mine - interesting. Most importantly, we all have, and will, learn from it...

Tartan Giant

23rd Jan 2004, 04:32

I wonder how many desk-bound chaps are this minute bashing into the Trip Fuel ground PC,

Trip One
From : Chania
To : Hanover
FL : 250
Maintenance: Gear Down

Trip Two
Bog-standard A - B.

I would be very interested in seeing the two figures for the
MIN RAMP FUEL Required for these two trips.

The conversation BIGIRON had with the F/O of that fateful trip tells us a lot:

Despite the FO's best effort to convince the captain they were not going to make it he pushed on

I am very surprised the Commander, with such seniority, was sucked into that hole.

Dispatch and maintenance put a lot of pressure on the crew to make it to Munich or Vienna (both have Airbus maintenance)

Dispatch should stick to what the word says.

Maintenance should do what they do best too.

Commanders should tell them both what's going to happen, despite listening to their dreams!

TG

broadreach

23rd Jan 2004, 07:26

Check out Avman's post again; Mrs Avman's memory is pretty good. It would help perspective tremendously if someone could post a link to the original thread - if it still exists. The subject was discussed intelligently and exhaustively there and, if I'm not mistaken, there was a timeline of sorts describing communications between the cockpit and dispatch/maintenance. I certainly recall there was company pressure to bring the aircraft to a HL base.

The discussion here, years after the fact and without the benefit of facts or even the gossip at the time, is pretty pointless.

SeniorDispatcher

23rd Jan 2004, 08:16

With all due respect to the respective posters, I must take exception with one statement, and comment on another..

>>>Dispatch should stick to what the word says.

It must first be recognized that the functions and responsibilities that an airline's dispatch office and an individual dispatcher have are quite non-standardized across the globe, since various countries have various rules. In some places, a "dispatcher" could be the one that waves the aircraft in/out of the parking area with the pretty flashlights. In some places, the "dispatcher" is the local person doing the weight and balance shipside. In some other places, the "dispatcher" is the lad/lass working in a centralized (usually) airline office that initiates the computer flight plans and ATC filings, amongst other things.

In the USA, the FAA Part 121 regs take that third "dispatcher" definition above and expand on it by making the dispatcher and PIC jointly responsible for "operational control" and the safe conduct of the flight. The US FARs (Part 1.1) state: "Operational control, with respect to a flight, means the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting or terminating a flight.

Everyone seems to understand the "initiating" function (pulling flight plans and filing ATC strips), but the previous statement "Dispatch should stick to what the word says" fails to acknowledge the "conducting" and (potential) "terminating" aspects of flight operations. While the vast majority of an airline's flights are routine and communications between PIC dispatcher will be minimal, that changes rapidly when weather-related or mechanical-related issues arise.

A key benefit of US FAR Part 121-type operational control is that the dispatcher is in a position to "backstop" the PIC when it comes to some critical decisionmaking as far as additional information that the PIC might not possess. Additionally, in of the event of a PICs ill-advised decision to "press-on" into an unsafe situation, the US FAR Part 121 dispatcher has the ability to -independently- initiate the declaration of an emergency condition.

Back to the Hapag-Lloyd 3378 accident, in the absence of an official report, I cannot say whether Hapag-Lloyd had the same operational control set-up as a US airline (as some non-US airlines do), or whether their "dispatcher" just pulled flight plans and filed ATC strips, and devoid of any supporting regulatory language, was forced to leave the critical safety-of-flight decisionmaking to management personnel. If it had been a Part 121-style operation, the flight would have had a different outcome.

I can personally attest that, in my 25 years as a dispatcher for 3 different US airlines, I have seen numerous situations where dispatcher intervention (mine, or that of colleagues) has been the "voice of reason" as far as countering a PIC's desire to do something that really wasn't safe, and PIC and dispatcher jointly (there's that word again) agreed on a more conservative course of action, which while not pleasing some of the management types, was truly in the airline's best -overall- interest, since it helped them to potentially stay off the evening news.

There may be some who read this and assume that I'm saying that "pilots are stupid" or some other nonsense, and I don't believe that for a second. What I do believe is that pilots, as well as dispatchers, are all human beings, and thus capable of some well-intended but poor decisionmaking at times. The duality afforded by US FAR Part 121-type operational control can (properly supported and exercised) serve in a similar "crosscheck" capacity as does the "two key" philosophy on a nuclear missile submarine. That is not to say that I expect a "Mother, may I?" call for every PIC deviation around weather, but I do expect one on obvious safety-of-flight items.

While operational control certainly can't prevent all accidents, it can sure prevent some. Anyone so inclined can see this in various accidents such as Air Illinois flight 710 (US, HS-748, 1985), Avianca 52 (US, B-707, 1990), and Valujet 558 (US, DC-9, 1996, and no, this was a different one than the Everglades crash). There are also the ones you -don't- hear about, for obvious PR reasons. I know of two potential fuel-starvations that were averted, one involving a MLG door stuck down, sucking fuel, and that one necessitated the dispatcher declaring an emergency and diverting the flight to an offline airport. The other was a MLG itself stuck down, sucking fuel, and the PIC wanting to continue to his desired XYZ (instead of a much closer ABC) due to his FMC telling him "he could do it." The dispatcher got the flight diverted to ABC without declaring the emergency, but his finger was on the proverbial trigger had the PIC not agreed. Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it, as the man once said...

>>>Dispatch and maintenance put a lot of pressure on the crew to make it to Munich or Vienna (both have Airbus maintenance)

Irrespective of whatever kind of dispatch operation an airline has, this kind of pressure (assuming it occurred, again in the absence of an official report, and the former Hapag-Lloyd F/O's comments notwithstanding), is simply unacceptable. One has to wonder if the pressure was coming from the "dispatcher" who did the flight plan and filed the ATC strip, or some management person (or two).

That said, another benefit of the US FAR Part 121-type operational control is that the dispatcher is licensed by the FAA, just as the flightcrew and mechanics are. It's not always a comfy place to be, this little no-man's land between company pressure and FAA accountability, and some outfits don't want/support that objectivity.

