PHI helicopter down in GoM

[Time Out]

Coast Guard searches for missing helicopter

The Associated Press
10/10/03 7:21 PM

CAMERON, La. (AP) -- A helicopter with three men on board is missing after it lost contact on its way to an offshore oil platform Friday morning, the U.S. Coast Guard said.

The Petroleum Helicopters Inc. pilot did not "verbally close the flight plan" after telling ground control that he was on his way to an oil rig about 80 miles south of Cameron, said Ed Gatza, a manager of field human resources at PHI.

PHI reported the helicopter missing at about 11:30 a.m. to the Coast Guard. Gatza said two offshore workers and a pilot were on the helicopter. Gatza said their next of kin was being notified, and he would not release the men's names.

The Coast Guard sent a helicopter crew from its air station in Houston and a jet crew from its Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Ala., to look for the missing helicopter.

By late Friday, 30 knot winds, clear skies and 5 to 6 foot seas were recorded in the search area, said Petty Officer Andrew Kendrick of the Houston air station. It was not clear what the conditions were like when the helicopter was reported missing.

"We don't know if they've gone done or not, but we're taking every precaution. It's not usual to lose communication," Kendrick said.

Petty Officer Jonathan McCool, a spokesman for the Coast Guard, said the Coast Guard will continue to search as long as necessary.



Source (http://www.nola.com/newsflash/louisiana/index.ssf?/newsflash/get_story.ssf?/cgi-free/getstory_ssf.cgi?n5529_BC_LA--HelicopterSearch&&news&newsflash-louisiana)

[Heliport]

The Lafayette Daily Advertiser
Louisiana
October 11, 2003
LAFAYETTE — A sea and air search for a missing helicopter with oil company employees aboard continued through the night Friday and will keep going around the clock, said a spokesman for the U.S. Coast Guard in New Orleans.

“We’ll continue as long as we think we can find survivors,” said Lt. Steve Cory. “It will depend on weather conditions and water temperature.”

Bad weather may have caused problems for the mid-sized Bell 206 helicopter, which was about 80 miles south of Cameron when it was reported missing, en route from one platform to another about 80 miles away, Cory said. The helicopter is owned by Petroleum Helicopters Inc. of Lafayette.

“At the time they were trying to land, a squall line and heavy rain came through that area,” he said. Cory said the pilot, a PHI employee, last made contact with PHI headquarters at about 10:15 a.m. Friday as he was about to land.

“He reported that he was landing on an oil platform, but never actually landed on it,” Cory said.

PHI notified the Coast Guard at 11:30 a.m.

The three people aboard were the pilot and two oil company employees who were being taken to the second platform. None has been identified by the Coast Guard or PHI.

The search has escalated since it first began Friday afternoon, Cory said. In addition to a Coast Guard helicopter crew from Houston and a jet crew from Mobile Ala., by Friday evening a second jet crew was dispatched from Corpus Christi, Texas, as well as the Heron, a Coast Guard cutter from Galveston, Texas.

Ed Gatza, PHI’s manager of field human resources, said his company is also looking for the missing helicopter.

“PHI has a couple of boats searching with sonar,” he said, trying to locate emissions from the helicopter’s emergency transmitter.

[Heliport]

A contact in the GoM tells me weather was bad yesterday.
He'd heard last contact with the helicopter (a 206 L-3) was in the area of WC-509.

[B Sousa]

Hope it works out. Having been through that area in bad weather I can say I am not envious.
I guess thats why those companies want you to have an Instrument Rating. So you can fly VFR equipped aircraft beyond VFR conditions.

[leading edge]

The weather was bad in the WC area yesterday, there was a large area of heavy rain which moved in during the morning.

Most of the GOM operators do, as B Sousa says, require instrument ratings but NOT so that pilots can knowingly fly into bad weather.

Weather minimums are strictly enforced and it just may be that the pilot of this aircraft got caught and couldn't get out. Both Airlog and PHI pilots are trained in inadvertant IMC using both the aircraft and simulators.

LE

[Mars]

Does anyone know how many accidents there have been in the GOM this year so far - it certainly seems to be more than one a month.

Surely now is the time for companies (both oil and operating) to institute an adverse weather policy. Why is there one in the North Sea and not (yet) one in the GOM?

Have the pilots no voice or is it that they enjoy the thrills and spills of this particular ride.

[Gomer Pylot]

In the GOM, things are run by the dispatchers & field foremen. Their only interest is in getting things done quickly and cheaply. The standard scenario is for the dispatcher or foreman to push the pilots to fly no matter what, and only back down if the pilots firmly refuse. They don't consider the possibility of an accident, they just want to get the flights done as soon as possible. I've been pushed to fly well before daylight, by companies whose written policies clearly prohibited it. There is very little active oversight by management or safety personnel over the dispatchers or foremen. It takes a strong personality to refuse a flight, knowing that you risk being removed from the job for doing so, even though the customer's official policy prohibits the flight. The written policies of the customers are simply eyewash, written to protect them from lawsuits. In actual practice, they push and push with impunity.

I know nothing about this particular flight, I'm just speaking of things in general from long experience.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

leading edge wrote:Most of the GOM operators do, as B Sousa says, require instrument ratings but NOT so that pilots can knowingly fly into bad weather.I cannot speak for him, but I'm sure that when Bert wrote:I guess thats why those companies want you to have an Instrument Rating. So you can fly VFR equipped aircraft beyond VFR conditions ...he merely left out the phrase "when you inadvertently encounter them."

[SASless]

I say Gomer....why do the pilots put up with this and not report the practice to the FAA Inspectors? It would seem with the union support available and the Federal laws that protect folks that report safety violations and problems like these, that helicopter pilots in the Gulf could freely contact the FAA whenever they get pressure to fly in below minima or dangerous weather.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

The thing about being a professional helicopter pilot is that you are pretty much on your own, decision-making-wise, especially out there in the GOM. This is both good and bad. Pilots who are susceptible to pressure sometimes yield.

