Whatever happened to the Chinook HC 3s?

[Jackonicko]

Last heard of being taken back for use by the US Army SOCOM, and thence to be replaced by new MH-47Ds.

Various snippets, all of which are just rumour:
Long delayed delivery due to problems/goalpost changing?
Severe corrosion/water damage while in storage in the USA?
Eventually delivered?
Failed MAR trials at Boscombe Down?
Delivered to Brize for transport back to the USA (except one GI airframe at Odiham and one airframe at Boscombe)?
Never sent back?
Now being scrapped?
Another procurement triumph?

Comments, anyone?

[Pilot Pacifier]

They were auctioned last month on eBay. One careful owner, VVGC, (one with slight accident damage when it was off loaded from a ferry on import). FSH, dry miles only, garaged overnight. Logbook and service manuals supplied. Best offers…

Such a waste it beggars belief. What was that about ‘Smart Procurement?’

[trailfinder]

Certainly not smart nor a triumph.

Possibly the most expensive helicopters in the world..ever!

[Jackonicko]

Originally expected to be delivered and in service by 1998.

But:

(according to Hansard in May this year)

"Norman Lamb: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many of the Chinook HC3 helicopters ordered for the RAF (a) were delivered to the UK and (b) are flying in the UK. [108847]

Mr. Ingram: Of the eight Chinook Mk3 aircraft ordered for the RAF, seven were delivered to the United Kingdom during the period of July 2001 to May 2002. The remaining aircraft has been retained at Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia, USA in support of a UK Chinook capability enhancement programme. Two of the Chinook Mk3s are flying in the UK as part of the Military Aircraft Release (MAR) Trials, another is currently being utilised at RAF Odiham for ground training. The remaining four in-country aircraft are awaiting the issue of MAR recommendations and a Release to Service."

Also:

"An approach was received from the United States last year about the possible purchase of the Chinook Mk3, with the United Kingdom in turn purchasing the MH47G. While informal discussions took place with the DoD, no formal approach has been received."

On 13 November, Norman Lamb asked:

"(1) what the total value of contracts in relation to the order for Chinook HC3 helicopters is; [137223]

(2) on what date is it intended that the Chinook HC3 helicopters ordered by the RAF will be delivered to a squadron to undertake their envisaged duties; [137222]

(3) pursuant to his answer of 12 May 2003, Official Report, column 37W, on Chinook helicopters, what reasons have been given to his Department by the US Department of Defense for its decision not to purchase the Chinook HC3 helicopters ordered by the RAF; whether the Chinook HC3 helicopters delivered to the United Kingdom have since been made airworthy; whether the Chinook HC3 helicopter retained by Boeing Helicopters at Philadelphia has been delivered to the United Kingdom; where the Chinook HC3 helicopters ordered for the RAF were stored prior to their shipment to the United Kingdom; what assessment was made of the conditions in which they were stored; what assessment was made of the condition of each of the helicopters following this storage; what his plans are for disposal of the fleet; what specific role the Chinook HC3 helicopter was intended to fulfil when the original order was placed with Boeing in October 1995; whether other helicopters have been evaluated for this role since then; and if he will make a statement. [137295]

Mr. Ingram [holding answer 10 November 2003]: I will write to the hon. Member and place a copy of my letter in the Library of the House."

Someone here must know the answers to these, and other, questions......

[Tocsin]

"Mr. Ingram [holding answer 10 November 2003]: I will write to the hon. Member and place a copy of my letter in the Library of the House."
"

Sometimes the most interesting questions are answered with this - it is bl00dy annoying! Can we force them to put the Library of the House online? (I can find Hansard and the Stationery Office, but not tLotH...)

[Brian Dixon]

No we can't, but you can write to your MP to ask if they will send you a copy of a document placed in the Library.

Doesn't always mean you'll get it though!

This story seems to ring a bell somehow.

[Jackonicko]

I can now add more unsubstantiated rumour:

......Delivered to Brize for transport back to the USA (except one GI airframe at Odiham and one airframe at Boscombe)?
Rejected by the US Army as being unfit for use and unsuitable for economic conversion?
Never sent back?
Now being scrapped?

This is a scandal, if true.

But can anyone give an opinion on whether or not it is?

[Archimedes]

JN,

You could also try David Davis, who has palced three questions about the Chinook 3s in the last ten days - all receving answers which of the 'I will write to the Rt Hon gentleman' type.

To the cynic, this proliferation of 'I will write...' answers suggests that there's something about the HC 3s that the govt doesn't want to appear in the publicly accessible official records...

[Jackonicko]

David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what process the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter has undergone to ascertain its readiness for release to operational service;
(2) what the latest estimate is of the cost of the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter procurement project;
(3) when the budget for the Chinook Mark 3 Procurement project was authorised; and what the total cost forecast was at contract stage;
(4) what the differences between the Mark 2 Chinook helicopter, the Chinook 47-H and the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter are;
(5) what the differences between the Mark 2 Chinook helicopter, the Chinook 47-H and the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter are;
(6) how the validation process of the FADEC system fitted to the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter differs from the validation process used to validate the FADEC system fitted to the Mark 2 and Mark 2a Chinook helicopter;
(7) how many lines of software cope were written in programming the FADEC system fitted to the Chinook Mark 3 helicopter;
(8) what operational requirement the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter was designed to fulfil when the original order was placed in October 1995;
(9) what cost-benefit analysis was conducted prior to initiating procurement of the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter; and what the results were;
(10) what software language was used in writing the software for the FADEC fitted to the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter; and what sub-contractors have been used to conduct this work;
(11) which company was contracted to fit the FADEC system into the Mark 3 Chinook helicopter;
(12) what differences there are between the FADEC system fitted to the Mark 3 Chinook and the MH47 Chinook helicopter.


Mr. Ingram: I will write to the hon. Member and a copy of my letter will be placed in the Library of the House.


David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the release to service of the Mark 3 Chinook helicopters.


Mr. Ingram: I will write to the hon. Member and place a copy of my letter in the Library of the House.

[role is great]

And his third question,20th Nov

David Davis: To ask the S of S for Defence how many Mk3 Chinooks the RAF have? What was their cost to the RAF was in the last year for which figures are available?, How many are active and what is the location of those which are (a) active and (b) inactive.
No prize here for quessing the answer
" I will write to............................."
hum

[Jackonicko]

I'll bet there's a Pruner who could answer the how many and where questions before Mr Davies gets his letter.....

[scroggs]

Perhaps someone who may be a constituent of Mr David Davis could write him and ask for a copy of the SoSfD's letter?

[sprucemoose]

Hi Jacko - perhaps you should read the Daily Express story on the project today, as no-one seems to be biting. I haven't seen it, but it must be true!

[Woff1965]

What does the Express story say? I can't bring myself to pick it up personally so a short precis would be useful.

(I checked their website and they have nothing on this story.)

[sprucemoose]

Just spoken to a vile Express reader who tells me the basis is as follows:

UK likely to scrap Mk 3s without ever using them and pull any useful kit out for the Mk 2s. However, it could also choose to upgrade them at taxpayers expense...scandal...bah... Boeing says the aircraft were delivered to spec...scandal...bah

The headline tells you all you need know really: 'Copters bungle grounds the SAS'. Without any comment from the mysterious 'SAS sources', of course. Or mentioning that the aircraft actually belong to the RAF, not the SAS. Or that they are really grounded (they could always use other aircraft, I guess).

From a journo - don't believe half of the c4ap you read!

[Ian Corrigible]

In-depth article on this story in this week's Defense News (http://www.defensenews.com/), which concludes "With the U.S. contractor and its suppliers absolved of any blame, suspicions are growing that the British specifications for the helicopters were faulty."

:bored:

I/C

[DummyRun]

Always going to be a winner-lets buy some probe equipped helos and scrap the C-130 tanker at the same time; mind you those guys on 1*1 Sqn can do anything, can't you???

[NURSE]

Yet another glorious chapter in British defence procurment:rolleyes:

[Jackonicko]

"The purchase of the Chinook HC.Mk 3 has been described by Edward Leigh, chairman of the Commons Public Accounts Committee as “one of the most incompetent procurements of all time”, while the NAO contented itself with describing the procurement as ‘flawed’.

In July 1995, the MoD decided that eight of the 14 Chinook HC.Mk 2 helicopters then on order should be delivered to an enhanced (HC.Mk 3) standard, to meet the emerging requirement for a dedicated Special Forces support helicopter. When the original contract was placed in 1995, it was recognised that neither the HC.Mk 2 nor HC.Mk 3 programmes would deliver aircraft to the full requirement but that this would be met by retrofitting the necessary systems later. Of the 100 "essential elements" outlined in the requirement, the contract delivered 55. Most of the 45 elements not delivered, could not be included owing to immature technology, but the NAO was unable to discover an audit trail to explain why these remaining elements have never been contracted for.

The new aircraft was to have improved range and navigation capability, and was to be fitted with night vision sensors and a new radar. Instead of simply buying MH-47Es or a similar glass-cockpit Chinook variant ‘off-the-shelf’ (an option that was considered to be unaffordable within the funding available for the HC.Mk 3 programme) the MoD opted for a bastardised hybrid solution, incorporating elements of the existing analogue cockpit with new digital systems and displays, with a new weather radar in a reconfigured nose radome, with provision for a refuelling probe, and with the increased size fuel tanks associated with the CH-47SD and MH-47E

The eight aircraft were to cost £259 million and the forecast In-Service Date (defined as delivery of the first six aircraft)was set at November 1998. An avionics upgrade programme for the aircraft was put to contract in 1997 but unfortunately, it soon became evident that the displays for the weather radar and other systems would not fit inside the existing cockpit. There are persistant reports that the aircraft were stored (inadequately) while the final avionics fit was being decided and designed, and that the aircraft suffered corrosion damage during this period.

In March 1998, the In-Service Date was redefined to allow for some programme slippage and for the Military Aircraft Release work that would be required following delivery . The new ISD was set for January 2002.

Seven of the eight aircraft were ‘delivered to specification’ by the contractor between July 2001 and May 2002, although one was reportedly damaged when it was unloaded at Southampton docks. None have so far been accepted into service, however, and there have been reports that the aircraft actually failed its Military Aircraft Release trials.

Unfortunately the Chinook HC.Mk 3's unique, hybrid digital/analogue cockpit is reliant on software. However, the contract did not specify that software documentation and code for avionics systems should be analysed in accordance with United Kingdom Defence standards in order to demonstrate software integrity. This was because it was (erroneously) assumed that since the systems and displays in the HC.Mk 3 cockpit were based upon those fitted to the Royal Netherlands Air Force's advanced CH-47D Chinooks, there could be a ‘read-across’ on the basis of similarity with the Dutch avionics, allowing an adequate safety case to be constructed. Unfortunately, the HC.Mk 3 hybrid cockpit had a unique configuration and this assumption proved unfounded. As a result it has not been possible to demonstrate that the helicopter's flight instruments meet the required United Kingdom Defence standards.

Although one of the main contractors for the avionics system indicated that it would allow access to some software data the process of proving that the software meets UK standards is time-consuming and extremely expensive. Moreover, because the legacy software in the hybrid cockpit is not amenable to the techniques required to confirm the robustness of new software design there is no guarantee of a successful outcome. Consequently, the Chinook HC.Mk 3 is currently restricted to day/night flying above 500 feet, clear of cloud, and in circumstances that ensure that the pilot can fly the aircraft solely using external reference points and without relying on the flight displays. These restrictions mean that the helicopters cannot be used except for the most limited flight trials, and may mean that the aircraft will have to be ‘de-modified’, stripped of their advanced systems and brought back to HC.Mk 2/2A standards before they can be used operationally, unless they are simply and quietly scrapped.

To bring the helicopters up to broadly the same standard as the existing Chinook fleet will require about£127 million, over and above the £259 million originally estimated, and the helicopters could then enter service in mid-2007 - nine years later than the original In-Service Date, and five years after the revised, ‘slipped’ date.

Problems have effectively kept the aircraft grounded (except for two aircraft used for trials) until today. There were reports that the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) would return all eight Chinook HC.Mk 3s to the US government for upgrade and use by US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the ‘war against terror’, in order to boost the number of MH-47E Chinooks available to US special forces. Under the rumoured deal, the HC.Mk 3s would later be replaced by new MH-47Gs. In the House of Commons, Adam Ingram confirmed that “An approach was received from the United States last year about the possible purchase of the Chinook Mk 3, with the United Kingdom in turn purchasing the MH-47G.” but he added that “While informal discussions took place with the DoD, no formal approach has been received.” Rumours suggested that a US team inspected the aircraft and politely declined them!

As far as can be ascertained two aircraft are at Boscombe for trials, one is at an undisclosed location near Bristol, one is with Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia (having never made it over to UK shores), being used in support of a UK Chinook capability enhancement programme and the remainder are in storage, being cannibalised for spares, or in use as GI airframes at RAF Odiham.

The Chinook HC.Mk 3 MAR flight trials have reportedly progressed despite the on-going contractual issues resulting from the MOD decision not to field the current aircraft into service, although the trials work is not intended to result in a release to service for the original planned configuration, but is instead focusing on those aspects likely to be common with the future, but as yet undecided, plans for the aircraft.

In recent months the HC.Mk 3s have mainly been used for clearance of the Allied Signal 714 engines, already fitted to the HC.Mk 3 but now being fitted to the HC.Mk 2 and 2A as a replacement for the Allied Signal 712. Much of the initial 714 engine and FADEC analysis was conducted on the Chinook HC 3 aircraft, one of which had already been instrumented as part of its MAR trials. These engine trials necessitated increasing the Chinook HC.Mk 3 clearance to 15,000 ft for high level engine shut downs and relights. Flight trials were reportedly successful, but issues with the integration of the engine with the HUMS and ADR of the HC.Mk 2/2A required some software changes before the new engine could be incorporated into the operational fleet.

