Associated Airlines Crash Lagos 3 October
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Associated Airlines Crash Lagos 3 October
I've just heard that an Associated Airlines chartered Embraer has crashed on take off from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos. I have no further news at this time as to whether there are casualties or how much damage had been done to the aircraft
Last edited by Keke Napep; 3rd Oct 2013 at 10:30.
Another news Site says 15 dead with 5 survivors.
Official: 15 dead after passenger plane crashes near Nigeria airport - World News
Any idea about the identities of the crew and if they were among the survivors.
Official: 15 dead after passenger plane crashes near Nigeria airport - World News
Any idea about the identities of the crew and if they were among the survivors.
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Might be MX issues
Associated died a slow death, due incompetent management, mostly. Four EMB 120s. Initial, two bare metal body machines, would never fly again, some said, in 2011. Of the last two, the crashed plane seemed to have the best hopes of flying legally. As it happened, it was the (only) one they used for their exclusively charter flights, in 2012 and 13. They were down to few pilots and techs, and there were rumours of limping, just get along, do the barest, operations. And now, this. This is to wish the crash victims, rest with the Lord...and hope that for this tragedy, the guilty heads roll
Last edited by dash200; 3rd Oct 2013 at 16:48.
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AIB Nigeria Releases Preliminary Report
Air Accident Investigation Board, Nigeria, has issued its preliminary report on the Associated Airlines Embraer 120 fatal crash in Lagos on October 3rd.
It seems that take off flap may not have been set and the right hand engine in auto-feather, but despite automated warnings to this effect, a query from the co-pilot as to whether the take off should be aborted, no V1 or Vr calls and a warning from the co-pilot to take it gently, the Captain continued the take off and the stall warning sounded less than 10 seconds after take-off. 31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90 degree right bank. The evidence initially appears quite damning, but I'll leave you to draw your own conclusions aboyr serviceability and CRM issues on this fatal flight.
Preliminary Report Into Associated Airlines Embraer 120 Accident on 3 October
It seems that take off flap may not have been set and the right hand engine in auto-feather, but despite automated warnings to this effect, a query from the co-pilot as to whether the take off should be aborted, no V1 or Vr calls and a warning from the co-pilot to take it gently, the Captain continued the take off and the stall warning sounded less than 10 seconds after take-off. 31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90 degree right bank. The evidence initially appears quite damning, but I'll leave you to draw your own conclusions aboyr serviceability and CRM issues on this fatal flight.
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ACCIDENT INVOLVING ASSOCIATED AIRLINE EMBRAER 120 AIRCRAFT REGISTERED 5N-BJY WHICH OCCURRED AT MMA ON THURSDAY 3RD OCTOBER, 2013.
The following information has been determined from preliminary readout and analysis of flight 361’s flight recorders. Flight 361 was equipped with both a COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER and a FLIGHT DATA RECORDER. Both recorders were replayed at the Accident Investigation Bureau’s recently acquired flight recorder laboratory located in Abuja. International flight recorder experts from Canada who designed the laboratory assisted the investigation team with the readout and analysis process along with representatives from the aircraft manufacturer and aircraft operator, Associated Airlines. We are conducting the investigation in accordance with the provisions of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, of which Nigeria is a member State.
The flight data recorder or FDR contained approximately 47 hours of data in solid state memory. The recorder downloaded without issue. There were approximately 50 parameters recorded. A few parameters were not working properly however we do not think, in this particular case, that it will hamper the overall investigation.
The cockpit voice recorder or CVR was an older generation magnetic tape based device. The CVR’s magnetic tape recording was removed from the unit and replayed on an open reel 4 track tape deck specially adapted for replaying CVR’s of this type. The CVR contained 32 and one half minutes of audio which included the internal conversation of the two pilots, radio calls and the overall aural environment in the cockpit on the cockpit area microphone. The CVR was of good quality and the team is in the process of generating a complete transcript of all relevant information. The AIB plans to release the transcript as part of its final report of the accident however the actual recording is, under international protocol, sensitive and therefore privileged information and will not be released at any time.
