Huh? If the elevator was seized then the trim tabs would work in the opposite sense - back trim would provide down elevator trim because the tab would now be acting directly as a control surface rather than as a device to move the elevator itself.

PDR

TescoApp, here is one of the KFC-150 manuals (there are several version depending on the associated panel instruments).
https://support.bendixking.com//HWL/...377-0001_1.pdf

The whole set is here (click "discontinued")
https://www.bendixking.com/en/downloads-and-manuals

Page 111, General Emergency Procedures, details the disengagement conditions.
I understand that "Internal Flight Control System failure" covers all the case where the electronic controlling the servos detects that they can't move or need to exercise too high a force.

MelEagerToo,
I had mixed experiences with KFC-150.
Some worked real fine for flying heading or route, keeping altitude or making initial descent.
I remember also KFC-150 that fly a heading with a 12° error or a route with constant wobbling from -5° left to +5° right and which accept descent rates of -200 ft/min but jump to -800 fpm if I make any increment to the descent rate.
I never trusted this AP enough to use it elsewhere than cruise or initial descent, usually in heading/alt mode.

To all the contributors who investigate a complex chain of events involving the autopilot and airframe icing, I don't think all of this is necessary to explain this LOC-I accident. I wouldn't be surprised if the final report states that the airplane was perfectly fine until it hit the sea.

I worked for one company that they were rarely working and if they were you only ever used them for straight and level. If they could they would have stripped them all out but the mod for that was more than the airframe was worth minus engines.

Its not the hinges that freeze up its the balance horn that goes up to the leading edge that gets an ice bridge going along the leading edge and locks it tight. Twin tps' have electric heaters on them and it gets very restrictive under the MEL if they are US.

If icing is involved which if the freezing level was 3000-4000ft he was in exactly the wet sub cooled just need something to stick to area when it all occurred. They will never find out because it will have all melted when it hit the water so the aircraft will show nothing wrong with it mainly because there is nothing wrong with it.
You can fly IFR and not see the ground from 200ft until 200ft at the other end apart from that its inside of a cloud and the only time you will pick up icing is in the first and last 5000ft and we are talking maybe 3 cm thick on the spinners and leading edge in under 5 mins sometimes. You land with lumps of ice banging off the hull from the props and you can feel the boots inflating on the tail through the controls while you flare and the reaction of the back end change as the ice comes off.

A and C I think you are being a little harsh here. He passed over the Island and airfield at Guernsey in VMC and under control at that point. The flight became problematic for him when he hit the storm cell to the WNW of Alderney. He could have and should have diverted to Guernsey and none of us would have heard of him or his passenger again. Or he could have routed via Southampton all in VMC. I don't agree that night flying over sea is especially onerous and he would have made either destination with ease. Anyway, it seems likely that he started to hand fly at precisely the wrong moment...

Interesting point of view from a number of people who don't think, on the face of it, that a flight under an AOC is any safer than with a PPL.

An AOC (even the smallest) where standard operating procedures are mandated, operations manuals Part A to D must be followed, a Safety Management System applies, aircraft technical ground school courses are completed at induction or when changing aircraft types, Dangerous Goods course (yearly), CRM (yearly), Route & Aerodrome competence course (yearly), Compliance/Quality system in force, where the CAA audits 2-4 times a year - one a flight check, where external auditors audit around 4 times per year, where the pilots have around three flight checks per year (instrument rating, OPC, LPC, Line), a technical exam (yearly), a class one medical, emergency training (first aid, fire and life jacket/raft*) with exam (yearly except *), insurance company mandated qualification and experience levels, and these days even in a basic aircraft a quite sophisticated FDR data acquisition (even from a G1000 fit or similar), Flight time limitations are observed etc, etc etc, or you could have the Wingly PPL with 55 hours ........... or the grey/illegal charter up from Nantes

Really ???

The cost of the AOC is the cost of putting in place safe flying practice, of doing things properly.

I have read a lot here about a new CPL IR being no better under IFR than someone who has done 3700 hours of para dropping or glider towing which is clear nonsense. I did a lot of glider towing, but it was the CPL IR course that taught me how to manage a flight under the exact circumstances of the one about which we speak.

A further thought about pilots possessing an instrument rating. Not only have they received the training, but they have passed the test. Not everyone gets that far and some never reach the standard. In that way the IR is also a filter that stops those who do not have the natural ability to ever fly an aircraft in instrument conditions and points them towards a different path.

What makes flight safety is that the pilot or the organisation imposes to themselves safety rules, and well thought safety rules.
For an AOC holder, 95% of these rules are imposed on the organisation by regulation.
For a private pilot, regulations also imposes some rules but most of the safety comes from the good judgement of the pilot, something which is optional.
Some of the rules imposed on AOC holders are hardly available to the private pilot, like flying in crew (with MCC training) for all flights at night.

Unfortunately, several common safety rules have been broken on that flight.

Summary of facts and other information regarding the legality of the flight:

The Pilot

Fact: a private pilot, his licence did not allow him to pilot a revenue earning flight, whether or not he was himself paid. Even having his hotel room paid for him was not allowed under the FAA rules for private pilots.