It is believed that an unknown number of HC.Mk 2/2As may have been upgraded with some HC.Mk 3 features, including the enlarged fuselage side fuel tanks, probably under a UOR. Further details remain unknown.

The NAO comfortingly hinted that the HC.Mk 3 programme pre-dated the MoD’s introduction of its ‘Smart Acquisition’ initiative, with its tighter risk controls, and that today the programme would have been adequately de-risked prior to investment decisions being taken."

That's OK then. Could never happen again.....

[BEagle]

Now that really is a case of Gross Negligence!

[Jackonicko]

How can you be so unreasonable, BEags? It's just 'flawed'.....

Anyone got any further light to shed?

[Art Field]

Don't you mean floored?. What a shambles.

[MReyn24050]

Agreed a real shambles. One would have thought that the Project Directors and Managers would have made certain that the software documentation and code was to be analysed in accordance with UK Defence Standards after the lessons learnt with FADEC. No doubt they have now all retired and are sitting back enjoying their protected pensions.
Jackonicko, you asked if anyone has any further light to shed. One thought that does come to mind is they could become expensive garden sheds with a built in greenhouse, sorry "glass cockpit." Will we ever see any Smart Acquisition?

[NURSE]

No surprises then we wanted a comprimise aircraft because our civil service masters wanted to save money and we got an aircraft that doesn't work that we can't even resell.

[sex it up]

The whole issue of the Mk3 being brought into service has been muddied by the comprehensive upgrade programme that has been embodied on the Mk2/2a. Around 20 UOR modifications have been embodied to most of the MK2/2a fleet giving a capability that is now well beyond that of the Mk3 in it's current form.

It is staggering that the Mk3 has taken so long to get released into service that we have been able to retrospectively design a modification to the existing fleet, embody, test, train and ultimately use in anger.

Many of the Mk3's have components that are compatible with the Mk2/2a and guess what, they have been robbed blind to service the Mk2 fleet.

Procurement 1 Fleet 0

[frank320pilot]

Decision to be made soon - probably prior to summer recess.

[Fg Off Max Stout]

****************************************************

Article on today's news - the worst defence procurement ever. The 8 HC3s which cost £259m are up for sale, but given the fact that BritMil couldn't make them viable, the chances are no other nation will want to touch them, so they may well be scrapped. Didn't do Hoon, et al, any harm though.

[totalwar]

Not sure it would be Mr Hon who takes the blame. The blame has to rest with the IPTL. He is the guy who should hang his head in shame and resign.

[engineer(retard)]

Does make a mockery of those that propose buying kit off the shelf from the US will solve all of our problems. An expensive way of learning a lesson. No excuses can be offered Def Stan 00-55 (software safety) was initially issued in 91.

[FJ2ME]

Au contraire, monsieur Retard, surely. According to the posts above it seems that the main cause of the cock up was NOT buying it off the shelf and insisting on some 'cost-cutting' b@$tardisation. Gross negligence indeed, BEagle. Oh when will we learn...

On the plus side, good to see that we have been much more demanding about the Mk3 Release to Service than arguably with the Mk2, eh Mr.Dixon?

[Kolibear]

Radio 4 this morning was saying that 'the aircraft couldn't fly in cloud because the altimeter didn't work'

Please tell me thats a vast over-simplification.

[engineer(retard)]

FJ2ME

I'm afraid I have to au contraire your au contraire

American safety standards are often an order of magnitude lower than ours, that is one of the reasons that why we cannot buy straight off the shelf (other than domestic industry interests). If you buy their kit and assess it against our safety critical standards it will often fail.

We have to build in additional redundancy and safety measures to integrate their weapons becasue they will accept a higher level of loss due to self-damage. Brimstone is a public example, there are others instances less public.

You cannot test software to death in the same way as you do hardware and so it is judged in a qualitative manner (documentation, assembly tools and other geeky bits). Hence, a MAR fail is almost a given because they do not use our methodology. A lot of effort has been put in to reading across US software standards (CMM I believe) to ours, AFAIK there is still no authoritative guidance on direct read across.

This reduces their procurement costs, but I assume that they can take afford to lose more kit than we can.

[Brian Dixon]

I have to agree with you FJ2ME. The only consolation in this fiasco is that the MoD was reluctant to issue a Release to Service until it was fit to fly. I wonder if anyone will be found grossly negligent with regards procurement?

If only they had been this reluctant with the Mk2...........

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[SmilingKnifed]

TotalWar,

If Buff has responsibility for the department, then it is his head that should roll, as per recent precedents e.g. immigration, transport.

What's the betting? :rolleyes:

[Safeware]

It's a bit of both - the idea, v popular at the time, was to go COTS as much as possible. Chinook IPT did - a load of 'Dutch' COTS that Boeing were putting together was picked for the Mk3, although overall the project was to meet UK requirements. That's requirements as in wish list as opposed to Requirements - part of the development cycle. Inherent in COTS is the difficulty in getting safety evidence for it.

Interestingly though, these issues were raised with the IPT when a supportability study was carried out in 1998. The effects on safety parallel this, but were not the object of the exercise. It was pointed out that because of the COTS nature of the magical glass cockpit, the software therein would not be able to be modified, and thus was limited in its use. The IPT were not very happy with the report!

[engineer(retard)]

Boll@x! Different maybe, but that doesn't mean lower.

Jungly AEO

I have had to provide MAR recommendations for US weapons and safety critical systems fitted to our cabs, have you?

Safety cases are derived as a mathematical probability of an event occuring, this means numbers. If the numbers thay have to reach to be declared safe are different, one has to be higher than the other. Unfortunately, there are a lot of numbers to look at, the basic EF weapons safety case was 1500 pages of numbers.

Suggest you read Def Stan 00-56 and Mil Std 882. I suggest you look at ES(Air) BP 1201 that will give you the targets for your own aircraft.

Our processes for hardware assessment are similar to the US, the targets we have to reach are different. US processes for assessing software quality are different and as I mentioned earlier there is no read-across for safety critical systems. Hence had the Chinook been bought off the shelf it still would not have gained MAR, nor would Apache if bought direct off the US.

We add complexity by the addition or modification of systems to make them meet our standards, or we reduce the operating envelope.

[Safeware]

retard - "Suggest you read Def Stan 00-56 and Mil Std 882. We set higher numerical targets than the US."

Actually, suggest you read 00-56, it doesn't set a target.

The target for UK Miltary Aircraft is laid down in JSP 553.

sw

[engineer(retard)]

Safeware

I stand corrected, I was getting carried away doing this and putting sprog to bed, 00-56 and BP 1201 are the methods of assessment. I have also read these documents more times than I care to remember. Although in my day the target was in JSP 318B Vol 4, 553 I believe is recent.

Jungly AEO

In my posting I was referring to aircraft self damage. This is an area where we do diverge and this causes significant integration problems and costs.

Regards

Retard

[fagin's goat]

Typical! Suddenly we have engineers coming out of the woodwork with excuses for this fiasco. There are no excuses - the a/c are a waste of tax-payers cash pure and simple. If we had not f***ed about with a fancy spec those machines would be doing a decent job of work for UK forces NOW. This must never happen again - no doubt those involved at various levels have received gongs and promotions. They should be 'outed' on this website. (Would be nice for Buff to take a little heat on the way............)

[engineer(retard)]

Goat

I have not offered any excuses, just stated the rules that we have to work to. Engineers do not create the rules anymore than you create air traffic regulations.

The fancy rules are mandated by ADRP, MOD and QinetiQ have no flex with regard to intepretation of safety regulations when applied to critical systems.

You need a lot more clout than I ever had to change safety standards whilst in uniform, and now I am in industry these standards are contractually binding. If you want to buy kit off the shelf, MOD need to change the standards. Our standards are possibly the most stringent, and I have worked on other nations latest generation aircraft that have not been allowed to carry out trials in our airspace because they cannot meet our standards. If you cannot change the rules at least carry out procurement with your eyes open.

[Safeware]

FG

Excuses?

I don't think people are making excuses here - at the end of the day the MOD has a duty of care to perform and the required level was not met. The fact that it could not have been met from the outset (IMHO) isn't being presented as an excuse here. The fault lies within DPA on this one, no excuses fit.

retard,

553 and 318 limts are the same, 882 also doesn't set targets, only gives examples as 00-56 used to. Not sure about any US equivalent of 553.

sw

[Twinact]

I have to agree with FJ2ME, the main source of the cock up was the incremental, cost-cutting attempt at procurement. Originally the 8 Mk3's were part of the 14 Mk 2a's being bought to boost the UKs lift capability, but every year a 'little' pot of money (probably from some other badly needed Chinook mod) was found to change the spec to produce an SF aircraft. This constantly changing spec, with insufficient cash to integrate the new sensors properly, has led us to today's debarcle.

What I can't understand is, as those who would ultimately test the hybrid aircraft were involved in the development of the cockpit at every stage, they didn't pick up that they would fail it?

Or is the engineers defence that they weren't involved in the development process?

[Safeware]

I could be wrong, cos I wasn't involved in that side of life, but I don't believe the 'right' people were bought in from the outset. Seemed from where I sat that it was a case of 'Here's a good idea, let's buy it now, then figure out everything else later' ...... (later) ..... 'oh fcuk'.

sw

[tucumseh]

Engineer said,

“American safety standards are often an order of magnitude lower than ours, that is one of the reasons that why we cannot buy straight off the shelf (other than domestic industry interests). If you buy their kit and assess it against our safety critical standards it will often fail”.

A simple statement of fact. No British manufacturer (eg WHL) could build a Chinook to print, as it wouldn’t (or shouldn’t) get through MoD safety or quality systems. The last new (RAF) Chinook I inspected (and I am fully qualified to do so) was a dog, and would have taken months to repair, never mind raise to our standards. Jungly, you’re an AEO and believe me you would have sent it back, on a low loader. But then, you’re probably a SK4 man, and spoilt with quality! We buy COTS/MOTS, but in doing so relinquish a lot of safeguards and the ability to control or maintain the build standard.


Recent postings refer to the Chinook IPT, and that the IPTL should carry the blame. The Chinook IPT did not exist when this requirement was formulated, or contract negotiated. The MoD(PE) department was Directorate Helicopter Projects, which was responsible for Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Apache, Chinook, HUMS at the time. (Note – not Merlin, although that was under the same Director General).


We read this week of the criticism about this being the worst MoD procurement ever. (I’d argue, but we all have our preferences. I’d say SA80 – why buy something that failed miserably in the 50s when first trialled, when it was found wanting in heat, cold, sand and had poor ergonomics. Familiar?). They express concern that no identifiable individual was to blame. Get out the files and look at the Directorate Management Plan and cross refer it to the staff list. That will narrow it down to about six. Then study the decision making hierarchy. That gets it down to four (all now retired). Then, look at the prevailing management ethos and directives of the day (and remaining to this day). For example:


1. Projects staffed against cost, not content. A simple conversion to say, 100 aircraft, costing £3M each, would attract far more staff than an enormously complex £150M Development / Production / Conversion to ten, requiring experience in every electrical, avionic and mechanical discipline. The former is far less demanding as most of the cost is in the mod set and conversion labour which is often managed with little or no project input, having been transferred to DLO.

2. What else was happening at the time (1995 >>) in that area? Mull of Kintyre. Did that impinge on routine work, divert labour or take priority?

3. CDP’s policy in 96 was to rid PE of experienced engineering project managers, en masse. No sooner had they been moved to Bristol from London (1995 – 96) when he announced he didn’t want such people and would retire early/make redundant around 500. (That’s a huge percentage). One reason was to lower the average age, another to build up a staff of direct entrant graduates. The latter have their place, but it is not being thrown in at the deep end to manage a relatively high profile project when they have zero experience, and have yet to catch up on the knowledge non-direct entrants gain through the 5 or so previous grades they must serve in (including Requirements Management, which the press say is part of the Mk3 problem). I think I said before – would you want a 21 year old non-pilot appointed as your squadron’s senior pilot? No. So why do it in technical project management when £100Ms of taxpayers’ money is at stake? The result is that such a direct entrant gets a minimal workload because of his learning curve (and remember, there’s very few left to teach him), and the remaining experienced staffs are told to work unpaid overtime, evenings, at home, at week-ends etc to compensate. And you wonder why detailed technical issues are overlooked? Like Engineer said, most of you wouldn’t get out of bed for what they’re paid. Oh, and the 21 year old is fast-tracked and never manages another project in his life, so permits the same mistakes when managing PMs. Am I alone thinking this is a no-brainer?




I have said it before – instead of simply bleating about poor procurement, why not ask why, at exactly the same time, were other far more difficult projects in the same Directorate managed and delivered with effortless competence, by fewer staff? I suspect that, to protect the guilty, the various committees don’t want to know the answer. CDP didn't.


In truth there is no deception.

[Safety_Helmut]

Safeware

Interesting comments about HC Mk 3 supportability study, if it's the one i'm thinking of, it was the second in a programme to look at all RAF aircraft under development, the first being the C-130J. The programme was stopped after reaction from Chinook IPT. Similar results in C-130J study, lessons now being learnt the hard way.

The lack of informed comment on the latter parts of this thread are quite telling.


As an aside, does anyone have any thoughts on the 553 targets, for example same safety target (in principle) for the C17 as a Hawk ?

Safety_Helmut

[Safeware]

SH

"The lack of informed comment" will always appear telling on a rumour based network when those who are informed take a wry look :)

I think the idea of a common baseline, like 553, is a good idea - it gives the IPTs somewhere to start, rather than come out with some way-off target. IMHO, the better way is to focus on the ALARP side of 553 - here's a baseline, aim to do better. Given the risks involved, I would expect multis to be able to do better than FJ eg vis a viz the effects of an uncontained engine, Aircraft Self Damage, loss of control etc etc.

Starting point for most problems, as for all areas, is likely to be getting a contract that has appropriate targets.