Gomer Pylot wrote:In the GOM, things are run by the dispatchers & field foremen. Their only interest is in getting things done quickly and cheaply.Heh. Welcome to civilian aviation, where making money is the name of the game. If you think this only occurs in the GOM, you are seriously mistaken. While weather minimums are documented in black and white, real weather seldom is. But you cannot fault anyone for trying to make you fly in weather as low as your minimums allow. And as a professional, you should be able to do this unless there is some compelling reason not to (e.g. squall line or nasty cold front coming which would intercept your flight path). The standard scenario is for the dispatcher or foreman to push the pilots to fly no matter what, and only back down if the pilots firmly refuse. They don't consider the possibility of an accident, they just want to get the flights done as soon as possible. I've been pushed to fly well before daylight, by companies whose written policies clearly prohibited it. There is very little active oversight by management or safety personnel over the dispatchers or foremen.It's really very simple: Go by the rules. Nobody can fault you for that. If someone pressures you to do something else, just look at them like they're crazy...because they are. If you get run-off, you get run-off. Shrug and say, "Oh, well." If your management (you know, the ones who actually pay your salary) won't back you up for going by the book, it's best to say good-bye and find another employer.

SASless wondered:I say Gomer....why do the pilots put up with this and not report the practice to the FAA Inspectors? It would seem with the union support available and the Federal laws that protect folks that report safety violations and problems like these, that helicopter pilots in the Gulf could freely contact the FAA whenever they get pressure to fly in below minima or dangerous weather.And what is the FAA going to do? They don't care. They really don't. What they care about is what WE (the pilots) do under such pressure. If we succumb to it, who is wrong: us or the customer? Nor could the FAA really do anything about a customer who asks a pilot to fly in below-minimum weather. Is that a crime? Hardly.

The "daylight" issue is pretty weird. Some companies do have rules stating that operations may not begin before sunrise. But inasmuch as the FAA allows pilots who are not night-current to fly as far as ONE HOUR prior to sunrise, and ONE HOUR after sunrise, then we're just talking semantics here. Personally, I never minded taking off a little before sunrise (it's only going to get lighter, right?) until the company I was working for put it in writing that we could not do this. <shrug> Oh, well.

If you ever want a lesson in being pressured to fly, go to work for some yahoo who owns his own aircraft but does not fly. They will expect the ridiculous. It will test your patience. It will test your diplomacy and tact. It will make those foremen in the GOM seem like rank amateurs.

[Gomer Pylot]

PF1, you're right, mostly. There is nothing at all the FAA can do about customer pressure - it's an administrative agency, with no authority over anyone without a license, & certainly not a law enforcement agency, even if there were a law (which there should be, but never will be). I was just responding to Mars, giving the situation over here. I've been working under it for more than 20 years, & I accept the way it is, but it does take some backbone to keep refusing, until you get used to it, & new guys sometimes cave in. Thus, pilots and passengers keep dying.

As for the darkness thing, both my employer's and the customer's own written policies forbade flying before sunrise or after 30 minutes before sunset. That was clear, but it made no difference to the foreman out in the field who needed just one more flight, or to the hands who were anxious to get home on break day.

I've always made it a policy to work for a company that flies as the main part of its business. Any job for anyone who owns a helicopter as an adjunct to his main business is temporary at best. Profits drop, & the helicopter is the first thing to go. I've seen it happen many times, & I ain't going there willingly.

Again, I have no idea whether any of this applies to the incident which initiated this thread.

[Time Out]

Nola report (http://www.nola.com/newsflash/louisiana/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1065911044210911.xml)

CAMERON, La. (AP) — A helicopter crashed in high winds with three men on board, and a slew of aircraft and boats searched for survivors on Saturday, the U.S. Coast Guard said.

"They've found parts of the aircraft this afternoon, small pieces of debris, the tail rotor, part of the fuselage, part of the engine covering," said Petty Officer Gaines Huneycutt of the U.S. Coast Guard in New Orleans on Saturday.

The helicopter, part of the Petroleum Helicopters Inc. fleet, was on its way to an offshore oil rig about 80 miles south of Cameron Friday morning when it crashed, officials said.

The pilot failed to report landing on the rig, and PHI reported the aircraft missing at 11:30 a.m.

"It was pretty windy. They had a rain squall that came through at about the same time," said Huneycutt. He estimated that winds were between 25 and 30 knots.

Huneycutt said there were no signs that the helicopter crashed into the rig.

Ed Gatza, a manager of field human resources at PHI, said two offshore workers and a pilot were on the helicopter. Gatza said their next of kin was being notified, and he would not release the men's names by late Friday. Gatza did not immediately return telephone calls on Saturday.

Huneycutt said several helicopters, a jet and offshore supply vessels searched for the men Saturday. A sonar boat looked for the wreckage of the helicopter.

Another PHI helicopter crashed in August, killing three people aboard. That helicopter crashed in rainy weather about 70 miles south of Morgan City.

And from The Advertiser (http://www.theadvertiser.com/newsupdate/html/1CEE8CF0-13E9-4055-86BC-B8E380AA84A7.shtml)

LAFAYETTE — Debris that probably came from a helicopter missing in the Gulf of Mexico since Friday has been found near the aircraft's last known position.

“We’re 98.9 percent sure that it’s from that helicopter,” said Lt. Kelly Skiles of the U.S. Coast Guard in New Orleans. The search for survivors continues, Skiles said, but is now being concentrated around a debris field that was found 10 to 15 miles south of the platform where the pilot of the helicopter radioed that he was going in for a landing, about 80 miles south of Cameron.

The helicopter is owned by Petroleum Helicopters Inc., based in Lafayette.

None of those aboard has been identified.

The pilot of the PHI aircraft was taking two oil company workers from one platform to another, about 80 miles apart. He was last heard from about 10:15 a.m. when he called to report he was coming in for a landing, said Ed Gatza, PHI’s manager of field human resources. The aircraft was reported missing at 11:30 a.m., and both PHI and the Coast Guard searched throughout the night.

The Coast Guard said the debris field was spotted from the air by a PHI search helicopter about 1:30 p.m. Saturday.

PHI has another helicopter and two boats searching for survivors. The Coast Guard also has several helicopters, two airplanes and two cutters in the area, Skiles said, but the search has narrowed to areas around the debris field, which she said consists of fiberglass and aluminum from the body of an aircraft.

“We’re pretty sure it’s from that helicopter,” she said. “It gives us a better location to search for survivors. At least we know where to look.”

Another PHI helicopter, with five people aboard, went down in the Gulf in mid-August, about 70 miles south of Morgan City. One man died in that accident, and two others were injured.

If the Coast Guard is correct about the debris, four helicopters have crashed in the Gulf since Jan. 1, 2002, and three others have been involved in accidents.