I'm quite fortunate in that my airline does support it. A PIC once called me on the last flight of the night (to a MX base) with a grounding item. It was a full flight, and he felt the pressure, but wasn't happy with the aircraft. I conferenced MX control in, and it was obvious that they wanted the bird back at the MX base for the night for the easiest and most convenient repair. The PIC asked me what I thought, and I opined that I wanted the aircraft back at the MX base just as much as the PIC and MX did, but that it didn't matter to me whether we MX-ferried it empty or taxied it 500 miles home on the interstate highway. The MX guy actually told me "Well, this aircraft is in no condition to MX-ferry", so I asked the inevitable question that nobody else seemed to be willing to ask "Then why are you trying to con us into carrying revenue pax on it?" No answer from the MX guy, but the PIC then chimed in "Yeah, I'm not going to take it." And we didn't. After an overnight light-twin charter with parts and personnel, they had it fixed for the morning.

Had my airline not supported me, my union and I were each quite content to have taken the issue directly to the FAA. Sadly, at some places, that's all too often an occurrence, and it's largely a matter of an airline's corporate culture.

In closing (sorry for the length), there are some kinds of "dispatch" that do need improvement, but there are some types of operational control that work quite well if properly understood, supported, and exercised...

Cheers...

411A

23rd Jan 2004, 09:14

Have to say...

SeniorDispatcher is right on target.
Those who might criticize my earlier comments would do well to find the original thread when this incident occured.

Private pilots, flying their personal aircraft occasionally run out of fuel, due to their own ill conceived actions.

This should never EVER happen with public transport aircraft, when suitable airports have been bypassed..

PS: always listen to your First Officer....he just might save your backside....bigtime.:ooh:

SeniorDispatcher

23rd Jan 2004, 12:35

Some links on the subject:

http://www.luftfahrt-presse-club.de/luftfahrt/storyboard/hapaglloyd.html

http://www.flugingenieur.de/hapaglloyd.htm

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m0UBT/29_14/63557856/p1/article.jhtml

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m0UBT/32_14/63944426/p1/article.jhtml

http://www.flybernhard.de/uebersicht.htm?

http://www.flybernhard.de/hlf_a310.htm

The Doubtful Guest

23rd Jan 2004, 14:15

it's funny to hear so many comments from those who have not been on site - i was.
i suggest not to condemn anybody yet. there is a judge doing this job.
company pressure seems to be a main driver for many flightcrew decisions nowadays - however, the final responsibility remains with the pic. but that's only a generic statement...

dg

BEagle

23rd Jan 2004, 15:50

Irrespective of whichever performance mode has been entered into the FMS, there are still Fuel Quantity Indicators and a full fuel system page on the ECAM...... Plus the fuel flow indicators, of course.

Time equals distance over speed, multiply by burn rate and subtract from total shown - does that give us enough fuel?

Surely it can't have been that basic?

no sig

23rd Jan 2004, 18:52

Excellent post Senior Dispatcher.

Tartan Giant, I don't know what happened with this flight, but I wonder if the Ops/Dispatchers re-ran the operational flight plan based on gear down/lower level performance and advised the crew of the revised figures. Had that been done I wonder if the final outcome would have been different.

694c

23rd Jan 2004, 18:55

I flew the A310 in the '80's and don't have the operating manuals any more. I do however have them for the A330 and out of interest made some calculations to try to get an insight into the performance available - they are after all quite similar aircraft.

Assuming ESAD 1500nm, wind 0, ISA standard, TOW 190t, alternate distance 100nm, normal long range cruise:

Initial FL 370
M .814
IAS 265kt
TAS 467kt
EPR 1.33
FF 2720 KG/hr per engine
Trip fuel 18200kg
Flight time 3:24

Minimum fuel calculation would typically be:
Taxy 500
Trip 18200
Contingency 1000
Alternate 2500
Final reserve 2500
Total 24700kg

Same flight with landing gear down:
There is a warning on the first page of the chapter:
'Use selected speed, disregard Flight Management fuel predictions'!
Initial FL 200
Trip fuel 44800Kg
Flight time 4:48
M .52
IAS 237kt
TAS 319kt
EPR 1.37
Fuel flow 4785Kg/hr per engine

assuming optimum step climbs, after 4 hours the cruise looks like this:
FL290
IAS 196kt
TAS 308kt
EPR1.42
Fuel flow 3370Kg/hr per engine

Therefore the average fuel burn is around 8t/hr for the gear down flight .

Draw your own conclusions!

Tartan Giant

23rd Jan 2004, 20:10

With all due respect to the Senior Dispatcher, I stand by my comment.

I am aware of the hotch-potch of what various countries define as a Dispatcher - one tends to get a feel for various views in 38 years of flying. I know this will upset you SD, but I do feel that if Dispatchers want to act as PIC, then they should give up the ground job. I know a few who have done that!

PIC then chimed in "Yeah, I'm not going to take it."

Does a surgeon hover with the scalpel whilst he listens in on a 'conference call' to ascertain which way to cut?
Too many cooks spoil the broth in my book. DODAR by all means, but there is one Commander!

no sig
I take your point; but in this case, does it really require somebody on the ground to tell you, "it's not going to work".

694c
Many thanks for taking the time and trouble to make that data available. I agree with you, "Draw your own conclusions"!

I contend, it does not need a Dispatcher (and we are talking about a flight operating in Europe) to tell that flight-deck crew, "it's not going to work"!

TG

SeniorDispatcher

24th Jan 2004, 07:12

>>>I know this will upset you SD, but I do feel that if Dispatchers want to act as PIC, then they should give up the ground job. I know a few who have done that!

Not upset at all, as the "debate" started long before either of us were around, and will probably be around for alot longer. ;)

I do know of a couple of dispatchers that went on to become pilots, and they were also excellent ones who truly knew, better than most, about what the true role of the dispatcher was (over here, at least) and the range of resouces that we could bring to bear when a problem arose. We also actually make some some pretty good troubleshooters. (I upset a PIC earlier today when I swapped his "good" aircraft and gave him one with an inop APU, so he could take it to sunny climes while the bird with the operative APU went on a flight to "Snow City". At least I made -one- of pilots happy. ;)

I also know one particular captain, who, after his previous airline folded, went on to a start-up operation. He had his FAA ADX ticket, and he spent the first year there dispatching (before eventually getting a flying seat and later moving into senior management). After he went back to flying, he would later tell me that he never knew what was really involved with this operational discipline until he'd actually been in the position. Yes, operational control -is- an operational discipline---we're not all unfulfilled pilot wannabes. (Admittedly, there are a few).