How are J lessons mainfesting themselves?

sw

[Safety_Helmut]

Safeware

Agree fully about the need for setting a common baseline. The concept of aiming to do better is also quite correct, but one not often seen in practice. As for ALARP, again a fine concept, in fact one based on case law. It would be easy to say ALARP is abused, but that implies some level of understanding of the principle, in reality, it is very badly misunderstood within MoD.

Safety_Helmut

[Safeware]

SH

I agree that it is mis-understood, which is surprising for such a simple concept. Maybe that's what needs to be explored?

And I have seen it abused.

sw

[NickLappos]

engineer(retard) said:
"American safety standards are often an order of magnitude lower than ours, that is one of the reasons that why we cannot buy straight off the shelf (other than domestic industry interests). If you buy their kit and assess it against our safety critical standards it will often fail.

We have to build in additional redundancy and safety measures to integrate their weapons becasue they will accept a higher level of loss due to self-damage. "

This statement is without merit, in every way. I have detailed knowledge of the standards of military helicopters, and can assure you that the latest British helicopter, the EH-101, falls far short of current US military practice, in almost every way. The purchase of the EH by the USMC will involve a full redesign of its major systems, and its entire structure to meet US standards, especially crashworthiness/crew protection.

The self-serving idea that US standards are less than those of the UK is simply silly. In short time, I will post the shortfalls of the EH-101 as compared to the Apache, Black Hawk and other 20 year old US machines.

IMHO, it will take European helos another generation to catch up with US standards.

[SASless]

Now Now Nick....lets not confuse the issue with facts. We manufactured a construct and we must stick to it here....never mind reality. Any simpleton knows it is easier to scrap eight helicopters than to admit a mistake.....well it is cheaper any way. Besides....it was only tax money. What with the promise of 300 Billion Pounds for new helicopters....what do you reckon that means in fleet size....6-12 depending upon mix?

[Jackonicko]

£300 Bn?

That'll be six aircraft for every rotary pilot, I suspect.

It's £3 Bn of course, down from the £4.2 Bn originally planned.

[engineer(retard)]

NL

Undoubtedly you are right, but if you reaqd the thread, the aircraft self damage standard is about how often a weapon failure will take out the launch aircraft, not about crash worthiness. Unless we are starting the kamikaze trend all over again.

I'm interested in your EH101 comments, have you bought an aircraft off the shelf that does not meet your airworthiness requirements. I thought that level of incompetence was reserved for us

PS Are you a Sikorsky PM?

Retard

[NickLappos]

engineer(retard)-

I will more carefully read the beginning posts, thanks! Weapons failure (self shootdown?) is not a prime design requirement in the US, we try our best to make the weapon more dangerous for the enemy, thank you very much! Generally, weapons blast considerations (not warhead but rocket/missile motor) are considered, as well as burn considerations. One could argue the rigor of US vs British standards, but it is far too sweeping to simply say that US standards are less safe. I would offer that the average US military aircraft has a 10 to 15 year technology/safety/operational capability advantage against the average such aircraft in any other military service in the world, with few exceptions, and I have the tax bills to prove it!

The EH-101 that the USMC has bought will be substantially redesigned prior to delivery (I am told every cabin frame will be strengthened) because it was designed to 8 g's forward and 15 g's downward, vice the US Mil need for 20 and 20, respectively. This 250% shortfall for the front-line British helo hardly allows one to say that US standards are lower! The cost of those mods will be bourne by the US taxpayer, of course.

Regarding my employment, I was a Sikorsky PM (and a test pilot prior to that) but have just left Sikorsky for Gulfstream Aircraft, to try my hand at airplane building!

[SASless]

Nick,

I owe you an apology.

A while back I made the statement to the effect that the S-92 had a spacious cockpit due to certain ergonomic considerations for you to fly the thing.

I have read very recently an interview of a PHI pilot who suggests the cockpit on the S-92 is not as roomy as it first appears thereby challenging my hasty suggestion about its design being based upon your entrance.

I admit the folly of my statement.

Unless.....ol' Bubba down there has been wandering and loitering in the kitchen too long and has taken to heart the need for a minimum crew weight while forgetting to divide by two, it being a crew served aircraft and all.

[engineer(retard)]

NL

Not a problem , I was trying to be brief and was too loose with my english. I noticed this when the world tried to strangle me.

For weapons, we look at launch, fly out and autopilots, in addition to blast and this causes great difficulties. Particularly, as our you do not cover this, and our software standards do not match up. Given the proliferation of software throughout new generation aircraft, I was trying to point out at that buying off the shelf from outside the UK is not the easy option that everyone thinks. You are left with 2 options:

1. Relax your standards - if you have the balls, stand by for litigation if it goes wrong.

2. Modify the aircraft to meet your standards - given the level of integration these days changes in one block of firmware will break out in mods all over the place. Kills the cheap option.

You appear to have made a better stab at this than we have on occassions, at leas you have an idea of the mismatches and potential costs. We have an aircraft that has not yet flown. And before everyone jumps down my throat about COTS, the analogue boxes that were put in were not specifically designed for the UK Mk3, they were already there.

Retard

[Safeware]

engineer(retard)

Relax your standards - if you have the balls, stand by for litigation if it goes wrong.

It isn't that the standards get relaxed, it's how people convince themselves that something sub-standard is acceptable that is the problem. At least in this case it has been accepted that the required standard has not been met. Although wasteful, better to do that than suffer the consequences of a fatal crash.

sw

[tucumseh]

In discussing standards, I think we may be at cross purposes here. I concur with all that is said, but in agreeing with Engineer’s original statement, I was considering the following:

The MoD (not DPA) mandates that the Order of Preference or Hierarchy for the selection of standards is:

1. European
2. International (British Standards implementing European ones)
3. National (BS)
4. Commercial standards recognised by industry
5. STANAGS and QSTAGS
6. UK MoD Defence Standards
7. UK MoD Departmental Standards and Specifications
8. Other Nations’ military standards e.g. USA DoD Mil Specs
9. Recognised company/partnership/consortium standards e.g. AIRBUS, PANAVIA

These mandated instructions specifically include this note/warning to all staffs;

“The USA has no direct equivalent of the UK BSI which acts as (their) National Standards Body…………… There are around 600 US based private sector standards organisations…….... They are NOT to be treated as International Standards”.

So, if you choose one of these “odd” standards or a US Mil Spec in preference to an equivalent higher spec, be prepared to answer why if something goes wrong. While such US based standards may be (and often are) more rigorous than UK equivalents, the point is that there is no visible control to the degree exercised in the UK and required by the MoD. Therefore, UK standards are “higher”. In the context of this thread, perhaps some Chinook standards selection deviated from these rules and may explain, in part, why other similar, concurrent projects were wholly successful? Perhaps the standards were correct but not implemented properly? Perhaps management of the process was compromised by lack of resources?

Another point often missed is that, in formulating the requirement and attaining Initial Gate, DEC must have a Standardisation Strategy Implementation Plan (what a mouthful). I have alluded to experienced engineering staff being ditched by DPA. Well, it is ALWAYS the Engineering Manager who sets the standards, and the Quality Assurance Officer (engineer) who ensures they are met. If the MoD insists on getting rid of the former, depleting all but the biggest projects of specialist QAOs and appointing non-technical project managers, then what chance has a non-technical DEC officer of getting it right? If he doesn’t, and the chosen contractor then insists on changing to higher standards, or implementing some that the MoD never thought of, then you can see that costs escalate.

Safeware is also correct that people delude themselves that a lower standard or the incorrect implementation of the correct standard is acceptable. That they are allowed to delude themselves, and in fact benefit from what is abrogation of the worst kind, is a management failure – and systematic. Once, on a major aircraft project, I (as was my right as senior engineer) raised the bar on a certain safety standard. I was very publicly castigated by a non-engineer boss for wasting time and money. I pointed out it was a safety issue and could not be ignored. Not interested. I asked him what lower standard he would find acceptable. Silence. It hadn’t crossed his mind that an alternative would be required, and setting a lower standard now would lead to inevitable delays and regression testing when Westland later refused to sign the 59C. I told him to ###### off and leave the job to people who wanted to deliver a safe aircraft on time; leaving him to concentrate on his career. Didn’t do me much good, but the aircraft is safe. That his bullying attitude, borne of ignorance, is ever more prevalent, and encouraged, perhaps explains a widespread reluctance to stick one’s head above the parapet.

[MarkD]

found NL's comment on weapon design interesting. I would amend it to "US weapons hit what they are aimed at".

Now if the US mil to train people not to fire those weapons on, oh let's say, Canadian soldiers in the 'stan, RAF Tornados, Iranian Airbuses etc. etc.

[VP959]

Unless someone has changed them recently, then the current UK forward crash case loads are 26G, whereas the US uses 20G. Even UK microlights (ultralights in US speak) are required to meet a 15G forward crash case load for the engine.

The major difference though is in software certification standards, which has been the Achilles heel of the Chinook HC3. The US standards can be much less rigorous than ours, although I'm not going to get into a p*ss*ng contest as to which is actually the most appropriate.

Engine qualification is another big difference. The UK demands that military aircraft engines shall not be less safe than civil certified engines. The US apply whatever standard they see fit, and it rarely demands the same lavel of certification proof as the UK.

I know you're still sore at losing out over the US101 deal Nick, but slagging off the 101 doesn't actually win brownie points in this argument. I don't disagree with you, but would point out that 101 is an old design, which would need a lot of work to meet current UK safety standards as well. FWIW I'm pretty sure that old Sikorsky product of yours would also need a fair bit of work to comply with Def Stan 00-970 as well.

[SASless]

This was posted in the OZ part of pprune....

Reckon these procrurement wallahs are cousins?


Navy Lemon Can't Fly in IMC
March 19, 2005

Serious flaws have been uncovered in Australia's $1.1 billion squadron of Seasprite naval helicopters, rendering them unable to fly crucial missions.

Costing $100 million each - more than the latest stealth fighter - and arriving more than three years late, the helicopters cannot be used in murky weather when the pilots' external vision is impaired, the Herald has learnt.

They have been restricted to simple tasks, such as delivering stores and transporting passengers, and only when the weather is good. Military missions such as search and rescue and training simulations of difficult combat scenarios cannot be undertaken. Up to 40 deficiencies were exposed during testing.

The navy bluntly told the Defence Minister, Robert Hill, in formal advice late last year that the Seasprites failed crucial tests and did not meet navy requirements.

The Defence Department's $50 billion hardware purchasing plan has suffered serious delays and cost blow-outs in many areas, among the worst being the Seasprite. So bad are the problems, the Australian Defence College will use the Seasprite as a cautionary case study in its leadership and ethics course next year.

When the Seasprites were unveiled in 2003 Senator Hill hailed them as "arguably the most advanced maritime aircraft in the world" but the Nowra-based squadron is in tatters.

In response to written questions, the Defence Department told the Herald the Seasprites had not achieved certification for flight in conditions where the pilot's visual cues were reduced, technically called instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
The Seasprite started life as Vietnam War-era airframes mothballed by the US Navy. The Government bought them to turn into super helicopters, gutting the insides and fitting them with high-tech electronic weapon systems.

Last year it emerged that the US had tried to give the aircraft away to Greece, Turkey and Thailand as part of their aid program, only to be rebuffed.

Installing high-tech hardware in an old airframe and developing the right software has been fraught with difficulty and is responsible for the blow-outs.

Aviation and defence insiders said senior defence figures had ignored these risks and that technical deficiencies with the flight systems meant full air worthiness could not be met.

One insider familiar with the Seasprite tests said: "A military aircraft that is not able to operate IMC is a fascinating proposition. Just imagine if you are a downed pilot or a sailor washed overboard or on board a vessel in distress, hoping to be picked up by a search and rescue helicopter but you find out the aircraft can't take off because the weather is claggy. Next to useless would be one of the more moderate terms you would use."

----------------------------------------------------------------------------


Is the 60s-era helicopter The Navy bought to operate of the Offshore Patrol Vessels they never ended up acquiring after someone changed their mind?

Supposedy the SH-60s were too big for the ship that never ended up appearing in the fleet anyway.

The cost should come out of the Federal pollies super-fund.

[Ian Corrigible]

Defense News (http://www.defensenews.com/) reports that the IAB has finally approved the necessary mods to the special ops wokkas to bring them into service. Future Lynx and MCSP also reportedly approved.

(No specific mention of whether the approval is dependant on QinetiQ keeping a distance of at least 250 feet from the aircraft at all times...)

:E

I/C

[crabbbo]

Glad to hear that after 3 years a final (in-)decision has been made. Let's hope it actually is the final decision and the aircraft can eventually get sorted. A shame though that the RAF will still end up with a bespoke fleet within a fleet.

I hope that the modifications fully take into account what has already been learnt about the systems and the good that is there is kept and not replaced with just more inappropriate displays generically designed for a passive flying environment.

[Jackonicko]

Ian C,

I couldn't get your link to work. Can you cut and paste?

[Ian Corrigible]

The relevant bits © Defense News.

U.K. Helicopter Acquisition Strategy Clears Hurdle
Defense News 07/18/05

The British MoD’s powerful Investment Approvals Board (IAB) has green-lighted the development of a new generation of Lynx helicopters, upgrades to naval EH101s, and steps to finally bring into service eight much-needed Chinooks sidelined since their 2001 delivery.

The chiefs of defense procurement and logistics and the vice chief of the Defence Staff are among those on the five-person IAB — the senior committee at the MoD responsible for investment decisions that includes the ministry’s chief scientific adviser.

Recommendations coming out of the July 6 IAB talks would set in motion a process of governmental approval that, if things go according to plan, could culminate in the fourth quarter of this year with an MoD procurement announcement on a number of programs. For now, though, the outcome of the deliberations remains under wraps. An MoD spokesman even declined to confirm the July 6 meeting took place.