[Mars]

Looks like the press are guilty of under-reporting, my information indicates that there have been far more accidents than are shown in the above article.

Simple statistics for the GOM (with a comparison against 2001 - OGP figures) appears to indicate: 2003 so far; 14 accidents 2003 so far; 6 fatal accidents 2003 so far; accidents per 100 000 hrs = 4.66 (2001 accidents per 100 000 hrs = 1.77) 2003 so far; fatal accidents per 100 000 = 2 (2001 fatal accidents per 100 000 = 0.22)It is difficult to understand the comment from Gomer Pylot that there is nothing the FAA can do about customer pressure. Oversight by the FAA of the practices in the GOM must now be on the cards given the above accident record.

If the FAA are not driven to act, the ASRS confidential incident reporting system can be used to highlight the problems due to commercial pressure.

A view recently expressed indicates that what is needed is an inculcation of a safety culture into these operations - they are becoming a source of embarrassment to our industry.

[Heliport]

http://www.uscg.mil/d8/dpa/images/rel_cgbar.gifU.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. Coast Guard
SEARCH CONTINUES FOR CREW OF MISSING HELICOPTER

HOUSTON – The Coast Guard continues to search for three crewmen of a commercial helicopter missing in the Gulf of Mexico since Friday morning.

Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI) notified the Coast Guard around 11:30 a.m. Friday that one of their helicopter crews failed to report in after beginning a landing approach to a rig 70 miles south of Cameron, La. in the West Cameron Block, 509.

At 5:22 p.m. Friday, an offshore supply boat picked up the signal from the missing helicopters radio beacon in the same area where it was last reported. Search crews determined the beacon was transmitting from underwater. An oil sheen and debris from the helicopter were also located in the same area.

The search for the missing crewmen continues.

Crews involved in the search are:

· Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin helicopters, from Air Station Houston
· Coast Guard Cutter Heron, an 87-foot patrol boat from Station Sabine, Texas
· Coast Guard Cutter Manowar, an 87-foot patrol boat from Station Galveston, Texas
· Coast Guard HU-25 Falcon jets, from Aviation Training Center Mobile, Ala. and Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas
· Two helicopters owned by PHI
· A sonar boat contracted by PHI
· Divers contracted by PHI

The names of the missing crewmen are being withheld pending notification of next of kin.

[B Sousa]

Leading Edge writes: "require instrument ratings but NOT so that pilots can knowingly fly into bad weather."

Therin lies the Sticky Wicket... coupled with the push for the almighty dollar. Pilots who know they will be in deep doo-doo if the mission is not accomplished , sometimes think that instrument ticket will save their ass. Those squall lines will kick an Airplane Drivers butt, you can imagine what it will do to a Helicopter.
Its nice to fallback on Company SOP and Policy that says you shall not do this or that, BUT talk to a Gomer once in a while over a beer and you will hear some Weather stories that would make an Alaskan Pilot cringe.....
All for that almighty dollar.....
Latest news on this situation does not look good. Very Sad, whos next.....

[Time Out]

The Associated Press
10/12/2003, 8:17 p.m. CT

CAMERON, La. (AP) — After three days of looking for survivors from a helicopter that crashed in the Gulf of Mexico south of here, the U.S. Coast Guard said on Sunday that it was giving up the search.

The helicopter with the Petroleum Helicopters Inc. fleet went down Friday morning with three men on board about 80 miles south of Cameron. The helicopter was on the way to an offshore oil rig.

An oil sheen, parts of the helicopter and a radio beacon signal from underwater were found in the same area, but search crews found no trace of the men on board.

Officials have said conditions were windy and that a rain squall passed through the area at about the same time the helicopter disappeared.

Ed Gatza, a manager of field human resources at PHI, said two offshore workers and a pilot were on board. Gatza said their next of kin was being notified, and he had not released the men's names.

It was uncertain if PHI ended its search also. Gatza did not immediately return a telephone call to his office late Sunday.

Another PHI helicopter crashed in August, killing three people aboard. That helicopter crashed in rainy weather about 70 miles south of Morgan City.

source (http://www.nola.com/newsflash/louisiana/index.ssf?/base/news-4/106600824430760.xml)

[Gomer Pylot]

Mars, it seems you have no idea how things work in the U.S. The FAA has no authority whatsoever over customers. The customer is free to request anything, using any coercion available, and it's not illegal, nor would the FAA be involved if it were illegal. The only way the FAA could be involved is if a pilot were to violate minimums, in which case the FAA would violate the pilot and likely suspend his certificate for a period of time. Even if it wanted to, the FAA could not touch the customer. In any case, in the current climate oil companies can pretty much do whatever they like about anything and expect to get away with it. Here in the Homeland we have the best government money can buy.

[S76Heavy]

But can the FAA touch the operator? It seems ridiculous that pilots continue to break the rules just to please the customer, lives and airframes are lost and that nobody seems willing to force the operators to get their act together and prevent their pilots from flying below minimums, whatever they are.
I'm glad to be working in Europe..

[crop duster]

But can the FAA touch the operator?

S76, if it became a prblem with one operator the FAA might look a little deeper into the operators business but, the final go/no go is the pilots responsibility.

One thing that agravates (sp) the situation is pilot ability. In the GOM you have pilots with decades of experience and others on their first day, unsupervised. The guys offshore are used to getting the job done and "getting their way". Not that they are bad people, in fact they are for the most part down home South Louisiana good old boys. After having a pilot that would get the job done, one that comes along and balks at a job can be at tremendous pressure to do it.

Barryb

[212man]

Ah, but MARS you'll probably find they don't count half of them as accidents; they'll be incidents!

[zalt]

Far to many of the accidents, assuming they are recorded as such, seem to be investigated at a superficial level, presumably at best being done by FAA for NTSB.

I wonder if its time the NTSB did the sort of systematic systemic study they did on bush flying in Alaska in the late 70s (again a bunch used to doing the business in extreme conditions) but with a bit more effort on the operators and FAA.

I still find it a little surprising that there are about 25 heli operators, of all sizes, working offshore in the GoM.

[Gomer Pylot]

I'm a little surprised that Europeans still think the US does things the way they're done in Europe. That has never been the case, in any category.