>>>PIC then chimed in "Yeah, I'm not going to take it."

>>>Does a surgeon hover with the scalpel whilst he listens in on a >>>'conference call' to ascertain which way to cut?

No, nor should he have to. I related that example (from experience) because the PIC involved was waffling on whether to go or not. Had his flight's dispatcher been of the "Yessir, Yessir, Captain; you always know best" mentality, he may well have taken the flight. despite the obvious grounding item. The "get-there-itis" virus isn't restricted to the GA world.

>>>Too many cooks spoil the broth in my book. DODAR by all means, but there is one Commander!

Very true, but having -no- cooks sometimes results in the pot boiling over and creating a real -mess-.

I think that one common misconception about operational control (as it's done here in the US under Part 121) is that it's management by committee. In my view, it's -not--- just as there's one PIC (Commander), there's also one dispatcher, and whatever we agree upon is the key, irrespective of other influences.

Over the years, I've had flights with partial gears, single generators (on a twin) and other abnormal situations that tend to draw manangement out of the woodwork only to become huddled behind my desk, each with their own idea of the "right" thing to do. Believe me, I've heard some pretty "Peter Pan" suggestions over the years. Even so, I've listened to their comments, and have considered some of them, but I always knew that the final decision as far as what to recomend to the PIC was with me, and nobody else.

What will be interesting (for me) to see from the Hapag Lloyd investigation is -who- was actually conversing with the aircraft (via ACARS), and presumably making the decisions as far as going to Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, or wherever, and what level of training (aircraft systems and performance) that they possessed, and what level of responsibility they had (or didn't have). Because of my training, I know that an extended gear will suck fuel at a horrific rate, but does that management guy? Some of these guys don't know there arse from an APU. Maybe it's from watching television or movies.

Based upon all the variations in operational control around the world, it would not surprise me in the least if it were found that the "dispatcher" in this event had no other responsibilities/duties other than routine flight plan generation, and that one or more "managers" got into a debate on where to put the aircraft down. If that proves to actually be the case, that will be much more of a "too many cooks spoil the broth" example than is the one-on-one PIC/dispatcher relationship that we see here in the US.

>>>no sig
>>>I take your point; but in this case, does it really require >>>somebody on the ground to tell you, "it's not going to work".

To reiterate, in a perfect world, it really shouldn't, but then again, we all know it's not a perfect world. I've caught their mistakes, just as they've caught mine, and it's that two-way exchange between PIC and dispatcher that allows it. Why is it that CRM between PIC and F/O is such a great idea, but that CRM between the PIC and a Part 121-style dispatcher somehow isn't?

Dr. Phil Smith, at Ohio State Universtity (Columbus OH) did a studt of pilots and dispatchers a few years back. The pilots were split into two groups, as were the dispatchers. He concocted an operational scenario (quite realistic, I thought) that had an rather insidious side effect on the proposed flight.

Working by themselves, 70% of the first pilot group caught the error, while the first group of dispatchers (also working by themselves) had 80% catch the error. (BTW, I'm not inferring that dispatchers are 10% smarter than pilots, only that the difference is largely attributable to the fact that dispatchers often see operational problems much more often than an individual pilot due to the centralized nature of our offices). Dr. Smith gave the second group of pilots and dispatchers the same operational scenario, but these two groups got to converse about it one-on-one, and by golly, they caught the error 100% of the time.

Could it be that both pilots and dispatchers -each- bring something unique to the party, and that "two heads" are truly better than "one?" You can guess where I stand, although I fully understand and respect your opinion to the contrary.

Cheers...

ATC Watcher

24th Jan 2004, 14:58

Very good explanations .SD, thank you, and very informative as well on how it is done in the States. .

I was shown at the time a transcript of the ACARS "dialogue" between HF ops and the A310. If my own memory serves me well, there was nothing on it suggesting OPS pressure to divert to MUC or VIE . There was a mention of Stuttgart if I remember but all was on the suggestion tone.

I also think a copy of that transcript was put on PPruNe at one stage or another. maybe someone remembers the link.

Avman

24th Jan 2004, 16:18

An excellent reply SD. The same philosophy applies (should apply) to many other professional relationships. I believe it's called Resource Management ;) . Unfortunately, the "I'm better than you" syndrome still dominates our society and professional lives.

BOAC

24th Jan 2004, 16:37

Good arguments on all sides ................... but it has been said many times before - inputs from the ground, being 'No 1 on the list' etc etc - until all the facts are known, we CANNOT make a judgement, except to say that until commercial a/c are controlled from the ground :eek: , there is only one person who has the ULTIMATE responsibility in law for allowing the fuel to run out before landing. All else is contributory, and there may well be blame attached there, but, refer to 'Rule 1'!

Indeed, many are the Naval Ships' Captains who have been court-martialled for events which occurred whilst they were 'not on watch'. It goes with the job.

SeniorDispatcher

24th Jan 2004, 20:23

>>>there is only one person who has the ULTIMATE responsibility in law for allowing the fuel to run out before landing. All else is contributory, and there may well be blame attached there, but, refer to 'Rule 1'!

That’s pretty much the way the US NTSB found in the 1990 Avianca 52 accident near JFK, i.e. the probable cause being the PIC’s allowing it to happen, and the lack of an operational control system as #1 in the contributing factors list, “loading and cocking the gun” that the crew would eventually “fire”.

http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR91-04.pdf

A clarification is also in order, methinks. Lest anyone get the idea that I believe that dispatchers are infallible and can prevent all accidents. We’re certainly not, and we certainly can’t, and the same can be said for pilots, mechanics, F/As, ATC controllers, or any other human being involved with the processes involved. While numerous airline and aviation technologies have make stellar leaps over the years, we are all still the same old Mk-1 human beings with inherent fallibilities. It is the recognition and the acceptance of this, and the subsequent design of regulations, policies, and procedures (and adherence to them) that best ensure the safety of not only the flying public, but the non-flying public who live underneath the potential path of wreckage bits.

In previous training roles, I always told the newbies that it wasn’t a dispatcher’s job to fly the aircraft, per se, but to act as a troubleshooter, searching for and eradicating problems before they could bite someone in the arse. Everyone knows that accidents are almost always a result of a chain of errors, and if we can think of those chain links as individual wheels on a slot machine, operational control (properly done) can be that –last- wheel that –doesn’t- turn over.