“The Merlin update [Merlin Capability Sustainment Plus] got through, although with question marks over whether the entire fleet would be upgraded,” one industry source said. “Future Lynx development for the Army and Navy was approved, subject to various conditions, particularly whether AgustaWestland can demonstrate value for money; and the Chinook modification work looks like it won the IAB’s approval.”

The statement was echoed by several others in industry. All cautioned, though, that the IAB was only the first of several significant hurdles the projects would have to overcome before gaining government approval, and are therefore subject to change.

It also seems as though the eight Chinook HC3s marooned for several years at the MoD airfield at Boscombe Down will be modified for service. Although the delivered helicopters met the contract specifications, the British were unable to demonstrate that the avionics software met local standards.

I/C

[maxburner]

U.K. helicopter acquisition strategy clears hurdle
The British Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) powerful Investment Approvals Board (IAB) has green-lighted the development of a new generation of Lynx helicopters, upgrades to naval EH101s, and steps to finally bring into
service eight much-needed Chinooks sidelined since their 2001 delivery
Source: Flight International, 19 July 2005

[crabbbo]

It is very disappointing to notice that in last weeks Flight Intl an In Brief comment noted that the UK MoD is still only'continuing discussions' of whether to conduct the 'fix to field' on the Mk3s. Will the MoD ever make its mind up over these 8 aircraft (one of which by May 05 had still never made it back from the factory)? It is over 3 years since the MoD woke up to the problems which it had been trying to ignore and yet there is still no solution on the horizon.

And have any of them flown since the last currency trip in January?

[tucumseh]

“It is over 3 years since the MoD woke up to the problems which it had been trying to ignore and yet there is still no solution on the horizon”.


I’m not sure the MoD has entirely woken up, as there have been no obvious changes to personnel, recruitment and project resourcing policies; which are some of the main underlying factors. However, the new CDP has refreshingly different views to that of his predecessor on this score, which should reduce the chances of it happening again in the future. Bear in mind the main players are now long gone, and their successors are probably struggling manfully to find a fix, but have other more pressing problems.

[Brian Dixon]

Sorry for the delay in posting. I had to find the piece of paper!

1 Nov 05
Parliamentary Question:
Mr Arbuthnot : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he expects the Chinook Mark 3 helicopter, including the six aircraft delivered to the UK during 2001–02, to enter service before the planned phasing out of the Mark 2 and Mark 2a Chinooks.

Mr Ingram : The Ministry of Defence is working towards resolving the problems of the eight Chinook Mk 3s. A study last year recommended a 'Fix to Field' solution as the probable best value for money solution. We are working with Boeing to ensure the proposed solution is mature and robust before taking the final decision on whether to proceed. If we do decide to proceed with the 'Fix to Field' solution I anticipate that the aircraft would be in service well before the Chinook Mk 2/2a fleet reaches its out of service date.

So there you have it. It's a definite maybe!

Regards,
Brian

[crabbbo]

Thanks Brian, a travesty that even the acceptance air tests have never been completed for all of the machines. As for entering service within the lifespan of the 2/2A fleet that is an unbelievable statement as these aircraft were meant to augment the 2/2A fleet by freeing up aircraft back to the Op Sqns. Perhaps if the aircraft are ignored for long enough the problem will go away or at least in to someone elses time in government.

[crabbbo]

Yes, straight after the incident.

[MG]

It was Bristol docks.

[Jackonicko]

Another year on, and nothing.

Are all eight really still sitting in a hangar at Boscombe (as 'File on Four' alleged on Monday)?

Are any of them regularly flying?

And more importantly, if the problem is UK MoD validation of software, does this imply that Boeing and the US DoD would have passed them 'fit to fly'?

If not, then they're plainly unfit for purpose, and Boeing should be punished (not awarded new Chinook support contracts, for example).

If they are, however, then is there even a possibility that our own validation standards are too high?

Is anyone suggesting that Boeing or the US Forces would have flown them happily.

I'm a huge admirer of Boscombe Down, but even I have to ask a difficult question.

There was a lot of talk about not clearing the Jag upgrade at one stage, with Boscombe Down expressing concerns over 'issues' that the frontline were 'easy' with.

Is there any possibility that frontline Chinook aircrew would be similarly relaxed about flying these aircraft?

[Saintsman]

The aircraft are due to be rewired and a new Thales avionics suite installed. The work will be carried out at Fleetlands with the 'bent' one done back at Boeing (TI).

[nigegilb]

Do you have a source? Drayson was talking about a possible Boeing fix over the weekend. He wants helos in place in Helmand for the start of the fighting season next year. Would the HC3s be fixed by then?

In answer to JNs question I understand that the Chinners are flown regularly by test pilots.

[crabbbo]

I think you will find that the Mk3s were being flown reqularly on trials flights, air tests and occassional limited currency trips but (checking my log book) i believe the last flight was 19 Jan 05.

[nigegilb]

Thanks crabbo. Can you explain why the flights stopped? I listened carefully to Drayson on the File on 4 prog the other day. He stated that the reason why the Chinners have not been fixed to date is because the MoD were not convinced that the fix on offer would actually work. I don't understand this statement at all. Can you enlighten us, please?

[Jackonicko]

"It may be that the aircraft don't actually NEED fixing per se.

I believe that the actual technical problems found with the aircraft are remarkably trivial, and could (should?) be worked around, improved, or even quietly acccepted.

The core, underlying problem is more serious and is related to clearance policy and to the 'philosophy' of flight safetly criticality.

The bespoke cockpit software can not be proven to the level currently required because it was written before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements came into force.

It would be fascinating to know when the new standard was introduced, and thus how much the HC3 'missed' the old standard by......

It is not that the unvalidated software doesn't work, nor has the software been shown to have particular problems. It's just that it can't be proven to the standards required.

Presumably (and I'd welcome confirmation of this) the software did meet (or would have met) the previous standard required - or that it was (or could have been) validated to those standards. Certainly some of the supposedly 'problem' displays are used without drama on other users' Chinooks and on commercial airliners. Boeing were entirely happy with the aircraft, and I'm informed (fairly reliably, I think!) that the Boscombe TPs were broadly satisfied - apart from the software validation issue.

Though the US Army did not take the aircraft back, as was once expected, this had nothing to do with any reservations about the software.

But with current requirements the flight safety critical cockpit and display software simply cannot be proven to the level which Boscombe Down are required to prove, and thus Boscombe Down will never be able to issue a recommendation for a Military Aircraft Release. Judged by the current standard, this software will always be 'unacceptable' by definition because it cannot be validated to the right level. But don't blame the TPs, Boscombe are just doing exactly what they are there to do.

A Military Aircraft Release could still be signed, of course (there are plenty of examples of senior officers going against Boscombe Down's advice - isn't that what happened when the TPs seemed to be a little over-cautious about a very remote risk of what the papers called 'catastrophic failure' on Typhoon?).

If the decision was taken to accept the hypothetical software risk then an MAR could have been signed (against recommendation) and the aircraft could have been in squadron service three years ago. But after the Mull of Kintyre, no-one is going to accept any risk on a Chinook (of all aircraft types) no matter how hypothetical or improbable that risk may be.

It's hard to see that changing.

You then have the problem that these aircraft lack much of the vital kit that all current frontline Chinooks enjoy as a result of five or so years of intensive UOR activity - a decent DAS, Cockpit Voice and Flight Data Recorder, HUMS, cockpit armour, etc.

When he opined that the a reason that the aircraft "have not been fixed to date is because the MoD were not convinced that the fix on offer would actually work", perhaps Drayson merely meant that if all of this kit were to be procured and installed (in a more permanent and robust fashion than via UOR/STF/SEM) then the underlying problem would still remain?

As to why they haven't flown? I believe that many of the HC3 qualified TPs have moved on, leaving only two at Boscombe, neither of whom are current, and leaving the aircraft unflown.



I remain uncertain as to where the aircraft are, physically - some suggest that all eight are at Boscombe (a view I incline towards), while others say that one is still in the USA.

[Jackonicko]

I wish Saintsman would give us a bit more detail about this, it's new to me.

I'd assumed that there were REAL problems beyond merely validating software, but I'm beginning to wonder. Could this be a case of the aircraft being grounded more by red tape and over-caution than by real technical problems?

I'm a HUGE fan of Boscombe, but I remember the fuss surrounding Typhoon's clearance - where there were risks, but these were deemed acceptable by the user. One wonders whether the Mull of Kintyre crash hasn't led to much more risk aversion where the platform is a Chinook?

[nigegilb]

Certainly the word that I had heard was that the Chinners could be signed off tomorrow, someone with large cojones required.

[Saintsman]

Jackoniko,

The company I work for put in a bid to do the work earlier this year (we didn't get it). We would have been sub-contracted from Boeing.

With Tone's pledge to give the Forces 'whatever they need', I'm sure this will be happening.

[Jackonicko]

What was the nature/extent of the work being bid for, Saints?

[Saintsman]

We were going to strip the avionics bay and flight deck, re-wire them and install new avionics. They would have been brought by road.

As they are in good nick there was very little else to do apart from some special forces mods.

It would have been nice to do as well but you can't win them all :sad:

[High_lander]

I heard Boeing offered to fix them for £3million when they didn't work.

But us being "smart" wanted to give it to British companies.

As I heard

[Jackonicko]

Saintsman

The Dutch avionics, presumably?

Not another bespoke fit?

[nigegilb]

Saint, any truth that Thales were charging half as much for the cost of the trames to do the work?

[Safeware]

Nige,Certainly the word that I had heard was that the Chinners could be signed off tomorrow, someone with large cojones required.

Are you inferring that is what should happen?

sw

[nigegilb]

SW, I am just trying to make sense of this whole thing. No 1 equipment shortage in UK Armed Forces right now is helicopters. We are at war, these Chinooks were flown regularly, why not use them? I suspect that they are not in a position to be flown at the moment but what sense is there in leaving them to rust? As far as I understand they were delivered to spec, so why can't they be signed off? If simply airing this absurd situation acts as a catalyst to finally sorting this procurement out, then, that in itself is a good thing.

[Safeware]

Nige,
The problem I see is that, having previously decided that these ac were not fit to have an RTS for safety reasons, is it not reasonable for Joe Public (and Jack Pilot) to say "These ac were previously considered unsafe, what has changed?" Is your statement of "We are at war, these Chinooks were flown regularly, why not use them?" good enough.
Or put it another way, in your dealings with the big wheels, if they said "We are at war, these Hercules were flown regularly, why not use them?" would you lessen your campaign to have ESF fitted?
Or do you think it is one rule for SH and another rule for AT?
As far as I understand they were delivered to spec, so why can't they be signed off?
I thought that you of all people would have learned that something delivered to spec isn't necessarily safe. :(
sw

[dervish]

As you need to log in to the MoD site with your service/staff number, I won’t reveal all the details, but the Chinook Mk3 “Fix to Field” team is actively recruiting. The bulletins state the proposed In Service Dates (plural). Not 2007.


Safeware - Fully agree.

[nigegilb]

SW, it would appear that having aired the situation, a fix is on the way.:)

I never expected the HC3s to get signed off, but File on 4 gave me a tinkle a few weeks ago and I suggested they take a look at the procurement of the Chinooks. Smart move? If they were delivered to spec at a cost of £246m and they were not safe why has nobody taken responsibility for an outrageous waste of taxpayers money? Or do you think that is OK? I am still not clear as to why these ac cannot be signed off which is why I ask the question. Accountability is something dear to my heart. There is precious little accountability here is there?

Oh, C4 News covered it on Saturday as well. (it was only a suggestion). Sometimes you have to think like politicians!

[Jackonicko]

"SW, it would appear that having aired the situation, a fix is on the way."

Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige? :rolleyes:

SW,

The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:

The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable, the TPs and operators were unhappy with the unmodified aircraft, and the lead customer was unhappy enough with the situation that it modified its own aircraft years ago. Any operator would regard the lack of inerting/foam as putting aircraft at unacceptable risk.

Whereas

The Chinook software risk is hypothetical, the TPs were happy with the aircraft, and the lead customer for the type almost bought back these airframes.

And there is the suggestion that the problem that led to these aircraft being grounded (impossible to validate software to standard required>'unacceptable' recommendation from Boscombe>refusal to sign MAR) would not have happened under previous clearance standards (eg before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements WHEN WERE THESE INTRODUCED?), and would not be viewed as a problem by other operators.

[nigegilb]

Plus the fact that there is a precedent for overruling BD RE: Typhoon. Surely the roots of this debacle lie in the Chinook that crashed on the Mull.

JN, not claiming credit. Drayson hinted that a Boeing fix should be on offer soon and that other ways to achieve more rotary lift in theater were being looked at. It can only assist the situation if the media are adding extra scrutiny.

[dervish]

“Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige?”


The “fix-to-field” initiative has been known for some time, at least since the demise of SABR. The recruiting is probably due to a combination of people coming to an end of their tours and in anticipation of approvals.



“The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable”


From previous posts I understood this also applied to Chinook and advance warning was given to the project office. The recent File On 4 programme included an interview on the subject. A retired Sqn Ldr. Also that the problem was more than just software. I concede I know little about helicopters, but Racal made it known around 1995 that some of their kit had been selected “off-the-shelf” for new Chinooks when in fact it was widely known to be so immature that years of development were still required. If the kit was immature, then the risk would be obvious and demonstrable surely?

[lightningmate]

Nige,

Boscombe RECOMMENDS it does not authorise etc any MAR or RTS; hence, the views expressed are not overruled, just ignored!. That has always been the case all the way back to when the organisation was formed - MOD in the shape of ACAS heads-up RTS content and approval.