The offshore helicopter industry here is more mature - we've been flying offshore oil support since 1949, and a culture has formed, which is difficult if not impossible to change, of get-it-done-whatever-the-cost. That, coupled with the current tide of crippling & eliminating government oversight over absolutely everything, means the FAA and the government in general is going to do as little as possible, down to a goal of nothing at all. The requirements for reporting an aircraft incident as an accident are different here, this is nothing new. Don't expect it to change. Helicopter pilots here are incredibly conservative, most take Rush Limbaugh as a model, applaud the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and acutely resent any government regulation.

To start an offshore helicopter business, all you need is money (or credit) in the bank and an optimistic outlook. Anyone can do it, and it's done every day. FAA oversight tends to be minimal, and the smaller the company the less attention the FAA pays. They put minimums in the operations manual, & then it's just a wink and a nod. If the FAA asks, they can show the minimums, & they'll swear they never permit breaking them. It can never be proven, unless the acts are really egregious. I know of one operator that essentially had no weather minimums, and the only flight time ever logged was time billed to the customer. Ferry and maintenance time just wasn't logged at all, so inspections were based only on customer time. One pilot finally called the FAA, and finally they pulled the company's certificate for a couple of months, the company swore never to do it again, & they were back in business as usual. Actually punishing an operator for pressuring pilots to fly below minimums has never happened, nor will it.

I don't claim any of this is intelligent, I'm just reporting the facts.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

Gomer Pylot wrote:Helicopter pilots here are incredibly conservative, most take Rush Limbaugh as a model, applaud the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and acutely resent any government regulation.I've noticed that too, and you're right, Gomer. It *is* funny, how many helicopter pilots here in the US do look at that drug-dealing, loud-mouthed bigot as some sort of God. Rush Limbaugh, that is. Makes you wonder...

Or maybe not. Helicopter pilots are fiercely independent. Their autonomous nature spills over into other areas of their lives. Witness how hard it is to get them to organize. Witness how many of them are dissatisfied with the federal government, no matter which party is in power. It's bizarre. They are nothing like airline (or other fixed-wing) pilots, as esteemed newsman Harry Reasoner pointed out all those years ago in his essay, "Helicopter Pilots are Different."

But how does this affect their decision-making process when it comes to weather? On one hand, you might think that their "You can't tell ME what to do!" attitude might prevent them from being coerced into bad situations. But there's another more prevalent attitude: "I'm all alone and I've got to get the job done." Too eager to please. And that's what leads to weather accidents. We tend to think that the "White Knight Syndrome" only applies to EMS pilots. In fact, helicopter pilots in all market segments are similarly afflicted.

On the other hand, sometimes you get forced into that uncomfortable space between the rock and the hard place. Weather decisions are not always cut-and-dried. It's nice to say, "Just make a 180," but sometimes when you've been zig-zagging your way toward someplace, there is no guarantee that a simple 180 will bring you back into the clear.

Which begs the question: Should a VFR pilot in the GOM turn around at the first sign of weather below his cross-country minimums? If so, there'd be whole days (if not weeks) when not a lot got done in the GOM. Obviously, some compromises have to be made between what's totally safe and what's practical.

The reality is that you sometimes fly in crummy weather that is perhaps a little above your company minimums. Then you run into a line of crap, but it looks isolated, so you deviate around it, do another "Direct-To" on the GPS and keep going. On a long flight, this may happen more than once. Maybe there are enough "clear" (read: above-minimum) areas to persuade you to keep going. Maybe you're talking to the rig/platform on the FM and they SWEAR it's clear-blue-and-22.

And maybe you try to zig around one bad area, but it puts you into a "room" with no exit. So you circle but find that the way you came in is blocked (weather does move, especially when the wind is high)...and there's no platform visible to set down on. Your heart goes into your throat as you look at that tiny artificial horizon that's not even directly in front of you but skewed off to the left (or you're in a BO105 that doesn't even have the flight instruments arranged in the "sacred six"). And you think to yourself, "Hmm. Might have pushed it just a *bit* too far this time, mate."

Been there.

And no amount of regulation, oversight or training will ever prevent situations like that from occurring. There are no easy solutions. No matter how good the IFR pilot is, 206's are not good IFR platforms. Nothing is without enough fuel to punch-in and go someplace with good weather. And if we carried that, then we wouldn't be able to carry much payload.

It might sound cavalierly negligent to say, "Weather accidents in the GOM are just the nature of the business," but I believe that it is true. We've always had weather accidents, and we likely always will. But if you really, really want to reduce them to an "acceptable" level, I would focus my pilot training on recognizing the peculiar weather patterns that exist in the GOM. It took me a long time to gather my stash of knowledge, and there was no book from which to learn it.

Perhaps someone should write one.

[Time Out]

HOUSTON (Dow Jones)--The Coast Guard called off a search late Sunday for any survivors of a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico, the second such accident befalling Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHEL) in two months.

The accident killed pilot Quan C. Le, 61, who had flown for Petroleum Helicopters since 1980, and two others.

According to the Coast Guard, an offshore supply boat picked up the radio beacon signal from the missing Bell helicopter Friday afternoon from underwater. An oil sheen and debris from the aircraft were also visible in the area.

As reported, the helicopter was shuttling two passengers between offshore oil and gas facilities in the Gulf.

The two workers were employees of Royal Dutch/Shell Group (RD) unit Shell Oil Co. and headed to a Shell-operated natural gas pipeline hub platform, according to a statement from the company.

Shell declined Monday to release the names of the two employees, both of whom worked for the company's Shell Gas Transmission unit.

Ed Gatza, manager of field human resources for Petroleum Helicopters, said the company would continue looking for the aircraft.

"PHI won't stop," he said. "We're continuing with search and recovery efforts."

The company didn't have a statement about the cause of the accident, but Gatza said Le was a "very experienced pilot".

The small helicopter - manufactured by Textron Inc. (TXT) unit Bell Helicopter - disappeared about 10:45 a.m. CDT (1545 GMT) Friday en route to an offshore oil facility about 70 miles south of Cameron, La.

Another Petroleum Helicopters aircraft crashed Aug. 13 when it hit the helipad of an offshore platform while trying to take off, killing three and injuring two others.

According to a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board, the earlier accident happened as the aircraft lifted off in winds of about 23 knots in the Eugene Island section of the Gulf of Mexico.

Oil and gas companies depend on helicopters to move employees to and from offshore platforms and drilling rigs, especially when storm systems rip through the Gulf.