It remains to be seen what the outcome of the HF3378 investigation will be, but it'll be interesting to watch.

Cheers...

Frosch

24th Jan 2004, 22:36

There was no pressure from 'OPS' to fly to a certain airport, since HLF-Ops does not have the man-power to take care about such incidents. The 'gear-down'-problem had been 'solved' in the flight-deck. E.g. the chief of the airbus fleet went to lunch after having a brief look on what was going on. The problem with HLF-OPS is that you don't get enough support when time-pressure is high (not the problem in this case). They are very, very lean. You're better off by telling them what's going to happen. This is not the type of 'dispatch' that some of you might be thinking of.

To the topic: Of course there have been lot's of mistakes, but none of the posts comes near the whole story. So just wait another couple of years until the austrians release their final report.

Tartan Giant

25th Jan 2004, 00:21

Senior Dispatcher
Many thanks for your balanced and considerate views - and for not being upset at my suggestions!

I can see I would have readily taken kind advice from you in my flying days, and I can see you would not be averse to the PIC making the final decision.

Taking the incident we are all talking about here, I see little time for a lengthy ACARS or perhaps even a lengthy R/T exchange.

From the list of references you give SD (thank you) there is another pointer than shows the options had drawn to a rapid close.

Meanwhile, according to an official press release from the investigation team, the following aspects of the case can be confirmed:

* The pilots used only the FMC for their fuel calculations.

* The airplane's fuel gauges were functioning. Low fuel warning (about 1.3t) was 40 N.M. abeam of Zagreb (distance to Vienna at this time was about 120 N.M.)

Having taken off from the island of Crete, one does not need to be a safety-related giant to know a lot of suitable airfields (OK no Airbus repairs on site) have been passed by the time you are ABM Zagreb.

Your splendid 'post' SD mentioned,
because the PIC involved was waffling on whether to go or not.

From where I'm sitting, there's seems to have been a bit too much "waffling on" between this particular aircraft and ground; ending up running out fuel so, so, so very near VIE's runway (akin to the Kegworth disaster).

There are occasions where a drawn out debate between air and ground can be beneficial - this case unfortunately seems to prove the opposite.

Frosch has the idea,
You're better off by telling them what's going to happen.

Using that analogy - that's enough from me!

TG

SeniorDispatcher

25th Jan 2004, 06:11

>>>Many thanks for your balanced and considerate views - and for not being upset at my suggestions!

Likewise, I’m sure…

>>>I can see I would have readily taken kind advice from you in my flying days, and I can see you would not be averse to the PIC making the final decision.

That would depend upon whether I concurred with your preferred choice of action as being the safest. About 99.9999% of the time, I’d agreed with a PIC’s course of action, but every once in awhile, that .0001% situation rears its ugly head, and the PIC suggests something that is patently unsafe. It happens. Really.

As I mentioned earlier, US Part 121 (Domestic/Flag) flights are commenced via a joint-responsibility and concurrence process. Should those previously agreed upon parameters change once enroute, the party first becoming aware of the change has a duty and responsibility (per other regs) to advise the party unaware of the change(s). After both PIC and dispatcher are aware of the changes, concurrence must be re-established that it’s a safe operation.

If, during one of those rare .0001% situations, I happen to disagree with the PIC’s course of action, I cannot, of course, beam-myself into his/her cockpit, or telepathically take control of their aircraft from my office workstation. While that fact might make the issue seem like a moot point to some, our FARs here in the US leave the dispatcher far from being an afterthought in the safety equation:

Section 121.627: Continuing flight in unsafe conditions.
(a) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue toward any airport to which it has been dispatched or released if, in the opinion of the pilot in command or dispatcher (domestic and flag operations only), the flight cannot be completed safely; unless, in the opinion of the pilot in command, there is no safer procedure. In that event, continuation toward that airport is an emergency situation as set forth in §121.557.

If you’re looking for an application, take a look at:

http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR85-03.pdf

This was the Air Illinois HS-748 crash back in 1985. In a nutshell, the PIC (a really pro-company guy) and his trust F/O (a real whiz on the aircraft) were on the last flight of the night, and the destination was the airline’s hub, complete with crewbase and MX folks. Their aircraft had a history of generator problems, and 90 seconds after takeoff (night VMC) the generator quit. The F/O, unfortunately, disconnected the wrong CSD, and without any APU, they were now a battery-powered aircraft.

Their destination, :40 away, was night IMC with showers and embedded cells in the area. At the time of the F/O plucked the wrong CSD, the PIC told ATC that they had “a minor electrical problem” and declined the air traffic controller’s offer of a 180 degree turn to the VMC departure airport just a couple of minutes behind them. Off they went, load shedding so much that the F/A comes up front wondering why it’s so dark in the cabin, and that some pax have noticed.

The F/O is watching the amp meter like a hawk, and the needle is holding steady. About halfway to their rainy destination, the PIC says to his F/O: “Please, if you would, don’t say a thing to dispatch about this, not a %&^%* thing.” The F/O responds by saying: “Yeah, the less you tell those folks the better off you are.” Fast forwarding, their NiCad battery quits after about :30, they stall/spin, go boom, and all aboard die.

This was a Part 121 flight, and it’s clear the dispatcher (and the safety mechanism they provide) was intentionally circumvented. Had the crew advised their dispatcher at the time the failure(s) occurred and told them of their plan to run a :40 flight on a :30 battery, the disagreement between PIC and dispatcher would have triggered the emergency. As I said before, the dispatcher can’t seize control of the aircraft, but they can alert ATC than an emergency situation exists and that the aircraft needs to be issued that 180 degree turn despite any crew protests. With the proverbial “cat out of the bag” as far as ATC (and thus FAA) awareness is concerned, maybe one of the flightcrew would have snapped to.

>>>Taking the incident we are all talking about here, I see little time for a lengthy ACARS or perhaps even a lengthy R/T exchange.

Leaving the Hapag-Lloyd flight aside momentarily, unless there’s an engine fire (you can pull and turn the red handles on your own, thanks) there is usually enough time to converse with one’s dispatcher. Numerous items in the aircraft’s QRH (over here) are appropriately flagged as such, as the idea is to start discussing the situation with dispatcher more “sooner” than “later” in the flight (and perhaps in the accident sequence). Back to Hapag-Lloyd, and assuming US Part 121 regs were in place and that they were followed, a dispatcher could have been aware of the extended gear soon after departure, allowing for diversion to places a lot further south than was Vienna, if not their takeoff point. If the PIC had insisted upon continuing, the dispatcher could have initiated the declaration of an emergency independently from the crew.