In this case the Boscombe view has not been ignored. Considering the desperate need for these platforms one concludes there is a genuine problem. The question to pose is why is it taking MOD so long to sort it out - one way or the other?

lm

[nigegilb]

LM, point taken and I am definitely not laying the blame with BD. Now this subject has been given the oxygen of publicity I would hope that there is added impetus to getting it fixed sharpish. Surely we should not go down the road of hiring private helicopters to ferry our troops around? SW mentioned the safety angle, can you imagine the arguments if a private helo went down with British troops on board? The solution to the current problem lies at BD. PM has stated that UK Armed Forces will get anything their commanders ask for. Well they are asking for more Chinners. Get it sorted.

[lightningmate]

Nige,

The solution does not rest at Boscombe, a little further east methinks.

Whilst I am not wholly familiar with the problem identified, I understand it relates to systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions. Hardly, the sort of concern you need for a SF capability platform.

The flying carried out at Boscombe to keep the oil moving etc in the 'stored' aircraft has only taken place on nice clear days.

lm

[nigegilb]

You can be sure that nobody will sign off the Chinooks if there are concerns about IMC flight. By stating the solution lies at BD, I implied that BD is the location for 8 (possibly 7) Chinooks that are sitting idle. I did not mean that this is a problem for BD to fix. The solution is a political one that will not wait much longer. Who knows, these helos might get scrapped, that is not what I am hearing though. I have a certain amount of respect for Lord Drayson, he strikes me as a problem solver. Drayson has stated he wants more rotary in Afg by next May. Could be there is a 2 stage solution to this need, certainly does not sound as though the Chinooks will be ready by then. This sorry episode in procurement has dragged on for too long, are we finally seeing light at the end of the tunnel?

[Jackonicko]

LM,

My understanding is that NO insoluble or ignorable problem has been identified or indicated with the systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions.

Rather the problem is that the software cannot be validated to a standard that would GUARANTEE that such problems cannot or could not occur.

However, it is believed that such a failure/problem would require all of the displays/feeds to the AFCS to suddenly, simultaneously be giving the same erroneous data to the displays (all at the same time and all agreeing with each other) - something that the TPs felt was improbable and no more that a hypothetical risk.

But because the source code can not be proven, you can't absolutely, unreservedly guarantee that it won't happen, leaving Boscombe with no choice but to give an "unacceptable" recommendation.

However, many systems have (quite rightly) been given a release despite such a judgement, after the risk has been properly evaluated. (Boscombe merely identify the risks - the IPT then assess them and get the MAR signed).

However, because these are Chinooks (a type involved in what is still being described as the RAF's worst post war accident) and because these particular aircraft have been labelled as having been judged unfit for release (in Parliament, in the Press, everywhere!), if they were now rushed into service, and one were then lost, the solids would really hit the rotating ventilator and the less supportive elements of the press and the lawyers would have a field day.

[lightningmate]

Jacko,

Hear what you say and I recollect an earlier post noting an MOD Web Site as stating a solution was identified. I suspect it has been for some time but someone has to fund the solution.

However, as one who has more than once experienced in a military aircraft a happening that could not/should not happen, I tend to regard such statements with some scepticism, particularly when software is involved.

As to Risk Assessments - bit like statistics, you can prove anything.

lm

[Jackonicko]

Perhaps a more realistic risk assessment would be possible if one of the Boscombe HC3s were to be flown really intensively, in simulated IMC, with a safety pilot and a handling pilot (only one of whom would necessarily need to be a TP, I guess?).

[lightningmate]

Jacko,

I make no pretensions to being an expert but I suspect an 'N of one' would not cut the mustard statistically. Moreover, it would be interesting to hear knowledgeable estimates of how many hours would need to be flown to provide credible evidence that all was OK - risk wise.

lm

[Jackonicko]

There are huge inconsistencies, though. There are a number of platforms with MARs carrying more real, more quantifiable risk.

[Jackonicko]

Just to show what we're talking about:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v613/Jackonicko/Chinook3.jpg


www.airliners.net/ open.file/546035/L/

[Safeware]

Some thought on bits from above:

“The Chinook software risk is hypothetical, the TPs were happy with the aircraft.”

1. Risks aren’t hypothetical, they are real. You identify a consequence, and figure out its probability – there’s your risk. Just because a tp is happy, doesn’t make it safe.

“would not have happened under previous clearance standards (eg before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements WHEN WERE THESE INTRODUCED?), and would not be viewed as a problem by other operators”

2. So what happened to ‘current best practice’, UK law, etc etc? Just because someone else thinks its ok for them doesn’t have to mean it’s ok for us. If you are talking Def Stan 00-55 Iss 2, Aug 1997.

“(Boscombe merely identify the risks - the IPT then assess them and get the MAR signed”

3. Not quite right, Boscombe identify the risks, we assess the risks and advise the IPTL on how to mitigate the risks. The IPTL considers whether or not he is prepared to accept that level of risk.

“As to Risk Assessments - bit like statistics, you can prove anything”

4. You can prove anything with a nasty outcome has some probability. The skill is in showing that a credible hazard has an acceptable (or unacceptable) level of risk. Not quite the same.

“Moreover, it would be interesting to hear knowledgeable estimates of how many hours would need to be flown to provide credible evidence that all was OK - risk wise.”

Lots of hours, and for complex systems more time than has existed in the universe so far. If you have lots of inputs in lots of combinations it takes lots of time to work through them all. So, for software it is better to show that the way you have identified and mitigated the risks is sound AND that you have developed the software correctly. 2 quotes from learned people in the /sw business:

If you try and tell me that the probability of a software failure occurring in a system is one in a million, I’m very unlikely to believe you. If you tell me that there is no way that the software can fail, I’m much more likely to believe you because in the first case, you can’t have tested sufficiently to get that level of confidence, in the second you must have done something to be so sure that this is the case.

There are 2 ways of developing software. The first is to make it so simple, there are obviously no errors, the second is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious errors.

Unfortunately there is much more of the latter around than the former.

“There are a number of platforms with MARs carrying more real, more quantifiable risk.”

5. Firstly see 1 above. Secondly, if the risk is quantifiable, then a reasoned argument as to its acceptability can be made. The problem comes when you can’t quantify the risk. That’s when you are on thin ice.

sw

[bjcc]

In addition to Jackonicko's picture, heres a different view, and more oddly, one flying!
http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v380/bjcc174/rotory/bcch47mk3.jpg
I've got a couple more of the same aircraft, somewhere if anyone's interested.

[Jackonicko]

MORE! MORE! MORE!

Place and date?

[nigegilb]

Jacko calm down you are behaving like a journalist.:)

[Jackonicko]

I resent that.




















........................................................I'm acting like a spotter!

[Jackonicko]

SW,

If it met (or would have met) previous standards, then the inference must be that while it's not good enough, it would have been good enough then.

And if it was good enough then, it must be within the "let the IPT decide if they're willing to accept the risk" basket now, surely?

Especially when as supporting evidence you have the bullishness of the TPs.

And an urgent operational need.

[bjcc]

Just for you Jacko....
http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v380/bjcc174/chin1.jpg
http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v380/bjcc174/chin2.jpg
Place? Boscombe Down. When? As I recall late 2004.

[Safeware]

Jacko,Especially when as supporting evidence you have the bullishness of the TPs

So, at the subsequent Board of Inquiry, the evidence supporting the RTS was the "bullishness of the tps"

No, can't see that one lasting long as a defence.

Mind you, not far behind would be the claim that And if it was good enough then, it must be within the "let the IPT decide if they're willing to accept the risk"

Like it or not, objective evidence is what is required. Counter evidence is very strong.

And stop calling me Shirley. :)

sw

[Jackonicko]

Ah, but are those the criteria applied to every other type?

[tucumseh]

“Ah, but are those the criteria applied to every other type?”


The simple answer is, NO. The main reasons, in my experience, are political imperative and poor leadership permitting widespread inconsistency in the application of process and procedure in DPA and DLO (and Mod(PE) and ASML/AMSO before them). The two, politics and inconsistency, are related.

I would say however that Safeware (whom I don’t know) and his colleagues at Boscombe ARE and always have been extremely consistent with their advice – but as we know, they only advise and recommend, it is for the IPT to decide. I have always believed that if the IPT reject BD advice, they should give their reasons in writing and have the decision endorsed at XD level. That would force a degree of consistency. Others disagree.

As it stands, and I quote a real example, BD can declare a system unsafe, the IPT reject their advice, sign and pay off the contract, and offer an aircraft to the Service which is not airworthy or otherwise fit for purpose. And walk away. Then, another IPT, under the same XD, can be instructed to make the aircraft/system safe, paying the same company again to do what they should have done in the first place, using funds from their own programmes which must, if necessary, be chopped to pay for it. What were the politics? Don’t make waves on certain individuals’ projects, as they have been earmarked for greater things. Or, typically, don’t mess with me, I’m on the fast track scheme and could soon be writing your report.

Now that I’ve moved on to Mk3 (!), what was the political imperative of the day? In my opinion it was (a) Mull of Kintyre and (b) COTS. The Mull thread is full of verifiable facts which demonstrate the airworthiness process was flawed, perhaps due to political imperative. COTS and MAR are, in many ways, mutually exclusive concepts. Same people involved, so is it possible they were overly cautious and risk-averse on Mk3? They would be bricking it in case something they signed for went wrong. I’ve asked people to consider this question before, “Why were far more complex concurrent programmes delivered ahead of schedule, under cost and to a better performance by the same Directorate?” Answer that, learn from the lessons, apply that learning consistently (vitally important – MoD is full of lessons learnt papers, but few are implemented), and many of MoD’s procurement problems would disappear. However, the lessons are politically unacceptable. The main one was, do the proper thing, not what the bosses say. If we’d followed their instructions the aircraft wouldn’t be flying yet, at 3 times the cost. Kind of like Mk3 really.

[GlosMikeP]

“Ah, but are those the criteria applied to every other type?”

Tuc

Please check urgent PM.

Anyone with private line to Tuc, I'd be grateful if you could alert him.

[Jackonicko]

Can anyone confirm that fix-to-field is now signed?

Can anyone explain how Thales Top Deck will be validateable when the original software wasn't?

And in view of the VERY mixed reports about this, can anyone say which aircraft wasn't at Boscombe, and positively confirm where the eight are as of now?

Is there definitely not one in the US?

Is there no longer an aircraft at Odiham?

Have any HC2s flown with the big tanks?

[nigegilb]

Can you also confirm the cost.


Amazing what a bit of media attention can do.;)

[ukmil]

firstly, there is NO Hc3 at odiham. Secondly, it will be some time before we see an operational MK3. Of the 8 that were bought, most of the 'unused' ones were sent back to the us, very early after the initial afghan conflict, to fill a stopgap in the us army. This was a deal signed by the government, in a part exchange deal, as the US re desparate for them. Part of the deal, is the RAF was to be supplied with upgraded MK2's which had the larger tanks, and glass cockpit. As where this deal is currently at, no one knows, but seing has we had to 'rob' the Chinny from the falklands to meet other tasks, it shows how desparate we are for airframes at present. Overcommited?

[Jackonicko]

It's my understanding that Main Building fluffed the deal to PX the HC.Mk 3s, which was to have been a no-cost transfer of the HC3s to the US Army, with a subsequent no-cost transfer of new build MH-47Gs to replace them.

[BossEyed]

ukmil, I couldn't comment on the first and last two sentences of your post - but the rest of it is wrong!
The deal you mention was discussed some while ago, but as JN says it came to naught.

[crabbbo]

Agreeing with the above i am afraid UKMil. The (face-saving?) 'deal' to get rid of the aircraft in 2002 was just water-testing by the USA and came of nothing. All 8 were still at BD in late 2005, the last flight having taken place in January of that year. There were even attempts to sell them to Middle East countries which fell through.

[nigegilb]

I understand that 1 cab is in the States, and only 1 cab is "S".

[Safeware]

I understand that 1 cab is in the States, and only 1 cab is "S".
Nige, only one being "S" is a bit of a hareng rouge. Would it matter if all were "S": Headline DISGRACE: SEVEN SERVICEABLE HELICOPTERS KEPT ON GROUND? Or all U/S: Headline DISGRACE: HELICOPTERS KEPT ON GROUND, SEVEN UNSERVICEABLE ? It matters not in the grand scheme of the failure that is Mk3, they have no RTS.

sw

[nigegilb]

I thought it was interesting that's all. The cabs were flown regularly til last year. Qualified guys disappeared and frames were robbed for parts and now we are down to one, bit sad really.

SW, forgive me but £1/4 billion taxpayers hard earned cash invested in this project. I don't for a second believe that anyone has been made accountable. We are at war and we do not have enough SH. Tuc has often said there is enough money out there, but it is frittered away, guess this project proves his point.

[Safeware]

SW, forgive me but £1/4 billion taxpayers hard earned cash invested in this project. I don't for a second believe that anyone has been made accountable. We are at war and we do not have enough SH. Tuc has often said there is enough money out there, but it is frittered away, guess this project proves his point.

Don't worry Nige, I agree with you completely! This project isn't about something that came as a surprise, there were enough warnings.

sw

[tucumseh]

Nigegilb

“Tuc has often said there is enough money out there, but it is frittered away, guess this project proves his point”.



Thank you for the kind words, but when it comes to financial waste by MoD, no-one has to prove anything. It is endemic and condoned at the highest level.

I don’t know how much it will cost to bring these Mk3s up to an acceptable standard, but if it was a mere £100M or so, then I can suggest real savings of that order, on a single project, in the time it takes to read this. Come to think of it, I already have; not that MoD was interested.

Two parties can agree to disagree. I just happen to disagree with certain senior staffs who take the view that waste, and potential for savings, is “political dynamite” and should not be mentioned. I also believe that, by knowingly avoiding their obligation to the taxpayer (enshrined in everyone’s letter of financial delegation), they are committing an offence. Under FOI, I obtained a letter stating that I am in a minority of one. Looks like its two now!

BTW, this is not thread creep away from Mk3. Same names in both audit trails.