The following represents information that has been determined from our preliminary assessment of both flight recorders:

The crew discussed some concerns about the aircraft prior to departure but at this time we are not prepared to elaborate on those concerns as there remains a lot of work to complete on the CVR analysis in order to determine the specific nature of the crew’s concerns.
Associated 361 was cleared for take-off on runway one eight left at Lagos international airport. The wind was calm and weather is not considered a factor in this accident. Approximately 4 seconds after engine power was advanced to commence the take-off roll, the crew received an automated warning from the onboard computer voice which consisted of three chimes followed by “Take-off Flaps...Take-off Flaps”. This is a configuration warning that suggests that the flaps were not in the correct position for take-off and there is some evidence that the crew may have chosen not to use flaps for the take-off. The warning did not appear to come as any surprise to the crew and they continued normally with the take-off. This warning continues throughout the take-off roll. As we are in the process of verifying the accuracy of the flight data, we have not yet been able to confirm the actual flap setting however we expect to determine this in the fullness of time.
It was determined from the CVR that the pilot flying was the Captain and the pilot monitoring and assisting was the First Officer.
The ‘set power‘ call was made by the Captain and the ‘power is set’ call was confirmed by the First Officer as expected in normal operations. Approximately 3 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the First Officer noted that the aircraft was moving slowly. Approximately 7 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the internal Aircraft Voice warning system could be heard stating ‘Take off Flaps, Auto Feather’. Auto feather refers to the pitch of the propeller blades. In the feather position, the propeller does not produce any thrust. The FDR contains several engine related parameters which the AIB is studying. At this time, we can state that the Right engine appears to be producing considerably less thrust than the Left engine. The left engine appeared to be working normally. The aircraft automated voice continued to repeat ‘Take-off Flaps, Auto Feather’.
The physical examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the engine fire handle was pulled/activated.
The standard ‘eighty knots’ call was made by the First Officer. The first evidence that the crew indicated that there was a problem with the take-off roll was immediately following the ‘eighty knots’ call. The First Officer asked if the take- off should be abortedapproximately 12 seconds after the ‘eighty knots’ callout. Our investigation team estimates the airspeed to be approximately 95 knots. Airspeed was one of the parameters that, while working in the cockpit, appeared not to be working on the Flight Data Recorder. We were able to estimate the speed based on the radar data that we synchronized to the FDR and CVR but it is very approximate because of this. In response to the First Officer’s question to abort, the Captain indicated that they should continue and they continued the take-off roll. The crew did not make a ‘V1’ call or a Vr’ call. V1 is the speed at which a decision to abort or continue a take-off is made. Vr is the speed at which it is planned to rotate the aircraft. Normally the non-flying pilot calls both the V1 and the Vr speeds. When Vr is called the flying pilot pulls back on the control column and the aircraft is rotated (pitched up) to climb away from the runway. During the rotation, the First Officer stated ‘gently’, which we believe reflects concern that the aircraft is not performing normally and therefore needs to be rotated very gently so as not to aerodynamically stall the aircraft.
The First Officer indicated that the aircraft was not climbing and advised the Captain who was flying not to stall the aircraft. Higher climb angles can cause an aerodynamic stall. If the aircraft is not producing enough overall thrust, it is difficult or impossible to climb without the risk of an aerodynamic stall.
Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft slowly veered off the runway heading to the right and was not climbing properly. This aircraft behavior appears to have resulted in the Air Traffic Controller asking Flight 361 if operation was normal. Flight 361 never responded.
Less than 10 seconds after rotation of the aircraft to climb away from the runway, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit and continued to the end of the
recording. The flight data shows characteristics consistent with an aerodynamic stall.
31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90 degree right bank.
The investigation is focussing on the following:
1) Mechanical and electronic engine control issues related to the Right engine and Right engine propeller systems.