In aviation, one of the things that makes for optimal flight safety is redundancy, and the mitigation (if not outright elimination) of potential single-point failures. Everyone seems to understand and accept that in the contexts of tangible mechanical stuff, but it simply amazes me at times that some have a problem applying the same risk mitigation and elimination to the intangible stuff like human factors and decisionmaking.

Cheers…

M.Mouse

25th Jan 2004, 17:00

SD your postings are reminiscent of days past here on PPRuNe, interesting and knowledgable postings by those that actually possess some knowledge!

I have always been unsure of the actual role of an FAA Dispatcher. I am a widebody captain and, frankly, the more impartial assistance I can get, in making a difficult decision, the better. I know I don't have all the answers and, funny enough, can make errors of judgement too.

Now can we return to making the more normal postings, full of abuse, innuendo and ignorant opinion?

Thank you.

SeniorDispatcher

25th Jan 2004, 22:50

Thanks for the kind words...

Part of the problem is that while some countries encourage or even require their own "dispatchers" to have a US FAA Aircraft Dispatcher certificate (issued under Part 65 of the US FARs), it's of limited use in the sense that a non-US airline is operating under their own country's rules which don't necessarily require the same US Part 121 Domestic/Flag level of operational control.

The situation is tantamount to having a law enforcement officier who has special training and certification in weapons use in one country, but when they go to work back home, the local rules of engagement don't allow them to be most optimally utilized, and the special training and certification become just words on a resume.

Lest anyone think I'm infallible, MX helped lead me to an inappropriate recomendation to a PIC the other day, and this time around the PIC was the one who said "Hey, wait a minute" and got me to look at that pesky MEL a little closer, and we didn't go. Operational control isn't about flight management by vast committees of folks, it's about a basic mechanism (2 folks) of concurrence.

SeniorDispatcher

27th Jan 2004, 07:11

For anyone interested, I found some info on dispatching in Germany...

http://www.flugdienstberater.org/Assembly03.htm

A/P Disc

27th Jan 2004, 23:36

Frosch

You claim that there was no pressure form HLF Ops to
divert to a certain airport.

I have read the ACARS messages between OPS and the
A/C and there was an intense discussion about which
airport they could just reach.

Care to comment??

fmgc

31st Jan 2004, 16:53

Once the doors are shut who is in charge of the aeroplane?

Answer: The Captain, not the company.

He ran out of fuel.

Simple verdict, doubt it will take too long to come to a guilty decision.

SeniorDispatcher

31st Jan 2004, 23:35

>>>I have read the ACARS messages between OPS and the
A/C and there was an intense discussion about which
airport they could just reach.

Pesonally, I'm still curious as to who the specific players were on the ground, and whom (manager, or HLF dispatcher devoid of Part 121 style capabilities) was actually exchanging ACARS messages with the aircraft.

Do you have any kind of transcript of yje ACARS exchanges that you can post. The only one I've seen is an excerpted one that was in an article, previously linked in this thread.

Cheers....

Shuttleworth

31st Jan 2004, 23:50

SD. In europe the despatcher helps out with the load and balance and has no influence whatsoever on MEL issues etc. Certainly he cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!¬
I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!

jetjackel

31st Jan 2004, 23:50

The fact that you guys are arguing about this is embarassing, not alone the fact that the Captains actions are an embarrassment to all of us and our profession. What extenuating circumstances would make a guy fly and airplane off profile half way across Europe.

What the hell is the "captain" doing even talking to management about where to take a malfuncioning airplane. If there's a system problem that serious you simply return to the departure airport. Discuss it with maintenance, if you have that luxury, confirm the gear down situation is ok for landing, and land. Simple.

Great CRM also. Thought, with all the stiff reguations in the JAA concerning CRM, lack of CRM in the cockpit, was a non problem. So much for the "pipe smokers" telling us all what we need. CRM can't "fix" a stupid Captain. Re-evaluating CRM profiles needs to be addressed. It wasn't a case of weak CRM - there flat out wasn't any CRM.

The "airline suits" run on cash registers. Show them a procedural manual and they would eat it. Management probably suggested later that he should have flown a 3 mile final instead of a 6 mile final.

Numerous airlines are run by idiots and it looks like they are winning.

Airmanship gentlemen, is what our job is all about.

The captain's actions were idiotic, as the results prove.

Shuttleworth

1st Feb 2004, 00:17

Airmanship gentlemen, is what our job is all about. - couldn't agree more.

BUT

I'm saddened but not surprised by the incident/accident.

This is because - in 10 years of flying
(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.
(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do. For example charter companies ( Air 2000 / Monarch / JMC / Airtours type... expecting that extra sector from a crew when they are totally shaged after a night flight " you will go into discretion".
For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.
(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .
(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.

This accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .

SeniorDispatcher

1st Feb 2004, 01:08

>>>SD. In europe the despatcher helps out with the load and balance and has no influence whatsoever on MEL issues etc. Certainly he cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!¬

Yes, I'm aware of the various regulatory schemes on that side of the pond and elsewhere that artificially limit the dispatcher's duties to preflight stuff. Over here, that's the "initiating" phase of operational control (US FAR 1.1), but our regs also cover the operation of the flight itself, as well as the termination of the flight when it becomes warranted, so a dispatcher's contribution (here) certainly -can- make a contribution to flight safety.

>>>I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!

Perhaps you misunderstand. I'm just a normal, fallible human dispatcher, working with fallible human pilots, fallible human mechanics, fallible human ATCOs, and fallible (sometimes highly so) human management types. Given the basic potential failings of the typical human being, the more robust an operational control system is as far as checks and balances, the less likely you are to have a "single point" failure.

I don't mean to be rude either, and you'll pardon the blasphemy of my saying this, but I catch pilots in errors all the time, just as they catch me. Ditto for MX and the other folks. The point isn't to keep score as to who makes the most/least mistakes, or who is better/worse than someone else, but to provide diversification in the error detection and prevention process, and to keep the error(s) from becoming links in an accident chain.