Petroleum Helicopters transports more than 1 million passengers for the oil and gas industry each year, according to the company's Web site.

source (http://sg.biz.yahoo.com/031013/15/3exc1.html)

[Gomer Pylot]

PF1, here's a novel idea. How about raising the VFR weather minimums? 500/3 for single-engine and 300/2 for multi-engine are the most conservative that I know of. Many operators use lower. Flying a hundred or two nautical miles with the weather right at those minimums, & there's a good chance they've gone lower both behind you and ahead of you. More than once I've been flying along with a 500' ceiling & decent visibility and had the sky fall on me. Intense rain, visibility nil, and no platform to put it on, no radar to find a platform or the beach or clear weather, it's just get down on the water, go slow, & pray a lot. The 180 turn doesn't always work. If the minimums were higher, it would be harder to get trapped; the chances of that happening are nil, though, because safety just isn't nearly as high a priority as making short-term profits by keeping contracts, & the oil companies just want to get the flights done, a few casualties are just part of making maximum profits. The only way to get things changed is for all the pilots to get together & force the changes, & I certainly won't be holding my breath waiting for that.

[Mars]

Whilst not wishing to prejudge the reason(s) for this accident, and only in the context of the comments on this thread:

There is some deja vu here. In another thread in a discussion of FARs and their (non) compliance with the ICAO Standard (in the context of the Rules-of-the-Air Annex 2): 4.6 Except when necessary for take-off or landing, or except by permission from the appropriate authority, a VFR flight shall not be flown:

a) over the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements or over an open-air assembly of persons at a height less than 300 m (1 000 ft) above the highest obstacle within a radius of 600 m from the aircraft;

b) elsewhere than as specified in 4.6 a), at a height less than 150 m (500 ft) above the ground or water.it was postulated that the US does not comply with the ICAO Standard, and alleviates helicopters (FAR 91.119(d)), because pilots are quite capable of making appropriate decisions and flying safely without any rule.

Gomer Pylot is very perceptive in his comment;The offshore helicopter industry here is more mature - we've been flying offshore oil support since 1949, and a culture has formed, which is difficult if not impossible to change, of get-it-done-whatever-the-cost.however, that is not a good reason not to re-assess the operational standards of the GOM (if that is not an oxymoron) now that the accident record has reached unacceptable proportions.

What we must particularly guard against, is the move to export the operational standards of the GOM to the rest of the world - they may be acceptable to the US (which must now be in doubt) but they are not appropriate elsewhere.

It may be that the re-assessment process has already started - an accident such as this is likely to be unacceptable to the Oil Company to which it occurred.

Whilst 'on air' it might be appropriate to comment on 212man's posting and clarify that the statistics given earlier were based on accidents as defined by the FAA (FAA and Europe adopt the ICAO definition of an accident). His comment might be related to the practice of not including ditching incidents when they do not fall within the scope of the definition (when damage does not ensue) - itself quite bizarre.

[212man]

That is what I was referring to and, yes, somewhat bizarre.

I agree about the company involved and will watch with interest.

[Hippolite]

212 man

What do you mean by:

"I agree about the company ivolved", are you talking the oil company re-assessing their minimums?

H:cool:

[Devil 49]

Folks, this was AN accident. You can't read anything into it. I knew the pilot and the area, albeit years ago. He was a very, very experienced pilot. Something went terribly awry, and now he's dead. A rule wouldn't have changed that outcome if the threat of death didn't.

There's nothing especially difficult in the area, or indeed, in the GOM. It's a large and mature market with it's own way of doing things. But EMS has it's idiosynchratic methods, as does utility, flight instruction, etc. They relate to the task at hand, nothing more.

Yes, customers ask pilots to do things that are unwise- but not just in the GOM. It happens all the time, in every profession. Knowing what's reasonable and how to accomplish that is what we're paid for. I've refused customer requests thousands of times, as the pilot involved has done -nothing unique or exceptional.

Yes, it's been an especially eventful few months in the Gulf. If anybody knows of a common point in this group of events, beyond geography, I'd like to hear it. The geographic connection is easy- on any flyable day, there are hundreds of helos in the GOM. Hundreds of operations means thousands of operations daily, and millions of pilot decisions. Increased exposure...

[B Sousa]

PPFan Writes:"...he merely left out the phrase "when you inadvertently encounter them."

You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off. It makes me believe more and more that Companies think they can get that extra mile by having pilots test the weather a bit more since they have that "Instrument Rating".
It will happen again, just a matter of time. I had a newbie try that on me years ago. headed right for one of those many number class thunderstorms...."I can see under it". I cancelled the mission and she ended up killing herself and a couple others years later in a similar Go/NoGo situation....But she was Instrument Rated.
Experience is no excuse when you mess with Mother Nature, she will give you an extreme spanking.

[Mars]

Devil 49

Folks, this was AN accident. You can't read anything into it.Yes but one of 14 so far this year, five fatal.

Yes, it's been an especially eventful few months in the Gulf. If anybody knows of a common point in this group of events, beyond geography, I'd like to hear it. The geographic connection is easy- on any flyable day, there are hundreds of helos in the GOM. Hundreds of operations means thousands of operations daily, and millions of pilot decisions. Increased exposure...Operating Standards and their enforcement!

The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.

Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?

My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents.

[Gomer Pylot]

B Sousa writes You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off. Yes, if you have a radar. Most helicopters here don't.

The truth is that we can beat this dead horse ad infinitum, but it won't change anything. No one in the U.S. government, nor in management in any oil company, nor in any helicopter company, give a rat's a$$ what anyone in a primarily British forum says. Or any other forum, for that matter. What counts is money, and the oil companies have the money, thus the power, to do whatever they want. There will be no more regulation, period. I'll bet the rent money on that.

[RDRickster]

Looks like the Coast Guard called off the search after three days. I hope the pilot finds happier landings in the big unknown that we will all face someday. Condolenses to the families of the three lost souls. :(

[Thomas coupling]

It boils down to one of two things I suppose. There are those who get up in the morning ready for another shift and think:
"it'll never happen to me", and there are others who think:
"there isn't a problem doing what I'm doing".

For all those who think outside this psychological twister......

Why are you still doing it?????

I suggest one answer might be:

the person is too weak willed to move on :uhoh:

[Barannfin]

The preliminary report was released.