2) Aural warnings related to auto-feather and the flap settings required for takeoff.
3) Take-off configuration issues with respect to flap settings.
4) Crew decision making and training with respect to proceeding with the
flight despite concerns regarding the aircraft’s suitability for flight.
5) When and how the number 2 engine fire handle was pulled.
6) Standard operating procedures with respect to continuing the take-off roll
despite continuous automated voice warnings of both ‘take-off flaps’ and
‘auto feather’ when there was ample time to abort the take-off.
7) The airline management’s safety culture fostered throughout the airline.
We are in the process of developing a comprehensive computer reconstruction of the flight which will help our team understand the sequence of events and will ultimately help us communicate our findings to the aviation community and the general public.
At this time we have no urgent safety recommendations. We will not wait for the final report to issue safety recommendations should any issue arise that we feel needs immediate attention.
The following information has been determined from preliminary readout and analysis of flight 361’s flight recorders. Flight 361 was equipped with both a COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER and a FLIGHT DATA RECORDER. Both recorders were replayed at the Accident Investigation Bureau’s recently acquired flight recorder laboratory located in Abuja. International flight recorder experts from Canada who designed the laboratory assisted the investigation team with the readout and analysis process along with representatives from the aircraft manufacturer and aircraft operator, Associated Airlines. We are conducting the investigation in accordance with the provisions of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, of which Nigeria is a member State.
The flight data recorder or FDR contained approximately 47 hours of data in solid state memory. The recorder downloaded without issue. There were approximately 50 parameters recorded. A few parameters were not working properly however we do not think, in this particular case, that it will hamper the overall investigation.
The cockpit voice recorder or CVR was an older generation magnetic tape based device. The CVR’s magnetic tape recording was removed from the unit and replayed on an open reel 4 track tape deck specially adapted for replaying CVR’s of this type. The CVR contained 32 and one half minutes of audio which included the internal conversation of the two pilots, radio calls and the overall aural environment in the cockpit on the cockpit area microphone. The CVR was of good quality and the team is in the process of generating a complete transcript of all relevant information. The AIB plans to release the transcript as part of its final report of the accident however the actual recording is, under international protocol, sensitive and therefore privileged information and will not be released at any time.
The following represents information that has been determined from our preliminary assessment of both flight recorders:

The crew discussed some concerns about the aircraft prior to departure but at this time we are not prepared to elaborate on those concerns as there remains a lot of work to complete on the CVR analysis in order to determine the specific nature of the crew’s concerns.
Associated 361 was cleared for take-off on runway one eight left at Lagos international airport. The wind was calm and weather is not considered a factor in this accident. Approximately 4 seconds after engine power was advanced to commence the take-off roll, the crew received an automated warning from the onboard computer voice which consisted of three chimes followed by “Take-off Flaps...Take-off Flaps”. This is a configuration warning that suggests that the flaps were not in the correct position for take-off and there is some evidence that the crew may have chosen not to use flaps for the take-off. The warning did not appear to come as any surprise to the crew and they continued normally with the take-off. This warning continues throughout the take-off roll. As we are in the process of verifying the accuracy of the flight data, we have not yet been able to confirm the actual flap setting however we expect to determine this in the fullness of time.
It was determined from the CVR that the pilot flying was the Captain and the pilot monitoring and assisting was the First Officer.
The ‘set power‘ call was made by the Captain and the ‘power is set’ call was confirmed by the First Officer as expected in normal operations. Approximately 3 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the First Officer noted that the aircraft was moving slowly. Approximately 7 seconds after the ‘power is set’ call, the internal Aircraft Voice warning system could be heard stating ‘Take off Flaps, Auto Feather’. Auto feather refers to the pitch of the propeller blades. In the feather position, the propeller does not produce any thrust. The FDR contains several engine related parameters which the AIB is studying. At this time, we can state that the Right engine appears to be producing considerably less thrust than the Left engine. The left engine appeared to be working normally. The aircraft automated voice continued to repeat ‘Take-off Flaps, Auto Feather’.