Look at some of the accidents that were previously mentioned--the accidents where operational control is circumvented (Air Illinois 710), ignored (Valujet 558), or non-existent because of the regulatory scheme (Avianca 52). All of these could have been avoided. Many more situations quietly are, and you'll never hear about most of them. As I said before, I know of two potential fuel-starvation situations, and that dispatcher intervention kept from occurring.

Cheers.

>>>The fact that you guys are arguing about this is embarassing,

With all due respect, sir, I think what's truly embarassing are the widespread misconceptions outside the US regarding what operational control is, and isn't.

It's not about erosion of PIC authority, it's about supplementing it and backstopping it during potentially critical decisionmaking events, when a little error can go a long way...

It's not about creating "pressure" to continue, it's about -preventing- that pressure from even being transmitted to you via phone or radio. (If I had a dollar for every time I've argued with certain mechanics and/or manangement types concerning a MEL item or proposed course of action, I'd be rich.) Over here, the vast majority of these types of situations are resolved by the dispatcher before the PIC even arrives planeside, and the dispatcher's efforts are largely transparent to the crews. Yes, =some- dispatcher's do err and create versus eradicate "pressure", and they are just as unprofessional as some of the other folks that have been mentioned.that do the same thing. Overall, our system works...

Whether it's "pressure" from someone other than the PIC, or self-induced "pressure" by the PIC themself to do something unsound, the Part 121 regulatory structure here allows the dispatcher to be in a position to say "nyet" to an unsafe operation, and take appropriate action if that unsafe operational is attempted.

If an operational control system is properly supported (via training and management support, as well as enabling regulatory authorities, the dispatcher -can- be your ally, and -not- an adversary as many folks seemed to be defaulted to believing.

no sig

1st Feb 2004, 02:07

Perhaps the use of the term Ramp Dispatcher versus Flight Dispatcher ( or commonly in Europe- Operations Officer/Flight Planners or Briefers) will help here.

Shuttleworth, in the US the Flight Dispatcher holds the same 'written' licence qualification as the ATPL (it the same exam)and is subject to type qualifcation and recurrent training, therefore contributes, within the FAR121 system, a great deal to the pre-flight planning and en-route monitoring of the flight- as a licenced individual with that background they are in a position to offer considerable support to a crew in flight.

SeniorDispatcher

1st Feb 2004, 02:10

Wait a minute... Is this the same "Shuttleworth" that just said a couple of messages back that "Certainly he [the dispatcher] cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!"?

>>>(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.

Me too, and it's these latter group that are the most spring-loaded towards making some bad decisions.

>>>(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do.

As I said previously, adding pressure (versus eradicating it) is unacceptable and unprofessional, and a big factor in that is an airline's corporate culture. Exactly how far manangement can manipulate that corporate culture to induce "pressure" is also affected by the regulatory structure in place. The more that regulatory structure -isn't- in place, the further some management's can "push."

>>>For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.

I have a really simple personal policy on fuel. If a PIC wants more than I've planned (per company policies, etc.), and he's not asking for 2x or 3x of what I'm asking, he gets it. I may query him about what he's seeing that I'm not, but I don't get anal-retentive or ego-sensitive about fuel. Period.

>>>(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .

The F/O on the Air Illinois 710 accident I previously mentioned was another example of this. Such a whiz on the aircraft, but fixated on the amp meter looking for signs of discharge trens when it was a NiCad (and not a lead-acid) battery. Back to basic human fallibility again...

>>>(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.

...and had those 10 pulled that stuff over here, 10 dispatchers would have been in a position to invoke 121.627(a) (and thus 121,557) and get the emergency ball rolling.

>>>This [Hapag-lloyd] accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .

Pity that it doesn't have to be that way...

A/P Disc

1st Feb 2004, 04:21

Senior Despatcher:

I've got about five ACARS messages. I don't want to
put them in the public domain but what I can tell you is
that is is from "HLF Ops". I've got no idea who the
actual person was. It was a very interesting discussion though
because HLF keeps asking which airport he can reach.
The a/c responds first with airfields in central Germany and
than later during the flight they give alternate airfields
much more south. So they very well new that something
was wrong fuel wise!

One point is interesting though. The captain was
Austrian not German. So he must have known Vienna Airport
pretty well. I am very intersted to read in the final report
if a case of "get there itis" was involved. Well just have to wait
and see.

Rgds.

SeniorDispatcher

1st Feb 2004, 04:53

Thanks for the info. That sounds like about the same number As I saw in that article, but I'm sure the full accounting will be in the final report, whenever it comes out...

jetjackel

1st Feb 2004, 05:14

SeniorDispatcher.

Your post about dispatchers is something I'm well aware of having worked for US 121 Air Carriers most of my career. The past 7 years I've worked in and around Europe. My current employer, a wannabe JAA member, uses "dispatchers" in O.C.C. When I first joined the company, I thought they were "dispatchers". In the US they would be Flight Followers, just as JAR operators don't use dispatch. Charter Captains "out here" fly alone being supplied with OFP and WX. and unless SelCal or company frequencies are available, make "all" the decisions while airbourne.

Under 121 this case of incompetence would never had happened as the dispatcher requried under 121 would have been seriously envolved.

The JAA needs to reorganize their definition of dispatch and get additional operational people in the loop with the pilots. Its ludicrous that the Captain was discussing issues with only maintenance and management.

Under 121 the chance of both a wacked out pilot and a wached out dispatcher working the same flight like the one we are discussing, would be pretty improbable.

I would also like to add that I am not against discussing this incident, but it does bother me that people are trying to justify the actions envolved. Must be a lack of understanding or experience.

Rananim

1st Feb 2004, 12:36

411a's comments,although harsh,are not unjustified.There are a plethora of airports between Greece and Germany,and I'm afraid this was a case of very poor judgement.Coordination with company should have been the last thing on this guy's mind.The pilot of a British Midland B737 that crashed at Kegworth also saw fit to devote precious time calling company when he should have been devoting his full attention to the unfolding events.

Give me a pilot who knows that airmanship and company considerations sometimes diverge and who knows which canoe to paddle when the divergence becomes clear.Remember,SOP's have never saved lives.Only airmanship.

no sig

1st Feb 2004, 18:13

Rananim

Most would agree that good airmanship is fundemental as is the prioritisation of tasks and decsion making. No one would suggest a crew with an immediate problem should be wasting time with calls to the Company. However, where time permits, to have engineering and flight dispatch/operations support hopefully, offers the crew more assistance than distraction.