[RumourMonger]

I see the MoD have finally announced that the HC Mk 3 are to be fisxed to fly or was it an April Fools Joke that the eight Chinook H C mk 3 are to be fixed for deployment in support helicopter role not with the SF fit according to the Press rElease from the MoD issued on Friday along with the news that they ae to take the six Danish Merlin TTH as part of £230M deal.

The statement issued said that it is going to take another two years before they can be fielded and that te Merlins will be going to AW for UK specific modifications and that they will be another twelve months before those become avaiable.

Also tucked away in the statement was news that they where going to continue with the work of the FRC on the procurement of Medium lift helicopters.

Quite again on what is going to be happening with a replacement for the Puma and Chinook SO we will still have to wait until they can make up there mind if they can rent(COMR) or refurbiish or actually get round to buying a replacement

[phil gollin]

This was posted on another site, I presume it is the actual formal announcement of what was previously announced :-

Quote :-
UK signs deal to get grounded Chinook HC3 helicopters...

DATE:18/10/07
SOURCE:Flightglobal.com


UK signs deal to get grounded Chinook HC3 helicopters into service


By Craig Hoyle ([email protected])


The UK Ministry of Defence has advanced a project to convert eight grounded Boeing CH-47 Chinook HC3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Chinook_%28UK_variants%29#Chinook_HC.3) transport helicopters for delayed use by the Royal Air Force from late this decade.

"An initial contract was placed with Boeing on 1 August," says armed forces minister Bob Ainsworth. "On current plans we expect to see the aircraft delivered by the end of 2009."

Originally scheduled to enter service in the late 1990s, but delivered from 2001, the Chinook HC3s were placed into storage after trials work concluded that their unique hybrid digital/analogue avionics configuration could not be certificated. Plans to prepare the aircraft for battlefield support use were finally confirmed earlier this year, under a £235 million ($480 million) initiative also covering the acquisition from Denmark of six AgustaWestland EH101 Merlin HC3As (Flight International, 10-16 April).
The MoD says the first phase of its so-called reversion deal with Boeing is worth £6.3 million, and will cover "aircraft characterisation" work, flight trials activities and the purchase of long-lead items for the Chinooks' subsequent modification. Qinetiq will support the modification and test process.

A follow-on contract is expected to be signed before year-end, with this to conclude design activities and cover modification work to take place during 2009, the MoD says. Focused on the installation of a secondary structure to support replacement avionics and display equipment, the project was earlier this year projected as valuing around £50-60 million.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/10/18/218699/uk-signs-deal-to-get-grounded-chinook-hc3-helicopters-into.html

[tucumseh]

At last.

Call me cynical, but I often think screw ups like this are swept under the nearest carpet until the main players are retired, to avoid embarrassment.

Case in point.

[Chugalug2]

tuc I know what you mean but, with respect, the main players in this game are fighting a war in sandy places, and have been in desperate need of these cabs since being there. That they may have been denied them, for even one day, for the reason that you give adds to the scandal that is the MOD.

[oxoneil]

Mmm so I wonder if the Topic 5 APs that I had a hand in producing will finally see the light of day. :eek:

[Jackonicko]

Phil G,

It's confirmation that the Topdeck scheme is dead, and that Fix to Field has followed it.

Reversion is a "let's convert these back to HC2 standards" scheme - the very cheapest option, yet still one which will cost millions - £6m for the first phase, for starters.

[VuctoredThrest]

Standby your beds for another twist in the tale (tail!).

[South Bound]

Interesting challenge as well as I wonder if the spares system can generate another 8 ship-sets of the appropriate equipment while continuing to fill PEPs. I wonder how many robs this will generate?

[The Helpful Stacker]

At the moment half the work of Fwd Del at Odious seems to be driving in between main supply and LDF to rob parts.

Stackers can't even use the old "its no good point as the USAS says its not there" line anymore as there is very little to point at.

:rolleyes:

[Lyneham Lad]

Not sure if this is exactly 'new' news, but a press release dated today states:-
2007-12-18
[16:07]
Eight Chinooks to boost operations in Afghanistan
PRNewswire-GNN London 18 December
London, 18 December /PRNewswire-GNN/ --
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE News Release (304/2007) issued by The Government News
Network on 18 December 2007
A £62 million contract with Boeing to convert eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters
to a support helicopter role was announced by the MoD today.
Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, said:
"Helicopters play a vital role in supporting our operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. That is why we are taking measures to make more helicopters
available to operations as quickly as possible."
These helicopters will deliver a significant boost to the UK's operational
heavy lift helicopter fleet. Chinooks are a key battle winning capability. The
first helicopters are expected to be operational in 2009.
The eight converted Chinooks will join the existing fleet of 40 RAF Chinook
helicopters and will be based at RAF Odiham in Hampshire.
Notes to Editors
1. The contract between MoD and Boeing was signed on Friday 14 December 2007.
2. The overall cost to the defence budget to modify these helicopters is
expected to be £90.1M of which £62M is the contract with Boeing.
3. Design work will take place at Boeing in Philadelphia and modification
work will be done by QinetiQ at Boscombe Down in Wiltshire, Hampshire.
4. A Chinook helicopter can carry up to 55 troops or 10 tonnes of freight,
and can be used for search and rescue or casualty evacuation. It can safely
land and lift off again from water. It can carry up to five Land Rovers (2
internal and 3 as under slung loads and with a twin rotor design it is one
the few helicopters that can carry a 'payload' equivalent to its own weight.
5. They are highly capable and versatile helicopters that cope well with
many diverse environments, including the harsh conditions in Afghanistan.
6. For further details please contact David Hunter at the MoD Press office on
0207 218 7950, or Nick West at Boeing on 0207 747 5531 ([email protected])
Ministry of Defence

[Archimedes]

In essence, a reannouncement of the last announcement, simply adding that the contract details have been now worked out. Still another year and a bit (at least) until the first airframe enters service.

[Razor61]

I posted about this conversion some time back but it's ridiculous. On the same thread i asked "why do the MoD need to mess around with the aircraft to begin with" when other countries buy them from the manufacturer and start flying them with the same avionics etc as with the other buyers such as the US Army. No one seemed to be able to answer it...

If we hadn't messed around or tried to fit our own avionics etc into them in the first place they would be out in Afghanistan now and not needed to be 'downgraded' to an HC2 (or whatever) standard from an HC3.

Our MoD always changes things which then limits the in service date. Surely other countries do not %^&* about as much as we do to get something into service... changing things around, putting different suites in than the original ones which seem to work fine in the first place?

Excuse the non technical jargon..

[ProfessionalStudent]

Just how many times are they going to blow the "8 more Chinooks for Afghanistan" trumpet? It winds me up that they :mad: it all up so badly yet still feel proud enough to sing from the rooftops about a decision which has taken months to get a contract sorted and will still take years to come to fruition. What a bunch of spin-bolleaux arse-biscuits.

How could we possibly complain that we're not getting the new equipment we need...? :ugh::ugh:

[H Peacock]

The overall cost to the defence budget to modify these helicopters is
expected to be £90.1M

Guys, am I reading this correctly, are we really going to spend over £90 million to 'modify' 8 Chinooks? That's over £10 million each, just to modify them!!!

Hope I've totally misunderstood the 'facts'.

:ugh:

[Mr-AEO]

No, you are spot on.

[tucumseh]

See also:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmpubacc/386/38607.htm

Including;

30. Until a final decision on the way forward was made, the Department had taken a prudent accounting measure in writing down the value of the Chinook Mk3s by £205 million in the Departmental Accounts. The value had been written down to reflect that of usable spares only.[42]

31. The Department had considerable experience of identifying lessons from procuring equipment but failed to learn from this experience when acquiring the Chinook Mk3. The Department said that it had now implemented the lessons from this particular procurement project.[43] These included the clear points of failure in the project such as deviations from standard procures, identifying how Smart Acquisition processes could have made a difference and the way in which the need for Military Aircraft Release acted as a constraint. The Department had formulated an action plan based on these lessons and would review progress in mid-2005.[44]


Given para 30, it would appear the cost of this faux pas is £295.1M, plus the incalculable cost to operational capability caused by the lack of these aircraft.

Para 31 is rubbish. “Smart Acquisition” would have made no difference whatsoever. The key point that is never made is that the same Directorate was concurrently delivering far more complex programmes to time, cost and performance. All they had to do was ask “How?”.

[MarkD]

Lewis Page: MoD sorts out 'turkey' helicopters for Xmas (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/12/20/chinook_hc3_cockup_finally_resolved_turkeys_fly_at_last/)

[Brian Dixon]

Looks like the National Audit Office have been at it again:

Taken from the Guardian website (I'm only interested in the Chinook - honest!)

The Ministry of Defence is accused today of a litany of mistakes after it was revealed to have spent hundreds of millions of pounds on eight Chinook helicopters which are still not airworthy 13 years after being ordered.

A report by the National Audit Office reveals that for seven years the helicopters have been stored in air conditioned hangars in Britain while troops in Afghanistan have been forced to rely on helicopters which are flying with safety faults. The new helicopters should have been in service in 2002.

Now the new helicopters are to be downgraded - stripping out some of their more advanced equipment - in a "quick fix" solution so they can fly by 2010. By the time they are airworthy, the total cost of the project could be as much as £500m.

The MoD admitted to the National Audit Office that it has put British troops at some risk in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan, by adapting existing helicopters for special operations. Eight more basic Chinook helicopters have been given temporary night vision equipment which obscures the pilot's forward and landing views. Edward Leigh, the Conservative chairman of the Commons public accounts committee, said the disclosures revealed "a gold-standard procurement cock-up" and "one of the most incompetent procurements of all time".

Main findings of the NAO report are:

· In 1995 eight Special Operation Mk3 Chinook helicopters were ordered by the MoD from the US manufacturer Boeing but officials did not include in the contract access to security codes to test their airworthiness;

· In 2001 the helicopters were delivered and found not to comply with airworthiness standards. The MoD was told they could only be flown safely up to 500ft from the ground on a clear, sunny day. They were put into store in hangars in Boscombe Down;

· In 2002 less sophisticated Mk2 Chinook helicopters were equipped for night vision flying instead - but the infra-red computer screens partly obscured front and landing vision, making them less safe to fly. The cost of the upgrade was £32.3m.

· In 2004 the MoD decided on a high-level upgrade at a cost of £215m to get the aircraft airworthy by 2008. But it took much longer than anticipated to get the programme organised with the contractor and it became clear the helicopters would not fly until 2011;

· In 2007 the MoD cancelled the upgrade, at a cost of £17.25m, because it would take too long. It opted for a cheaper programme with a new night vision system, costing £53m. That cost later more than doubled to £112m, with a further, unknown sum for night vision equipment.

The MoD now says it will have one of the eight helicopters in operation by 2009 and the rest in 2010.

The report is certain to exacerbate relations between the MoD and army commanders in Afghanistan because it makes clear that they will have to wait two years to get the extra Chinooks, a year longer than previously promised. In the meantime, troops will have to travel by land, at a time when they are increasingly susceptible to attack from roadside bombs.

Not all the RAF's Chinooks are in good condition and some have been cannibalised for spare parts to keep others flying in Afghanistan. Leigh said: "This is a very unhappy state of affairs, made more acute by the knowledge of how much our soldiers in the hostile terrain of Afghanistan need helicopter support. By the time it is sorted out, the whole programme will have cost more than £422m - probably substantially more."

The minister for defence equipment and support, Lady Taylor, said: "The reversion project will allow delivery of more Chinooks to theatre in the shortest time-frame. The project remains on track in terms of time and budget, and is just part of a package of measures that we are implementing to improve our helicopter lift capability on operations."

The RAF fleet of 48 Chinooks is the largest outside the US. They have a good safety record except for the crash of a Chinook in the Mull of Kintyre in 1994 which killed 29 intelligence officers and service personnel.

Article by David Hencke

[MG]

Surprisingly, this is a good, accurate article about the report. A few small errors but generally correct. What's gone wrong?!

[VuctoredThrest]

To paraphrase ' I dont believe it!!

Has any other country in the world ever taken such an expensive retrograde step with new build aircraft?? I bet this is a first, if so we must congratulate ourselves - roll (role) on Mk 4.

[Demoralised]

What is so depressing about this whole protracted administrative disaster is that almost everyone assumes that the fault is with the aircraft engineering when it could equally be that the engineering is perfectly adequate for the role in the context of the whole range of risks that are involved, but the standards being used to judge that adequacy are excessive and inappropriate.

This is a twin engine MILITARY helicopter, with two piloting positions and fully duplicated systems right the way through from power supplies and sensors to display instruments.

The engine management systems and the navigation and flight instrument systems were not supposed to be interconnected, so the risks ref FADEC and instrumentation are independent.

Then there are the reversionary modes where displays on the left can be fed from the displays on the right, and vice versa, if there is good reason to feel one of the systems is misbehaving. THEN there are the electromechanical back-up instruments - as far as I remember there is an electromechanical AI on each side, and there was supposed to be a Meggitt combined backup electromechanical HSI & altimeter too. Looked at from an overall systems point of view, it's hard to see that the software in the digital flight and navigation instruments really is flight critical.

Then there is the extensive operating history on all the instruments used, in other aircraft types - I believe they all had FAA certification.

The fact is that too many people have had their fingers burnt with the Chinook FADEC software analysis and certification issues, the crash, and all the subsequent enquiries. No-one has dared make the pragmatic decisions for HC Mk3 that have been taken on other MOD aircraft types such as Apache and C17 that have flight instrument, engine, and a lot of other, software that was "off the shelf" from the USA rather than built from scratch in the way favoured by particular teams of experts at UK MOD / Boscombe Down. The truth is that unless the software is designed from the outset in accordance with the UK Def Stan preferred methodology, it's virtually impossible to get the tick in the box from Boscombe Down that says "Yes, we can assure you this is absolutely safe and a software glitch will never give you a problem".