Does anybody know if they are going to dive down to the wreckage?

Report (http://www1.faa.gov/avr/aai/J_1014_N.txt)

[B Sousa]

Gomer Pylot writes: "Yes, if you have a radar. Most helicopters here don't. "

Dam Gomer, Im glad to hear that, in 33 years of flying I have never seen Radar in a small helicopter......Im talking about Flight Planning. You know, get a brief before you fly..........Or dont they do that either.
Im not envious of flying the gulf either. Bigger balls than I have. If its over my head its too deep. Just doing tours out of STT or crossing from Florida down Island is just about all I want to see.

Hey, this is an accident that could have been prevented as are most. We all who fly, know that folks get pushed to bring in the money. My original posts were pointing to the fact that VFR Pilots should remain VFR. Inadvertant to me, means someone pushed it for whatever reason. BTDT and have been lucky...Hopefully lessons learned.... To me Companies have an agenda when they want you to fly VFR Equiped Aircraft in VFR Conditions and you MUST have an Instrument rating...... Bet that agenda is $$$$
Stay Safe, you cant cash the check if your dead......

[Gomer Pylot]

If you're offshore, it's difficult if not impossible to see a radar. And lots of us stay offshore the entire hitch. The weather reports you get are what you see out the window, & what you hear on the radio as you dodge around the thunderstorms. There is very little weather reporting offshore. Putting in ASOS systems would cost the government or some company money. Money has been appropriated, but the administration doesn't want to release it. As always, follow the money.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

Hey Bert, there are some things you don't understand about the GOM.

Yes, we do flight planning. All of our shore bases have satellite weather. However, most offshore locations do not. And we often find ourselves initiating long platform-to-platform flights without the ability to any in-depth follow-up flight planning other than what was done that morning prior to sunrise, prior to launch.

Not only that, but the various satellite weather providers depict precip in different ways. And they seem to be pretty pessimistic. You'll see large areas of dark green and think, "Gee, it must be raining pretty good there," only to find out that it's not raining at all. Or you'll do the "You Are Here" thing and see that your specific location is under a big yellow blob, yet it's only raining lightly outside. You see enough of this and finally realize that the satellite picture is of some general value but is far from totally accurate.

And Bert, you betray your lack of knowledge of overwater flight when you make statements like, "You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off..." I think you were referring to thunderstorms there, no? Oh Bert, if they were the ONLY thing we had to worry about! But they're not. In fact, running into a thunderstorm is not even high up on the risks, weather-wise. They're pretty easy to see, even in the worst weather we fly in. There are other hazards.

Gomer Pylot mentioned an interesting phenomenon in an earlier post. We all probably think that rain occurs in rather small, isolated areas, like out the bottom of cumulus clouds. But I have been flying along under a fairly even 500 or 600 foot overcast when the sky literally fell - the whole thing just started raining for miles and miles around. One second it's not raining, next second it is - seemingly out of nowhere. When that happens, you can't even turn and run for a clear area. Sometimes the rain is so heavy that you can't see sh*t.

But even that pales next to flying under a solid 500 foot overcast and having fog form underneath you. I'm not talking about little wispy strands of sea fog, but whole areas suddenly turning white. It happened to me on one peculiar November day and I will never forget it. I'd seen fog "roll-in" before; I'd just never seen it just materialize like that. At first, I wasn't at all sure how it would play out. But I called on the radio and found where it was better, and so went there.

I've run into solid walls of creeping fog that a horror movie director would kill to film. I've been flying in fog "mazes" while thinking to myself, "This is REALLY stupid." I've been sitting on platforms and had fog banks over-run the place with a swiftness that I never would have believed. I've seen fog down on the water in 25 knots of wind.

I've seen cold fronts pass through and then back up as warm fronts within the span of a mid-day nap.

I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day...

I've seen little lines of cumulus clouds bisecting my flight path in the morning as the sun was starting to warm them. Instead of ducking under, I'd decide to climb over. And sometimes I found that the cloud's growth rate exceeded the climb-ability of my aircraft. Without enough lateral clearance to go between the spires, I'd have to admit defeat, backtrack and just go under like everyone else.

I've seen calm, hot summer days when I'd be flying along at 1,000 feet. The water would be featureless and flat. It, the sky and the air would all merge into the same color grey. The visibility might be 3 miles or 30 miles or .3 miles. If there was not a platform or boat to look at, you simply could not tell. Remember the summer that Mexico had forest fires burning out of control? (Blender Pilot probably does - I think it was around 1995.) That was miserable for us in the GOM as the southerly winds carried all that smoke and soot northward.

Yes, fifteen years of living offshore and flying VFR aircraft in the GOM has let me see some strange and wonderful examples of Mother Nature in all her glory. And yes, there are plenty of hazards out in the GOM other than t-storms.

I'm not saying that an Instrument Rating makes one cocky or cavalier. But if I were running a company, I'd insist that all of my VFR pilots would *NOT* be instrument-rated. I would tell them, "If you go inadvertent-IMC you are GOING to die." Boy, I'll bet you'd see some really conservative pilots then, eh? Sometimes I think that the only reason I ever survived till now is that: a) I knew I was not instrument-current and didn't delude myself that I could "simply" fly on the gauges if necessary; and b) I was often flying a BO105 with the flight instruments arranged in some weird and utterly random way on a console that was well out of my direct vision.

People think that the GOM is a place for barely-qualified pilots to go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true. Not true at all.

[S76Heavy]

So, as always, it's a money thing. Nobody wants to invest in IFR machines and IF trained pilots to operate them.
Nobody is willing to pay for proper en-route weather reporting.
There is a certain stubborness about flying single engine helicopters with little lifting capacity, so it's not feasible to bolt equipment to it or fly multi crew.
In my experience, VFR only pilots and A/C limit themselves severely in the number of options when things turn sour, while an IFR capable crew and A/C will climb and turn away. In my view, it's not worth the risk.

I'm amazed that where Shell are paying lots of money on improved flight safety over the North Sea, they are willing to let their employees fly single engine VFR in the GOM, losing some of them in the process.

