Luckily I never had to do it but I assume that there was CRM/SOP re-enforcement in there along with line oriented training (LOFT) tailored to this event...Also maybe PTSD counseling...Not sure how it's structured but they didn't need to be taught how to fly again :)..The facts are that the event occurred, thankfully they recovered in time, FOQA data documented it, and it was addressed...They wouldn't have been turned loose otherwise...

Eh? That appears to be the only failing here; the captain's instrument cross-reference was poor. He fixated on the flaps, instead of flying and looking at the flap position. An hour sharpening his basic IF skills would have been the most valuable retraining IMO. All that other stuff worked well; reinforce the other stuff if you want but the lack of flying skill in an unusual situation caused this. Not that I am criticising him for the lack of skill; the fact that automation is rammed down our throats makes this sort of incident more and more likely because people's flying skills naturally atrophy.

Speed tape confusion, anyone? An unforeseen red stripe descends unexpectedly on top of your speed index....

Easy to play in the SIM with predictable results if the scenario is set up well. Ugly but educative.

The flying skills vs automation is a big deal and reminds me of the Dog and Pilot joke https://ci3.googleusercontent.com/pr...lies/smile.gif...My speculation is that the crew's skills (CRM, SOP, IF, etc.) as well as their mental state post event were assessed and addressed...I think it would have been comprehensive and more than just time in the "box"...Like the accident chain it's always more than one thing...Unfortunately this wouldn't be the training department's first rodeo and not the last...

Not impossible. You can, especially from RHS. When flying in an airline with this hand-on-lever SOP, if I was RHS PM and moved the flaps, then immediately got a new heading request or whatever from PF, I used my other hand, or swapped hands on the flap lever and used the original hand.

It is a bit worrying that these seemingly basic excursions and errors are happening. Is pilot training and basic skills practice being cut too much these days?

Yes, I have often thought that the modern speed tape is "upside down". i.e. the higher you look on the speed tape the higher the speed, but that is opposite - in terms of the pitch you need to apply - to "move" the speed tape in a given 'direction'.
On the altitude tape, pitching the nose up makes the aircraft go higher on the altitude scale, which is more intuitive. Maybe, when PF saw the red bar suddenly descend on his speed tape, he instinctively reduced thrust and pitched hard down to avoid it in the heat of the moment, as you would pitch down to go lower on the altitude scale. (see reply to middle quote).

With a round dial speed gauge with a pointer, the lower speeds tend to be on the right half of the dial, so at the slower, more critical speeds, the speed pointer moves intuitively; pitch up: speed reduces - pitch down: speed increases, which makes more sense.
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What if the PM were running up or down, an asymmetric flap. That's is a good enough reason to keep your hand on the lever and watch. If no other reason?

Just curious, the FO statement "I noticed our airspeed holding just below max Vfe, ≈ 178KTS," caught my eye. How would that be anywhere near the max Vfe for flaps 20 or less?

Any chance that they encountered some sort of odd A/T mode change where it wasn't noticed and resulted in a pitch down nose attitude? Heard of alot of previous accidents/incidents where 777 A/T issues were listed as contributing factor.