The experts have not been proved that the systems and aircraft are DANGEROUS; rather, they have been unable to prove independently that they are absolutely fault-free. That is a very different thing.

This little extract from the 2004 Public Accounts Committee report should have received far more attention as a possible route out of the morass:

"The Department acknowledged, however, that, as with the Apache Attack Helicopter, it was not always necessary to have access to source codes to achieve adequate safety assurances. The Department currently operates the C17 aircraft within United States' safety parameters without having independently validated the avionics software codes."

i.e. don't blame the aircraft, or the contract it was purchased under, blame lack of systems-wide failure-modes-&-effects analysis, and gold-plated MOD UK software assessment standards that very few people understand enough to challenge.

We will probably never know what actually happened in-between all the documentation leaving the MOD PE offices citing Def Stan 55, and a contract actually being placed on Boeing by the embassy offices in Washington. It IS clear that there were fundamental conflicts between the overall policies to maximise use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf software and Boscombe Down's preferred software engineering and analysis methods. Within the limited budget available the Boeing engineers, and everyone else with a brain involved at the time, must have put creating a system that would do the job, using certificated components that were already proven in other aircraft, in a highly redundant system, as a higher priority than designing a complete new set of instruments from scratch for just eight aircraft at far higher cost much more slowly and with more timescale risk.

Also from the Public Accounts Committee report of 2004: "there needed to be a better understanding of the underlying safety issues, particularly where there was a unique British requirement for the independent validation of source software codes. The need to validate independently the software codes for the Chinook Mk3 had been a British requirement. Other countries, including the United States, were happy to fly the aircraft. "

N.B. This is saying "make sure you challenge the requirement" just as much as it is saying "carry the requirement right the way through the contract to the testing and the release to service".

Indeed Boeing has always asserted that the aircraft is safe and fit for purpose - including extremely low level night-time operations in bad weather - which Boeing was perfectly well aware were the intended missions for this aircraft type. Their test pilots had passed the aircraft as fit to fly.

So the wasted costs being discussed may really be the costs of a policy, not the costs of an aircraft that according to some daft newspaper reporters "can't fly in the rain".

One other cause of the problems that seems not to have received much comment is that if most of the people on a project change part way through, through retirement or whatever, key aspects of their approach may get lost too.

Any comments or corrections from people more closely associated with this programme recently?

[tucumseh]

Demoralised

A good first post, if I may say so. I’d take issue on a few minor points but the thrust is excellent.


almost everyone assumes that the fault is with the aircraft engineering

That may be the view of Joe Public or elements of the press, but the real cause was predicted almost immediately and came to pass with depressing inevitability. The question never asked is why corrective action was not taken at this time.


The fact is that too many people have had their fingers burnt with the Chinook FADEC software analysis and certification issues, the crash, and all the subsequent enquiries. No-one has dared make the pragmatic decisions for HC Mk3 that have been taken on other


I agree the Mull experience is a large factor here, but believe one should look deeper at the very obvious breakdown in relationship between Boscombe and elements within MoD(PE). (I say “elements” because, as I’ve said above, other programmes of greater complexity were, and continue to be, delivered with effortless competence. The question “Why” is never asked).

In very simple terms, you engage with Boscombe from Day 1, not as an afterthought. That they were once MoD and are now QinetiQ matters not, the principles are the same. It just costs more now. You adopt a JOINT approach to trialing, validation, verification, acceptance etc. You agree boundaries of responsibility. That is, you place both industry and Boscombe under contractual obligation to work together from day 1, thus eliminating as far as possible any nasty surprise late in the day, for example if Boscombe are forced to regress, catch up or are faced with software which they cannot verify in accordance with the standards imposed on them. Ask anyone who has worked at Boscombe what their biggest problem is. They’ll say, lack of communication, we’re engaged too late in the day, the bane of our existence is project offices who ignore our advice and insist on accepting unsafe aircraft or equipment – and so on. But they’ll temper that with the fact many project managers know the score and never experience a single problem with Boscombe, ever.

Crucially, you make sure you adhere to the regs covering feedback. If the project office doesn’t agree with Boscombe, you talk. You offer reasons why you don’t agree or are not accepting their advice. What you DO NOT do is blank Boscombe and leave them seething. It leads to toys being thrown. If you drill down through Mull and Mk3 you’ll eventually narrow it down to a small number of boneheads who couldn’t stand the thought of some jumped up Boscombe type highlighting the fact the simple regs weren’t followed. And, given the timeframe, you’ll find the same names crop up.

None of this is new and it wasn’t new in 1995.


One other cause of the problems that seems not to have received much comment is that if most of the people on a project change part way through, through retirement or whatever, key aspects of their approach may get lost too.


It’s certainly an inconvenience but I go back to what I said. Others managed fine. Why? Achieving a seamless transition is easy if the basic groundwork has been robust and the correct people are selected. Eliminate the fixed problems (by early Risk Reduction), use your resources to manage the variables.


There is more, but I just wanted to concentrate on the breakdown of relations between PE and Boscombe. It’s crucial to both this and the Mull case.

[JFZ90]

Demoralised,

Your post strikes many chords with me. I've never been involved with chinook, and have no idea whether your technical assessment is correct, but I have harboured suspicions that your views may well be very near the mark and the real scandal here is possibly that the HC3 is, and always was, arguably, fit for purpose.

Whilst I'm no expert, I have some grasp of of the

gold-plated MOD UK software assessment standards that very few people understand enough to challenge.

and think they have gone unchallenged far too many times at great cost in time and money to many projects.

Tuc, whilst I agree that :

many project managers know the score and never experience a single problem with Boscombe, ever.

there is still the flip side that Boscombe can sometimes take too purist a view, and your qoute...


It leads to toys being thrown.

...does I think correctly imply that toys can get thrown (i.e. a negative behaviour) and sometimes the actual risks and safety context get lost in a rather unfortunate communication breakdown / willy waving contest.

It would be interesting to know if
Any comments or corrections from people more closely associated with this programme recently?

could shed light on your views.

[tucumseh]

JFZ90

...does I think correctly imply that toys can get thrown (i.e. a negative behaviour) and sometimes the actual risks and safety context get lost in a rather unfortunate communication breakdown / willy waving contest.
Couldn't agree more. A project manager's job, be it in MoD or Boscombe, is to make decisions within his remit, and seek them outside his remit. Boscombe are contracted to give advice, which is based on internal decision making within their remit. The advice (typically the MAR recommendations report) is the decision seeking part. If there is no complementary decision from MoD, then I suggest that is the point at which Boscombe MUST take a purist view.

The difficulty comes when MoD makes a decision so bizarre, so obviously politically motivated, that Boscombe feels it cannot support it. The decision to ignore Boscombe's advice on Mk2 just prior to Mull is a classic case, but it by no means unique.

[dangermouse]

Tecumseh, you hit the nail on the head

what BD produce is ADVICE, and the IPTs are free to take or ignore it.

BD do not have the right to make absolute decisions. BD is frequently at odds with others in the procurement chain and everyone is entitled to their opinion, it's a matter of view point.

At the end of the day the decision lies with the IPTs as to what ADVICE they listen to, be it the users, the manufacturers, QinetiQs or some other agency. Just because they ignore BD from time to time there is no reason to get all uppity about it. Boeing no doubt have a similar view regarding those aircraft not flying when in their opinion they are perfectly safe.

DM

[tucumseh]

Dangermouse

I would add that if MoD chooses to ignore Boscombe’s advice, any Safety Management System (and certainly MoD’s own) requires reasoned explanation to be logged.

Not only that, but something like the FADEC issue would immediately be logged as a risk (if it wasn’t already), and the same rules require a full record to be retained even if the risk is fully mitigated or deemed erroneous.

It cannot be acceptable for any MoD officer to say that a Boscombe report stating there is a safety risk can be ignored. It must be investigated. Equally, it cannot be acceptable for a contract to be paid off, the aircraft offered to the RTSA and the RTS signed, in the full knowledge that it is physically or functionally unsafe. But that is precisely what the Chinook 2 Star in MoD(PE)/DPA ruled.

It is rulings like this which have prompted IPTs to adopt a too literal interpretation of “Boscombe only give advice, we don’t have to take it”. They don’t have to accept it, but they do have to investigate and state why they don’t; and record the reasoning.

[dangermouse]

by definition the MAR (recommendations remember) are just that and again I reiterate it comes down to a difference in view between the BD trials officers and other agencies.

I have no inside knowledge of the Mk2 procurement so the only comment I can make on your statement 'in the full knowledge that it is physically or functionally unsafe' is that the term 'unsafe' is one particular point of view, obviously the IPT had a different view, as is their right.

I accept that the MoD Proc system requires 'reasoned explanation to be logged', but does that apply to BD as well? Do BD have to justify why any existing limitations are disregarded and their own put in place, or is the statement 'we havent looked at it so it must be unsafe' all that is needed? In my experience no credit seems to be given to previous work or certification already granted to other operators of the aircraft, it smacks a bit of arrogance in that only BD's view is taken as valid.

DM

[Jackonicko]

While the airworthiness folk are inevitably (and quite rightly) cautious, I remain puzzled by the fact that Boeing, the US DoD and others all viewed these aircraft as being perfectly airworthy and fit for service, and by the fact that one of the Boscombe project pilots viewed them as fit for release. There were also suggestions that had these not been delayed, they'd have been judged entirely acceptable under previous Defstans.

Is all of the money wasted on storage for long years, the abortive 'fix-to-field' and now 'reversion' a massive piece of ar.se covering because of a change to the rules and regs surrounding how airworthiness is judged?

Worse still is the way in which the Government are now trumpeting reversion as some kind of 'pride-worthy' and 'significant' expansion to SH capacity.

[tucumseh]

I accept that the MoD Proc system requires 'reasoned explanation to be logged', but does that apply to BD as well?

In this context, the recommendations Boscombe make are always accompanied by a reasoned explanation, so “yes”. I’d say Boscombe are meticulous in this regard. If they didn’t provide reasoning, they wouldn’t be paid!


Do BD have to justify why any existing limitations are disregarded and their own put in place, or is the statement 'we havent looked at it so it must be unsafe' all that is needed? In my experience no credit seems to be given to previous work or certification already granted to other operators of the aircraft, it smacks a bit of arrogance in that only BD's view is taken as valid.


I’m sure I’ll be corrected if I’m wrong, but the whole point on Mk3 is the configuration is unique to MoD UK. The Aircraft Safety Case has to be constructed against that build standard and intended use. What is safe in one build standard/use may be unsafe in another so, for example, existing limitations (say, on the Mk2) would not just be accepted on the Mk3, but would have to be assessed against the new build standard and use. It is not for BD to justify this, but MoD, and is a much abused area of airworthiness certification. In this case it would appear Boscombe’s adverse comments were confined to what could not be validated or verified, in accordance with the standards imposed on them (Boscombe) - the “new” hybrid nature of the aircraft equipment, particularly its software.

Of course Boeing’s input is crucial, which is why I wonder at the relationship between them, MoD and Boscombe. This whole saga smacks of Boscombe having warned MoD of the dangers of the hybrid design procurement strategy, but were ignored. If I recall, the contract was originally all Mk2s, with the split to Mk2 and Mk3 made later. That is a big change. Originally, the programme resources would have been geared to a “follow on buy” of a known build standard. To suddenly include a new Mk of aircraft requires a complete reappraisal of procurement strategy and funding. My gut feeling is they ran into financial trouble immediately, “forcing” the hybrid solution – but in fact it would have been wiser to pay more for a build standard that Boeing recognised and carried less risk. In short, this was “novel and contentious”, the criteria for elevation to 2 Star and above to benefit from their “wisdom”. And so to the Audit report which trashed that very senior management for “lack of management oversight”. Notably it didn’t name anyone, but we all know………

Jacko’s post gets back to what we were saying – a certain nervousness existed in MoD post-Mull because, very clearly, the Mk2 should never have been released to service. Boscombe were probably frustrated at MoD’s bizarre inconsistency. Ignored on Mk2 in 1994, similarly ignored in the following years on other programmes (leading to the 2 Star ruling I mentioned, which was specifically sought to establish just what rules we were working to - those laid down or those made up on a whim) yet at the same time suddenly listened to on Mk3 and MAR withheld at the first sign of concern. What this highlights is how compartmentalised MoD is at a certain level. Indeed, MoD encourages this and in doing so fails to learn lessons from other programmes which were recognising and avoiding the same risks on a daily basis.

[South Bound]

I personally found the approach to C17 very refreshing. BD/QQ were desperate to get their fingers into the programme and cite the same issues. The intelligent safety case presented for the aircraft is how it was introduced in a year and a day. I just hope no-one ever decides to operate outside the bounds of that safety case, QQ would surely ground the aircraft while they start from scratch.

lol - allowing the crews to wear US flying kit is a small price to pay, and they do look soooo pretty!!!

[dum_my]

QQ would surely ground the aircraft

Please don't repeat the old falsehoods about Boscombe Down.

Boscombe Down does not 'ground aircraft' and it does not 'give clearances' either.

It makes independent recommendations and delivers advice. End of.

[Chugalug2]

Southbound:

I personally found the approach to C17 very refreshing.

How much though do the RAF's C17s vary from the USAF ones? Surely the problem with the Chinook Mk3s is that they were very much one off variants cobbled together by the cash strapped Brits? The reason for being cash strapped may very well be because we are forever "cobbling" (see MRA4), but that is another matter. It is Boscombe's job to assess such one offs and make sure that they meet the airworthiness standards prescribed. When they do not and the solution is to ignore BD then alarm bells should be ringing at illegally high decibels. Sorry, what's that? Can't hear you old boy, it's the bells, the bells!!

[South Bound]

Please don't repeat the old falsehoods about Boscombe Down.

Boscombe Down does not 'ground aircraft' and it does not 'give clearances' either.

It makes independent recommendations and delivers advice. End of.

Yawn. Surely QQ involvement would lead to the aircraft being grounded. Better?