[B Sousa]

PPrune Fan #1. Very Good, You have probabaly said it best on this topic. Many different weather conditions that those of us who do not fly there, will not encounter.....
As to painting things, the example I was using was from a situation I got into while flying from Trent Lott to Panama City. I had been jumping down through crap from Ft Worthless on my way to the islands.. Weather sucked with rain coming in from the Gulf. rather than go throuigh Pensacolas airspace I decided to take it out about 30 miles offshore. No biggie, as I had popouts etc....
I got into some crap that had me flying back to shore to find a place to set down. Broke clear and back to Gulf shores for a breather. Gathered all the old guys I saw who flew there daily, and with their heads together picked their brains on how to go Eastbound. They showed me their Weather Reports which showed all the Squalls heading inland. All were consistent and had about 30 minute breaks between. Timed things right and flew between with no problem. Those were the painting I used.
Again you answered it great as to what you have available. and it probabaly makes more sense to all of us as to why this accident happened.....

[Gomer Pylot]

S76H, I think the single-engine subject is a red herring. Please show me one accident or incident in the GOM in which injuries or death occurred and in which the number of engines was a factor. I can't find one. Making things safer is going to cost someone money, and I'd much prefer to have it spent on things which can actually save lives, maybe mine. Better weather reporting, better communications (talking to ATC out here is a sometimes thing), terrain proximity warning systems, collision avoidance systems, radar (it can be put in small ships, it just costs lots of money), etc are far more important than having 2 engines.

Like PPF1, I've had the wind change 180 degrees between platforms less than 1/2 mile apart, I've had fog roll in between the time I picked up a slingload and the time I dropped it 1/4 mile away, I've had wind come up on a sunny day from calm to so strong it almost blew my helicopter over the side, it was only saved because the wind blew it toward the center of the platform, and every other phenomenon imaginable. These things can kill you, whether you have 1, 2, or 3 engines. Being able to not fly without being chewed out by management would be far safer than adding another engine.

OK, rant off, I'm done on this one.

[S76Heavy]

Gomer, I was merely pointing out that one global oil company adopts wildly different standards for the aircraft its employees travel on, both sides of the Atlantic. I'm not starting the single vs twin debate, although I think twins will usually have more lifting capacity and therefore carry more goodies to work with. They just happen to be the standard required on the North Sea and I'm quite happy with that.

I agree with your list of items, and we find ourselves improving what we have in that respect out here in Europe as we speak. So again, wildly differing standards between us. Why? The laws of nature are still the same..
As far as wind changes, we have a windsock on every deck, we have fairly accurate weather reporting and are issued warnings by trained radio operators when they observe large changes that might affect our operations, and if the weather closes in, we declare IFR, climb and either fly ARAs or go home.

So why deny yourselves that option list?

[crop duster]

PPF1 says:
People think that the GOM is a place for barely qualified pilots go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true at all.

You are very right; yet, every day it is happening in the Gulf. Years ago I had heard a story about a pilot that had gotten lost while going from one platform to the next. The story went that, with a load in a 206B, he would fly one way for a few minutes and then turn and go another. He was in the High Island area where there are not many platfroms and although the day was fairly clear the visibility was "not good". For some time he flew in full contact with company flight following at times nearly crying that he was lost and he thought he should just land in the water. Finally, he did spot a platform and landed, nearly out of gas.

Well, a foreman and I were on a long flight into the same area from the East Cameron blocks when this story came up. (When flying the little birds in the GOM the guy with the biggest check gets to sit up front with the pilot.) It seems that this foreman was sitting up front on the day this happened. He said that the pilot paniced and began flying around like he was crazy. The pilot was told several times to just turn toward the beach but could not be convinced that that would help. Eventually they did find a platform, landed, spent the night there, and got out of there the next morning when the company brought more fuel and pilot.

The GOM is unique in many ways as PPF1 has shone. Yet, what is needed is not more regulation but the whole list PPF1 wrote would be just fine.

Barryb

[Mars]

Gomer Pylot: S76H, I think the single-engine subject is a red herring. Please show me one accident or incident in the GOM in which injuries or death occurred and in which the number of engines was a factor. I can't find one.How about this one.NTSB Identification: FTW03FA097
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, February 16, 2003 in MI 700, GM
Aircraft: Bell 407, registration: N407HH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On February 16, 2003, approximately 1225 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, landed offshore in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of engine power. The helicopter was owned and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, by Houston Helicopters, Inc., at Pearland, Texas. The pilot and one passenger received fatal injuries, and three passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter has not been recovered and is presumed destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight. Approximately 1210, the helicopter departed Harbor Island (Tesoro Heliport) at Ingleside, Texas, for the 26.1 nautical mile flight to the Ensco Rig 84 (Matagorda 700 block offshore).

The operator and the dispatcher reported that the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, engine failure, and that he was going to land the helicopter on the water. The Coast Guard at Aransas Pass, Texas, and Corpus Christi, Texas, were notified. Search and rescue was initiated by the operator, Coast Guard, water vessels, and other helicopter operators.

Two of the passengers reported that the helicopter rolled inverted within a few seconds after the landing. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter, inflated their life vest, and awaited their rescue. Approximately 1425, the pilot and passengers were recovered by the Coast Guard.

The operator, the dispatcher, Coast Guard helicopter pilots, pilot's of other search helicopters, and two of the passengers reported the winds were from the north at 25-40 mph with 5 to 9-foot seas.

[zalt]

S76H That oilco's policy is the same worldwide. I've heard this was a non-standard contract placed by the a local business unit's logistics office.

[S76Heavy]

Zalt, thanks for clarifying. No doubt some heads will roll..

[Barannfin]

Just found these articles on another forum. Seems dive teams located the pilot and one of the passengers, last one still missing though.

2theadvocate.com (http://www.2theadvocate.com/stories/101403/new_copter001.shtml)

news24houston.com (http://www.news24houston.com/content/headlines/?ArID=16732&SecID=2)

[GOMEX214]

Gentlemen,
We are starting to make progress in the GOM. Following is part of an update sent to PHPA members by President Butch Grafton. It shows the progress we have begun throgh the efforts of the newly organized Professional Helicopter Pilots Association, and the roadblocks we face in the effort to make change. We are DONE waiting for HAI (managemnet) and the FAA to make changes for us. We are now going to be the agent of that change.

If you are a US Helicopter Pilot of ANY experience level I strongly ecourage you to join the PHPA. We are the new voice for all US helicopter pilots who care, and want to get rid of the attitude that says "don't tell my mother I'm a helicopter pilot, she thinks I'm a piano player in a New Orleans whore house".

