Feds Probe Near Collision of Airliner, Executive Jet in San Diego
 

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/fe...go/ar-AA1fc4Gm

Some background:
KSAN ops were good visibility with broken 1100 cloud bases (Pirep 1700 bases). Aircraft were flying instrument approaches to runway 27 (no visual approach clearances by tower). Bizjet was N564HV.

From Live ATC:
4HV granted landing clearance 27 with advisory that traffic would be holding in position
One minute later SWA2493 cleared LUAW 27
3 minutes after 4HV receives landing clearance, directed to go around
SWA2493 directed to exit 27 at C2 (annoyed that position in queue just went from #1 to #5)
Prior to 4HV go around, tower was issuing an amended clearance to another aircraft resulting in multiple blocked transmissions, possibly from 4HV

ADS-B data showed 4HV initiated go around at the runway 27 threshold. Minimum corrected altitude was 225 ft, which would give a clearance of about 165ft over a 737

As a crazy bonus, on 4HV’s second approach, he was following N565HV. Tower directed 4HV to again go around and fly published missed due to insufficient spacing from 5HV. Tower then queried 4HV if he had the traffic (5HV) in sight. 4HV replied affirmative. Tower then queried if 4HV had the airport in sight. 4HV replied affirmative. Tower then amended the clearance for 4HV to cleared visual approach 27, which 4HV accepted. Don’t know that I’ve ever heard a rescinded go around.

Glad to hear there was no metal-to-metal. The double go-around sounds more like a Flight Safety sim session!

More bad controlling USA
 

That certainly doesn't make for great listening. Once she'd cleared Southwest to enter the runway with the other aircraft on a 5 mile final, that should have been the overriding priority, but she seemingly got completely distracted giving departure instructions to the aircraft at #4 in the queue.

Agree on that...Pretty messed up but SWA didn't help things by asking why the exit and then asking if number 5 for dep..Obviously things were fouled up so get off the rwy, stay off the radio and then sort it out...I would think they could've negotiated something better than the end of the line :)...

I think SWA did manage to avoid the end of the line by accepting a 27/C2 departure.

There was no need for SWA to vacate in the first place

I don’t understand your statement.

Would you have kept the SWA at the threshold and sent Alaska 772 around also?
I don’t know if there was further landing traffic close behind the Alaska 772 that would also have stopped the SWA from departing.

You don’t mean you’d have launched the SWA with landing traffic at 2 miles and a go around at the up wind end of the runway?

Forgot about Alaska

I understand now - thanks!

Would the system used in the U.K. of phraseology "continue approach" until the runway is actually clear then giving a landing clearance not be feasible in the U.S. due to the intensity of traffic.

Asking for the reasoning at a point of high workload poor airmanship IMHO

Not sure if it’s feasible but it’s not required in the U.S. under certain circumstances. 7110.65 allows landing clearances to be issued if the runway is predicted to be clear and required separation maintained, but only at airports with an operating “safety logic” system. KSAN would qualify. I suspect the KSAN safety logic system had something to say during this incident.

The point of withholding the landing clearance until the runway is actually clear has been discussed in many other loss of separation threads (e.g., Austin incident). I remain unconvinced that the “continue approach” procedure prevents loss of separation or runway incursions. A predictive landing clearance does not change the local controller’s responsibility to maintain separation. Similarly, the point in time that a landing clearance is issued during the approach does not change the landing pilot’s obligation to see and avoid (weather permitting). I do wonder what 4HV would have done if the LC had gone mute.

"A predictive landing clearance does not change the local controller’s responsibility to maintain separation."

No, but it does change the risk associated with subsequent error or omission.

If a controller states to 'continue approach' and subsequently omits landing clearance, the PIC is aware that the aircraft is not cleared to land.
If a controller states 'cleared to land' and subsequently omits any necessary ammendment, the PIC remains cleared to land on a runway that is not clear.

Clearing an aircraft to land on a runway which is not clear requires an error to be spotted and rectified, whereas the alternative does not.

Your last sentence was my point earlier but you're much more succinct :ok:

Also no need to direct "line up and wait". Solves nothing. Also, given SWA history of "queueing issues":
SFO UAL go around, Alaska go around, Fedex "on the go", directing this exit at C2 should have been followed by a stern "without delay"... hat tip to 4HV

WTH was she doing giving an amending heads up to #4 with HV trying to get her attention on short final? ASDE gets 100 foot conflict and she lost the plot.

boy. howdy.