In the case of the FAR121 dispatch system, if might be seen as another crew member (operating to operational regulations and law) based on the ground, not a 'Company Man' trying to influence a Commanders decision for economic or commercial reasons. It's the very reason FAA Dispatchers are licenced to the same technical levels as aircrew.

repulo

3rd Feb 2004, 01:03

Just to get some things right, the mentioned company is sometimes trying to influence the PIC`s decission. BUT it never tries to actually make that decission. The PIC does. I have been working for that company for quite a time in both seats and never got a call why I did this or that. There are black sheeps in every company and its only a question of having "a" problem with the wrong guy being involved.

PS HLF made quite an effort to strengthen the position of the F/O to avoid things like this happening again.

jetjackel

3rd Feb 2004, 04:45

"gave the F.O. more training......" What did they do issue clubs or more CRM?

Rosbif

3rd Feb 2004, 05:24

I am sure that certain Canadian 'glider pilots' will be watching this with some interest.

Leezyjet

8th Feb 2004, 05:02

SeniorDispatcher,

I work as a Dispatcher (talking running the turnround a/c side doing loadsheets etc type) in the UK and would love to see the US way of doing things adopted. It would be benificial from a safety point of view, and the extra cash from having an official license would be nice too !! ;)

There are too many f/deck crews in Europe who have little or no respect for the Dispatcher and what they do and merely think we are just wannabe's or glorified jetbridge drivers, and because of the lack of formal training we get I can see why.

You are only required to do just 2 weeks training in what that particular airline/handling agent wants you to know and another couple of weeks shadowing on the job and off you go !!.

In my last job we spent a majority of the 2 weeks purely on manual loadsheets and that was only for narrowbody a/c, but when I moved to my current job, for a widebody operator we only got 1 day on manual loadsheets - even that was split 1/2 day on weight and 1/2 next day on trim !!!. That wasn't such a problem for me, but for the poor girls and guys who had never even seen one before it wasn't nearly enough, I pity them if they ever had to do one for real !!.

Some of the flight crew at my airline don't even realise we actually work for the same company - they have that little interest in what we do, they think we are just handling agent staff.

I have offered numerous f/deck crews the chance to come and see what we really do when they are shouting at us or saying how incompetent the dispatch department is, but not one of them has ever bothered to take up that offer.

We actually had a flight crew in our office last week (not their choice I might add) when the snow hit and they were amazed by what actually went on when they saw it and what problems we face everyday from the airport authorities/handling agents etc etc. At least that is 2 crew members who now understand more about why things happen the way they do and thats 2 that will be a little more understanding instead of shouting at us over the r/t next time they are holding for 20 mins for a stand at the busiest time of day.

As part of our job function as a dispatcher we need to know something about the job roles of everyone we deal with, from cleaners to captains so we know what problems they are up against. It would be nice if it worked the other way too.

I just wish that JAA would change the rules to adopt the FAA way of doing things, but we'll have flown to the moon and back again before that ever happens.

Straying from the thread now so I'll shut up.........

:)

SeniorDispatcher

9th Feb 2004, 06:09

Given that operational control has received attention as a result of other accidents outside the USA proper like the Air Ontario F-28 at Dryden (resulting in changes in Canadian regs) and the USAF T-43/B737 in Croatia (resulting in USAF changes at Scott AFB, where they now have FAA-licensed dispatchers), I suspect that operational control will be a prominent factor once the final report on Hapag-Lloyd eventually comes out. There is simply too much evidence to support operational control's overall contribution to flight (and public) safety, despite the objections of some, most of whom have zero understanding of what operational control truly is, and what it isn't.

Time will tell.

Frosty Hoar

11th Feb 2004, 16:15

Senior dispatcher, as a fellow dispatcher one cannot fail to be impressed by your rhetoric in relation to Vienna issue as well as the implications of part 121 dispatch.

In the instance of the Vienna incident, effective liason was established with operations,however ops were advised that the aircraft would be continuing to MUC gear down.There was no commercial pressure to get the aircraft to a main base as a spare a310 and crew were available to cover the rotations where necessary. No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.

You also refer to the background work carried out within operations that goes largely unnoticed by the pilot workforce,this maybe the case, but by the same token whilst you are sitting in your cosy office that same pilot workforce may be dealing with all manner of horrors that are unnoticed by us,e.g bad weather operations,unruly pax, fatigue etc.

Whilst I applaud your defence of our profession, I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.

ND Hapag Lloyd Operations/TUI GP OPS

opsbod

12th Feb 2004, 05:45

this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.

As a European Operations Controller I recognise in your response the leave it to the pilot he knows best attitude which is prevelant throughout Europe. In doing so you have missed the point Senior Dispatcher has been making all along. In FAR121 Operations the Dispatcher has equal responsibility with the aircraft commander.

Had this particular flight have operated under FAR121 as SD has commented the question would hopefully have been asked "Why do you think you can make MUC when the flight planning system and my calculations says your going to be short?". From there if a resolution could not have been reached the dispatcher would have had the authority and could have taken action to have the aircraft land.

When the Commander made the decision to continue to MUC did anyone question it, did anyone run a gear down plan and pass any predicted fuel burns, and was any flight planning assistance offered by HL ops?

With the greatest of respect on this occassion it is quite obvious that the statement "this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation" is incorrect.

Now whilst I hope as SD and others on this forum have said this inquirey may lead to a fundamental review of Operations Control in Europe I think we are all big enough and ugly enough to realise FAR121 style dispatch is not going to be the outcome.

I wait for the results with interest.

SeniorDispatcher

12th Feb 2004, 07:03

>>>to realise FAR121 style dispatch is not going to be the outcome.

Probably not. It'll probably take the death of a member of a royal family, a politician, or a pop music star... ;)

>>>No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,

No, it can't. As I've said previously, a dispatcher (anywhere) can't teleport themselves from the office to the cockpit and wrestle control away from an errant PIC. A dispatcher -can- however take independent steps to declare an emergency when a PIC's action is likely to become a single-point failure.

>>>to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.

I don't believe I've ever blamed "operational input" as a possible cause, but I have mentioned "operational control" as a likely factor, and they are two different things. Rather than rehash all that here, please feel free to see US FAR 1.1, or previous posts for exactly what "operational control" is. As far as being hostage as to only the info that a PIC wants to tell you, sure it happens sometimes, but because of our level of training here (the ADX is 98% common to the ATP), we usually are able to see through the smokescreeen. Via ACARS, dispatchers here can get a fuel query answered truthfully, and are sufficiently trained to know that extended flight with gear down eats fuel, a PIC's assertions that "they can make it" aside.