The physical examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the engine fire handle was pulled/activated.
The standard ‘eighty knots’ call was made by the First Officer. The first evidence that the crew indicated that there was a problem with the take-off roll was immediately following the ‘eighty knots’ call. The First Officer asked if the take- off should be abortedapproximately 12 seconds after the ‘eighty knots’ callout. Our investigation team estimates the airspeed to be approximately 95 knots. Airspeed was one of the parameters that, while working in the cockpit, appeared not to be working on the Flight Data Recorder. We were able to estimate the speed based on the radar data that we synchronized to the FDR and CVR but it is very approximate because of this. In response to the First Officer’s question to abort, the Captain indicated that they should continue and they continued the take-off roll. The crew did not make a ‘V1’ call or a Vr’ call. V1 is the speed at which a decision to abort or continue a take-off is made. Vr is the speed at which it is planned to rotate the aircraft. Normally the non-flying pilot calls both the V1 and the Vr speeds. When Vr is called the flying pilot pulls back on the control column and the aircraft is rotated (pitched up) to climb away from the runway. During the rotation, the First Officer stated ‘gently’, which we believe reflects concern that the aircraft is not performing normally and therefore needs to be rotated very gently so as not to aerodynamically stall the aircraft.
The First Officer indicated that the aircraft was not climbing and advised the Captain who was flying not to stall the aircraft. Higher climb angles can cause an aerodynamic stall. If the aircraft is not producing enough overall thrust, it is difficult or impossible to climb without the risk of an aerodynamic stall.
Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft slowly veered off the runway heading to the right and was not climbing properly. This aircraft behavior appears to have resulted in the Air Traffic Controller asking Flight 361 if operation was normal. Flight 361 never responded.
Less than 10 seconds after rotation of the aircraft to climb away from the runway, the stall warning sounded in the cockpit and continued to the end of the
recording. The flight data shows characteristics consistent with an aerodynamic stall.
31 seconds after the stall warning was heard, the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down near 90 degree right bank.
The investigation is focussing on the following:
1) Mechanical and electronic engine control issues related to the Right engine and Right engine propeller systems.
2) Aural warnings related to auto-feather and the flap settings required for takeoff.
3) Take-off configuration issues with respect to flap settings.
4) Crew decision making and training with respect to proceeding with the
flight despite concerns regarding the aircraft’s suitability for flight.
5) When and how the number 2 engine fire handle was pulled.
6) Standard operating procedures with respect to continuing the take-off roll
despite continuous automated voice warnings of both ‘take-off flaps’ and
‘auto feather’ when there was ample time to abort the take-off.
7) The airline management’s safety culture fostered throughout the airline.
We are in the process of developing a comprehensive computer reconstruction of the flight which will help our team understand the sequence of events and will ultimately help us communicate our findings to the aviation community and the general public.
At this time we have no urgent safety recommendations. We will not wait for the final report to issue safety recommendations should any issue arise that we feel needs immediate attention.
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That would explain the long take off run experienced as seen by eye witness.
As for CRM cultural behaviors will continue to dominate good CRM practice until operators take up the gauntlet by dealing decisively with it,rather than a box to tick as a requirement.
As for CRM cultural behaviors will continue to dominate good CRM practice until operators take up the gauntlet by dealing decisively with it,rather than a box to tick as a requirement.
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That is why Something has to be urgently done to get rid of the anti-CRM macho tin gods still flying in the Nigerian airspace and working at the NCAA.
Virgin Nigeria and Arik did a good job in inculcating CRM in most of us flying. Try flying in the GA section in Nigeria and you will be shocked. CRM is almost non existent!
Virgin Nigeria and Arik did a good job in inculcating CRM in most of us flying. Try flying in the GA section in Nigeria and you will be shocked. CRM is almost non existent!