Contact us at www.autorotate.org



2. PHPA Attends HAI/FAA Meeting on Gulf Issues
PHPA was invited to attend the meeting between HAI and the FAA to discuss the safety issues in the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently some at HAI were not very pleased with our presence at this meeting. However, we did have three people there representing our members interests in the safety problems in the Gulf. Kevin Kistler of OPEIU, Al Duquette PHPA's Safety Representative and a legislative representative from the Transportation Trades Department of which PHPA is a member. There is little doubt left among the companies that PHPA is starting to play a part in many, many areas of our profession where we have never been allowed to participate before. The Gulf issues are very serious issues and PHPA is working diligently to get the changes needed to enhance safety, weather, communications and search and rescue capabilities over the entire working area.

[zalt]

Q: Do PHPA act as a 'party' to helicopter accident investigations as ALPA do?

[GOMEX214]

Not at this time. We hope that one day we will be that strong.

[Devil 49]

Mars said- "Yes but one of 14 so far this year, five fatal."

I say (Chronological, latest first)-
1) This one, FATAL, PHI, and the cause is still to be determined
2) Galveston 395, Go-Helitrans, mishap on start
3) Eugene Island 276, FATAL, PHI, LOC engine accelerate/takeoff
4) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, rotor strike on landing
5) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, tail rotor strike on landing
6) Brazos 532, FATAL,Tarleton Helicopters, dark night
7) "GOM", PHI, forced landing following fadec fault
8) High Island 44, FATAL, PHI, main rotor strike pax
9) Mississippi 700, FATAL, Houston Helicopters, engine failure forced landing.
10) 14 nm. NE of Venice, FATAL, Air Log, hit the platform
11) High Island 471, Air Log, LOC takeoff/landing/repo

I make 11. Can you add to the list?
Yep, 5 fatal.
Pattern? Tex Air seems to be over-represented. PHI's had a bunch of fatals (3 of 5) with WX as a factor. You appear to have a point there. The rest are pretty much all over the map.

Mars said-
Operating Standards and their enforcement!

The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.


Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?

My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents

Response-
Operating standards are always a good idea. Suggest some changes that would have made a difference.

The number of helicopters IS an issue. I'll say it again- hundreds of helicopters, thousands of operations. Increased exposure equals increased incidence, all things being equal.

Human factors are always present. No humans, no human factors. So, no humans is the answer?

WX shows up far too often as a contributing factor in almost all these accidents. Weather offshore is especially hazardous, it appears. Fits my recollection.
But, when I was there:
Offshore minimums were 300 and 2 in a VFR twin, 500 and 3 single engine;
40 knots sustained/15 knot gust spread;
Local in the field and on the beach, 300 and 1- which is really, really crappy offshore or cross country on the beach.
Frankly, I always viewed these as permission to operate but not a requirement. And I was faulted only once in 13 years- questioned often- but criticised only once, and that indirectly. I'd say that's the best safety culture possible- allow a well trained professional to evaluate conditions and make a reasoned decision.

[zalt]

Mars' total match Bob Williams of ExxonMobile's tally (he is the OGP's accident stats guru).

For the missing events how about:

24 March PHI 407 near Houma (dep EI 132) LOC
21 March AirLog 206L (dep EC 89) damaged in hard (precautionary) landing
6 March Taylor Energy AS350B2 near Venice, LA (for MC 20) LA hit water while turning

The past OGP GoM stats:

1995 3 fatal / 5 total
1996 4 / 7
1997 1/ 6
1998 1 / 3
1999 1 / 9
2000 3 / 9
2001 1 / 8 with a rate of 0.22 fatal accidents per 100K hrs or 1.77 accidents per 100K hrs.
2002 due out soon

2003 YTD 5 / 14 and 2003 extrapolated: 6 / 17 with a estimated rate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100K hrs (6 times worse than 2001) or 3.77 accidents per 100K hrs (or twice 2001).


EDITED UPDATE:
15th GoM accident this year & PHI's 6th was Bell 407 N405PH which ditched just after take off from a rig nine miles south of Marsh Island 16 Nov 2003. http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=109186&highlight=Marsh+Island

[zalt]

To put my 2003 estimate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100K hours in GoM in context:

Its is 4 times the 1998-2002 fatal accident rate in GoM according to HASC data.

It is roughly twice the fatal+non-fatal rate PHI achieved between 1992 and 2000 (I note they have changed their web site recently to remome this sort of data). The extrapolated total accident rate is almost 6 times higher.

A certain 'major oil company' (if you are in the industry: you know who) has a 2000 target of less than 0.5 fatal accidents per 100k hours, and aim to reduce that target to 0.2 in 2005 (which they had been able to achieved last year), and 0.1 by the end of the decade.

Comparing with US military Class A accidents (ie fatal and high value damage accidents):
US Navy (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY02 was 1.746 (FY02 slightly above the USN 5 year average)
US Army (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY03 was 1.645 per 100K hours (FY03 slightly below the Army's 3 year average)

Both these are less than half the extrapolated 2003 GoM total accident rate (ie assuming things get no better by the end of the year).

Summary: A really bad year.

PS I am aware that relying to my own posts is a sign of insanity!!

[HeloTeacher]

From Prune Fan #1:

"I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day..."

I hope there was more to it than that. Not confirming wind at the platform by looking at the water, combined with no windsock on the platform, would be the height foolishness. So I assume the entire wasn't told?
---------------------------
This is one example from this post of many weather phenomenon that should be part of every pilot's basic weather education. This includes the over-water losses of visibility from smoke and haze. The same things happen over land too. The difference is the lack of places to land, just like there is in many other undeveloped parts of the world.

In so many other parts of the world the combined needs of the oil companies to respond imediately to operational requirements and the lack of options for aircraft in offshore flying have resulted in mandatory IFR capabilities for all operations, even if the primary role is day-VFR. Why is such a basic safety concept so foreign to the Gulf of Mexico?

Too often on here I have seen pilots state that the Gulf of Mexico is unique as an explanation of why things are the way they are. Bull, it is not unique. The mentailty in viewing it is the only unique thing I see...

[S76Heavy]

I agree, the GoM debate bears much resemblance to the Aussie HEMS debate when it comes to VFR flight over water in conditions that can only be described as actual IMC.
Why do we as a profession and community continue to sell ourselves so cheap?