>>>I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.

I can appreciate that you'd not like to see any kind of situation that could potentially result in a dispatcher there sharing the same legal fun as 3378's PIC is now enjoying, but it has to be noted that joint responsibility as practiced here can resolve these kinds of operational situations LONG before the event gets to a courtroom. You may think "the commander is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation" but the accidents that I've mentioned previously, as well as 3378, don't always bear this out.

templar

15th Feb 2004, 07:46

Small issue of a 'point' bein missed here..Captain by definition is the one mainly responsible for the safety of his aircraft in the air. I say mainly since a few less important personalities have a part to play, like Dispatchers, ATC etc. Assuming he had a plog to work from, isn't it reasonable to assume that it was all laid out in black and white in front of him before the fateful decision was taken by him or made for him by accountants. Damn the cost..put the aircraft first..if it comes to having your ears bashed or wrists slapped then let it be for insubordination and not for jeopardising peoples lives. It's so basic a PPL could make the right call! If you've earned the rank then wear it..call your own shots when in the air!!

Dogma

15th Feb 2004, 09:42

Seniordispatcher,

You are over egging the role of the dispatcher, something of a wetdream to think you would ever be in that position.

Most of the "dispatchers" in the UK are glorified paper delivery boys. With the exception of the serviceair long haul dispatchers, some of whom are very good indeed!

411A

15th Feb 2004, 09:54

Yes Dogma, and that is precisely the problem with European airline flight ops (JAR or no JAR)...ie: very poor flight following and operational control.

Will they ever learn?...not in our lifetimes.

Even some third world airlines who have seen fit to adopt the FAA style dispatch/flight following procedures, are much better organized.

Case in point, many prior threads here on PPRuNe with regard to operating into LHR with absolute minimum fuel...by UK airlines who should absolutely know better.

In a word...clowns.:mad:

Color 'em Hapag-Lloyd.

SeniorDispatcher

15th Feb 2004, 10:36

>>>You are over egging the role of the dispatcher,

No, not really. Many folks don't read any further back in a thread more than a few messages, and if folks make the same statements, I'll make the same points in return. Sorry if any repeteion has offended you...

>>>something of a wetdream to think you would ever be in that position.

Perhaps because folks over there still seem to think solely in terms of how/what dispatchers are -there-. and not -here-.

>>>Most of the "dispatchers" in the UK are glorified paper delivery boys.

As others have said, as well as myself, it doesn't have to be that way, but absent equivalent training and sufficient support by industry/regulators (as is the case -here-) nothing is likely to change -there-. How puzzling that folks seem to lament about the "paper delivery boys" yet do not/will not support efforts to change that.

What do you wanna bet that lack of operational control is noted as a factor in the final report on the Hapag-Lloyd accident?

no sig

15th Feb 2004, 18:49

Dogma

You really do need read back in this post, we're not talking about ramp dispatchers here but FAA licensed Aircraft/Flight Dispatchers, a world apart in their roles. And I suspect the Servisair Dispatchers your are referring to have FAA Licences.

411a

What is encouraging for European Ops under JAR, are the moves to require the adoption of the ICAO Flight Dispatcher/Operations Officer training standard. This, last I heard, was to be included as a requirement in a JAROPS1 operators Ops Manual Part D. The sad fact is that in the UK and several other European countries, there has never been a minimum training standard for operations control personnel, that I hope is about to change.

dispatcherdoug

21st Feb 2004, 18:10

I'm joining the discussion late. Let me add a bit of background, I am also a current US FAR 121 dispatcher working for a regional airline in the US midwest, having previously worked for a major airline HQ'd somewhere in the western US.

When I was going through my IOE at my previous carrier, I was told a story of an A320 captain who decided that he knew more than his dispatcher. On a flight from Boston to the airlines hub, the dispatcher had built a route well north of the standard beaten path, due to the horrific jet stream core speeds. The airbus departed KBOS with 42.2 fuel on board (ie., max fuel).

In the states we have ASD (Aircraft Situation Display), which is a continual download of FAA radar data. I can see where each of my airplanes are now, and their ATC radar datablock. I can superimpose weather, the filed and actually flown route, and a myriad number of other things. I cant imagine dispatching 121 domestic or flag without it.

Anyway, our dispatcher of this flight remarked their release as to the reason for the nonstandard route as a best-time route due to extreme headwinds. Once the flight was handed off from departure to center, he was displayed on ASD. The dispatcher displayed his filed route (it went up into Canada, so nasty was the jetstream that day for westbounds). A few minutes later his nicely displayed route was deleted, and the flight was either offered or requested direct to the initial fix on the arrival into the hub.

Instead of avoiding the jetstream winds, like the flight plan called for - he was flying directly into the face of a 200 mph jetstream core.

Several radio contacts asking what is MCDU was saying as expected FOB at destination resulted in a decreasing amount, as he was eating well into the reserve - he was planned to land with about 6500 lbs of fuel onboard. All he'd get from the Captain was "we'll be alright." Under US FAR 121, thou shall not plan to land with less than the 45 minute reserve on board - unless unforeseen situations arise, but ignoring the flight plan and the remarks section of his release doesnt count as one of them. At one point his ground speed was less than 300 KTS, and he had over 4 hours of flight time remaining.

Long story short, the crew landed with only about 2500 lbs of fuel on board (IFR reserve is 4000 lbs). The dispatcher had made repeated attempts, to include a near demand to land short for fuel - which the captain disregarded. The dispatcher called the handing center, and declared a minimum fuel advisory, since the captain refused to, to get priority handing into the hub. An investgation ensured, and the captain had to go to "bad captain school". Had the dispatcher not called center and declared a MFA (since the captain wasnt about to), this flight might not have had a safe ending.

As a dispatcher, I know I cant fly the airplane, but, under our system of control, I do manage the flight. I do have the right, and legal responsibility to step in when warranted - and I do sometimes. I can divert a plane when necessary. While I can consult with management, all they can make is suggestions, they're thinking of economics and operational statistics and flight completion factor - nice things when you have the luxury of sitting back and relaxing, but count for naught when youre charged with maintaining flight safety.