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I KNOW IT ALL SYNDROME
I believe this crash would have been averted if the crew took the time to listen to each other(CRM skills)hence enhancing safety and security of passengers and crews instead of one person acting like he knows it all due to the fact that he has 3000+ hours.No one is above mistake and it has been proven that fatigue or even family problems can shorten ones attention span.
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Hmm...
The reaction to a configuration warning, about the flaps not being set to take-off, is to continue the take-off. 
That reads like a cultural problem leading to an accident: the lack of respect for a safety culture. Want to bet that previous flights had been done in the same way, just that this one was enhanced with an engine failure?
Your take-off performance is predicated on such things as having the airplane configured in a certain way. If you don't have the flaps properly set, you are now a test pilot! Well, you, your crew and your passengers, too... all of you off on a test flight, and may the Lord be with you.
It will be interesting to see what Stella makes of the final report....
That reads like a cultural problem leading to an accident: the lack of respect for a safety culture. Want to bet that previous flights had been done in the same way, just that this one was enhanced with an engine failure?
Your take-off performance is predicated on such things as having the airplane configured in a certain way. If you don't have the flaps properly set, you are now a test pilot! Well, you, your crew and your passengers, too... all of you off on a test flight, and may the Lord be with you.
It will be interesting to see what Stella makes of the final report....
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Maybe some emb 120 drivers can respond
Is it allowed on emb120 to take off flaps up ? I know it is allowed on some props .
On a side
I have to say that i am pleasantly surprised that they did not report the cvr and fdr to be damaged this time. And further there are publishing early findings related to the crash. It is a push to the right direction unlike previous crashes in nigeria.
Is it allowed on emb120 to take off flaps up ? I know it is allowed on some props .
On a side
I have to say that i am pleasantly surprised that they did not report the cvr and fdr to be damaged this time. And further there are publishing early findings related to the crash. It is a push to the right direction unlike previous crashes in nigeria.
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Stella has been quoted as calling a recent aviation accident "an act of God." You know, something out of human control, like having an eagle drop a tortoise on your bonce. She's got nothing to do with acts of God, and, it would seem, not a lot to do with improving aviation safety in Nigeria. So, that's why I thought of Stella.
Has Stella said anything noteworthy about this accident? I have to ask, because I am pretty far out of touch with the local scene.
I know very close to almost nothing about the Brasilia, aside from doing a short ride in a Brasilia sim once, just doing training with FSI Le Bourget for windshear encounters, but I bet that, if one is supposed to set take-off flap, trying to depart clean is a big no-no. Otherwise, why have the configuration warning?
Has Stella said anything noteworthy about this accident? I have to ask, because I am pretty far out of touch with the local scene.
I know very close to almost nothing about the Brasilia, aside from doing a short ride in a Brasilia sim once, just doing training with FSI Le Bourget for windshear encounters, but I bet that, if one is supposed to set take-off flap, trying to depart clean is a big no-no. Otherwise, why have the configuration warning?
Last edited by chuks; 15th Oct 2013 at 16:15.
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NCAA standards
Strange, the NCAA department of Airworthiness Standards was very busy to comb through the Maintenance activities of Arik and ACN the last couple of month, although they are the only Airlines in Nigeria having sort of a proper Maintenance Facilities including Hangar, tools and certified staff.
How comes that nobody took a closer look at Associated, an Airline not having enough resources to operate in accordance with minimum requirements.
The crew whacked it, no doubt !!! Although, the company provided the playground, to do so !!!
Maybe the NCAA should review their procedures, stop to play games with operators who comply with rules and start to muck out the rest.........
Or maybe there are some old scores to settle between the current Director of Airworthiness Standards and his former employers
How comes that nobody took a closer look at Associated, an Airline not having enough resources to operate in accordance with minimum requirements.
The crew whacked it, no doubt !!! Although, the company provided the playground, to do so !!!
Maybe the NCAA should review their procedures, stop to play games with operators who comply with rules and start to muck out the rest.........
Or maybe there are some old scores to settle between the current Director of Airworthiness Standards and his former employers