[FlapJackMuncher]

The quote
"One other cause of the problems that seems not to have received much comment is that if most of the people on a project change part way through, through retirement or whatever, key aspects of their approach may get lost too."

I've often thought about this re the military way of everyone changing jobs after 2 or 3 years. (especially officers (read managers))
The first 9 months are spent bringing the individual upto speed on how their new job works, the last 9 months are spent winding down (new posting is being sorted etc) which leaves possibly only 6 months of good honest productive work.

I've no doubt the frequent changes produce a more rounded and experienced individual but do the jobs get done in the most productive way?

[XV277]

One of the great 20-20 hindsights of Defence Procurement is that if we'd just bought 8 straight MH-47Es they'd probably have cost an awful lot less in total and been in service years ago.

Buy cheap, buy twice as my old Gran used to say!

[Evalu8ter]

The C17 is a bit of a red herring with regard to the Chinook. We are able to get around QQ as we operate the ac in compliance with USAF regulations and SOPs, and, effectively, within the US RTS. In addition we look at USAF certification and see a rigour similar to ours.

Chinook is completely different. We operate our CH47s significantly differently to the US Army, and any release based on US Army clearances would be way too restrictive. There are also substantial differences between a UK and US Chinook in terms of avionics, comms and DAS so the C17 arguement doesn't stand up. Any future potential Chinook purchase would have to weigh up the pros of aligning with the US Army with the obvious loss of sovereignty over key capabilities.

The Mk3 fiasco was caused, in effect, by a fundementally flawed procurement decision. The decision to purchase Merlin (for overtly political reasons) distorted the Chinook buy. By the time the decision had been made to convert 8 of the ac to Mk3 standard, the Merlin programme was in danger of going way over budget and the MoD prioritised on the Merlin, arguing that the Chinook purchase should be straightforward as it was already in service. By the time it was realised that Mk3 was in trouble, the money ran out and we ended up with the hybrid cockpit - the rest is history.

Yes, buying MH-47Es then would seem a good idea but they were not available, think F-22. Sometimes our "special" relationship is just not special enough...

[tucumseh]

Chinook Helicopters Afghanistan Mission Cancelled | UK News | Sky News (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/UK-News/Chinook-Helicopters-Afghanistan-Mission-Cancelled/Article/200902415228522?f=rss)

[Seaking93]

There's a broken one sitting on the concrete(thats set) at Yeovilton at the moment

[phil gollin]

:ugh:

:ugh:

:ugh:

It's a shame there isn't a "crying" smiley.

.

[green granite]

I agree.

This one any good?

http://209.85.48.8/1889/52/emo/saddy.gif

[The Helpful Stacker]

Isn't there a more simple reason for keeping the dumbed-down Mk3's in the UK, such as that of commonality of aircraft being rotated through Afghanistan?

Whilst the 'dumbening' process is making the Mk3's almost the same as the Mk2/2a's they won't be exactly the same and restricting them to UK-based duties will free-up Mk2/2a's, which can then be added to the pool of aircraft rotated through Afghanistan, which will hopefully improve the serviceability of the whole fleet.

Whilst its easy get AATOB over this and start firing off letters to the Daily Wail decrying the MoD for wasting perfectly good new aircraft its probably quite important to bear in mind that the older Chinooks are the epitome of the 'Trigger's Brush' process. They may carry old serial numbers but I'd suggest there is very little left on them that was attached to those serial numbers straight out of the factory.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

THS,

It's simply no use applying that sort of logic in here young man, it'll never catch on :ok:

[billynospares]

Same old Boscombe bashing ! Doesnt seem to matter if MOD or QQ always the same uninformed rubbish. Whole lot of good work done there towards all your safety and UOR requirements. Lets not forget there are still a lot of forces there including TPs all have an input. So if you dont really know may as well just keep quiet. :ugh:

[tucumseh]

Same old Boscombe bashing !

The perpetrators of this screw up are well known, and it is most definitely NOT Boscombe Down.

[Dan Gerous]

Isn't there a more simple reason for keeping the dumbed-down Mk3's in the UK, such as that of commonality of aircraft being rotated through Afghanistan?

I bet that is the same theory concerning the six HC3A/used to be Danish Merlins, or is that a story for another slow news day.

[Nicholas Howard]

Did the HCDC really say "credibility gap", or should the reporter have heard "capability gap"?

Genuine mistake, freudian slip or accurate commentary?

Nick

[KG86]

Let's not forget that, about the time the RAF ordered its Mk 3s, the RNLAF ordered their CH 47D fleet. Their ac do not have the big tanks of the Mk 3, but otherwise they are very similar, with the same engines and FADEC, and an almost identical digital cockpit.

The Dutch Chinooks were delivered in 1995, entered service straight away, and have been operating around the world, in some very hostile theatres, since then.

The MOD cited uncertainties over FADEC and EFIS software as the main causes for holding the Mk 3s back from entering service. The RNLAF CH 47Ds, with the same FADEC software, and virtually identical EFIS, were not held back. I am not aware of any flight safety issues encountered in those 2 areas during their extensive and intensive useage.

The Chinook Mk 3 debacle is a very British problem!

[Two_Squirrels]

[QUOTE][Let's not forget that, about the time the RAF ordered its Mk 3s, the RNLAF ordered their CH 47D fleet. Their ac do not have the big tanks of the Mk 3, but otherwise they are very similar, with the same engines and FADEC, and an almost identical digital cockpit.

The Dutch Chinooks were delivered in 1995, entered service straight away, and have been operating around the world, in some very hostile theatres, since then.

The MOD cited uncertainties over FADEC and EFIS software as the main causes for holding the Mk 3s back from entering service. The RNLAF CH 47Ds, with the same FADEC software, and virtually identical EFIS, were not held back. I am not aware of any flight safety issues encountered in those 2 areas during their extensive and intensive useage.

The Chinook Mk 3 debacle is a very British problem!/QUOTE]

The Dutch Chinooks do NOT have the same cockpit, software, AFCS or indeed other bits and bobs. I can assure you that the Dutch Chinook evdicen was looked at in detail, but it could not be read across to the HC3.

[Chugalug2]

I imagine that the main difference between the Dutch and British experiences with the CH47D and Chinook Mk3 respectively, and pretty well every other military aircraft in their respective fleets, is that those charged with the duty of enforcing Airworthiness Regulations in the former did not renege on that duty and suborn the very system they were charged to defend.

[Al R]

Morning Chuggers!

BBC NEWS | UK | Chinook refit 'linked to crashes' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7923341.stm)

<A decision to add night vision equipment to RAF Chinook helicopters supporting special forces missions has been linked to two crashes, MPs say.>

[tucumseh]

People will recall that the PAC debated the NAO Chinook report last June. One of the reasons why their report (the one to be released today) has been delayed is because MoD claimed those responsible could not be identified. The PAC requested further information, which MoD undertook to provide. I wonder if this will be included? (A ludicrous situation. The Committee have previously criticised the “lack of management oversight” in MoD(PE). One simply has to look at the family tree of the day and you’re immediately down to a handful of people, all of whom served many years in post).

Against this background of MoD claiming not to know the individuals (i.e. not being able to read), I recall the responsible 2 Star telling me, face to face, that the conclusions of a report to PUS informing him that money was being knowingly wasted was “Of no concern to MoD(PE)”. He reinforced this view by ruling that attempting to implement the mandated regulations designed to avoid such waste, when instructed not to, was a disciplinary offence; subsequently upheld by CDP. It is rulings such as these which, in my opinion, set the minimum level at which the Committee should direct their attention. That is, not the Project Manager, or even Project Director (as he may have been otherwise occupied with Mull).

And did anyone notice the use of Americanisms? “Fender bending”. I wonder who the driving force behind that little gem was. Still, a small thing compared to the drip drip drip of the leaking MoD funding tap. Or should that be Faucet?

[Chugalug2]

Al R:
Morning Chuggers!

And a high rotational rate whirling of 'kerchief and deep bow to you too, Sirrah!
Isn't it time that we all started to join up the dots? For those like me who have moved from incredulity through jaw dropping amazement to sickening acceptance of the deliberate bullying tactics of senior air officers to subvert and suborn the UK Military Airworthiness system as revealed by the likes of tucumseh, the HC3 farrago is merely par for the course. Thank God that it has only wasted money rather than lives as other airworthiness compromised accidents have. Ironic then that the very motivation was to save money; Penny Wise, Pound Foolish, eh your Airships? The military airworthiness scandal affects every military air fleet in the inventory. It will take decades to put behind us. The starting point must be to take responsibility for UK Military Airworthiness Provision out of the clutches of the MOD and into the hands of an independent Military Airworthiness Authority. Self Regulation is the British Disease. It never works!

[TEEEJ]

BBC wrote

But the aircraft have never been able to fly because the MoD failed to secure access to key software source code.

What was the HC.3 doing on Exercise Kush Dragon back in 2007?

Images going back to 2003 of HC.3 flying.

Airliners.net | Airplanes - Aviation - Aircraft- Aircraft Photos & News (http://www.airliners.net/search/photo.search?regsearch=ZH898&distinct_entry=true)

TJ

[Evalu8ter]

TEEJ,
The clue is in the captions and callsign. Aircraft that are on QinetiQ charge can hardly be said to be "in service". An amount of Mk3 flying has been conducted to gather data prior to the Mk3 Reversion programme, and to de-risk certain aspects of it. The aircraft are, of course, perfectly flyable - it is just craven inattention to detail, inexcusable project management and the usual under-investment in RW platforms that created this problem.

[TEEEJ]

Evalu8ter,
Thanks for the reply. I'm fully aware that the aircraft is not in service. I was referring to lazy journalism not providing the full story. The general reader of that article would come away with the interpretation that the type has never flown.

[tucumseh]

Having had a chance to read the report, MoD is almost correct in saying it contains nothing new; primarily because, as I said earlier, the Committee was awaiting answers to certain questions, but the bulk of the evidence was already published. These supplementary questions include;


Questions 64-66 (Mr Bacon): Who was the predecessor as the head of the Integrated Project Team or its equivalent to the present one, Group Captain Sibley?
In line with Cabinet Office guidance1 and the principle that employment matters are a matter of confidence and trust (extending beyond the end of employment) the Ministry of Defence is unwilling to release publicly the names of the previous Chinook IPT Team Leaders. The Senior Responsible Officer for Helicopters, is currently Capability Manager (Battlefield Manoeuvre) Maj Gen Chris Wilson. He is responsible for ensuring the delivery of benefits for helicopter projects and sits on the MOD's Joint Capabilities Board.

Question 72 (Mr Mitchell): Can you give us, perhaps in a letter to the Committee, an indication of who stayed with the project all this time to make all these cock-ups or are folk constantly moving on?
No member of staff has worked continuously on the Chinook Mk3 procurement from its original approval in July 1995. Postings to the Chinook IPT, in common with postings across the Ministry of Defence, are normally between two and five years in length.

To these and other questions, we get the normal MoD dissembling; however they are helped by the ill-informed questions. For example, why ask who the predecessor to the current IPTL was when it is clear that the IPT, formed in 1999, had nothing whatsoever to do with the negotiation and letting of the contract? The mistakes were made years before (and predicted and risks notified before that). And the notion that those in post at the time cannot be named is plain daft. For example, House of Commons - Public Accounts - Minutes of Evidence (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubacc/533/3031201.htm), but perhaps MoD is being selective.

Q72 is a more valiant effort but again suffers because it is poorly phrased. (Who briefs these committees?). Nevertheless, MoD’s answer is pure bollocks as the answer only discusses the IPT (post-1999). No mention at all of the 1, 2 and 4 Stars who were in post in PE for the crucial years before (and after in the case of the 2* and 4*) the IPT was formed.

The report also purports to include the written evidence it received. It doesn’t, at least not all of it. This combination of faffy questions and selectivity leads me to conclude this is the usual stitch up. Everyone agrees MoD must take a hit; the name of the game is to dilute it as far as possible while protecting the guilty. No change there then. It is a pity the press can’t see through this and report the facts.

[Ian Corrigible]

Av Week reporting that the RAF "last week finally received the first of eight Boeing Chinook helicopters intended to have entered service more than a decade ago." Two more Mk3As due to be handed over "in the next few weeks" with all eight being delivered by the end of next year.

I/C

[Squirrel 41]

Yes..... as HC 2a-ish.... and then they get to undergo Project JULIUS upgrade. So presumably having just ripped out the cockpit and replaced it, very soon the RAF will, umm, err, rip out the cockpit and replace it. Again. :hmm:

Oh very bl:mad:dy well done! :ugh:

(Unless of course there's a sensible and unimpeachable technical reason that we couldn't go direct from the HC3 cockpit to Project JULIUS standard, in which case I apologise and will crawl back under my favourite rock. Over to Tuc, Evalu8ter, etc... Gentlemen, pls)

S41

[troddenmasses]

I don't know whether this has been reported anywhere, but a number of the contractors working on this downgrade program have been laid off to save costs. This will of course mean that it will take longer to get the rest of the fleet into service, but it is believed that since one of them is now being test flown, the political pressure is off.

[lightningmate]

Yet another fixed-price programme way over budget and late - presumably, from the above, now later still :ugh:

lm

[Hilife]

The revised delivery date wouldn’t be 2013 by chance? :suspect:

[Squidlord]

Squirrel 41:

Yes..... as HC 2a-ish.... and then they get to undergo Project JULIUS upgrade. So presumably having just ripped out the cockpit and replaced it, very soon the RAF will, umm, err, rip out the cockpit and replace it. Again. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/yeees.gif

Oh very blhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gifdy well done! :ugh:

(Unless of course there's a sensible and unimpeachable technical reason that we couldn't go direct from the HC3 cockpit to Project JULIUS standard [...])

The idea was to get the aircraft into theatre as soon as possible. Putting them through Julius directly would have delayed that for a few years.