GIV SP Crash Dominican Republic
 

Happened on Dec 15 and the preliminary report is out. It is in Spanish but Google Translate works reasonably well. There is a picture of the aircraft taxiing out with the spoilers on one wing extended. Maintenance had been performed on those spoilers just prior to departure.

Probably rarely happens in such a case but it might be worth a peek out the passenger window in such a case.

Informe-Preliminar-CIAA-108-21-HI-1050.pdf (elveedordigital.com)

So what happened to the double inspection process for maintenance on critical items? (my Spanish is almost non existent). Presumably there is no cockpit flight control position display on these aircraft?

Note to self, if ever work has been done on the flight controls, make sure the full-and-free check is very thorough - preferably with someone watching for correct function from outside.

Pity ATC did not mention it or query it - the view of one's own wings and engines from the cockpit is very restricted or non existent in many aircraft. Dash 8 Q400 pilots often had calls from other aircraft about their spoilers, which deploy on the ground when armed until take-off power is applied. Years since I flew those so they might have modified them since.

A lot of unknowns about things like cockpit display capability of this type for spoilers.

I suspect that that a large percentage of pilots would not have done a paranoia visual check of the spoilers during the taxi out after the flight control checks were complete, even if there is no cockpit indication.

In reality, having a maintenance scenario like this(serious spoiler work just before departure) is likely a once-in-a-career event. It is now tucked away in my mind to consider taking a minute to do a visual check after the post-engine start for departure flight control check.

But how far do you take your paranoia?
A check that the spoilers are all stowed when you expect them to be won't catch that they are not deploying when you want them deployed, or are deploying opposite to the desired sense, or ...
Flight control sweep type checks are not intended to, or able to, "catch" all these unlikely scenarios; their principal function ios of course to detect jams or restrictions which could have occurred due to FOD or similar getting into the controls. Proper function of flight controls following MX - or indeed of any system - can only be assured by a thorough RTS; it may be cold comfort to aircrew, but a reliance on the proper MX having been conducted becomes unavoidable ...

Already a thread running in R&N:
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/...-republic.html