Information: according to a post on this forum his EASA medical contained a restriction to day flying only due to colour vision problem, and by extension the same day restriction applied to his FAA piggyback licence because "all restrictions on the foreign licence apply".

The Aircraft

Fact: as a single engine piston aircraft it could not be legally operated commercially at night. A bona fide private flight at night (with a pilot who was allowed to fly at night), would have been legit, but not a commercial flight.

Information: according to leaked messages from the passenger it was always going to be a return night flight.

Jurisdiction

Fact: The aircraft was USA registered but UK based. If flying outside the UK, the pilot had to have an FAA licence and operate to the more restrictive of FAA rules and/or the rules of the country in which the aircraft was flying.

The Type of Operation

Facts: if commercial, the operator would need either an Air Operator Certificate from the UK CAA or a Part 129 Certificate from the FAA. According to the AAIB interim report this aircraft did not have permission for commercial operation form either the CAA or FAA. Nor would any of that permit the aircraft to be flown commercially at night anyway.

Information: it has not been established officially whether the flight was private or commercial. However, statements from Willie McKay as well as leaked messages from Sala, indicate that the flight was de facto commercial.

From the above it follows that: the only potential legal scenario is if the flight was a bona fide private flight (contradicted by the statements of Willie Mckay), the report on this forum of the pilot's medical restriction to day flight is wrong, and the pilot held at least an EASA night rating (unkown). More likely, the flight was illegal for some/all of the following reasons:

The pilot was NOT allowed to fly at night (based on reports of medical restriciton).
The pilot was NOT permitted to operate commercially (fact according to the regulations and airman database).
The flight was NOT private therefore it was an illegal charter (based on reports of Willie MaKay).
The aircraft was NOT permitted to operate commercially at night (fact according to the regulations).
The aircraft was NOT permitted to operate commercially by day anyway (fact according to the Interim Report due absence of requisite certificate).

I think often posts are deleted due to legal reasons or rude/hurtful choice of words. Perhaps try to repost taking both into account?

He could also have continued on autopilot at FL 55 to cross the storm cell. Illegal but it would still be alive. :sad:

Is it just me but don't we read this afternoons posts and think this is ridiculous?

The pilot is dead. The passenger is dead. The aircraft is at the bottom of the sea never to return. The agent who gets quoted will obviously at some point modify his statement to "clarify" who was doing what for whom and on what basis... and what the accident pilot told him he was able to do and what was legal to do.. because hey I'm just an agent and this guy I trusted as the pilot, blah, blah.

So we are twisting ourselves in knots to give a 100 reasons why the flight was illegal under EASA, CAA, FAA, to what end? If a flight ends in death and destruction through 1 illegality is that less deadly than if it has 10x the number of illegal factors? Will you be able to stone the pilot? I suppose you could if you find the body. Again to what end? The whole thing is utterly utterly meaningless.

Not entirely I think. Unfortunately in aviation a lot of knowledge gained over the years comes from analysing accidents. In case of that accident itself there is, in all probability, nothing new to be learned here. A pilot not trained and/or not current for what he was doing lost control. That has happened to professionals too and the lesson learned is always the same: More/better training and don't do what you are not qualified to do.

But here there is something extra that we all who fly should think about when we take the controls of an aircraft next time: Before pushing that "Start" button ask yourself: "Am I covered for what I will be doing the next few hours?" Will my familiy have to live under a bridge if it goes wrong? Was that budddy of mine really sayng the truth when he asked me to fly that plane for him and everything would be OK? Am I really supposed to take the buddies of my flying students in the back seats? Am I really allowed to fly a turboprop in Europe only because my Australian license says so? ... If one or two or three pilots will answer questions like these with "No!" in the future then this thread is worth being kept alive!

What next - no because those diligent pilots can already read a truck load of accident reports that give you the same, can already subscribe to CHIRP, GASCo, perhaps do a safety evening that are ongoing currently, do a bit of time with an instructor etc etc.

Those with no care will not. Yet while we look in the rear view mirror with perfect knowledge take a look at a recent yak52 fatal accidemt and how our very own ETPS had engaged with an entitity that couldnt have delivered what they were...

Indeed the more likely thing to come from this is evidence that the accident pilot and agent had been doing similar work for a while, well publicised and gone unchallenged... whilst the tangled web of regulation is just that. It certainly isnt helpful.

Very well put by What Next.

What sort of a legacy for those left behind is the one that reverberates for me from another PA46 accident that occurred many years ago, took six lives, and a trail of devastation in its wake. It had many similarities to this one.

To say it is meaningless is abject naivety. Piloting aircraft is first and foremost about judgment, if that is no longer required, the quicker we get computers and electronic wizardry to do it the better for us all.

Thankyou S-Works. That is helpful information which some posters on here seem to wish to deny.

Now I am going to make some predictions based on the facts and the other information that have surfaced so far. When the dust settles and the powers that be have concluded their inquiries it will be established that:

Ibottson did not have night privileges.
The flight was not a private flight.
The accident flight and the flight to Nantes were both illegal charters.